

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**PEACEKEEPING AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA: THE CASE OF
AMISOM IN THE COUNTRY**

THESIS

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Filiz KATMAN

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İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ



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I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original to this thesis (/ /2019).

Abdishakur JAMA NUR

FOREWORD

This thesis is written as requirement for the completion of the Master's Program in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University.

The success in producing this work is attributed to such a number of people to whom I wish to acknowledge. The completion of this piece of work has been such a demanding task that would not have been a success when handled solely.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFS	: African Standby Force
AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
ARS	: Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia
ARS-A	: Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somali- Asmara
AU	: African Union
BMA	: British Military Administration
COMESA	: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
ENDF	: Ethiopian National Defence Force
EU	: European Union
ICISS	: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	: IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
KDF	: Kenyan Defence Force
NFD	: Northern Frontier District
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
PKO	: Peace Keeping Operation
R2P	: Responsibility to Protect
UN	: United Nations
UNOSOM I	: United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	: United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USA	: United States of America

BARIŐI KORUMA VE SOSYAL İSTIKRAR: SOMALİ'DE BARIŐI KORUMA VE SOSYAL STABİLİTE: ÜLKEDE AMİSOM OLGUSU

ÖZET

Arařtırma Somali'deki sosyal çatıřmanın nedenlerini açıklamayı ve istikrarsızlıęa katkıda bulunan faktörleri vurgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca, Somali'deki barıřı koruma operasyonlarının çeřitli ařamalarına odaklanan barıřı koruma misyonlarını da incelemektedir. Bununla birlikte, ülkedeki barıřı koruma misyonunun (Somali'deki Afrika Birlięi Misyonu (AMISOM)) karřılařtıęı zorluklara özel önem verilmektedir. Ülke, Amerika Birleřik Devletleri (ABD) gibi farklı siyasi aktörlerin yanı sıra Somali devletinin ülkedeki çatıřmayı uzatan bir dıřman olan Al-Shabaab milis grubu için oyun alanı oldu. Bununla birlikte, söz konusu aktörlerin / oyuncuların her biri çıkarlarını korumaya çalışıyor ve bir řekilde çeřitli çıkarlar nedeniyle ülkedeki çatıřmalara dahil oluyorlar. Arařtırma sorusu, AMISOM'un karřılařtıęı zorlukların üstesinden gelinebilmesinin mümkün olup olmadıęıdır. İlk bölüm arařtırmaya arka plan saęlar. İkinci bölüm farklı barıřı koruma kavramlarını açıklar. Üçüncü bölümde, Somali'deki sosyal çatıřmayı açıklayan teoriler sunulmaktadır. Arařtırmanın dördüncü bölümünde dıř aktörler ve bunların barıř ve istikrar üzerindeki etkileri tartıřılmaktadır. Beřinci bölüm, AMISOM'un Somali'deki barıřı koruma misyonuna meydan okuyan faktörleri vurgulamakta ve eleřtirel olarak incelemektedir. Bu nedenle arařtırma, uluslararası krizin Somali'ye güvenlik krizleri ve kurumsal zayıflıkla bařa çıkma konusunda yardımcı olma kapasitesi konusunda mevcut bilgi birikimine katkıda bulunuyor. Somali'de istikrarın saęlanması kolay bir iř deęildir ve durumu kolaylařtırmak için hem iç hem de uluslararası çabalar gerektirir ve ülkede sürdürülebilir barıř getirir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Al-Shabaab, AMISOM, AU, Barıřı Koruma, Sosyal Çatıřma, BM.*

PEACEKEEPING AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA: THE CASE OF AMISOM IN THE COUNTRY

ABSTRACT

Research aims to explain the causes of the social conflict in Somalia and highlighted the factors contributing to the instability. The study also explores the different peacekeeping missions in Somalia focusing on the various phases of peacekeeping operations. Although, special consideration is given to the challenges facing the peacekeeping mission in the country, namely African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The country has been playground for different political actors like the United States of America (USA) as well as Al-Shabaab militia group, which is an enemy to the Somali state making the conflict in the country prolonged. However, each one of the mentioned actors/players tries to maintain its interest and engages the conflict of the country one way or the other with varying interests. The research question is whether AMISOM's challenges would be possible to cope. The first chapter provides background to the research. The second chapter explains the different concepts of peacekeeping. The third chapter presents theories explaining the social conflict in Somalia. The fourth chapter of the research discusses the external actors and their impact on peace and stability. The fifth chapter highlights and critically analyses the factors challenging AMISOM's peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Therefore, the research adds to the existing body of knowledge on the capacity of the international community to help Somalia in order to cope with security crises and institutional weakness. Achieving stability in Somalia is not an easy task and requires both domestic and international efforts to ease the situation and brings sustainable peace in the country.

Keywords: *Al-Shabaab, AMISOM, AU, Peacekeeping, Social-Conflict, UN.*

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the background, problem statement, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, scope of the study, research methodology and structure of the thesis.

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa. The country is regarded as very poor state though Somalia is a rich country in terms of natural resources. Somalis are homogeneous united by culture, language as well as religion these commonalities are rare in most cases (Elmi, 2010). Colonial powers divided the Somaliland into five major parts. Italian Somaliland together with British Somaliland became the independent Somali Republic in 1960 (Abdullahi, 1992). Although, Djibouti which was French Somaliland later got its independence in 1977, other two the Northern Frontier Districts (NFDs) and finally, the fifth division Ogaden region are still under the role of Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. Therefore, the five parts of the country are represented in the five-pointed star, which is on national flag adopted by the Somali Republic while gaining independence in 1960 (Lewis, 1993).

The fall of the central government occurred in 1991, after twenty-one years of dictatorship which began in 1969. Prior to that, there was a brief democratic system, which the West once labelled the Africa's leading democracy. Somalis experienced one of the most damaging civil wars in Africa. The downfall of the Siyad Barre regime left a political vacuum whereby the clans, sub-clans, warlords, and even Islamist groups took the stage and struggled for power and resources resulting endless conflict. This caused in a hostile situation where everyone claimed legitimacy. After the collapse of the Somali state, the opposition forces were not ready to take over and maintain law and order. They failed to establish government institutions or in other words, restore state institutions. These opposition groups claimed victory against the Barre regime leading to the civil war (Abdullahi, 2017). Since the fall of the military regime in 1991, many attempts were made to bring stability in Somalia but, most of them failed. The international community, the

United Nations (UN) together with the United States sent peacekeeping forces, namely the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM), Operation Restore Hope in 1993 and also UNOSOM II. However, most of the interventions were fruitless and they did not end well though the focus was later given the reconciliation meetings and conferences. These conferences also never changed the situation of the country needless to say they bring no change to the outcome. On March 2007, the African Union peacekeepers were deployed in Mogadishu with the mandate of the United Nations to help the transitional government in that time. They faced strong resistance from Al-Shabaab, a militia group fighting with government in southern Somalia. It is fair to say that African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is better than most of the previous peacekeeping missions. Though, Al-Shabaab is still threat to the so called, federal state in the country. The problems are not from the insurgent groups only but the system itself is ravaged by corruption, injustice and inequality (Bulhan, 2008).

The absence of state power, especially strong central state caused many problems like instability in the region because of the existence of terrorist groups filling the vacuum left by the central state in Somalia. Many attempts were made by the international community to change the situation and stop the civil war but most of those initiatives were not fruitful. After years of civil conflict, Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as first transitional head state in 2004. Later in 2012, the international community recognized the Somali state with the establishment of federal state system. In fact, Somalia has been in stateless situation in so many years, different actors intervened the country with different interests. The aim of this study is to analyse peacekeeping and social-conflict in Somalia with the case of AMISOM in the country.

1.1 Background to the study

Since there is no strong state authority in the Somalia after the collapse of the central state, the insurgent groups were gaining grounds in the south-central Somalia especially Mogadishu and its surroundings. In 2005, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) decided to implement peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In the following year, IGAD conceded that they failed to have peacekeeping mission in the country due to funding issues and the fact that

there was an UN arms embargo on Somalia. IGAD member countries continued to find solutions for the problems hindering its mission in the country but fortunately the African Union (AU) took major step in order to send peacekeeping operation and finally succeeded to implement African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007.

On the other hand, the UN was not interested in deteriorating Somalia security. Furthermore, in 2007, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon made it clear that it was impossible to send UN peacekeeping forces to Somalia. Nevertheless, the security crises in Somalia increased Western countries' concern about worsening peace in the country. For example, the United States of America (USA) was worried about increasing strength of such groups in Somalia, especially Islamist groups. In 2006, ICU (Islamic Courts Union) was gaining strength militarily; therefore, the USA believed that they have ties with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. In February 2006, Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism was created, funded and supported by the United States. Mogadishu became battleground as street fights rapidly increased in March 2006, the ICU had the upper hand and controlled majority of Mogadishu. As a result, their rivals withdrew from Mogadishu by early June 2006. As soon as Ethiopia realized the growth of the Islamic Courts Union, Ethiopia began talks with Transitional Federal Government to send its forces into Somalia to counter growing threat from ICU (Wise, 2011). This move was backed by the US in order to support and rescue the Somali national government.

1.2 Problem statement

The United Nations has an organ specialized in solving and promoting peace talks to tackle world problems, at least, in order to reduce conflict level in such areas like Africa and other places. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been taken such significant role in mediating and trying to find lasting solutions towards security crises around the world. Nonetheless, some of these attempts failed to reach the desired goals. As a result, other challenges emerged for example refugee crises and internally displaced persons making difficult to cope with the security crises in conflict zones. Somalia presents very complex security challenges whereby many actors are involved with the conflict in the country, each of them trying to pursue their self-interest. Needless to say,

making conflict in Somalia difficult to solve. The aim of the research is to analyse and explain peacekeeping and social conflict in Somalia with AMISON as a case study. Many peacekeeping operations failed because of different factors. However, the study also tries to draw a picture of the challenges of AMISOM's peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

1.3 Objectives of the research

- 1) To evaluate the intentions of the various phases of peacekeeping in Somalia,
- 2) To assess the obstacles of social stability in Somalia,
- 3) To assess the impact of peacekeeping on peace and stability in Somalia.

1.4 Research questions

1. What are the causes of social conflict in Somalia?
2. What are the impacts of the external actors in Somali conflict?
3. What are the challenges and opportunities for AMISOM's peacekeeping operation?

1.5 Significance of the study

The research will be significantly important for local policy makers and foreign organizations who are trying to promote peace in conflict zones. Moreover, the findings of this study will give foundation for future researchers who could use the information for any related research on foreign peace advocacy in order to promote peace and peace building as this will be part of existing information. Findings will also increase the level of knowledge about foreign actors and peace initiatives in the region.

1.6 Scope of the research

The study aims to address the social conflict in Somalia and the factors contributed the fall of the Somali central state. The research also highlights different peacekeeping interventions and their impact on peace. Somalia has been a conflict zone for more than two decades, a place characterized as the home for violent actions like fighting among rival fractions, humanitarian crises, kidnapping of aid workers and injustices. More importantly, the civil war ravaged the country in all aspects of

social life. Several attempts have been made in order to change the situation in Somalia. A good example is the different peacekeeping missions, which took place in the country starting from 1992 up to date. Several peacekeeping operations were undertaken by different actors. African peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) is the last one in the country.

1.7 Research methodology

The research attempts to demonstrate factors contributing to the collapse of the Somali state. After the fall of the central state, there have been different peacekeeping missions trying to change the security situation in Somalia; hence, all peace attempts faced considerable challenges. The method used in the study will be qualitative, which is an analysis based on reviews of related literature in the areas of conflict and security, peacekeeping as well as the situation in Somalia. Therefore, secondary sources will be used. In fact, the research question is whether AMISOM's challenges would be possible to cope with is discussed. Hence, AU documents will be explained where suitable. However, the sources of this study will contain articles, books, and other important publications on the mentioned topics, provided by writers in their specialty areas. No interviews, questionnaires or close kind of study will be taken.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is about the background of the research, which includes explanations of the problem statement, objectives of the research, research questions, significance and scope, methodology, and the structure of the research. Chapter two discusses different concepts of peacekeeping. Chapter three will provide the theoretical framework of the study, using theories of conflict in order to explain what happened in Somalia. Moreover, the section highlights the root causes of Somali conflict. Chapter four discusses the impact of foreign actors on peace and stability. In addition to that, the chapter highlights some of neighbouring countries' interventions towards Somalia. In fact, there are states who are directly involved in Somali peace crises. Chapter five critically analyses AMISOM's work in Somalia and gives detailed information about the challenges of the African Union's mission in the country. Chapter six, which is the last chapter of the study,

contains summaries, conclusions and recommendation of the study.

2. PEACEKEEPING AS A CONCEPT

“Peacekeeping consists of coordinated existence of military and civilian personnel, sometimes with police tasked for various duties like humanitarian help, protecting human rights, policing, observation of the electoral process and monitoring as well as economic and social restoration and reestablishment” (Amadi, 2014). Whenever peacekeeping is mentioned, what comes to the mind is that the United Nations peacekeeping can be either traditional or multidimensional missions. Peacekeeping therefore attempts to limit or reduce the scale of the conflict. Peacekeeping has always been something tied to the United Nations but there are rising debates about which peacekeeping suits best regarding violent conflict and what strategy should be employed in order to address the political will of it. An Indian Army who took part in peacekeeping mission writes that “despite of many attempts, the definition of the word ‘peacekeeping’ is yet to be agreed. Hence, the absence of common and understandable definition of the term makes other suggestions possible for example that it can be used as political and of course operational purposes” (Rikhye, 1984).

2.1 The Emergence of Peacekeeping Operations

After the Second World War, the world witnessed the severe damage that war can cause together with production of the mass killing machines and it convinced global leaders that international organization is needed. As a result, the United Nations was created with aims of maintaining global peace in order to promote worldwide economic, social and cultural collaboration, to enhance friendly ties between states, to provide the platform where different state can work together and respect goals behind the creation of the United Nations, to protect human rights and basic freedoms for all.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is an organ responsible to solve disputes among nations via peaceful methods like negotiation, mediation and conciliation. The fundamental purpose of the United Nations is to safeguard peaceful relations between states. The organization require military force to tackle such

problems arising from the international arena. Therefore, the objective however is the UN should deploy forces where necessary.

MacQueen (2002) explains the difficulty of the desire for global security arrangement because of the then international system, which was characterized as bipolar. The two world blocks, namely West and the East, prevented UNSC from fulfilling its objective of preserving peace and stability. The early days of the UN, the world was divided into two blocks; this division, however, was a challenge to the UN, especially to the UNSC in performing its tasks. In short, the problem was the use of veto by the super powers, especially the five veto member states. These states tackled such peace efforts and damaged primary mission of keeping world peace.

2.2 Peace missions

Today, the situation of the world is different than before and the reason the UN was created, and its charter formed. The biggest challenge to global peace and stability is not interstate atrocities anymore but rather internal conflicts, civil wars, terrorism, abuses of human rights, violation of international laws and failed states. Although, the aim that UN was established is to protect world peace and security, with the emergence of new challenges like terrorism, civil wars and others; there should be different strategies and logical development of the purpose to ensure that international peace and security is protected.

There have been different arguments on the role for peace operations on the international ground. The UN's role in securing international peace and security can be viewed as a function of how member countries perceive the international order. Peacekeeping in the current world happens in 'complex emergencies', joining elements of civil war, human rights abuses, state collapse, humanitarian issues and 'criminality'. Emergency conditions are mostly created by domestic agents with interests attached with foreign powers (Spivak, 1999).

2.3 Humanitarian intervention

Amadi (2014) wrote in his thesis that "Interventions, which focus on reducing the human suffering generated by oppression, famines and refugee crises can be categorized as humanitarian intervention. Abuses of human rights can also present humanitarian issue, which may activate sanctions from international community.

Such violations can be executions, rape, ethnic cleansing, illegal detentions and forced labour”. As a result, the United Nations with the help of the Security Council ensured sanctions aiming to stop human rights abuses or violations of human wellbeing. In order to ensure that measures have been put in a place in peace missions with the goal to protect and create safe zones to uphold law and order and protect the humanitarian relief. There are also non-military measures like economic sanctions, including weapon embargoes. while explaining humanitarian intervention two concepts are important. Humanitarian intervention which indicates the use power, and humanitarian assistance, which there is no use of force.

2.4. Responsibility to protect

The problem of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty persisted quite some time. In 2000, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) took step in order to solve the problem. They published the Report on Responsibility to Protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001) in 2001, based on three main agendas namely to prevent, react and rebuild. Again in 2001, ICISS came up with a new report; this time they flourished the concept of responsibility to protect giving the states duty of protecting their citizens from preventable crises like mass killings, starvation and from rape but when they fail to protect or unwilling, responsibility will be given to the international community. In short, states have the primary task to safeguard their people whereas the international community has the secondary responsibility to protect civilians from war related crimes whether that may be crimes against humanity, genocide, as well as ethnic cleansing.

In 2004, the concept of responsibility to protect was further debated on UN reform. The high level panel on threats, challenges and changes were expressed in the report A More Secure World and wrote that “it is understandable that every state must protect its people from crises but when state fails to do their responsibilities of providing security for their citizens there should be external intervention from the international community. That may be reconstructing the loss of statehood or prevention of violence”. (A More Secure World, 2004)

In 2005 UN secretary general stated in a report called “In larger Freedom: Towards

Development, Security and Human Rights for All” explaining the concept that state’s safety and that of humanity are inseparable meaning any challenges or problems affecting humanity can be tackled through collective measures. (A More Secure World, 2004)

Although, there is still a doubt about the reliability of the concept “responsibility to protect”, the concept is not an idea anymore but rather legal norm causing many to question its implementation. The principle of responsibility to protect still faces considerable challenges meaning certain things still need to be answered. For example, there are no systems or mechanisms put place to hold government and individuals accountable for failing to protect their people from danger.

2.5 African peace and Security framework

Different peacekeeping approaches has been tried by the African states in past years with the help of multinational organizations to tackle conflicts and manage them. Therefore, leading mutual understanding among African countries on different levels such as macro-policy (De Coning, 2004). Therefore, the acceptance and acknowledgement of the UN is important because the organisation still remains the leading global power in charge of global peace and global peacekeeping. The following refers : a) the realisation of the demand to develop continent’s capacity to offer and provide for peacekeeping missions taking place on Africa and beyond; b) The identification that peacekeeping missions on the continent should be handled with UN consideration meaning the International Community should authorise and cooperate with Africa; c) The allowance that in special situations- when the Security Council is unwilling or unable to conduct its duties- Africa should step up to conduct peacekeeping missions; and d) Desire that different attempts from donor community to increase capacity of African states in this field should be harmonized by the UN, or at least respecting the UN peacekeeping principles, and close collaboration with African Organizations.

Secondly, common defense and security framework concerns in an understandable fashion way challenges especially security ones which can bring “threat” to the common defense and security benefits of Africa or seem to hinder preservation of security, peace and stability of Africa. Similar dangers

are considered under the following four major classifications; intra-state conflicts and tensions; inter-state atrocities and tensions; unstable post-conflict conditions; and other factors that cause conflicts. Therefore, intra-state conflicts and tensions being important category of the four. It is interesting because it is dominant in this modern era. Intra-state conflicts and peacekeeping and conflict resolutions on the continent (Africa) after cold war are greatly involved with civil wars internal conflicts and state failure (Omar, 2005). To this context, the common defense and security policy highlights these challenges under intra-state conflicts. The presence of grave circumstances, like genocide and abuses of humanity, war crimes, violence of human life, impunity, assassinations especially political ones, coups d'état and unconstitutional government reforms, terrorism activities, and conditions hindering the encouragement of democratic institutions and systems, including lack of the rule of law, fair social order, and political participations; free and fair conduct of electoral processes, absence of commitment by the parties to obey the laws of the country and most importantly conduct fair elections. Lack of individual and collective rights, unavailability of protection and development of human rights, equal chance for all, including marginalized groups or ethnic minorities, Poverty, unequal division of natural resources, corruption, political, religious, and ethnic radicalism as well as racism.

Thirdly, the document underlines a set of rules and values underlying the policy framework. The document establishes the significance of the concept of sovereignty on which the international arena and the AU are constructed. It respects the old OAU rules/principles and protects each and every states authority and power to control its border. In the meantime, the document, repeats the AU standing position that intervention may be required where fragile states are powerless to keep its people from any harms like genocide and human rights abuses. The request of any member state looking for intervention is also considered in the document. (Omar, 2005)

Fourthly, the people who made the document of the common security and defense policy participated to aims and objectives of the policy framework. One must remember that the management and framework of the common defense and security expand far beyond the demand to join conflict peacekeeping and conflict resolution

attempts in Africa. Normally, it marks the require securing collective actions to both domestic and external challenges to the continent in adherence to the rules and principles contained in the AU Act. The aims and objectives of the document are as follows: To develop the AU's capacity for cooperation of measures when preventing conflict, controlling, coping disputes, including the positioning and preserving peacekeeping agendas and hence, to encourage attempts which can sustain, secure peace enhancement in Africa; to combine at the same time coordinate regional motivations on security and defense matters; to construct peacebuilding and rebuilding in a post-conflict situations; to increase and develop the size of AU to advance and stimulate general policies in places like international relations and trade. To protect the security of Africa; to deliver a framework to create and functionalize the continent's Standby Force (ASF) and to promote peace and co-existence among the members countries of AU and within the (sub) regions that can promote an importance of good offices and peaceful means of conflict managing and the use of diplomacy, mediation, and use of no force, persuasion, mediation and conciliation.

Last but not least, the document regards with a various of "performing mechanisms and organs", i.e. the "Organs or Actors for applying the Common Defense and Security Policy for the entire continent". What is interesting here is the announcement of number of sub regional blocks that is named like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Maghreb Union organization, the Common Market, for Eastern and Southren Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other significant organization (Omar, 2005).

2.6 AU Protocol on Peace and Security

With the attendance of fifty African Countries the Constitutive Act of AU was drafted and achieved in July 2000, Lome, Togo. Though the ratification was later completed in Lusaka Meeting in July 2001 with signature of fifty states. After that the AU was born. Many, thought that the establishment of the newly created organization will solve many of the continent's problems and tackle pressing challenges of Africa. Thus, resulting unity and integration which take place in Africa which could possible solve some of the challenges. However, all those changes taking place which were occurring on the continent could not

provide effective resolution to the major problems of the continent leading the failure OAU to accomplish its purposes and principles. When OAU was failing the continent was struggling with these challenges of conflicts, underdevelopment, poverty, healthy issues such as HIV/AIDS and TB. The organization was unsuccessful because, it failed to realize its norms and principles which could have protected and promoted peace, development, security in Africa. Thus, resulting the appearance of the AU replacing the former OAU and making the AU the organization to ensure and respect its principles and norms (Melber, 2001).

The establishment of the AU was encouraged by many factors whether that be historical to economic or developments occurring around the globe. To start with the disappointment showed by many Africans towards poor socio-economic assimilation. Secondly, many African leaders suggested to tackle continent's problems needed new plans which gives hand the participation of all the categories of civil society, including youth, women as well as private sectors and powering the common institutions and giving them with essentials capacity and resources to work with the states to implement their appropriate mandate productively. Moreover, the 'current leaders' generated new ideas such consideration of the collective measures of effectively directing the challenges of the African continent as well as answering to the problems presented by the globalization and integration.

Kioko noted that African leaders came to realize that there is a need to champion and consolidate the unification of the Africans as well as strengthening its organizations; to empower the organization to engage effective role of the economic, political and cultural developments taking place inside and elsewhere Africa, to find solution of the widespread disputes in Africa, and to increase the pace of accomplishing the agreement creating the African Economic community or block (Kioko, 2003).

It was 2002 when the first inauguration of the African Union took place at the Meeting of Leaders from African states in Durban, South Africa. The attendance was 53 Heads of African States led by a Commission based the Capital City of Ethiopia. The aim was to encourage unity, collaboration and support between/among African countries and their citizens to solve the challenges Africa as a continent. One major problem to this solidarity regards how the organization can tackle challenges posed by the humanitarian and security issues. The African Union Commission proposed

that “Realisation of real solidarity and cooperation among African nations can be achieved when African states see the wellbeing and security stability of their neighbours as their own. When that is attained, there comes the need for political commitment to complete the humanitarian intervention in needy places”. This idea was part of the Strategic Plan and vision 2004-2007 provided by the Commission. It highlights significance to notice peace and security as tools which are fundamental precondition for post- conflict rebuilding and development (Murithi, 2007).

The organization (AU) was tasked with the basic duty of creating and operating Africa’s peace and security forms. The Constitutive Act of AU guarantees the right to intervention when necessary therefore, one of the principles of the organization mentions that all member Countries acknowledged to give up some of their sovereign capability to let the AU to be as the one to safeguard the well-being and the rights of the Africans. Consequently, the Peace and Security Council is created as the legitimate organ of the AU via the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council in 2002 (Kindiki, 2003). On 26 December 2003 the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council of the AU came into existence after necessary vote for its ratification of many African countries which are member countries. It is tasked with the preserving peace in Africa therefore emphasized by the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System, and the Panel of the Wise.

For the purpose of solving conflicts the AU made sure there is enough budget for post-conflict re-building initiatives. According to the work figure of the Peace and Security Council, the African Union is going to take part peacekeeping mission where there is requirement. That may be solely implementing or in partnership with others like UN, Regional Organizations especially the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the AU showed its dedication to be influential in post- conflict reconstruction. Therefore, this shows that the African Standby Force will be active or will be functioning to protect the needed application capacity to consolidate peace treaties as well as intervene where needed (Murithi, 2007).

2.7 UNOSOM I

The collapse of President Barre regime in January 1991 resulted a power vacuum and resulted power struggle making Mogadishu battle ground. The interesting story is that when the central government collapsed two factions

fought the control of the capital Mogadishu one supporting Ali Mahdi and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The hostilities between the two damaged many lives and caused destruction of properties forcing thousands of Somalis to flee from their places resulting urgent need for emergency humanitarian help. The instability, worsening security situation, widespread banditry and looting, destruction of buildings, all these challenges made it difficult for the delivery of humanitarian supplies to reach the needy places. Moreover, the conflict in Somalia threatened stability in Horn of Africa region and its continuation was not something desired from the region and international peace and security in the area.

On 24 April 1992 UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia) was established with the request of the Secretary-General, the United Nations through Security Council supported resolution 751 (1992), hence resulting the first UN adopted mission in Somalia. The Security Council also encouraged while asking the Secretary-General cooperation with other LAS, OAU and OIC to continue discussions with parties concerned about the Somalia situation. The Council also supported national reconciliation conferences and requested from the international community financial support for emergency humanitarian help to Somalia. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was given special representative role to supervise UN activities in Somalia. Agreement was reached between the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu however, the ceasefire in the capital was monitored by UN observers. On 23 June, 1992, the Secretary-General enlightened the Security Council that both factions in Mogadishu accepted the deployment of unarmed observers. The observers led by Chief Military General Shaheen of Pakistan arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, agreement was reached with consent of the factions' leaders to bring 500 UN security personnel in the capital as part United Nations operation in Somalia. Pakistan was the first Government to offer a unit which arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992. (United Nations, n.d.)

2.8 UNOSOM II

On 26 March 1993 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was mandated in agreement with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) to replace the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was combined forces from different

nationalities arranged and guided by United Nations. In December 1992 UNITAF was given the authority to use the necessary means by the Security Council in order to make safe zone for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. UNOSOM II was mandated to undertake the suitable action for creating secure environment for humanitarian relief. For that reason, UNOSOM II was to be accomplished via disarmament and reconciliation, the operation was started by UNITAF with goal of restoring peace and stability and more importantly law and order. Part of the mandate was monitoring that all parties continue to hold the agreement to stop the violence, preventing renewal of violence and if necessary, using proper actions, protecting the UN personnel and equipment. In resolution 814 (1993), the Council also asked the Secretary-General, help from all different parties of the United Nations including offices and specialized agencies to offer humanitarian and other required assistance to the Somali people in order for them to reconstruct their political institutions, economy and reach national reconciliation.

The Security Council's resolution 897 (1994) of February 1994 revised the mandate of UNOSOM II. This time they focused helping Somali parties for applying the "Addis Ababa Agreements" especially the ceasefire initiatives as well as protecting key areas like ports, airports and important places. Part of revised mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance to all places in need throughout the country and helping the reformation of Somali police and judicial system. Helping process such as political in Somalia and protecting the UN personnel, equipment, agencies and most importantly NGOs offering the humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance. UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in early March 1995. (United Nations, 2003)

2.9 Evaluation

The chapter explained some AU documents. The problems of this world are complicated. Intra-state conflicts are common in this period of time which makes such international organizations important. The world is no longer the same to the one we used to know where interstate atrocities was dominant but today, threats are mainly internal for example civil wars, failed states, terrorism and human rights abuses. To tackle the security challenges of the world today cooperation of the all international actors are required.

3. LITREATURE REVIEW

3.1 Theories of Conflict “Social Conflict”

It is true that states do not fall without disputes or in other word conflicts, although causes of conflict differ from one state to another. Each state may experience its own conflict or internal difference. Therefore, many see these theories primordial, eclectic and class as main theories of conflict. However, it is hard to agree the definition of the term conflict and there is not a single common definition for it. Conflict can be phenomenon which comes from differences/disagreements in a specific social occurrence or it can be clash of interests between two or more groups. Civil conflict was described as dispute among local actors (private, group, government) over political, economic, social or may be culture issues by Kieh and Mukenge. The writers highlighted three different areas as prime causes of conflicts especially civil one.

Class theory of conflict explains the fact that every society has its classes and the relationship between them when it comes to their mode of production. According to famous Marxist theory all conflicts emerge from class related struggles whether that may the ambition to own the means of production although, the capitalist would do whatever it takes to hold their place as the top class of the society (production means owners). The capitalist controlling the means of production may have an influence of the life of the working class this sometimes causes disputes between the two. What causes the conflict is the decisions made by the capitalists regarding distribution and allocation of resources and sometimes wages. As result, the working class may see themselves as the victims which causes conflict. Nonetheless, what is vital is that the outbreak of a conflict needs conditions to be fulfilled. That may be the ability to know the exploitation and also the organisation to form movements or political parties capable of practicing class struggle (Goldstone, 2014). To Somalia context much is not written from class struggle as triggers of conflict but, some recent studies claim the presence of conflicts related class struggle in

some places. For example, Alex de Waal argues state influence on both agriculture and pastoralism and the fact that state controlled almost all of the production modes resulted some kind of capital accumulation (De Waal, 1996). Indeed, most of the production modes were controlled by either the state or particular group of people who had good ties with state in 1980s. Most importantly, the country was under the leadership of socialist leader Siyyad Barre who embraced socialism in 1970s.

Primordial theory also puts emphasis on primordial groups like racial groups, clans and sub-clans. Clan is something that slowly forms identity which can also be inborn or via psychological procedures in which politics and societies have small effect. This theory best suits Somali state case where clan is important. Moreover, Somalia is a nation of clans, almost most of the conflicts which occur in Somalia are clan-based conflicts where people are categorized based on their clan lineage. According to the theory the authors exquisitely demonstrated how hegemonic pattern of relations persists most of the postcolonial nation states and there is no exception to Somalia whereby few members of the society control and dominate the power. In fact, particular clans in Somalia dominate political stage of the country which is based clan system. As result elites from other clans establish rebel groups. In short those belonging to marginalized groups “civil” or “military” create insurgencies to get what they want causing conflict erupt in the society (Klay and Jr Kieh, 2002). On the other hand, World Bank stated in a report “almost all conflicts in recent Somali History fall under clan-based conflicts”. Clan is something that be used in both good and bad ways. It can be used as a tool for solving problems or it can be used as something which a specific clan group pursue its political goals and resource control.

The Eclectic Theory of conflict explains that one factor is impossible to explain the difficulty of internal conflicts or in other word civil wars. The theory further explains that conflict is result of several variables that may be historical, political, economic social and so many others. Hence, several coordinated factors can cause conflict. For instance, mis-treatment of humans or human rights abuses, mis-use of political power, poverty, suppression all these factors may trigger conflict. To find solution for a conflict requires different methods to be implemented to play role. For example,

conflicts sometimes require peacekeepers to intervene the situation like it is true in the case of Somalia where peacekeeping forces are currently present. Non- use of force can also be an option for instance negotiation and mediation (Abdullahi, 2017 p.178).

The fall of the Somali central state in 1991 attracted many scholars, policy makers, and Somali people because of what had happened. It became something interesting since the civil war is still going on the country with almost three decades. The country represents one of Africa's most homogeneous nation-states sharing the same language, ethnicity, and religion (Samatar, 2016). Somali people are citizens of four different countries in the Horn of Africa because of the colonial partition: The Somali republic, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. Furthermore, many Somalis have attained different citizenships of different countries becoming global citizens.

To precisely explain the collapse and failure of Somali state, one must keep in mind the mistakes of the leaders and their policies in postcolonial state in the country which was founded with fragile and weak institutions, and structures. Such failure cannot be regarded or associated with the people of Somalia and their social institutions, who have experienced many problems like marginalization and victimized because of conflicts, bad state policies and collapse (Abdullahi, 2017). Therefore, like any other colonized state in Africa, the nature of Somali state is obtained not from within but rather outside. Hence, its collapse must be regarded as failure of these three areas which are confusing ideologies, lacking the capacity and external challenges.

3.2 Three core difficulties of Somali state formation

3.2.1 A divided nation

Colonial powers divided people of Somalia into five different parties and the territories were given among four colonial powers namely: Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia. As a result, Somali nationalists came up with the idea of unifying all Somali speaking regions under one flag to liberate them from the colonizers and bring them the umbrella of Somali state.

3.2.2 Secular ideology and centralized system of state

This system of state based on secular ideology and centralized state was challenge to

Somalis because it eliminated the traditional structure of the Somali society which was based on Islamic faith, the clan system, and culture. This resulted three competing and conflicting believes/ideologies: Islamism, clannism, and nationalism sometimes confusing and cross-cutting (Abdullahi, 2017, p.163).

3.2.3 Geographical location

Geographical challenge is one which many can say God-given or natural one because of the countries' strategic location. Somalia happens to be in a place where world products cross, it connects three continents Asia, Europe and Africa. This important crossroads attracted many European colonial powers during the partition or scramble for Africa. It also became the playground of the second world war, which was fought on Somali soil, where Somali people involving on all fighting sides. Somalia was the theatre of the Cold War because of being part of the Suaz Canal and oil producing Gulf region geopolitics. Moreover, the country was drawn into conflict especially regional one, the tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over Nile river. What is more interesting is that Somalia locates where two identity of "Africaness" and "Arabness" challenge and clash one another. It is also a place where the Christian-Muslim borders meet, whereby Somalia leading the Muslim faith in the Horn of Africa against Kenya and Ethiopia on the other side where the Christianity faith is ruling.

To produce the causes of Somali state collapse, the study attracted many enormous academic interests in the last three decades. However, this chapter tries put together analysis and perspectives of various academic fields in order to provide the main factors and build understandable picture of what facilitated the collapse of Somali State. Secondly, prominent academic perspectives of the collapse especially the Somali state collapse are analysed.

3.3 Overview

The establishment of modern Somali state started with the UN trusteeship Mandate to Italy on November 21, 1949, to prepare its colony for independence. The trusteeship Agreement of the Somali state was approved by the UN Trusteeship Council on 27 January, 1950. Which says "the territory [Somalia] shall be an independent and sovereign state; that its independence shall become effective at the end of ten years from the date of approval of the trusteeship agreement by the [UN] general assembly." (Abdullahi, 2017, p.165). Therefore, Italy the former colony of

Somalia was given the authority and the mandate to administer UN trusteeship Council in Somalia. Other countries like Philippines, Colombia, Egypt were also given the advisory role representing the UN trusteeship council in the country. Furthermore, the agreement highlights the duties Italy should achieve within the ten years given, for example creating a democratic system of governance, economic development, providing social services such as building education, healthy institutions, establishing security apparatus, and preparing the territory to become 1960 as an independent state. Italy took over the administration of territory (AFIS) from the British Military Administration (BMA) on April 1950. Although, the return of former colony (Italy) was not supported by many like Somali Youth League (SYL), the major nationalist party, however, AFIS started providing Somalis administrative responsibilities like the election of the municipal councils in 1954, establishing a Territorial Council and most importantly modest socio-economic development programs were implemented. The course of taking part the idea of Somalization pursued bearing in mind the difficulties of AFIS and having not enough time to prepare the country for independence. For example, many and low paid Somalis took control of high positions especially administration roles given by the Italians.

Promoting democratization process the first election with parliament seats of 90 was organized in 1959, where the SYL was victorious creating the first Somali government “Affare Interno” facilitated by the AFIS. Moreover, the constitution of the country was drafted in the year 1959. In contrast, the British protectorate/British Somaliland, “in 1957 the first legislative Council of Somaliland was created and Somalis started to replace expatriate government representatives.” (Bradbury, 2008). The rapid procedure for preparing the territory was going smoothly and the first elections was handled in February, 1960 with parliament of 33 seats. However, Britain decided to give independence to British protectorate, thus, Somaliland took its independence on June 26, 1960, days before the Italian protectorate celebrated independence on July 1, 1960. The two came together the Italian protectorate (UN Trust territory) and British protectorate and agreed to establish historic accord of forming united and centralized Republic state of Somalia.

3.4 The impact of the Cold War in the Region

Somalia is located a very strategic place in the Horn of Africa, which has attracted

many rivalries and competing super powers. Its strategic location, which supposed to be advantage or asset turned to be disadvantage or a liability to the country because of attracting competing global super powers. There has been a competition between super powers over the control of Somalia since the country took its independence in 1960. The rivalry between the great powers like USSR and US resulted many changes which have taken place in the region. Although, the Soviet Union won the heart of Somalis when the two reached agreement and signed a military agreement worth of 30 million US in 1963. Furthermore, the Soviets went on to enlarge the Somali army from 4,000 to 20, 000 to outbid the offer of the west which was 10 million aid and Military assistance (Chirumamilla, 2011). Thus, Soviet Union winning the race against the USA and its NATO allies which assured to expand Somali Military from 5, 000 to 6, 000 army.

General Barre took the advantage of the soviets and overthrow the civilian government in 1969 with bloodless coup d'état. He embraced socialism, and signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR making Somalia an important ally of soviets in the region. Although, the situation later changed when Somalia attacked Ethiopia in 1977-1978 war. The Somali-Ethiopia war was the decisive moment of the good relationship between Barre regime and the soviets. On the other hand, US offered Military and economic aid to react from Cuban and USSR Military support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden war. About 500 million US Dollars of Military relief was promised by the US to support Barre regime in 1980s. However, everything changed when Gorbachev came to power as Soviet Union leader in 1985, his political reforms led the decline of the soviet-union in 1990 and most importantly marked the end of the cold war. Thus, damaging the foreign aid promise of the West to Somalia since the country lost its strategic significance which was vital during the cold war (Bell, 1973). Therefore, US was no longer interested Somalia as US partner because of the end of the war.

The point here worth noting is the removal of the aid was big impact for Barre regime and it weakened his government resulting armed insurgencies to overthrow him from power. The impact of the war together with refusal of foreign aid were major factors which caused the Somali central state to fall. Moreover, withdrawal of foreign assistance was area of focus for many scholars as a major factor of state collapse including, Ahmed Samatar, Ken Menkhaus, Walter S. Clarke, Robert Gosende, John Prendergast and Terrence Lyons. For example, Terrence Lyons links

the Somali state collapse with the removal of foreign help/assistance and strengthened domestic call for better political goods. He argues that Somali state collapsed when “absence of foreign aid and increased need for good governance and economic enhancement.” (Lyons and Samatar, 1995) Robert Gosende and Walter S. Clarke are in line with Terrence Lyons of the negative impact of withdrawal of foreign aids/assistance but, partially. They argued that “Somalia’s downfall may not be solely due to cold war but, there are also other factors contributed the state to fail.” (Clark and Gosende, 2000) Though, Ahmed Samatar regards the collapse combination of three things and he wrote “due to devastating and humiliation from the defeat, declining economy and lack of superpower support, Somali’s political situation turned upside-down. All eyes were on the regime and the loss from the war overwhelmingly changed everything causing a situation characterized of suspension and bitterness” (Samatar, 1994)” Ken Menkhaus argues that foreign assistance was vital to Somalia economy. He went even further to note “it was obvious that the external assistance was vital for the Somali economy and it is also clear that local state resources were not enough. Even observers in 1950s were concerned that an independent Somali state would not be economically feasible” (Menkhaus, 1997) furthermore, Ken Menkhaus and John Pendergast went even further more, seemingly over expressing the significance of the foreign aid. They argued, “Somalia entirely depended on the foreign aid especially in cold war era and when the war ended the country’s government collapsed. The central state’s authority depended on the foreign aid the country collapsed soon after the aid was frozen in late 1980s.” (Menkhaus and Pendergast, 1995)

3.5 Somalia War with Ethiopia

Somali Irredentism is in fact based on the history that the Somali Speaking area in the Horn of Africa are divided and occupied among four colonial powers during the partition of Africa. The Colonizers were Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia. Somali nationalists encouraged by the Bevin Plan, desired the concept of “Greater Somalia”, established on the idea of re-uniting all Somali Speaking people living in five separate regions as represented by the Somali Flag’s five-pointed white star. Two of the five regions, the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland united and became in 1960 the Somali Republic. The other three remaining regions including the current Republic of Djibouti, Ogaden or

Somali-region in Ethiopia, and the NFD (Northern Frontier District) in Kenya. Chasing the vision of “Greater Somalia”, the newly born State of Somalia was Manipulated, encouraged into the cold war by the major powers namely the US and Soviet Union competing for the influence of the strategic Horn of Africa where Somalia locates (Fishel, 1997). After Military aid from the soviets Somalia went war with the Ethiopia this created hostile environment with the neighbouring countries affecting the peace and the stability of the region. Somalia fought two wars with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977-8 (Somalia-Ethiopia war) the later, however, was internationalized and devastating not only it was one of the reasons why Somalia is not at peace today but, it also had an impact on peace of Horn of Africa as a region (Nkaisserry, 1997).

Somali irredentism and the war with neighbouring countries for example like the one with Ethiopia as a prime factor for the collapse of Somali state was study focused by many scholars. For instance, Terrence Lyons explains the historical causes and the impact of the war. He argues that the war with Ethiopia caused by Somali national desire for unification and the unwillingness of neighbour countries to give back Somali speaking regions like ogaden in Ethiopia due to different believes or perceptions over the disputed areas. He notes, “the point here is that [nationalism] as an ideology; it inspired leaders in the capital Mogadishu to chase foreign policies that essentially guided the state into conflict with neighbour states that have claimed the Somali-inhabited territories. Somalia’s argument which was the vision of Greater Somalia seemed threat to Ethiopia, Kenya and these countries were ready to defend and use force if needed the land they are not rightfully own.” Another scholar A. Lefebvre emphasizes and notes: “Ironically, Said’s demise and the disintegration of the Somali state were not only a consequence of clan politics but also attributable in part, to Somalia’s irredentist foreign policy, principally the aspect of it aimed at Ethiopia.” (Lefebvre, 1993). On the other hand, Peter Woodward regards state collapse to other factors like domestic issues, he also identifies border permeability as percentage of the misfortune. He writes: “While the destruction of Somalia state as constituted from 1960 was primarily due to domestic factors, the issue of the permeability of the state’s border was also relevant”.

Furthermore, he claims “border permeability was to work against Somalia from 1978 as Ethiopia hosted Siyad Barre’s growing number of opponents”.

3.6 Injustice

In this modern state system, there are many ways which injustice can be tackled like applying rule of law and creating equal opportunities for the people without any kind of discrimination such as faith, race, ethnicity, gender as well as clan. Human history teaches us when societies reaches the point when they morally become corrupted and greedy, selfishness prevails which leads societies to collapse. Morality simply means the right and wrong character and the goodness or badness of human behaviour. When justice is applied it enhances togetherness and prevents conflicts especially social conflicts. Furthermore, any disputes can be discussed through peaceful means and agreements can be reached with use of non-use of force. (Abdullahi, 2017, p.191)

3.7 Evaluation

The chapter analysed factors behind the collapse of the Somali state and has given us explanations that the Somali state lacks the good quality of good governance which resulted poor political, economic and social system of governance. The country took its independence in 1960 although there was low human resource and material capacity. The colonial powers left weak Somali State which was in conflict with its neighbours. Some argued that collapse of Somali state took place while the country was still searching for its final state identity. The realization of greater Somalia coupled with weakening clannism were major goals of the civilian state in early years of Somali governance from 1960 to 1969. Things later changed when military regime took over the power and radicalized policies. As result Somalia fought a devastating war with Ethiopia in 1977-8.

4. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

This section discusses the different peacekeeping operations which took place in Somalia and the role of the external actors in Somali conflict. The chapter focuses mainly the roles and the motives of the various actors in Somali crises and further explains in details the impact of the foreign forces in Somali dispute. To do so, the roles of Somalia's neighbouring states are discussed to explain the counties situation. Different actors play different roles when understanding the dynamic nature of Somali Conflict.

4.1 The role of History in Somali Dispute

As mentioned in chapter one the following European countries Italy, France and Britain all colonized Somalia before the country took independence and divided the country into five different parts. The most commonly known being Britain who occupied the northern part of Somalia (also known as British Somaliland), from 1886 and Italy who settled southern part of Somalia from 1889. Italy attained a trusteeship of southern Somalia for ten years in 1950. Both southern Somalia (also known as Italian Somaliland) and British Somaliland became the Somali Republic in the year 1960 (Lewis, 2008).

Political parties were formed but clan loyalty became something indispensable, this led to class of interests between the South Somalia and the North Somalia regions both colonized by Italy and British respectively. Though, elections were held peacefully whereby Aden Abdulle hassan became the first president in 1960 (Lewis, 1980). The second election president Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was victorious. In short time Sharmarke established successful government led by Prime Minister Egal Later on he was overthrown by Major General Mohamed Said Barre in a coup d'etat and President Abdirishid was killed in an assassination on October 15, 1969. Those nine years between 1960-1969 Somalia was called Africa's leading Democratic state and got the famous nickname "Switzerland of Africa". The west once labelled because Somalia enjoyed almost decade of working democracy.

When Barre took power, he created new form of government whereby he embraced Socialism and dissolved legislative and executive powers. He made Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) under his command by the 1970 Somalia was socialist State an important ally of USSR in the Horn of Africa. Resulting economic and ideological dependence on the soviet unions which enhanced the friendly relationship and cooperation between the two. In deed Somalia and Soviet Union put terms on paper in November 1974. Somalia went on further making the USSR her main supplier of military equipment. The relations between Soviet and Somalia deteriorated when USSR re-directed its attention and supported Somalia's main rival Ethiopia. Barre responded cultivating new relationship with the US, and welcomed the Americans by providing them an important base in the country. Barre suffered crises inside that contributed his decline and collapsed his authoritarian regime in late 1980 (Abdullahi, 2017, p.170). The attacks were coming from every side of the country with aim of overthrowing barre's regime. It was clear that many wanted Barre to be overthrown when an aircraft from the Somali National Force bombed several cities in the north in 1988. The attack caused civilian casualties in the north west province the current Somaliland and former British colony. The chaos was everywhere in the country resulting enormous economic crises as Barre took as much as he wanted. This caused a situation where the country was stateless and Somalia Government collapsed. Barre fled the country and the army dissolved into smaller groups of clan leaders. The same year Somali British protectorate (current Somaliland) declared independence from the rest of the country. In 1991 the Somali government fully collapsed and Barre died exile in Abuja Nigeria.

Starting from colonial era, Somalia has demanded from Ethiopia the Ogaden region. Somalia's aim was to unite all Somali-speaking people in Ethiopia especially Ogaden region, Kenya and Djibouti under one state. For this reason, Somalia went war with Ethiopia from 1963 to 1964 over the disputed Ogaden region whereby all the people living this area of land are ethnically Somalis. Before the country took the independence there were suggestions of unification of all Somali peoples under one single emblem, this was a threat to neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. For instance, Ethiopia had huge Somali

territories under its command and fought successfully to retain it. This caused one of the Africa's catastrophic inter-state conflicts when Somali state under the leadership of Said Barre attacked Ethiopia to retain Ogaden region from Ethiopia in 1977-78 (Abdullahi, 2017, p.169)

As mentioned above Somalia and Ethiopia fought several wars because of the border disputes between the two countries. Somalia looked military support to achieve the aim of uniting Somalis in the year 1960. By the year 1961 war started in the disputed area between Somalia and Ethiopia. The situation worsened in march, 1963 when Somalis in Ogaden region resisted the presence of Ethiopia government in the region which later resulted many conflicts between the two countries. These disputes led to war between Somalia and Ethiopia (Lewis, 2008).

According Ghalib Although, "there were serious diplomatic clashes between Haile Sellassie and Aden Abdulla (of Somalia) when OAU was formed and its charter signed in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963" the two head of states met to resolve their differences and came terms to cease all hostilities between them. Indeed, Somalia went to vote for Ethiopia's permanent membership of OAU, when Haile Sellassie of Ethiopia asked for support from Abdulle of Somalia (the president of Somalia that time) and he accepted the request to vote for Ethiopia in telegram conversation between the two leaders. It seemed that the relation between the two were improving. Tensions raised when Ethiopia accused of Somalia of supporting the guerrilla warfare conducted by the Western Somali Liberation Front (Lockyer, 2006). WSLF goals were to free Somalis in Ogaden under Ethiopia, in short, they aimed to capture back Ogaden from Ethiopia. What made the situation even worse was the Ethiopia's rebel leaders lived in the capital city of Somalia though Somalia adopted wait and see tactics instead of doing something about it.

The above factors combined with offers of the superpowers in terms of military aid made everything difficult leading to war between the two states. Good example, is the 30 million offers of military aid from USSR while Somalia rejected previous offers from western countries of USA, Italy and Germany which was less than the amount of the east. Soon after Somalia rejected the aid from USA, there were terms put place between Somalia and the Soviet Union.

This agreement was one of the main factors resulted the border war between Somalia and Ethiopia over Ogaden in the year 1963 to 1964.

Wars either build states or destroy them but, this one is one of the main reasons that Somalia lacks strong state today. It was Siyyad Barre who took the opportunity of the internal crises taking place in Ethiopia particularly, the demonstrations coming from the changes started by the Derg and the nationalist activities in Eritrea, who had initiated attack in the capital Asmara in 1975. Hence, the Ogaden war seemed winnable to Barre. He mis-calculated because of the Ethiopia's internal problems and thought the chance to retain Ogaden is alive (Lewis, 1990). Furthermore, USSR had already supported Somalia in terms of military and made them one of the strongest states in Africa. The military aid support from soviets built strong Somali armed forces in Sub-Sahara Africa. Bradbury argues between 1966 and 1977, Siyyad Barre established one of the largest military forces in Africa, with the support of USSR which convinced him to attack. However, the Somali-Ethiopia war in 1977/8 was international and eventually military failure for Somalis, causing huge consequences on regional peace and stability especially the Horn of Africa (Nkaisserry, 1997). Many suggested 1977 war was the reason Somalia State collapsed, arguing that it was one of the major factors if not the biggest one contributing the state failure in country in 1991.

The down fall of the Barre regime in 1991 marked the collapse of Somali state leading long civil war and absence of government services. The chaos and human suffering where everywhere in the country causing unbearable human situations like famine, disease and civil wars. The collapse of the state also highlighted massive movements of Somalis into the outside world followed by worsening humanitarian conditions which led the intervention of the UN and USA between 1992 and 1995. According to the fund for peace (2010) Somalia is regarded as number one failed state in the world in terms social, economic and politics not to forget even military capability (Centre for Research and Dialogues, 2004). The level of conflict in Somalia is damaging, the country was not even ranked on the Human Development Index established by the UNDP in (2010) reason being unavailability of data. Somalia is a country ravaged by conflicts, civil wars, violence, warlords, jihad, terrorism, clannism, piracy and

underdevelopment for almost three decades. The cause of the conflict traces back to history in post-colonial government.

After so many years of stateless period in 2000 the Transitional National Government was established, in an election which took place Nairobi, Kenya. Later, in 2006 was the time when officials of newly born Transitional Federal Government met for first time reason being security issues in fact that time the city was not the hands of the Government (Cecilia, 2013, p.12). Since 1991 there was no functioning Parliament because of the statelessness period. It was until August 2012 when the first federal Parliament was established since the central state. This resulted the creation of new constitution on 10 September that same year. The parliament election which took place in 2012 Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was victorious and elected as the President of the Federal Government of Somalia. Currently Somalia is a state functioning as federal with different various administrative entities/units. Starting with Puntland which claimed autonomy as federal state in 1998 on the other hand, Somaliland is also declared as independent and separate entity in 1991 from the rest of the country but not yet recognized internationally (Amadi, 2014). Galmudug state is also part of the federal state system and declared autonomy in 2006 making it one of the federal states of the country. Jubaland which have borders Kenya and Ethiopia is also a region which became part of the states making the federal state system of Somalia in 2010 declaring its own autonomy as a region. More recently, Hirshabelle and South West regions became parts of the Federal state system.

Somalia has been an unsolved problem to the international community for long time almost three decades. Many suggested especially non-government organizations “NGOs” that the foreign influence has played important role for keeping the fights alive and the war economy booming. However, the situation is anarchic meaning informal structures still exist making Somalia economy without state. It is pretty clear that Somali economy is in fact not shattered as believed.

4.2.1 Non-State Actors

4.2.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

After Ethiopian military withdrawal that helped the transitional federal government to settle Mogadishu. In December 2006, AMISOM mission to Somalia installed. In fact, the mandate deployed the mission was given by African Union in January 2007. Soon as the mission started the United Nations especially the security council showed support towards the deployment of the peacekeeping forces (Murithi, 2007). AMISOM started the mission with 8000 soldiers mandated to safeguard transitional government staff and take part actions against the anti-government groups like Al-Shabaab UN Council Resolution 1744 (2007). The operation also provided civil military missions and humanitarian support. Part of the AMISOM's mandate was to support the government of Somalia in terms of military capacity whether that may be training and mentoring the Somali police force for the best way possible. Ugandan soldiers consisting of around 1600 were deployed in Mogadishu. Although troops from Burundi later joined the mission in December 2007.

AMISOM continued its mission of supporting the transitional federal government while on the other hand, the Ethiopian troops were withdrawing from Mogadishu. In 2009 Ethiopian forces left Mogadishu. AMISOM focused to protect special members of the TFG and key areas in Mogadishu including the presidential palace known as villa Somalia, the airport, and K4 junction connecting them. African Union initially expected that UN peacekeeping mission would replace AMISOM after six months. Though it was impossible because of several factors. Rather, UN opted to back UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) for supporting AMISOM operation in Somalia. As result UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) gave logistical assistance to AMISOM's military troops in the capital Mogadishu. The resistance coming from the anti- government groups like Al-Shabaab was increasing but, the Ugandan and Burundian forces originally making up the African Union force prevented the Somali government from the rebels. However, AMISOM faced huge challenge after the Ethiopian military exit in 2009. In 2010 attacks from Al-Shabaab doubled making Mogadishu battle ground resulting civilian casualties. Neither Al-Shabaab nor AMISOM managed to win the war between

them. In fact, Al-Shabaab carried out attacks outside the country to weaken Uganda's military role. Al-Shabaab claimed suicide bombings which took place in Kampala in July 2010. In response Ugandan government added more troops to the mission to fight the war against the enemy Al-Shabaab.

The transitional federal government of Somalia with help AMISOM countered endless offensive attacks from rebel group in 2010. During the Ramadan same year AMISOM retaliated with offensive military campaign against insurgents resulting enormous losses of Al-Shabaab fighters. The street fights between the two continued many months resulting removal of Al-Shabaab from its strategic areas in Mogadishu. In October 2011, Kenyan military troops entered the war against insurgent militia (Cecilia, 2013). The Kenyans also carried out an operation against Al-Shabaab and send forces into southern Somalia region in response to Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil. Soon after the Kenyan forces came in also the Ethiopian troops returned to Somalia and launched attacks against Al-Shabaab major holds Bakool, Hiraan, and Bay all these regions have border with Ethiopia. In December 2011, a new military strategy was developed. This expanded AMISOM's military personnel making the number 18, 000. This new military strategy expanding the operation was facilitated by the AU's Peace and Security Council and UNSC in January and February 2012 UN Security, Council Resolution 2036 (2012). The new offensive military campaign resulted the removal of Al-Shabaab from the capital city Mogadishu.

4.3 The role of AU, IGAD, and the Arab league

The two most dominant organization in Somalia's situation are the African Union and the IGAD, their involvement in the country's crises is important to mention. OAU has recognized Somali National Government (TNG) later it was the AU which also recognized Somalia state as Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The role of the AU and IGAD combined is vital one compare to the Arab league which is a minor role. The Arab league has been trying to play a mediatory role in the security situation in Somalia. It was the AU who decided to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2007 with the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to replace the Ethiopian army presence in the country. Uganda and Burundi were the first two

countries which offered troops though AMISOM was expected to provide 8, 000 troops later that number got increased and Kenya and Ethiopia added troops to send Somalia as part of the AU mission.

It was in July 2012 when the AMISOM accepted the Kenyan troops to be integrated into AMISOM and be part of the peacekeeping operation, though there were suggestions that the neighbouring states cannot send peacekeeping forces to Somali soil meaning Kenya and Ethiopia (Cecilia, 2013, p.33). It is clear that the AU is always in cooperation with the Regional Economic Community (REC) especially IGAD in the mission of bringing peace keeping operation in Somalia. However, one may argue that IGAD has been partially playing the situation in Somalia because of Ethiopia's influence of the regional block. In short, Ethiopia has huge influence on IGAD's decisions.

4.4 The Roles of State-Actors

4.4.1 Ethiopia's military Intervention

When we go back to history the relation between Ethiopia and Somalia is characterized turbulent one. Somalia and Ethiopia are opposite from almost everything the two have different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Somalia leading the Islamic faith while Ethiopia is championing the Cristian faith. According to Somali people's view, Ethiopia is one of the former colonial powers that divided Somali land into five parts. In fact, King Menelik of Ethiopia participated the famous conference for partition of Africa. As result, in 1954 Ethiopian was given the Ogaden region of Somalia by the British government. Consequently, Ethiopia and Somalia fought two wars in 1964 and 1977. The cause of the war was Ogaden region which originally belongs to Somalia even the inhabitants of this region are Somalis but controlled by Ethiopian government. Somalia hosted and supported opposition leaders to fight Ethiopia. On the other hand, Ethiopia regime also supported Somali rebel groups SSDF, SNM and other groups. In fact, Somali government was overthrown by this opposition groups and in 1990 the Somali government finally collapsed. In the eyes of many Somali citizens Ethiopia is an enemy which only wants weak and fragile Somali state.

In 2006, Ethiopian government intervened Somalia with its own political goals and military support from US. Ethiopian National Defense Force entered the Sovereign Somali land to help the Transitional Federal Government. Even though, the allied armies of ENDF and Somali National Force weakened the Islamic Courts Union, the violence lasted many more years causing considerable damage to the parties involved and even deteriorated the conditions of many Somali people in Southern part of the country (Chris, 2008).

Several attempts were made to install a central government in Somalia between 1991 and 2006 but, none of them resulted peace and stopped the war. Baidoa was the base of the Transitional Federal Government since Mogadishu was under the control of Union of Islamic Courts. However, these group of sharia courts defeated various warlords mainly from prominent Hawiye clans hence, controlling majority of the south and central Somalia. In July 2006 with the request of Somali Government (TFG) Ethiopian Forces were deployed to Baidoa following the occupation of a nearby city by insurgent group loyal to Islamic Courts Union.

In December the United Nations with the aim of facilitating talks between Somali Government and rebel groups passed Resolution 1725. The Resolution encouraged to deploy peacekeeping forces from the region consisting of Intergovernmental Authority on Development and of course from African Union military forces, it also supported the call for peace dialogues between the TFG and ICU, protection of the transitional government officials and facilitation of training programs for security personnel was also encouraged in the resolution. ICU rejected the resolution and begun attacking the Somali government held territories. In response, the TFG together with ENDF swiped ICU fighters and marked the end of ICU. In spite of the defeat of the Islamic courts the conflict did not stop there. Other militias were born like Al-Shabaab, and Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) launching attacks against transitional federal government and prolonging the violence and chaos (Branden, 2010).

4.4.2 Eritrea

When explaining Somalia's situation some neighbor states are important to mention Eritrea is one of them. The role played by the regime in Eritrea in Somali dispute is documented but rather explained from the perspective of its

animosity or hostile relationship with Ethiopia. Eritrea gained its independence after thirty years of Military struggle against the Ethiopian regime in 1991. Moller argues the collapse of the dictator rule of Ethiopia as a result Ethiopia officially recognized Eritrea's self-determination as independent state which seemed to establish new successful relationship but later worsened resulting a war to start between the two in 1998-2000. Since then the two states instead of going direct warfare they opted proxy wars against one another. Eritrea supported the UIC and later the ARS-A while Ethiopia on the other hand helped the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. Moller furthermore, claims that Eritrea was vital for the UIC and has been giving them military aids meaning arms which the international community (the UN) and United States could not agree and welcome. Eritrea moreover, allowed the insurgent groups to stay Asmara so that they can have a base on its territory (Amadi, 2014, p.53).

4.4.3 Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen

When talking the influence of the neighbouring countries in the situation of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea dominate the rest of the states. These states have been strongly involved in Somali disputes. On the other hand, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen are not as important as the previous two. For example, there is a good relationship between Somalia and Djibouti unlike Somalia and Ethiopia so there is nothing much to say between Djibouti and Somalia. However, one may argue the role Djibouti played is a significant one for hosting several conferences especially reconciliation conferences. In short Djibouti has tried to play a broker role for providing the platform for Somali peace talks most recent ones being the talks between the TFG and ARSA-A factions in August 2008 as well as state building initiatives. Sudan is also a mediator when talking the role, she played in Somalia's crises and remained neutral the whole time.

Kenya is different than Sudan and Djibouti combined because is a country which share a border with Somalia. It was recently when the Kenyan government decided to send its troops in Somalia to be part of AMISOM. It can be said that Kenya hosted large number of Somali refugees in recent years though the country is still for Somali irredentism which makes her similar with the Ethiopian state. One can also say that Kenya also took part of the regional and sub-regional efforts especially IGAD when

talking the security situation in Somalia.

Yemen is also a country which played a minor role in Somalia's crises. Muthuma claims that there are enough evidences that some of small arms and light weapons (SWAT) which the warring parts in Somalia using come from Yemen but, there is no enough evidence whether the Yemeni state was engaged or not. In contrast, Muthuma emphasizes that some Arab regimes are directly or indirectly supporting some of the insurgent groups in Somalia. This may be because some Arab states see that the animosity between Somalia and Ethiopia rooted the fact that they believe in two opposing believes Somalia is leading the Islamic faith in the region while Ethiopia is also leading the Christianity faith in the Horn of Africa region (Amadi, 2014, p. 56-57).

4.5 US influence in Somalia

the United States involvement in Somalia was initially started in 1990 as form of humanitarian assistance though later it changed. In recent years the foreign policy of the US towards Somalia totally changed. In the 90s the US engagement in Somalia was related humanitarian issues however, it seems that things have changed over the years. Today, the US main focus is about the expansion of the Islamist insurgency. The Bush Administration started what the US called the war against the 'terrorism' which is the reason why the US had to Support and assist the state in Somalia. many assumed that failed states would promote terrorism and that is the case US had to assist the transitional federal government in Somalia. Americans were against the activities of the Islamic Court Union in its early stage because they feared that Somalia could be a ground for terrorist groups.

Things were not the same after the famous incident when the US lost 18 of their soldiers in a fight which took place in Mogadishu 1993, this operation was known as 'black Hawk Down'. After what happened that day the Americans entirely changed their policy towards Somalia. Johnnie Carson once said that "we do not want an American footprint or boot on the ground". That was clear example of how US changed its approach towards Somalia however, US is still playing an important role when it comes to the region. They created their military base in Djibouti in 2002. It was in 2012 when drone strike killed high ranking Al-Shabaab leader in an operation

undertaken by the American military in Somalia. Obama administration not only conducted air strikes but they also facilitated support towards the Somali government through USAID in areas of military and economic support. America plays significant role in supporting financially the AMISOM mission in Somalia (Amadi, 2014).

4.6 Evaluation

The chapter mainly discussed both internal and external factors and their influence in Somali conflict. It is also widely acknowledged that the neighbouring countries had their hidden agendas towards the Somali conflict some even argued that they are part of the Somali crises. Critics argue that external actors are meddling political affairs of the Somali society. Some suggest that for the peacekeeping mission to be fruitful emphasis should be made on the external actors and their position towards Somali conflict.

5. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AMISOM'S WORK

5.1 Challenges of African Union's Military Interventions

The recognition on the side of the AU towards the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel about the UN Peace Keeping missions in 2000 have extensive implications for African Union especially in fields of equipment, training, organization, capacities etc. African Union should take part in areas of support when it comes to the regional peace efforts on the continent. There was realization that the panel disagreement that “[t]here are several duties which UN peacekeeping personnel are not supposed to be doing in areas they must go” demands significant thoughts of matters regarding to mission-qualified armies on the African soul. Moreover, there was also realization on the part of the AU that the Brahimi report produced alliance and cooperation with United Nation system even more demanding and basic. The point here to be mentioned is that some incidents which took place in the continent highly proposed that the regional and sub- regional organizations are the ones to respond the pressing issues. Regional or sub-regional organizations sometimes set up short strong stabilization and peace enforcement processes some of these processes are changed to multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations (De Coning, 2004).

The understanding between the United Nations and regional organizations when it comes to division of labour seems to be vital which makes an advantage to have for both types of organizations. The events taking places around the world suggest that the UN is not the first one to respond to crises especially those taking place in Africa what I mean here is that the United Nations is relatively slow to answer security issues or crises on the African continent. However, it is the regional organizations which are immediate to respond. They look to be ready to deploy somehow sooner than the United Nations. More importantly, the requirement of the regional organizations when facing such situations is not the same as those of the United Nations. In short, the scenarios and standards of the

UN is not required from the regional organizations for the them to adopt a peacekeeping mission.

According to Brahimi report, the first six to twelve weeks following a cease-fire is the most difficult time for creating sustainable peace and reliability/credibility of peacekeepers (Rikhye, 1984). On the other hand, Kent and Malan suggested that these areas like personnel, material readiness, and funding should be improved. Thus, they noted that the African Union requires the capacity to respond or react rapidly. One must notice that one of the realities of the recent African peace-keeping operations like AMISOM, financial problems is one of the major challenges facing the mission. Recent years proved that financial constrains restricted AU peacekeeping missions. It was not the political will or the need for military personnel, but the reality is financial difficulties. Peacekeeping operations are in fact costly even the OAU could not provide the required financial capacity to facilitate such operations because the budget was not enough. Furthermore, OAU will most likely depend on its members and the international community 'UN' for financial help in order the African Union realize African Standby Force as reinforcement system in Africa. When it comes to financing some observers suggested that from financing perspective, the best available peacekeeping missions on the continent are the UN financed peacekeeping missions (De Coning, 2003).

The other challenges are technical problems, AU and ASF functionaries moreover will have to participate the logistical and managerial features concerning to the creation of lists of mission leadership, policy, military, civilian specialists as a demand for genuine undertaking missions as well as effective planning and the needs to stablish operations swiftly. The basic requirement is to develop staff capacity and unity of command for operations especially the new ones are recognized as of importance priority while establishing united operations.

5.2 Security Threats

Somalia has been struggling to establish civilian state because of security challenges. In 1960 the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland formed union creating the Somali republic. Since the establishment of the

republic the countries security situations has been worsening leading to complete collapse in 1991. After the failure of the Somali state several attempts has been made to rebuild the state good example is the creation of a transitional government. Though, it faced enormous challenges from Islamist insurgency in spite of the Ethiopian help to intervene in December 2006. It is been argued that the Ethiopian Intervention and the defeat of the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) have resulted huge damage on the civilian peace in south central Somalia (Chris, 2008). Moreover, the Darod-Hawiye rivalry, competition and the existence of resistance manoeuvres made security situation even more difficult to solve.

The Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country in 2009 many thought it will be an era of unpredictability and risk, it was also believed that it will produce a new opportunity to re-establish political processes. The reconciliation talks which was held in Djibouti was a good start and provided room for further talks between different competing groups to come to the negotiation table. Many from the local and international actors welcomed the peace talks including the US. Even though, Ethiopians won in de-solving the Islamic Courts Union, the competition for power in Somalia had started. Soon after the Ethiopians destabilized the ICU a mix of different Somali militias, former ICU loyalists and al-Shabaab Islamists waged an insurgency fight against Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and transitional Federal Government (TFG). Thus, resulting catastrophic humanitarian situations and violence which lasted more than two years.

The first Transitional Federal Government led by President Abdullahi Yusuf failed to establish a broad-based government. It was ravaged by internal conflicts such as dis-agreements among different government organs most notably the confrontations with the prime minister. Although, the real security threat was coming from Al-Shabaab who did not accept the power sharing deal developed between Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia Djibouti division (ARS-D) and TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan. The talks between Transitional Federal Government and the moderate Islamist group led by Sheikh Sharif was held in Djibouti, Al- Shabaab on the other hand, had already separated from the moderate Islamist group refused the peace deal and

waged war against the TFG. While Al-Shabaab continued to gain territories on the ground HizbulIslam later joined them throughout 2007 and 2009, Al-Shabaab gained more military advantages, taking over the control of important towns and ports in south and central Somalia.

In 2008 they had already seized Baidoa not the capital Mogadishu. The beginning of 2009, they forced the Ethiopian army to withdraw from Somalia though African Union's peacekeeping troops were still present in the country. Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'ah', which was another Islamic group formed alliance with TFG backed by Ethiopia both attacked al-Shabaab and gained towns from them. Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'ah cleared al-Shabaab from central region of Galguduud. The confrontation in the southern started in February 2009, the fight between the TFG armies helped by the AU peacekeeping forces and different Islamic militia groups and factions. In 2011, collective military mission between multinational forces and Somali military started (Heinlein, 2014). The operation was officially conducted by the Somali military with expected assistance from AU troops to help the TFG gain control more territories. On August the same year Transitional Federal Government forces with their AU troops succeeded to take over Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab. The next destination was Kismaayo which was the major source of income and the last Al-Shabaab stronghold, on 28 September 2012 the national forces helped by AU troops and Ras Kamboni militia began their raid towards Kismayo. The allied forces managed to re-capture much of the city from Al-Shabaab (Chonghaile, Clar Ni, 2014).

5.3 Internal Coordination

The problem of internal coordination has its own dimensions. To start with the geographical separation regarding some important parts of the operations the strategic planning and political work of the AMISOM was guided from the Ethiopian capital, also the operation command and the military units were based in Mogadishu while the head of the mission and its analysts was based in Nairobi. Hence, resulting problem in fact different international training facilitates which was supposed to help the capacity of the TFG's military armies were taking place different countries like Djibouti Uganda and Ethiopia.

Another major challenge was the cooperation between AMISOM's military, police

and that of the civilian. The fact that operation's head office was not in Somalia caused misguidance and placed more AMISOM commanders in problematic position like making them act as political representative of the operation in the capital Mogadishu. This is because of the lack of headquarters in Mogadishu otherwise the AMISOM force commanders could not have placed such positions (Amadi, 2014). It was in 2012 when Mogadishu became the head of mission.

In late 2011 and early 2012 new military and strategic ideas of mission were advanced but the problem was AMISOM encountered more challenges of internal coordination with arrival of the new Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). This because of the operation's deployment of Four land parts in most of the south-central Somalia. The arrival of the new AMISOM troops were from Djibouti, Kenya and Sierra Leone each agreed to be part of the mission in 2012. However, they all experienced prolonged debates regarding their missions, whether it is financial or logistical issues. Furthermore, the AMISOM's mission faced additional problems of coordinating works.

5.4 Ineffective Domestic Partners

The insurgent groups like Al-Shabaab took the advantage of the local hostility towards the Ethiopian army's presence of Somali soil and the weakness of the TFG. This provided room for Al-Shabaab to recruit significant number of fighters to its cause in and outside the country. Therefore, AMISOM was caught in the middle of this situation although, its mandate calls AMISOM to work with the TFG and help Somalia get sustainable peace and security goals.

After the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces in the country, AMISOM became more focused the security of the TFG's and its survival however, this gave Al-Shabaab the Opportunity to continue attacks against AMISOM and fill the vacuum left by Ethiopian army by occupying the former ENDF positions in Mogadishu. All this happened because the Ethiopian Forces were not fully coordinating with AMISOM regarding the details of their withdrawal. As a result, Al-Shabaab seized positions in early 2009. (Lackey, 2008)

After Yusuf resigned as president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed came in as replacement of the TFG in early 2009. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was former leader of UIC which once took the control of the capital city in mid-2006. He decided to work

with the TFG whereas his colleague Hassan Dahir Aways who led the Eritrean-based faction of ARS rejected to work with the TFG. Sharif Ahmed himself was the leader of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). However, many criticized the TFG and accused it for closely working with the Ethiopian government. It was also accused that one particular diaspora elites were dominant the Hawiye clan. The critics were saying that the government was corrupted and ineffective and not focused the reconciliation efforts.

5.5 Lack of exit strategy

It is not even clear that that there is guide to the exit which leads me my point that any given operation or mission has to have its timeline indicating the withdrawal and closure of the entire operation in a certain period of time. It is impossible for a mission to be assumed indefinitely in this modern time therefore, a mission should come up with timeline or strategy indicating the termination of its mandate and most importantly the handover of its responsibility to the domestic partner, to the government of Somalia. It is obvious that the local actors are not happy AMISOM's presence for longer period of time. Some already believed that this is similar to military occupation because of the lack of exit strategy.

5.6 Opportunities for AMISOM

The federal government of Somalia is no longer in transitional period thanks to AMISOM's peacekeeping mission. In fact, part of AMISOM's mandate was to protect Government institutions and other key areas. For that in 2012, the first time since the collapse of central state elections were held inside Somalia with help of the African Union's Mission in the country. This means that the government can exercise its powers and has some kind of legitimacy. Moreover, the international community recognized the government in Somalia including United Nations and African Union.

In February 2017, the second parliamentary election took place successfully in Somalia whereby Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed was elected as president. Although, AMISOM played key role for the election to take place smoothly. The president and his government set out priorities for the country including

security, economic recovery, justice and enhancing good governance while minimizing corruption.

The achievements made in the fight against Al-Shabaab presents opportunity to assert the government's presence throughout the country. This also presents opportunity for AMISOM since Al-Shabaab is not controlling any major city in Somalia. In fact, the capture of port city Kismayo from Al-Shabaab was big success and gained AMISOM critical leverage because of denying Al-Shabaab access to seaport which can generate income (Cecilia, 2013). Since AMISOM's mission deployment, there has been increasing support from various partners to provide the necessary resources to continue the operation until Somali state has the capacity to control its borders. Indeed, the Somali government and its people have immensely complemented AMISOM work in the country. Moreover, AMISOM will be of great help in the securitization process going on the country (Freear and de Coning, 2013).

AMISOM was mandated to replace the Ethiopian military intervention but, neighbour countries frequently intervened after Ethiopian military withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenyan military forces intervened in Somalia although later incorporated into AMISOM after AU's approval.

Somalia possess great potential; the country is in rich of natural resources and if properly managed can play an important role in poverty reduction and reconstruction. Therefore, the Somali government has to come up with strategies and policy framework to enhance and manage the natural resources. Furthermore, the federal government should fairly redistribute revenues from natural resources. All that would be possible when security situation of Somalia changes for the right direction.

5.7 Evaluation

The people in Somalia are divided by clan system. The clan itself can provide welfare for people which means giving its members the basic needs. Basically, the Somali society has five major clans and other sub-clans (Elmi, 2010). Darod which is the most widely distributed clan in whole Somalia inhabiting Puntland, Jubaland and Northern Frontier District (NFD). Hawiye clan inhabits the capital and its surroundings. Some argue that the majority of Al-Shabaab militia is from

this clan. Isaaq clan resides present day Somaliland and its one of the major tribes forming the Somali population.

Inadequate funds presents a problem for AMISOM when it comes to AMISOM's mission continuity. There is a need for logistical support and other requirements. The African Union does not have the capacity to fund the budgetary AMISOM needs although, the support from the EU was crucial in terms of funds (Cecilia, 2013, p.27). There is still a need for skilled and expertise in the police department for AMISOM especially the trainings. The problem however, is some of the skilled and specialized police officials are deployed temporarily this causes a challenge especially when training.

With all the above, mentioned challenges that AMISOM faces, it is safe to say that still the operation achieved some significant achievements. For that case the country is no longer in a transitional period. This means that today, Somalia is a Federal government recognized by the international community, the African Union and other international actors. It is also important to add that the federal government exercises some of its forceful rights locally. The government uses its legitimate power to promote peace, security and justice while still trying to tackle corruption and encourage good governance. However, all those would be impossible without the help from AMISOM. African Union's operation hindered the activities of the insurgence groups against the government of Somalia. AMISOM operation in Somalia was supposed to replace the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia although, neighbour states frequently crossed borders for example, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in 2011 though, the operation later got acceptance and approval from the AU and incorporated its forces into the AMISOM troops.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Summaries

The vision of greater Somalia encouraged Somalia to go to war with Ethiopia and bring back the Somali Speaking regions starting with Ogadenia which caused the disastrous 1977-8 war with Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the loss from the war with Ethiopia humiliated the Somali state and led huge strategic defeat. What followed was the internal conflict between the Somali government and the armed groups opposing Barre regime supported by the Ethiopian government. Somalia is a country damaged by clan divisions with fragile state system. (Abdullahi, 2017)

After the fall of the central state in the country many attempts were made to make peace and bring warring parts on the negotiation table. However, many of those peace initiatives failed. One of the peace conferences took place in Kenya with the aim of bringing peace to Somalia. Indeed, it established the federal government with expectations that it will bring lasting solution to many problems. Many expected that transitional federal government will strengthen the state institutions, find solutions for security threats, and restore order in the country. Sadly, the TFG did not change much from the country and became ineffective. The transitional federal government failed to maintain order and stability and most importantly unable to cope with challenges coming from the Islamic Courts Unions (ICU). Although the Ethiopian military intervention weakened ICU in support to ensure that transitional federal government exercise power and become the only legitimate force in the country.

After the Ethiopian intervention AMISOM came in 2007 in a support of the struggling Somali state. It was the African Union who gave hand to Somalia and supported peace keeping mission in the country with the help of the United Nations. AMISOM's peace-keeping mission encountered many challenges and faced numerous threats from Al-Shabaab a militia group that is against the Somali state. In general, the research discloses that AMISOM operation faces

more challenges than opportunities and most importantly lacks the best strategy to stabilize the country and get rid of the militia groups like Al-Shabaab.

Currently, the biggest problem Somalia faces is the security issue whereby Al-Shabaab presents considerable challenge to Somali state. Moreover, the country lacks capacity to control its borders and diminish threats from inside and outside its territory.

6.2 Key Findings

The intervention of the UN was aimed to give urgent humanitarian help to the affected people in Somalia. It also provided respect for the safety and security of the humanitarian workers and promised that it will protect their freedom of movement around the country. On the other hand, AMISOM intervention in Somalia was needed to provide protection of the officials especially those of the transitional federal government as well as others taking part in the political reconciliation process. AMISOM engaged a campaign of removing Al-Shabaab and other forces trying to overtake the state power and its role in the country. African union's mission facilitated range of civil military assistance activities. Although, AU consistently, struggles to offer the military assets need for complex peace missions in the continent. AMISOM also lacks other significant facilities; communication and intelligence equipment are part of it. However, to fill the gaps of the AU has no option except depending on foreign donors to provide funding, training and equipment. Hence, the external donors directly contact to the troop contributing countries to give the required facility.

It was acknowledged that the Ethiopian army crossed the border between Ethiopia and Somalia during peace time to police. The main reason is said to be Ethiopia protecting its state from threats coming from armed groups. However, the main argument of the Ethiopian intervention is securing the integrity and sovereignty of the Ethiopian border.

The findings have shown that political instability prevented Mogadishu the capital city of the country to be developing domestic place. The absence of strong central government that exercise legitimate power over its society makes the rule of law something difficult to apply and almost impossible. With the presence of various armed groups, militias, authorities as well as clans playing and

filling the state role and providing legal framework makes everything difficult for the state. In Mogadishu disputes over land properties and conflicting resulting from it dominate the rest of the cases.

6.3 Recommendations

It is widely acknowledged that the government of Somalia gives its best to try to bring the rebels on the negotiation table. In other word the government should adhere all the peaceful mechanism whether that may be opening peace dialogues with the warring factions within Somalia and to discuss the matters of common interest with the opposition groups in order to reach lasting peace so that they can pave way peace-building process which can take place inside Somalia.

It is also important to mention that the role of the international community is of important one. The international community should not apply ‘watch and see’ tactics towards the Somali crises but rather come in the situation and help Somalis create a peaceful nation. Some international powers only enter or meddle the Somali issues because of their selfish interests and to take advantage of the situation so that they can get what they need, however, the Somali government does not need such interventions.

Somali’s neighbouring countries should also provide support and in order Somalia stands its feet again. These neighbouring states can offer whatever they can to see Somalia progressed and build peaceful Somalia where refugees living outside Somalia can come back and live their homeland.

There must be strong international involvement from peace and reconciliation processes. International community and can offer the expertise of the above mentioned. The mediation of the state and the opposition groups is important and it can bring peace and stability which take place Somalia.

To develop the level of education and increase awareness that violence and conflict will only result backwardness. This will help people understand the importance of rule law. To have a state that can exercise the legitimate force within a society is something that brings peace and stability. It is the recommendation of the study that youth in Somalia should be educated for them to have brighter future.

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