

T.R.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RESOLUTION OF
NATIONAL CONFLICTS. A CASE STUDY: CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC (CAR) FROM 2010 TO PRESENT.**

THESIS

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Department of Political Science and International Relations
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Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Gökhan DUMAN

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T.C.
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ONAY FORMU

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original of this thesis. (.. /.. /2018)

Jean Claude NDI

FOREWORD

This thesis is written in completion of Master's Program in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. The research is focused on "A Comparative Analysis of Role of International and Regional Organizations in Resolving Conflicts: Case Central African Republic from 2010 to present". It tries to analyze the various roles international and regional organizations play in resolving conflicts highlighting how both organizations can work together in maintaining peace in the world. It also included other political actors like sub regional organizations and states who all play key roles in conflict resolution pointing out of the challenges these actors generally face in trying to resolve conflicts. Looking at the world today it is very important for such organizations and actors to work together in preserving human life and prevent conflicts.

If I have learned not to give up despite all the educational and life obstacles, it was because I leaned on a handful of individuals and groups to whom I am deeply indebted. My profound appreciation goes to my supervisor Assist. Prof Gökhan DUMAN whose ideas, criticisms, guidance, encouragement and devotion spurred me, and gave the shape of this study. Despite his tight schedule, he created appropriate time to guide me, read carefully through my manuscript, making necessary corrections and observations, making sure I was on the right tract. I will say he was more of an Elder brother and care taker than just a supervisor.

My sincere gratitude and appreciation goes to my beloved parents, my grandparents, uncles, aunts and most especially my elder brother Mr. Lafon Ernest Ndze and wife Mrs. Mayaah Lafon. My siblings and wonderful friends like; Atabong Therence Njuafac, Mbinka Lawrence etc for their relentless encouragement, moral and financial assistance for this exercise. My profound gratitude also goes to the staff of Istanbul Aydin University; ISSA, ERASMUS Office and International Students Office staff. Above all, greatest thanks go to GOD/ALLAH Almighty for protection and guidance throughout the entire course, and His marvelous deeds in my education and life. I wish that this thesis will be useful for researchers in further study on fields related to this topic.

September 2018

Jean Claude NDI

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFTA	: ASEAN Free Trade Area
ARF	: ASEAN Regional Forum
APEC	: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
A2K	: The Alliance of Revival and Rebuilding
Anti-Balaka	: Anti-Machete
ACP	: Association of Central African Farmers
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	: African Union
CAR	: Central African Republic
CGDK	: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea CGDK
CPT	: Communist Party of Thailand
CPP	: Cambodian People's Party
CEP	: Provisional Elections Council
CPJP	: Convention the Patriote pour la Justice et la Paix
CPSK	: The Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country
CEMAC	: Central African Economic and Minatory Community
CLMV	: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
DK	: Democratic Kampuchea
ECCAS	: Economic Community of Central African States
EUFOR RCA	: European Forces for Central African Republic
ECHO	: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.
EU	: European Union
FDPC	: Democratic Front for the Central African People
FIDH	: International Federation for Human rights (FIDH).
FACA	: Central African Armed forces (In French,Force Armees CA)
FROCCA	: Front for the Return of the Constitutional Order in CAR
CSS	: Community of Sahel State
HRC	: The Commission on Human Rights
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
IDP	: Internally Displaced People
JIM	: Jakarta Informal Meetings
KUFNS	: Kampuchea United front for National Salvation
KPNLF	: Khmer People's National Liberation Front
LOC	: Cease fire line or Line of Control
MICOPAX	: Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique.
MISCA	: The African Led International Support to the Central African
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NTC	: National Transitional Council
OAS	: Organization of American States.
OAS-DEMOC	: Organization of American States Democratic Chatter
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Conference
PKR	: People's Republic of Kampuchea

SAARC	: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SRP	: Sam Rainsy Party
SEANWFZ	: Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free
TAC	: Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
UFR	: The Union of Republican forces
UFDR	: Union de force Democratic pour le Rassemblement
UFDR	: Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UN	: United Nations
UNBRO	: UN Border Relief Organization
UNDP	: United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	: United Nations Children Emergency Fund
UNTAC	: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia UNHCR
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WFP	: World Food Program
ZOPFAN	: Zone for Peace Freedom and Neutrality

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RESOLUTION OF NATIONAL CONFLICTS. A CASE STUDY: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) FROM 2010 TO PRESENT.

ABSTRACT

This thesis focused on analyzing the comparative roles of international and regional organizations in resolving national conflicts with focus on Central African Republic (CAR) from 2010 to present. It examines the role of UN and AU Resolving Intrastate conflicts in CAR on the one hand and gives an overview on how both organizations can work together in resolving ethnic conflicts. It equally depicts the major roles of international organizations like UN with its resources and how vital it can be in resolving such conflicts not leaving out its shortcomings. We will also see AU as a regional organization with available potentials and how effective it can contribute to resolving conflicts and some of the challenges it faces with reference to the intrastate conflict in CAR. It should be noted that the researcher shall also pay attention to major key actors like states and how they can assist and cooperate with both international regional and sub regional organization in managing conflicts.

Keywords: *International Organizations, Regional Organizations, Sub Regional Organizations, Africa, Powerful States, Central African Republic.*

ÇATIŞMALARIN ÇÖZÜMÜNDE ULUSLARARASI VE BÖLGESEL ÖRGÜTLERİN ROLLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ. VAKA ANALİZİ: 2010'DAN 2017'YE KADAR ORTA AFRIKA CUMHURİYETİ.

ÖZET

Bu tez, Afrika Cumhuriyetinde 2010'dan bugüne kadar olan ulusal çatışmaların çözümünde uluslararası ve bölgesel örgütlerin karşılaştırmalı rollerini analiz etmeye odaklanmıştır. Bu çalışma bir yandan Orta Afrika Cumhuriyetinin eyalet içinde ki olan çatışmalarını çözmek için Birleşmiş Milletler ve Afrika Birliğinin oynadığı rolleri inceler ve aynı zamanda bu iki örgütün etnik çatışmaları çözmek için nasıl beraber çalışabileceğine dair genel bir bakış sunar. Aynı şekilde BM gibi uluslararası örgütlerin önemli rollerini ve bu tür çatışmaları çözmek için ne kadar hayati bir öneme sahip olduğunu eksikliklerini göz ardı etmeden eşit bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca, Afrika Birliğini mevcut potansiyelleri olan bölgesel bir organizasyon olarak göreceğiz ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyetindeki eyalet içi çatışmalarına atıfta bulunularak karşılaştığı çatışmaların ve bazı zorlukların çözümüne nasıl katkıda bulunabileceğini göreceğiz. Ayrıca, devletler gibi önemli kilit aktörlerin çatışmaların yönetilmesinde hem uluslararası bölgesel hem de alt bölgesel örgütlere nasıl yardımcı olabileceklerine ve işbirliği yapabileceklerine dikkat edeceğim de not edilmelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Uluslararası Organizasyon Bölgesel Organizasyon, Alt-Bölgesel organizasyon, Afrika, Güçlü Devle*

1. INTRODUCTION

From its creation, the United Nations (UN) have as main objective to maintain world peace and security. While the African union (AU) was also created to promote corporation, peace and development of Africa. It is worth noting that the UN and AU have been influential in resolving conflicts elsewhere in Africa like in Sudan and Ivory Coast. This thesis therefore attempts to transfuse into the academic effort the role of UN and AU in resolving conflicts with a paramount subject matter in that it seeks to explain how these two organizations can work together towards resolving the conflict In CAR and why it is difficult at some point for International organizations and regional Organizations to achieve a peaceful deal without each other.

Most academic works on the role played by international and regional organizations have traditionally focused on the separate roles the UN and AU play in conflict resolution. International and regional organizations have all played vital roles in conflicts resolutions but the idea of both organizations working together remains questionable in most studies and academic works. This thesis therefore focuses on analyzing the comparative roles of the UN and AU in resolving national conflict with the focal point being the crisis in the CAR from 2010 to present relating to how both organizations can work together in managing future conflicts in Africa. Also this write-up highlights how the UN can work with other regional organizations in the world in managing conflicts.

The relationship between UN and AU in the 21st century is among the vital aspects in current world politics. Cooperation between these organizations stands out to be strategic and pivotal in resolving conflicts not only in CAR but also in the entire continent of Africa. Looking at the activities of the UN working as a mediator in many conflicts around the world and likewise other regional organizations in the world, AU, therefore, is not an exception and should for these reasons work in

collaboration with the UN in resolving national conflicts. The objective of this thesis is to analyze and compare the roles of UN and AU in resolving the conflicts in the CAR from 2010 to present and how both organizations can work together in resolving other Conflicts with respect to their resources and capabilities. The findings of this thesis will also try to show how UN being the main international organization can work with other regional organizations in resolving conflicts in other parts of the world with respect to available resources from both organizations.

This thesis is segmented into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic with the two major organizations involved in resolving the conflicts in the CAR: that is UN and AU not leaving out other sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Central African Economic and Minatory Community (CEMAC). This component also defines major concepts such as international organizations, regional organizations, and sub-regional organizations giving examples from Africa and the world at large. The second chapter anchor on the literature review recounting what other scholars have written on the roles of International and regional organizations in conflicts resolution.

The third chapter represents historical framework: Stages of the Conflicts in the Central African Republic from Independence to present. This component further indicates the various armed groups that were involved in the crisis from 2010 to present, the reasons they were involved and those that constituted the various groups.

Chapter four which is the last but one chapter talks about the efforts that were made at resolving this conflict in CAR or how the international community responded to the crisis Analyzing the various efforts and role played by State Actors, inter-regional, regional and international organizations. This chapter further reveals to the readers the relationship and clash of interest among these actors in the course of resolving the crisis.

Chapter five the last and conclusive chapter points out possible ways in which international and regional organizations can cooperate in resolving national conflicts with respect to their available resources and positions without any clash of interest and thus save the human race from future conflicts.

A qualitative method is employed in this thesis and the researcher focuses on content analysis and symmetrically assess past available literature on the topic. Secondary data analysis is used in this thesis, and it is entitled to analyze vividly the roles the UN and AU played in the crisis in the Central African Republic. In this research, articles, conference, presentations, newspapers, official sources, reports, and news announcement at the websites of both UN and AU is used.

This thesis will be structured into five main chapters: The first Chapter will be Introduction of the crisis in CAR outlining the various reasons for the escalating conflicts from 2010 to present as seen above, the second chapter dwells on literature review or what other school of thoughts have written with regards to the various roles of international and regional organizations in resolving conflicts, chapters three will further expatiate on the methodology, Chapter four will point out how the UN and AU have contributed in resolving the crisis in Central African Republic and chapter five which is the last chapter will present various ways through which UN and AU could work together to resolve intrastate conflict in Central African Republic.

Many might be eager to know why delimit the time frame for this thesis from 2010 to present despite the long history of internal conflicts in CAR. The reason is that life in CAR witnessed a drastic change with the creation of the Seleka group, the anti-Balaka, the interventions of AU through it MISCA operation and the coming into play of MINUSCA the UN led multidimensional task force to resolve the crisis in CAR. This period constituted the apex of the conflict in CAR.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SAMPLE CASES

Many theories have striven to explain the effective roles of international and regional Organization in resolving national conflicts. Even though literature covers a vast periphery of such theories, this review hub on three main theories that will unfold repeatedly throughout the literature review. These propositions are incorporated into the roles of international and regional organizations and how both can work together in resolving intrastate conflicts.

It should be noted that the UN is the world's major inter-governmental organization with its prime objective to enhance international cooperation and encourage international order. Due to too many confrontations in the world today and the profuse of UN activities, it has triggered a lot of scholars to advocate the importance of regional organizations to assist in promoting peace and security in the world. According to Article 52 of the UN charter, it states that interstate disputes could be settled at the regional level before being referred to the UN and this resolutions through the Security Council can be considered only when the regional or sub regional attempts fail to yield dividend (Thi 2002). While the UN charter in resolution 53 states vividly that the Security Council can work and use regional treaties and institutions to foster and promote peace.

Jenny Gustafsson in his book published in 2007 creates a substructure looked at the normative and constructive conceptions through which the UN can act to deter and resolve violence. This findings were segmented in to two viewpoints: The first part was derived from the Joseph Nye's analytic framework and gave a lamp light of the research and findings available for the reasons of most ethnic wars. From these findings, three main reasons were developed; society in transition, structural inequality and Poverty. The second section comprised of both normative and constructive methods, with the use of two extreme circles of findings. The normative

ption discourses how war deterrence should be and the UN moral position in such a case. The constructive chapter discourse UN available resource and limitations taking into account conflict deterrence and to what extent the UN should assist to address the problems listed in the already seen sector (Poverty, inequality and societal transformation). The conclusion drawn from the analysis is that the UN possesses the know-how, experience and functioning capability to redress such issues, also highlighting the fact that there are some problems concerning the UN as an institution and its member which often makes it cumbersome for the organization to efficiently use the resources it has to deter and resolve deathly ethnic wars (Gustafsson 2007).

He focused on armed intrastate conflicts of ethno-political structure and how such conflicts can be prevented. Intrastate conflicts whatever their character poses a great threat to the global body through its world effect instigated by the media broadcast, huge movement of displaced people and the spread of conflicts to nearby countries. In addition, intrastate wars have after the cold war exceeded interstate wars (Peck 1998). These trends therefore explain how important it is to stress on how vital it is to deter and resolve intrastate wars in the scholarly world as well as in the practice of politics: should there be a means of curtailing the spread and occurrence of wars, as implied by the evolution of time, then conflicts prevention and resolution ought to be of priority. This study aimed at highlighting how inter-state and intra-states wars (called national conflicts and international conflicts), since when wars broke out they promote torture, killing, destruction of property, hardship and deaths like the situation with the genocide that took place in Rwanda and the massive killings in former Yugoslavia.

At the end of WW II, the pioneer members of the UN aimed at promoting the idea of world peace and cooperation at a new and large scale. The understanding of peace is considered a necessary tool for long-lasting security and evolution; considering all as valuable factors to resolve and deter conflict. The states are all looked upon as having first priority to enhance and as promoter of human rights with responsibility to protect first its citizens but when the state fails the international community has a moral obligation to react. This doesn't only apply through its commitment carried out with regards to human rights drive, it is often also seen as

part of its moral attempt to the problems of particular attributes present day intra-state wars possess. Summarily the international bodies have as top priority to ensure security to the common man when the regime in which they harbor have failed to protect them in time of desperation. Among other issues, the most pertinent point of this moral commitment of nation states is the authority to deter and or stop wars. This is seen as the base of evolutionary rational of human beings and experienced learned from past wars through which hundreds of thousands to millions of lives have been wasted despite the ability of the international institutions or body to deter such incidents (Peck 1998). Given that conflicts prevention and resolution are laudably considered acceptable, it is therefore imperative to acknowledge that which ought to be done to deter national or inter-states wars.

The UN possesses the strength to redress pertinent issues more or less effective looking at the resources got. Gustafsson further in his study argue factually that this organization that is UN and it diverse offices and missions, most particularly the UNDP got the experience, Know-how and functional powers to redress the problems present in within ethnic wars situations. For these reasons the relevance this organization is indicated as a platform to look for means of deterring and resolve ethnic wars through which pertinent questions can be answered through constructive rational. However, the author also points out several difficulties that impede the optimistic views of the UN as a main platform of structural war deterrence looking at them from internal and external views: The internal difficulties are those found inside the organization itself; lack of normative scheme, no decisive authority and there is the absence of corporation and consistency among its various offices. One key obstacle is the contradiction among the states as being elementary actors and their obligation to provide security for its citizens (Boutros 1992).

The external difficulties concern UN's member states. Even though they have as moral responsibility to resolve some pertinent points, they sporadically to some very little outstanding act in such directions, as earlier indicated above, the UN seems not to have greater influence over most concerns than it member countries and such member countries in turn to pursue their private political objectives. This puts much blockade to UN's functions in attempt to promote a level playground for a transparent international scene. It's also decrease some chances of a culture to

resolve or prevent or resolve since the eventual obligation for application depends on these countries that makeup the organization. One hopeful developmental advancement is the view that the habit to deter is arising in the UN, both its security council and UNGA are cultivating political will to regularize it (Gustafsson 2007). This school of thought also agree to that these mother institution has the functional powers through it diverse offices, know-how, resources, finance with a vital background to be able to carry it functions at full scale, even though due to the organizations limitations (internal and external difficulties), it thus finds it difficult to perform it duties using their potentials in its entirety.

Another writer by name Thi Hai Yen Nguyen expresses his thoughts that by the time the cold war came to an end, international interactions ceased to capitalize on the by-polar clashes among the super powers (USA and USSR), paving the chance for regional blocs providing them with a direct possibility to take a lead role in war resolution and cooperating with UN as a normative expectation of the global body increases while super powers arbitration in territorial rivalry decreases (Thi 2002). The pertinent scenario he cited in his article included the contributions of the Organization of American States (OAS) as an attempt to resolve the chaos in Haiti and the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the crisis in Cambodia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Yugoslavia.

In the course of the Cold War, there were some level of conflict proliferation with motivation and contributions from either United States of America (USA) or Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (Soviet Union). These situation projected almost every confrontation to a near war situation between the super powers from the background. Most confrontations at the by-polar era erupted among members of same regional organizations. Such members often feel reluctant to resolve their differences within same regional organizations due to the fact that they are afraid of being deceived by others members. As such, territorial organization functioned at a very low level with limited chances of making only their good offices to disputant.

One could therefore affirm that the UN luxuriate in all alone in crisis resolution arbitration, peace keeping and may be through persuasive armed interventions. When the by-polar era came to a halt, regional organizations got the opportunity to lead in

conflict resolution as the polarization confrontation between the two super powers died a natural death. Regional organizations could therefore participate in conflicts management separately with little corporation with the UN as a standardized expectation from global institutions skyrocketed while super powers arbitration influence in territorial crisis greatly dropped.

With a shift from bipolar to multi-polar system, regional organizations had a new role to play beyond providing disputant with simply good offices. ASEAN besides facilitating negotiations was also a third party mediator. The OAS restore democracy and promoted human rights in member states. In Africa, The ECOWAS had as a new responsibility to prevent and resolve regional conflicts. In addition, the AU teamed up with the UN in a joint peace keeping mission in and NATO and Western European union championed the resolution van of the crisis in Yugoslavia with UN permission by 1993 to 1996 (Malone 2008).

As mentioned earlier, I will focus on ASEAN and OAS who after close examination was viewed as functional and efficient during the Haitian and Cambodian crisis. Thanks to geographical nearness in these conflict areas, these organizations were able to act and establish peace, respect for human and people's rights and security in their regions. Due to differences in size and capacity and the different qualities with purview of each conflicts, OAS like ASEAN adopted varied means of crisis management and both attained their objectives: Autonomy to the Cambodians through the ballot box and reinstating representative government in Haiti (Gillian 2002).

Comparatively, it can be analyzed with the situations of ASEAN and OAS that regional Organizations could assist in promoting safety and tranquility and peace in the entire globe. If regional organizations have become very productive in managing conflicts, certain conditions are required. Examining the contributions and outcomes of ASEAN and the OAS in managing the crisis in Cambodia and Haiti, it empowers the endorsement for the subsequent parts to be played by regional organizations throughout the world.

Determinants for essential regional organizations engagements, Thi Hai Yen Nguyen outlined some constrains required for regional Organizations in order for them to be

efficient and functional their part during crisis management and resolutions: Legitimacy, Enforcement power, Resource allocation and cooperating together with other international organizations and world super states (Thi 2002).

Legitimacy: This point within this context is global acceptance. Deeds with behavior of the mediator arbitrating to manage the crisis should always go along in consonance with the UN constitutions, global regulations, and diplomatic assemblies. Such constitutions permit regional treaties and regional institutions in settling local and ethnic crisis. It is worth noting that these same constitutions together with other global rules and the constitutions of most regional blocs, stops mediation into other states concerns, indicating the negative persuasion through high pressure, including economic punishments is considered unconstitutional apart from self-determination (Tavares 2009).

Such conditions of international recognition could therefore be acceptable if regional blocs have the authorization from the UN Security Council. UN Security Council has the independent mandate to either accept if a current crisis demands arbitration and if intimidating (coercive diplomacy) methods could be vital in preserving safety and peace as stipulated by the UN charter. However, as a result of the lengthy decisions making process, the capacity to vote against (Veto power) of five permanent states with the varying perspective of states of the UN Security Council regarding the part to be played by regional blocs in conflicts resolution has been a problem. Hence it's often challenging for regional blocs to get the authorization which is required to mediate in managing national conflicts at it initial level (Ho-Won 2017).

Enforcement Power: Enforcement power in this context is the ability to implement safety strategies in order to efficiently pass on resolutions arrived at to those involve in conflicts. For example, coercive diplomacy method: Ban, restrains and blockade to detach and cripple the parties involved. This point is vital because it is needed throughout the crisis management process trying to convince rivalries to cooperate at the start of the conflicts and to enable that both camps come to terms agreeing to take their responsibilities at the end of such crisis or conflicts (Thi 2002).

Regrettably it is often complicated and challenging for these regional blocs to have such qualities. UN authorizes regional blocs to implement violent or coercive actions acting with authorized support of territorial treaties due to the points which shows they are acting as tools for the UN Security Council. More so, since regional blocs are regularly headed by superior regional powers, petit states in most cases are afraid agreements of such giant countries in the region can affect their interest. Consequently, most regional blocs resolutions are usually taken through concord or may not be bidding by other countries. Such occurrences vividly compromise regional organizations implementation capacity principally where it tries to manage crisis were a country involved is not a member state (Tavares 2009).

Resources: For Regional organization to be able to intervene and resolve intrastate conflicts, it should be able to finance the safety operations by covering a larger part of the total cost. At first, wealth was needed for soft diplomacy and administrative procedures. Where conflicts management is achieved, finance and administrative work is required in order to carryout safety agreements, enable and observe democratic values and recollect weapons from groups fighting. Furthermore, huge sums of money is often needed to assist affected communities, and to take care of such an amount of money required for rebuilding and peace agendas. Such activities demand and absorb valuable hours and material including finances as mentioned above.

Cooperation: Lastly, preconditions required for efficient regional efforts is working together with the UN as a team and other main super countries. Knowledge and revelations at the by-polar era revealed that with the absence of main super states support to regional blocs, they simply play a minor part in crisis management. It is worth noting that many regional blocs are often ready, capable and also moved to partake in resolving conflicts but are hindered by the small nature of their membership within the organization, the exclusion manner in which some members go through and the discrimination they face in analyzing (Thi 2002). UN and the main super powers working together will boost their current ready to be used materials, helps legally recognize their activities and give them more powers and integrity. Experience have also shown that involvement of UN is of advantage since the organization possess the substantial capital and the reputation required in solving

conflicts. In this regard therefore, the necessity for regional blocs to closely cooperate in line for super powers and UN to increase their bargaining chip with disputant, gain access to auxiliary capital and provide additional enforcement strength ability and strength (Tavares 2009).

Even though cooperation, enforcement, and legitimacy, are vital while creating an efficient conflicts management though often difficult to these regional blocs procuring complete prerequisite. Referring to the conflicts in Cambodia and Haiti, one can assess the level to which ASEAN and OAS met the above conditions and how this affected Organizations approach, efforts and contributions to the settlement of the two conflicts in question.

2.1 The Role of ASEAN in the Cambodia Crisis.

Born by 1967, ASEAN has as main objectives to enhance economic solidarity and amicable resolution of crisis among its member countries. Notwithstanding its authorization, ASEAN had no crisis management system or application power. However, the coming of ZOPFAN agreement, members officially termed ASEAN the zone for peace, flexibility and noninterference demanding that all members must intervene in other member's internal squabbles. When conflicts in Cambodia erupted, ASEAN comprised of just five member states with Indonesia as the largest member and was the world fourth largest most populated country. Other members included Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand though it independence came later (Thai 2002.)

The Cambodian conflicts was an intra-state conflicts which comprised of four local fighting groups tussling for administrative power and global realization, The conflict skyrocketed by 1978 during which Vietnamese soldiers with demand of Kampuchea United front for National Salvation (KUFNS) and as a means of retaliation to the confrontations by the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) at the Vietnams south west boundaries instigated a total combat advancement attacking the ruling Khmer Rouge (Le Billo 2002). It took the Vietnamese three weeks to get Phnom Penh to assist in restoring the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Some school of thoughts termed it as a proxy war because China and Vietnam stood for the PRD and the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia. Thus it's imperative to know that

Cambodia, be it China or Vietnam were not members of the ASEAN during these conflicts. Due to international and local variations of the clashes and targeted killings of the Khmer Rouge which took the lives of up to 1.5 million Kampuchians from 1975 and 1978, it was therefore difficult to resolve the Cambodian conflicts by installing the governing regime. Hence managing the crisis was therefore to put in place a strategy on which individual or group of individuals should govern Cambodia at the end of the war negotiating for a partition of authority in the government in a treaty which can be unanimously recognized and mandated to all groups involved with foreign bodies inclusive.

When Vietnamese troops marched into Cambodia, the ASEAN standing committee at the time published some declarations which hinted at intensifying the already existing crisis in Indochina demanding for respect and acceptance of the UN constitution together with the Bandung Declarations. The ASEAN continuously mounted pressure on the Security Council to talk on and analyze the crisis for necessary procedures to be taken and respected. The ASEAN's policy maintains their views on the point which stated the illegal and unlawful interference of Vietnam. Irrespective of the protracted crisis and confrontations which sufficed with Cambodia and Vietnam before the Vietnam's interference, ASEAN stood state-fast in its stands on the unlawful Vietnam's troops present in Cambodia.

Among the majority of prosperous strategies the ASEAN's adopted in attempt to manage the crisis was the fact that it made proper application of the UN offices in backing up the point that Vietnam's troops in Cambodia were unlawful. They stood firm in acknowledging the Democratic Kampuchea government at the UN general assembly. They continuously urged for a complete and prompt removal of all foreign forces in Cambodia pleading for a global meeting with aim at gaining a post conflict resolution and UN financed election in the country. Looking for means of firmly holding their stands, the Heng Samrin government in 1981 conducted an election. The ASEAN refused the holding of any vote affirming the views that it was to force Cambodians to agree an international sponsored government. Refusing to go for such an election, they requested the UN general assembly resolution which will decide a valid and long lasting solution to the conflict with a UN sponsored election.

The UN by July 1981 sponsored an international conference on the Kampuchea and this conference took place in New York with ASEAN as a key participant. The resolutions arrived at called for a cease fire from both sides, withdrawal of all foreign forces, and putting in place security measures to prevent armed factions from disrupting the elections under the supervision of UN.

ASEAN succeeded in creating a joint government for the Democratic Kampuchea CGDK that united the Khmer Rouge under Khieu Sampha, the United National Front for independent Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) under Norodom Sihanouk and Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) with Son Sann as leader. Reasons for the coalition government was to unite every resistance group beneath one canopy for dialogue to be able to flow, to also legitimize the Khmer Rouge which for many years was left alone by most factions as a results of their inhuman policies. Also this coalition was to give another opportunity for the Heng Samrin government that wish for fetched recognition and acceptance from the international community.

Another initiative that was achieved was the proposition demand for reinstalling safety and a quite society by the Indochina regions whereby every Vietnamese Volunteers should leave and later safeguarding the ultimatum from PRK together with some groups that laid around the Thai and Cambodia boundary witness an end. These volunteers agreed to exit annually.

It was further agreed that elections will take place with foreign observers present with former Khmer Rouge members who are interested in participating to contest. It is worth noting that most of the resolutions proposed during the early stage of the crisis by ASEAN failed because both sides were state fast on their positions and displayed unwillingness to resolve the political crisis.

The main focus of the ASEAN rules were characterized by their die heart need to guarantee the exit of international troops out of Cambodia, before proceeding to the political resolutions of the chaos. Even though, from July 1982 to about May 1983 there was a lot of trials on how to and effectively exit the forces, many doubted if the troops were actually withdrawn because very little or nothing changed in this context.

Swift respond from ASEAN and the OAS was the first role they played. Although they never in strict terms addressed Vietnam, ASEAN representative ministers demanded the total exit of every international military present in Cambodia and the dissolving of the Phnom Penh regime in order for Cambodians to be able to exercise their rights to self-determinations through elections. On the other side, OAS ministers denounced the coup few days after it took place, embracing a decree refusing any diplomatic acknowledgement of the governments of General Cedras calling for immediate reinstatement of president Aristed.

ASEAN was adamant in getting long lasting and understandable solutions in Cambodia calling on the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops, dismantling all armed groups with directions from the UN peace keeping forces to be able organized transparent vote for Cambodians to decide democratically the future regime. OAS on it part strived to reinstall the legally voted president Aristed at same time preventing violators of human rights in Hiati.

ASEAN made much diplomatic efforts by pressurizing the United Nations at the initial level of the conflicts. Between 1979 and 1982, ASEAN involved the crisis of Cambodia in all it yearly program at the UN general assembly. By 1981, ASEAN gained an outstanding buttress for a UN financed global congress on Kampuchea, which demand a stop to violence and requested an understandable and meaningful dialogue for political resolutions (Kierman 2010). Also in formal and informal meetings, ASEAN call for UN and the global society to help resolve the Cambodian crisis. ASEAN efforts towards resolving the conflicts in Cambodia was seen through it pressure to stabilize global interest observant on the crisis for more than 10 years. In addition, ASEAN made everything possible to stop the PRK in gaining membership at the UN and hence from being the legal regime in Cambodia. During the 34th conclave of the UN general assembly, ASEAN representative ministers stood against Indians proposition to abandon the Cambodian chair and the UN empty. In the course of UN conclave 34 until 37 (1979 to 1982), ASEAN successfully stopped India's recommendations making sure Cambodia's position at the UN remained untouchable (Thi 2002).

ASEAN started and aided the peaceful consolidation of the three armed groups in Cambodia and skyrocketed their grip opposing the PRK (Kierman 2010). By April 1981 the regime in Singapore summoned members from the various groups in order to take part in dialogue in attempt to create a coalition government. Consequently, Suddi Savetsilla Thailand's foreign minister and the chairperson of the committee arrived in Washington DC in order to demand for assistance. This motion led to the establishment of an alliance government of DK that consolidated the three main combating groups by September 4th 1982 (Gillian 2002).

The formation of coalition government was a lamp light that legitimize the DK's seat at the UN indicating to both factions that this crisis can be sought out only by meaningful dialogue and negotiations rather than by the use of force.

Many scholars and diplomats viewed this crisis as being the most complex among all under or less developed states after the world changed from by-polar to multi-polar system because of the presence of Vietnam and China standing with the Khmer Rouge. ASEAN forced Vietnam in order for them their military to exit from Cambodia, galvanized the global institutions and the UN Security Council to disengage the country in Economic, social together with diplomatic aspect. At the end of the 1980's, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia made everything at their reach to better the corporation with China in order to make at ease their position in Cambodia due to its long standing views on Vietnams presence in Cambodia. It was difficult at this time for china to continuously disregard ASEAN's engrossment in resolving the crisis in Cambodia, for this reason they at the end of the day accept to involve the points raised in view of the will be total supremacy of the Khmer Rouge during the pre-conflict resolutions in Cambodia into it antagonizing standpoint (Thi 2002).

It was generally viewed that ASEAN was a prosperous arbitration institution with regards to the crisis. Vietnam made it intensions clear that they cannot meet with the combating coalition ahead of a meeting with the other battling groups, Indonesia made a proposition of two separate meetings, the first one to be just for the four groups fighting, last another one that will involve Vietnam. These near agreement discussions proceeded to the new three Jakarta informal Meetings (JIM): Indonesia

25th July 1988, the four factions met in a first ever meeting to talk each other's worries and demands (Kierman 2010). The gatherings were therefore regarded as a major step that paved the way for the peace negotiations as Khmer Rouge and PRK kept away their differences.

Also, ASEAN provided good offices to the disputants, at the end of the second JIM of 9 to 21 of February 1989, the PRK made known its own prepositions to the peaceful dialogue and amicable agreement together with all the other groups. The PRK accepted that electoral procedure will be a tool to determine the would be regime in Cambodia against their previous non-negotiable stance.

During the third JIM, ASEAN created peaceful concepts (26TH February to 1st of March 1990). Ali Alatas Indonesian foreign minister made some vital recommendation programs for the establishment of a national supreme council in Cambodia where every group will have a representative. The conception was an impetus for the four separate groups to thrash out their differences over division of power.

Towards the end of 1980's Australia and Japan government together with the UN Security Council championed the move for a peaceful dialogue and reconciliation in Cambodia. 23rd of October 1991, 18 countries together with the four armed groups in Cambodia signed peace accord in Paris that established the UN transitional authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to follow up the institutionalization of the peace treaties in Cambodia (This 2002). Even though the eventual focus in Cambodian crisis was to a larger extent coordinated by UN Security Council and many other bigger states, ASEAN played the awareness plane for the international community to advance the peaceful procedures.

The ASEAN however faced constraints in their effort to facilitate the 1993 elections due to insufficient funds. Where there was a possibility for cease fire infringements and the Khmer Rouge orchestrated a boycott of the electoral plans, The ASEAN called on all groups and political parties in Cambodia to respect the treaties as agreed upon during the peace agreement. The call by ASEAN member countries on to all political parties to stay maintain the ego of national solidarity and reconciliation for

the purpose of preserving Cambodians national and territorial sovereignty, inviolability, neutrality, Independence (Gillian 2002).

The ASEAN made much effort than any other body to the successful 1998 elections whereby Hun Sen defeated Norodom Ranariddh who was the first prime minister, In July 1997 the ASEAN authoritative suspended the membership of Cambodia until a transparent elections could take place. Furthermore, Philippine and Thai came together with other Cambodian close partners in order to act as arbitrators for the Hun Sen regime and the main opposing camps to reinstall democratic values for the new regime. Other members of the ASEAN supported Cambodia technically in preparing and to observe the elections.

As the main pilot directing the affairs relating to redressing the conflicts in Cambodia, they gave varying aid to the Cambodian displaced persons. They secured in most cases the expedition of Cambodian refugees to countries where they could get a permanent stay and settlement. When the conflict started, ASEAN called on the UNHCR to manage the current state of affairs urging the global community in putting in place significant assistance to UNHCR (Thi 2002).

The ASEAN's main reason aimed at facilitating the continues existence of dictatorial government menaced by foreign destruction with alien duress from the Cold War: the hidden goals were meant to obtain magnitude of unity before the arrival of thrown less government which could bring in the patient Britain and a future probable exit of the USA. Both countries had one adversary who was the Communist hit and run advancement, supported by the USSR, China, and North Vietnam. This group proclaimed the desire for security and development to be able to stand against and deter the USSR the socio-economic circumstances for the much desired political transformation, Although the ASEAN's made it vividly clear that its main goals was socio-cultural and economic, the international community was aware of the fact that cooperating economically, socially and culturally will definitely be sluggish. They were joining forces together in order to achieve a common goal which was political and security stability. ASEAN in its capacity made possible, like the Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik declared openly that, as a result of the political unity or coming together of the five member countries the Sukarno's

campaign for anti-imperialism came to a standstill point by Suharto's new deal regime.

The positioning of the conservative capitalist government through the region granted most of the leaders in the area the opportunity to collaborate in fighting against the pertinent menace of the positions: local revolutions, especially those menace that came from the communist subversions, through that which most ASEAN countries sighed some mutual treaties with them during the late 1970s (Snitwongse 1995). The ASEAN's main policy of zero interference, consecrated by the 1967 ASEAN promulgation, the ZOPFAN promulgation of 1971 and the TAC of 1976 simply lay more emphasis, in stern details, norms previously stated in the UN Charter. The fact that these laws previously prevailed in other places demanded the worry some question asking "why ASEAN should wish to epitomize same laws".

The answer to this question could be seen within the timing and how the various declarations impacted the political activities and actions. The ASEAN treaties mostly focused on the frequent clashes among one another's role which for a very long time had been common with both international and regional alliances. Henceforth, to guarantee safety and political stability from foreign interference with any magnitude they made efforts to restore and preserve the territorial unfitness (ASEAN, 1967). Their main intensions were to authorize the elite class take into action with much obligation to curtail such violent political atrocities at a time when nationalistic values where been threaten as a results of its laxity. Both ZOPFAN and TAC came to existence due to the fast declining global institutions and the evolving positions of the communist insurrections. Before the end of 1970, Philippines and Thailand fell before authoritarian regimes because of continues economic failures and the increasing revolutionary menace to embed political and economic establishment. At this time Marxist guerrillas were still functioning within most of these countries, efficiently controlling thousands of people (Alexander 1999).

To refuse the access to the presence of a huge elite arbitration given by civil in Indochina, The ASEAN took an oath to enhance national flexibility guaranteeing safety and calmness from foreign influence to be able to perpetuate core nationalistic values (ASEAN, 1971). Though as a results of the presence of the Nixon Doctrine, the ASEAN therefore decided to push forth and preserve the right to

be able to accommodate our own developing actualities in Asia, Claimed Marcos (Silverman 1975). The TAC, evolving during this period of much impetus provided to the regions communists factions by insurgence advancements in Indochina in 1975, laid emphasis for dual respect to the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national values of all countries, the legality of all countries control its territorial rights to life by leaving independently from foreign influence, destruction, or coercive and isolating from themselves from the activities of other (ASEAN 1976).

The ASEAN had positive views in deterring the viral movement of revolution through a means of giving the quite scene to the new communist state of Indochina. In this light of positive aspirations they could implement an independent refusal ordinance. The ASEAN foreign laws of noninterference were home factors inscribed for standard political obligations, proclaimed to deter the strong from attacking the fragile capitalist government from foreign sponsored insurgencies. Some scholars like Justin Rosenberg argued that, foreign institutions have become more involved in the evolution of in domestic political will, something viewed as revolutionary international policy looked upon as a basic international law. To a certain extent it varies among the private situations giving directives inward to a nationalist propaganda of some local political platforms with menace from the international scene (Rosenberg 1994).

Although interventions are looked upon as means construed to alter political eventualities in an out of state political scene, it can thus father be looked at such mediations with the case in Malaysian military assistance against communist insurgencies in Indonesian Borne, a successive indo-Malaysian attempt in defeating the Muslim combatant in the southern Philippines and ASEAN backing of Indonesia as colonization of East Timor. It was believe that actions like this depicting the fact that the ASEAN elites struggled to protect not only the normative laws but rather their own dangerous social aspirations all of which was evident at the current situation. Similarly, an arrangement of that magnitude showed that Thailand financed armed insurgencies in Burma believing they will aid in crushing the communist groups in Thailand preventing the collaboration and unity among the communist parties in Burman (Smith, 1991).

When Cambodia was invaded by Vietnam by December 1978 and overthrow Pol Pot, the struggled to install a new regime with the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), also pressurizing Khmer Rouge (KR) left over's to departs to Thailand border, This raised the aspirations of a continues spread of revelations and overthrowing dominoes. Respective of their exaggerated believes to the laws of no interference, The ASEAN continuously maintained this objective to arbitrate in the crisis in Cambodia.

By 1980,representative from both rebels and refugee camps: the ASEAN UN actions standing for the Khmer Rouge, the security council regarded Vietnam's presence in January and February 1979 but felt discouraged by the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The soviet Union vetoed all propositions regarding the resolving of the cases against Vietnam's ally, At same time Beijing troops invaded the northern part of Vietnam to punish Hanoi because he overthrow their friendly government in Cambodia and thus shifting the attention to the UNGA at this point.

The greatest worry at this time was who will be the one to represent the country at the UN since basically it had to do with plenty of bureaucratic procedure observed be the credentials committee, whose yearly reports were seen as rubber stamped not having any objection or debates from the UNGA. The ASEAN made everything political during this time by campaigning successively annually for KR to preserve Cambodia's position and the UN. This action was without a pattern and had serious after effects the evenly distribution of power in Cambodia.

While using the expressions of no interference to protect their actions, The ASEAN galvanized most underdeveloped countries at the UNGA to vote in favor Democratic Kampuchea against the PRK qualifications, represented by Leng Sary, Pol Pot' deputy: Financing importance yearly resolutions on the crisis management case in Kampuchea; Taking hostage Vietnams backup points during debates on the safety, stability and how to resolve the crisis in southeast Asia to castigate Hanoi.

The ASEAN made it clear that PRK was noise making government put in place by armed insurgencies and allowing such a government to exist is endorsing violent and encouraging the violations of primary international rules and moral political conduct, The Philippines ambassador made his declarations that if the PRK is

allowed a position it would be leveling a playground for complicated issues with heavy consequences of event whereby most underdeveloped countries in the world will begin losing their rights of existence and be faced with untold preconditions of live under the schemes of bigger countries and another form of imperialism. The verbal connections between the crisis in Cambodia and the UN constitutional principles and many of its priorities towards smaller countries gave the ambassador of Singapore the legitimacy to openly declare that their stands against Vietnams activities were primarily linked to the principles and the DK obligations to maintain their position at the UN which must be in accordance with the protection of certain basic rights and principles of the UN constitution.

For this reasons it is possible accept such verbal predicaments as symptoms of engagements to the noninterference principles, like many constructivist will often do. Comparatively ASEAN crusade and their actions through their non-interference, therefore brings out the perceptions as being political and not of its value principles. A vivid similarity was the January 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda that marked the end of Idi Amin's rule as president. There were a lot of similarities with the factors that encouraged the intervention: There were two wars with great identities in Tanzania and Vietnam were both parties claimed they acted in self-defense mean while it was a simultaneous ethnic revolutions that saw a regime change: and Tanzanian military were stationed in Uganda for many years, as a means of polishing the post war agreements. In 1980, the newly installed government was granted a position at the UN which was endorsed by more than 80 governments with ASEAN raising a trace and criticism (Wheeler 2000).

The occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Union in same year manufactured and released some counter actions from the ASEAN ministers. Two members spoke at the UN debate while ASEAN stood against Thailand's proposal of a joint declaration and reconstruction. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi accepted it was as results of the interference which did not have any strange impact or consequences on the region as a whole (Van der Kroef, 1980).

The new government was installed with a given position at the UN with very little preservative supports, whereby Singapore a member of the achievement and quality delegation casting their vote for the in significant defense with primary functions nor

had ASEAN campaigned against France during its 1978 interference to seize power from the Central African Empire in which the new government was installed without any form of endorsement elections.

The ASEAN's crusade therefore was considered political. This also had great impact for the Cambodian plight in times of the crisis. The ASEAN at this moment refused Vietnam and the PRK chance to emerge victorious while they struggled to use the UN organs and its offices in propagating their stand points in the course of the crisis. The ASEAN's campaign for complete isolation of the PRK and Vietnam also hindered them from the developmental assistance they got at poor states (e.g. from UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP), the IMF, World Bank, etc), its tighten the strings for the new regime making it difficult for them to attain significant international recognition and legitimacy (Alagappa 1995), irrespective of its local supremacy.

Lastly, the UN membership was the main ASEAN's debating stand point, through a process whereby, the Ambassador Koh concluded that, it will be very difficult for them to get any incentives for Vietnam to go into a meaningful political dialogue in favor of the ASEAN stand point in the crisis.

2.2 Aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Looking at the means through which the DK maintained its candidacy at the UN one can say with certainty that it should have been a farfetched dream without the presence and efforts of ASEAN, so the KR's army resilience could also have been difficult if Thailand did not support them. Ieng Sary, who was saved from captivity from Vietnam and was airlifted to safety by Thai forces, In January 1979 the Thai government and its military had laid camps for KR militias on Thai territories, where they were given food water and other basic needs like medical assistance, and later transported back to the boundaries to fight against the Vietnamese. At this time the boundaries were considered safe heavens for displaced persons and refugees, Thai military transported KR soldiers across at safe points away from Vietnamese troops. The military commanders affirmed through condemnation the violation of international norms of non-interference which they looked at as an official law. The KR foot soldiers hidden camps were created on the

Thai territories and the island of Khemara Phumin were all protected since they were reserved as safe roads for Chinese weapons.

By early 1980, Thailand was blamed for transporting 500 tons of military materials and weapons to the KR on monthly bases. The US intelligence estimated that Thailand's military assisted with closed to \$100m cost for weapons yearly to the KR in the course of the crisis by mid 1980s. Thai military bases were regularly used in order to protect and reserve KR bombardments into Cambodia and Thai militias often and regularly place themselves to deter 'hot pursuit' by Vietnamese forces (BP, 1979; Daily Telegraph, 1979a, 1979b; Guardian, 1979; Kiernan, 2002: 488; Shui, 2002; ST, 1979b, 1979c, 1979a; Van der Kroef, 1990: 235). Without the assistance from Thailand, it would have been very difficult for them to resist as a menace to the PRK. Chinese and Thai government's assistance gave the KR the opportunity to reconstruct its military from about 2000 to 40,000 troopers. This delivered uncountable profits to the regime in Thailand. One other vital factor was that China stopped its assistance for the communist Party in Thailand (CPT), compelling them to sign a treaty temporarily preventing the access of television channels throughout the Yunnan province and openly pronouncing with strict terms that they will no seat to watch the CPT cripple the Sino-Thai friendly ties (Alexander, 1999). The Chinese assistance to the Bangkok government was estimated to cost close to \$283m from 1985-89 alone, with the military also gaining advanced access updated military arms, technology and (Kiernan, 1993).

With all these situations at hand and the confusion that caged the communist menace granted a chance for the military the rights to manage the 1/5 of state budget in 1982, strengthening the capitalist regimes. Providing aid to the KP also opened a vacuum and a buffer area for the containment and holding the growth of revolutions, ensuring that the authorities concern within Cambodian and make them stay in contest, that which legally endorse ASEAN to proceed in its activities on behalf of DK. As the DK's representation within the UN recognized the primary concerns of the crisis was to be removed, there will be no chances for another debates, since they Hanoi annexation should at this point gained the unchangeable truth of their occupation on the land of Kampuchea.

The manner in which ASEAN's treated of refugees fleeing Cambodia was regarded as another measure to inflict pain on the PRK. At first, the SEAN members looked for ways of excluding refugees with the hope that they were the fifth communist sent to iron the revolution. One senior Thai staff made an estimated which showed that about 10% were Hanoi spies whom according to them were assigned to sabotage the regime, and Bangkok for this reason had no choice that to vehemently repatriated thousands of these refugees into minefields, killing hundreds of them. The regime in Singapore named refugees human bombs, constantly refusing to take some into their country, while Malaysia threatened to deport 65,000 of them and adopt a policy of shot on site (Antolik, 1990).

Nevertheless, the anti-communist irrationality pave the way for new and much unscrupulous programs where the refugees were considered as been a strategic zone for containment along the boundaries and as a root of assistance for the new born resistant as was recognized (Terry, 2002). Thailand therefore had to reject the classification of all those crossing it borders as refugees; refusing them the legal international protection and assuring the global community that the institutions at it border will be the WFP and UNICEF, not the UNHCR due to their powerful protection terms. This granted them the reasons to play on the intelligence of these refugees in three critical methods.

Firstly, to use them as a population primary stand point for the KR and other combating groups, which among them were Khmer People's National, Liberation Front (KPNLF, Headed by Son Sann, an ex-Cambodian Prime minister who made public his liberation government) and Moulinaka (A royalist group with Prince Sihanouk, as the head and he was the former president). With heavy support from of Thai Task Force, 80 civilians were held captive in some camps, whereby tens of thousands of refugees were violently momentarily moved away from UNHCR space and facilities.

Accordingly, the UN Border Relief Organization (UNBRO), put in place by WFP during it exit by 1983, made a presentation which stated the combating factions had total control over every refugee camp and about 260.000 civilians by the end of 1987. The ASEAN yearly crusade for UN assistance with which close to 90% of the financial aid was purposely shifted towards the war efforts. Top UN envoys accepted

the critics views that the border operations in 1987 were completely political oriented. It was a program intended to maintain and sustain the operations as it proceeded. One school of thought held the view that had it been the UN ceased from providing food for families of these soldiers the crisis would have experienced a natural death (Terry 2002).

Secondly, the displaced persons were used to humiliate the Vietnamese given evidence of the PRK's unacceptable character from them (Although many of the displaced people were fleeing Thai promoted conflicts). Many schools of thought debated on the UNHCR camp at Khao-I-Dang was a purposeful and deliberate establishment to entice displaced persons from the other side of the territory in order to aid this manifesto, and was later shutdown in 1987 when civilians started running away from the camps for fear of persecution in thousands (Vickery 1987).

Thirdly, the displaced people grouped themselves, creating a flexible human buffer. From this period, whenever the Vietnamese attack these resistance camps, such as in 1979 and 1983 raids on KPRLF headquarters at Nong Chang (located on Cambodian territory), ASEAN openly declared their dissatisfaction over such offensive, claiming Vietnam was occupying Thailand and slaughtering Cambodian innocent displaced persons in their camps: as a result numerous international calls were made demanding the withdrawal of. Nonetheless, Thailand at this point already instigated attacks on both sides attempting to smuggle it combatant into Cambodia claiming they were repatriated displaced persons. This buffer of untold human suffering also showed how good it was for the Thai army and the KR, who had total authority over black market economy. International trade was estimated at \$500,000 per day by 1983, and in 1989, the KR could make dividend of \$2.4m per month from the areas they managed with Thai assistance.

The military advantage of uniting the Khmer combatants into a united front, and the diplomatic impetus of isolating ASEAN from a regime that committed mass killings motivated ASEAN to start piloting the plane as a means, as Lee Kuan Yew stated that, in order to sustain the DK membership at the UN and change the leadership of the regime of DK (Saravanamuttu 1996). The importance and necessity of this acts skyrocketed when the EEC made it intentions known that they may not give their electoral support to DK in 1982 at the UNGA. The ASEAN was gripped by fear that

many others may do same, and if it happen as foreseen the PRK will be internationally recognized giving them the legal of control over the land.

The ASEAN from this moment added its Endeavour applying new methods and menace. After a series of about nine failed conferences in Bangkok, Son Sann was again summoned for a secret meeting in Singapore on April. By May, Singapore's foreign Minister made a declaration which stated the major objective was not creating a united front instead forming a coalition government because the term portrayed more authority, strength legality and sustainability. Lee publicly gave an ultimatum to the KR that they are compelled accept that the alternatives of this recommendations so to avoid the validity of the of a Vietnams unacceptable government in Kampuchea a very strong menace with source from the DK head at the UNGA. Singapore agreed to support the non-communist combatant groups in all endeavors on one condition which is if they join the coalition, rejecting Son Sann whenever his combatant will agree for meaningful dialogue and long last negotiations. Thailand government threatened to curtail the assistance they gave to the KPNLF in totality while pleading with Sihanouk to come together and part take through a promised support of his post war assistance for the Cambodians (Chanda 1981).

In September, Siddhi went on a one month journey in order to maintain assistance for the coalition in the west and by October, Singapore succeeded in securing a treaty agreeing to restore Sihanouk as the President with Son Sann the prime minister of international, while Malaysia promised to provide continues assistance to the united and coalition government whenever full agreement is arrived at. Meaningful dialogue for the coalition program working under the umbrella were eventually restored by the KR combatants, for this reason the ASEAN once again under took it anticipations of how DK can get rid of it UN membership if a coalition government was not set up (Sricharatchanya 1982).

At the eve of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 22 1982, Malaysian government promised to give economic assistance in the coalition ceremony besides the food, clothe and weapons they had initially promised to provide. With the present situation of die need for a solution to the pending crisis, a coalition government was finally formed and was named "The coalition Government of the Democratic Kampuchea ".

Siddhi believed that the creation of the coalition was more of a local issue and the work load for the Kampuchea citizens and those of Thailand and ASEAN in general had to intervene was all falsified. The main negotiations for the creation of a coalition were held in ASEAN capital, rather on Kampuchean territory, amidst intense ASEAN diplomats, trying to make both camps see the need for peace, avoiding threats, with the absence of total kampuchea active participations and lack of a greater majority of their, the CGDK heads openly praised ASEAN's coordinating efforts. During the 1980s, ASEAN diplomats repeatedly recalled Sihanouk with numerous demands for his step down over KR insults as an attempt to hold the coalition firm for greater unity (Amer 1990).

The formation of a coalition radically altered the leadership regime on exile: In order to address the KR's impact and developed nationalistic program to the communist government was in its totality the main goal of the ASEAN. The foreign minister from Malaysia vividly analyzed how their main goal was to lead the non-communist militias, gradually displacing the KR and improving on the chances of a non-communist military return to Phnom Penh by political negotiations. The ASEAN as a result was at this time capable of using the participation of Sihanouk, an admired founding father of the non-aligned movement in order to galvanize more assistance to its manifesto. Analytic reports showed that his presence was a booster point adding more impetus to the majority who stood in favor of the CGDK recognition at the UN in 1982. These developments from the KR's part played also gave a chance for the western countries to react to ASEAN demands for heavy aid. This was vividly outstanding and important after the Vietnamese in 1984 to 1985 dry seasons attacks deliberately cleaned the CGDK's hide outs. Washington reacted immediately with an expendable assistance of \$2m and a yearly financial assistance that roomed around \$17m to \$32m after a certain period of time (Mysliwec 1988).

Although Jakarta refused Singapore's proposition of a direct military assistance from ASEAN for the CGDK and threatened to quit the ASEAN because of this reason. It should be noted Jakarta was unwilling to legitimize ASEAN's initiatives while demanding a rightful counter interference or through a direct battle against Hanoi military, through a proxy war, because it might openly jeopardize ASEAN distressing by standers expectations. Even though Singapore was the man leader in

this drive, a congress of Malaysian, Thailand, Singapore and America was convened in Bangkok regularly to galvanize and assistance and in order to help the CGDK. Among other things were ammunition, training, communications equipment, food, and the establishment of a Khmer-language KPNLF radio station with British assistance. The three ASEAN states provide a token of \$70m and were critical in pushing for Washington to actively participate (Lee 2000).

2.3 Elections to Coalition Formation

Many elites said that it will no longer be complicated for Cambodia to gain membership into the ASEAN after elections are conducted an attitude made known by some ASEAN ministers. Even though after the results of the elections were declared new circumstances were placed. The creation of a coalition government. The intervention of ASEAN had normally compelled Cambodia combating groups to actively participate in the elections with fully resolving the main political crisis that sparked up the occurrence of July 1997. The CPP obtained 41.1 %, FUNCINPEC 31.7 % and SRP were the under dogs with just 14.3 %. Although the CC was the largest party with majority of the populations they did not have the parliamentary majority to be able to create a government and for this reasons invited both opposition parties for a coalition. Instead of going in for any form of negotiations, they thought it wise to use the global concern on Cambodia denouncing the election out comes which was endorsed by foreign monitors to be free and fair galvanizing corroborations demanding for international military interventions in order to forcefully push out Hun Sen while allowing the country with an unproductive national assembly politically paralyzing the state. Instead of forming or setting in place a political safe and sound grounds, the ASEAN interference assisted in paralyzing and giving Ranariddh a playground for a new political carrier, irrespective of his hidden agenda with the KR to forcefully take power from the democratically elected regime and providing FUNCINPEC and ARP and added impetus to their analytic capacity (Peou 2000).

The ASEAN's recent determinants for the creation of a coalition clearly started their flows in attempting to resolve the crisis and re-implant political stability in Cambodia which again was regard as an added advantage to the situation. By September 9, ASEAN issued a press release that ask all the camps to solve their

differences through a high level national reconciliatory move through negotiations, dialogue, and deliberations for unity for the Cambodian to be able to create a new government which will work towards the desires of the Cambodians and the aspirations of the country within the region (Xinhua 1998). Nonetheless ASEAN countries also agreed to foreign interventions through the IMF predatory aid parcel, ASEAN greatly depended on Thailand's Sukhumbhand Paribatra to be able to push forward the alginate democracy with it political parties compelling them to venture into negotiations, supported by Tokyo, the EU, and the USA. Paribatra at the tail end was able to bring together the various factions to a negotiation table under the leadership of Sihanouk, with a treaty on coalition that was successful and announced three months of which the elections were far gone.

The added grip made possible by the foreign intermediaries granted Ranariddh to right to keep in his position about half the post of ministers and the post of prime minister and the speaker of the national assembly. They also agreed on creating a house of senate that was to be headed by the CPP member (Jones 2007).

Badawi further made his own declarations that there is nothing at this point that could restrict Cambodia from becoming a member of ASEAN after they had created the government. Unfortunately for him the moment the coalition agreement was made public, ASEAN altered it conditions for more visits to their unpreparedness to take total Cambodian responsibilities, After the AMM on November 14, the Thai external relations minister insisted that Cambodian candidacy will now be granted after a review of their constitutional amendments as was stipulated to form a house of senate established (Severino 2006). This new order was expressed after referring to an unstoppable panic for the stability in Cambodia, while the Philippines were afraid that could be new resistance movements within them. Some schools of thought began by saying that they could be another chance of negotiations while some said it's possible for another betrayal (The AFP. As the Straits Times noted, Cambodia's membership could be made public ASEAN's reputation if they face any form of accusation especially if there is a standstill to the deal and this again will greatly damage ASEAN's credibility perpetually with the recent financial upheavals.

The media though with much regular sentiments in Singapore proposed the need for Cambodia to implement discipline and stay away from force trials. That they could

postponed it for a year such that the government integrity and can be put to test with the creation of a house of Senate, military reforms and the management of foreign aid. The Singapore government had angered Indonesia during the economic and financial crisis compelling Jakarta to adhere to the attached conditions forced on them during the structural adjustment program (Henderson 1999). With the condition fully attached to hearts of Indonesia's socio-political and economic strength of friendly ties with the external world (Robison 2001), this was therefore evident that any revolution from Indonesia will continuously lead to more strings from ASEAN. Atalas demanded at what stage of level will ASEAN prepare a meeting on how a government can prepare itself for necessary admissions into the ASEAN? Was the same situation for the admission of Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, before that Brunei Darussalam? Nothing was mentioned. He concluded with a message saying the pray for good governance after which they will they will observe closely. Especially with the recent conditions if they will be fully implemented judiciously (Jones 2007).

Malaysia, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam shared similar feelings, while the readmission of Cambodia in UN in coming December cut down the grip ASEAN on the crisis. Singapore Goh Chok Tong proceeded and was reiterating the implementation of those conditions passed through with communal denial from Atalas (Kyodo 1998). The poor and disgraceful understanding that came up from ASEAN Hanoi congress in December depicted the lack of solidarity within the organization, though Cambodia was granted membership the installation ceremony was technically delayed until the house of senate was established (Severino 2006). This act gave ASEAN the upper hand in interference more than what the foreign donors, who a certain point demanded new negotiations for new assistance grants by February. In February, Paribatra began a new journey to Phnom Penh for a fast programming of the house of senate (Kyodo 1999) together with an eventual constitutional amendment done, Cambodia was there officially installed into ASEAN by April 1999 after it was believed they had completed their international rehabilitation and putting an end to ASEAN influence within the country.

The preceding interventions showed how resolute ASEAN was prepared to protect both the economic and political circumstances. Similarly such a lesson was viewed as ASEAN stood firm in defending East Timor annexation of 1975 by Indonesia.

Some writers claimed that the ASEAN reasons for re-interfering in the crisis in Cambodia after the cold war could not be explained. A primary attentiveness in the stability of the region and the security for investment was not seen as being enough to analyze the establishment of conditions for admissions into the organization for the very first time in the history of the organization.

When compared to the initial magnitude of the diplomatic campaigns put forth by ASEAN, the creation of counter governments and the assistance provided to other combating groups as means to resolve the crisis was more of a pressured method, which some of their members stood against and it was also seen as a sign of weakness. The made it known that they could pilot the affairs of the regions but at same time allowed foreign bodies to pressure her in order to intervene in the Cambodian crisis risking the credibility of the intervention with near participating eventualities of the autonym of ASEAN member governments in a public international duress. The ASEAN in a likewise situation was again compelled to enable or force Burma to embrace democracy and they found it complicated but had no choice than to do as the international community wished though reluctantly and less effectively.

The ASEAN to a larger extent was considered to always be a little unenthusiastic on taking it full responsibility of matters from within its own member countries: though the west did not want to directly resolve the problems on their own but want wished to push ASEAN in order for them to carry out their hidden agenda suggesting a likewise unenthusiastic display of leadership with little interest.

2.4 ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

At this point I will through more light on the various efforts both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) attempt to resolve the crisis in their various sub-regions.

The dependable sentiments of insecurity which some countries faced could be cut down if at any point in time we experience a united effort between countries of a particular regional are resolved without any menace from one member against another. Peace, order, Security forecasting were often looked at as dependable

factors for good diplomacy and accepting international laws with that believe that after a length of time, because regional organizations shall always come into existence. Faithfulness to diplomatic dictum and international developments are always of absorption and such values were attained by ASEAN countries though still very fragile with the SAARC member's countries. The ASEAN gradually became a corporative organization for protection of regimes in crisis and resolving conflicts with a framework of solidarity related customs and strategies (Jones 2017). I will like to begin by analyzing the crisis in these two separate regions before delving into the various efforts and parts both associations played how efficient they were in resolving the crisis.

1976 was a very judgmental year for the ASEAN during which they summoned their first ever summit. Most members observed from the communist success stories in Indochina that this situation gave more impetus for the ASEAN members to unite and work together. Thanks to this observations which gave way for a possible ASEAN treaty and consensus of amity and corporation in the southeastern Asia (TAC). It was aimed at galvanizing regional harmony and solidarity in actions, security while encouraging the right of the law to non-interference in local matters and bringing down boarder crisis to the countries in question. It was all regarded as a deterring means which ASEAN member could use to redress their conflicts within them; efficiently putting an end to the creation of a less effective sub regional government whereby members will accept not further their differences through the use of force (Rosser 2001). In 1977 ASEAN had it second congress during which ASEAN experienced another blow with the Philippines president Marcos declaring that his country had total control over Sabah.

The South Asian characteristics is widely different from that of Southeast Asia. The presence of a regional organization has not fractioned the raw edges of historical irritants between members nor ameliorated the high levels of suspicion and distrust among neighbors. Most conflicts in the region are products of the colonial era, but they have also been exaggerated by the short sighted policies of states. Precisely because of their inflammatory nature, one of the conditions that bound SAARC from the beginning was to keep debatable issues off its agenda (Jones 20017).

Created in 1985 by seven countries, the SAARC has as members Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka while Afghanistan became a member in 2007. The SAARC head quarter is in Kathmandu Nepal. 2007. The SAARC Secretariat is located in Kathmandu, Nepal. The top decision making office of the organization is summit of the head of states. The council of ministers is there to help the head of states and they meet two times annually. In 1980's, the south Asian countries decided to undertake a new face of solidarity through regionalism there was no evident of deceit in these new hope of unity. Conflict within this sub-region ranged from boarder conflicts, water catchment resolutions, transit and commercial crisis, migration and ethno-nationalist anxiety.

Crisis from such context are generally protracted, encouraged by progressive clashes from Pakistan and India. The un-trusts character among the regional powers and the key actors of the unstable relationship remained unshakeable from the moment they both got their independence in 1947. They had been into battle in 1947, 1948, 1965, 1971 and in 1999, that was four times and have both witnessed untold hardship within which the mode of violence was at maximum in 1984, 1987, 1990, and 2002. Menace from insurgencies, nuclear and missile competition and with the greatest of all the Kasnir territorial conflicts that represents the focal point of clashes for these two countries (Jones 2007).

Pakistan after it formation in 1947 believed that the Muslim dominated state of Kashmir headed by the Hindu king will become part of them. The Kashmir king denied making any declaration on which of the two countries he wished to become part of. In October 1947, Pakistani tribe's men marched into Kashmir advancing towards the unable to protect their capital city of Srinagar the kings had to sign a treat of accession and choose to join India. Indian military was sent into Srinagar where they secured the capital and the fighting came to a standstill with UN imposing a cease fire in 1948. The truce that was termed Line of Control (LOC) segmented the country into two and one third of their territory was controlled by Pakistan. Although Pakistan hand conducted a series of attack on Kashmir to gain full control over its territory they never achieved their intensions. These countries proceeded with their tussle for supremacy and the outcome of such rivalry was dilapidating because it was substantial state fast on the south Asian course for

regionalism. It all happened because of the unenthusiastic character of India who didn't wish to seat in same room with Pakistan for fear of legitimizing the military government suspected of master minding the Kargil event (Amer 1990).

Considered to be a ceremonial and casual reason of their relationship like early noted, ASEAN crisis management methods was classified under conflict preventions category whereby they could easily resolve a dispute that has not reached its apex for military intervention. For such reasons one of the major point of criticism against ASEAN countries was that they were very comfortable with observing rather fully engaging in total conflict settlement. To a larger extent gain some fruits in it actions because they succeeded in maintaining peace and no confrontations between it member countries. Being able to deter unresolved crisis from degenerating into full scale war ,means that the ASEAN presence in the region has created a positive impacted solidarity they have implanted within the sub-region has created a level play ground in a admirable way in which they handle both formal and informal crisis originating from within the sub-region, some of the notable critics of ASEAN and it activities like Michael Leifer, claimed that ASEAN is institutionalized, with a truce which was considered informal through corporation on security matters which depends or link up with the international laws and it accountability (Alexander 1999).

Mel Anthony gave his view that the reconciling mechanism which ASEAN has instituted is that of conflict or crisis prevention and crisis resolution. It was called the ASEAN way and believed in was coined to promote a diplomacy of accommodation and to reinforce and cultivate carefully socialization and respect to regional or sub-regional norms (Jones 2007).

The ASEAN principles were centered on how members can tactically prevent and resolve upheavals among them which can dismantle the future organization. Their accord have succeeded in maintaining its members to great deal. This has been possible because members are able to make sacrifices respecting the norms of the organizations in the application of organizational values although the price they pay for sacrificing has been within their comfort. Moving in the direction of an accord usually takes much time than expected and often looks complicated since not everyone is always satisfied with some of the points raised within the association.

Even though the absence for total solidarity has from time to time been resolved by an intelligent planned treaties .This system gives the opportunity for members to either stay in or out when there a point raised for others to proceed without any quarrel on view points and resentment of the scheme that's unfolding. This was seen during the concluding statements and deliberations of the ASEAN free trade Area (AFTA), that allowed and gave a chance to those considered good in economics to proceed with the scheme at the time when the CLMV were granted much time to meet up with reforms ahead of their economic advancement.

Accords are very important and essential goals under the ASEAN actions and procedures. According to Diane Mauzy's .Together with the laws and decisions marking are numerous accords strategies: The first thing is that no point is added to the program without unanimous agreement to that point. Various items that are raised are covered for future analysis if no concrete accord arises. Secondly The ASEAN countries agree to disagree with open or communal united declarations; thirdly, there are usually slow deliberations procedures which involve consultations, concessions and understanding. Fourthly, the state or member with a vital issue at hand is given the chance champion the scenario and the points raised and their conceptions are often given a substantial gravity. Lastly, it was agreed from the word go that conflicts within the association should be resolved in house by the high council since experienced showed that third party arbitration as changed the statues of AESAN's unity (Amer 1990).

The need for a developmental and economic cooperation was seen as a gate way to projecting the region to cooperation and success but such concepts were not taken into consideration until in later years. Neither the neo-liberalist nor the neo-realist was seen in regional visible in regional thoughts, with focus on the part of the political elite' class. The creation of SAARC in 1985 was as a result of the inability of most South Asian countries to find a place to anchor within their preferred regions such as Pakistan in the West of Asia and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the south eastern Asia. For the fact that they could not address this problem, they diverted their focus to their geographical area. After all, they were and remained reluctant in regionalists without a common menace conception and common values (Acharya 2000).

The prominent roles regions projects in safe-guarding regionalism efficiently are pivotal especially looking at it from some two perspectives: the donations of focal countries in the creation of a regional forum and the balance with the large and petit countries. One unexpected character of SAARC it came into existence thanks to concepts of a small country in the region. Credited for championing the initiative was Bangladesh as he was so influential in the formation and activities of AARC. During it creation, India was a skeptical that such union would be use to the advantage of some countries to influence of mount pressure on concerns that bedeviled their relationship with their country. Some other countries just like India thought that there was a hided agenda especially from outside the region that could influence and harm their existence and India was also afraid that this could be possible as New Delhi might be a target from such an external influence. Thus India had a look warm attitude towards the creation of such a union (Muni 1996).

Pakistan centered in debatable views on that if political concerns are not resolved, the dream for an economic partnership will still be a fare fetched issue and this led to a land lock agreements. Finding it complex and in introducing the much need alterations in this context. India therefore diverted her interest from SAARC to other trans-regional blogs. Today India has a vibrant economy some countries close to her greatly depend on her and India's interest in the SAARC comparably reduced (Jones 2007).It was visible through her increasing economic links with neighbors from the southeast Asia and the East Asian regions. Figures from 2004 and 2005 analysis showed it has replaced the EU as India's main economic partner amounting to about for close to 19.9 percent (19.9%) of India's foreign trade.

On the other side of the coin, the economic giant of south east Asia that is Indonesia, was focused on establishing a mechanism whereby regional dialogue and reconciliation could be made possible after all differences with Malaysia in 1964 (Leifer 1983). It was therefore thanks to the effort from Asian that the post-Sukarno Indonesia was able to be regarded and accepted as the unstoppable regional leader. In this regards they were able to implement a non-assertive portfolio and developed the regional forum (Rosser 2001). The ASEAN figures great saw an increase in Indonesia international policy and this slowly added much impetus to the superiority of the organization at the regional level.

Post- Suharto Indonesia found it difficult to give same engagement to ASEAN due to its local challenges and activities. ASEAN negligence was evident when President Megawati during the 9th summit that he hosted in 2003 declared that ASEAN three pillar proposals for a security, socio-economic and cultural community. This was as a means to change the perceptions some people had on ASEAN and make the organization look more credible. Some school of thoughts still argued that the proposed security structure had no assurance on how ASEAN will become more efficient in managing regional disputes (Jones 2007). Nonetheless, the concept of community building from Indonesia was welcomed by most member states and was a total regional demand. It came to a point whereby some members concluded that even a paralyzed Indonesia could still head the affairs of the union in a more welcoming manner. This at same time was an unfriendly situation in a region like South East Asia where India who being reluctant to exit its candidacy because there was no reason for that could not gain the regional backing she expected from some member states.

Generally, it's often complex and difficult to see a regional forum in the world where power is distributed evenly with equal capacities. Inequality is visible if not in all but majority of the international organizations and it naturally causes consciousness within regional members. Remember not all inequalities are same. The difference between the size and capacity of these countries in some regions appear not to be as pronounced as the case with other organizations.

Imbalance, intensified by the Indo-China, was the greatest menace to the SAARC. Looking at the physical size, populations and the economy, India is a superman when compared to the other nations. Imbalance has infested a long lasting image in intra-regional partnership in South Asia. The sphere size of India was looked upon as a dominated factor whether or not irrespective of their character and engagement within the organizations (Jones 2007). Other neighboring countries have reiterated the critical responsibility she has for the progress and development of regionalism but this could only happen if she implements warm-hearted attitude together with a simple functional methods of behavior. A vast majority of perceptions on the role of India in the region overshadows the debate in South Asia. Critics believed that

India's high-handed and lack of cordial attitude towards the smaller and weaker neighbors welfare.

Initially, B. J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid all formal presidents of Indonesia, were openly sarcastic about its small neighbor, Singapore. President B.J Habibie labeled the country " the unfriendly small red spot while Abdurrahman during an impromptu outing made the declaration in November 2000 which stated that Singapore is an exceptionally selfish country, secular and arrogant of Malaysia (Sahadevan 2001). Abdurrahman Wahid went as far as making propositions that Malaysia and Indonesia should collectively disconnect the supply of water to Singapore. In this context such a demand was considered abnormal and had no retaliatory declarations. Singapore's responds to this nonchalant comment was openly restrained.

The humble attitude of Indonesia was also look into from another view point. They deed everything they could to sustain this behavior because their partners and members of the ASEAN were at all moment prepared to attach a different meaning to such posture and give another interpretation to it. They do everything possible to be respectful due to their status as regional power. Hence there has always been a fixed kind of understanding with the members with respect to courtesy and cordiality on either side (Jones 2007) .The scenario in south Asia was a little different from this. India is never given a benefit of doubt by it smaller partners and neighbors. The government of India never expected Pakistan to someday be biased, though what was complex in the situation was the other small neighbors were expected to be reserved even at a time when India believed they had achieved a lot to these petit states. It was almost generally accepted that this was the reason India was not generous enough towards it partners. A fair declaration on this issue of complex nature of power among big and small countries within a bloc is always challenging and had to analyze. Even though Indian's role of not ready to assist other small nations is always criticized, some argued that such criticisms rather provoked and made India endorsed highly negative positions. This among other behaviors greatly reduced the value of SAARC making the organization an insignificant regional partner.

The large population and land size of India and the image it reveals have shown different views on security concerns within its regional partners. The absence of a unilateral menace within the region and the direct and major source of menace has been witness and growing just from within the region. In all, India is considered the major menace in the region (Bajpai 1999). It has prompted some regional members such as Pakistan together with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to from time to time demand assistance from countries outside the regional for security reasons in this light encouraging other countries out of the region to infiltrate their region. India regarded this act as totally unfavorable and as a sign of threat to the region and the region's systematic agenda. Being the successor to the strategic programs on defiance and security like the British government analyzed when they were in total control of the sub-continent, India believed that the region was under its sphere of jurisdiction and influence. India therefore was being challenged to any outside interference from external actors with the only exception if such external actor was coming under her terms.

To a larger extent, these assertions were verifiable in a situation where USA and its allies in the war against terrorism and play over India's suspicion on border terrorism in Kashmir. For over ten years, the role of external powers in SAARC was very welcoming due to various roles the organization could handle though the admission of Afghanistan in SAARC the USA became conscious of certain actions. The admission of Kabul into the South Asian organization was seen as a means to stabilize the country and a link between South Asia and Central Asia. The USA became SAARC's observer together with Japan, China, and EU. The presence of these observers in the regional forum was a definite reason for India to be worried.

The presence of USA was very suspicious but as a result of the warm relationship between Washington and China and their developing interest in the regional activities, India had to revamp its conceptions. In the course of the conflicts between Pakistan and the menace from cross border terrorism, India regarded the presence of USA as an important grip point. USA and India had no choice that to begin a careful coordination of their policies within the region where ever there is a confrontation from a local dispute involving one member of the South Asian region. Evidently in

Nepal they harmonized their actions in redressing the governmental issues of 2006 (Jones 2007).

These two main Asian blogs were the only readily established confidence galvanizing weapon in a region where there is the absence institutions with equivalence. The concept in return was to help Asia regained its importance that was witnessing a fall by the time the crisis erupted in 1990's. Beside the foreign powers, international institutions were also of great assistance to the region. One hidden barometer of the efficient nature of ASEAN in managing conflicts among its regional members was the ability of these members to whole heartedly accept to channel their disputes to the international mediation institutions for possible solutions. It was also claimed that this actions showed ASEAN flows in redressing regional crisis though a critical look will depict a reasonable level of confidence the surrounded these countries in the organization in adhering to a more objective oriented option. Mely Caballero-Anthony pointed out that she is tempted to say that the mechanism lay out of the ASEAN possession, the implementation of a legal system is indeed an important advancement for the organization which have for some time suffered from the absence of a legal framework and institutions in redressing and managing conflicts (Jones 2007).

Singapore and Malaysia claims over the Island of Pedra Branca or Pulau Batuh Putih were also referred to the ICJ for a peaceful handling of the case. A peaceful and public hearing was held on November 2007 though the case was sent to the ICJ in 2003 (ICJ 2007). They both decided to ask for an international institution to address their difference and thus a booster to their later days married relationship. Malaysia launched and international arbitration procedure in 2003 against Singapore to deter them from retaking the land in Johor Straits. Kuala Lumpur claimed that such an action from Singapore will narrow the shipping routes and menacing maritime interest. Malaysia went forward to demand the international tribunal intervention for the law of the sea to be implemented and put a stop to the reclamation process by Singapore. The court ruled and demanded that both sides should set up a committee to investigate and analyze the impact of the reclamation (Saran 2005).

Peaceful relationship was reinstated after the parties evolved accepted to the proposed endorsement from the expert's institutions as a base for the establishment

of a long lasting solution (Jones 2007). The behavior of cooperating within the AASEAN created a good path for South East Asian countries to choose on how to manage their differences through international mediation and arbitration which was a good example for other regional forums to copy. While in the south of Asia it is regarded as the last option since there a wide trust lacking within the countries. The presence of SAARC did not altered the thoughts and believes of the relationship between states in order to explore such avenues in settling their conflicts.

To a larger extent, regional forums are made up of elite driven projects. In certain regions, the creation of regional blogs is often the concept of political leaders who think that regionalism is best means of alleviating insecurity and promoting peace within the region. The example from EU was evident because without the ideas from Robert Shuman and Jean Monet the plight of Europe in regionalism would have been farfetched. The commitment from these two leaders from the word goes pave the way forward for the organization. The pioneer members of ASEAN, though not replicating the EU methods but were rather motivated by the development through cooperation. The idea of regional peace was viewed pertinent for the states to further their developmental conceptions. Therefore, regional cooperation was a key and vital structure.

With all the happenings, SAARC was not considered as being too vital to the South Asian countries and besides the exuberance portrayed by the president of Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman for coming up with the concept of a regional organization by 1980's, no leader after his initiation showed the same concern and efforts towards the goals of such an organization. This was a troublesome situation and SAARC continuously faced a downfall. A scholar from Nepal blamed South Asian elite class for deliberately expanding the differences among the members due to xenophobic contemplations and their need to galvanize their support that worsen the environmental cooperation and hinder the success for regionalism (Sahadevan 2001).

Being the major regional giants, India was unable but hesitant to champion the affairs of the region because of lack of trust from other countries around her. According to India, regional cooperation should be focused on a give and take principle. Shyam Saran Indians foreign made an open declaration that the menace of the future and hope for the south Asian regional struggle laying significance on the

economic road to collaboration which he considered the perfect option since political and security concerns in the region was antagonistic. He further said that India wanted to curtail its cross border economic partnership due to the high rate of mistrust, though found it a little complicated with the presence of SAARC since its members were to use the organization as a pin point to limit her level of influence and power exercise. India regarded her neighbors as being un-wanting through their calls for a strong regional collaboration and for this they were so hesitant to pilot the affairs of SAARC (Saran 2005).

Taken away by the leadership calls, the process of learning is considered a vital component in the drive for effective regionalism. We should note that the act of learning is a process and a key factor needed to set up an effective and efficient organization like the EU. The Southeast Asian countries had a long term debate on revamping and making the organization more productive in its functions. Heads of states debated the importance for a more integrative and advanced implementation of ASEAN agendas that will help develop the ASEAN area of jurisdiction. It was generally believed that ASEAN had a fragile institution which acted as an obstacle for the organization implementation mechanism to its pro-active actions whenever it was required like in the late 1990's.

All this ups and downs prompted some ASEAN heads of states to demand for a constitution, a functional conflicts management channel and the setting up a penalty to be paid by defaulters. A group was assigned to work on the matter and the name of the group was called "The Eminent Persons Group", instituted in 2007 and was to be ratified by the member countries (Lee 2007). The long life of the organization and the prerogative national sovereignty over every other circumstance would have hindered any profound cooperation. This was another key factor that was about to disrupt ASEAN's improvement plans on its institution assembly from becoming more efficient. The request by member states to create a secured environment, they had to ask themselves how functional the organization consultative mechanism will be over time and treat for achieving its goals. The tabled propositions envisaged encouraged the security and political partnership determinants, but what we should note is that there has never existed an assembly and was hoped to realize this objective.

The level at which the people within the blog wished for integration was far higher than in later years. The difference between these two eras and the expectations were so high: where in the countries within the organization are seems to be more united deep inside them irrespective of their personal realities, and the countries are to an extent work in isolation in spite the presence of the organization (Jones 2007). The leaders from South Asian countries acknowledged regionalism arbitration impact on the mood of intra-regional relationship. They also acknowledge the fact that the ASEAN existence actually helps the region in several ways and thus the love for ASEAN. They were interested in making giants from the organization teachings, though their actions revealed they had very little or nothing in common to the experiences in the Southeast Asia. These symptoms made some people felt that they were chasing the benefits of regionalism without thinking of the sacrifices needed for the benefits to come. All members wished for a secured and safe regional blog while at same time they were reluctant to give inn the much required time and energy for such a progress and stability of their organization.

The period when 87 Muslims protesters were killed by the Thai brutal military, the government of Malaysia confined in itself the comments on the brutal killings. Also Malaysia who chaired the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that is made up of 57 members, agreed that she will not channel the southern Thailand case to the OIC foreign ministers summit in 2005 hosted by Yamen (Saran 2005)

It should be noted that the Islamic states did not ignore the brutal and heavy inhuman action pupated by the regime in Thailand, but Thailand's non presence at the OIC should have been a booster for ASEAN member countries who same time members of the OIC who should exploited this opportunity to air out their grievances against the Thai government. A comparative constrain within the south Asian states was had to realize. In fact the case in Pakistan and OIC has been a pertinent diplomatic platform for pushing forward Kasmir case and some Indian related problems. The deliberately re-iterated their incriminating poor diplomatic attitude and cause shattered the trust between them. India and Pakistant angered both sides for not respecting the laws of diplomatic portfolio and both faced the reactions of inadequate use of communication systems (Lee 2007).

SAARC on its part enclosed the region where member states still believe in the use of force as a weapon for foreign policy. Its existence has not deterred any violent uprising, nor settles and redresses any. Regional collaboration in South Asia is still at a primitive stage. The deterrence of disputes in the region does still at the milder level or better still not exist. It was considered that the countries in South Asia still to cross the red line and make advanced regionalism efficient enough to reinstate trust among the countries in that region and use it as a solidarity platform for conflict management. Comparatively, Southeast Asia was considered more developed, and the ASEAN more efficient in its drive for conflict management and settlement.

2.5 OAS in Haiti

Created in 1948, OAS comprised of 25 member states all from the northern hemisphere with its main objective to promote military, economic, social and cultural cooperation among member states. OAS had institutional tools to prevent and manage conflict: among which are the Santiago pledge for democracy and the rebirth of the Inter-American schemes, declared by the 21st general assembly of OAS and approved by member countries and resolution 1080 (Thi 2002). These set a structure for the proceedings for organizations to menace to democracy in western world. When the Haitian conflicts erupted OAS had 25 members with USA inclusive.

The Haitian conflict came as a result of an armed coup headed by General Raoul Cedras, chief commander of the Haitian armed forces. He overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide the president of Haiti on the 29th of September 1991. Aristide was the first democratically elected president of Haiti who won elections with 67 percent but due to the coup was forced to go into exile in Venezuela and later to the USA. The Haitian conflict was a national conflict that comprised of General Cedras military regime and former president Aristide who was at this time on exile armed faction.

In 1992, many officials, states and the international community believed that the active and direct involvement of the UN was necessary to resolve the situation in Haiti. It was evidently clear that the OAS sanctions were ineffective and that human rights violations were continuing and there was a need to resolve the conflicts thus the presence and involvement of UN was primordial.

It was also believed that if all UN members observe the OAS sanctions, it could be a booster in assuring their success in bringing about the restoration of Aristide. Although the OAS Secretary General initially opposed UN involvement, he was pressured by many OAS members, including the U.S. to change his position. In December 1992, The Argentine former foreign minister was appointed special representative to the UN secretary general to explore UN involvement. To crown the move by UN a tri-partite arrangement among the OAS, UN and U.S. in which the UN exercised leadership in resolving the Haitian conflicts. The focus was upon negotiations and how to send in human rights observers. The reports on the negotiation process by early January were positive and show that there was a positive development among the UN and the OAS observation team that was established to monitor human rights status.

Unlike the Cambodian who was not a member of ASEAN, when the dispute erupted, Haiti had already gained membership within the regional forum and even when the resolution 1080 was being adopted. According to the international community, the solution to this conflicts was to reinstate president Aristide to his democratically elected post of president.

Unlike the ASEAN, OAS worked independently to resolve the conflict in Haiti. They worked tirelessly in deterring the military government in Haiti not to be able to consolidating power. Initially, OAS members diplomatically and economically isolated Haiti. In October 1991, OAS foreign ministers called the suspension of economic, Financial, commercial and Technical links with Haiti but agree on providing humanitarian aid to it citizens.

As an attempt to achieve political settlement for the conflict in Haiti OAS on regular basis insisted on the military government to step down. On the 8th of October 1991, they denied Haiti access to international oil which was the country's main opening of fuel and energy. Haitians who carried out and sympathized with the coup plotters were all refused traveling visas and their properties frozen OAS partner countries. To initiate negotiations and restore democracy and increase credibility of exiled president Aristide, OAS organized a congress between Aristide and the leaders of the Haitian house of Legislature in Washington. Furthermore, a team of representatives

from OAS and six foreign affairs ministers met at Port au Prince to begin meaningful negotiations and dialogue for the reinstatement of democracy in Haiti. Nonetheless the military leaders in Haiti rejected the negotiations with the representatives.

The OAS and ASEAN set a pace for their offices to provide the necessary assistance that was needed for peaceful resolutions. Aristide and heads of both houses of legislature signed a Washington protocol that gave way to the return of civil government with a prime minister, appointed by President Aristide and an unconditional immunity for all those that were involved in the coup. The coup plotters refused to sign the protocol but rather created a triangular committee represented by the Marc Bazin the prime minister to be appointed by Aristide.

The OAS had a flexible approach toward ending the conflicts in Haiti. In the late 1992 the organization realized that its oil embargo had failed to achieve its goal due to insufficient naval blockade and violations by some members who among them was USA. The embargo neither failed to weaken nor compromise the military government in Haiti. By December 1992, OAS ministers requested for a universal embargo against Haiti and a possible military intervention from UN. This global embargo, fostered by the deployment of US naval blockade and a ban imposed on the leaders and supporters of Cedras government from travelling into USA, eventually pressurized the coup organizers to sign a treaty of understanding. Treaty of Governors signed on the Island on the 3rd of July 1993. The agreement called for the return of president Aristide to power from October 30th 1993 and he had to appoint a prime minister. The military chief of staff was set to go for an early retirement while all penalties against Haiti were to be relaxed (Shamsie 2007).

This accord did not bring peace and the lasting solutions it intended to. The military regime sponsored acts of violence as an attempt to deter the new regime from taking power. The OAS members reacted immediately by combining forces with the Security Council and other UN member countries to get rid of the military government in Haiti. On the 19th of September 1994, over 22,000 US troops arrived in Haiti and within one month, the coup leaders stepped down while President Aristide was reinstated (Malone 2008).

After the crisis was resolved and peaceful treaties signed by both camps, OAS played a pivotal role in preparing and observing the elections in Haiti. The OAS Council of Freely Elected Heads of States appointed members to Provisional Elections council (CEP) to monitor elections. A 300 man delegation that constituted the members from OAS civilian program to Haiti. They were considered the major foreign observation delegation for twin parliamentary and presidential runs that took place in June and December respectively. Nonetheless these results were considered unfair as foreign monitor institutions like the Carter Center, a US based NGO headed by formal president Jimmy Carter made an open declaration on the CEP to be partisan as they favored Aristed and his political accessory. Most prominent opposition leaders and their parties did not run for the elections leaving just 14 unpopular parties to run for the presidential polls (Thi 2002). There was a low voter turnout of only 25% and Rene Preval Aristed's preferred prime minister won the elections with an absolute majority vote which many claimed it was a quick count ballot samples.

Unlike ASEAS, The OAS woefully worked to promoted human right and democracy in Haiti. Beyond condemning the coup as a violation of political rights and other basic freedoms recognized by the American Convention of Human and people's right, the permanent council of OAS declaring a resolution program to assist and foster the values of democracy. The Worthington treaty signed by OAS member countries on the 23rd of February 1992 and followed by an agreement that saw the deployment of an OAS civilian presence in Haiti to help restore democracy. From 1993 to 1994, more than 1000 human rights monitors were stationed permanently in each of the nine provinces of Haiti. There was also the creation of a joined OAS/UN international civilian mission that gave evidence and report from the field on Human rights abuses and promoted the respect to human rights and democratic values after president Aristed's government was reinstalled (Shamsie 2007).

From the above analysis of ASEAN and OAS, one can depict a series of recommendations among which were: Both ASEAN and OAS as regional forums to be legal and efficient needed to be internationally recognized but by all the groups that were combating in the region. When these regional organizations took the challenging action to resolve the crisis in Cambodia and Haiti, none of them has any

form of authorization from the UN Security Council. OAS used Santiago commitment to democracy and the rebirth of Inter-American mechanism, together with President Aristed appealed to this organization as legitimate ground for action. For these reasons the organization faced no criticism from international community, even though the military government in Haiti refused to accept the performance and character in the efforts by OAS in managing the crisis Haiti. ASEAN on its part got international credibility by bringing the Cambodian crisis and gaining favors from major world powers United States, Japan and France. Yet the PRK was not satisfied and still demanded the legitimacy of the organization for the reasons that they had no authorization from the UN. Between 1979 and 1986, ASEAN made all available effort to include PRK in the peace settlement procedure, from public condemnation, mobilizing international community to isolate Cambodia while demanding to serve as an arbitrator (Larman 1993).

The PRK stood its grounds and rejected every call for any form of negotiations or frank dialogue with the ASEAN backed resistance coalition government. It was believed by some individuals that both Haitian and Cambodian conflicts might have lasted shorter than it lasted if both regional organizations never witnessed any problem of legality.

Looking at administrative power, these two conflicts proved that it is not proportional to the size of the organizations. ASEAN a smaller Organization in collaboration with great powers was able to use it bargaining chip assistance and convince the warring groups to actively partake and agree with the peaceful procedures. In comparison, the enforcement power of OAS was undermined by member States as they differ in levels of commitment to resolutions arrived at by the organization as was the case with the first embargo (Thi 2002).

The OAS had much available resource than that of ASEAN; both organizations invested much to reach the final stage. They provided expertise, human resources together with the staffs with good diplomatic techniques and a mastery of the conflicts which are pivotal for the peaceful negotiation and settlement.

With reference to the above experience of Haiti and Cambodia, close collaboration with the UN and the great powers are the key and pertinent conditions to gaining

success. Though regarded as a pivotal regional Organization with available resources, the OAS had to demand from the UN and the western European states to pass a universal ultimatum and provide strict conditions to persuade the back down. In Cambodia, ASEAN actions were carried along in collaboration with the UN and other world powers in the negotiation process in order to gain the resources and capacity that it lacked (Larman 1993).

Notwithstanding the fact that the UN Security Council and other world powers handled the final decisions arrived at during the conflict settlement in both Haiti and Cambodia, these two organizations from the efforts and activities played a vital and greater role as regional organizations in resolving the conflicts in Haiti and Cambodia.

Generally speaking, conflicts create interstate boundary problems such as the refugee flow and instability. For these reasons regional partners, and neighbors with available resources and motivations might be more suitable to encourage peace than UN and major world powers outside the region trying to prevent and resolve local conflicts. Furthermore, most countries in same regions share originality, communities, cultural and custom values that constitutes the perfect available human resource needed in arbitration moves with conflicting groups. In such situations were regional organizations had to intervene to preserve peace, logistic problems are solved because of proximity (Shamsie 2007).

The level of commitment of the United Nations have over stretched their engagement ranging from peacekeeping to humanitarian affairs. These engagements require both financial and human resources and in most cases their achievements are less proportionate to the resources and time invested. It is therefore imperative for regional forums to play a more committed role in conflicts resolutions (Larman 1993).

Regional Organizations and United Nations Need to cooperate as observed in Haiti and Cambodia. The need each other to be effective in resolving conflicts. Cooperation with regional organizations will enable them UN deal with intrastate conflicts especially those that aligned with ethnic differences.

There is a long history of a perplexed relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The most common problem stemmed from harboring each other's exiles and aiding their efforts to promote a coup back home. These two cases briefly summarized here dealt with charges of intervention and violations of sovereignty and did not involve democracy or human rights. In 1949, Haiti appealed to the OAS Council and charged the Dominican government with harboring and supporting an exile who was broadcasting a call for a coup in Haiti. The OAS Council met and sent a delegation of the newly created Inter-American Peace Committee to investigate, which both countries permitted. Its report to the Council resulted in a series of recommendations to both parties as they both accepted. (A year later Haiti appealed again and, after another committee visit, the OAS called upon both to prevent exile activity in their territory).

A much more serious crisis developed after the inauguration of President Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic in 1963. A Dominican invasion of Haiti almost resulted when Haitian police took over the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince and removed some Haitian exiles who were given the right for political asylum. President Bosch appealed to the OAS and the Council met upon the basis of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty in effect in 1948) in response to his charges of a threat to the peace and violation of nonintervention rule. An investigating committee visited both countries while charges and counter charges increased, and Dominican troops and tanks were stationed at the border (Shamsie 2007).

Haitian President Duvalier openly rejected the committee's critical recommendations. Although the crisis died down when Bosch was overthrown in June, the OAS remained involved until 1966 when the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations after the inauguration of President Joaquin Balaguer. The Commission on Human Rights (HRC) was created by the OAS in 1960 and attempted to respond to the numerous complaints received regarding human rights violations in Haiti. Duvalier, however, rejected all calls by the HRC to enter the country and investigate, and he refused to reply to demands for information on the ground that the HRC was trying to interfere in Haiti's internal affairs, thus violating the nonintervention principle (Larman 1993).

The guide of this rests upon, two assumptions about the nature of the OAS and relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the U.S. The first is that the role of the OAS is a function of the will of its members. It is neither an autonomous organization nor actor because OAS actions depend upon the cooperation and consensus of its members. The second assumption, related to the first, is that there is a direct correlation between the state of Latin American and Caribbean U.S. relations and the role of the OAS: when these relations are good and when there is a convergence of interests and policies they manifest themselves in an active OAS (Shamsie 2007). When relations are not good, the opposite becomes true: OAS is inactive. OAS and Non Intervention. In writing and approving the OAS Charter in 1948 (it went into effect in 1951), the American States made the nonintervention principle the primary binding legal one, which the Latin American States continued as the cornerstone (la piedra angular) of the Inter of nonintervention, mainly to limit the U.S. and the OAS as well, was indicated by its being made absolute in a separate Charter in article 15 (Larman 1993).

This Charter also mentioned representative democracy (in Chapter II: Principles, Article 5 d) in the context of the solidarity and high aims of the members require the political organization on the basis of the efficient implementation of the major values of democracy. The constitution or charter did make an exception to the principle of nonintervention (Article 15) for measures agreed upon for the application and sustenance of peace and security, provided they were approved by a two-thirds vote of the union for deliberations (Meeting of Foreign Ministers). Therefore, the OAS Charter, which was amended the first time in 1967 (the Protocol of Buenos Aires became effective in 1970), provided that nonintervention was a legal duty while that of representative democracy was a moral one (Malone 2008).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the nonintervention rule was reinforced by dictators who were then in the majority and by the Cold War. The OAS could not take any actions on the grounds without promoting the values of democracy and protecting human rights. Instead, the organization concentrated upon violations of nonintervention by dictators that threatened hemispheric stability and security. For example, the OAS sanctions that were applied against the Dominican Republic in 1960 were because General Rafael Trujillo had violated the nonintervention principle when he tried to

kill President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela. It was not on account of his well-known human rights violations against his opponents about which the OAS Human Rights Commission had received many complaints against him (Shamsie 2007).

During this period and even on a later date dictators used nonintervention as a shield to protect them from outside criticism, which they viewed as intervention. Many members of the OAS, however, were aware of the linkage between democracy and instability, but the OAS at that time could not promote the former because it would violate the nonintervention rule as stipulated in their constitution.

As a tool of the Cold War, the OAS was converted into an anti-communist alliance to deal with communist sympathizers a role directed by the U.S. The U.S. linked security and stability by its maintaining relations with and aiding dictatorial governments. The OAS action in 1962 to suspend Cuban participation in the OAS was based predominantly upon security concerns and Cuba's growing dependence upon the USSR, though it also included its departure from the principles of the OAS, including representative democracy (Larman 1993).

In writing and approving the OAS Charter in 1948 that went into effect in 1951, the American States made the nonintervention principle the primary binding legal one, which the Latin American States continued as the cornerstone of the Inter-American System (IAS). The prominence of nonintervention, mainly to limit the U.S. and the OAS as well, was pointed out by its being made absolute in a separate Charter article 15. This Charter also mentioned representative democracy (in Chapter II: Principles, Article 5 d) in the line of the solidarity and "high aims" of the members "require the political organization on the grounds of the efficient implementation of the core values of democracy. The constitution did make an exception to the rules of non-interference (Article 15) for measures adopted for the perseverance of peace and security, (Article 19), provided they were approved by a two thirds vote of the council of deliberation of the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Therefore, the OAS constitution, that witnessed an amendment for the very first time in 1967 (the Protocol of Buenos Aires became effective in 1970), provided that nonintervention was a legal duty while that of representative democracy was a moral one (Larman 1993).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the nonintervention rule was reinforced by dictators who were then in the majority and by the Cold War. The OAS was unable to take any actions on the grounds of promoting democracy and protecting human rights. Instead, it concentrated upon violations of nonintervention by dictators that threatened hemispheric stability and security. For example, the OAS sanctions that were applied against the Dominican Republic in 1960 were because General Rafael Trujillo had violated the nonintervention principle when he tried to kill President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela. It was not on account of his well-known human rights violations against his opponents about which the OAS Human Rights Commission had received many complaints.

During this period and even in later years, dictators have used nonintervention as a shield to protect them from outside criticism, which they viewed as intervention. Many members of the OAS, however, were aware of the linkage between democracy and instability, but the OAS at that time could not promote the former because it would violate the nonintervention rule. As an instrument of the Cold War, the OAS was converted into an anti-communist alliance to deal with communist subversion a role directed by the U.S. The U.S. linked security and stability by its maintaining relations with and aiding dictatorial governments. The OAS action in 1962 to suspend Cuban participation in the OAS was based primarily upon security concerns and Cuba's growing dependence upon the Soviet Union, but also included its departure from the principles of the OAS, including representative democracy (Shamsie 2007).

The response of the OAS to the insurrection against General Anastasio Somoza in 1979 set an important precedent and placed great importance on human rights. A Sandinista-led armed struggle to overthrow Somoza had become a popular insurrection in 1978, which prompted the convocation of the OAS union of deliberation (Meeting of Foreign Ministers) to consider the conflict. The HRC was sent to Nicaragua to investigate the charges of human rights violations by Somoza's National Guard. The resultant critical report of the HRC validating the charges laid the basis for an unprecedented OAS resolution in June 1979. (The UN General Assembly also passed a critical resolution).

The resolution stated that the inhumane conduct of the dictatorial regime is the principle reason for the situation and recommended of the replacement of the Somoza regime, the implementation of democratically elected regime that would ensure and protect human rights and the call for a free and fair elections with immediate effect that will enable the settings in place of perfect democratic regime. Somoza fled the country in July.

2.6 The Transition to Democracy.

Beginning in 1979, and accelerating in the early and mid-1980s, was a tide that swept authoritarian governments, whether civilian or military, from office by means of force or elections. For example, in 1979, Eric Gairy was forced out by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement in Grenada and Somoza by the Sandinista-led popular insurrection. In the 1980s, military governments was replaced by civilian elected regime in Peru (1980), Bolivia and Honduras (1982), Argentina (1983), and in Brazil and Uruguay (1985). This tide resulted in isolating the remaining dictatorial regimes and their being subjected to mounting pressure by the elected governments, by the U.S. and the OAS as well as by international financial bodies, to reform and begin the transition to democracy (Larman 1993).

In 1985, the OAS amended its Charter again (Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, effective in 1988), reaffirming and strengthening the commitment to promote and consolidate representative democracy, as one of the OAS's important goal. And the Secretary General was given more authority to bring matters before the OAS (Shamsie 2007).

The regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier became the subject of increasing pressure by these states organizing, and there was mounting opposition to it within Haiti. These external and internal pressures resulted in his removal and departure in early 1986. Before putting the end of his rule, a few words were in order about elections in the democratic transition.

Elections play a very important role in the democratic process, likewise an indispensable legitimizing activity. For these reasons, their being fair and honest is required. They reflected what should have been called the, procedural, aspect of the process. However, there was another aspect of the process, and that was the

substantive, one, which is really more important. In fact, the really crucial questions about democracy is not the holding of free elections, as important as they are, but the acceptance of the outcome of the elections by the former government, the military, state institutions, major interest groups, and by the electorate. Too often there is a preoccupation with elections and procedural democracy as often the case with the U.S, and the assumption that if they are free, that is tantamount to being democratic or having a democracy. The historical record demonstrates that the assumption is invalid (Malone 2008).

The preconditions for democracy have been widely discussed but frequently they have been applied more to the procedural, than the substantive side of democracy. While the former require a particular degree of information and instruction, experience and practice, the latter must include a belief in and commitment to the process, a fragment of economic well-being, functioning governmental institutions, and law and order. Economic development and political stability contribute directly to the substantive side of democracy.

The inability of the OAS to affect and improve the human rights situation in Haiti resulted in a reluctant invitation to the UN for assistance. For example, two OAS bodies a group of experts under OEA-DEMOC and one other organ, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) were denied access to become operational in or to visit Haiti (Wilson 1990).

In September 1992, the OAS Secretary General had been able to negotiate an agreement with representatives of Aristide and Prime Minister Bazin permitting the OAS to send 18 experts as observers over the activities in Haiti. They were to provide humanitarian aid and monitor human rights as well as economic conditions. This civilian mission arrived in mid-September but the members were not able to carry out their activities because the OAS failed to work out with Foreign Minister Benoit an acceptable accord providing for their duties, including protection, of the Bazin government to the mission. Consequently, the mission members remained idle in the capital (Larman 1993).

In December, the HRC had requested permission from Haitian authorities to make two visits, first, an exploratory one in mid-December and, second, an on-site one

from January 11-15, 1993. The purpose was to follow up on its early December 1991 visit and the resultant critical report. However, the government did not give permission. This prompted the Foreign Ministers to approve on December 13 a resolution reinstatement of democracy in Haiti calling upon the head of the union of foreign ministers and the secretary general to assist the HRC in its efforts in view of "the high level and the continuous violation of human right values in Haiti and the government unwillingness to allow the Commission to visit. The same congress requested those members of the OAS and UN who had not yet done so to carry out the measures as approved by the OAS.

As from the fall of 1992, a growing number of officials and states believed that the active and direct involvement of the UN was necessary in order to resolve the situation in Haiti. By this time it was clear that the OAS sanctions were ineffective and that human rights violations were continuing. Many felt that requiring all UN members to observe the OAS sanctions would assure their success in bringing about the restoration of Aristide. The mounting fear of a mass movement of Haitian refugees once the Clinton Administration took office assured the assignment of a high priority to the crisis in Haiti (Malone 2008).

Although the OAS secretary general opposed UN involvement, he was pressured by many OAS members, including the U.S, to turn to the UN. In early December, the Foreign Ministers authorized him to explore UN involvement. This resulted in his appointing on December 11 Mr. Dante Caputo, a former Argentine foreign minister, as his personal representative for Haiti. (A week later the UN secretary general sent a special envoy, Mr. Antonio Suarez, to survey the situation in Haiti.) What followed was an active tri-partite declaration among the OAS, UN and U.S. in which the UN exercised leadership in trying to break the impasse in a Haitian settlement. There were intense negotiations between Mr. Caputo and the prime minister and military authorities in Haiti, in his strong initiative to resurrect and expand the size of OEA-DEMOC to monitor human rights in Haiti (Wilson 1990).

The focus was upon sending in a number of human rights observers, for example, expanding the 18 of the OAS to around 200, later to be enlarged to 400 or 500. Pressure was mounted upon the human rights observer accord as providing a framework for negotiating an end to the violence. The reports on the negotiation

process in early and mid-January were positive and optimistic; it appeared that agreement on an OAS-UN observer mission to monitor human rights had been reached. Caputo mentioned that he had signed letters signed by Prime Minister Bazin and Gen. Cedras, which validated their agreement. The negotiation process was overshadowed by the unanticipated and surprising announcement of President-elect Clinton on January 14 that he was continuing President Bush's policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees (Larman 1993). .

This reversal of his campaign attack on and promise to cancel Bush's deportation policy, was followed by Clinton's announcing that a coast guard and naval force would be placed around Haiti to pick up and return fleeing Haitians. There were mixed signals about the human rights monitoring accord the third week of January; Caputo mentioned an agreement while Bazin and Cedras were tentative. Over the weekend the Rev. Jesse Jackson made a visit to Haiti and he spoke in favor of military intervention if the military failed to respond to an ultimatum about the return of Aristide.

In view of the favorable reports by Caputo about agreement on the OAS-UN human rights mission, it came as a shock when Prime Minister Bazin announced his rejection of the observer mission on January 27. He declared that the powers of the mission were unlimited, that they constituted a violation of Haiti's sovereignty and would place Haiti under international tutelage. However, Bazin did indicate in his press conference that he still accepted, the principle of the mission. After this major setback, negotiations were resumed and they intensified, and the U.S. became more actively involved in the process; it applied pressure, both public and private, upon all parties concern, especially Bazin, Cedras, and upon Aristide as well.

The U.S. mentioned they will tighten up and strengthen the embargo as a means of pressuring Haitian authorities. For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated on February 5 the Clinton Administration's strong support of the UN-OAS mediation effort to monitor human rights and that it was considering the tightening of the embargo as a means of assuring agreement on the mission.

Despite pro-de facto government demonstrations against an early February mediation visit by Caputo, agreement was reached on the UN-OAS civilian mission

to monitor human rights on February 10. Four days later the first contingent of 40 human rights observers arrived, including 15 U.S. citizens, and they were scheduled to stay there for one year. It was expected that the full complement of observers will reach 400 or 500. 42 Clearly, the implementation of this UN-OAS mission marks an important accomplishment for there is now a mechanism for dealing with the human rights situation, a justified end in itself. It remains to be determined if such will contribute to an agreement providing for the eventual return of Aristide (Larman 1993).

This therefore traced the expanding legal authority of the OAS to prevent conflicts, promote peace and representative democracy and to protect human rights. This expansion resulted in another basis being provided in addition to maintaining peace and security for collective action that is compatible with the principle of nonintervention: hence promoting representative democracy and protecting human rights (Wilson 1990).

The Santiago Commitment of 1991 manifests the important change that was made possible by the hemisphere wide transition to democratically elected governments. The election of Father Jean Bertrand Aristide in late 1990 was an important part of the transition and marked a most significant historical event in Haiti, the first fair and free presidential election carried out since independence.

When he was overthrown by the military after almost eight months in office, it provided the first test of the new authority and efficacy of the OAS under the Santiago Commitment. The OAS responded to his removal by imposing economic sanctions against the de facto military government as the principal means to bring about his return to power. However, the OAS was somewhat unsuccessful in meeting the challenge and achieving the restoration of Aristide, and thereby making operational the Santiago Commitment. Not only has the OAS failed to restore Aristide, but it has been unable to reduce the tragic and continuing attacks upon Aristide's supporters committed by the military since he was forced from power (Larman 1993). The OAS' turning to the United Nations later 1992, which resulted in the mission headed by Mr. Caputo, one made operational in February 1993, was an admission of failure of OEA-DEMOC in order to thrash away the on-going human rights violations and situation.

In their decision to apply economic sanctions as the means to persuade the military regime to accept the re-installation of Aristide, the members of the OAS in general, and the U.S. in particular, made three serious miscalculations or mistakes. The consequences of these flaws have been the further discrediting and weakening of the OAS certainly not its re-vitalization and demonstrated effectiveness in promoting representative democracy or protecting human rights, which were the rationale for acting to restore Aristide(Wilson 1990).

Tragically, the embargo has been counter-productive and it has seriously impaired the most precarious economy in the hemisphere and the brunt of it has been borne by the majority of the Haitian people, who are at the subsistence level. Ironically, they were the ones who elected Aristide and who strongly support the sanctions and the OAS; they were willing to continue suffering while waiting for the embargo to bring about the return of their president. This ill-advised policy overlooked the important linkage between economic and political development in the transition to democracy (Malone 2008).

A second serious flaws was confusing, in fact equating, the procedural aspect of the democratic process, elections, with the, substantive, aspect of commitment to and accepting the results of the process. The elections and the restoration of Aristide were presented as being tantamount to restoring democracy in Haiti. Unfortunately, Haiti has never been democratic and was not a democracy, and restoring Aristide will not make Haiti democratic. True, Haiti has been engaged in a transition to democracy and elections were an important aspect of the democratic process (Larman 1993).

Another major miscalculation, particularly related to the second, was that certain OAS members, especially the U.S., remained silent about some of Aristide's actions as president. The most serious were his intimidating and threatening speeches concerning his critics and opponents, which his supporters believed warranted their resorting to vigilante justice. Aristide urged such actions and he condoned them, thus violating Constitutional guarantees and other "procedural" aspects of the democratic process; by these acts he contributed to his own downfall. The U.S. and other OAS members stressed his being democratically-elected but ignored and were silent about his human rights violations.

Notwithstanding the above mistakes, the political impasse remains and the illegal and unacceptable human rights violations continue under the governance of the military regime. Ending them must be a top and urgent priority, which both the OAS and UN recognize. That is why the former invited the latter to take over the mission to monitor the human rights situation. The mission is operational, for the first group of observers were deployed in mid-February 1993; the size of the mission is expected to reach that of 400-500 observers (Wilson 1990).

This is a prerequisite to breaking the political impasse, which may or may not result in the return of Aristide. If the continuing violence perpetrated by the military is not ended and if the UN-OAS monitoring mission is not able to do so, humanitarian intervention will remain as the only viable alternative--one of last resort. Another irony of the OAS and U.S. approach to resolving the situation in Haiti was that sanctions were selected as the means although several proposals were made for a humanitarian intervention (the present writer submitted on see appendix). It is interesting that the Bush Administration was willing to engage in an UN approved humanitarian intervention in Somalia and sent a division of Marines that great distance, but it was not willing to work out a similar mission through the OAS in the Caribbean. A humanitarian intervention in the Caribbean would have been far cheaper, would have ended the exodus of refugees and would have provided the economic and political conditions conducive to ending the political impasse. And a few other OAS members, at least Argentina and Venezuela, would have provided troops and shared the burden with the U.S. Another advantage of a humanitarian action of this type is that the U.S. would not have become involved in the controversial and illegal forcible seizure and deportation of Haitian refugees (Malone 2008).

Once the role of the UN-OAS human rights mission has been institutionalized and has become effective in ending the military's violent acts against its opponents, a basis will be provided for turning to the question of the resumption of the transition to democracy. A key issue will be amnesty for the military as it was in Argentina, Uruguay, and in Chile in the 1980s. Aristide's return depends upon his accepting amnesty. The requisite Haitian solution, which is being negotiated, involves the following: lifting the ineffective and counter-productive embargo, recognizing Bazin

as the interim prime minister, resuming the suspended economic assistance, granting amnesty to the military and arranging the phased return of Aristide to office (Malone 2008).

Summarily, Regional Organizations have a pertinent role in crisis management likewise they must maintain friendly ties and cooperation's with the UN and other great powers in the world to be able to efficiently resolve interstate wars.

3. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Historical framework: Stages of the Conflicts in CAR from Independence

The CAR is a landlocked state located in the center of African Continent. The area which is today called the CAR has been occupied by its inhabitants for closed to 8,000 years. The initial and earliest settlers were the ancestors of today's Aka people (Pygmies), whom are today inhabitants of the west and southern forest parts of the country. The slave state of Dar al-Kuti occupied reach northern areas until the various regions of the CAR were brought united under French colonial leadership later in the 19th century. It is believed that Colonial administrators usually favored some ethnic groups as against others, which resulted in political differences that have persisted after independence in 1960 (Siradag 2016). Preceding to the era of civil disobedience and dictatorial regime, which included the unpopular regime of the self-declared Emperor Bokassa I (who renamed the country the Central African Empire), the country engaged on a quest for democracy values which were menaced towards the end of the 20th C, by inter-ethnic civil wars from neighboring states as well as by attempted coup within the country. Feeling exhausted due to the social decadence and the changing respect and sympathy to the numerous rising warring factions for the struggle for power, the citizens of this country had a popular proverb which they use "When elephants fight, it the vegetation around that suffers, and when elephants make love, the vegetation suffers as well (Dukhan 2016).

Founded as France trading center in 1889, Bangui is the capital of CAR that lies on the banks of the Ubangi River in CAR. It was popular during the colonial era as the most delightful cities in the equatorial Africa with it beautiful green hills with pasture and a thickly populated rundown neighborhood, a nice city center with modern residential quarters. Even though demonstrations and curfews regularly shot down the city, night life in Bangui was fascinating with various music from different cultures and entertainment (Husted 2016).

The CAR shares boundary to the north with Chad, in the northeast with Sudan and south Sudan, the Democratic republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and to the south with Congo (Kinshasa), and to the west with Cameroon and in terms of land mass can be compared to France.

"CAR gained its independence on the 13th of August 1960 from France its colonial master with David Dacko as the first President of the country. Six years after the CAR gained independence (1966), Colonel Jean Bédel Bokassa, the cousin to president Dacko overthrew the regime.

Bokassa in December 1968 changed the name of the country to Central African Empire and made himself the emperor of this new empire (Tomolya 2004). He was accused by the amnesty international for committing mass murder when he was the leader of the country when close 80 students and pupils were killed as results of his brutal extravagant rule. Bokassa was ousted in September 1979 through a coup supported by the French Paratroopers and the CAR was restored (Debos 2008).

In 1981, a series of event occurred that led to some changes within the country; this time the country's name was changed again to Central African Republic and President David Dacko was overthrown this time by a military coup again led by General Andre Kolingba who banned all political parties in the country (Dukhan 2016).

Bokassa later returned to Central Africa Republic from exile in France in 1986 and in 1987 he was convicted for embezzlement and an accomplice to numerous cases of murder: he was given a death sentenced which was later altered to life in jail (Tomolya 2014).



Figure 3.1: MAP OF Africa

Source: Maps of World (2015), Political maps of Africa,

Passing through three turbulent decades of mostly military coups and military rule, in 1993 a civilian regime was established in CAR and this civilian regime ruled for 10 years with Ange-Felix Patasse as head of state. During the decade with Ange-felix Patasse as the president, he witnesses plagues or civil disobedience and by Match

2003 he was overthrown through a military coup championed by General Francois Bozize who set in place a transitional or temporal administration.

The temporal administration had popular support from civil society organizations and parties and as such several candidates went in for the municipal, legislative and presidential elections that took place in March and in May 2005. Mr. Bozize was elected the president after the votes was declared in 2005 (Dukhan 2016). Despite this evolution, the government lack full control over the countryside due to inefficacy, lawlessness and unrest in neighboring Chad, Sudan and DR Congo.

In June 2005, thousands of civilians flee across the CAR border to Chad as a results of fighting between government forces and rebels and this lasted for years, a number of peace treaties were later arrived at for cease fire between then state military and the different rebel factions in 2007 and 2008. Unfortunately, majority of the points agreed upon were not applied at full capacity.

As earlier indicated, the north was subjected to conflicts which originated from conflicts in Darfur regions in neighboring Sudan spilling across the boundary, while in the southern part of the country, the people were regularly terrorized by militias from the Lord Resistance Army: A rebel faction with base in Ugandan which use DR Congo as it base before the military offensive at the end of the 2008, which further compelled them to move far into the CAR and other neighboring states (Debos 2008).

Presidential elections where scheduled due 2010, but it was repeatedly postponed till January 23 2011. Bozize and Patasse were also the candidates for the presidential run. Before the proclamation of the results, Patasse and other candidates claimed elections were rigged in favor of Bozize and launched complains in that plight. When results were later made public in February, Bozize was declared winner with 66% of the total votes.

With decades of violence and instability from independence, CAR is a small but resource rich country with an approximate population of 4.6million inhabitants. For almost a decade, CAR has condensed into sectarian violence claiming thousands of

lives and displacing over a million citizens. With much concern on the conflicts being an Ethno-Religious purge dividing the country into religious lines.

The CAR is a country that comprises of Christians and Muslims with Muslim being just 15 % of the total population (sohaib 2014). This Muslim minority migrated into CAR in the early 19th century as settled in Northeastern part of the country with the country's borders with Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan borders with Chad, Sudan and South Sudan. They also consist of merchants class in urban city in Bangui, it should be noted that the northeastern part of the country is resource rich accommodating the countries major petroleum extractions and diamond mining sites not leaving the fact that it is the country's poorest area facing developmental neglect by the central government (Siradag 2016).

Looking at the conflict in CAR from 2010, one cannot begin without mentioning the Seleka rebels. This armed group comprises of disgruntled politicians, prominent officials of the government and long existing rebel groups that wanted political change and tribal or religious balance and equality within the government of President Bozize (Dukhan 2016). President Bozize came to power through an uprising event in which he overthrows President Ange-Felix Patasse in 2003. In 2007, President Bozize came up with the "2007 Birao peace agreement which was heavily applauded and welcomed with great euphoria by the sub rebel groups. It was termed demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) with main conception on settling the armed groups. Despite this applaudable efforts, President Bozize failed to implement majority of the endorsement and by 2012 most of the groups were disenchanted and hence a new face of organized rebellions supported by both former, famed officials and politicians under Bozize. Among which were Firmi and Findiro and Michel Djotodia disgruntled by Bozize's increased nepotism.

The most effective among these groups rebelling were "Union de force Democratic pour le Ressemblement (UFDR) and Convention de Patriote pour la justice et la Paix (CPJP). These two groups eventually formed an alliance of convenience and rallied under Djotodia creating the large Muslim "Seleka". Their activities moved indelible and in December 2012, they were outside the administrative capital of Bangui and by

March 2013, the seleka killed 13 South African soldiers stationed in Bangui and took control of the Capital ousting President Bozize (Sohaib 2014).

Djotodia became the leader of the transitional government that faced untold challenges with the administration due the activities of the seleka rebels. As a result of these activities: looting, raping and killings. The seleka coalition untangled itself and with an attempt to reinstate order, Djotodia officially dissolved seleka in August 2013 creating a transitional parliament in order to reintroduce Democratic rule (Trinidad 2014). All these attempts failed and the seleka rebels continue looting and killing indiscriminately. Amid this Anarchy, large groups of Christians in Central African Republic organized themselves into local self-defense militias identifying themselves as “Anti-Balaka”. The anti-balaka believed the seleka were deliberately targeting them and they staged-managed retaliation attacks against the Muslim populations in the nation’s capital of Bangui and later on in rural communities. As a result of this violence and turbulence, in January 2014 Djotodia was forced to resign with Catherine Samba-Panza chosen as provisional president (Debos 2008).

From March 2013 when the seleka rebels overthrow Bozize, Christians and Muslim communities in CAR witnessed untold clashes leading to hatred and bloodshed. While the seleka rebels were retreating, Anti-Balaka rebels continuously committed atrocities against the Muslims in Centre-west: looting from abandoned homes burning Mosques beating and killing groups of Muslims (Dukhan 2016). Both groups have increasingly used propaganda and unhealthy languages in attempt to clean each other. According to Sohaib and Shaw 2014, over 80 % of the Muslims have fled their homes in Bangui and over 100,000 have also left Christian dominated communities. This predominant drive of reprisal hoop has partitioned Bangui the capital city between Muslims and the Christians communities and has caused mass displacement of citizens both internally and internationally as refugees.

With the gravity of the crisis, in 2013 France deployed 2000 troops (operation sangaria), African union 6000 troops (MISCA) , the European union deploys 1000 troops, meanwhile the UN authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), with all these troops peace was still a farfetched situation in CAR (CRS 2016).

Multiple factions have openly criticized both Seleka and the Anti-balaka groups and speculative command structures the poor control of members and leadership squabbles. Both groups have practically targeted civilians whom the suspect sympathizes with their opponent and both groups have also attacked the UN in CAR. Almost defeated in July 2013, Djotodia dissolved the seleka in September 2013 but this did not put end the rivalry as rival groups in December that same year exchanged a heave gun battle in the capital city of Bangui resulting to at least 1000 death (Debos 2008). Due to pressure from the International community, by January 2014 Djotodia stepped down while a majority of the seleka forces were chased out of Bangui and a transitional authority was install with a National Transitional Council (NTC) made up of 135 members and a 20 man delegation with interim President Catherin Samba-Panza as the leader (Dukhan 2016).

On July 23 2014, an end to hostility accord was signed by the fighting groups. With respect to the series of analysis made throughout the CAR, a general conference was scheduled in May 2015 for National reconciliation, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) were some of the agreements arrived at; to reconcile and stop to the use of child soldiers inclusive (Siradag 2016). The interim government identified top concerns: DDRR and security sector reforms; justice and forgiveness: decentralized system of government, economic development and elections. While the UN on it part through it Security Council Resolution 2134 2014, set in place official ban on arms and heavy fines to defaulters. In 2015 and 2016, CAR democratically elected a President and members of the house of assembly.

In essence, the country has been divided into two as a result of the increase tension from 2013 to 2017: North and East majority being Muslims with the seleka rebels while the Christians dominated the south with the anti-Balaka. It should be recalled that the central administration that was set up in Bangui had very week control of the rural interior. This has again led to continues violence making peace a farfetched dream through government effort (CRS 2016).

3.2 Reasons for the Escalating Conflict in CAR

Though taken to be religious conflicts, some school of thoughts view it as a political conflict caused by the tension between the northern rebels (Seleka) and the Central government of Bozize which has gradually transformed into a sectarian violence. So many factors therefore accounted for the escalation of this conflict from 2013 to 2017 which are outlined below.

Control over Resources: The Northerners in CAR who stand to be Muslims have for decades criticized the central government for not giving them a fair share of the natural resources wealth. This is often regarded as the predominant reasons why the seleka rebelled against Bozize .In addition has been the division within the seleka which has been a hindrance for this group to be controlled as a military force (Debos 2008).Remember the seleka is made up of some major rebel factions UFDR and CPJP whose rivalry have long existed and the struggle for leadership over the territory and resources. This explains the wide spread killings and looting in the central Capital of Bangui when they took control .There has been a significant level of greed in the conflicts because people are not only targeted on bases of religion but also depending on how wealthy they are especially in Urban areas. Such Targets are killed and their properties looted and others destroyed. This has been the case with Muslim merchants who are very wealthy in the urban area. Hence Targets are chosen not only for the religious affiliations but also with relation to their wealth.

Regional Interference: The gradual withdrawal of regional support for Bozize's regime led to the seleka rebellion. Fade up with the government of Ange-Felix Patasse, France neglected Patasse's government which enabled Bozize to take power in 2003 to the approval of CAR's neighbors. The support showed to Bozize later died a natural death and by 2012, neither France nor CAR's neighbors were willing to help Bozize fight the seleka rebels. Chad for example was angry with Bozize for failing to effectively negotiate with the rebels and as a result withdrew its presidential guard troops which was looked upon as the strongest in the country and in the fall of that same year 2012, Chad started releasing seleka rebels held in Chad under house arrest, There were also high spread rumors that Chadian Mercenaries helped the seleka rebels along its border with CAR (Siradag 2016).

High level of Insecurity: The conflict in CAR witnessed a dramatic twist from 2013 as a result of inadequate state security. President Bozize for fear of a coup against him did not little or nothing to upgrade his forces exposing the regimes weakness which was an added impetus to the seleka rebels. With inadequate ability to speak French language, the seleka militants in Bangui relied on Arabic speaking Muslim for shelter ware houses to secure their looted goods (CSR 2016). With a weak state security in place the Christians communities resorted to arming themselves for self-defense against the Seleka rebels. These small Christian's groups that armed themselves were what became known as Anti-Balaka and was believed o comprise of former members of the CAR arm force. By late 2013, AU and France forces intervened and the seleka rebels started retreating to the north. The ex-seleka operated from the Muslim communities, while the Anti-Balaka operated from the Christian areas with each force acting as a default defense the communities in question. As such, each Community was regarded as a threat and hence increased hatred, religious segregation out of mutual hostility and consequently continues intrastate violence in CAR (Siradag 2016).

Two new unknown groups, The Alliance of Revival and Rebuilding (A2K) and The Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK) (Tomolya 2014). These former rebel movements accused Bozize for neglecting ad not fully implementing the initial peace talks. The requested that president Bozize should resign and be tried at the international criminal court of justice. The seleka rapidly launched attacks advancing to the south though was stopped from taking over the capital city of Bangui and by December they ventured into frank dialogue and negotiations with the regime. In 2013, the selekka rebels and the Bozizie's government accepted a call for end of confrontations through a power sharing accord that redressed several request made by the rebels like the release of prisoners and the exit of all foreign troops from the country, Also some seleka members were given top ranking offices in the administration (Husted 2016). The seleka soon became disgruntle with the terms of the accord with claims that Bozize could not put into effect the pertinent points of the treaty. The seleka by March 2014 issued another ultimatum to president Bozize, even though there were some eventual talks and agreements between both camps, the

seleka resumed violence and after a few days they took control over the Bangui and on the 24th of March 2013, Bozize left the country.

The seleka took total control of the country with one of its members Michael Djotodia as the president who promised to maintain the power sharing agreement in January. The international community condemned the actions of the rebels while the African Union suspended CAR from its activities and sanctions meted on the rebel leaders. Djotodia announced the suspension of the constitution and also dissolved the parliament. His initial effort to create a transitional authority was rejected by the opposition and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) a regional forum, ECCAS demanded the creation of a national transitional council to champion the state matters until the environment was calm for elections to be conducted. The rebels accepted and in April 2013 a national transitional council was set up and Djotodia was elected interim president and was inaugurated on the 18 of August 2013 (Siradag 2016).

Despite efforts by these interim regime to reinstate peace and order and pilot the affairs of the country, they were unable to perform the functions of a government effectively. At this time the rebels were busy pillaging the countryside and carrying out kidnappings, rape, killings and looting.

The Christian communities began to form militias under the name “The anti-balaka” in order to protect themselves against the Muslim rebels (Seleka). These therefor change the face of the struggle to a religious violence as both camps launched violent attacks on each other. This circle of violent attacks led to the deaths of hundreds and displaced Thousands.




Figure 3.2: Map of CAR.

Source: Central African Republic: “Map of Rebel Control (January 2013)”

On December 5th 2013, the UN Security Council signed and approved the deployment of an African led peace keeping force that will work with collaboration with ECCAS troops that were already in CAR and French troops in order to protect the civilian population. At the end of December 2014, humanitarian situations were bleak and more than half of the entire population of the CAR needed aid (Dukhan 2016). Early 2014, ECCAS held a summit to seek for lasting solutions to the degenerating situation in the country. At the end of the summit, Djotodia and Tiangaye announced their resignations and at the end of that same month a transitional government was put in place with Madam Catherin Samba-Panza the mayor of Bangui installed as the interim president from the 23rd January 2014 (Tomolya 2014).




Figure 3.3 Events Involving Muslim and/or Christian Militias and Associated Fatalities, Central African Republic, September 2013 - August 2014.

Source: Country Report: Central African Republic. January 2015.

3.3 Groups that Were Involved in the Arm Conflicts in CAR from 2010.

The seleka Rebels: They were made up of Union of Democratic Forces for Unity(UFDR), The Union of Republican forces (UFR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) who unanimously agreed to come together and launched the rebellion.

In 2012 other groups willfully joined like: Democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC), Alliance of Revival and Rebuilding (A2R), and Patriotic convention for the Country (CPSK) (Husted 2016).

It’s worth noting that there are fighters from other countries within the predominant Muslim groups from Chad and Sudan. The Seleka have been accused for the human rights abuses, unlawful killings since December 2012. The number of seleka fighters was estimated at 15,000 to 20.000 from reports from the International Federation for Human rights (FIDH).

Armed Forces of Central African Republic: The Central African Armed forces (In French, Force Armies central African FACA), established at the independence in 1960 is very weak force that often depend on International support to be able to fight

the rebels when they attack. The disloyalty of the forces to president in 1996-1997 has caused a serious setback on the conflict increasing internal problems. They have faced criticism from Human rights institutions due to its high level of terror, killing, torture and sexual harassment. General Kolingba in 1981, adopted an ethnic priority military recruitment strategy that gave priority to the “Yakom Tribe from the southern part of the country. The Yakom consist of 5% of total population of CAR but during Kolingba's rule as General of the Army in 1981, they occupied key positions in the military and in the administration. The consequences became disastrous when Ange Felix Patasse from the north became president. President Patasse and Bozize had equipped and managed their own army outside the FACA because they considered FACA to be disloyal to them (Country Report CAR 2015).

Bozize failed to pay the forces that assisted him seize power in 2003 as promised and they engaged in terrorizing and killing civilians'. By 2006 the situation degenerated and the national army together with the presidential guard were on regular bases tortured, executed while increasingly violating human rights. For this reason, the forces it was evident that the forces were poorly equipped, poorly trained, lack financial motivation and were small in number (4,500 troops) with very light weapons as compared to that of the rebels (Siradag 2016).

Anti-Balaka Militias (Anti-seleka): In local Sangu and Mandja languages Anti-Balaka means anti-Machete. Anti-Balaka was created to respond to the seleka attacks on Christians. They were mainly vigilante peasants armed with crude weapons and machetes. As a result of the fall of Bozize and victory for the Seleka, the seleka attacked communities, looted property and thousands of civilians fled their homes with an increase in humanitarian crisis (Country Report CAR 2015).

We should recall here that the Anti-Balaka were vigilantes who initially were being hired to protect cattle's crops from highway robbers. The anti-balaka also involved associations of Central African Farmers (ACF), and anti-balaka Movements and the Front for the Return of the Constitutional Order in Central African Republic (FROCCA) (Dukhan 2016).

Anti-balaka ("anti-machete") was the general name given to the vigilante associations that involved in the fighting against the seleka rebels in CAR. The group anti-balaka came into existence in 2013 with no leadership at the top and comprised of

a disjoined vigilant groups. Some believe it was an initiative from the former head of state Bozize to curtail high level theft and among the fighters of the anti-balaka were ex-service men from the CAR forces who worked under Bozize as FACA. It later became a mix union of fighters from Association of Central African Famers (ACP), and the peasants from the anti-balaka or anti-seleka movements not leaving out members of the Front for the Return of a constitutional order in CAR (FROCCA). This group the FROCCA also comprises if ex-service men loyal to former president Bozize and the disgruntled youths who could not continue to seat and watch the selaka killing their armless people (Tomolyaa 2014).

This group constituted Christians and carried out violent actions against the Muslims faithful's mostly in the northern part of CAR and Cameroon. In the course of the conflict from 014 to 2017, this group was angry with the atrocities committed by the seleka rebels in the country and this pushed them to collaborate with other groups like the Armee populire pour le Restauration de la Democracy (APRD), and UFDR, a joint union of fighters headed by the current interim president and rebel leader michael Djotodia. They launched attacks in the northern zone, took control over some towns, and committed human right violations besides other evil acts like unlawful killings, kidnappings and the recruitment of child soldiers (Siradag 2016).

Since the selaka started these rebel activities in 2012, the North West part of the country has been witnessing continuous kidnappings and killings among other atrocities. There was continuous birth of other petit militia made up of ex-soldiers, others leaving the selaka groups sting up more vigilante famers groups to combine with the highly segmented anti-balaka warriors. The conflicts in CAR today is evidently between the seleka rebels who took power from President Francois Bozize through a military coup and replaced him with Michael Djotodia in Match 2013 (Country Report CAR 2015). In fostering the move for retaliation against the seleka violence, the anti-balaka initiated new tactics resistance in the northern area characterized by atrocities not only against seleka sympathizers toward every Muslim. All this is reaction to the seleka pain matted on the Christian populations through unlawful killing, Torture, rape and looting (Tomolya 2014).

On the 05 of December 2013, the anti-balaka coordinated some attacks on the capital city of Bangui with sophisticated weapons like rocket launchers and grenades to the

surprise of many. Figures from amnesty international reports reveal that 800 to 1200 people lost their lives in Bangui and its neighboring villages on the 5th and 6th of December. The anti-balaka fighter depended on weapons like dangerous and poisoned arrows, hunting rifles and AK-47 taken from the Seleka fighters (Country report CAR 2015).

FROCCA, constituted ex-army officers who were disgruntled with the Seleka violence and was formed in Paris France by August 2013 by ex-president Bozize. The anti-balaka fighters increased in number to approximately 15000 troops. The Anti-Balaka also constituted bandit and opportunist who have joined to benefit from looting and acts of vandalism since 2013.

International Military: The French military presence is evident in all its former colonies since their independence with CAR inclusive. Initially France had 1400 troops stationed in CAR when the conflict started. As the situation aggravated during the mutinies, France had 2400 troops patrolling in Bangui with main objective to evacuate foreign citizens but this did not resolve the situation as there were continued mutinies leading to more casualties to both France and the Rebels. The local population protested against the French troops for protecting the dictator against the people's will and this was because a greater majority of the population sided with the mutineers. France by 2014 reduced her troops to 1600 in CAR (Tomolya 2014).



Figure 3.4: French Military Bases in Africa.

Sources: “Crisis in the Central African Republic: Is it a religious war in a godforsaken country or something else?” Page 472.

MISCA (Mission Internationale de soutien à La Centre Afrique): Before the birth of MISCA, there was an earlier mission in CAR created in 2008 by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and sponsored by the European Union (EU). Known as the mission of the ECCAS Peace and Security Council, or MICOPAX, it surrendered over its leadership role to MISCA on 19 December 2013. MISCA was an African led International Support Mission in Central Africa. The CAR is a formal French colony and uses French as the country’s official language and MISCA is the French acronym for Mission Internationale de Soutien a la Centrafrique sous Conduite African (MISCA 2014).

Created by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU with absolute favor from the UN, MISAC was born on the 5th of December 2013 through the UNSC resolution 2127 with aim and objective to stabilize the situation in CAR following a successive coup d’etat on March 2013. Backed by the UN and headed by the AU, the mission was deployed to the field on the 19th of December 2013 (Siradag 2016)

The MISCA mission had to involve officers from various department to assist in the crisis. As from the 2nd of July 2014, MISCA had 5,089 soldiers, together with civil administrators under departs of human rights, gender, disarmament, humanitarian department, political matters and a police force of 602 men.

Their mission was further blended by the France deployed operation that comprised 2000 military men and women, under the name Operation Sangaris, and the EU support troops that arrived CAR in April 2014 and which numbered 800 including troops and police men (Tomolya 2014). The number of EU support troops later reached 680 by 02 July 2014.

Resolution 2127 of the UNSC had as option to transform MISCA to a bigger mission if need be under UN authority, that was schedule to be into infacts on the 15th September 2014. This mission was led by the Republic of Congo born Major General Jean-Marie Mokoko who was to be the AU's Special Representative for the Chairman of the AU commission (SRCC) in the CAR. This general was a man with past experience in peace and security missions. He was once the chief of the defense staff of the Congolese armed forces and worked as a special envoy for the Chairperson of the AU missions in Cote D'Ivoire. He also graduated from the war college in France and before his appointment he was the Assistant high representative for Mali and the Sahel under the AU (Siradag 2016)

The MISCA military department was headed by a commander called Major General Martin Tumenta Chomu, who was a Cameroonian and has worked as a senior military general in Cameroon army. He also obtained a diplomat from the Staff College in the USA (ft Lenworth) and also graduated from the war college in France (MISCA 2014).

The assistant commander was Brigadier-general Athanaze Karruza from Burundi. The police department under MISCA was headed by Colonel Patrice Ostangue Bengone from Gabon who was also had a diplomat from the national school of gendarmerie in Gabon. He also studied and undergo training some schools in France and Moroccp (Tomolya 2014)

MISCA troops came from the following countries: Burundi 850, Cameroon 800, Congo 850, DR Congo 850, Gabon 500, Guinea Equatorial 200 and Chad 850. The

mission was officially aided and supported by France and headed by African union and were dispatched on the 19 of December 2013.

Chadian Military: Beside the multilateral forces, support came from other African countries among which was Chad. President Bozize depended on the Chadian although Chad has always been involved in CAR conflicts because it needed to protect and ensure calmness to its oil fields and Pipelines to the Cameroon coast located close to the troubled northwest part of CAR. It should be recalled that President Bozize built his rebel forces in Chad and they were assisted by Chadian military before taking over the country in March 2013. His fighters had 100 Chadian combatants and after the coup in March 2013, Chad sent in 400 soldiers into CAR and by the end of 2013 Chadian soldiers were among the presidential guard. Chadians were accused by locals for supporting Seleka and killing civilians. In January 2011, Chadian peacekeeping forces left Bangui as an attempt to diffuse the rising tension in the capital city (Siradag 2016)

MINUSCA: This team was given the task to protect civilians and enable the transition program to be a success in the CAR. Regarding the political, humanitarian, security, and political instability in CAR and its regional impacts, on April 10th 2014, the Security Council authorized the dispatch of multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations (MINUSCA) with the security of civilian population as its ultimate goal. Some initial objectives of MINUSCA included enhancing the transition agenda; enabling humanitarian aid; promote and secure an environment where human rights are respected; enabling justice, the rule of law, ensure success in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programs of the refugees from neighboring countries (UN 2017).

MINUSCA took over from the Integrated Peace building Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) from the day it was created. On 15 September 2014, MISCA transferred its authority to MINUSCA, in compliance with UNSC resolution 2149 (2014). In 2017, the Security Council under resolution 2387 (2017) extended the mandate to 15 November 2018, increasing the number of troops in the Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic. The UN secretary general's report on the CAR (document S/2017/865) provided that due to the resurgence of violence over a wide area of the country, the mission's resources were overstretched. It demanded the

augmenting capabilities in protection while focusing more on the core goal of facilitating the political will.

The Council call on the Secretary General to make provisions that all members deployed for the mission be investigated for past experience of sexual mishaps in their previous missions with the UN and to inform the Council from the beginning, agreed deadlines and outcomes of reviews, urging contributing countries to carry out pre deployment awareness training and ensure full accountability of troops and personnel that violate the laws. The Council, further, renewed its authorization for French troops to do everything in their capacity in providing duty aid to members of MINUSCA when they are under threat.

Also to delineating tasks under the protection of civilians and support to the peace endeavors, the Council, described in detail a wide range of responsibilities for MINUSCA, ranging from support for the rule of law and for ensuring a secure environment for safe deliveries of humanitarian assistance for the extension of state authorities and for the Central African Armed Forces (FACA).

Politically, the Council renewed its support to the government of President Faustin- Archange Touadera, applauding his endeavors to proceed with frank negotiations with rebel factions and extend government authority to the entire country. It also asserts that the road map of the African conception for peace and reconciliation in the CAR was the major structure for the political settlement in CAR under national leadership. The UN secretary general also welcomed the resolution's enhancement with the efforts to prevent sexual abuses by the peacekeepers on the ground. He reiterated the gradual stationing of the country's armed forces trained by the EU was an element in the country's reinstating of the control over its territory. Complete support to the president and the African initiative of reconciliation was also important in that regard.

Michele J. Sison (United States) emphasized that her country considered each mission with its importance in order to ensure it had the right capacity. MINUSCA had a very clear mandate with a clear exit platform and was heading to the right direction. Increasing troop strength was quite appropriate at this point, but focus on quality as well as quantity was essential. In that regard, she affirmed efforts to meet

equipment standards and head on action to deal with accusations of abuse by peacekeepers. She insisted that sustainable peace within the country was a compliment of strengthening of the national security forces (United Nations peacekeeping 2014)

Petr V. Iliichev (Russian Federation), added that the focus be placed on securing the civilians and enabling the political process as called for by the resolution, so that peacekeeping efforts were not spread out too in a mega manner. Mobility of forces, was vital both for protection and to allow Bangui to focus on peace and reconciliation. The national forces must be built properly for sustainable peace. Commenting on the issue of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, he said it was not uncalled for that a whole contingent to be sent home due to sexual allegations.

Top troop contributors under MINUSCA were: Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Zambia, Burundi, Mauritania, Cameroon, Morocco, and Gabon. While for the police force top 10 contributors were: Rwanda, Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, Jordan, Congo, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Burkina Faso. Total number of personnel 14,110 and authorized number of personnel was 12,870 that is uniform officers. Among this number of personnel were: civilians, foot soldiers, mission experts, the police, staffs and UN volunteer.

4. THE ROLE OF THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS

4.1 Efforts at Resolving the Crisis in CAR from 2010. (State Actors, Inter-regional, Regional and International Organizations)

The apex of this crisis was seen during the military coup launched March 2013 by the seleka rebels which amount to the thousands of civilian deaths, over half a million displaced and more than 2/5 million people of the total 4.6 million people in desperate desire for assistance. Consequently, state actors, Sub-regional, Regional and international organizations like, France, Chad, The African Union (AU), Economic Community of Central States (ECCAS), European Union (EU), and United Nations (UN). They all have contributed in one way or the other to resolve the crisis in CAR though all this contributions have gone in vain as we still see killings and other Human right violations erupting from CAR. For the purpose of this thesis we shall focus on the international response to the crisis from March 2013 when the seleka rise to power. Special attention shall be given to France, Chad, ECCAS, AU, and UN (Dukhan 2016).

This chapter also seeks to analyze the relationship between the actors involve in the crisis resolution. It shows that there is a complex relationship and competition among them for notice-ability, discernibility and authority over the crisis resolution process in CAR, Notably with the AU and UN, and the ECCASS and AU. Such tensed relationships as a result have delayed responds to the crisis and they understand each other only when there is reciprocity in considerable interest between the organizations and their member states (Siradag 2016). A vivid example in this situation was France and Chad who had much control over CAR.

The CAR citizens are still waiting to leave for 10 years with absolute peace as seen in previous chapters, The very first democratic and peaceful elections witness in the CAR was in 1993, with Ange-Felix Patasse elected president but he soon lost public

confidence for reasons already explained. With several attempted coup against Patasse's regime, The ECCAS and the community of Sahel states (CSS) together with UN and France reacted with numerous peaceful operations with none being futile as it never led to sustainable peace (Welz 2014). This was due to lack of coordination and proper collaboration among the actors involved.

General Françoise Bozize by March 2003 master minded a successful military coup and saw himself as the president of CAR with the inception of a bush war in CAR (Husted 2016). In June 2008 an agreement was signed known as the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This put in place a framework known as the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique (MICOPAX). The mission was under the authority of the ECCAS, with Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe as member state.

By 2012, MICOPAX had increased its troops in the country and more peace deals agreed with majority of the rebel leaders but despite all these efforts there was continued confrontation between them. In same year 2012 the rebel movement called the Seleka with Michel Djotodia as their chairman came to light as a coalition of principally Muslim revolutionary militia, they launched their offensive from December 2012 targeting Christian populations and pro-Bozize. Bozize's call on France to intervene went in vain after losing Chad as a close ally hence Bozize was overthrown on the 25th March 2013. Same day Michel Djotodia the Seleka leader became the president plunging the CAR into hyper crisis. In the course of the crisis, ECCAS representatives organized a meeting by January 2014 and demanded for the immediate resignation of Djotodia and his Prime minister. This call was supported by France and other regional leaders and Djotodia resigned thanks to pressure from the international community. After his resignation, A National Transitional Council was created and established as a temporary parliament. The elected Mayor of Bangui Catherine Samba-Panza was installed as the Head of Government (Siradag 2016). Many observers view the joint efforts between ECCAS, France and other Regional leaders as a good step towards sustainable peace in CAR and despite the numerous plea for disarmament by interim president Samba-Panza, Fighting continued.

4.2 International Responds to the Crisis

By early 2012, MICOPAX mission of ECCAS witnessed a setback as troops contributed countries partially withdrew their troops as a results of limited peace advancement and a drop in the financial assistance from abroad (Welz 2014). The coming into existence of the seleka factions and the change in the face of the confrontation to a Christian against Muslim conflicts, MICOPAX had no choice that to make unmatched return. At a summit on the 21st of December 2012, ECCAS ministers unanimously accepted to re-strengthen MACOPAX mission by deploying more troops to CAR and by October 2013, they had over 2700 troops from member states stationed in CAR.

At this time, the AU was more and observer closely observing the situation in the country and the responds ECCAS was enhancing. The last days of December 2012 witnessed a change in AU's observation role. Thomas Yayi the president of Benin and the chairman of the AU visited CAR just at a time when the chair lady of the AU commission Nkosazana Olamini-Zuma had made several calls for the international institutions and power nations to support the ECCAS. When the Seleka eventually moved into the capital city of Bangui by 2013, The Peace and Security Council under the AU came out strong for the first time to take concrete measures (Siradag 2016).

The AU imposed a travel band to all those that undermined the Libreville accord of January 2013 by frizzing the wealth of the coup plotters and few days after the successive coup, CAR was suspended from all AU activities. On the 18 of April 2013 during the ECCAS summit, ECCAS requested for assistance from AU and insisted on maintaining the lead role in resolving the crisis (Dukhan 2016). Fortunately, and unfortunately, this request was a giant step that paved the way for advanced commitment by the AU in settling the conflict.

The AU after it meeting set up a military operation task in order to access the MICOPAX needs with representatives from ECCAS, EU, UN, LA Fracophonie with the Peace and Security Council of the AU as head to the mission. In principle they expressed their buttress to the institution over the mission in CAR. The created and install the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic on the 19th

of July 2013 (with its French acronym MISCA) and on the first of August 2013 MICOPAX was transformed to MISCA an African led operation (Husted 2016).

The UN Security Council certified MISCA with resolution 2127 on the 5 of December acting under chapter VII also permitting French operations to bolster the. Having its military stationed on the field already in CAR they officially launched the operation “Sangaris” with 1600 troops. Fighting alongside the AU troops they focused on the capital city of Bangui strategic airport, secured a logistic and vital stretch of road to the west of CAR linking the border with Cameroon and Congo Kinshasa. At this time the CAR was segmented and controlled by Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), and Gabon. All the above countries shared borders with CAR except Gabon and each country therefore extended its sector from their respective borders into the CAR interior (Welz 2014).

Furthermore, In February 2014 the EU council established another mission known as EUFOR RCA (European Forces for CAR), aimed at adding security measures in CAR. With respect to the recognition of the UNSC resolution 2134, the mission was launched by April 2014 and was expected to work to December 2014 (Welz 2014). One important thing to note here is that the AU initially requested for assistance from the UN and same moment struggling to convince the world on how capable they could provide safety and peace in the continent of Africa and can operate independently for as long as possible (Siradag 2016).

Nonetheless, the UNSC resolution 2149 of April 10 2014, formed and installed a Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA took over from MISCA on the 15 September 2014 and comprised of many MISCA soldiers and police officers. According to the AU the decision to replace AU’s led mission MISCA with the UN led security operation MINUSCA was a face shaving exercise to the AU whose major objective was to prove how capable he could provide security in the continent and thus the news was received with considerable displeasure (Dukhan 2016).

The UN Security Council deployed its peace keeping operations MINUSCA and urged that elections be conducted as soon as possible on or before February 2015. In October 2014 violence blazed up around Bangui culminating in the arrival of a new mediator Dennis Sassou Nguesso the president of the Republic Congo. After making

consultations a general agreement was arrived to hold a Forum in Bangui in January 2015 and the National Electoral Authority extended the electoral date limit to with a constitutional referendum due May 2015 and the presidential and the legislative elections scheduled for July and August 2015 (Husted 2016).

Amid preparations for the elections as demanded by the UN Security Council, secrete negotiations were took place between Joakim Kokate factions representatives and Anti-Balaka and Nourredine Adam Seleka factions representatives and Michel Djotodia in Nairobi Kenya. The signed an agreement that granted amnesty to all that were involve in the violence and to replace the transitional movement. The prohibition of the members of the transitional council and some foreign actors let to rejection of the agreement by the UN and AU as both refused to endorse the deal (Carayannis 2015).

On the 9th and 10th of March, the security Council mission visited Bangui and realized the environment was tensed and frightening and for this reason they indicated the importance of the Bangui forum schedule to take place on the 4th of May 2015. In the course of this visit to Bangui, the security council authorized MINUSCA to add 750 military officers 250 police and 20 correction officers to it already exiting 10,000 troops approved during it mandate in 2014 (Dukhan 2016).

The report also points out some pertinent cases of human right violations norms and international laws by forces loyal to the regime, local armed groups and international forces present in CAR. This document detailed 620 incidents Mandated by security council among which are horrific acts with entire villages completely burnt down, multiple cases of rape of ladies and children of the ages 5 years old, unlawful killings, torture, violent attacks based on religion, ethnicity believe and the support to armed groups: Thousands of children recruited as child soldiers by armed groups and uncountable attacks on UN peace keeping forces and Humanitarian actors. Hundreds of thousands internally displaced (IDP) or force to flee their homes for fear of persecution by local armed groups through the bushes into neighboring countries (EU Commission 2018).

The country and it History has been noted for high level poverty, ethnic divisions and tension, constant Political squabbles, embezzlement and discrimination which have resulted to inherited armed confrontations. The public declaration stated that after it independence CAR have witnessed a series of authoritarian regimes that

committed untold human rights crimes, killings and regional in stability and local conflicts in neighboring states increasing the spread of arms and rebel groups in CAR.

Furthermore, this report outlines the untold misery and hardship the population in this abundant natural resource blessed state that is today consider one of the poorest states around the globe. Though the report acknowledged the security challenges in CAR, It advocated for certain procedures to be implemented in order to commence the process of sustainable justice, among which will be developing a state protocol for respect of human rights and the training of security forces. Galvanizing local and foreign attempt at promoting peace, and to apply justice to perpetrators of evil against humanity.

In this report were some vital prepositions as outlined below:

- A die desire for a chain and understandable approach to transitional peace and justice, having in mind the current security issues and need for total disarmament.
- A special trial framework at ICJ for the CAR, with respect to the high level and gravity of crimes during the confrontations and the difficulties in judging all perpetrators.
- The need to prioritize areas of the ICJ actions to show the degree of frankness; acknowledging gender prospect at every level of new judicial procedures, even at the special trial sessions and the use of the framework set up.
- Creating an important reconciliation council in this regard the regime together with local and foreign institutions would have to cooperate to put a long lasting solution to the impunity.

In addition to the previous calls to end violence and seek for long lasting solutions, the G5 which constituted representatives from ECCAS, AU, EU, France and World Bank condemns very strongly the current violence in some areas of Bambari, Bria Kanga, Bando and Ndele which have again inflicted pain on citizens with many deaths recorded by this civilian population who in most cases are always the victims. The G5 members expressing their worries about this attacks and the casualties recorded by civilian population also sends their hearty message condolence to

bereaved families wishing all wounded a quick recovery as well (UN Human rights 2018).

Attacks against the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and MINUSCA, fighting among armed groups, as well as ongoing criminal acts in some localities undermine the efforts of the Central African Government to restore peace and security, and promote national reconciliation and development in the whole country. The G5 further reiterates its unconditional condemnation of all activities and actions aimed at plunging the Central African Republic into another political chaos and instability. They convey full support to the government of the CAR and MINUSCA, in their ceaseless endeavors to restore the authority of the Country, fighting against impunity, promoting national solidarity and to promote well-being for all Central Africans.

In this light, the G5 encourages the continuation of solidarity in accordance with the rule of law throughout the country. They also urge the combatant factions to immediately stop violent activities to rather pursue, urgently, the exclusive path of dialogue under the African led initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR as they have done many times since the beginning of this process. The G5 also insisted that the track for frank dialogue is the major means in achieving the long-awaited settlement and sustainable development by the Central Africans who have experienced boundless suffering and deaths.

4.3 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)

The ECHO declared that Since January 2017, the number of IDP's have again witness an increased by 70% and above because of recent attacks by fighting factions within the country. Abject poverty and lack of basic social services further escalate living conditions. With this backdrop, humanitarian needs have increased exponentially, reaching levels comparable to the apex of the conflicts in 2014. Almost half the population needs humanitarian assistance. Living conditions and agricultural activities are severely affected by violence, provoking a substantial decrease in household income provoked by increase in the prices of goods and service. Chronic malnutrition currently among the highest in the world and affects closed to 40% of children under 5 years (UNICEF) (EU Commission 2018).

CAR has an alarming rate of newborn mortality rate in (1 in 24). The collapse of an already weaken national health system and a troubling scarcity of health workers

shortage and shortage of medical supplies within the country. About 58% of health infrastructures are surviving today thanks to the assistance from humanitarian donations. Inadequate basic healthcare has created tremendous fallout for the local people. Humanitarian wants in CAR remain unmet and consequent spill-over to neighboring countries. Some critics claim that the Central African refugees in Chad and Cameroon were long forgotten.

ECHO Assistance to CAR: From 2014 the EU have contributed more financial and material aid to the people in CAR than any other organization. In total they have contributed 475 million euro mean while the EU Commission gave 108 million euro in same year 2014. The ECHO basically focused on covering the basic needs of the most affected population such as food, health, emergency shelter, water, sanitation and the protection of civilians. Alleviation aid is provided to IDP's as well as to refugees who totally rely on humanitarian gestures for survival.

The EU funds food assistance, short term livelihood and agricultural support as well as interventions to enhance free basic health services with prime objective to save life for the most vulnerable population. This projects seeks to promote life protection of the people and receive EU support, along with the preventing sexual violence, medical, psycho social actions that will offer a safe and educative environment for children. To respond to sudden displacements of the current local populations, the EU funds the rapid response mechanism that monitored the humanitarian situation, delivering essential items (e.g. soap, jerry cans, cooking utensils, mattresses, blankets) and access to potable water, sanitation and hygiene to those who immediately, leaving everything behind (EU Commission 2018). The European Commission contributes to the UN humanitarian air services (UNHAS) which provided delivery of humanitarian assistance in affected areas in CAR due to widespread violence and very poor transportation infrastructure. The crisis has also affected neighboring countries, like Chad and Cameroon, where over half a million Central Africans have fled to as refugees. Their prolonged stay increases pressure on the local populations who are hosting them and are also witnessing shortage in basic resources. It is worth noting that EU humanitarian assistance is also provided to these countries to both host populations and Central African refugees.

4.4 Relations between the Various Actors

Examining the reactions and counter reactions of the international actors involved in the crisis in CAR, one can explore fundamental questions and worries from the display of interest by the various organizations and states involved. One can outrageously state that troubled relations between the ECCAS, EU, AU, and UN though with limited not keeping out Chad and France who struggled to influence the agendas from these organizations to their advantage.

Generally speaking, The AU is always having problems with regional economic communities in Africa Members states from regional economic blocks believes their forums more placed to resolve regional conflicts than the AU and its offices. For example, In Mali the ECCAS compete with AU for the lead role in resolving the conflict (Welz 2014). In CAR some school of thoughts considered the ECCAS to be unable and weak in settling the conflicts. Most international actors had same view and the criticized ECCAS for mismanaging the fund allocated to conduct security sector reform programs.

When AU took over the lead role in the crisis resolution, it was welcomed with great Euphoria out of the ECCAS zone and this provoked friction in the AU and the ECCAS relationship (Siradag 2016). The chairman for ECCAS by June 2013, travelled to the AU headquarters to address the misunderstanding and set a pace for MISCA. A major reason for this misunderstanding was the recognition of the coup leader by ECCAS against the unions' state fast position for unconstitutional regime change. Considering herself in a better position to resolve the crisis in CAR because the AU realized the conflicts was escalating as ECCAS was in control. The presence of ECCAS was an indication that the conflict will come to an end because they promised 100 million dollars as aid to CAR. They created a commission and their office in CAR was not dissolved (Husted 2016)). Also the MISCA troops constituted mostly troops from ECCAS member states and it took 4 months from August 2013 for MICOPAX to be transformed into MISCA and this Transformation process posed great danger to the civilians as a result of the deteriorating security situation, with the Muslim and Christian fighters engaged in an intense combat that wasted hundreds of non-combatant lives due to the tousele for supremacy over who should lead the crisis between ECCAS and AU.

Regional Organizations like the AU needs sub regional organizations like ECCAS for efficiency but there is often conflict of interest on lead role in times of crisis causing uncountable civilian casualties. According to the heads of African peace and security program, member states of sub regional communities are supposed to deploy troops for peace operations but the desire to deploy troops are regularly linked to political and economic interest and fear of potential spill of conflicts over state boundaries. This was evident in Somalia's operation AMISOM in Ethiopia (AMISON: African Union Mission in Somalia approved by UN) and Chad with the MICOPAX/MISCA operations in CAR. Such states were considered to be part of the conflicts and should be part of the solution (Dukhan 2016).

There should always be a general striking balance amidst the short terms interest for purposed of stability whereby sub regional organizations and states are needed (to send soldiers faster) and a wide period of gains engulfed with freeing such countries from the conflicts. This situation also applies to international organizations like the UN and Regional organizations like the AU and EU. Unexpectedly Chad withdrew its troops from CAR following accusations for perpetrating and unapproved attack on a crowd in Bangui on the 29th of March 2014 that took the lives of 30 civilians. The AU face faced tough challenges because they lost the main troop contributor at the time when they needed Chad for short term stability objectives and the fact that Chad had embroiled herself in the conflict in CAR for decades (Welz 2014). Often considered as the predominant state in the crisis in CAR, she is also viewed by other school of thoughts as a complex aspect in CAR. Chadian President Idriss Deby. Skillfully used ECCAS and France to get a tight clutch to CAR with security interest dominating his claims. Notably, Majority of the rebel factions that struggled to overthrow Idriss Deby were informed in the CAR for this reason giving the unsecured borders in the region, there was the fear that the conflicts could spill into his country (Siradag 2016). Economic interest also dominated his mind because Chad's oil pumps lies to the border region which stretch of oil deposit into CAR. Idriss Deby mobilized and positioned ECCAS as the pilot of the crisis maintaining every measure for ECCAS to play the central or leadership role even after the establishment of MISCA. Significantly was Deby's relationship with France. He was loyal to France and played a key role in Mali where Chadian troops were at the

forefront on the battle ground and they French provided more of intelligence though receiving credit for the stabilization of (Welz 2014).

After the situation in Mali that led to a lot of criticism of the AU by donors and international community, the AU strive to run MISCA for over a decade in order to portray its security capability as being a security architect to its member states with a lead role. There were two schools of thoughts on the lead role of AU in crisis in CAR especially handing over MISCA to the UN. The USA advanced three reasons to the timing of this power handover: They consider AU as a low level adverse Organization to UN, they have very low defensive engagement strategies; operating in a very cheap and effective manner and will contribute greatly to United States goals of avoiding the CAR from becoming a safe ground for Islamic terrorists (Husted 2016). The other school of thought holds that despite the geopolitical and economic interest of France in CAR, they wanted to militarize their operations first as a result of the operation in Mali which was at the same time and was costly and they had appealed for help from the UN and EU. For the UN to take over MISCA was the only exit strategy for France especially after the withdrawal of Chadian troops they needed a partner to share the burden with to preserve their interest (Dukhan 2016). The above analysis stipulates that cooperation between International and Regional Organizations are sometimes blocked by or hindered by some powerful states for their selfish gains.

In April 2014, the EU established EUFOR RCA with 1000 troops for a 9 months' support mission of the MISCA. This was an applaudable move by the EU and also countries like Estonia, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, while others like Germany and Sweden gave air transporting and logistic facilities. The unproblematic relations between AU and EU were greatly welcomed while the AU-ECCAS and AU-UN differences face a lot of criticism. The complementary role of EUFOR RCA was a blending operation rather than a defying operation to the AU's mission and both camps were contented seeing EUFOR RCA playing a very active part in attempt to resolve the conflicts and branding EU's capacity to deliver out of its jurisdiction as well (Fowles 2017).

4.5 Observations

Despite the efforts put in place by actors involved, they all failed because of clash of interest as some of these actors struggle to lead the resolution efforts put in place especially France and Chad. The delay in change of authority in leading the peace

settlement among MICOPAX to MISCA which showed both the bureaucracy effect in decision making and also indicating delay in international response to crisis and thus heavy consequences on the civilian population.

Today, much is expected from UN who pushed out AU and ECCAS to the backyard and engaged in Post conflict reconstruction, among which they are constructing effective security organs and reconciling the Muslim and Christian communities. The CAR has experienced five military coup since independence. The UN lead role in resolving the conflicts is considered eminent because many people on ground zero belief that the UN is the only organization that could resolve the situation putting an end to the future confrontations and redress the current situation, Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza asked for UN intervention because, It was widely believed and held in Bangui that a UN mission on ground will effective handle Governance and security concerns due to its large available resources that usually accompanied their missions (Fowlis 2017). In addition, the only means of financing such mission will be for UN lead the operation and through it member states gather more finance. Furthermore, AU was regarded by major actors both on ground and internationally as incapable and inefficient in intervening in the crisis because of regional division. More so, The UN-AU partnership is far from peace missions, AU has always serve as responder with it forces and civilian personnel for certain measures to be put in place before UN can deploy as was the case in CAR. It should be noted that though flexible and fast in deploying, the often tolerate more casualties than the case with UN peace keeping missions.

On the other hand, some school of thoughts hold the fact the AU is in a better place to manage the crisis regarding their knowledge of the long standing problem (Fowlis 2017). Dialogue between regional heads of states and the UN made the situation much complex that it should have been within the region as they considered UN and outsider.

The AU had a logical interest in redressing and repairing interstates boundary security concerns: With this in mind, the AU had automatically should be the principle mediator since external actors in most cases go for quick fix solutions using the military for stabilization and pushing hastily for elections irrespective of broader

structural needs (Carayannis 2017). When hostilities dropped among the rebelling actors in CAR, most international actors left the country and could only send aid where the AU was lacking.

Continues financial and material aid was vital to the collaborative AU/UN peacekeeping mission, though it often depends on member's state. Nonetheless, the UN offices have time and again continue to provide short term financial aid. For example, they sent a delegation of experts to assist the MISCA missions in training officers and soldiers on how to protect and work with civilians (Siradag 2016).

Re-hatting troops from regional missions to UN missions is another lesson learned from the crisis in CAR. The transfer of authority from MICOPAX, to MISCA, to MINUSCA, brought to light very little or no change because the keep adding new layer as opposed to strategic change and cunning planned operations. Most of the troops were inherited and did not have the training and capacity for a peacekeeping operation and these troops were not well examined. The accusation of MINUSCA troops for sexual abuse was due to re-hatting. It is therefore a call for concern that future operations should be carried out with much attention to avoid much mere transformation. Positively, the well managed MISCA MINUSCA handover depict possible future corporations particularly at the levels of the secretariat. The AU is dependent on what African continent is able to provide and face limitations with what they cannot provide hence faced challenges in an attempt to raise the standards in peacekeeping operations, with examples such as equipment's, expatriates and technology etc.

The role of Regional Economic communities (REC) expressed a lesson to dwell on. The most powerful neighbors had significant consequences on the AU-UN cooperation's. The transfer from ECCAS to MISCA leadership (Chad acting as a dominant state from the region), strained the relations between Idriss Deby that isolated Chadian military engagements eminent arbitration missions creating difficult moments the African led MISCA. Both the AU and the UN faced tough times with the REC's and therefore have to step up their relationships and thus enhance peace operations. Chapter VIII of the UN charter, applies to both REC's and the AU though it gives a gloomy picture if it is the perfect framework for working with REC's

(Carayyanis 2017). This shows why engagements between REC's, AU, and the UN has been on a make-do basis and regularly competitive.

The prolonged attempt on peace settlement in CAR had produced more political differences given the involvement of France, the ECCAS, the AU, and the UN, since analyst finds it difficult to know who is actually laying down the political framework. One major shortcoming visible within the AU and UN joint peace missions' model is, the AU has a narrow part to play which is contributing troops, while the UN design the policies. MISCA was totally a group of soldiers with very little political affiliations. Consequently, the operation had very little influence, neither was it leading political power in managing the crisis was widely acknowledged (UN Human rights 2018).

The absence of true leadership and designed political framework, affected the transitional government making them less productive. There were many institutions and countries involved which rather caused tussle for leadership role among them. This point has been had rock with the AU's missions, arbitration procedure, and peculiar in a need to synchronize both the military and political roles of the AU led efforts.

One major hindrance to the international and regional players in the conflicts in CAR is that they struggle to analyze and tackle the situation with examples from outside the country and the region. We should note that the conflict spilled from Darfur, which menace the peace in Chad and the confrontations with the LRA from the south. The actors arbitrating in CAR targets every new conflicts as if its cause differ from the previous causes which is not correct. Reasons why must peace negotiation frameworks keep failing. All the conflicts in CAR have a traceable rout with same origin. Initially both the AU (MISCA) and the UN (MINUSCA) gave the impression that they understood and mastered the political environment in CAR. There were claims that the UN office in New gave very little analysis that was deemed vital and pivotal in setting creating the MINUSCA, the office in New York often provide the needed analysis and how recruitment showed be done for any peaceful mission to ensure professionalism and efficiency.

AU together with the UN face difficulties in finance and economic endeavors in the CAR irrespective of the fact that the UN was able to prioritize economy in its agenda. Earlier on some institutions like the World Bank, EU and UN met in a meeting organized by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF). The CPPF is a program of the Social Science Research Council in New York which works as an outside analytic office for the UN; CPPF agreed to pay some workers in CAR, even with the nonexistence of an audit-able pay slips. There was great euphoria that surrounded this declaration in the country and failure of this salary payment would have caused serious quagmire (EU Commission 2018). It should be noted that neither the AU nor UN had as good faith to offer political choices that were proposed by some international bodies but which many of such proposals were masterminded by France to keep their grip on the CAR.

One can at this juncture say that the AU's inability to design political frameworks are not generally hindered by the UN, but a weakness from the organization itself irrespective of the available resources within the region. For these reasons, the AU time and again have failed to spearhead political leadership in peace resolution missions. With the lack of a rational framework it means there is no strategy, indicating the importance of taking political leadership in mediation missions. The million-dollar question now, should be the person to define the policies and if shared analysis could be prioritized during the AU and UN joint missions in the future? Although their main objectives should be constructing a productive partnership for an absolute and comparative benefits and putting smiles on the faces of the civilian population.

5. CONCLUSION

Speaking on the various roles international and regional organizations have been playing in resolving conflicts and the challenges they face, it is possible to conclude by saying that, both international and regional organizations are vital in conflict resolutions and have pivotal roles in maintaining world peace and security. The world today cannot rely on one side; international or regional organizations for peace to reign. It is worth noting that, the state as an actor in world politics should not be neglected as well as the sub regional organizations. All these actors have very important roles to play in conflict resolution irrespective of how small their function might be and should be in cooperation with the other actors in times of crisis to save human life.

For cooperation to be effective, all the above mentioned actors must always keep aside their selfish goals or interests which in most cases have delayed peaceful negotiations for a cease fire causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in different parts of the world. This section focuses on how can these actors (International, regional, sub regional, states) cooperate in resolving conflicts with the available resources each actor possesses. We will look at the resources they have and how both actors can blend these resources to provide long lasting solutions to conflicts in the world and save the human race from complete extinction.

To begin with, as the main international organization responsible for world peace and security the UN needs to put in place a standing order on all regional organizations to build the capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in various regions. In this effect, the UN should call on regional organizations to create a standby army or force which can intervene at the start of every crisis to prevent killings while waiting for the regional organizations to proceed with resolutions meetings and treaties. In this light the standing army will prevent killings whereby in most situations like the case with the genocide in Rwanda 1994 the

regional organization that was supposed to prevent (AU) reacted late. A standing army for regional organizations like AU, EU, and ASEAN etc, should be encouraged.

Secondly, a clear defined leadership role in a conflicts will also enable efficiency in conflicts resolutions. The struggle between actors on who to lead, draft or design the way forward during a conflicts has also been a setback. In CAR, the frequent change of leadership role affected the civilian population in CAR. In the process of handing over lead role to MINUSCA by MISCA, state actors like Chad and France had conflicting interest because of personal gains. Chad knew that with AU at the forefront of the resolution drive she will be able to control the internal security in CAR since she was contributing more troops than all other countries in Africa.

When UN (MINUSACA) took over France championed the peacekeeping campaign implementing her own selfish desired policies to protect her resource exploitative activities in CAR. It is therefore preferable that at the beginning of any crisis it should be made know to the entire world and the people concern which organization is in charge and what are the measures or strategies put in place to resolve the conflicts.

In addition, Statistics have proven that soldiers from the region concerned are always more familiar with the terrain than peacekeeping forces that come from outside the region where there is a case at hand. It is important that the international organizations should often support regional peacekeeping forces with training, technology, finance and material in times of need rather than sending in troops from outside the region who are not familiar with the terrain in question.

Furthermore, peacekeeping forces needs to be educated on international human rights laws and I think that the UN is in the best place to make sure that all peacekeeping forces that are deployed by international and regional organizations have knowledge of these international laws. The crisis in CAR witness cross human rights violation from peacekeeping forces because most of the forces have very little or no knowledge about human rights laws. Most of these troops also came from dictatorial regimes where there are often protected for being loyal to the dictator rather than doing what is right or acceptable by law. For example, a country like

Cameroon where the military rapes students, torture and kill civilians, brutalize journalist and go unpunished. Where a cross-section of such an army is been deployed for peacekeeping mission in another country they are bound to commit such crimes under the eyes of the international community like was the case in CAR.

Also, the international organizations often have high level technology more than the regional organizations. It is in this capacity that they should always support the regional troops with this high level technology for effective peace keeping mission and conflicts prevention. Most regional organizations lack this advanced technology during conflicts to address situations on the ground. For example, the ability to use drones in surveillance, delivering basic needs like water and food to desperate populations trapped in areas that not accessible. It is also vital to rescue civilian populations that are trapped in cross-fire probably between rebels and military forces as was the case in CAR.

Regarding financial aid provided by most international organizations to regional and or sub regional organizations or states when there is a crisis at hand. I will like to call on all international organizations to regularly dedicate a team to always follow up how the funds or financial aid is often used in resolving the crisis assigned to or if the aid actually attained it intended goals. With examples from Africa such funds are often diverted to private bank accounts leaving the civilian or die need populations in complete desperation. For this reason, a follow up committee should be created to follow up and control the use of this funds provided by international organizations to assist in the place or time of need.

Another area of concern are the weapons used by peacekeeping forces in some conflict affected countries in a continent like Africa. Most successive coup's in Africa are as a results of the category or types of weapons rebels or coup plotters regularly use against government forces and regional or sub regional peacekeeping forces that rush inn to intervene or protect the regime under attack. In this situation the international organizations can back up these forces from the regional organizations with high level weapons to match the rebels in combat. One vivid example was the case of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, their weapons out level that of both the Nigerian, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon army who formed a tag unit with the approval and support of AU to combat this jihadist in the northern

part of Nigeria. Thanks to the assistance provided by the American and French government by giving top class weapons, drones and air jets to these forces to be able to fight this terrorist.

CAR has been in constant turmoil since its independence in 1961. The complexity of the problem, led to a long number of unsuccessful peace settlement treaties. The entire CEMAC region that have been affected by the prolonged crisis have made tremendous efforts and at certain periods made conflicting proposed strategies to settle the crisis. The CEMAC, AU, EU and UN and other major states have been constantly engaged with the Crisis in CAR from 2010 as per this research. Throughout this period from 2010 to 2017, UN, AU, and CEMAC mandated its member states especially France, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and DR Congo, to redress the situation. The AU have approved and implemented ideas from its members in attempt to resolve the crisis. During the peace meetings, the AU's participation efforts were evident and thus the NTC was positioned in 2014.

Despite the series of efforts that both the AU and UN member made in attempt to redress the crisis in CAR, the rivalry and conflict between the Muslims and Christian still continued and aggravated the situation. The situation in CAR remains precarious. In CAR, there is still the absence of an effective government, primary services and security to the people. The present regime is weak and have limited control over the entire territorial boundary. The Muslim Seleka and the Christians anti-balaka combatants continue to menace the very existence of each other. There are cases of attacks from both camps on daily bases as they still have control over some areas of the north and the south of the country. The crisis in CAR has come to a point where a united effort is vital and necessary for a long lasting peace settlement where all actors will be committed and cooperate to seek the final end to this upheaval.

Lastly, one can at this point say with certainty that International, regional, sub regional organizations and states all acting as actors in the international politics, should always collaborate when there is need for collaboration with the available resources, from technology, Finance, expatriate, knowledge, experience, master of terrain gives hope for effective conflict resolution from these actors and hence a new hope of life for the civilian population that often suffer more in times of conflicts.

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RESUME



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