

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOMALIA: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

THESIS

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**Department of Political Science And International Relations
Political Science And International Relations Program**

September, 2019

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ONAY FORMU

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ABDULKADIR YUSUF ALI

FOREWORD

This thesis is concerned with the current sociopolitical problems of Somalia. The study tries to the best of its ability to present the origins, breadth and width of the security challenges that Somalia faces. Above all, it presents its arguments from an indigenous point of view which is quasi-independent of some of the literature presented by other Western scholars who maybe defiant of some very fine information and who might be missing a few fine points in their analogies. Furthermore, this study elucidates on the fundamental needs to address the root causes of the Somalia problem beginning from its indigenous identity before the arrival of the colonialists. Then it examines the different administrations in power and the political cultures they established by which it believes that regime type and governance might be accountable for the current collapsed nature of the country.

Lastly, it looks the current dissolution of the country and the many nation building attempts that have been made both locally at the Somali level, at the regional levels under the auspices of the African Union and internationally, mentioning alliances between Ethiopia, the transitional governments of Somalia and the United States.

This study is a rational account from a son of the soil who literally understands the problems of his country from a native perspective, and who also uses much of the academic language to present his most reasonable findings.

"In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All praise due to Allah Lord of the world".

Firstly and for most I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER whose commitment, patience and guidance gave form to this piece of work. And also thanks to all lecturers and staffs in the Institute of Social Sciences for their contribution as well.

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ABDULKADIR YUSUF ALI

TABLE OF CONTENT

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	iv
TABLE OF CONTENT	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
ÖZET	x
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of the Study	1
1.2 Purpose and the Importance	4
1.2.1 Importance	5
1.3 Methodology	5
1.4 Organization of the study	6
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON SECURITY STUDIES	7
2.1 Literature Review	7
2.1.1 Early origins and etymology of security.	9
2.1.2 Levels of analysis of security studies	9
2.1.3 Buzan’s five-dimensional security	10
2.1.3.1 Political security	10
2.1.3.2 Military Security	10
2.1.3.3 Economic security	10
2.1.3.4 Societal security	11
2.1.3.5 Environmental security	11
2.1.4 Fundamental schools of thought of security studies	11
2.1.4.1 Copenhagen School of security studies.....	13
3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA	16
3.1 Somalia: a Brief History	16
3.2 The Colonial History of Somalia	17
3.3 The Rise of Somali Nationalism and the War of Liberation	17
3.3.1 The Nation’s Road to Independence	18
3.4 Somalia in Siad Barre’s Era	19
3.5 Collapse of the Government and International Aid	20
3.6 The Rise of the Islamic Courts and the Ethiopian Invasion	22
3.6.1 Ethiopian Invasion in Somalia	24
4. THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOMALIA	27
4.1 Political Causes of the Insecurity	28
4.1.1 Somaliland	28
4.1.2 Puntland	29
4.1.3 The Transitional Federal Government	29
4.1.4 Failure of State-building in Somalia	35
4.2 Military Threats	36
4.2.1 Somali Piracy as a Regional and International Security Threat.....	41

4.3 Societal Threats and the Somali Clan System as Insecuritizing Factor	43
4.4 Economic Threats.....	44
4.5 Environmental Threats	46
5. CONCLUSION.....	51
REFERENCES.....	54
RESUME.....	59

ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	: African Union Mission to Somalia
AU	: African Union
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
NFD	: Northern Frontier District
OAU	: The Organization of African Unity
SACB	: Somali Aid Coordination Body
SEMG	: UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
TFC	: Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TFP	: Transitional Federal Parliament
TNG	: Transitional National Government
UNISOM	: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	: Unified Task Force

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 3.1: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.....	16
Figure 3.2: Map of the Islamic Courts Union 2006 (ICU)	22
Figure 4.1: Political Situation in Somalia, 2009	32
Figure 4.2: Al-Shabaab's presence in 2016	38
Figure 4.3: Al-Shabaab's presence in 2016	39
Figure 4.4: Al-Shabaab's presence in 2018	40
Figure 4.5: Somali Economic Growth	45
Figure 4.6: Jubba and Shabelle Rivers map (Wikimedia)	49

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOMALIA: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

ABSTRACT

Security is a vital component for each sovereign country, like in the case of the Federal Republic of Somalia. As one of the powers in Africa, or as known as the Horn of Africa, Somalia has its own difficulties and problems within the scope of international relations and internal security. As a matter of fact these problems are preventing Somalia's national development. Global society is in a constant transformation and therefore, an interdependent system has been launched. Thereby, countries became more dependent and each action taken may affect another country which is nearby or hundreds of kilometers away. Thus, the outcome of this system is that it is not possible to stay isolated, so that strengthening intergovernmental relations by creating strong bonds and policies with other countries are crucial necessities in order to survive within this system. Since Somalia situates in a continent which possesses vast possibilities and rich sources, fortified international policies will play vital roles as a significant component for security as well as for the national growth.

This study aims to shed a light on the various challenges that Somalia has been confronted with and is in challenge with by the perspective of security concept and its evolution throughout the years. After stressing these concepts, historical background of the country and challenges it preserves within itself which is preventing the development will be argued. Somalia's political challenges are going to be broadly discussed under this research. Finally, this thesis supports the idea of reconciliation and reunification to improve and strengthen national development in Somalia.

Key words: *Security, security challenges, Alshabab, Piracy, Somalia*

SOMALI'DE GÜVENLİK ZORLUKLARI NEDENLERİ VE SONUÇLARI

ÖZET

Güvenlik, Federal Somali Cumhuriyeti örneğinde olduğu gibi her egemen ülke için hayati bir unsurdur. Afrika'daki güçlerden biri veya Afrika Boynuzu olarak bilinen Somali'nin uluslararası ilişkiler ve iç güvenlik kapsamında kendi zorlukları ve sorunları var. Nitekim bu sorunlar Somali'nin ulusal kalkınmasını engelliyor. Küresel toplum sürekli bir dönüşüm içinde ve bu nedenle birbirine bağlı bir sistem başlatıldı. Böylece, ülkeler daha bağımlı hale geldi ve yapılan her bir eylem, yakındaki ya da yüzlerce kilometre uzaktaki başka bir ülkeyi etkileyebilir. Bu nedenle, bu sistemin sonucu yalıtılmış kalmanın mümkün olmamasıdır, bu nedenle diğer ülkelerle güçlü bağlar ve politikalar yaratarak hükümetlerarası ilişkileri güçlendirmek, bu sistemde ayakta kalabilmek için çok önemli gerekliliklerdir. Somali, geniş imkanlara ve zengin kaynaklara sahip bir kıtada yer aldığından, güçlendirilmiş uluslararası politikalar, güvenlik için olduğu kadar ulusal büyüme için de önemli bir rol oynayacaktır.

Bu çalışma, Somali'nin karşı karşıya kaldığı çeşitli zorluklara ışık tutmayı ve güvenlik konsepti ve yılların evrimi perspektifiyle karşı karşıya kalmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu kavramları vurguladıktan sonra, ülkenin tarihi arka planı ve gelişimini engelleyen kendi içinde koruduğu zorluklar tartışılacaktır. Somali'nin politik zorlukları bu araştırma kapsamında geniş bir şekilde tartışılacak. Son olarak, bu tez, Somali'deki ulusal kalkınmayı geliştirmek ve güçlendirmek için uzlaşma ve yeniden birleşme fikrini desteklemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Güvenlik, güvenlik tehditleri, Eş şabab, Korsanlık, Somali*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Security is a concept which maintains vital importance for a sovereign country. The concept is still contested and there is no existing consensus yet, regarding the definition and the elements of it. For that matter, common ground for discussion is challenging due to the conceptual vagueness. This frequently used vague concept is being generally associated with the existence of man as an individual, as well as small and large social groups. The literature provides a variety of definitions of security, which basically is a proof of different approaches in order to understand the content and meaning of the notion. The stated concept can be used while enucleating several situations and specific aspects. For instance, different definitions are being used while defining human security, national security and as well as the security of goods and services.

The nature of the security can be classified and examined as listed below (Hofreiter, 2015):

- Security is a state in which the risks and the threats resulting from them are minimized or eliminated.
- Security is a state in which the given object does not feel endangered in term of its legal interests.
- Security is understood as a complex of social relations governed by the law and they protect the rights and justified interests of persons, social groups and state.
- Security is judged as the ability of the object, event, process to protect its nature and basic characteristics in conditions of deliberately aimed, disruptive and destructive activity whether from outside or inside of the object.

- Security is perceived as a requirement for each element of a system. Since the destruction of an element might cause a collateral destruction for the system itself.
- Security is being considered as a guarantee for individuals and society. And the existence of the state consists a presumption that the security will be provided.

There have been various interpretations of security. In general, this concept has been understood as synonymous with the accumulation of power. It has been regarded as a commodity, power and the means of achieving the power. Most strikingly, the interpretation of security has changed with the end of the antagonist system between the Soviet Union (SU) and the United States (US). The conventional aim was to defend national sovereignty in terms of territory, people, and the political tendency of the government. Two principal assumptions supported this view: the state was seen to be relatively absolute, and the conflict between capitalism and communism was unresolvable. Within the organizational framework of the United Nations, the focus has shifted away from a state-centered to a more human-centered approach.

The concept of human security was included in the agendas of the United Nations' bodies and incorporated by the academics of security studies. Although a shift took its place towards human-centered security policies after the Cold War, it didn't last long enough. The 9/11 incident and pursuing a declaration of the 'war on terror', lead a shift back to state-centered and military based security understanding.

During these shifts in the scope of security concept, Africa was facing with another reality. Most of the developing countries which are situated in Africa were being challenged the post-colonial period. The continent was severely divided by the colonial countries and the neighbors were alienated from each other. Therefore, a step for unification of the continent in order to challenge the same post-colonial process and for that matter the necessity of supporting each other entered to the agenda of these countries with a delay. The interstate and intrastate conflicts were excessive that African countries couldn't unify due to their security problems for a long period of time.

The security of African countries was highly endangered by the invasion of colonial countries. As a result, there was a great concern of security for the countries situated within this continent. And in order to deal with the common social, economic and political problems an organization for solidarity became a necessity. The Organization of African Unity was established in 1963 in response to external domination. African leaders showed strong commitment for African liberation, recognizing the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’. One of the fundamental objectives of the establishment of OAU was to install a collective cognition and facilitate the decolonization process for African countries.

Although the Organization was new in the international scene, it was successful enough to fulfill some of the aimed objectives during the post-colonial and liberation era process of the continent. However, since OAU was pre-occupied with the program of anti-colonialism, it was found to be inefficient to respond to other challenges encountered, especially in the maintenance of peace and security within the region. The brand-new organization was not capable enough to address interstate and intrastate conflicts effectively (Bayeh, 2014).

After the detection of the deficient parts of the OAU, a new organization has been founded in order to enhance the capacity and augment the efficiency of a continental organization the African Union has been established in 1999. The African Union (AU), which derives from the fundamentals of the Organization has furthered its function and chose new missions such as finding a rightful place within the scene of global economy, fighting against poverty and supporting each other against external forces. Somalia as a member of former OAU and the AU, is showing effort to integrate with the intergovernmental and continental organizations as well the international organizations.

The Federal Republic of Somalia has constantly faced security challenges throughout its foundation. These challenges that the country is constantly facing can be categorized as historical, political, economic, and developmental challenges which are still affecting the growth and development of the country at the national and international basis. So in order to understand the root causes underlying the problems these stated bases should be examined in depth within the context of international and national conjuncture.

In 1994 the US launched a failed operation against the Warlords in Mogadishu and resulted in the withdrawal of the US from the country. Following the withdrawal of the US from Somalia the UN withdrew in 1995 and the International Community left Somalia to its fate. After this date, the "stateless" period began in Somalia.

Between 1991 and 2004, 14 separate governments were established in the country but disintegrated due to disagreements among tribes.

In 2006 Islamic Union Courts was established and cleared the warlords in Mogadishu and established order in the country. However, the period in which the Union of Islamic Courts was established and operated coincided with the time in which the US launched a "Global War on Terror" Policy. The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were seen to be a danger to the whole region, for that reason Ethiopia occupied Mogadishu in 2006 with the support of the United States.

This caused many bloody wars in the region and the climate of the conflict caused the emergence of Alshabab as a terrorist organization.

From this point onwards, until the year 2011 (until the great war of Mogadishu between AMISOM and Al-Shabab), one-third of the capital was controlled by Alshabab, one-third controlled by the government and another one-third was in the control of Hizbul Islam.

The central government gradually began to narrow the area of Alshabab with the contributions of AMISOM to a great extent. In 2011, the Alshabab announced that they withdrew from Mogadishu for tactical reasons. However, Alshabab continued to exist in the region with assassinations and bombings.

Another issue in Somalia that occupies the world agenda is the piracy activities in the country. It is very important to understand why piracy activities arise and why they are a challenge.

1.2 Purpose and the Importance

The predominant purpose of this research is to shed light on the security challenges that Somalia is facing. Regardless of the many troubles that the

Somali people face, there is still hope and strong prospects for foreign direct investment, and a promise for national unity and growth in the war-torn country. Within that framework, the goal of this research is to analyze in detail the security challenges facing Somalia in the current period.

1.2.1 Importance

Somali studies are very important not only for the Horn of Africa where Somalia shares borders with Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. However, understanding the political and demographic landscape of Somalia is predominant to attempting a solution to some of the crisis in the region.

Furthermore, this study would like to present a logical explanation of the problem as it sees it and attempt to advise policy makers about what it thinks should be the solution to the politically impoverished country. Somalia can still stand up to its feet and become one of the world's largest economies if only the best sustainable policies are made.

Furthermore, the war in Somalia is a direct concern because it affects the neighbors and the entire African continent which are partly results of the spillover of the Somali civil war.

This thesis shall also consider the religious tension currently being instigated by Al-Shabaab and shall question its importance to the political, economic, military and environmental formations of the restrained country. Moreover, this thesis shall present to the entire community the need for the deradicalization of the extremist militant groups who fight against the installation of peace and serenity.

1.3 Methodology

This study shall use the secondary analysis to collect its data as well as analysis of published sources, and a wide range of materials shall be read on the subject but only those that really address the subject in its objective way shall be taken to account. Furthermore, the research will try as much also to be empirical and provide supporting examples where necessary.

This study shall work with the thesis question “what are the threats to Somali national security?”

Similarly, the research questions shall be:

- What are the political security challenges facing Somalia?
- What are the military challenges facing Somalia?
- What are the economic challenges facing Somalia?
- What are the societal challenges facing Somalia?
- What are the environmental challenges facing Somalia?

1.4 Organization of the study

Chapter one introduces the study and chapter two shall try to present the conceptual controversies that surround the concept of security. Chapter three provides a brief historical background and chronological events regarding this topic, while chapter four presents the efforts of state-building in Somalia and also analysis security challenges that Somalia is facing.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON SECURITY STUDIES

2.1 Literature Review

This chapter presents the conceptual controversies that surround the concept of security. Also in this chapter provides brief insight to how far the security studies dates back and what kind of scholarly literature and explanations can be found today and analyzes the emergence of opposing schools of thought in security studies and also provides the views of traditionalists and modernists and what their differences are. Similarly this chapter discusses about Buzan's systematic categorization of security studies with his five levels of security threats, which this study will be based upon.

Furthermore, this study shall discuss about some prominent scholars and their contributions to security studies.

Throughout history people have been killed by things other than soldiers and weapons, and states have been weakened or destroyed by things other than military conflict (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). Hence, the need to squarely address the contingent framework of measures that would assure the survival of a state and prevent its species from going to extinction probably became an undeniable imperative.

In this study the conceptual definitions of security shall be considered from mostly an academic point of view. However, before diving into, it is good to know that finding the most appropriate definition of security has become a challenge as many scholars prefer to define it in the light of national security rather than its true meaning (Baldwin, 1997). Baldwin (1997) adds that the concept of security has many inclusive elements which are interrelated and carry similar attentive importance.

Therefore, understanding what they are and rightly grouping them according to their distinct categories simplifies the worrisome academic problem. Furthermore, he thinks that there might just be another class of scholarly

explanation between security and power, a reason why finding the right definition is really worrisome. Boemckern and Schetter (2009) define security as “security is conceived as something that can be objectively known and thus needs to be diligently measured, monitored and improved upon by means of reason and scientific inquiry” (Boemcken and Schetter, 2009).

Hofreiter (2015) proposes two good definitions which are cited in her own words. They read “security is a state in which the risks and the threats resulting from them are minimized or eliminated. Secondly, security is a state in which the given object does not feel endangered in terms of its legal interests (Hofreiter (2015). Her definitions sound good but they come with two other words, risks and threats, an understanding of these words is pivotal to addressing the concept to its finest meaning or at least near meaning.

A threat to the security of a country refers to potential causes of national insecurity and includes actions by other states (e.g. military or cyber attack), violent non-state actors (e.g. terrorist attack), organised criminal groups such as narcotic cartels, and also the effects of natural disasters (e.g. floods, earthquakes) (Romm, Joseph J. 1993).

Schafer (2013) argues that the word security once pronounced directs the attention of the hearer to the need of addressing something of vital importance and necessity. Furthermore, he agrees that it is a highly controversial subject that has come to have a lot of attention recently (Schafer, 2013, cited Gallie 1956, p. 184; Buzan 1983, p. 6). According to him the definition should be addressed with respect to “threats” and the threats mentioned here are those that have a direct effect on the “referent object” in value of analysis (Schafer, 2013, cited Williams 2008, p. 5).

Before discussing the subject in detail with allegiance to one of its pioneer founders, Barry Buzan, it is of strict importance to clarify the meaning of the word “referent object”. According to the understanding of this study, it simply means the “object being referred to” and “in study at the time”. In a summary, the referent object “is the object that deserves the security attention required in order to maintain its survival from any existential threat”.

2.1.1 Early origins and etymology of security.

The word 'secure' entered the English language in the 16th century. It is derived from Latin *securus*, '*securus*' which means "free from care, quiet, easy," from the 1600s it continues that the word was used from the adjective 'secure' which meant "to make safe" (Evaristus, 2017).

According to Örmeci (2010) security studies date back right to the ancient Greeks who wrote about the security of the city state. More so, the writings of Thucydides who wrote about the Peloponnesian wars broadly explain the imperative need for this study in international relations and also shows that it was already an impassable subject (Örmeci, 2010). Considering this development, Örmeci (2010) adds that security studies might be well understood if they are approached from three levels of analysis at it is within the framework of neoliberal studies of international relations.

2.1.2 Levels of analysis of security studies

The first level of analysis is the state-to-state analysis whereby states appear as the foremost actors of international affairs and interact with other states in order to meet their needs and interests (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010).

Secondly, states might interact with other non-state actors such as transnational civil societies of other countries (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010).

Thirdly, states interact with international organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization etc. (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010). With this explanation the stage is set to introduce Buzan's description of security studies. However, this study thinks that it might be mindful to add that during the cold war, security studies and security itself was a priceless jewel which was handled by military experts and military security then was a substantial need.

Nevertheless, it behooves this study to add that after the Cold War, things might have taken a downward dive as the security elements that were put in place during the Cold War, saw their demise. There was no need for them anymore as the great polarity that ruled the world and powered by the Soviet Union and the United States had been thrust out. The Soviets had been defeated and

American capitalism had claimed the spoils. The sudden demise of all that security war and the attention that was given to a new era of American hegemony and the birth of multipolarity could possibly be the reason why Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 1990 cited in Toft, 2005) cried “we will soon miss the Cold War”.

However, as for what concerns the systematic categorization of security studies Buzan (1983) is reckoned to be one of the best if not the pioneer of modern security analysis with his five levels of security threats.

2.1.3 Buzan’s five-dimensional security

Barry Buzan (1983) viewed security on a larger scale than the classical perspective. He also introduced the concept of comprehensive security, emphasizing the integrity of security and extended definition of Security. According to Buzan (1983), security should be addressed from five different levels and according to how states are threatened. His levels are; 1) political threats, 2) military threats, 3) economic threats, and 4) societal threats and 5) environmental threats.

2.1.3.1 Political security

The political security is the defense against any form of political oppression. The Political security of the surrounding countries or third world countries left behind the iceberg came to light after the Cold War.

2.1.3.2 Military security

The military security implies the combination of the offensive and defensive military capacities of the states and the perceptions of the states against each other, similarly, military security implies a nation-state to defend itself from any aggression or any external and internal threats.

2.1.3.3 Economic security

Economic security is about access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power, (Buzan, 1991). States' access to the necessary financial resources and markets in order to maintain or increase their power and prosperity.

2.1.3.4 Societal security

Societal security is about the threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture, (Buzan, 1991). To maintain, develop and reproduce the traditions, religious and national identities, languages and cultures of societies within acceptable conditions of change. It prioritizes social security, including identity and cultural values.

2.1.3.5 Environmental security

Environmental security examines the threats of environmental safety, environmental events, and trends to individuals, communities or nations. It focuses on the dependence on the protection of the regional and global biosphere and how to protect humanity from the threats and dangers of an environment or how environmental problems occur.

2.1.4 Fundamental schools of thought of security studies

Furthermore, he adopts a rather traditionalist perspective and prefers to concentrate more on military security threats which to him are primordial for state security.

Buzan (1983) does not deny that the threats mentioned above are interlinked and one could possibly lead to the other. Instead, he thinks that by addressing military threats above all, it shows what must be taken into account by states for their own survival. Buzan (1983) adds that in the light of discussing security it must be in the state-centric perspective as states are the principal agents of security and the actors with the instruments to create and provide security.

Waever (1989) supports Buzan's (1983) state-centric thinks that security primarily depends on on the regime in power. Furthermore, regimes will not permit anything that will firstly, directly target them in power, and which might cause their fall. So, there is a tendency that the threat of the regime is purposely a threat to the nation, but this also is vague and difficult to measure. As a matter of fact, if people, be they government ministers (most especially) or private individuals, perceive an issue to threaten their lives in some way and respond politically to this, then that issue should be deemed to be a security issue (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998).

Meanwhile, Waeber (1989) suggests that instead of staying in static with Buzan's five levels of analysis listed above, elements of drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, should be added as threats to a state. Buzan's proposal clearly shows his position he is not a traditionalist like Buzan but rather a modernist and that sets the stage for the scholarly tussle over the concept.

In addition, Buzan (1983) maintains his point that isolating military threats spells out a possibility to define securitization by an entity, purportedly the one carrying out and the setting of the conditions necessary for the good of that securitization.

- Eroukhmanoff (2018) analyses the emergence of two opposing schools of thought in security studies to be as a result of the questions regarding the conceptualization of security from feminists, international political economy and strategic security advisers. He adds that these and many others put their views forward and came to separate themselves between the modernists who don't see a need of stressing much on military security threats and traditionalists who hold the flesh on it. Furthermore, traditionalists believe that identifying security issues is relatively easy for them since they have a stereoscopic view over the elements that make up the threats.
- Similarly, they equate security to military and the use of force as the end to a need. Their arguments do not go unsolicited by Walt (1991) who heartily agrees with them that "security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force". Furthermore, the military confrontations of the Cold War created a narrowing of security studies which created a strong dissatisfaction and possibly the reason why some shy away from military threats as the sole perspective (Buzan, 1983). Similarly, the rise of economic and environmental agendas in the 1970s and 1980s fueled this dissatisfaction and prompted many this made Buzan (1983) to think that this shift might have been interpreted as straying far from military and political aspects would jeopardize the true essence of security studies.
- However, though the sudden isolation of the military traditionalist perspective suffered, Buzan remained therein. Some years earlier he tried to broaden his views about approaching security from another perspective other

than his military stronghold but remained very skeptical about addressing it especially from the economic sector (Buzan, 1991).

- For modernists like De Wilde and Waever the battle was far from ended.
- According to them, the Cold War gave traditionalists many ingredients to cement their arguments but put them at the same time at great risk when it ended (Taureck, 2006). For De Wilde (2006) a die-hard modernist, he laments at the short sightedness of traditionalists who narrow security analyses to only one area and insist that all analysis must be made from there. He adds that there is a need to expand on the discourse to include other lucrative areas which might have been biasedly left aside by traditionalists. Similarly, De Wilde (2006) takes another decisive shift from the traditional state-centric paradigm to the human centric perspective. For him traditionalists have not only endangered themselves but have also endangered security studies because their state centric stance poses a threat to the outcomes that might be gotten from a careful and pragmatic analysis of security issues.
- Nonetheless, this is not properly digested by Buzan (Buzan et al., 1998 cited Buzan, 1991) who decries such claim stating that for traditionalists war and force remains their fundamental argument. Furthermore, he insists that the main purpose of securitization theory is to present the rationale that argues the views of traditionalists and which tries to swallow them up in the proposals of modernists who see theirs above and better than everyone else's.

2.1.4.1 Copenhagen School of security studies

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS) and their securitization theory are credited by many as one of the most fruitful and influential schools of thought in the field of security studies, (Rog, 2018) The Copenhagen School emerged in the 1980s and sought to demonstrate a security understanding of the behavior of states that accelerated the development of the power vacuum at the end of the Cold War. The school is based at the University of Copenhagen. In 1985, the Center for Peace and Conflict began its activities with the

establishment of research. European security was studied here especially with its non-military dimensions. (Huysmans, 1998).

The point of security has not been state-centered but individual-centered. The Copenhagen school has three security concepts: regional security complex theory, sectoral security approach, securitization theory. With these insights, it has tried to build security through society, and the security policies of the state have tried to provide legitimacy by seeking persuasion on the people's side.

This theoretical transformation is closely related to the changing dynamics after the Cold War and the understanding of military threat coming from the states that were the dominant conception of the Cold War era was replaced with the issues of internal conflict, global warming, drug trade, human trafficking and natural disasters.

- Despite this war of conceptualizations between the two prominent schools of thought in security studies not forgetting the Welsh School and Paris Schools they all arrive at one common junction that threats are basic necessities that push states to define security measures. Nonetheless, it is imperative for states to identify the threats, decide what needs to be securitized, design the instruments required to address the security threats and then treat them as pertinent existential threats that must be dealt with otherwise the state doesn't go to sleep.
- The concept of securitization, for the first time in the mid-1990s, was introduced by Waeber into the terminology of international relations.
- The Copenhagen School's later theoretical work is based on this approach.
- The theory of securitization has recently been used extensively in international relations and political science research. It is a highly descriptive theory for analyzing military interventions especially after the Cold War. The concept of securitization was first introduced by Ole Waeber in 1995; it later became a theory that underpinned the work of the authors of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School has also updated its other approaches, such as sectoral security and regional security complexity, on the basis of the theory of securitization. According to this theory, in the

simplest terms, to make a subject a security problem, it makes it a security problem (Baysal and Luleci, 2015).

To sum up, this literature review discussed and described the topic of this study and provided an insight of how this study shall be and what elements its going to address. This part of the study provided a review of the related literature regarding the study. This chapter presented Buzan's categorization of security studies analysis with his five levels, which are; 1) political threats, 2) military threats, 3) economic threats, 4) societal threats and 5) environmental threats. Also Waever (1989) proposes that instead of staying in a static with Buzan's five levels of analysis listed above, elements of drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, should be added as threats to a state.

3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA

3.1 Somalia: a Brief History

This part of the study gives a historical background regarding the topic. We are going through chronologically a brief history of Somalia, the colonial history of Somalia, the rise of Somali nationalism movements, and the nation's road to independence. And also we are going to find what went wrong after the independence and the civilian government which lasted a short period of time, followed by Siad Barre Era of socialism, dictatorship and brutal which caused the collapse of the government, warlords, conflict and uncertainty.

Finally closing of this section shall be addressing the Islamic Union Courts and the Ethiopian Invasion in Somalia.




Figure 3.1: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Source UN OCHA, 2019

Somalia is a country in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti in the northwest, Kenya in the southwest and Ethiopia in the west. Somalia has the longest coastline on Africa's mainland.

The History of Somalia goes back to thousands of years. The ancient Egyptians called Somalia as 'land of God (Land of Punt). The Chinese Merchants frequented its coast and carried on lucrative trade before the arrival of the the European Powers, (Omar C. 2001).

3.2 The Colonial History of Somalia

In late 19th century Africans were under the occupation of the European colonialists, and Somalia was divided into five parts; 1) Northern Somalia came under the occupation of the British 2) The Southern part was under the occupation of Italy, 3) Djibouti which was a part of Somalia by that time, had also been dominated by France and Ethiopia had also been occupied. Such was with the Western Somali regions with the support of colonial powers and finally 5) the Northern Frontier District (NFD). The territory today is known as the North Eastern Province of Kenya.

3.3 The Rise of Somali Nationalism and the War of Liberation

The Somali People did not bow down to the colonialists and showed a serious resistance against them. The War of Liberation against the imperialists began and continued under the leadership of Somali nationalists and religious scholars. The father of Somali Nationalism Movements Sayyid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan had started to fight against Britain and Ethiopia (until 1895-1920) in the Northern part of the country, while in the Southern part the Biyamal, Hassan Barsane and many others struggled against the Italians.

The Somaliland campaign in 1920 the British launched a massive land, air and sea attack on strongholds of Hassan and his loyalists Dervish. This was the first air bombardment and ended one of the longest and bloodiest struggle in the Horn of Africa.

3.3.1 The Nation's Road to Independence

The Somali Youth League (SYL) which was significantly influenced by the earlier Father of Somali Nationalism was founded in 1943. At its foundation the league had 13 members and later on began to open offices in every part of Somalia. It played a key role in the nation's road to independence during the 1950-1960s.

In 1960 Northern and Southern regions united to form the independent Somalia Republic under a civilian government led by Aden Abdullah Osman the first elected Somali President. The president constituted civilian democratic government from 1960-1967, however, the president Osman was defeated in elections by his former prime minister, Abdirashid Ali and stepped down. This was the first peaceful transfer of power in Africa and today Somalia is considered as Africa's first democracy (Samatar, 2016)

After 2 years in power in 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated by a member of his own bodyguards. Shortly after the President, Sharmarke was assassinated General Mohamed Siad Barre-led military junta came to power by a successful and bloodless military coup on 22 October in 1969. In 1970 Siad declared Somalia a socialist state, and aligned with the socialist countries, subjecting the country to his ideology of 'Scientific Socialism' (Baadiyow, 2017).

The military regime that came to power dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution (Ingiriis, 2016). The Barre regime became increasingly oppressive and violent in the later parts of its reign. Siad Barre once said "I came to power by a gun; only the gun can make me go", (Abdullahi, 2001).

The regime government was finally overthrown in a bloody civil war waged by clan-based guerrillas in 1991. Consequently, Somalia as a country and its people have witnessed almost three decades without strong functioning governments which have rendered many of its necessary institutions almost non-existent.

3.4 Somalia in Siad Barre's Era

As a territory which is located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia was always challenged with conflicts and the lack of the central government establishment. In order to understand the conflict history of Somalia, the root causes have to be analyzed chronologically. At the beginning of the 20th century, Somalia was divided into five regions which were being under the control of colonial states such as France, Italy and Great Britain. After the decolonization era, Somalia declared its independence in 1960 and became ‘The Republic of Somalia’. Although independence was gained, there were conflicts amongst the rulers of the decolonization process, therefore, instability manifested itself.

Siad Barre took the control with a military coup in October of 1969. The military coup aimed to build a new and revolutionary government under the influence of the Soviet Union. The regime that Siad Barre declared was called ‘Scientific Socialism’ or as Lewis describes it as ‘Scientific Socialism’ (Lewis, 2014, p.501) and it was not exactly the same ideology of communism that the Soviet Union was trying to spread, but it was derived from the same origin. At the end there was a central government which gained the support of the society due to its significant actions and plans through education and health system. However, in the course of events and the increasing influence of the Soviet Union, Barre’s government shifted from socialism to dictatorship. After declaring a war against Ethiopia and losing Soviet’s support, Barre’s government only focused on the survival of the regime (Menkhaus, 2014).

Meanwhile, present in the government’s techniques in order to maintain the power were based on encouraging divisions by accelerating conflict amongst the clans and favoring certain clans due to family ties (Stremlau, 2018). Furthermore, Barre’s scientific socialism ideology had alienated and radicalized several groups within this territory. According to UNDP’s report regarding the period of Barre’s government, the continent of Africa had witnessed the worst human rights records (UNDP, 2001). In consequence of the oppressive, violent and alienating regime a civil war erupted at the end of the 1980s and proceeded with the collapse of the Republic of Somalia.

Following the collapse there was not any national government anymore and this fact resulted with the domination of warlords over different parts of the country (Jones, 2006). The country's situation was described by Jones as below:

“Much of the country's infrastructure, especially in the south, was destroyed during the civil war. Agricultural communities in southern Somalia were damaged, and thousands of Somalis sought refuge in the north or in neighboring countries. An estimated one million to two million Somalis were displaced internally or across borders into Kenya and Ethiopia. Hostilities prevented the international donor community from providing food assistance. The widespread famine, drought, and interclan war-fare resulted in the deaths of an estimated 240,000 to 280,000 Somalis” (Jones, 2006).

3.5 Collapse of the Government and International Aid

The collapse of Somalia formally began in January 1991 pursuant to the collapse of the Barre government. Since Barre's regime was built on alienation, which was the root cause of the augmenting radicalization, violence between the groups had flared after the collapse. Despite the extreme violence and instability, international aid came almost two years later in 1992 by United Nations in order to revive the central government. Somalia lodged in one of the worst violence ever that the country witnessed which at the time, already possessed a bloody history marked by conflicts between clans and sub-clans, blood feuds, and revenge killings (Clarke and Serena, 2014).

There were many parties responsible for these massacres but mainly the most violent actors were warlords. Somali warlords were massacring the orphans, children, raping women from the rival clans, mass slaughters, mutilating pregnant women and killing their unborn children and many more (Menkhaus, 2010).

On the other hand the international community wasn't well aware of the fact that there was a massacre happening in the country. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) was launched and inaugurated with the aim of brokering ceasefire amongst clans, pursuing a peacekeeping operation, enhancing the

capacity of institution-building and establishing a central government (Menkhaus, 2014).

The government-building mission proceeded with the aids such as Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993, UNISOM II from May 1993 to March 1995, and thereupon, to the ongoing security problems, the disjointed approach of the non-governmental organizations and aid agencies, and the lack of a central government to appease the conflicts and take control, the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was formed in 1994 in order to provide coordination of aid to Somalia.

Although these humanitarian and political aids, the objectives weren't able to be fulfilled due to several reasons which can be listed as:

- Neither policymakers nor the workers at the aid agencies were fully aware of the magnitude of humanitarian crises,
- The absence of the central government obstructed the peacekeeping process,
- Warlords of the country were preventing the aids, and
- Security is an essential component and condition for humanitarian assistance therefore, the absence of it created the major problems.

The results of the conflict and following collapse were destructive (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014):

- Approximately 9 million Somalis were internally displaced which was equivalent to one third of the population.
- Conflict amongst the clans and with Barre government between 1991 and 1992 caused 35,000 non-combatant people's death.
- Al-Shabaab augmented its function and affiliation with Al-Qaeda. This will later become one of the biggest security issues of Somalia until today.
- Investments were ceased, the economy degraded, Somalia became one of the poorest countries in the world which unfortunately, will be the main parameter of famine crises.

3.6 The Rise of the Islamic Courts and the Ethiopian Invasion

The Islamic Courts Union were small courts at the neighborhood levels at the beginning of their foundation. Over the years, they were to form one of the most effective territorial and credible state-like structures that Somalia had witnessed since the collapse of the government in 1991 (Stremlau, 2018). Alas, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) started to function in response to the violent politics of the warlords in 2006.




Figure 3.2: Map of the Islamic Courts Union 2006 (ICU)

Source by James Dahl 2019

ICU was trying to address the security problems locally and enhance the business climate. ICU, in its fundamental vision was not aiming at any

radicalization, in fact, the Union was founded by businessmen and the elders of the clans in order to challenge the violent acts of the warlords and also the armed youth who were threatening the society and accelerating the security concerns. Preliminarily, the courts were local and didn't have any connection or coordination between themselves. But in mid 2000s coordination emerged amongst the courts. So the courts' coordination had accelerated, and they accepted the Sharia as governing rule, which is based on Quran and Islamic law system. The aim of building a non-divided and grand nation was forwarded; therefore the focus was to unite the clans without making any discrimination. By the time ICU became a respected and popular entity among various communities of South Somalia. Due to the lack of government, residents of South Somalia were appreciating relatively order, peace and security brought by the Islamic Court of Union (Stremlau, 2018). As a consequence, of the collaboration amongst the courts, warlords had lost power and at the end they were too weak to function. Therefore, moderate governance based on Islamic rules constructed the most government-like structures and facilities that were known since 1991 in Southern Somalia. Besides the security improvements, business actions had augmented, and trade was revived.

Although the positive developments in Somalia were provided by the order of ICU, Ethiopia was not content with the rise of an Islamist order. Further, Ethiopia considered ICU as a national threat and made alliance with the United States against ICU. The tendency and sympathy of ICU to radical Islamist acts and also pan-Islamic caliphate objectives were present but these traits were not the dominant components of the ICU at that time. As a result of the Ethiopian and the U.S. initiative against ICU, the courts union disintegrated. Oppressing and disintegrating ICU had negative affects then foreseen and consequently, a disintegrated party of ICU which had more tendency to radical Islamist acts had radicalized. Because of these initiatives of Ethiopia and the U.S., they evolved into the terrorist organization which is recognized worldwide as al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2007). Therefore, it can be said that the policy of the Ethiopia to secure its national interests and those of its neighborhood by aligning with the US directly led to the creation of Africa's second and most deadly terrorist organization. So, if Al-Shabaab is threatening to penetrate Ethiopia today, it is

not a coincidence because their miscalculations actually helped this group to surface, and somehow, they would be reaping what they have sown.

3.6.1 Ethiopian Invasion in Somalia

The relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have known turbulent episodes in recent history. The deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia in 2006 can be understood as a new phase in their relations, but one with historical roots. It implied a change from the relative peace between the two countries since the end of the Cold War and the start of a conflict dissimilar to previous wars between the two states. It is widely acknowledged that Ethiopian troops have regularly crossed the frontier during peacetime to police the border area, especially to fight armed movements and to secure the Ethiopian state. But this was not something overtly admitted by the Ethiopian government in 2006, until Meles Zenawi openly deployed his troops in Somalia with the tacit support of the international community. Since then, their presence has been virtually constant, though two phases can be discerned: from December 2006 to January 2009, and from November 2011 until the present, (Samatar, 2007)

The intervention officially started on 24th December 2006, and was legitimized by the Ethiopian government as an act of self-defense under international law, following the invitation from the TFG for troops to enter Somalia and combat the UIC. It aligned Ethiopia with other countries in the global war on terror. The main argument for deploying Ethiopian troops then was the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia's territory and, in order to ensure that a pro-Ethiopian regime could thrive in Mogadishu, (Frenkil, 2015).

Although it is frequently said that this intervention was undertaken with the direct sponsorship of the United States, the type of support provided by the US is far from being clear and even recognized by both parts. This question of the US involvement is not easy to elucidate, as it is neither easy to know how many soldiers were effectively deployed during the different phases of the intervention, nor how many casualties there were.

In fact, the decision process around the issue has been characterized by its secrecy, Parliament being consulted in November/December 2006 just to approve the measure. Although some opposition deputies tried to question the

intervention, they had no capacity to impede the resolution, as any questioning of it implied an accusation of betrayal.

The Ethiopian government has claimed it received no foreign support, but at the same time fuelled the ambiguity. The Ethiopian Herald showed strong support by the international society towards the decision to intervene in Somalia, while exposing the renewal and increase of foreign aid flows. Nevertheless, although the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia is frequently associated with US sponsorship or direction, no evidence has been made public. This does not mean that the US had no knowledge of the Ethiopian decision to intervene, but it seems worth not overstating the American factor in the intervention. As Menkhaus (2009) puts it “though the Ethiopian offensive was not, as has sometimes been falsely portrayed, an instance of the US subcontracting the war of terror to a regional ally (Ethiopia pursued its own interests and would have acted with or without US approval), the US did provide diplomatic, intelligence, and possibly other support to the Ethiopian government in this operation” (Menkhaus, 2009).

It seems prudent then not to overstate or understate the involvement of the United States. This link isn't clear, for at least two reasons: first, because in military terms, the Ethiopian state is strong enough to bear the costs of the deployment by itself (especially in terms of troops and ammunition) and second, because the United States was not interested in getting closely involved in another war. Although the interests of Ethiopia and the United States seemed to converge, it appears that the Americans were aware of the difficult consequences that engaging directly or overtly supporting Ethiopia might have. Consequently, any direct link had been avoided, which does not mean the absence of any connection.

In conclusion, this chapter discussed about the conflict history of Somalia and some chronological event that might have impacts. From the independence, democratically elected leaders, socialism, dictatorship and failed state. The collapse of the central government in 1991 after 21 years of dictatorship which began in 1969 prior to that there was a brief democratic system which lasted a short time but the west once labelled the Africa's leading democracy. And aftermath Somalia had witnessed one of the most damaging out-break of civil

war in the world. Following the collapse of the government there was not any national government anymore and this resulted with the domination of warlords and many other groups.

The fall of the Siyad Barre regime left a political vacuum whereby the clans, sub-clans and Islamist groups took the stage and struggled for power resulting endless conflict. This caused in a hostile situation where everyone claimed legitimacy. Finally, we discussed about the rise of Islamic court which were first of its kind in Somalia and Ethiopian Invasion in Somalia in 2006.

4. THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOMALIA

This chapter will discuss various security challenges that Somalia faces and will be discussed based on Buzan's five levels of Security studies, basically which are economic, political, environmental, military and also societal. The analysis will be based on these five levels and it might be beyond.

In this chapter, will also discuss the failure of state building and alternatives in detail. Somali-led alternative and also International Community-led alternatives, conferences of reconciliation and Transitional Federal Governments will be discussed.

Furthermore, this chapter will discuss security crisis and underlying causes of insecurity in Somalia. Somali piracy, religious extremism and the threat of terrorism, the Somali clan system, political instability and the impact of economy and development.

From this time onwards, Somalia's security challenges have several root causes in different dimensions. Security is a notion which cannot be established within this territory since its colonization, decolonization and post-colonization processes. Although, he was a dictator and practiced bad governance, during Siad Barre's regime an order was relatively provided by a central government via formal institutions, and violent acts such as massacres were not on the table. After the collapse of the Barre government which was followed by the incompetent policies of the Transitional Federal Government on ensuring authority, chaos dominated the country. Within this chaos, economic investments stopped, trade rates decreased and deploy market ran down. Therefore, it is not hard to state the fact that opportunity shortage was a dominant factor at the time of chaos. This opportunity structure played an important role and became a motivation for Somalis to join certain non-state and illegal actors such as pirates, terrorist groups or criminal gangs. To this respect, individuals who participated in these illegal groups acquired different motivations. Seeing that especially for the most of the Al-Shabaab members,

Islamic ideology was the starting point, but the fact remains that there was a significant participation of these individuals to the illegal entities just for ‘play to pay’ (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014).

4.1 Political Causes of the Insecurity

Since the Somali State collapsed in 1991 Somalia has been cited as a real-world example of an anarchist stateless society and a country with no formal legal system, until 2004, when the Transitional Federal Government was formed, (Gentleman, Jeffrey, 2007)

In 2004 Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) was adopted by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) of Somalia, and according to this Charter some federal institutions have been found including Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The aim of these new establishments was serving to sustain the building capacity in Somalia. TFG's legitimacy was internationally recognized until 2012. In 2012 mandate of the transitional government has come to an end and Federal Government of Somalia was established, (CIA world factbook, 2012)

After the collapse of the Barre government judicial system as well collapsed with any other formal system which has been established before. Although there is a semi-systematic legal system at state-like entities, Puntland and Somaliland, this stability couldn't be sustained within most of the territory. As an example of Somali-led alternatives of State building we are going to look at the case of Somaliland and the case of Puntland.

4.1.1 Somaliland

Somaliland is one of the most significant entities which evolved from the dissolution of the Somali central government, when in 1991 the SNM proclaimed that the region was re-establishing its independence, severing its ties to the south and would now be known as the Republic of Somaliland. It declared its independence from the south in 1991 and is internationally considered to be an autonomous region of Somalia, (Lacey, Marc, 2006).

Though it is not recognized by international, Somaliland is in a leadership position of western-based democratic concept within the continent, (Lacey,

Marc, 2006). For instance, in 2017 Somaliland witnessed an election with the participation of multiple political parties (classans) and was relatively transparent and fair comparing other failed-elections and constant military coup d'états in the continent. In fact, this election was not the first case of democratic example that Somalis in Somaliland witnessed as in 2003, there was presidential election which resulted in peaceful process of power transmission from predecessor to successor (Hills, 2014).

Also, as it has been stated before Somaliland possesses a police force which isn't a formal force that a government should provide, however, it's more of an ad hoc and some sort of very local. Even though it's local and has ad hoc traits, the police force maintains the security and control of the Somaliland territories while providing intelligence to the governors (Stremlau, 2018). Moreover, Somaliland has its own currency and a bank called Central Bank of Somaliland.

4.1.2 Puntland

Puntland also mostly has state-like characteristics which basically resembles the governance of Somaliland. Puntland also had elections, its own Constitution and security forces. Although there are similarities between the two state-like governments, Puntland in contrast didn't declare its independence from the South and isn't seeking for it. Puntland basically is a unity of local conference where various clans of its society are being represented by the elders of the clans. Although Puntland did not declare its independence from the South, the absence of a government is certain so that a state-like structure has been found locally in order to provide basic services to the habitants of Puntland (Menkhaus, 2009).

The self-declared Somaliland state and autonomous Puntland regions do have their own security forces. And the outcomes of the statistics prove that whether there is a transitional federal government present in the south of the country or not, these territories are better ruled locally and with state-like structures.

4.1.3 The Transitional Federal Government

Local courts and traditions mainly dominated the judicial process after the collapse in 1991. So the basis of formal and systematic judicial system and

structure was tried to be built upon Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with several international conferences held.

Although important political differentiations of several small entities and their own local judicial systems, they possessed similar legal structures mainly deriving from former Somali administrations including Sharia law, xeer law and civil law. So the new charter in order to combine and create a set of rules was launched, and it could be analyzed in the following points: (Le Sage, 2005):

So as stated before the Transitional Federal Government was internationally recognized as the interim national authority in Somalia from 2004 to 2012 until its mandate was over and the transitional trait was no longer necessary. By 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was inaugurated as the executive power of the "state". Before the Transitional Federal Government's first attempt of interim administration was the Transitional National Government (TNG), so Transitional Federal Government was the second interim national administration serving to the aim of rebuilding a central government at Somalia. This interim government was raised in order to take the control and give an end to the constant conflicts, since the collapse of Siad Barre regime, which was accelerating and causing deaths of many civilians day by day.

There were local courts functioning and also being respected by the society even after the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government. So by 2006, these local courts raised their cooperation amongst each other and were mentioned as the Islamic Court Union. This unity was imposing sharia law in order to sustain an order in streets and districts, apart from the TFG. So, the existence of ICU was threatening the authority of TFG, and as the recognized interim national administration TFG sought to reestablish its damaged reputation and authority by starting to clean the obstacles and rival unities.

So in order to reestablish and sustain its authority back TFG made alliance with Ethiopian authorities, the United States and the African Union which were concerned due to radical Islamism tendencies of ICU entities. Therefore with the external aids of allies, TFG managed to annihilate Islamic Courts Union, which will cause more damage in the future for interim administration and the present government. As it was mentioned in the ICU section, this annihilation process only radicalized people more which already had a tendency for it. While

TFG was focused on solidifying its rule in the society, interim administration couldn't see the risk of radicalization and creation of terrorism in its own territories.

So that, following this annihilation, the Islamic Courts Union splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical groups, including Al-Shabaab as well, continued their riot against the TFG. Furthermore these radical groups were opposed to Ethiopian military presence in Somalia territories, which solidified their argument against TFG and its politics.

Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab attacked the TFG and its allies several times and won military victories. Al-Shabaab was taking the control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia from TFG governance. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other radical fractions splintered from ICU, forced the Ethiopian troops to retreat from Somalia. So, after the retreat of Ethiopian military forces an unqualified and equipped African Union peacekeeping force was left behind in order to provide aid to the Transitional Federal Government's military forces.

Due to following incidents and constant conflicts, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the President of Somalia for TFG declared his resignation before the Transitional Federal Parliament on December 2008. In his resignation announcement he stressed his regret for failing to govern and failing to end Somalia's constant conflict under the mandate of his government. Furthermore he accused international community for their failure of support. After the resignation of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the speaker of the parliament took his place according to Charter of the Transitional Federal Government (World Factbook, 2009).

The political segmentation of Somalia territory in 2009 can be seen in map 1.2. below. The green marked places were the areas under the control of Al-Shabaab.




Figure 4.1: Political Situation in Somalia, 2009

Source Crisis Group, Cedric Barnes. 2019.

Between 31 May and 9 June 2008, with the participation of Somalia’s Federal Government representatives at the time being and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) which was a more moderate group of Islamist rebels, convened for reconciliation and peace talks. This was mediated by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The Peace talks were one of the most successful initiatives since the collapse of the

Barre regime which led the conflicting parties to negotiate. So, the outcome of the peace talks was an agreement signed by the parties summoned for a withdrawal of Ethiopian troops for good in exchange for the cessation of armed actions.

As a bargaining chip, the coalition government of Somalia declared that Shari'a will be re-implemented as Somalia's official judicial system although several attempts, and peace talks conflict accelerated in the southern and central areas of the country and expanded further.

Meanwhile, although the conflicts were going on, coalition the government's detrimental effects rose to surface even though they had such a short-termed mandate. For instance, according to World Bank report between 2009 and 2010, approximately \$130 million donation was given to the coalition government and these donations were not accounted at any official report. Furthermore, in 2012, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) submitted a report to the UN Security Council regarding the fact that between 2009 and 2010, around 70 percent of funds made in order to use for the development and stabilization were unaccounted for although there were strong objections of the coalition regarding these allegations.

On 14 October 2010, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed was appointed the new Prime Minister of Somalia and based on the Charter of Transitional Federal Government he appointed a new cabinet consisting mainly of technocrats. Somalia once again received a great recognition by the international community. Mohamed and his cabinet focused on uniting most of the segments in the society consisting of lawyers, religious scholars and experts in order to re-write Somalia's Constitution based on Somali culture. Furthermore, he appointed several mediators who mainly were at the high level of the government with aim of reducing the tension and hostility amongst the clans.

Besides these diplomatic and positive initiatives Mohamed focused on one of the biggest problems of Somalis: trust. Somalia is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. So, during the extended period of time people of Somalia got used to the corruption that every governing entity made, whether state-like or directly by the state itself. By serving to this aim Mohamad, disclosed assets of his cabinet and signed a code regarding ethics to enhance

transparency and decrease the culture of corruption. The Prime minister of Somalia didn't leave this combat against corruption in theory but he transferred it into practice by introducing a control mechanism called 'Anti-Corruption Commission'. So, the Commission will have the authority to investigate the government's decisions, protocols, executions and all public activities of the officials. In addition, the Prime Minister put a prohibition to the abroad trips which are not necessary; therefore, ministers' trips abroad were under the consent of the Prime Minister.

But in mid of June 2011, due to a controversial Kampala Accord's condition, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned from his position as Prime Minister. In 2012, government officials gathered in order to discuss the post-transition period and the necessary arrangements to be taken. As a result of the meetings, a new Constitution was agreed upon by officials, federal and regional leaders of Somalia. Thereby, new amendments resulted with a bicameral parliament structure.

Although newly structured 'a post-transitional federal government' has been launched amid the fact that Somalia remains one of the "most failed states" in the world (Fund for Peace, 2013).

From 2004 to 2012 the Transitional Federal Government couldn't manage any development at the administrative level or capacity building. TFG's law making body Transitional Federal Parliament was incompetent to perform in spite of external supports and funds regarding capacity building. Although post-transitional government took TFG's place in 2012, this newly structured government also has to develop capacity to exercise its authority over the territories of the country or even on delivering security and social services (Menkhaus, 2007).

Post-transitional government is facing with stronger difficulty, the armed and better structured radical Islamist group, Al-Shabaab. This government is mainly keeping its place in the capital, Mogadishu, with the protection of African Union peacekeeping force.

4.1.4 Failure of State-building in Somalia

The international community has been engaged at both diplomatic and also military based levels to help resolve the conflict in Somalia. Nevertheless, the focus was on national level capacity building, peace building, peacekeeping and reconciliation. Although the constant flux of international help into Somalia, it remained still in the middle of a conflict zone, and the engagement attempts have helped to radicalize some other groups (Menkhaus, 2009). Therefore, these outcomes raised the question of the wrong perspective. The ‘national level capacity building’ was built on the sense of western-based democracy and in order to possess these kinds of concepts Somalia needs a bottom-up approach. The peace process should start from within and trickle up in Somalia and should win the hearts and minds of Somali people. Somalia does not need externally convened conferences where self-appointed governments are set up, (Nureidin Netabay, 2007).

Somalia, since its early periods was under the strong influence of clan-based governance. Therefore, efforts regarding the national level capacity building were mainly aimed to impose a democratic government. But fundamental the obstacle lying in wait of the reconciliation was the clan culture. Somalia, as a country, does not require a culture of formal governance. In other words, trying to build a western-based culture is completely different hasn’t got that much similarities with the kind of democracy that will work for Somalia. So, the country continues to face a constant conflict, because the root causes have been detected and interpreted deficiently by the international scene. There is therefore, a need to return to the original and indigenous traditions, norms, cultures and precepts of the Somali people, which until now remains apparently, high above every Western proposal. Since this is the only identity value the Somalis see, then they must be served with it, however, creating a balance so that no region claims the ascendancy over the other for whatsoever reason.

The conflict and the security issues that it brings along are still present within these territories. This is because security can be sustained by stabilization and stabilization can only be provided by an organized government. This government’s style should not to be in a formal and western-based kind, hybrid political order which covers multiple sovereignties and institutional multiplicity

concepts. This hybrid political concept allows a consideration of stabilization and peace building attempts in the aftermath of conflicts basing on historical perspective by considering the culture and fluidity of power and boundary shifts amongst formal and informal authorities (Stremlau, 2018).

To conclude many attempts were made since the fall down of the Siad Barre military regime in 1991. Somali people and the International Community made a lot of efforts and alternatives to re-establish national government. Reconciliation conferences were held several times and peacekeeping forces were sent to Somalia. However, nothing has changed.

The United States sent peacekeeping forces namely the UNOSOM, one of these was the well-known peace-forcing mission''Operation Restore Hope'' in 1993 and also UNOSOM II.

Today African Union Mission in Somalia is an active regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union and supported by the United Nations and European Union.

Hence, there are successful examples of hybrid political concepts which have been established by Somalis. For instance, Somaliland and Puntland are two state-like places that some level of security has been successfully established. Within these places, Somaliland and Puntland, a community-based police organization has been found in order to secure the society which is basically offering building blocks of the state.

Despite the attempts by the International Community to re-establish national government and create rule of law in Somalia become nightmare.

4.2 Military Threats

When a security challenge is being mentioned within the subject matter of Somalia, the first group that comes into mind is Al-Shabaab. Despite the growing body of academic literature that seeks to explain the evolution of Al-Shabaab, the movement remains one of the least understood on the continent (Mohamed H. Ingiriis, 2018)

As it has been explained in the previous sections that Al-Shabaab is an armed, radical Islamist fraction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which at the basis is the outgrowth of Al-Itihaad al Islamiya. ICU was functioning when the Transitional Federal Government was inaugurated, and it was in union with the local courts which compromising several parts and groups of the community opened doors for radical Islamists. After the inauguration of the Transitional Federal Government, they realized that they do not possess any authority although they are being recognized in the international scene. ICU has authority within the territory that the Transitional Federal Government should have. Therefore, the Transitional Federal Government made alliances with Ethiopia, the United States and the African Union in order to annihilate ICU and take back the authority from them and this act ensued a detrimental fight against ICU. These attempts of the interim government radicalized groups who already had a tendency to it. Consequently, while ICU was splintered, a radical fraction of this union was established under the name of Al-Shabaab and by 2005, fighters (militants) of Al-Shabaab numbers raised approximately to 400. More so, the group furthered this acceleration of its number when Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in late 2006.

ICU was respected by the society because this union of the courts at least provided a temporal sense of security in Mogadishu and its periphery until the invasion of Ethiopian military forces backed up with the support of Transitional Federal Government, the U.S. and the African Union, which forced ICU from power. During the invasion the Transitional Federal Government's President dispatched his troops from Puntland – an autonomous but attached state-like zone – to Mogadishu in order to retain and pursue the battle against rebellious groups. Puntland's autonomous regional government provided these troops and defrayed the costs.

Moreover, after this invasion of Ethiopian troops, who were against the expansion of ICU regarding religious concerns, Al-Shabaab had more motivation to conduct vital attacks. Their new aim evolved to spreading Islam in the society, protect the territories and repel the Ethiopian troops. So from 2007 to 2008, the amount and range of the attacks accelerated. Range was starting from ambush-style attacks, explosive devices, assassinations, and bombings. Al-

Shabaab militants resisted and furthered their attacks until the Ethiopian troops stood still and retreated. So in early 2009 Ethiopian troops were forced to withdraw from the Somalia territory. Thus, Al-Shabaab took the management back of these territories and expanded their authorities which can be seen at the Table 1.2.

This combat between Al-Shabaab and Ethiopian military forces was also supported by the U.S. and earned the reputation as the ‘dirty war’, by virtue of that both Al-Shabaab and Ethiopian troops did not abstain from accelerating the violence and means of attacks. Mostly, Al-Shabaab was using the method of suicide bombing, while the Ethiopians were responding back with the usage of white phosphorous bombs to demolish the rebel possessed neighborhoods as a whole (Menkhaus and Boucek, 2010).

Today, although Al-Shabab is not as powerful as it was before, a wide area of Somalia is still under their rule. Areas which are under the Al-Shabaab management can be observed from.



Figure 4.2: Al-Shabaab’s presence in 2016

Source BBC by Jamal Osman, 2019.

Between 2015 and 2016 African Union's troops' governance had declined in a significant rate and Al-Shabaab occupied these areas and took them under its governance.




Figure 4.3: Al-Shabaab's presence in 2016

Source BBC by Jamal Osman, 2019.

In 2018, African Union had to withdraw most of its troops from Somalia. Only Mogadishu where the current government performs its facilities has relatively intense support of the African Union troops which are aiding the government of Somalia to sustain its presence.




Figure 4.4: Al-Shabaab’s presence in 2018

Source BBC by Jamal Osman, 2019.

The fact remains that terrorism is a security challenge, but on the other hand ethnic and cultural issues are lying under these conflicts. In Somalia ethnic conflict is a complex issue because there is still a culture of clans. In fact, the society preserves these clans as a national identity. Each clan has different and resembling cultures and traditions. Since Somalia has this culture of clannism, it sure to maintain the race of power. Clans are powerful local organizations

which can affect decision makers' policies, and in order to affect political and economic institutions a power and authority shall be sustained. Therefore, hostility amongst clans is deriving from the conflict of interests.

So, in regard of these cultural facts, violence in the society can be traced back to clans, sub-clans and even to tribes. But more particularly there is a fact that worst crimes and violent acts in the country have been performed and perpetrated by politicians, elites, pirates, terrorists and other illegal and criminal gangs (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014).

4.2.1 Somali piracy as a regional and international security threat

Somalia, due to the long coasts and ports of the country, has always had the issue of piracy therefore; it is not a recent problem or a new security challenge.

Fishing is an important source of income in Somalia. There is no institution that will protect the rights of fishermen due to civil wars and unrest in the country. Powerful states have benefited from this situation and illegally fished and somehow plundered the coasts of Somalia, despite their lack of rights.

Piracy activities in the country initially emerged in order to prevent this situation. However, with the realization that it was much better to take the ships coming to the region hostage and ransom demand than fishing, the resistance that emerged as a reaction against the big states turned into piracy activity. So far, an anti-piracy task force with the UN, NATO, EU and Turkey's initiatives have been created in region but piracy problem still exists and threatens the security.

Although a consistent piracy act was present in the country, the attacks were augmented in the second half of the 2000s. In addition, since there isn't an efficient mechanism against piracy, pirates are able to collect a remarkable amount of financial rewards due to these attacks, which is raising the question and concern regarding the piracy-nexus terrorism and its acceleration (Menkhaus, 2009). According to statistics and researches of academics, the attacks of the pirates have increased from a 'few dozens' in 2006 to 1000 – 1500 in 2008, in Somalia (Daniels, 2012). Pirates are not only pillaging the ships but are also involved in kidnappings for ransom as well. Therefore, between \$20 million and \$40 million has been paid for ransom to these pirates

in 2008 (Menkhaus, 2009). In 2012, while a Somali can earn an average \$2 per day, pirates can earn several thousand fold of the average depending on the success of the hijack and their roles in this criminal act. The numbers they collect range from \$35,000 to \$100,000 (Daniels, 2012).

There are four Somali pirate groups that are dominating this illegal conducts in Somalia: the National Volunteer Coast Guard, the Marka group, the Somali Marines, and another group from Puntland which consists of traditional Somali fishermen. These pirates are operating in a large zone starting from the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and till the coasts of Oman (Pham, 2011).

In Somalia, kidnapping for ransom is the most commonly committed criminal act. As Menkhaus (2007) stated, for more than three decades – including the civil war and oppressive regime of Barre, fall of his government until today – kidnapping became ‘endemic’ especially in Mogadishu. It is the easiest illegal means to earn money. And, most common targeted people are those who have a wealth family with connections, employers or anyone who is considered to have a tendency to pay for their life.

Furthermore, this illegal act of kidnapping is being used as a political means of threatening and oppressing or as a means to collect the debts from the debtors who have failed to do so. Since there is not any sufficient and formal police organization or alternative, people who are kidnapped are being held until their family or relatives gather the amount of the ransom that the kidnappers request (Menkhaus, 2007).

Somalia always had a lack of police organization, therefore, neither a deterrent law and structure nor an organization which would punish criminals as a consequence of deterrent law system exists. But in mid of 2000s a privatization in the security sector had furthered. At the end of the 1999, while a civil war and statelessness were present within the territories of Somalia, leading business people of the country revolted against the warlords especially who are based in Mogadishu and its periphery and they hired the militiamen of warlords in exchange high amount of wage, consistent payment and also a further possible career (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014).

4.3 Societal Threats and the Somali Clan System as Insecuritizing Factor

Somalis are divided into clans and sub clans. Clans play an important role in Somali politics the clan system existed and was a dominant factor influencing politics since the republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 and even before. However, it worsened with the state collapse followed by wars and the clan division which all revived tribalism (Said H. Mohamed, 2017).

Somalia is known to be a country where most clans and tribes practice the same culture and traditions. Somalia is ethnically, religiously, culturally and linguistically the same, contrary to most African countries which are which are victims of their cultural diversity. Historically, the Somalis of today are said to have originated from the Hamitic tribes that lived or emigrated in the area (World Atlas, 2019). Furthermore, the people are so conservative that they would prefer to pay allegiance to their clans than to any central government. This explains why every Western type approach to unite the country has failed. As a matter of fact, the bigger clans are mostly controlled by powerful warlords (World Atlas, 2019) who act as the security actors and custodians of the values, interests and norms of the clans. Overcoming these warlords is no small trouble since most times, they enjoy the loyalty and support of their brethren.

- Some of the tribes identified in this study which are scattered throughout the national territory of Somalia are: Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir, Darod, Rahanweyn, Digil and Mirifle (World Atlas, 2019). There have been reports of non-Somalis living in Somalia who either identify with a separate identity or have adopted an indigenous Somali identity. These non-Somalis include, Arabs, Indians and Pakistanis who are said to be involved in petty trades, teaching and working in the banana plantations. Furthermore, there are multiple reports of other emigrants from the Bantu clan who surgen in Somalia (World Atlas, 2019).
- Therefore, it can be said that the Somali society is a kind of diverse and doesn't only contain its own indigenes but despite the war and the collapsed nature of the state, there are foreigners who still seek greener pastures in the war torn country. Furthermore, seeing that the clans are all of the same ethnic line and ancestral origin, there are greater tendencies for inter clan

partnerships and agreements on many things. Moreover, when these interclan partnerships are enacted and ratified, there is an enabling factor that the society in which its done will get stronger and socially bonded together. In that case, the objectives and leadership of the societies will most likely work together meaning any threat to their collective identities and securities will be handled collectively. As good as it sounds, it is also dangerous because the intention to retreat by one may directly threaten the other clan that might not entertain the idea. Thus, if the latter is stronger, it might impede the weaker from retreating meaning any attempt to make peace and enforce reconciliation will be hampered.

- Moving the argument along the 4.5 formula ruined the Somali politics and stability. This formula is a clan-based system that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has established in 2000 the “4.5 formula” which seeks ensure that each of the four main clans (identified as the Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn) be equally represented in government. The remaining “0.5” is intended to accommodate all groups that are not part of the main clans, i.e. minorities, women, civil society and other groups. However, this formula is highly disputed as a viable formula for conflict resolution in Somalia as reflected by the continued civil war (ACCORD, 2009)
- Therefore Somali minority clans suffer and those marginalized minorities are more likely to join the terrorist group and they are more vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist groups recruitment.

4.4 Economic Threats

From an economic point of view, Somalia during the stateless situation and the lack of efficient and competent national governance in Somalia, economic activities are being handled. The country also suffers from the deficiency of a formal institutional authority, informal economy mainly based on livestock, incorporation of tax free or low-taxed companies, companies of money transfer and telecommunications.

In Somalia, agriculture is the most significant sector that sustains Somalis employment and the country’s economy. Somalia’s economy based on

livestock normally accounts for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Large parts of the population are comprised of nomads and semi pastoralists, so their livelihoods are mainly dependent on the livestock. In 2014, after a permanent government was established Somalia witnessed an increase in the economy around 3.7% depending upon the growth of agriculture, construction and telecommunications sectors, (economy watch, 2015).




Figure 4.5: Somali Economic Growth

Source IMF and FGS authorities, 2019

In recent years some developments such as a first gas station, several supermarkets and airline flights (especially to Turkey via Turkish Airlines) had taken its place in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, since the collapse of the Siad Barre's regime and central government system. Furthermore, there are several markets in Mogadishu which also offer food, electronics etc. Moreover, investments in the service sector also augmented, there are hotels which still operate and are protected by private securities. These slight developments only took their place in Mogadishu where government officials and external powers are located such as African Union troops. Although it has some capacity of trade especially via ports, Somalia consists of great transportation capacity, but due to security concerns businesses do not prefer to invest.

In addition, the telecommunication system is one of the most developed sectors in Somalia. Telecommunication firms provide internet and wireless internet services in many major cities and also provide low call rates. Despite there is not any formal banking system yet, there are presently money remittance and transfer systems. As of now, it cannot take investment in order to further this system, again due to international concerns on security.

After the collapse of central government in 1991, state-building efforts didn't give a positive outcome and therefore, Somalis created their own means to survive and regulate businesses. Since there was a lack of formal institutions (even after they were established, these institutions weren't competent enough to provide stable services). Somalis privatized approximately every sector from education to security. And according to Menkhaus, "*the 'privatization of everything' in Somalia has created a largely unregulated economy in which criminal economic activity (such as smuggling and drug production) flourishes*".

4.5 Environmental Threats

According to UN report land degradation is a key environmental issue in Somalia, closely linked to desertification, drought and unsustainable livestock and agricultural practices. Food insecurity and livelihoods, possible hazardous waste, lack of marine and costal management, and mitigation and management of natural disasters are also environmental concerns in Somalia, (UN Report, 2005).

The climate and weather systems of the earth are constantly changing. Therefore this causes drought and famine in Somalia, which is a decline in food availability due to a reduction in production resulting from adverse weather.

A drought is defined as "a period of abnormally dry weather sufficiently prolonged for the lack of water to cause a serious hydrologic imbalance in the affected area". And Famine is mass starvation, where whole communities are literally starving to death. In the last quarter-century, Somalia has undergone three periods of protracted drought and two periods of famine. A famine in 1992 killed nearly 300,000 people and displaced 1 out of 5 people.

Historical trends show droughts occurring regularly at intervals of 2-3 years in the Deyr (October-December) season and 8-10 years in consecutive Deyr and Gu (April-June) seasons, extending seasonal hardships. Records indicate that ten significant droughts occurred between 1918 and 1975, while droughts also occurred in 1979-80, 1983-86 and 1989-90.

By early 1992, it was estimated that between one-quarter and one-third of all children had died. During the 2011 East Africa Drought, more than a quarter of a million people died in Somalia, half of them children under the age of five. The drought resulted in 955,000 Somali refugees in neighboring countries and devastating economic losses to agriculture and livestock. It also brought famine to the south of the country.

The summer of 2011 produced one of the worst droughts in 60 years in the Horn of Africa, affecting Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Following several seasons of very low rainfall, there was a total failure of the October-December 2010 Deyr (or short) rains and the April-June 2011 Gu (or long) rains were meager, resulting in the worst annual crop production in 17 years, excess animal mortality, and very high food prices.

In late July 2011, the UN declared the situation in parts of southern Somalia to be a famine in which 3.7 million people – nearly half the country's population – faced a humanitarian crisis, but most of the issues facing the country were not new.

The fact that famine emerged in Somalia in mid-2011 serves as an example of the deadly effects of the combination of severe and prolonged drought, ballooning food and water prices, poor governance, ongoing conflict, and international response that was inadequate, for many reasons, to meet the needs of millions of people. By early August, the international community was trying to scale up operations in response to the famine and had begun airlifts of emergency food. But most of the starvation was occurring in the south, in areas largely inaccessible to international agencies. In fact, the two parts of Southern Somalia where famine was initially declared were controlled by al-Shabaab. The militants had forced out Western aid organizations in 2010 and even when famine was declared, few of these agencies were able to return quickly, (Barrow, 2017).

The risk of famine remains, and the cyclical droughts and increasingly erratic weather patterns continue to prevent the achievement of vital long-term development goals needed to lift Somalia out of poverty and insecurity. The impact of drought on the Somali people is compounded by an interrelated set of factors that include the environment, governance, conflict, displacement, and poverty.

Somalia is heavily reliant on its natural resource base and the provision of ecosystem services. The country's vulnerability to climate change is projected to increase due to its dependency on its natural resource base. This, coupled with the man-made degradation of natural resources due to charcoal production and overgrazing, has increased Somalia's vulnerability to drought and desertification, leading to a marked reduction in food security.

The 2011 famine in Somalia was not a natural phenomenon, but rather the product of human-made factors, including lack of governance, political instability, and conflict, which undermined traditional coping strategies that have evolved over generations in response to the natural hazard of drought. The best way of preventing famines is not simply a technical issue of coming up with better warning systems or aid delivery mechanisms but engaging in the far more difficult task of creating political systems capable of protecting and assisting their people when natural hazards occur.



Figure 4.6:. Jubba and Shabelle Rivers map

Source Wikimedia Kmusser, .2019

Adding a further point, in Somalia, there are two rivers, the Jubba river which is 800 km and the Shabelle river 1500km, they both originate from Ethiopia along the border of Hiraan, and Gedo regions. Shabelle ends at Dhaytubako and the Jubba flows through the border with Ethiopia in Gedo region and passes through Dolow, Luq, Bardheere, Buale, Jilib, Jamame, and other cities. It ends at the Indian Ocean sea at a place called Goobweyn, about 25km from Kismayo.

According to the FAO report the water flow along the Juba and Shabelle decreases as the rivers flow downstream through Somalia, due mainly to factors such as: the minimal contribution of tributaries from the Somali catchment areas, “bank full” spillage of floodwater into the flood plains, natural and man-made flood relief channels, river diversions for irrigation during both low and

high flow periods and natural losses due to evaporation and infiltration/recharge of the groundwater along the rivers.

Over the last two decades, the two big rivers created challenges rather than opportunities. A recent study by FAO the development and management of the Juba and Shabelle basins are faced with many challenges, which if not adequately addressed could derail the ongoing efforts to revive the agricultural sector. As the FAO stated these include, but are not limited to:

Insecurity and lack of Access, Sparse data/information, limited monitoring network, Lack of resources and Trans-boundary issues. The trans-boundary nature of the Juba and Shabelle drainage basins complicate proper planning, development, and management of the water resources. More than two-thirds of the joint Somali-Ethiopian drainage basin lies in Ethiopia. Some are in Kenya. However, there is little information available in Somalia on weather, river flows and abstractions in the upper catchments in Ethiopia. In early 2016, the Shabelle River in Somalia became dry, which is very unusual for that time of year. This opened a lot of speculation into the cause of the dry river, but no information was forthcoming from the Ethiopian side. Information sharing between the two countries would go a long way towards overcoming this challenge, (FAO Report, 2016).

In Conclusion, security challenges in Somalia have several root causes and dimensions, like political, economic, military, environmental and societal threats.

Moreover, underlying causes of insecurity in Somalia are; Somali Piracy, Alshabab and the Somali clan system which is an insecurity factor that caused political instability and therefore ruined the economy of the country and its development. Although Somalia is recovering there is still challenges and in spite of tribalism, warlordism, terrorism and piracy Somali people are resilient and one hopes that the efforts of the international community, by taking into account the wishes of the Somali people, will help bring peace and stability.

5. CONCLUSION

Somalia is a country, situated in the Golden Horn of Africa, and its pending crises are such that even the international community couldn't solve its ongoing conflicts. This territory first witnessed the colonization period of Britain and Italy. Moreover, during the decolonization process of Africa, Somalia declared its independence as well but couldn't establish a proper state to govern the country. This deficiency and incompetency regarding the state establishment's root cause is the clan culture of Somalis. Today, there are several areas in Somalia governed by the government, by Al-Shabaab, by autonomous zones such as Puntland and by independent zones such as Somaliland. Furthermore, even within these separated areas there are several governance needs to be addressed from the core. Somalis are capable of establishing an order and structure for their clans, but when it comes to uniting these clans and establish a State as a whole, they do not possess this culture. Despite the facts of the Somali traditions and cultures, Siad Barre managed to build a State with a functioning government. At the beginning Somalis were supporting his system which brings order and independence from colonization. But later, Barre's regime evolved from "scientific socialism" to dictatorship and the violence augmented amongst the community. After a civil war arose in 1988, Barre's regime and the government-centric system that he had established collapsed in 1991. Since 1991, there were several attempts to rebuild the state. Most of them failed and led Somalis into famine, violence, massacres and poverty. Although there is a government today, the authority it possesses and the competency of the policies that they create are questionable.

A government-centric governing model derived from the Western-based liberal culture which constitutes the democracy system remains another flaw. Nevertheless, Somalia possesses neither a western culture nor government culture. Therefore, the international community's state-building capacity development attempts always fail. The international community has equally

failed because it couldn't understand the root causes of the conflicts and also the culture underlying it.

By virtue of the fact that the state establishment failed to build or to function, Somalis experienced the chaos and the violence along with it. The interim government was not sufficient for the mediation and reconciliation of the conflict parties. As a matter of fact, the interim governments such as, Transitional Federal Government, accelerated the conflicts and radicalized Islamist groups gained the impetus to arise resulting from failed security and political systems of the collapsed state. In the face of such a situation business cannot operate due to security concerns (Stremlau, 2018). Businesses that are willing to invest in the country first worry of its stability and the concept of stability can only be assured when its security systems function well. Since Somalia didn't have even a dysfunctional security system, Somalis privatized this sector.

National growth can only be sustained via a stable economy and a non-conflicting community. Since the state-building attempts didn't pay back sufficiently enough, local governments should be the ones who in focus. Somali culture is mainly based on clannism; therefore, by using these leverage municipals, local governance can be enforced under the control of the state. So, that each municipality or local governance would provide security and basic services that the state should provide. Somaliland and Puntland are two examples proving that this system can efficiently function.

After a peace and order is provided to the country as a whole, national growth can augment. But in order to do that, Somalia must firstly, try to reconcile the conflicting clans, end terrorism, implement deterrent laws and punishment against kidnapping and enforce maritime force in order to tackle the piracy problem.

As stated above, security measures can be developed via usage of the clannism leverage. Stremlau (2018) provided detailed observation regarding clans such as:

'Clans traditionally provide security and support for caravans that might be passing through their territory. By hosting the guest caravan, often in exchange

for gifts to the local leader, clans make themselves responsible for any attack on the guests, which will be considered as serious as an attack on the host. This enables the guests to enter into a security contract and have recourse to remedies if they experience loss of property or loss of life.’’

Therefore, security can be ensured using the culture of clan and its fundamental traditions if local governance is supported. Although Somalis had demonstrated development in state-building and economic growth, it is not enough to tackle with security issues. State development process is reciprocal that is it must work first for the country and then for the regime or government in power. If the current security challenges and conflicts are resolved, then national development will grow and also when national development grows then the security challenges will be resolved.

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