

**T.C.**  
**ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

**THESIS**

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations**

**Political Science and International Relations Program**

**Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Gülay Uğur GÖKSEL**

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

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*To my parents To my mother that has continued what my father started and to my  
father that always believed in me. May his soul rest in perfect peace*

*Special dedication to FOURERA ALKALY ELKEBIR ALKALY  
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## **FOREWORD**

**Quran chapter Al-Baqra(2),Verse No (32)** "Glory be to You, we have no knowledge except what you have taught us. Verily, it is You, the All-Knower, the All-Wise."

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFAD</b>	: Emergency Management Presidency
<b>AFDB</b>	: African Development Bank
<b>AIER</b>	: Athens Institute for Education and Research
<b>AKP</b>	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (English: Justice and Development Party)
<b>AMI</b>	: Africa Media Endeavors
<b>ANSEDER</b>	: Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Association
<b>AOAP</b>	: Africa Opening Action Plan
<b>ASAFED</b>	: Aegean International Health Foundation
<b>BPC</b>	: Bipartisan Policy Center
<b>COMESA</b>	: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>DEIK</b>	: Board of Foreign Economic Relations
<b>DRC</b>	: Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>DSI</b>	: General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works
<b>DWW</b>	: Doctors Worldwide
<b>EAC</b>	: East African Community
<b>ECCAS</b>	: Economic Community of Central African States
<b>ECOWAS</b>	: Economic Community of West African States
<b>EGESADER</b>	: Aegean Health Volunteers Association
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>FPA</b>	: Foreign policy analysis
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
<b>HSIOs</b>	: Horizontally Structured Intermediate Organizations
<b>IBB</b>	: Istanbul Municipality
<b>ICG</b>	: International Crisis Group
<b>ICOC</b>	: Istanbul chamber of commerce
<b>ICT</b>	: Information and Communication Technology
<b>IDRC</b>	: International Development Research Centre (Canada)
<b>IGAD</b>	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum
<b>IHH</b>	: Humanitarian Relief Foundation
<b>JDP</b>	: Justice and Development Party
<b>KYM</b>	: Kimse Yok Mu
<b>MEB</b>	: Ministry of National Education
<b>MFA</b>	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MNCs</b>	: Multinational Cooperations
<b>NATO</b>	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGOs</b>	: Non-governmental Organizations



<b>ODA</b>	: Official Development Assistance
<b>OIC</b>	: Organization of the Islamic Conference
<b>SAMEDER</b>	: Health Members Association
<b>SBA</b>	: Sovereignty Bound Actors
<b>SFA</b>	: Sovereign Free Actors
<b>SMEs</b>	: Small and Medium Scale Enterprises
<b>SPO</b>	: State Planning Organization
<b>TACSS</b>	: Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
<b>TASAM</b>	: Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Studies
<b>TET</b>	: Technical and Economic Cooperation
<b>THY</b>	: Türk Hava Yollari (Turkish Airlines)
<b>TIKA</b>	: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
<b>TUBİTAK</b>	: Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
<b>TURSTAT</b>	: Turkish Institute of Statistics
<b>TUSKON</b>	: Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey
<b>UN</b>	: United Nations
<b>US</b>	: United States
<b>USA</b>	: United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>USTKİP</b>	: International Development and Cooperation Platform of Nongovernmental Organizations
<b>WWI</b>	: World War I
<b>WWII</b>	: World War II
<b>YOK</b>	: Higher Education Council
<b>YTB</b>	: Turkish Diaspora Directorate and Related communities

## TÜRKİYE'NİN AFRIKA DIŞ POLİTİKASI

### ÖZET

Soğuk savaş sonrasında Türkiye kendi dış politikasını küresel sahnede stratejik bir konuma getirme sürecine girişti. Bunun sonucunda, dış politikasında Afrika'ya doğru bir kayma meydana geldi ve artık Afrika'ya karşı daha açık bir politika benimsenmiş durumdadır. Bu tez, Afrika'ya olan bu kaymayı ve dış politika üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Ele alınacak konular arasında geleneksel dış politika, yeni dış politika değişimleri, Türk dış politikasının Sahra-altı Afrika'ya yönelişi yer almaktadır. Türkiye'nin geleneksel müttefikleri ile olan ilişki yapısı, Afrika dış politikasını önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Türkiye'nin politika hedeflerinin gerçekleşmesinde hangi farklı oyuncuların ne ölçüde rol oynadıkları da analiz edilmiştir. Türk dış politikasının Afrika lehine dönüşmesi Türkiye'nin Batılı veya Avrupalı müttefiklerinden kayması olmayıp, yerel ve uluslararası siyaset ve ekonomi dinamiklerinin getirdiği bağımsız bir yeniden konumlanmadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** *Türk dış politikası, Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri, dış politika uygulaması, ulusalcılık-sonrası, Sahra-altı Afrika, Dış Politika Analizi*

## TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

### ABSTRACT

After the Cold war, Turkey embarked on a process of refining its foreign policy to position itself strategically in the global scene. This resulted in a shift in its foreign policy towards Africa such that it is now more open to Africa. This thesis aims at analyzing the shift towards Africa and reflects on the policy formulation. The areas to be covered include the traditional foreign policy, new foreign policy changes, focus of Turkish foreign policy on Sub-Saharan Africa. The nature of Turkey's relationship with its traditional allies has significantly influenced its foreign policy towards Africa. The extents to which the different players have been involved in the realization of the Turkey's policy objectives will be analyzed too. The transformation of Turkish foreign policy in favor of Africa is not a reorientation of Turkey from its Western or Eurasian allies, but an autonomous reposition driven by domestic and international dynamics of politics and economy.

**Keywords:** *Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-Africa relations, foreign policy implementation, post-internationalism, Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign Policy Analysis*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Cold war resulted in the weakening of most international relations between countries. The current dynamic transformation happening in Turkey is a necessary move aimed at establishing healthy and beneficial international relations (Davutoğlu SAM, 2012, p. 44). It has had to change the priorities and principles of its foreign policy in line with the changing world politics and domestic spheres.

After the First World War, Turkey suffered significant drawbacks on its domestic and foreign affairs. Domestically, Turkey witnessed a peak of uneasiness following its reform initiative. On foreign issues, it had to engage in military fights against outside forces that were quarrelling for Ottoman territories. The battle for independence that followed WWI compounded the challenge for Turkey (Kalaitzidis & Athens Institute for Education and Research (AIER), 2009). There was need to secure the integrity of the new state within and protect its sovereignty on the outside. In its young state, Turkey worked to normalize its foreign relation and westernize its domestic political landscape. These strenuous conditions caused the behavior of Turkey's foreign policy formed to be security-oriented.

The Cold War that followed added to the new Republic's challenges of maneuvering the international scene strategically. The Cold War was characterized by bipolar power controlled by the US and the USSR (Savas & Oguzhan, 2014, p. 17). This forced most nations to choose sides of alignment. Turkey placed itself under the Western powers. This meant that it had to make its foreign policy comply with the expectation of the Westerners. The polarization by the Cold War affected the geopolitical position of Turkey due to the security situation outside Turkey's borders combined with the heated politics on the inside (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009).

The Soviet system later collapse and presented a crucial opportunity for the transformation of the international relations. The ambiguous situation left behind by the end of the continental power balance meant that the instability would persist.

Turkey has been undergoing a gradual transformation process since the Cold war period with an aim of positioning itself in the World politics (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013).

The terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001 marked a critical turning point in the world politics. The US launched war global terror thereby making security a global agenda in the international political scene (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009). The components of the post-Cold war international relations had to be changed in light of the new developments. The new policies on international relation pioneered by the US made it very complex to live in peace and order. The heightened focus on the issue of security following the identification of the Islamic terrorism as the new enemy meant that a more amicable solution had to be determined in place of military force.

The direction of the World politics after the attack of September 11 placed Turkey in the spotlight. Turkey was placed at the centre of the new world order after it was identified that Islamic radicalization is what led to the attack (Aykan, 1987, p. 291). Turkey has been seen as the hope for peace in the region. This is largely because it is the only Muslim country to embrace westernization. Turkey democracy is working and it has been successful in integrating modernization with the traditional Muslim practice, making itself a role model for the Middle Eastern countries.

Turkey's foreign policy has morphed significantly within the last decade because of the described socio- political transformations and systemic scheme. Turkey embarked on a more proactive approach towards its neighbors and began evaluating its previous conflicts from a different angle. This thesis will now focus on how the unfolding global situation of Turkey since the WWI has influenced has shaped its foreign policy and led to its openness to Africa.

The growing economic importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to Ankara is what has triggered an enthusiastic engagement of Turkey. Turkey aspires to influence the Muslim population in Sub-Saharan Africa and to expand or drift away from the Middle East (Walker, 2011).

Presently, Turkey is experienced a strained link with its traditional allies in the Middle East. This means that it will certainly continue fostering its strategy in Africa. This explains why the number of embassies and official high-profile bilateral visits has increased. In 2014, the second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was conducted in the Equatorial Guinea (Davutoğlu SAM, 2012, p. 49).

Somalia is at the center of Turkey's strategy for Africa. The visit of Erdoğan to Somalia in 2011 marked the beginning visits by non-African dignitaries who are not heads of governments. This had never happened in nearly 20 years (Edelman & Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), 2013). It was followed by gradual visits by Turkish business people and humanitarian groups. Although the percentage of Turkey's global trade that is directed to African is small, direct investments have been on the increase with more and more negotiation continually being made concerning free trade between the African nations and Turkey. Most SMEs (Small and Medium Scale Enterprises) are venturing in the construction sector, air transport, and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 4). Quite evident is the dominance of the Turkish airlines in Africa.

There has been considerable rise in the aid to Africa from Turkey. TIKA has spread its assistance further that more African Students are joining institutions on Turkish Scholarships.

The Sub-Saharan Africa has experience in influx of humanitarian organizations from Turkey. This is the case especially in countries with Muslim population as the majority. However, there has been a worsen disagreement between Erdoğan and former friend, which has resulted in increased pressure on the Fethullah Gülen-linked organizations (Davutoğlu SAM, 2012, p. 5). The African governments have nonetheless been resistant to close down the Gülen-managed institutions.

The following paragraph discusses the key questions that this paper will address in an analytical and descriptive methodology:

What are the traditional Turkish foreign policy main principles? How did the domestic and international changes up until the end of the Cold War affect the traditional Turkish foreign policy? What are the new foreign policy orientations of Turkey towards Africa? What is the foreign policy implementation strategy for Africa? How are the stakeholders interacting in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa?

In addressing these questions, Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed to identify the AKP government initiatives and extent of success in connects to Africa.

There are six chapters in this thesis. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter elaborates the methods to be used in conducting this study. Theories such as the constructivist theory, it is possible to draw logically explanation for Turkey's

deviation from its traditional foreign policy principles to the present state where it is now open to Africa. An analysis of the policy implementation and outcome will help project the potential or expect the path of Turkey in the entire Africa. A general feel and inclination of traditional Turkish foreign policy are portrayed. A more detailed look at it is done in subtopics uncover the underlying factors in the traditional foreign policy. The Kemalist foundations among the domestic influences on foreign policy formation are discussed. The international factors are also looked at, mainly the Cold-War.

The third chapter assesses looks at the determinants of traditional Turkish foreign policy. It then points to the new developments following changes in the Turkish foreign policy. The factors that bring about the changes are studied. In the subtopics, the changes that resulted from the ending of the Cold War are handled. The September 11 attack on the US had a significant impact on Turkey's stance internationally. There a look at the EU process contribution to the disposition of Turkey's foreign relations. This chapter is crucial to the understanding of the reason why Turkey shifted its focus to Africa. The changes that took place in the global arena led Turkey to realize the potential of Africa and its strategic suitability to Turkey vision of the future. Therefore, it is necessary to study these changes before looking at the present focus of Turkey foreign policy towards Africa.

The fourth and fifth chapter focuses its attention on Turkey foreign policy inclination towards Africa. The policy objectives that Turkey has prioritized are discussed alongside the efforts and strategies employed. The focus of Turkey on the Sub-Saharan Africa is analyzed. The chapter also looks at the various players involved in the realization of Turkey's foreign policy objective. The Gülen movement, which has had significant success in Africa, is looked at in light of its conflictual relationship with the government of Turkey under Erdoğan. This chapter also focuses on the institutionalization of the various links between African countries and Turkey. The conclusion is the final part of the thesis. A summary of the literature finding to questions is found here. There are also recommended areas of future study.

## **2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY**

In international relations, the behavior of agents or states can be explained using agent-structure dichotomy. According to Wendt, ontological primitive approach should not be employed in analyzing the agents or the structure. He also adds that the behavior of agents cannot be based on structural characteristics only or be termed as being purely state-agent centric (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). Although the properties of social structures and of agents are used in explaining the behavior of agents, it is not sufficient. This is because the interaction between them makes an independent effect on their behavior. The inter-subjective relation that is born of interactions significantly influences the properties of the structures and agents. There are instances where the social structures cannot be separated from the self-understanding and reasons brought by agents (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009). Therefore, the agents' real interests are only explainable within the social or external context of the structures (Edelman & BPC, 2013).

### **2.1 Agents and Structures**

To explain the dichotomy of agent-structure relationship, Wendt uses the microstructure and macrostructure in view of international relations. Microstructure is the relationship between agents and the structure. It is essentially the structure of interaction (Davutoğlu & SAM, 2012). Looking at the attributes of an agent is insufficient to explain the outcome. The interaction needs to be analyzed to obtain relevant explanation of the behavior and identity of the agent. The configuration of the agent's beliefs, desires, capabilities and strategies gives the structure of interaction. As much as attribute are part of the nature of interactions, the interaction itself is factors independent from the agent, which are systemic dimensions that are independent called microstructure (Walker, 2011).



Conversely, macro-structure focuses on explaining outcomes structurally. Macrostructure is an independent level but still dependent on microstructures. Knowledge of microstructure contributes to the understanding of macro-structure but only partly. Wendt uses the concept of supervenience to explain the relationship between microstructure and macrostructure (Köker, 2010). Supervenience is the non-reducible, non-causal ontological dependency of classes of facts. Agents are supervened by social structures because there is always a difference structures if there is difference in the constituting agents. However, the relationship here is constitutive and not causal (Sozen, 2010). The constitution of the structures is by self-perception and practices of the agents. Similarly, the interest and behavior of agents are constituted and explained by structures.

Nonetheless, agency is considered irreducible and separated. It has the consciousness and ability to choose from different behavioral options, which is influenced by decision-making procedures, interests, and identities (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). Therefore, when state policy agency is analyzed, responsible decision makers represent it. In foreign policy, international political elite are the representatives (Edelman & BPC, 2013). In this case, the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Ministry high officials are the representatives.

This thesis paper looks at the ruling party of Turkey, AKP, and its officials. The officials were in power in given periods serving as agents and whose identity, interests, and behavior was constituted in the existing structures of tradition foreign policy. The paper will also seek to identify how the new discourse and identities brought into the foreign policy by actors altered and reproduced these same structures. The leadership is AKP party is of strong centrality and authority (Davutoğlu & SAM, 2012). In this regard, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have particular and crucial roles in the Turkish foreign policy formulation. Regarding the relations between Turkey and the world, they, back then Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, are considered the main actors (Bölme, 2009). Therefore, in the analysis of the relationship between Turkey and African countries, the focus should be on these two key players. Other players complement or antagonize the roles played by these two in fulfilling their foreign policy objectives for Africa. They will also be discussed alongside the manner of interaction with the Turkish government (Davutoğlu, 2008).

There are three constitutional components in every system structure: structure of interest, material structure, and ideational structure (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009). They are all significant to the outcome.

The Constructivists are challenged to relate interest structures to the ideational structure when explaining international relation. Constructivists look at the constitutive effects of the property of agents' structural identity (Akgün, Perçinoğlu & Gündoğar, 2009). Similarly, this thesis will investigate how Turkey traditional foreign policy perception affected the formation of interest and identity of the new governing actors, the AKP government, and its officials. It will also look at how the ideational structure contributed to the formulation of the recent interest of Turkey in Africa.

### **2.1.1 Agency and Structure in the Foreign Policy of Turkey towards Africa**

Using the constructivists approach in analyzing Turkey-Africa relations, this analysis focuses on the ideational structure of the foreign policy of Turkey. The traditional Turkish foreign policy is a macro-structure, which has autonomous structural effects (Davutoğlu & SAM, 2012). It is a kind of collective knowledge accumulated over time. The traditional determinants of the foreign policy of Turkey are belief generated in society about how Turkey conducts international relations and its positions in the international system (Moran, Graham & Blomström, 2005). The culture of foreign policy that developed when the country gained its sovereignty now is a macro-structure with effects that are constitutive on interests and identity of new agents, AKP officials and the Turkey's foreign policy behavior.

In order to understand how a particular behavior came to be and why it came to be in any given form and time, there is a need to study its methodological or historical bracketing. It entails taking agents and social structures with an aim of identifying the explanatory effects of one aside from the other (Ozbudun, 2007). There is a need to determine when the analysis will begin structure or agent perspective. During analysis, agency and structure need to be treated independently even though they are constitutive, mutually influential and co-dependent (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013).

The principles of Turkey foreign policy will be studied using this methodological bracketing technique for the period before the AKP government and from formation of Turkey republic. It will be treated an independent variable and a given structure. In this analysis, the aim will be to figure out how established collective knowledge has

influenced the formation of Turkey's new foreign policy and how it has shaped the behavior of Turkey towards African countries, the dependent variables.

Additionally, a focus on how the US and NATO policy, which are independent variables, have affected the Turkey's behavior and position towards Africa (Moran, Graham & Blomström, 2005). Although it can be viewed as part of the tradition Turkish foreign policy and a part of the Western alliance, it is a factor in itself. There is also the influence of the EU process and its enlargement to Turkey's embrace of Africa (Edelman & BPC, 2013).

Instead of using the causal interaction only in the description of agent-structure relationship like the one it is commonly done by scholars, study of international relations should be looked at the constitutive agents and effects, and how it affects the properties and behavior of agents (Aral, 2009). Culture can have constitutive effect, in which case the agent-structure relationship is of mutual constitution instead of interaction (Moran, Graham & Blomström, 2005).

Using this approach, this paper will attempt identify the elements of the traditional Turkish culture and principles of organization that are central to Turkey's new identity and approach to Africa. The task here is to identify which components of the old ideational structure are present relationship between Turkey and Africa. There is also need to determine to what extent the traditional foreign policy of Turkey supervenes on the actors and shapes the government's foreign policy identity and behavior towards Africa particularly after the Foreign Minister Davutoğlu took office. Because the interaction at the micro-level analysis by actors result in structure formation, this paper will attempt to extract the structural transformations that resulted from the change in regime, i.e. change in state actors. It will also figure out the changes and newness in its relations with Turkey.

This thesis will also focus on illustrating how culture of Turkey's foreign policy presents knowledge structures that produce micro-level patterns in its foreign policy behavior when view from the defensive realpolitik, geopolitics and strategic studies. For a long time, geopolitics, security, defensive and non-assertive strategies, and the balance of regional and global power relations have influenced Turkey's knowledge of the world and its conceptualization of external relations. Although there have been changes in microstructure involving the elite, new principles and doctrines, the macro-structure patterns persisted and influenced the new identity of Turkey's foreign policy that Davutoğlu presented (Aral, 2009).

## **2.2 Methods**

To address the research questions, this study will use quantitative methods. It will focus on interpreting and describing the manner in which structure influenced the agency. Through the constructivist theory, it will be determined how the principles of the traditional foreign policy have shaped the policy of Turkey and consequently its relations to Africa.

Describing of the principles of the traditional Turkish foreign policy will require use of secondary literature on security and foreign policy of Turkey. Because the Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has been instrumental in shaping of the new foreign policy of Turkey to have a new identity, presentation of agency will be on him mostly, and the Prime Minister (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009). By looking at the publications on speeches and interviews of AKP officials, Turkey's relations with Africa will be explained from an ideational perspective. Through analysis of Ministry papers and implementation project reports, it will be possible to highlight the extent to which the actors are influenced by the elements of the tradition. This will also help point out the observable changes in the structure of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa.

### **2.2.1. Analysis of Foreign Policy**

Analysis of foreign policy focuses on the international system to identify the practice and conduct of the states or actors relationship. Foreign policy analysis is characterized by trade negotiations, intelligence, diplomacy and cultural exchanges. Therefore, it looks the borderline between domestic environment and the environment outside the nation, with consideration of the sub-national influence sources. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is part of the international relations study because it looks at relations between states and it has normative impulse (Siradag, 2013, p. 15). FPA scrutinizes the conduct of a state and the sources of the influences to the decisions. The task of foreign policy analysis is considered normative because it seeks to boost peaceful states relation besides enhance decision making in foreign policy.

In seeking to understand international system, foreign policy analysis has always emphasized on the individual and the state as the key components. International system had been changed by globalization such that connectivity beyond the traditional state-state conduct is now possible (Aras, 2007, p. 3). This means that analysis of foreign policy had to expand its scope to capture the ever-increasing range of non-state actors

like multinational organizations and environmental lobby groups. Analysis of foreign policy is split into two, where one looks at the structural influences posed by the international system, while the other focuses on the human agency or individuals involved in the shaping of the international system (Sozen, 2010, p. 115). Both approaches are useful in the analysis of decision-making environments and the policy decisions.

Analysis of foreign policy begins by looking at a country and its relationship with others. The relationship can be through institutions such as the United Nations, which are multi-lateral or direct bilateral relations. The approach of the FPA employs the realist paradigm in looking at the state where it treats it as a unitary actor. This means that it needs not analyze the components of the government, whether legislature or the executive, to determine the foreign policy of that state. The main component is national interest. National interest is a major reference point in the interpretation of a state's action in view of its foreign policy. National interest is equated to the states power, implying that it is critical in the determination of the states capabilities in achieve its goals. It is also a crucial component of the state's foreign policy (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009). In order to understand the steps taken by a state in terms of choice and responses at the international arena, there is need to know the constituents of national interest, its determination and implementation. Realists view the anarchic nature of international system to be crucial to the interpretation of foreign policy. In pursuing material wealth and security, states end up competing and therefore limit the extent of their cooperation to few strategies of self-interest (Aras, 2007, p. 3). In such a scenario, the military might is becomes the central determinant of a nation's ability to maintain a successful foreign policy. The other key determinants are geographical position, demographic characteristics and material resources (Avci, 2005, p. 130).

According to Realists, these components are characteristic of the foreign policies in all states and therefore there is need to investigate the states' relative power and what influences international system structures in order to comprehend the foreign policy decision outcomes.

### **3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS**

Whereas the principles of traditional Turkish foreign policy can be explained by many concepts: bilateral, passive, neutrality, caution, conservatism, protectionism, autonomy, balance of power, reactive, isolationism among many others, there are two key principles used, i.e. westernization and the status quo. The principle of status quo involved maintaining the balances of the existing borders while westernization, on the other hand, was to achieve a policy formation that was western oriented.

The determination of the traditional Turkish foreign policy was with significant influence of structural and hypothetical factors (Siradag, 2013, p. 22). These factors were drawn real history. Murinson has been able to outline four sources of the traditional Turkish foreign policy: classical Western inclinations and lack of trust for foreign powers and interests, the national revolution of the Kemalist and the making of the republic, and Ottoman State historical experience (Avci, 2005, p. 135). During this time, the foreign policy was a product of the constrained conditions occasioned by the then existing variables.

Another challenge to the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy was the occurrence of Cold war between European countries in their international relations. This put a major barrier in Turkey's ability to maneuver in the politics of the world. During this period, Turkey acted in harmony with the interest of other western nations by defining its security system position.

Turkish foreign policy behavior consists of observable patterns and characteristics with a clear structural basis. These characteristics and patterns constitute the long lasting Turkish foreign policy principles. According to Mustafa Aydin, while analyzing factors shaping the foreign policy of Turkey, suggests the formulation of any countries foreign policy (Turkey included) are influenced by specific conjectural and structural variables (Moran, Graham Blomström, 2005, p. 5). The structural variables are continuous and static in nature and are usually not influenced by political occurrences. They include factors such as the countries geographical position, cultural backgrounds,

historical backgrounds, national stereotypes and other nation's images. Conjectural factors, on the other hand, are very dynamic and always change with respect to developments in politics of the nation and relations abroad. Therefore, the main structural factors determining Turkish Foreign policy can be distinguished as the long lasting legacy and experience of the Ottoman period: Turkey's geopolitical realities and the Ataturk leadership ideological foundations (The Economist, 2010).

There is also an analysis, by Ali Karaosmanoglu, focusing on the Turkish foreign policy aspects that have existed consistently all along during different historical periods. This suggests three important observable elements determining Turkish foreign policy formulation. They include the realpolitik security culture that changed to be dominant defensive from being offensive in nature, western orientation with internationalist and liberal elements and the military role in foreign policy decision-making. The Kemalist westernization ideology or western orientation is the main element influencing Turkish foreign policy from the period of republic founding to the post-cold war era (Moran, Graham Blomström, 2005, p. ). The above-mentioned factors are major influencers of the Turkey's foreign policy formulation and great determiners of how Turkey should manage its international relations.

In conclusion, the traditional determinants of Turkish foreign policy can be listed as:

- The influence of the Ottoman legacy.
- Geopolitical dominance.
- Kemalist ideology influence
- Strong orientation to the West
- Strong realpolitik security culture
- Diplomacy towards maintaining the existing status quo and balance of power.
- Approach to foreign policy issues i.e. reactive and conservative.
- Military and elite domination in running policy relations.

### **3.1. The Influence of the Ottoman Legacy on the Formation of Turkish Foreign Policy.**

This factor is most commonly presented as having the most significant effect in Turkish foreign policy conceptualization. The new republic of Turkey was created with an aim of breaking up the old system, which consisted of an empire and sultanates, and coming up with a new system comprising new social structures, the institution of politics, norms and values alike (Hurewitz, Simon & Columbia University, 1990, p. 11).

The Empire's experience left two important legacies that continued to influence Turkish new republic's behavior in international affairs. One of the legacies is being reduced to a single nation state from a very large Empire while the other one is having gone through the struggle to save its independence and national homeland (Bozdoğan Kasaba, 199 , p. 129).

The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the end of the First World War. It surrendered under the Treaty of Sevres. This resulted in formation of Sevres Syndrome or the Sevres phobia, which refer to the act of creating distrust attitude towards other nations and territorial integrity domination as the main issue of security. It was caused by the European powers severely dismembering the Empire's territory under the Treaty's propositions (Siradag, 2013, p. 23). There were also Sevres Treaty dissatisfactions, which led to the Turkish national movement unification and the outbreak of the uprising against the Turkish territory occupation. Signing the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 marked the end of Turkish independence war (Hurewitz, Simon & Columbia University, 1990, p. 14). The treaty also made the new Turkey secure back lost territories of Anatolian. The experience of long periods of struggle for independence and territory occupation produced elites of the national republic, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to adopt a foreign policy that was more deliberate, cautious and non-aggressive in nature.

According to Karaosmanoglu, Turkish republic has been influenced much by the Ottoman heritage to embrace the defensive principle, realpolitik non-involvement and power balance in its diplomacy (Özkan, 2011, p. 135). A lot of fear and the feel of abandonment were created by the process of Ottoman territory partition by the European powers after World War 1 and the continued war for the struggle for independence (Hurewitz, Simon & Columbia



University, 1990, p. 28). As a result, therefore, realist's security principles were adopted by the Turkish foreign policy makers and the state security given much priority. Considerations on the principle of power balance and geopolitics have been emphasized a lot by the military elites and the state in general.

There was a serious structural change in the system of the state after the Ottoman Empire was transformed into a republic i.e. from a theocracy system of government to a parliamentary democracy one. The Turkish nation was to be formed from a multiracial, multi-religious and multinational society (Kalaitzidis & AIER, 2009).

Although such changes did occur, Turkey still inherited much of the fundamental characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire's bureaucratic elite was still relied upon by the new republic. The Empire, in itself, had elite administrators who gave different views on how the Empire needed to run having been well equipped with western education as a result of the late 19<sup>th</sup>-century experiment of the Empire with westernization and modernization in particular (Siradag, 2013, p. 29). The modernizing elite of the new republic still formed by the same group of administrators, under the leadership of Ataturk (founding officials of the Republican Peoples Party) (Hurewitz, Simon & Columbia University, 1990, p. 29). The assumption that these elites had is that European or Western civilization was the most progressive and the best. Although Turkey was against the US during the WWI, orientation to the West became the signature of its foreign policy after gaining independence. This was evident in military and political terms during the WWII (Aydin, 2000, p. 1).

### **3.2. Geopolitics in Turkish Foreign Policy**

Geography is the most important aspect of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy culture is dominated by the idea of geopolitical determinism. The idea is that Turkey's security and foreign policies are determined by its geographical location. Considering that Turkey geographical location and the neighboring countries, there is a general feeling of threats emanating from all sides. Turkey is perceived to be at a connecting point of major land, air and sea routes in present time (Kieran, 2008, p. 119). This geostrategic position makes it a point of connection for the industrialized Europe and the oil-rich Middle East.

During the Cold War, the issue of geopolitics gained a lot of importance. During this time, Turkey was seen as a border state and was a member of the Western bloc. In geopolitical terms, it was regarded the first line of defense against the main adversary. The seaway linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Black sea was very significant during the bipolar Cold War. Because Turkey had control over seaway, it was geopolitical important. The insecurity perception born from the being geographical bordering the Soviet Union and other unstable nations like the Middle East made Turkey be more pro-West (Özkan, 2011, p. 135). Essentially, the geographic location compounded by the Cold War caused Turkey to prioritize national security in its considerations in national security.

### **3.3. Turkish Foreign Policy Western Orientation and The Legacy Of Kemalist**

Immediately after the formation of Turkey as a state, conduction of foreign policy was mainly through local and international environments. The making of Turkey's foreign policy was majorly affected by the historical transformations during this period such as the ottoman disintegration, the republican revolution, First World War and the making of Turkey as a new state.

Mustafa Kemal, while leading the liberation movement of Turkey after the First World War, rejected the Sevres peace treaty whose main aim was to make all the allied powers to share the Ottoman territories. Turkey signed the treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) after winning against the Greeks, with the support of Allied Powers, in the Liberation War (Aydin, 2000, p. 1). Turkey wanted to secure all its political boundaries and to gain both political and economic independence in line with the declaration of the National Pact (1920) whose main aim was to ensure sovereignty and independence of the individual state. The signing of the treaty of Lausanne, therefore, meant that Turkey's wish for sovereignty and independence would then be recognized and respected internationally (Bölme, 2009, p. 1).

Turkey becoming a new state influenced the formation of principles of its foreign policy in a number of ways  
(Kieran, 2008, p. 149):

- (i) The Ottoman states' objective of foreign policy making changed from boosting its sphere of influence by the means of conquering the territory, to enhancing its national survival.
- (ii) The acquisition of harmony in politics at local and international level.
- (iii) Concerns of security involved in the agenda of the foreign policy.

The new nations' reform process influenced the pace of the foreign policy making. Before, religious traditions and opinions were the major deciders of the states' legitimacy and existence in both the internal and international politics. The foundations of the new nation, on the other hand, required emission of all religious beliefs and opinions from the public arena (Ozbudun, 2007, p. 188). The new state, therefore, was faced with contradictions as it sought full integration fully to the Western civilizations.

Creation of harmony both locally and internationally, on the other hand, was very important in the early years of foundation. The local order and the relations abroad were supported very much by the principle of peace at home and abroad. The principle saw international peace brought about by peace existing in within the domestic borders. Kemalist local new ideas also formed the ideas by which making of the foreign policy was conducted and any contradictions of the foundations of the republic were left out (Aytürk, 2009, p. 2). For example, the Ottoman discussions in the practical formulation of policy internationally were discouraged. In addition, the domestic secular structure was to be protected in the searching of policies abroad especially in Muslim countries and the republics uniform religious structure was not to be threatened.

This clearly shows that Turkey did not want interference in its domestic politics from international politics. This security motive of the foreign policy making is explained through "the fear logic" by the Kibaroglu and Ogozlu (Rose, 1998, p. 144). This stated that in order to attain the independence of domestic politics, Turkey was to adopt a cooperation strategy with the security organizations of the west and reforms that were west oriented. The internal power and independence were to be strengthened through the creation of fear of external powers. The Turkish people were forcibly made to believe they were under constant internal and external threats, i.e. the current realities were addressed through historical injustices and experiences (Kieran, 2008, p. 150).

The other component of security is reform of the socio-political process. The Atatürk political leadership has been at the frontline in initiating this reform. There were complaints by large social segments of segregation from the political and socio-political areas of the new Turkey republic (Aytürk, 2009, p. 2). There are arguments that the practice by Ottoman of linking the elite with the masses through religious recognition is no longer applicable in Turkey (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). The Republic declaration was followed by launching an intense process of reform in line with the secularist motive. The religious influence and control were removed from the state, law and education systems by the reform process. This included the abolition of Islam from being the religion of the state (1923), removal of all caliphates and sultanates, and adaptation of the civil code of Switzerland and the penal code of Italy (Safadi, International Development Research Centre (Canada) (IDRC), & Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran, and Turkey (ERFAC), 1998, p. 3). It also required the adaptation of the Unification Law of Education (1924), forbidding religious dressings and traditional headgears, an adaptation of the western calendar and clock systems, stopping the tarikats and the Latin alphabet adaptation (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011).

Such factors put into consideration, after the establishment of the new republic, a continuation of the pace of the process of foreign policy formulation internationally became an implausible choice. There were structural shifts surrounding the newly established state because of the First World War (Bac, 2005, p. 1). When comparing the international environment after the war between the wake of the First World War and the Ottoman ages shows a lack of similarity. The Austrian-Hungarian and the Russian empires were similarly disintegrated. International action thus, was made unpredictable and weak by the war. The European dominance deterioration also weakened balance of the power system (Sozen, 2010, p. 115). This created an international disorder such that there was no dominant force/nation until the Second World War. Territorial conquests thus become a nonpriority of foreign policy formation more so to the newly formed states like Turkey. At this point, Turkey still needed policy adaptations to favor the existence of its new state. These local and international conditions determined the preferences under which Turkey formulated its foreign policies. By signing many pacts and creating alliances, Turkish republic secured good relations with neighboring nations. The young Republics foreign policy

stand was shaped by the Kemalist tradition emphasizing on a western orientation, nonintervention, and watchfulness of the national sovereignty. Before the Second World War early signs, Turkey's foreign policy making and implementation was aimed at preserving state neutrality by avoiding rivalry and clashes with other states, joining the European Union and protecting the integrity of its territory (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011).

Several friendship treaties were signed by the Atatürk towards preserving its political and territorial integrity. For instance, in 1925, Turkey re-signed the Moscow Treaty of 1921 with the Soviet Union (Nugent & Pesaran, 2006, p. 72). In 1926, it also accepted the integration of Mosul into the Iraqi territory (Collinsworth, 2007, p. 3). There was also another treaty signed with the Greece in 1930 called the Ankara Treaty or the Treaty of Friendship. With Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania, in 1934, Turkey signed pact aimed at normalizing relations with the newly formed European states (Davutoğlu, 2010, p. 1 ). The period of 1934 also witnessed the then Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, visit Ankara and promoting the signing of several pacts on security, borders, trade and tariffs with Turkey throughout the 1930s e.g. the Saadabad Treaty in 1937 signed between Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan to discourage any form of aggression among them (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011).

Turkish policy main aim was to stay out of any form of war with neighboring nations and to remain neutral in case of wars. The only exceptional case, before this aim, was the solution to the question of Hatay province in Turkey's favor (Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 7). With the looming of the Second World War, Turkey emphasized majorly on neutrality in its foreign policy formation. As reported by Millman (1995), in order to attain its goals, Turkey decided on principles such as (p. 3): (i) maintain an alliance with Russia with the aim of securing borders in the East and around the Black sea. (ii) Creating harmony with the west aimed at ensuring stable security against the threats caused by Germans and Italians, and the Iraqis and Syrians in its southern borders. (iii) Like in the case of Balkan Entente, Turkey to ensure acting in common with the African countries whenever there is any external threat. Turkey used the League of Nations to push for these goals together with consolidating good international relations and removing its enemies through alliance network formations outside the league (Kieran, 2008, p. 150).

After the end of WWI and before the WWII, Turkey main intention was to preserve the young nation's domestic independence and in the process building its foreign policy strategy. Being part of the Western civilization was the interest of Turkey and hence, it adapted the socio-political structure of the West (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011). Turkey foreign policy, therefore, was aimed at acquiring the western orientation but maintaining the balances and the status quo existing.

### **3.4. The Cold War**

The Second World War ended with the Soviet Union and the United States of America as the two main superpowers with rivaling ideologies. The result of this rivalry and threats for world security and peace was the period of Cold War. It not only determined the Turkish foreign policy formation but the international system in general. Cold War led to the power structure shifting the balance of power to the 'bipolar' superpower structure and through this, other actors were then forced to align themselves with one on the two superpowers.

As one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union provided a new perspective on international relations. The bipolarity born of the Cold war translated into a geostrategic balance between the Eurasia Continental Powers and Trade-Dependent Maritime World (Nugent & Pesaran, 2006, p. 77). This power balance caused stability that discouraged offensive undertaking between the partners. Moreover, the only way the rule was broken was when one of the superpowers threatened to have control of the Geopolitics heartland. The Vietnamese and Korean War, invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the missile crisis of Cuba remained as the only clashes in relations between the two partners (Eyryce, 2015, p. 96).

With other actors being forced to take sides within the established power poles, Turkey also made its position very clear in the Western Block. This included; becoming a member of OECD in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952 (Bozdoğan Kasaba, 199 , p. 149). Turkey also becomes an associate member of the EEC in 1963 (Safadi, IDRC, & ERFAC, 1998, p. 8). The Cold War perfected Turkey's westernization strategy, which was centered on its foreign policy goals (Özkan, 2011, p. 130).

During the Cold War, international conditions favored the choice that Turkey took. It was a political balance of selecting a rising axis over a close threat. The rise of the competing power, i.e. the US and USSR meant that the European powers were insignificant (Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 4). Additionally, Turkey was not militarily or technologically capable of maintaining neutrality. Similarly, Turkey prioritized its security and sovereignty given the threat of the Soviets. This was more important than the lure of liberal democracy marketed by the West (Gupta, 1999, p. 183 ).

Turkey's Foreign policy towards most parts of the Middle East was highly discouraged by the period of the cold war. The ideological divergence of the cold war period encouraged the two opposing sides to the West and East sides of the split. This was mainly after Turkey became aligned to the West. The Soviet Union received support from many Arab leaders who viewed Turkey as helping the Western interests. During this period, Turkey did not pursue a central position as it did in the foundation years but struggled for survival within the power polarization. In addition, as Davutoğlu states, "the preference was received as a stable paradigm" (Eyryce, 2015, p. 97). The situation thus prevented Turkey from having substitute paradigms and hence making Turkey put little weight to its spheres of influence and other substitute power centers. During this period, Turkey foreign policy was gauged against the perspective of the US and NATO alliance (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). Turkey also related minimally with other actors. The Western-dependent Turkish foreign policy was also extended to the Middle Eastern nations and the third world countries through its relations with the same. The foreign politics played by Turkey during the cold war period did not have a policy engagement body which was unified despite its alignment to the western powers and maintaining its the status quo of its traditional foreign policy. After mid-1960s, Turkey started to maneuver widely after the Soviet Union softened the harshness of its military threat. The Cyprus question influenced Turkey's Foreign policy making to support the bloc of the Soviet Union. In addition, the impacts of the domestic foundations as an Islamic community brought Turkey closer to the countries of the Middle East. From the 1960s henceforth, Turkey, therefore, decided to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, countries of the Middle East and the third world nations mostly Africa (Ozbudun, 2007, p. 180). In addition, Turkey revised its relations in both public opinion and real politics with the United States of America. Turkey remained in harmony with its relations in the region as well as the international system except only in the Cyprus question. Until the cold war, there

existed no transformations in the principles of the Turkish traditional foreign policy (Haufler, 2004, p. 158).

Therefore, traditional Turkish foreign policy formulation was mainly shaped by the international relations during the cold war era and the Kemalist foundations and standpoint with its revolutionary practices and agenda (Özkan, 2011, p. 132). These were the two major factors under which the objectives and principles of the traditional formation of Turkey's foreign policy were based. The constant objective has been maintaining Turkey's position within the international power balances and not outside the western orientation.

### **3.5. Progressive Change in Turkish Foreign Policy towards Africa**

The last decade has seen Turkey undergo major transformations in its domestic and foreign policy. It was a member of NATO during the Cold War and has maintained staunch friend with the US (Sozen, 2010, p.

119). Turkey followed a unique path in the formulation of its foreign policies as compared to its neighbors. It resulted in it being criticized for leaving the Western alliance and putting doubt to its partnership with the EU and the US. By looking at various cases involving the Middle East and the region of Eurasia, it is possible to interpret the recent modifications in the Turkish foreign policy as a deliberate move to steer the country away. Various factors are driving the Turkish foreign policy to be more open to Africa (Eyrice, 2015, p.

101). Studies in this paper indicate that changes in the Turkish foreign policy are not aimed at steering the country away from the West, by a move into autonomy. Domestic factors of economic interest and other international factors have been the driving force to the change in Turkey's foreign policy. The public opinion of the Turks has also contributed significantly to the foreign policy change that is currently opening up Turkey for Africa.

Talking about Turkey-Africa relation is usually difficult since Turkey's relations is concentrated mostly in the European Union, the Middle East, Caucasians, the Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia, United States, the Pacific nations and the far Eastern. The Assumption is that the major the determinants for Turkey-Africa relations are the change of personality and regime. The key questions here are; (i) Why is it important that Turkey develops its relations with Africa? (ii) In which way will both Africa



and Turkey gain from the relation? (iii) What was the reaction of the European Union towards the relation? (iv) What was the reaction of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) towards the relation? The focus is to present recent information on Turkey-Africa relationship and to examine the continued presence and changes of Turkey's foreign policy Towards Africa. The argument here is that the Foreign policy of Turkey towards Africa is driven by national interests and guided by the domestic factors and historical legacies, and that the relationship between Africa and Turkey is an alternative to the fact that Turkey has faced serious challenges joining the European Union (Bölme, 2009, p. 1).

Understanding the current Turkish Foreign Policy towards Africa requires an analysis of foreign policy. That is, analyzing Turkey-Africa relations historical background from the Ottoman era to the regime of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip as well as analyzing the Turkey-Africa formal relations such as the visits of high-level officials of Turkey and Africa, the international Turkey-Africa relation summits, the existing commercial contacts between Africa and Turkey, agreements of trade and cooperation, Turkish investors, firms and entrepreneurs in Africa, Turkish routes and Airlines to Africa, perspectives of Africa towards Turkey and that of the European Union and the organization of Islamic countries towards the existing relation between Turkey and Africa and lastly conclusions and recommendations.

### **3.5.1. Turkey's Opening to Africa.**

Before the Turkish government adopted the policy of opening to Africa in 1998, Turkey and Africa had no good relations as it is portrayed by Turkey's Foreign Ministry on their official website (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011, p. 96). The Turkish government focused very little on matters of Africa as a continent. It was only studied as an academic subject in Turkey under the broad topic of the political history of the world (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 4). Africa was only known of negative characteristics of poverty, HIV/AIDS, hunger among many others.

Opening to Africa policy was the first initiative towards implementing Turkey's policy in Africa. Turkey opted to strengthen its economic, political and cultural relations. It was initiated by the Ismail Cem, Turkish foreign minister by then, to respond partly to the failure of the European Union to recognize Turkey as its member state in 1997 EU summit (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011, p. 108).

From 1990 henceforth, Turkey adopted new transformations in its domestic and international foreign policies. The new path of Turkish foreign policy has been a result of the end of the bi-polar power split and that of international relations during the cold war. Just after the cold war has ended and before September 11, was a period of attacks that transformed and readjusted the existing status quo of the geopolitics (Bölme, 2009, p. 1). After September 11, a new threat to world security, peace and order was viewed only as terrorism. In addition, the domestic socio-political transformation has been a major factor in the review of the traditional attitudes in Turkey's foreign policy formulation.

From the 1990s to present, a number of factors have affected the making of Turkish foreign policy. The most notable ones have been; the ending of the cold war period, European Union integration process and relations with the USA and 9/11 events (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013).

### **3.5.2. The ending of Cold War period.**

After the Soviet Union had collapsed, there existed key transformations in international relations. The bipolar system faded and the international order became very uncertain. The international order rules greatly changed and there were new challenges and opportunities. The ideological superiority of the west declaration, with the hegemonic leadership of America representation, was the basic result of the collapse of the Cold War system of power (Eyryce, 2015, p. 101). When the Soviet bloc fell, NATO remained uncertain of its agenda until the 1991 Summit in Rome where it declared its new strategic plan and remained an organization of security by which the leadership of the USA was presented towards international security (AkgünÖzkan,2010,p.543).

## **4. TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

### **4.1 Perspective of Turkey's Africa Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy is usually viewed from a state perspective as a product of the decisions and actions of decision makers. The growth of globalization has posed major challenges to the state-centered foreign policy analysis especially the behaviorist and the classical type. Non-state actors have also had a gradual effect on the foreign policy analysis (Eyryce, 2015, p. 105). This is because the political oppositions, ethnic, business and public groups are increasingly able to challenge and contribute to the decision-making processes of governments. A look at the transnationalism, global governance, and interdependence show how non-state actors are engaged in the making of decisions on foreign policy.

Nonetheless, foreign policy analysis focuses on the decisions. This means that foreign policy theories look at why some decisions are taken as compared to others. The process of decision-making is given more emphasis as compared to implementation. Additionally, it is quite notable that the literature on foreign policy analysis has ignored the impact of globalization and the relevance of transnationalization in the application of foreign policies (Sørensen, 2000, p. 154). The contribution of non-state actors to the foreign policy formulation is often considered in light of how it influences the decisions on foreign policy that touch on settings of agenda, lobby, framing or building of the norm (Hakura & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011, p. 108).

Conversely, analysis of the input of the non-state actors can be looked at from a formal state actor perspective. Agencies and formal state actors are usually concerned with the implementation of the policies while the non-state actors look at the operational aspect. Increasingly, more studies indicate that formal foreign policy makers implement foreign policy implementation with the active engagement of non-state actors (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 220). This is done through the deployment of hired private security firms to war and consultants who campaign and

push for peace. There are instances where the involvement of non-state actors has faced challenges in the implementation of the strategic policy frameworks due to the increase in the number perspectives of foreign policy and actors (Sozen, 2010, p. 120, p. 104).

In regards to the foreign of Turkey towards Africa, attention has also been in the decision-making and understanding why Turkey has revamped its association with African countries. This shows that the Turkish government is bowing to pressure from various groups within its circles. The special interest in the Sub-Saharan Africa is a consequence of globalization and the pressure from domestic business groups, which require export market diversification. Nationalistic and religious groups, on the other hand, are pushing for the Turkish government to act autonomously from the influence of the Western powers (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 225). On the issue of Africa, it is commonly argued that the Turkish government depends on the kinship of the Turks with their fellow Muslims (Eyrice, 2015, p. 105). The other argument is centered off the perspective of the policy makers and the advent of new multidimensional foreign policies. What is considered weighty is the apparent smooth convergent business and governmental policies that are largely made possible by the non-state actors' involvement.

However, the contribution of the non-state actors is often exhibited as a product of the foreign policy (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 226). A case example is the level of development, trade and humanitarian aid from civil society. However, such arguments do not fully capture the interaction patterns involved in the Turkish foreign policy implementation in Africa. The right perspective explains how Turkey has opened itself to Africa, thereby leaving room for analysis of the nature of the relationship.

The focus of turkey in Africa has largely been in the Sub-Saharan Africa. It is, therefore, prudent to look at the two theoretical approaches to implementation of foreign policy and their post-internationalism. In view of post-internationalism, it can be argued that world politics is commonly sustained without the active participation of the concerned states and countries. To realize goals, most countries have replaced the use of military force with an unwillingness to comply or cooperate with target countries (Cooper & Fledes, 2013, p. 23). The implementation of foreign policies also requires a lasting coalition. Similarly, the foreign policies of Turkey towards Africa

are implemented through varying types and levels of cooperation with the non-state actors from various fields. The input of various parties in the implementation of the foreign policies may be classified into complementary, supplementary and cooperative categories.

In order to capture the Turkish foreign policies towards Africa fully, there is needed to look at four areas. First, there is a need to understand the historical background of Turkey's relationship with Africa and particularly the countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. The Sovereign Free Actors (SFA) were minimally associated with the state-centered interactions. Secondly, there is need to look at the literature on post-internationalization and implementation of Turkey's foreign policies towards Africa. Thirdly, an analysis of the SFA and SBA (Sovereignty Bound Actors) to understand the four interaction patterns in the implementation of the foreign policies of Turkey towards Africa (Yayman, 2015). That is, complementary, conflictual, supplementary and cooperative. Finally, a look at Turkey's prospects for Africa considering these patterns is also essential.

## **4.2 The Relationship between Turkey and Africa**

### **4.2.1 Africa in General**

Presently, Africa is experiencing a surge in urbanization growth, and modernization. This impressive progress is occasioned by the abundance and diversity of human and natural resources. When a number of basic indicators are examined, Africa is seen as a continent experiencing a rebirth, which has numerous developmental possibilities. There was a time when the name Africa was a synonym for epidemics, natural disasters, and conflict, but now the common trend is high profile visits. Most of these visits are aimed at establishing deals on natural resources, construction, and trade. Within the last decade, Africa has recorded an impressive growth of about 5 percent (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 182). This is expected to continue in future. This vision is partly supported by the fact that about 60 percent of the fastest growing economies are currently in Africa (Cooper & Flemes, 2013, p. 36). According to economic projections, by 2050, the economy of Africa is expected to exceed the 2012 Eurozone and the US combined. It expected to reach US\$ 29 trillion (Jia, 2016, p. 15). The countries have posted a growth of over 4 percent host over 70 percent of Africa's population. The

number of the middle-class population has also increased to about 313 million people, which translates to about 34 percent of Africa's population. Besides, compared to the year 2000, Africa has increased its engagement in business with the rest of the world by almost 200 percent (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 188). Most of these positive changes are due to economic reforms, urbanization, good governance, and increased productivity that has led to increased wealth.

In social scene, there is remarkable and significant development. About 40 percent of Africa now resides in urban areas as compared to about 28 percent in 1980. This pattern is expected to continue and in 2025, there may be 47 percent of the population living in urban areas (Evin, 2009, p. 40). In the last decade, the number of school enrollments has increased by 50 percent (Yayman, 2015). There has also been a remarkable embrace of democracy. Progressively, more and more African Countries are having peaceful power transitions after successful elections. This shows that democracy is taking root in Africa. This is demonstrated by the progress observed in regional cooperation and integration between African countries, which is aimed at establishing economic development and conflict prevention mechanisms. The African Union, which has existed for over 50 years, is a significant voice for Africa both regionally and internationally (Sørensen, 200 , p. 154). The achievements of the African Union have been incredible especially towards enhancing democracy, good governance, economic integration and setting of the high standards across the continent. Besides the African Union, other bodies play complementary roles in enhancing regional cooperation, mediation and preventing conflict.

In general, it is impressive that present-day African countries are more determined to overcome the challenges concerning resources through the use of its own mechanism. All of these economic and social trends have permanently changed the economic and political landscape of Africa. It also depicts the actual potential of Africa.

#### **4.2.2 Turkey and Africa**

One key orientation of the Turkish foreign policy is the relationship between Turkey and Africa. Because Turkey is an Afro-Eurasian state, its policy of opening up to Africa is more than just an indication of transient political and economic expectation. It is borne of the deep historical and cultural aspect. These policies are an indication of the strong atmosphere of friendship between Turkey and Africa (Kalaycioglu,

2011, p. 79). Since the African Union declared Turkey a strategic partner to the African continent in 2008, there has been significant momentum in the Turkey-Africa ties.

In 2013, Turkey enhanced its policies towards Africa significantly. Those policies were instrumental in establishing a reinforced a partnership that is political and economic. These policies are multilayered and comprise of the following doctrines (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 189):

- (i.) Through increased bilateral high profile visits and speaking for Africa, Turkey has been able to establish closer political relations. It has acted as the voice for Africa by defending the interest of its countries in talks.
- (ii.) Through economic support, that is aimed at helping out in difficult situations. Trade, humanitarian assistance, and investment are some of the ways in which Turkey engages Africa thereby helping solve its problems.
- (iii.) Through complying with requests to help in resolving disputes through diplomatic means.
- (iv.) Giving assistance to Africa for it to embrace good governance and democracy progressively.
- (v.) Offering supports the regional and international organizations that handle negotiations and dialogues for regional peace.
- (vi.) Providing assistance in a peacekeeping mission in Africa.
- (vii.) Supporting the African Union's approach of finding African solutions to African problems.

Areas of diplomacy, education, investment, aid, security, crisis, trade and crisis management in Africa have experienced growing focus by Turkey. The emphasis has been in the northern Africa countries. North Africa has consistently been crucial to Turkey than Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economy, to Turkey. For instance, in 2012 Algeria was ranked 20 among Turkey's import partners and 24 among its largest exporter partners. Nigeria is ranked 53 in both import and export while South Africa

is 38 in imports and 55 among exporters (Yayman, 2015). Nonetheless, Turkey is focusing more of its attention on the Sub-Saharan Africa given its potential. Sub-Saharan African has growing economic importance to Nigeria and South Africa (Bulley, 2009, p. 79). The Muslim population in the SSA countries is the other factor motivating Turkey.

The Opening Up to Africa Policy of Turkey that was issued in 1998 is an elaborate indicator of its intention to extend to the entire continent of Africa. An action plan was later drawn up to stirrup engagements at all levels in Africa that had earlier been left out. It is the earthquake 1999 and the financial crisis that caused Turkey to postpone majority of its plans for Africa.

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) party, however, revived the plans in 2002 with the successful election bid. This coupled with the economic improvement and recovery from the earthquake meant that Turkey was going to re-embark on its strategy for Africa. Turkey declared 2005 a year for Africa and had the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visit the SSA countries (Davutoğlu , 200 , p. ). This was following with intensive well-choreographed efforts by civil society group and the government to expand and reinforce Turkey's influence in this region. In 200 , the President, Abdullah Gül, organized the Turkey-Africa Summit for the very first time. He also visited other countries in the subsequent years.

Presently, Turkey's economic and political atmosphere indicate that it will continue being open to Africa. The lack of economic stability due to war in its target markets such as Iraq has had an impact on Turkey. The depreciation of Iraq's economy currently meant that it had receded its attractiveness to direct foreign investors. Iraq was Turkey's second largest market for export. Turkey has also suffered strained relationships with longtime allies and powerful countries such as the EU (European Union) and Egypt (Kohler, Holt & Hirschler, 2013, p. 210). Those circumstances led the Prime Minister to point out that Africa will gradually become very significant to Turkey. The Sub-Saharan Countries are capable of supporting the Turkey's foreign policy, which rival of the West and other emerging countries. The economic competitiveness of Turkey has become evident in some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its role in Africa's economy is growing.



This paper focuses on the attributes of Turkey's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa and Africa in general in regards to nature, balance and efficiency. It also analyzes the extent to which Turkey's foreign policy design has made it appear to be a soft power in Africa and whether its gains are born of its strategic engagements (Bulley, 2009, p. 92). It also assesses whether the Turkish foreign policy agenda is fed from the trade, cultural and humanitarian engagement engagements with Africa.

### **4.3 Historical Background**

The relationship between Turkey and Africa is over a century old and touches on historical and cultural aspects. Tulunids is the first state, which was founded by Turkish leaders in Africa. It ended up ruling the present Egypt between the ninth and the tenth century. In the following period, the Ottoman Empire fought and prevented the colonialists from making any expansion towards the north. This empire inhibited entry into East Africa. The navy of the same empire that shielded Zanzibar from being occupied. More good relations were established with other kingdoms such as Timbuktu and Kanem (Yayman, 2015). Timbuktu was located where the present-day Mali is and Kanem where present day Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad are located. In entirety, Turkey's independence fight has significant admiration to Africa. The influence of Atatürk's examples guided most African leaders during the infant stages of independence. The link between Africa and Turkey is notably strong towards the northern part. An understanding of the past engagement of Turkey with Africa, and especially East Africa, sheds light to the relevance of their present involvement (Sørensen, 200 , p. 176). For instance, Turkey has initiated developmental projects of mosques, madrasahs, water systems and other infrastructures in the same area where the Ottoman Empire existed. This is aimed at benefiting the local population. All this has been done without compelling the local population to follow the culture of the Turks.

#### **4.3.1 A History of Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.**

Many factors led Africa, along with many Middle Eastern countries, to become a focus of interest for Turkey's implement of its foreign policy. These included some international circumstances coupled with Turkey's social, economic and political

problems witnessed during both the Second World War and the Cold War that limited it to the non-western countries (Sozen, 2010, p. 105).

Before the end of the Second World War, Turkey confined its relations with Africa through the establishment of limited diplomatic contacts. The Turkish liberation war was anti-imperialistic, which led to a sympathetic fight for independence in the Africa. During this period, Turkey had established its first embassy in Ethiopia.

The other move that was essential to Africa was Turkey's entry to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the United Nations (UN) in 1948 and 1952 respectively. Turkey was supportive of the British ideology in Suez Canal and opposed the Soviets expansionism strategy. This stand by Turkey strained its relationship with African countries that were not aligned with this approach. This situation was worsened further in 1955 when Turkey sided with the Westerners in the Bandung Conference (Yayman, 2015). The other move, which restrained Turkey's relations with Africa, was the decision of not supporting Algeria's independence in the 1956 UN General Assembly.

Before this period, in 1948, Turkey become supportive of the sending of economic assistance by the UN General Assembly to the Sahel region and in 1956, it established a General Consulate in Nigeria and another Embassy in Ghana a year later.

The Cyprus problem made worse the relation between Turkey and the US making Turkey reconsider its relations with the non-western countries from the mid-1960s henceforth (Millman, 1995, p. 3). This was also the same period when most of the African nations were attaining independence hence Turkey saw it necessary to develop with them better cultural, economic and political relations. The period, therefore, witnessed Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Cevdet Suney of Turkey visit each other's countries in March 1967 and December 1969 respectively (Sirin, 2013).

The pressure put by the US government on the Turkey's poppy cultivation, the support to the British ideology in Cyprus and the successive US arms embargo worsened further the relationship between the two nations in the 1970s. Turkey, therefore, opted for other foreign relations, made an Action Plan in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on how to implement the objectives of the foreign policy (Yayman,

2015). Africa then becomes the one of the most certain destinations for the already planned objectives (The MFA Action Plan).

By this time, Turkey had already developed strong diplomatic contacts with Ethiopia making the Ethiopian Emperor pay his second visit to Turkey in 1971. Turkey's foreign relations continued in Africa. In 1972, Turkey also established an embassy in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1978, Zimbabwe also received a medical support program from Turkey. Turkey went on with the implementation of the Action Plan by signing an agreement with Sierra Leone in 1979 on the Technical and Economic Cooperation (TET).

The MFA Action Plan faced some difficulties after that, such as lack of enough personnel, hence the abandonment. In 1981, after the military coup (1980), more political and economic difficulties forced Turkey to close the embassy in Ghana (Kalaycioglu, 2011, p. 82).

After this period, though not as strong as before, Turkey continued with its efforts to boost relationship ties with Africa. In January 1982, for example, the then Sudanese president Mohamed Nimeyri paid Turkey a visit and in the same year, another Treaty on Economic and Technical Cooperation (TET) was signed with Somalia (Aktaran, 2012, p. 17). In the same year too, Turkey's Gazi University initiated the first African Studies Graduate program (Sørensen, 2007, p. 19).

The implementations of the foreign policy again become stronger during the mid-1980s. This was due to the increased effects of the economic liberalization and the strong belief of multifaceted foreign policy implementation by the then Turkish Prime Minister Ozal (Evin, 2009, p. 40). Although this made Turkey shy away from some African countries, it also led Turkey to develop new mechanisms for implementing more foreign policies in Africa. One such mechanism was making use of the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Treasury as important assets in the implementation.

In 1985, for example, several African nations benefited from the move by the SPO to avail a total of \$10 million for the building of the countries' institutional capacity as the first implementation program. Many TET agreements were also signed with many other African nations (Karpas, 1996, p. 66).

The Turkish Prime Minister believed that the nation's future relationship with the West was to be greatly determined by the relationship it had with the non-west nations. He, therefore, improved Turkey's relationship with the non-west by signing more and more international treaties on issues of Health, culture, and security (Aktaran, 2012, p. 17). This promoted many formal visits between Turkey and African countries; Jacques Roger Boo, then Cameroonian Foreign Minister (1991) visited Turkey; Turkish President Ozal paid Senegal a visit (1993) and in 1996, the President of Kenya Daniel Moi visited Turkey (Wheeler, 2011, p. 45). During this same period (1994), Turkey also managed to establish an embassy in South Africa.

The late 1990s, particularly 1998, witnessed Turkey develop a more comprehensive plan of Foreign Policy implementation with Africa as the focus. This was due to the frustration Turkey gained with the rest of the European Union (Karpat, 1996, p. 67). The plan was called the Africa Opening Action Plan (AOAP), and it included several players from the Turkish political, business, civil service and diplomacy circles. The aim of the plan was to improve further Turkey presence in Africa through the provision of necessary humanitarian aids, initiating of various mechanisms of political consultation and improving the bilateral ties such as the trade between Turkey and the African Nations.

The implementation of the plan, however, slowed down in the period of 2000-2001 when Turkey was hit with a political and economic crisis and confrontations as it limited the various playmakers from pushing forward (Aktaran, 2012, p. 17). The implementation, however, was reconsidered when the political and economic crisis started to fade with the reign of JDP (Justice and Development Party), which won the election in 2002.

After the elections, in March 2003, the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat came up with another strategy to boost further the implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy in Africa. This was still with much help from the civil service and the business sector playmakers (Wheeler, 2011, p. 49). The Strategy was known as the Strategy for Developing Economic Relations with Africa.

The Justice and Development Party continued to implement Turkey's Foreign Policy in Africa with much involvement of non-state groups such as Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Cooperations (MNCs), International Media, etc. 2005, for example, was made the "Africa year" in Turkey (Köker, 2010, p. 2).

### **4.3.2 Post-International Implementation of Foreign Policy**

The study of Foreign Policy implementation entails considering more than the official playmakers in decision making and focusing on the setup and the circumstances in which Foreign policy decisions are made, i.e., the context and environment of the policy implementation (The Guardian, 2013). Its constituent components thus consist of the government agencies, non-state actors who are the implementers, foreign policy targets who are the beneficiaries of the implementation, and also the setup and the circumstances, which influence the policy decision-making process.

Today, the task of Foreign Policy implementation has ceased to be purely the activity of a state as there is continued involvement of more non-state actors including the Non-Governmental Organizations, various religious groups, the Multinational Corporations among many others (Özkan, 2010, p. 539).

The implementation study, therefore, must consider both the parties involved in the implementation, i.e., both the policy implementers and the targets of the implementation and largely focus on the impacts of the interaction between the two over time.

Since the implementation is not purely a one party activity, it requires, therefore, all the parties involved to participate in the decision-making the process of the policy implementation i.e. it is a coalition process whether or not there is an agreement on the final goal of the policy.

The Post-International theory of Foreign policy implementation becomes necessary, therefore, when we majorly want to consider the multicentric approach of policy implementation and the various actors involved process, i.e., the government agencies, non-state actors and the policy targets (Wheeler, 2011, p. 56). These may be either bound sovereignty actors (SBAs) or sovereignty free actors (SFAs).

The sovereignty bound actors to act to initiate and support policy actions bounded or as directed by their legal status and sovereignty whereas the sovereignty free actors operate with no limitations by their sovereignty and legal status but rather their capability to start and support the policy implementation process. To fully implement and sustain policies. Therefore, it is necessary that both the SBAs and SFAs form a working cooperation with each other (Sirin, 2013). Globalization has therefore ensured

that states implement their policies by forming more and more co-operations with the non-state groups.

Although both the two theories; the implementation approach theory and post-international theory focus on the existence or lack of cooperation between the SBAs and SFAs, in the post-international theory the cooperation is usually not permanent. A multi-focused world uses temporary coalition as a mean to collaboration, which is dissimilar to the state-focused world. Both approaches also factor in the sequence of interactions that are relevant to the empirical inquiry. Although there are rules that guide actors interactions are mostly ad hoc and situational, a common trend is observable when these interactions are repeated. The clarity of these patterns is seen in the manner in which it influences the outcome of foreign policy and area of cooperative action. At the beginning stages, the SBAs have total control of the process of implementation. This is because the area of policy action is exclusively a confine of the SBAs and the limited participation of SFAs. Such include actions like sending peacekeeping troops, participating in government-to-government organizations and signing of international treaties. At an advanced stage, the SFAs get more independence and the areas of focus expand to include academic, cultural exchanges, professional and humanitarian aids (Özkan, 2010, p. 53 ). Consequently, it diffuses the control on the outcome of foreign policy. According to research, when decision makers are involved in the implementation process, they can influence the outcomes. This is especially the case if they use HSIOs (Horizontally Structured Intermediate Organizations) (Wheeler, 2011, p. 61). HSIOs are essentially SBAs design to work hand-in-hand with SFAs when looked at a post-international perspective (Beasley, 2013, p. 114). They are characterized by a huge network of branches in and out of the country and with the considerable private organization and individual support. Rescue agencies and governmental aids are some of the bodies that occupy this position.

This shows that there can be four possible classifications of interactions that are differentiated by the actors involved, timing, the area of action, and governmental control of the results. The first group involves SBAs and SFAs interacting in a cooperative manner. They cooperate with each other directly to realize common goals. The difference in motivation does not affect the congruency of their actions. This means that they agree on what they need to do. Frequently, the involvement of SBAs is substantive the government is actively engaged in shaping the outcome.

Because of the compliance requirement for SFAs, the joint project is common and have a common purpose highlighted. Their area of focus is mostly humanitarian like education, poverty, and health improvement. Cooperative engagement is mostly witnessed in the early stages of SBAs and SFAs interaction. This is followed by complementary interaction, which is the second category. Here, the two parties have different goals. It requires that SFAs and even HSIOs be more actively involved (Beasley, 2013, p. 115). While they work on their various projects, they have their activities coordinated. The main components of the actions are transport, investment, and trade. The government and SBAs are only involved partially in the control of outcomes that are achieved in the end by HSIOs. In the third category is a supplementary interaction that gives the SFAs an upper in the handling of responsibilities. Under this type of interaction, the government and SBAs are more recessed in controlling the outcomes. Coordination of the activities by the HSIOs is also very partial. The spheres of action are the creation of cultural exchange mechanics, humanitarian assistance, and fostering private interests (Özkan, 2010, p. 536). As the SFAs, expand their links and experience, the degree of supplementary interaction increases.

Conversely, not all foreign policies issues require the SBAs and SFAs to be in direct contact with each other. Groups such as the environmentalists, business, and human rights challenge the foreign policies of various states. This is through discursive actions and foreign policy behavior that contradict the stand of the state (Wheeler, 2011, p. 61). By declining to participate in the implementation of the foreign policy, SFAs can frustrate the efforts of the SBAs to achieve foreign policy objectives. This kind of interaction called conflictual interaction. It happens when the SBAs and SFAs challenge each other on the basic components of individual foreign policy objectives. Depending on the support one may receive, either local or international, and the level of resource allocation, both SBAs and SFA have a chance of prevailing.

### **4.3.3 Post-International Implementation of Turkey's Policy towards Africa**

#### **4.3.3.1 Cooperative interaction**

The interaction between the SBA and SFA in the implementation of foreign policies is often a cooperative type. Here, the Turkish government cooperates with the non-state groups to achieve common goals (Kalaycioglu, 2011, p. 82). For example, the goal, of the Turkish ruling party (APK), to form better relations with Africa and creating new

destinations for its goods matches that of other small non-state groups, e.g., the faith-based organizations in Turkey with the aim to create better relations with the Muslims of Africa. The shared goals usually result from different motivations of the parties involved hence the collaboration.

Faith-based nongovernmental organizations achieve their goals through religious service and obligations while the government agencies focus on the basic rights. One clear example is service delivery of water and sanitation by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) as a fundamental right to improve the lives of African people (Özkan, 2010, p. 53 ). This reduces the daily hassle of Africans to carry water and the death rates because of water-borne diseases. By doing so, the Turkish government, therefore, accomplishes the goal of water provision.

To the Faith-based organizations, on the other hand, provision of water for the Africans is by religious teachings and practices. That is, cleanliness is as godliness. Water is also used for other religious purposes such as rituals of purification of the Muslim communities.

In addition, providing health services to the needy as another goal of TIKA is achieved by the Red Crescent Agency through availing various food aid programs in Africa. The Muslim Nongovernmental Organizations meet the same purpose by maintaining the Muslim religious practice of sharing one's fortunes with the needy and the poor (Karlsson, 2009). The convergence of the activities and goals of two groups is, therefore, clear even though they use very different approaches.

Humanitarian aid, development, and consultations are the main areas of cooperation between the state agencies and the non-state groups although the coordination process, funding and many times initiating the policy may require much of involvement from the government and hence having much said on the outcomes of the projects.

SBAs-SFAs project is usually standard since precise aims of the interactions are stated, and this requires SFAs to comply highly. The projects involve having many international meetings across in Africa, providing education services to African students and promotion and development of various health services (Beasley, 2013, p. 120). The most visible cooperation between the SBAs and SFAs are in the war-tone African countries like Somalia and South Sudan.



Through consultation, the Turkish government organized two international conferences, in May 2010 and May-June 2012 to help with the crisis in Somalia. The conferences' logistics and funding were majorly done by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the civil society, Somalis in the Diaspora, the private sector, women and the youth were all involved in the discussion of making Somali a peaceful Nation. The two conferences final declarations highly emphasized the importance of involvement SFAs in the process. In addition, the cooperation between civil society groups and African business organization and the Turkish government, witnessed Turkey, in March 2011, host the fourth UN Conference on Least Developing Nations (Jia, 2016, p. 15). The conference emphasized on the urge of more cooperation between the political elites and the private sector to offer development services to the least developed nations in Africa.

In 2012, the Turkish government, in helping promote the cooperation between the media organization of Turkey and Africa and to increase the exchange of their two different cultures, organized the Africa-Turkey Media Forum. The forum led to the formation of a multinational NGO to promote the interaction of media organization of both Turkey and Africa, i.e., between Africa Media Endeavors (AMI) and the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Press and Information. (BYGM). 270 representatives from all over Africa managed to attend the meeting, and a program of exchange of the journalists was agreed.

Turkey is represented in the African States by the Honorary Consulates, who are in constant consultations with the Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These consulates Act on behalf of their governments if physical constraints such as political instabilities and geographical distances inhibit state accredited diplomatic missions in operating as required (Narlı Küntay, 2013, p. 3 ). The consulates and the accredited missions, therefore, cooperate in collecting and issuing visas applications in the host nations. They also promote relations of trade and culture between the countries they represent and their host nations. Presently, thirty-one countries in Africa are represented in Turkey by fifty-four citizens of Turkey. Moreover, in Africa, twenty-one Africans are representing Turkey. Their consulates have personal connections with the states they represent which may be in the form of intellectual, cultural or economic interests.

African countries with no accredited diplomats in Turkey like Rwanda, Togo, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Burundi are represented by honorary consuls who are mostly the businesspersons of Turkey. And in countries like Eritrea, Togo, Congo, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Benin, Guinea-Bissau Botswana and Liberia where Turkey still do not have accredited diplomatic nations, Africa's businessmen act as Turkey's honorary consuls (Wheeler, 2011, p. 89). The Honorary Consuls are very significant since they serve as the bridge between the two countries. The host nation and the nation are representing and hence empowering means promoting a good relationship between the two states.

In addition, the government of Turkey supports health services and aids in development programs in Africa in collaboration with various SFAs. TIKA acts as official government agency after being assigned the sole role of coordinating all the governments' aid programs in 2001 and has offices in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Senegal. In 2005, for example, Turkey offered approximately 1.96% of its official aid budget (\$ 11.8 million) to promote development in five countries of sub-Saharan Africa. From 2005 henceforth, through TIKA's collaboration with various SFAs of Africa, Turkey has managed to raise its humanitarian aid budget to approximately 22% (\$ 131.2 million) in sub-Sahara Africa (Özkan, 2010, p. 53).

In 2007, for instance, TIKA initiated the Africa Cataract Campaign in collaboration with the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), which is spread in ten countries, Africa. TIKA has also collaborated with many other SFAs in initiating various projects across the sub-Saharan Africa. Such Organizations include the Kimse Yok Mu Association, Doctors of Hope, Aegean Health Volunteers Association (EGESADER), the Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Association (ANSEDER) and the Health Members Association (SAMEDER) (Sirin, 2013).

These projects have helped provide medical services such issuing of free drugs, voluntary circumcisions, frequent health checkups, surgeries, e.g., of cataracts and educating of nurses and doctors in Somalia. For example in December 2012, through the collaboration of Aegean International Health Foundation (ASAFED), Turkish Ministry of Health and TIKA, Somalia's Deva Hospital was opened (Jia, 2016, p. 21). These programs also include the provision of clean water, for example, the cooperation of TIKA, and the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) led to the drilling of water wells in Ethiopia. Other SFAs like the IHH and Kimse Yok Mu

have also collaborated with TIKA in opening many water wells across Africa. To achieve the same objective in 2007, TIKA also started collaborating with an organization such as the Istanbul chamber of commerce (ICOC) and Istanbul Municipality (IBB) (Özkan, 2010, p. 53 ). The projects thus have bridged the gap between the people of Africa and Turkey in general acting as the contact point between the two.

Another form of collaborative association by the Turkish government agencies has been through scholarships. Many African Students have been admitted into Turkish Universities through scholarships offered by the Turkish Government through its agencies. For instance, in 2001-2012, 6820 students have managed to secure graduate and undergraduate level scholarships into Turkish Universities. 360 African students were also offered different scholarship between 2010 and 2012 by the Turkish government (Bagis, 2013). There was also another scholarship program initiated in 2012 by the Turkish Diaspora Directorate and Related communities (YTB) and in this program, only African students were accepted (Narlı Küntay,2013, p. 37).

The cooperation among the Turkish government through various agencies likes TIKA, YTB and other public organizations like the civil society, Turkish Universities, Ministry of National Education (MEB); the Higher Education Council (YOK) has provided many sub-Saharan African students with opportunities in education. For instance, SFAs such as the Turkey's Foundations of Religious Affairs and Yunus Emre Foundation collaborated with government SBAs like the YTB and MEB as well as public organizations, the civil society organizations, African high schools, and universities to advertise the scholarship program (Kalaycioglu, 2011, p. 108). The program witnessed more than six thousand African students apply for the scholarships with Ethiopia registering more applications than any other African state, and coming third after Pakistan and Afghanistan internationally. Overall, 878 out of the 3916 students selected internationally were from the Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia, on the other hand, has had more beneficiaries since initiation of the program with 301 recipients and the number of African student beneficiaries of the scholarship program in one academic year has registered a significant increase from 25 to 43 in 2000-2001 and 2012-2013 respectively (Karlsson, 2009). The first steps of SBAs-SFAs collaboration in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in water provision through

the drilling of wells and Heath projects, usually require SBAs to introduce the SFAs to the target foreign countries and help them organize themselves as well as their aims internationally and organizing sufficient security to the SFAs mission in crisis-stricken nations. SFAs then become more independent in its operations in the successive project campaigns (Özkan, 2010, p. 540).

#### **4.3.3.2 Complementary Interaction**

Under complementary interaction, SBA and SFA cooperate loosely and act in coordination to achieve independent goals. Trade and business actors who work consistently with the official foreign policy goals characterize such interactions. Their main aims are, however, to make a profit. There are various ways in which SFAs and SBAs benefit. In pursuit of their personal objectives, SFAs get an opportunity to host SBAs, thereby pushing them to effect certain policies promptly and influencing their future decisions (Özkan, 2010, p. 540). The SBAs, in turn, get private funding from the SFAs. They also get to legitimize their foreign policies and impress a good image of themselves to the intended countries. The government is also passively involved in the control of SFAs in complementary interaction (Wheeler, 2011, p. 86). Instances of such complementary interactions are witnessed when a mix of delegations makes government official visits, conferences and the travel links to sub-Saharan Africa through Turkish Airlines.

During official visits, the mix of delegations often comprises of the Turkish government officials, academics, and businesspersons. To enhance bilateral diplomatic ties, the government of Turkey has consistently paid official visits to the African countries. Although the main aim is to enter into cooperation treaties of transport, trade, health, tourism and visa regulations, it has provided leeway for SFAs to engage in business. This way, as the government works to strengthen ties with the African countries, the other section of the delegation is actively involved in their business agendas. The Board of Foreign Economic Relations (DEIK) has developed programs that help the business elites begin and develop their investments within the local market (Hurriyet Daily News, 2010). The academics benefit from the knowledge they gain firsthand on the applicability of the Turkey's foreign policies in Africa.

The high profile visits between Turkey and African countries in five years to 2013 shows increased involvement of SFAs. In February 2009, President Abdullah Gül visited Kenya and Tanzania together with his SBAs in the state and transport

ministries (Özkan, 2010, p. 533). 55 TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) businesspeople and journalists also accompanied him. The following, he visited Cameroon and Congo DRC with an even higher number of businesspersons of about 70. This trend continued in 2011 where he visited Ghana and Gabon with over a hundred SFAs from Turkey (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 1). The visits of the Prime Minister Erdoğan to Africa were also conducted in a similar fashion. In August of 2011, he visited the Somalia in the company of musicians such as Muazzez Ersoy and Adja Pekkan. The visit was considered crucial because it marked the beginning of collaborated effort between the government of Turkey and its music artists in the implementation of the foreign policy towards Africa. After the visit, there was increased the involvement of independent in issues of Somalia. Artists such as Pekkan and Sertab Erener held concerts and gave the proceeds to Somalia (Sirin, 2013). After the visit, Doğan promised to give to Somalia half of his earning from future music Albums. In his visit to Gabon, Senegal, and Niger, the Prime Minister invited over 300 business elite to go along with him. Predictably, this routine of mixed delegation is expected to continue as more and more trade volumes are implement by Turkey.

Besides the visits to Turkey to Africa, there is evidence of complementary interaction as officials from African countries visit Turkey. Turkish organizations such as DEIK, TUSKON, TIM (Turkish Exporters Assembly) together with the Ministry of Economy have been instrumental in aiding African State officials and businesspeople establish viable connections with Turkey. They help the visiting states and business leaders attend bilateral investment and trade forums, multilateral business conferences, and workshop that are organized by Turkish business groups (Ulutaş, 2010, p. 1). The SFAs organize and fund such setups and active support and presence of SBAs. For instance, since 2006, TIM and TUSKON have organized Turkey- Africa Trade Bridges. The aim has been to link up the African and Turkish political and trade leaders in six trade summits (Özkan, 2010, p. 533). TUSKON has had ten bilateral trade talks that were attended by high- profile officials of African governments. TUSKON has also been in liaison with the Turkish MPs. A case example is the meeting that brought Gambian ambassador and TUSKON business leaders where a project of fishing ships sale to Mauritius, Gambia and Senegal was initiated (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 35). A member of Turkey-Gambia Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group, Deputy Ercan Candan, arranged this meeting (Adelman, 2003, p 9).

There have been other international forums of complementary interaction have been an organization by SBAs and SFAs in different ways. TASAM (Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Studies) has been organizing for annual congresses of Turkey-Africa involving academics, business leaders, and experts. The aim of the congress is mainly to analyze the role that Turkey can play about temporary Africa's problems. The first congress was an initiative of SBAs such TİKA and TUBİTAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) and the Ministry of Tourism. Future congresses following this were organized without the active participation of the SBAs. Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit and the Turkey-Africa Civil Society Organization Forum were organized alongside each other in 2008, by TASAM. It gave opportunities to SFAs for networking and exchange of ideas that lead to the formation of USTKİP (International Development and Cooperation Platform of Non-governmental Organizations) (Özkan, 2010, p. 534).

In the transport sector, the THY Airlines is considered a product of the contemporary interaction of the non- state actors and the government. It has played a significant position in the role out of Turkish foreign policy towards Africa. Although private, THY is considered at the national airline of Turkey. It launched direct flights to Africa in 2006. Besides offering flight services, THY has also been involved in the issuing of travel visas to business people of Africa. They get to acquire visas to Turkey if they have US visas and buy a ticket to Turkey at the THY offices. By taking part in the process of visa issuing through coordination with bodies such as MFA, THY can promote its business and advance Turkey's foreign policy objective (Bagis, 2013).

#### **4.3.3.3 Supplementary Interaction**

Towards achieving Turkish foreign policy implementation across sub-Saharan Africa, various Turkish SBAs and SFAs also involve a supplementary form of reaction. This is where by SFAs solely operate in the target nations to implement policies, which are exactly in line the official policies of the Turkish government (Hazar, 2000, p 107). Here the SFAs start, fund and sustain projects in the African countries with minimal support from the SBAs. The SBAs only involvement could be through ensuring tax reductions, giving infrastructural and legal support to the SFAs and offering them moral support through visits and awards among many others. The most active SFAs in this category include organizations like IHH, Red Crescent, Diyanet Foundation and the Kimse Yok Mu. This form of interaction, therefore, implies that

the control of the Turkish government on the outcomes of the implementation is usually minimal (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 1).

In supplementary interactions, however, the activities of SFAs are often inspired by the SBAs. This is through previous complementary and cooperative interactions and collaborations of the SFAs and various government agencies in implementing Turkish foreign policies as is clearly visible in the development and humanitarian assistance carried out by the SFAs across the sub-Saharan Africa.

For instance, by establishing its first office, Africa 2005, the activities of TIKA across Africa began and it focused mainly on the spheres health, training of professional and Agriculture. Implementation of the activities was initially through collaboration with various SFAs like the Agricultural Ministry and that of Health (Hazar, 2000, p 110). TIKAs following projects across Africa saw many other SFAs both from Turkey and Africa collaborate and cooperate with it in implementation. As the SFAs gained more experience, they started initiating their projects independently.

The SFAs activities initially before the operations of TIKA across Africa mainly focused on direct assistance/campaigns of crisis-stricken nations regarding food, clothing and medicine provision or during the religious holidays. In 2005, for example, SFAs offered a total of \$2 million relating to the assistance of African states, but in 2011, after TIKA has started its operations, the figure rose to \$120 million (Hurriyet Daily News, 2010).

Before TIKA, the Religious Affairs Directorate and Diyanet Foundation arranged such assistance campaigns in cooperation with individual SBAs such as the Turkish Red Crescent, the Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and Prime Ministry Disaster. For example, Somalia received 222.5 million through a campaign organized by Diyanet Foundation. In addition, several sub-Saharan countries received food aids for Ramadan sent by the Diyanet Foundation. This inspired other SFAs such as the IHH that also initiated Ramadan campaigns, the Bodrum Business Association and Muhammediye Taskopru Foundation offering financial assistance programs and the Aksaray Business Association with food aid programs. These campaigns have then evolved to long-term and permanent projects (Hazar, 2000, p 114).

SFAs like Kimse Yok Mu and IHH are now networked heavily across Africa and with clear know how of policy implementation and hence have increased their activities across the continent. This came following collaboration and cooperation with TIKA

in carrying some of the TIKAs activities of water, food and medical services provision and development projects such as the building of schools and other infrastructure. For example, until 2005, IHH still did not have construction projects in Africa, but by end 2006 after TIKAS operations have started in sub-Saharan Africa, IHH had initiated more than 60 projects of buildings in twelve target countries across the region.

The same is also true with health SFAs organizations. For example, reports from Gönüllüler Platform for Health Association suggest that the first health NGO to be established was in Niger in 2006, i.e., it focused on promoting free and voluntary circumcision along with cataract. With time, such organizations also evolved and networked with other SFAs both on the local and international level. For example, cooperation with organizations like the Qatar Red Crescent and the Somalia's Zamzam Foundation led to the building of disease center in Somalia called the Tropical Disease Center. It also cooperated with international SFAs like the Kimse York Mu, Çare association, Cansuyu Association and the Istanbul International Brotherhood and Solidarity Association (Ulutaş, 2010, p. 1). The "Africa Life Operation" initiative was also started through collaboration between the Worldwide Doctors and the Bezm-i Alem University of Istanbul.

The interest of various private businesses can also bring about supplementary interaction. In such a case, private business companies develop interest from the different SBAs and SFAs complimentary interactions. Moreover, concerning Turkey, Turkish private companies have developed interest operating independently in Africa enhancing economic and trade relations, which are a strategy, hoped to be achieved by the Turkish government (2003 Strategy). Clear examples are the VTG Holding with coal mines in South Africa, Pet Oil, which is awaiting approval to start its operations in Uganda and the Latex Holding in Senegal involved with the production of cashew nuts and with construction interests in Kenya (Akgün, Perçinoğlu Gündoğar, 2009, p. 15). Other private businesses, which have set their base in Africa, include the Gürmen Group (energy delivery in Ghana), Florence Nightingale (Nigeria), Çetin Group (Mogadishu Airport) and BEKO in Tanzania. Similarly, there are African private organizations in Turkey. An example is the African Innovations and Development Consultancy firm in Ankara, which has bridged much investment and trade relations between businesspersons in Turkey and those in African countries



such as Mali, Ivory Coast, Senegal and many others (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 2).

The establishments of business councils have also institutionalized the business interests between the two regions. Turkey has established business councils all across Africa in Ethiopia (2008), Kenya (2010), Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tanzania, Angola and Uganda (all in 2011), Rwanda and Gambia (2012). Furthermore, the business and trade cooperation between Africa and Turkey has been promoted by organizations; Union of African Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agricultural Professions i.e. the UACCIAP and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges i.e. the TOBB (Sirin, 2013).

Another area where supplementary interaction can be clearly seen is in the cultural domain. For instance, Turkey's push for a stable educational background in Africa has much been done by the SFAs like think tanks and several university programs. The Kadir Has University in Istanbul Turkey has an African Studies Center (opened in 2006) that focuses mostly on the subjects of relations between Turkey and Africa and the issues of Turkey's African Immigrants. There is also a similar center at the University of Ankara where professors like Dr. Getie Gelaye and Dr. Nancy Walker have already been invited to lecture on the matters of Africa and Turkey-Africa relations (Hazar, 2000, p 114). The center also organizes conferences, seminars and events on issues of Africa, i.e., poetry, literature, and film as well as publishing these matters in its monthly the bulletin, Africa Gündemi. African studies centers of similar functions have also been established in the Kırklareli University (2011) and the Izmir Economy University (2009) (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 2). Some policy institutes have set up African branches to research on African matters. An example is TASAM with an African branch called the TASAM African Institute. This institute reports much in Africa as well as organizing several formal meetings and congresses between Turkey and African representatives (SETA- Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research, 2009, p. 10). Since 2005, the institute has organized about seven of such meetings. The first four received much support and participation from some government SBAs while the other three were done in cooperation with other African NGOs (Hazar, 2000, p 111). There was also notable diversification on the ideas of discussion of the meetings, i.e. the first meetings focused only on building the relations and organizations of the governments between Turkey and Africa, and as

they progressed, issues related to Africa and the cooperation between the two societies become more of the discussion topics.

In 2008, because of such meetings, USTKIP was formed which has become the institute's primary partner in organizing the congresses since 2009 and has brought many SFAs together both from Turkey and Africa (over 175 SFAs).

There is also evidence of supplementary cultural interaction in the humanitarian and cultural exchange programs promoted across Africa by the civil society groups such as the Turkish Media, Education Sector of Turkey among many others. Examples of such initiatives include; the African Brotherhood and Cooperation Association started in 2010, the African Film Festival in 2012 organized by Art Gallery Istanbul Modern, and Somali aid concerts.

Private Turkish institutions of learning from nursery institutions to colleges and a university have also been established in the education sector in Turkey, and many African students allowed enrolling. The schools, operated by Turkish business people, were first set up in the African nations where Turkey already had connections like in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa Senegal and Nigeria. The declaration of interest in Africa by Turkey influenced much the periods of establishing of these schools and institutions. For instance, the first bunch of these schools opened in five African countries in correspondence with the 1998 Opening Action Plan (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 2). The next schools in other five more nations also corresponded with the Turkey's strategic Plan of 2003 and after 2005, the Africa-Turkey year, many more schools opened. Currently, Turkish schools are spread all over Africa including those countries where Turkey has no presence of embassies or honorary consulates like in Rwanda, Benin, Togo, Liberia, Malawi and the Central African Republic and have been praised much for their quality of education (Hazar, 2000, p 112). By paying the schools occasional visits to their events and through symbolic awards, the Turkish government officials (SBAs) provide moral support and hence this might have increased the growing of the schools across the African continent.

#### **4.3.3.4 Conflictual Interaction**

The harmonious interaction between SBAs and SFAs is also marred by instances of disagreements on issues of the Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. The conflictual interaction happens when the state and non- state actors work against each other by

trying to incapacitate the other's ability to conduct the foreign policy of Turkey in their preferred way.

One such instance was witnessed in the Sudan case. Most SFAs disagreed with Turkey's foreign policy towards Sudan, which supported President Omar al-Basheer despite claims of the genocide (Karlsson, 2009). These claims were from the international community and had a solid backing of evidence. It is the same claims that led to the warrant for arrest being issued against President Omar al-Basheer. In 2008, before his visit to Turkey, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, which is a Turkish human rights umbrella group, asked the government of Turkey to execute the arrest warrant issued by ICC against the then Minister of Interior, and senior Janjaweed commander. In 2009, the warrant was against the president. These events cause the non-state actors to resist cooperation with the government of Turkey. The resistance is especially significant when the President al-Basheer was invited to the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) convention (The Economist, 2010). Turkey's Amnesty International and the Human Rights Agenda Association were openly opposed to this invitation of al-Basheer. The buildup of pressure from all quarters including the international community led the Turkish decision makers to do quiet diplomacy, which lowers the profile of the subject. Consequently, al-Basheer turned down the invitation to the OIC meeting (SETA, 2009, p. 13).

Another instance where the state and non-state actors clashed on the issue of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa was about Somalia. In an attack by the Al-Shabaab terror group on the Turkish Embassy resulted in the death of a Turkish Special Forces officer and injury of others. In explaining their motive, the Al-Shabaab claimed that Turkey was meddling with the Somalia's issues and that their engagement with Somalia empowered the apostate regime and derailed their mission of establishing Islamic Shariah in Somalia. They also blamed Turkey for planning to attack Somalia, a Muslim home, and the people of Somalia. Turkey response through the Parliament Speaker was that Al-Shabaab's aim was to derail the humanitarian action. Turkey vowed not is cowed by Al-Shabaab's actions (Zamzam Foundation, 2010, p. 2). However, Turkey's foreign policy implementation in Somalia became more challenging as it called for heightened security measures. The relevance of this

attack is significant because it was a conflictual interaction between the state actors of Turkey and Somalia non-state actors.

A focus on the sub-Saharan African reveals instances where the SBAs have been determined to detract SFAs activities that affect Turkey's relationship with Africa. In 2013, under claims of pressure from the government, the University of Ankara suspended its academic journal, *Africa* (Jia, 2016, p. 22). In its third issue, the journal highlighted Turkey's policy on refugees and immigrants of African origin. The Journal talked about the death of Festus Okey, a Nigerian, who died at a police station in Turkey. It was claimed that featuring of this story is what led to the censorship and later suspension of the journal (Mehmet Akgün, 2010, p. 533). The researchers of AÇAUM publishers protested the action of the state, which they saw as a plan to have research centers reproduce bureaucratic views. This case is unique because the SBAs are out to stop the SFAs from carrying out their activities.

There are two resulting implications of the conflictual interactions between state and non-state actors in the Turkish foreign policy issue. One implication is drawn from the controversy of al-Basheer and the Somalia bombing. Here, it is evident that not everyone readily accepts the opening up of Turkey to Africa. In addition, it is clear that non-state actors from Turkey and Africa can significantly antagonize Turkey's aim of implementing its foreign policy towards Africa (The Economist, 2010). The second implication is drawn from the case of the *Afrika* journal. It showed that the state could ride on its prerogative of legality and institutional status to block the activities of SFAs that are considered retrogressive to the implementation of the foreign policy towards Africa.

### ***The Gülen Movement and Its Impact of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Africa***

The Gülen movement is that forefront of Africa-Turkey engagement. The exiled followers of Fethullah Gülen call this movement the *Hizmet*, which literally means service for others. It began in Turkey as a non-political, faith group that focused on culture and education, and it presently all over the world. It places great emphasis on dialogue between different faiths. There was a time when it was in very good terms with the AKP government. This was because the group agreed with the government's objective of capitalizing on the opportunities brought by globalization (Yel, 2009). The Islamic and traditional Turkish charity obtained from the business community is responsible for the financial needs of the group. However, the Gülenists have received

condemnation from various people who feel that the groups are pursuing a personal agenda. These people also feel that the group is aiming at placing individuals at key positions in the government and security docket (Hurriyet Daily News, 2010).

The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has largely been considered the bridge to the rift between the AKP government and the Gulen movement. The national understanding is that religious matters should not be intertwined with political matters. From the onset, the Gulen movement declared that it is not political but religious. However, the government has been skeptical about the Gulen movement's operations and considers it a threat to national and international agenda. The role of Diyanet in this case is to keep the Gulen movement in check, which would bring about mediation between it and the AKP government.

However, the success of Diyanet in this mediation role is hardly observable given the turn of events. It has been seen to condemn the Gulen movement while justifying the government policies. The Diyanet has control over the mosques in Turkey and has capitalized on this to influence the Friday prayers to contain sermons that support the political positions of the government. This combination of the government, the Diyanet and several Islamic communities has served to segregate the Gulen movement largely. While these actions do not appear to bridge the gap between the AKP government and the Gulen movement, it is yet to be seen whether the movement will make necessary adjustments in favor of truce.

The fame of the Gülen movement is highly regarded in Sub-Saharan Africa because of the high-quality schools that are run by business people inspired by Gülen. The schools include primary and secondary schools, and one university. There lacks a central organization managing the schools and the schools follow the curriculum of the host country. Usually, the schools are private and pay fees. They are closely associated with the Turkish business people within the countries they are located (Zamzam Foundation, 2010). The network of these schools and the Turkish business people is central to their success. For instance, the students who graduate from their schools are able to speak the Turkish language and are incorporated into the team spearheading Turkey's commercial agenda. This scenario has been witnessed in Congo DRC.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are about 96 institutions that are affiliated to the Gülen movement (Akgün & Özkan, 2010). Nigeria leads the pact with about 17 Gülen-affiliated schools and Nigerian Turkish Nile University, which is the only African university associated with the Gülen movement. The other SSA countries with six or

more Gülen schools are Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mali, Tanzania and Senegal. The Gülen movement has had significant influence on Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa and is credited for pioneering the focus on the continent. The recent gulf between Gülen and Erdoğan has prompted calls by Turks for a review of the foreign policy (SETA, 2009). There instances where Erdoğan urged for the closure of all Gülen affiliated institutions and projects in Africa. In the 2014 summit, the Turkey-Africa Partnership, Erdoğan cautioned the African leaders to be wary of hidden motives of the Gülen. Although these schools are still running, there have been reports from Turkish government side that Gabon and Senegal heeded to Erdoğan call to shutdown all institutions affiliated to the Gülen movement. The reports further state that Somalia and Congo DRC are in the process of doing the same. However, the President of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi has openly showed his support for Gülen through a public announcement in 2015 that he planned to visit the Maputo Gülen-run school where his son had completed his studied. The Education deputy minister in Côte d'Ivoire was quoted saying that Erdoğan was propagating a philosophy similar to that of the colonialists who wanted Africa to be an education backward continent (Jia, 2016).

The IHH, a Humanitarian Relief Foundation that is non-governmental, focuses on giving aid to regions torn by natural disasters and wars. It began its aid program in Somalia in 1996. Presently, it is in about 35 Sub-Saharan Africa countries (Keyman, 2009). By March 2014, there were over 100 water wells constructed and 76,000 successful cataract operations done by the IHH in Africa alone (Jia, 2016). It has also engaged Qurban campaigns where appropriately slaughtered meat is given freely as food to impoverished Muslims.

The other group that has spread globally is the KYM. KYM for Kimse Yok Mu translates Is Anybody There. It is a relief organization started after the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 and is Gülen-inspired. Unlike the schools, this organization is well structured, hierarchical and with a system of fundraising. It began assisting Africa in 2006 and by 2013, it had spent over \$65.4 million in assisting 45 countries. It has been forcing on developmental projects such as water wells, education, and health and helping the orphans (The Guardian, 2013). KYM also provides *iftar* and other food packs in Sub-Saharan Africa during the month of Ramadan (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003). The government of Turkey has also reached out to KYM in its anti-Gülenist efforts. In 2015, it the bank accounts of KYM frozen under allegation of involvement in terrorist activities (Jia, 2016). Regardless, KYM has gone on to enter into an agreement with

the African Union on its aim boost cooperation, development and aid to Africa. Its initial objective was to have 1000 schools new built in Africa by 2020.

The Red Crescent from Turkey has been very active in providing health services to selected countries in Africa. Its hospital project in Dafur in 2006 cost \$5 million. In the capital city of Chad, N'Djamena, the Red Crescent established a modern pharmacy. The year 2011 saw one of the largest projects by the Red Crescent in Sub-Saharan Africa. The group harnessed help for Somalia through a major national campaign (SETA, 2009). In Kenya, Sudan, Ghana and other SSA countries, the branch of DWW (Doctors Worldwide) from Turkey has been very active since 2000. A team that has been in Congo since 2007 assisted people with non-food staff in 2014. The Turkish DWW has also trained the first Somalia health specialist besides operating the Mogadishu hospital.

## **5. THE THREE DIMENSIONAL APPROACH IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN TOWARDS AFRICA**

### **5.1 The Institutional Approach of Turkey's Relations to Africa**

Turkey-Africa relation goes back deep in history. That is, even before Turkey became a republic, there were traces of socio-cultural relationships with Africa. For instance, most parts of North Africa were encompassed in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, through Anglo-Egyptian relationship the Ottomans found their way into Sudan. The Ottomans also had small traces of connections in West Africa. The Ottomans did establish political and diplomatic contacts in the areas where it had not defined its presence in form of bureaucracy or military e.g. the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Countries like Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, before they were split between France, Italy and the United Kingdom, were all reported to be African provinces of the larger Ottoman Empire (Karaca, 2000, p. 117).

The close relationship of the Ottoman Empire with these parts of Africa could have been as result of the existence of Muslim population and the discovery of gold, diamond and other valuable mineral resources. These indicate clearly that Turkey-African diplomatic relationships started centuries ago (around 16<sup>th</sup> century). More specifically, Turkey relationship with Africa was much in the sub-Saharan parts of Africa (Karaca, 2000, p. 117). The shared history, economic, cultural, military, administrative values and characteristics between Turks and Africans faded away due to changes in personality and regime on both sides. In recent years therefore, the strenuous efforts made by Turkey towards Africa is to renew the relationship that once existed.

#### **5.1.1. Formal relations between Turkey and Africa**

Turkey's formal relations with Africa have been through establishment of embassies and consulates. Turkey recognized and established formal relations with all the African countries, which attained independence in the 1960s. Currently, there are 12



official Turkish embassies in Africa and approximately 20 honorary consulates. Egypt, Libya, South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan all have Turkish embassies. These countries too, have their embassies and honorary consulates in Turkey (Karaca, 2000, p. 118). These are the Algerian Embassy, Egyptian Embassy, Senegalese Embassy, Moroccan Embassy, Tunisian Embassy, Ethiopian Embassy, Libyan Embassy, Sudanese Embassy and the South African Embassy. In April 2005, Turkey became an “Observer” in the AU and in recent years, there have been new advancements to renew these relations through high-level official visits between the countries (Hurriyet Daily News, 2010).

### **5.1.2. High-level state visits.**

The period after 1997, witnessed many high level visits between Turkey and Africa. For instance, through the invitation of then Turkish president Suleyman Demirel, Yahya Jameh, then Gambian president visited Turkey (Kirisici, 2009, p. 29). Libya also received a visit paid by Turkish Prime minister by then Necmetin Erbakan. In 1998, the Prime Minister Necmetin Erbakan visited Nigeria. The following year, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel became the first president of Turkey, in ten years, to visit Algeria through his official visit. In 2000, there were many of these visits such as; the visit paid to Turkey by the South African deputy minister, Aziz Pahad, the foreign department of Turkey head visit to South Africa, the visit to Turkey by the former Nigerian president Olusegun Abasanjo and Gambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo being visited by Turkish businessmen delegation led by then minister of state, Hasan Gemici (Kirişçi, 200 , p. 7). In 2001, there were consequent visits between South Africa and Turkey. In addition, Algeria was visited by then Foreign minister of Turkey Abdullah Gül. There were several high level state visits between Turkey and Africa in the year 2003 too. Turkey was paid a three-day official visit by the South African president Jacob Zuma. Then Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer also paid a visit to Tunisia. In 2005, the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to four African countries including South Africa, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Morocco. Presently, Turkey along with other international communities and regional organizations such as the European Union has strenuously boosted economic and trade relations with Africa (Keyman, 2009, p. 21).

### **5.1.3. First International Turkish-Africa Summit.**

This was organized by the TASAM (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies) and took place in Istanbul Turkey on November 2005, the same year “Africa Year” was declared in Turkey. The goals and objectives of the Summit included (SETA, 2009, p. 17):

- To improve the social, political, economic and cultural ties between the two regions.
- To address the possible solutions to the problems faced in Africa.
- To decide on matters of regulating Turkey-Africa relations.

Turkey lacks experts concerned with African affairs and so is Africa to Turkey. This summit therefore provided a good platform to renew the old relations between the two regions through discussion on matters affecting both of them.

### **5.1.4. Second International Turkish-Africa Summit.**

This was held on December 2006 through the organization of TUSKON (Turkeys Confederations of Businessmen and Industrialists). Its main aim was analyze Turkey-Africa relations in terms of economic cooperation, development assistance and opportunities for investment. Both Africa and Turkey were presented well by their officials including businesspersons, ministers and other senior bureaucrats (Kirişçi, 2006, p. 7). For instance, 1300 executives from Turkey attended the summit. Africa, on the other, was represented by 550 businesspersons, their ministers and other senior officials (Hermann, 1990, p. 6). This summit acted to promote much business relations between Turkey and Africa as many business agreements and pacts were signed.

### **5.1.5. Third International Turkish-Africa Summit.**

The third international Turkey-Africa summit was held in Istanbul on December 2007, organized by TACSS (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies). This congress also created a great platform for improvement of African-Turkey cooperation. This summit led to opening of TIKAs office in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia after which other offices were also established in Sudan and Senegal. In this summit too, both the parties participated well (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 19). Africa was represented by more than 60 government officials including ministers and 500 executives. There were delegates Turkey, on the other hand, had over 1500 Business persons presented.

The congress had delegates from 40 African states including Algeria, Ethiopia, Congo Republic, South Africa, Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, Niger, Central Africa, Sudan, Comoros, Togo, Senegal, Liberia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Benin, Egypt, Mozambique, Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, Morocco, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania and Mali. The congress brought many entrepreneurs and business individuals from both sides together which resulted in signing of many business pacts that boosted trade relations between the two regions in future.

#### **5.1.6. Fourth International Turkish-Africa Summit.**

This was organized by TUSKON (Turkish Confederations of Businessmen and Industrialists) and was held in Istanbul in 2008 (Yel, 2009, p. 1). Approximately 3500 Turkish and African businesspersons from 45 countries attended the summit. The need to develop stronger relationship between Africa and Turkey was really stressed. Africa was seen as presenting fresh opportunities to Turkey. The meeting was also seen as a platform to improve the economic, commercial and cultural relations between Turkey and Africa. The relationship was to operate under the principles of brotherhood, partnership, sharing and friendship. Turkey was to open an additional 15 embassies all across Africa to the already existing ones. Humanitarian assistance to Africa was also stressed and the need to sustain such services in future. The summit made it possible for Turkey to be a member of the African Development Bank (AFDB) and through this Turkey is not limited to any economic projects in Africa (Adelman, 2003, p 10).

## **5.2 The Economic Approach of Turkey's Relation to Africa**

### **5.2.1. Commercial Contacts between Turkey and Africa.**

Before, in the Turkish society, it was impossible to develop trade with Africa but, currently, Africa has several Turkish investments and businesspersons earning economically for Turkey. Turkish private business companies established commercial connections with those of Africa towards end of 1980s. The plan "opening to Africa" was drafted by the Turkish government in 199 , and in 1990 onwards, there were rapid development of interests by Turkey in Africa. In 2000, Turkey put into reality its dream of opening to Africa by taking a strong course of action. In 2003, before Turkey declared 2005 as the "Africa Year", it established its

economic relations development strategies with Africa (Keyman, 2009, p. 25). Some of these economic relations with Africa include:

- Signed pacts and agreements on economic and trade cooperation
- Turkish investors and Entrepreneurs in Africa.
- Turkish airlines and routes to Africa.
- Perspective of Africa towards Turkey-Africa relations.
- Intercultural marriages

### **5.2.2. Agreements of Trade and Economic Cooperation between Turkey and Africa.**

Several pacts on trade and economic cooperation between turkey and Africa have been signed since 2003. Turkey-Africa trade volume amounted to 5.4 billion US Dollars in 2003 with a 2.1% total share of trade. In the same year through strenuous efforts, this value was increased by almost 3%. In 2005, it amounted to 10 billion US Dollars and by the end of 2006, it increased by 120% to 12 billion US dollars. Turkey targeted to attain trade volume of 25 billion US dollars with Africa by 2010. Turkey's main target is to reach an export volume of 500 billion US dollars within the period of 2010 – 2023. According to TURSTAT (Turkish Institute of Statistics), there was an increase of 42.9 percent in the export volumes of Turkey to Africa in first quarter of 2008 as compared to the previous year. In North Africa alone, by March that year, Turkey managed an export volume of 531 million US Dollars while by the same period, in 2007, the volume of export by Turkey to North Africa was only 302 million US Dollars (Mehmet Akgün, 2010, p. 533). With the expanding economic relations between the two, Turkey is reaping much in terms of politics and diplomacy. For instance, Turkish contracting firms have steadily acquired contracts all across Africa. In

2006, the contracting firms managed to undertake contracting activities all across Africa valued at 16 Billion US Dollars. Cooperation pacts have also been signed with countries like Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 30).

### **5.2.3. Benchmarks in Turkey's Foreign Policy towards Africa**

The Action plan of 1999 marked the beginning of Turkey's policy being open to Africa. Later in 2003, the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade developed a strategy whose aim was to develop economic relations with the African Countries (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 31). This was followed by a declaration in 2005, where the government of Turkey called it a Year of Africa (Hermann, 1990, p. 6). The African Union acknowledged this deliberate effort by the Turkish government and in turn accorded it a status of 'observer' (Kilinç, 2009, p. 3). The relationship between Africa and Turkey was further fortified in 2008 during the tenth summit when the African Union declared Turkey a strategic partner of Africa. In August the same year, 49 countries attended at the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit that was held in Istanbul (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 22). The product of the summit was establishment of cooperation process between Africa and Turkey that is steady and sustainable. Further, in 2008, a follow up mechanism was developed at the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit. The follow up mechanism was aimed at implementing the "The Istanbul Declaration on Turkey- Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future". It also sought to effect the "Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership" (Haynes, 2010, p. 65). There have been several follow up meetings such as the High-Level Officials Meeting of 2010 and the Ministerial Level Reviewing Conference.

### **5.2.4. Turkey - Africa Partnership Summit (2014)**

The second Summit of a partnership between Turkey and Africa was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (19-21 November 2014). This was in line with the decisions by the Africa Union after it had failed in 2013 due to lack of agreement on best time and date of the event (Jia, 2016, p. 40). The Banjul Formula wants an individual representation of nations to participate in Summits that involve any partner country and the African Union. Moreover, since this time the summit was to be held in Africa, it was the duty of the Africa Union Commissions to send invitations. Sixteen nations participate on the Summits (Haynes, 2010, p. 69).

The Malabo Summit registered a large number of representatives since many African nations were invited by Equatorial Guinea as observers. Almost 30 African nations had

representatives in terms of their presidents, vice presidents, Prime ministers and Ministers. Niger, Mauritania, Benin, Zimbabwe, Chad, Congo republic and the host Equatorial Guinea were all represented by their presidents while South Africa and Burundi had their vice presidents present. Gabon, Algeria and Swaziland, on the other hand, were all represented by the prime ministers. The ministers who were present were from Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Morocco, DRC, Somalia, Ghana, Ethiopia and Libya (International Crisis Group - ICG), 2012). In addition, in attendance was the African Union chairperson Dr. Zuma. “A New model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration” was the theme of the Summit. First, there was the meeting of officials of High Level on 19 November followed by that of the ministers on 20 November before the actual date of the Summit on 21 November of that same year (Kilinç, 2009, p. 3). The joint implementation plan was then declared to take effect as from 2015 to 2019 and the third summit to be held in Turkey in 2019.

### **5.3 The Political Approach of Turkey’s Foreign Relation to Africa.**

#### **5.3.1. Turkey’s relation with the African union and regional organizations.**

The African Union and other regional organizations will receive endless support from Turkey to achieve their objectives, which include ownership of African matters. Since 2009, Turkey has always risen to the occasion whenever there is need by regional organizations and contributing an amount equal to \$ 1 million to assist the African Union to meet its objectives. The cooperation between Turkey and the African Union, first as an observer in 2005 and later as a partner in 2008, led to Turkey becoming a member of the African Development Bank as an outsider.

Turkey has also shown relation with regional organizations through accreditations of its embassies in the following ways (Walker, 2011):

- The embassy in Ethiopia has been endorsed by the IGAD i.e. Intergovernmental Authority on

Development Partners Forum (2012).

- The embassy in Tanzania has also been endorsed by EAC (East African Community).

- The COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) accredited the embassy based in Lusaka Zambia.
- The embassy in Abuja Nigeria has also been accredited to the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).
- In Libreville, the Turkish embassy has been endorsed by the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States).

### **5.3.2. Turkey's G20 presidency.**

The conference of High Level on Energy access being held in Africa in October 2015 was through the efforts of the government of Turkey in accordance with the 2063 African agenda through its G20 presidency (Jia, 2016, p. 56).

## **5.4. A Comparative View of Turkey-Africa Bilateral Data.**

### **5.4.1. Diplomatic Representation.**

In 2013, Turkey's interaction with Africa entered a new face. Unlike before, it was now a mutual partnership where both the sides were to benefit (ICG, 2012). For instance, now 39 Turkish embassies are present in Africa compared to only 12 by 2009 and it is nearly opening another one in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Similarly, African Embassies have also increased in Turkey from the 10 to 32 in a period of five years (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 90). This trend implies a strong mutual partnership of the two regions and the obligation to develop further their relationship.

### **5.4.2. Economic Partnership.**

Turkey has continued its presence in Africa by opening 26 commercial consulates in various capital cities and establishing business councils in 19 countries of Africa through its council of Foreign Economic Relations.

Agreements on trade and economic relations have also been signed between Turkey and African states to promote the existence of a strong mutual partnership between the regions. The trade volume between the two regions, therefore, has increased three times from 2003 to 2015, i.e. from \$6 billion (2003) to \$17.5 billion (2015) (Jia, 2016, p. 57).

Turkey has also remained consistent in its shares and involvement in the total trade of the African continent with its contractors among major undertakers. Their current investments total up to \$55 billion with over 1,150 projects all across Africa.

Turkey also has other investments in various African countries that require a local force of labor, use of homemade raw materials and exporting to other third world nations. This makes Turkey create more job opportunities than any other foreign country with direct investments in Africa (reports by the Financial Times of October 2015). In total, Turkey's investment in the continent is estimated to approximately \$.2 billion all across Africa (Yel, 2009, p. 1).

#### **5.4.3. Development Assistance.**

Turkey employs a more holistic approach to offering humanitarian and developmental aids to African nations in need of it. By sharing its experience on development, expertise and offering solutions the country political and social challenges, it improves its communication and partnership with the host country.

Currently, Turkey is among the leading foreign nations offering humanitarian assistance to Africa with its main agency TIKA operating 15 offices of program coordination in Africa. According to the report by the World Humanitarian Assistance, its total net disbursement amounted to \$3.3 billion in 2014 as ODA (Official Development Assistance) i.e. 0.42% of the Gross National Income. Of this, Africa received a total of \$383.3 million (\$153.6 to sub-Saharan Africa) making Turkey the third largest donor to Africa in terms of humanitarian and development aids in the whole world (Savas & Oguzhan, 2014, p. 18).

African students have also benefited much from Turkish scholarship programs. For instance, from 1991 to 2014, 4380 scholarships were awarded, but this also has increased much such that, 2015/2016 academic year only, witnessed 1239 scholarships granted to African students across Africa (Tihanyi, Pedersen, Devinney & Banalieva, 2015, p. 14). Currently, 543 students are in Turkey's colleges, universities, and 11 professors visiting from Africa through the scholarship programs. Turkey also, through its various ministries and institutions, organizes training programs for many African nations e.g. Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Sudan. A clear example of such training programs is the International Young Diplomats Training Program, which is organized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Mehmet Akgün, 2010, p. 533).



#### **5.4.5. Security Cooperation**

To Turkey, peace in Africa is very important. That is why it provides deployments for peace missions by the United Nations. Presently, Turkey is providing financial and personnel to Africa's peacekeeping missions such as UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMID in Darfur, MINUSMA in Mali, UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire, MONUSCO in Congo, and UNMISS in South Sudan. In addition to this, Turkey has been offering police training to counterpart countries in Africa. This training of personnel is done by the National Police of Turkey. There has also been the training of military personnel from Africa. Turkey had trained about 2022 military personnel from Africa by the end of 2014 (Savas & Oguzhan, 2014, p. 18). Progressively, the number of trainees has gradually increased to a point where the about 570 were recruited in 2015 (Tihanyi, et al., 2015, p. 21). This is expected to increase gradually in the coming years.

#### **5.4.6. Cooperation in Health Sector**

The area of health is the other area where Turkey has used to reinforce its links with Africa. Its foreign policy for Africa has enabled it to venture into the health sector in Africa as part of its humanitarian assistance initiative. Turkey has entered into cooperation agreements on health with about 20 nations from Africa. There have been several screening programs by Turkish doctors in various African countries since

2007. These programs have been organized by TIKA, Turkish Ministry of Health and other NGOs from Turkey. Statistics show that close to 300,000 patients had been screened by 2014, 53,000 of whom were operated on for cataract treatment. About 600 health professionals, 500 doctors and 100 health personnel, have been involved in the exercise that spanned about 20 countries in Africa. All the 600 health professionals were from Turkey (Kilinc, 2009, p. 3). In the Africa Cataract Project which has been rolled out in four African countries, Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, and Sudan, has seen 21,600 cataract patients treated in 2015 only. Additionally, the Turkish government has been giving further treatment in Turkey for patients who cannot be treated in their home African countries. Turkey's foreign policy has established a framework of emergency humanitarian assistance and bilateral agreements. This framework has resulted in the treatment of over 1000 patients in

Turkey, who could not be treated in their countries in Africa (Tihanyi, et al., 2015, p. 25).

The Ministry of Health in Turkey has gone a step further by instituting a vocational training in health matters within African countries. This is a vital component of cooperation in the area of health between Turkey and Africa. One such initiative was launched in Sudan. A hospital with a capacity of 150 beds was built in Nyala by TIKA. It was dubbed Turkish-Sudanese Research and Training Hospital. This health project with launched its operation in February 2014 is scheduled to run for five years under the joint supervision of the Sudanese Ministry of Health and Turkey (Tihanyi, et al., 2015, p. 27). After the five years, the project will be fully run by the government of Sudan. The other megaproject that Turkey has spearheaded in line with its foreign policy implementation in Africa is the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital. This is the largest hospital in Somalia with about 200-bed capacity. It was built and equipped by Turkey. President Erdoğan was present to open it officially on January 25, 2015 during a formal visit to Somalia. Turkey has also ventured into the health sector of Africa's youngest nation, South Sudan. In Juba, it constructed the Educational Hospital (Tihanyi, et al., 2015, p. 28). In Ethiopia, Turkey's health ministry constructed the Black Lion Hospital in the capital city, Addis Ababa. One of the prominent doctrines of Turkey's policy towards Africa is the humanitarian diplomacy. As an endorsement of this attribute and the role that Turkey is playing, the authorities of the United Nations chose to hold the First World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, in 2016 (Tihanyi, et al., 2015, p. 30).

#### **5.4.7. Turkish Airlines**

The Turkish Airline has become a significant player in the world air transport. With 48 destinations in about 31 nations, it has become a critical connector of Africa to the world. The direct flights from Turkey to Africa have increased the connection between people. This has translated to increased number of business people, tourists and students travelling to both countries. A look at the last eight years reveals a quadrupled number of visitors from Africa to Turkey. The number increased from about 210,000 tourists in 2006 to about 885,000 tourists in 2015 (Tihanyi, Pedersen, Devinney & Banalieva, 2015).

In over 20 years had never been served by a major carrier. In 2012, however, Turkish Airlines became the first with four flights in a week. Turkish Airline had undertaken

rehabilitative efforts to install air traffic control and other security features in the airport. The Airlines have tapped the growing tourist travel and business in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is quite notable considering that presently 26 countries in Africa are served by the airline as compared to the four; Khartoum, Johannesburg, Lagos, and Addis Ababa, in 2008 (Jia, 2016).

#### **5.4.8. Cultural Cooperation**

Turkey's foreign policy touching on cultural cooperation with Africa has grown very lenient. It has even abolished visas for Africans who have diplomatic passports. Tourists and business people with other passports for countries such as the US, UK and a valid Schengen can conveniently obtain visas from the Istanbul Ataturk Airport. This shows acceptance of the Africans and is a welcome gesture for the continent that depicts trust. In Sudan's capital Khartoum, a cultural center, the Turkish Cultural Center was established by the Yunus Emre Association. There are future prospects of establishing such centers in Gambia, Niger, Djibouti and Pretoria (Altunişik Tur, 200 , p. 3).

## **6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

### **6.1. Conclusion**

The main question that this thesis has attempted to respond to is why Turkey wants to cooperate with the African continent and the potential benefits both ways. Turkey has been known to focus more of its international relations with the European Union, Middle East, USA, Balkans, and Caucasians. Therefore, its opening up to Africa is a significant development. However, as discussed earlier, such relationships between Turkey and Africa existed in during the Ottoman Empire era, especially with North Africa. Presently, the relations between Africa and Turkey are between individual African countries. With the spread of globalization, Turkey is reorienting herself by developing stronger political and economical ties with Africa. While it may be globalization that is pushing Turkey to established links with Africa, there is more because there have been increased high-profile visits between African countries and Turkey. Additionally, the number of trade engagements between these countries has been on a steady increase. Studies show that Africa requires more investment. Analysis of the Turkish foreign policy towards Africa shows that it is nationally driven, guided by domestic politics and historical legacies. Turkish relations with Africa have been undergoing various adaptive policy changes. Through the input of state and non-state actors, the government of Turkey has seen increased presence and cooperative association with several African countries. Although there is non-state actors with whom the government of Turkey is not in agreement with, the overall progress has been towards developing a bond that opens up Africa to Turkey in a mutually beneficial manner. Emphasis has shifted away from the decision-making process to the implementation of foreign policy, but there is a little study on this area. This paper addressed this lagging by focusing on the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. From a post-international standpoint, interactions between state and non-state actors were analyzed in different spheres. It was identified

that SFAs who are the non-state actors have a greater responsibility increasingly in the course of realizing foreign policy objectives.

SBA establish rules through transport, visa, and trade agreements, besides making decisions on foreign policy. They also give expertise and funds from the public kitty to SFAs. At later stages of implementation, however, the support ceases as SFAs stabilize in later implementation phases. The SFAs from Turkey have become increasingly proactive following their heightened expertise and widened international networks. Such confidence and independence by the SFAs is drawn from previous engagements in collaborative projects involving state and non-state actors. The non-state actors who get more adept in working with state actors get at the forefront in taking initiatives.

This study agreed with the post-international view that non-state actors are more efficient at exploiting current technologies and adapting to situations because they are less bureaucratic and non-hierarchical. This is what has contributed to their domination in the issues of foreign policy implementation. However, the constructive collaboration between SBAs and SFAs had synergy effect on their efficiency. The SFAs are able to reach more target countries and increase the number of activities. Predictably, the state actors of Turkey will increasingly depend on the non-state actors who are widening their scope of resourcefulness. On the opposite end, conflictual interaction is more likely as the local and international publics develop an interest in Turkey's foreign policy toward Africa.

Turkey's opening to Africa plan of 2005, viewed as an extension of the 1990 "African Action Plan", had great impacts in Africa in terms of increasing the figures of trade, opening of new embassies and boosting political relations. However much the Turkish economy strengthening dynamism has been and is still supported very much by African opening plan, Turkey has also received many obstacles posed by it. In order for Turkey to overcome these constrains, there is need to customize to each country the action plan applied for the whole continent. There is also need to consider differences in terms of regional and national basis. Otherwise, instruments of foreign policy, which may not work for Uganda, Algeria or Ivory Coast, may work smoothly for South Africa. In addition, when having problems, either current or potential, making contingency plans or strategies is very necessary. Lastly changing

the pejorative and stereotypical perceptions of Africa in Turkey requires appropriate national programming.

There are several reasons making Turkey's operations in Africa unique as compared to other actors. First, Turkey provides aid to Africa in a very distinctive way. That is, ranging from education to infrastructure, Turkey aims at establishing long-term development projects. Second, trust in Turkey, its citizens and activities in Africa have been boosted by Turkey's religion. The religion has also enabled Turkey enter legitimately in areas the Westerners and other actors may not be allowed. Third, mushrooming of Turkish educational schools has helped much in providing the future generations with education necessary for Africa to stand on its own. These Turkish schools therefore are like the 19th and 20th century schools, which molded many African leaders, presidents, intellectuals and many activists. In future years, this education system will most probably bring change and shape the continent's social dynamics.

Turkey's domestic peace has also been promoted by the plan of opening to Africa. It is the Turkish foreign policy area that has raised no disagreement between Turkish business sectors, the civil society and the state in general.

Putting the unique aspect aside, the depth and persistence of Turkey's socio-political long run in Africa not only depends on the increasing trade between the two regions but also to Turkey's ability in helping Africa find the solution to its problems, as in the case of Somalia. If the attention to Somalia is aimed at bringing peace and success, then Turkey will join France, United States of America and United Kingdom in viewing Africa in both political and economical aspect rather than countries like Brazil, India, and China that only view the continent from an economical point of view. The experience of Turkey in Somalia not only tests its relations with Somalia alone, but also is a wider test to its relations with Africa as a whole. Thus, its results will shape the continent's perspective of Turkey in future.

## **6.2. Recommendation**

There is need for the Turkish Republic to increase the number of their representative offices in Africa. They should not focus only on the African countries with which they share a historical past but even on other African countries.

Cooperation at the university level between Turkey and African countries is vital for the cementing of relations between the countries. Turkey and countries in Africa should therefore put adequate measure in place that will boost the mutual cooperation between the Turkish and African universities. The number of African students who are studying in Turkish universities is substantial, however, there is need to initiate a programs where Turkish students study in African universities. This would enhance the ties between African countries and Turkey.

Turkey and African countries should take the initiative of introduction projects. These introduction projects should be aimed at introducing Turkey to African countries in a proper way and vice versa.

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Thesis: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Africa

## **EXPERIENCE**

2015-2016 5th International Students' Day at Istanbul Aydin University

2015-2016 Participation at Ottoman Hapsburg And Vatican Conference

2009-2011 Network Maintaining and Advisor on Communication and Marketing at Dakumawa Company in Niger

2008-2009 Participation at inepo Eurasia in Azerbaijan with the 3<sup>rd</sup> place

## **SKILLS AND ACTIVITIES**

Software MS-Office, Lexis-Nexis, Blender, Drupal CMS, Raiser's Edge

Languages English, Turkish, French, Haussa, Djerma, Fulani

Activities Member of Lions Club International

Interests Football and Music