

**T.C.**  
**ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**US-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN OBAMA ERA OPPORTUNITIES AND  
CHALLENGES**

**M.A. THESIS**

**Sayed Saboor ZAFAR**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations Program**  
**Political Science and International Relations Program**

**June, 2020**

**T.C.**  
**ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**US-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN OBAMA ERA OPPORTUNITIES AND  
CHALLENGES**

**M.A. THESIS**

**Sayed Saboor ZAFAR**  
**(Y1712.110041)**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations Program**  
**Political Science and International Relations Program**

**Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER**

**June, 2020**

## ONAY FORMU

*My dear father, everything I do is to keep your name a live*

*To my dear Wife Zuhail,,*

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material.

**Sayed Saboor ZAFAR**

## **FOREWORD**

This thesis is about the U.S.-Afghanistan Relations in Obama Era. The reason for I chose this topic is to find out the facts behind the strategic and huge presence of U.S. and to identify positive and negative impacts in the country. I learned lots of terminologies and gained knowledge in the political, social, economic and security aspects of Afghanistan.

I would like to express my gratitude to the founder of Istanbul Aydin University and all my professors at Department of International Relations since 2018, I had the honor to be their students. I would like to express my profound gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz Yüksek Tekin that without her assistance and constructive guidance, this thesis could not have been realized. The ocean of her knowledge, character and dedication to academic life, interesting lectures and patience motivated me to write my thesis under her guidance.

I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Filiz Katman and Prof. Dr. Deniz Turker to have them in my jury. I appreciate their positive comments on my thesis and encouraging words. I would like to express my deepest gratitude from my family, specially my father Sayed Najibullah Zafar who fought cancer for 20 years and left us alone. May his soul rest in peace, I am indebted to for his love, inspiration and consistent support to my education, and to my mother that I cannot compensate one the nights she did not sleep and looked after me and my wife Zuhail Zafar who endured my absence, looked after my children and gave me invaluable opportunities that I could end this academic journey .

**June, 2020**

**Sayed Saboor ZAFAR**

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
<b>FOREWORD</b> .....	iv
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....	v
<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	vii
<b>LIST OF TABLES</b> .....	ix
<b>LIST OF FIGURES</b> .....	x
<b>ÖZET</b> .....	xiii
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	xi
<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
1.1 Background of the Study .....	3
1.2 Purpose of the Study.....	4
1.3. Statement of Problem .....	5
1.4 Significance of the Study .....	5
1.5 Research Questions .....	6
1.6 Methodology .....	6
1.7 Limitation of the Study .....	6
1.8 Thesis Outline.....	7
1.9 Conclusion.....	13
<b>2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON INTERNATIONAL RELATION THEOR</b> ....	14
2.1 Introduction .....	14
2.2 Liberalism.....	14
2.2.1 Neoliberalism .....	18
2.3 Realism .....	19
2.3.1 Classical Realism .....	20
2.3.2 Structural Realism.....	22
2.4 Constructivism.....	24
2.5 Conclusion.....	26
<b>3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. INVASION IN AFGHANISTAN</b> 32	
3.1 Introduction .....	32
3.2 Afghanistan’s Strategic Importance .....	32
3.3 Afghanistan’s Strategic Importance for Regional and Global Power .....	35
3.3.1 Afghanistan importance for Pakistan .....	35
3.3.2 Afghanistan importance for Iran .....	36
3.3.3 Afghanistan importance for India .....	37
3.3.4 Afghanistan importance for Russia.....	38
3.3.5 Afghanistan importance for China.....	39
3.3.6 Afghanistan importance for United States .....	42
3.7 U.S. and Mujahedeen Relations During Soviet Invasion .....	42
3.8 The 9/11 Incident.....	44
3.8.1 Operation Enduring Freedom.....	44
3.8.2 Bonn Agreement .....	44

3.8.3 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) .....	45
3.9 Building Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) .....	47
3.10 Big Powers and Reconstruction in Afghanistan & Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) .....	51
3.11 Emergent Forces: Women, Youth, Media, and Civil Society Organizations .....	53
3.12 Conclusion .....	58
<b>4. U.S. AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN OBAMA ERA .....</b>	<b>62</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	62
4.2 Views on Causes of Tense Relations .....	62
4.3 The Obama Administration’s New Strategy .....	68
4.3.1 The New Strategy Consequences .....	70
4.4 Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency .....	74
4.5 Stabilization Strategy .....	77
4.6 The Security Transition to Afghan National Security Forces .....	81
4.7 Obama’s Exit Strategy .....	82
4.8 The Impact of the 2014 U.S.-NATO Withdrawal on the Internal Situation of Afghanistan .....	83
4.8.1. Security consequences .....	83
4.8.2 Social and Economic Consequences .....	85
4.9 U.S. and Afghanistan’s Bilateral Challenges .....	87
4.9.1 Corruption .....	87
4.9.2 Narcotics Production .....	88
4.9.3 Insecurity .....	89
4.10 U.S. and Afghanistan’s Bilateral Opportunities .....	90
4.10.1 Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between U.S. and Afghanistan .....	92
4.10.2 Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan .....	92
4.11 Conclusion .....	95
<b>5. CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>RESUME .....</b>	<b>128</b>

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A3</b>	: Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness
<b>ADALAT</b>	: Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency
<b>AIJA</b>	: Afghanistan Journalists Independent Association
<b>ALP</b>	: Afghan Local Police
<b>AMDEP</b>	: Afghan Media Development and Empowerment Project
<b>ANA</b>	: Afghan National Army
<b>ANP</b>	: Afghan National Police
<b>ANDSF</b>	: Afghan National Defense Security Force
<b>ANSF</b>	: Afghan National Security Forces
<b>ANYP</b>	: Afghan National Youth Policy
<b>AF-PAK</b>	: Afghan-Pakistan
<b>BSA</b>	: Bilateral Security Agreement
<b>CADG</b>	: Central Asian Development Group
<b>CARs</b>	: Central Asian Republics
<b>CAREC</b>	: Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
<b>CDP</b>	: Community Development Program
<b>CENTCOM</b>	: Central Command
<b>CERP</b>	: Commander Emergency Response Program
<b>CHCC</b>	: Counter Heavy Crimes Center
<b>CNPC</b>	: China National Petroleum Corporation
<b>COIN</b>	: Counterinsurgency
<b>CPEC</b>	: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
<b>CSOs</b>	: Civil Society Organizations
<b>CSO</b>	: Central Statistics Organization
<b>CT</b>	: Counterterrorism
<b>DDR</b>	: Disarmament Demilitarization Reintegration
<b>DOD</b>	: Department of Defense
<b>DOS</b>	: Department of State
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>FCCS</b>	: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
<b>GDP</b>	: Gross Domestic Product
<b>GWOT</b>	: Global War on Terror
<b>HIG</b>	: Hezbi -e- Islami Gulbuddin
<b>IEDs</b>	: Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>IOs</b>	: International Organizations
<b>IOM</b>	: International Organization for Migration
<b>I-PACS</b>	: Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society
<b>ISAF</b>	: International Security Assistance Force
<b>ISI</b>	: Inter-Service Intelligence Agency
<b>MCTF-A</b>	: Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan
<b>MIC</b>	: Ministry of Information and Culture

<b>MOE</b>	: Ministry of Economy
<b>MOJ</b>	: Ministry of Justice
<b>NATO</b>	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGOs</b>	: National Governmental Organizations
<b>NUG</b>	: National Unity Government
<b>OBOR</b>	: One Belt One Road
<b>PRT</b>	: Provincial Reconstruction Team
<b>QIP</b>	: Quick Impact Project
<b>RSM</b>	: Resolute Support Mission
<b>RTA</b>	: Radio and Television of Afghanistan
<b>SF</b>	: Special Forces
<b>SIGAR</b>	: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
<b>SOCOM</b>	: Special Operations Command
<b>SOF</b>	: Special Operation Force
<b>SPA</b>	: Strategic Partnership Agreement
<b>SPECS</b>	: Strengthening Political Entities and Civil Society
<b>SSR</b>	: Security Sector Reform
<b>TAPI</b>	: Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India
<b>TFBSO</b>	: Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
<b>TTP</b>	: Tehrik Taliban Pakistani
<b>UN</b>	: United Nation
<b>UNAMA</b>	: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
<b>UNODC</b>	: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNHCR</b>	: United Nation High Commission for Refugees
<b>UNOPS</b>	: United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>UNSCR</b>	: United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>US</b>	: United States
<b>USAID</b>	: United States Agency for International Development
<b>USFOR-A</b>	: U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
<b>USGS</b>	: U.S. Geological Survey
<b>VSO</b>	: Village Stability Operation
<b>WTO</b>	: World Trade Organization

**LIST OF TABLES**

**Pages**

**Table 3.1:** Size of Afghan Security Troops on Duty, 2003-2017 ..... 48  
**Table 3.2:** Ethnic Composition in the (ANA) and (ANP)..... 49  
**Table 4.1:** Cause of U.S. troops Casualties, By Year ..... 70  
**Table 4.2:** Comparison of (IEDs) by Province and Regional Command 2008-2009 72  
**Table 4.3:** CERP Projects FY 2009- 2013 ..... 78

## LIST OF FIGURES

## Pages

<b>Figure 1.1:</b> Afghanistan Pakistan Region 2015-2017 Concept Notes .....	33
<b>Figure 1.2:</b> Investments Along China’s Belt and Road Initiative .....	40
<b>Figure 1.3:</b> Wakhan Corridor .....	41
<b>Figure 3.1:</b> Afghanistan Annual Cost of War and Reconstruction Between 2002- 2018 (\$ Billions) .....	47
<b>Figure 3.2:</b> Spent Amounts in Programs by Agency in 2002 FY – FY 2014 .....	53
<b>Figure 4.1:</b> Polling and Public Opinion .....	74
<b>Figure 4.2:</b> CERP Projects Between FY 2009 -2013.....	79
<b>Figure 4.3:</b> Initiated Attacks on ANSF In June 04- April 17 .....	84

# **US-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN OBAMA ERA OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

## **ABSTRACT**

U.S.-Afghan relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century was reestablished after the September 11 attacks in the United States, disintegration of the Taliban regime and installation of an interim government in Afghanistan. President George W. Bush soon after the incident attached the attacks to the Al-Qaida Network, hence this network's identity was constructed and promoted at a global scale. President Bush declared a, Global War on Terror arguing that the international community was unified to participate in the war and Afghanistan became a focus of U.S. foreign policy.

This thesis is about U.S.-Afghanistan relations in the Obama era. I used a secondary source analysis to assess the two states' relations with each other to find out what were the key bilateral challenges and opportunities.

When President Barack Obama entered office, he inherited a war from his predecessor, while the security situation was worsening in Afghanistan and a pessimism was dominating the prospects of the war. Obama announced a new strategy in 2009, that emphasized troop surge in the country and counterterrorism approach was replaced with counterinsurgency approach. Subsequently, when he realized that the threat was decentralized, he announced Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaida and its affiliate groups, in addition, to build Afghan National Security Defense Forces. The U.S.-Afghan administrations experienced irritated and tense relations in this period. Initially, the opposition of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai to Obama's policy in Afghanistan opened a new chapter of distrust and sparked the tense relations between the two administrations. Furthermore, intervention of the U.S. in the domestic politics of Afghanistan was perceived as a violation of Afghanistan's sovereignty by President Karzai and elevated the tense relations.

The conclusion derived from this study describes that troop surge policy of Obama caused escalation of insecurity in Afghanistan which not only affected Afghan national security forces, but coalition and U.S. troops as well. But the U.S. stabilization strategy was constructive because thousands of large, medium and small-scale projects in diverse infrastructural aspects through an expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars have been implemented and enabled Afghan government to practice its legitimacy and sovereignty.

The US-NATO withdrawal impacted the internal situation of Afghanistan, the security situation worsened which then caused – internal displacement and outmigration to Europe. The local workforce of international forces lost their jobs, poverty and social deprivation increased, employment and economic growth declined. Whilst, the key bilateral challenges comprised corruption, narcotics production and insecurity in Afghanistan and the bilateral opportunities that this study explored were integration of Hezbi-e- Islami Gulbuddin, signing of strategic partnership agreement and bilateral security agreement which ensured both states interests.

**Keywords:** *Surge Strategy, Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, Insecurity, Tense Relations, Stabilization Strategy, Exit Strategy, Challenges, Opportunities*

## **OBAMA DÖNEMİNDE ABD-AFGANİSTAN İLİŞKİLERİ FIRSATLAR VE ZORLUKLAR**

### **ÖZET**

21. yüzyılda ABD-Afgan ilişkileri; Birleşik Devletler'deki 11 Eylül saldırıları, Taliban rejiminin dağılması ve Afganistan'da geçici bir hükümetin kurulması sonrasında yeniden kuruldu. Başkan George W. Bush olaydan kısa bir süre sonra saldırıları El Kaide ağına bağladı, dolayısıyla bu ağın kimliği küresel ölçekte inşa edildi ve tanıtıldı. Başkan Bush uluslararası toplumun savaşa katılmak için birleştiğini ve Afganistan'ın ABD dış politikasının odağı hâline geldiğini iddia ederek Teröre Karşı Küresel Bir Savaş ilan etti.

Bu tez Obama dönemindeki ABD-Afganistan ilişkileri hakkındadır. İki devletin birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini değerlendirmek için iki taraflı zorlukların ve fırsatların neler olduğunu bulmak amacıyla ikincil bir kaynak analizi kullandım.

Başkan Barack Obama göreve geldiğinde selefinden bir savaş miras almıştı. Bu esnada da Afganistan'da güvenlik durumu kötüleşmekte ve karamsarlık, savaş sonrası umutlara baskın gelmekteydi. Obama 2009 yılında ülkedeki birliği artırmanın üzerinde duran yeni bir strateji açıkladı ve terörle mücadele yaklaşımının yerine karşı direniş yaklaşımı getirildi. Sonrasında tehdidin merkezi olmadığını fark ettiğinde Afganistan ve Pakistan'ın El Kaide'yi ve bağlı örgütlerini sekteye uğratma, parçalama ve yenme ve buna ek olarak Afgan Ulusal Güvenlik Güçleri'ni kurma stratejisini açıkladı. ABD-Afgan yönetimleri bu dönemde tedirgin edici ve gergin ilişkiler yaşadı. Başlangıçta Afganistan Devlet Başkanı Hamid Karzai'nin, Obama'nın Afganistan'daki politikasına karşı çıkması yeni bir güvensizlik sayfası açtı ve iki yönetim arasındaki gergin ilişkileri ateşledi. Ek olarak ABD'nin, Afganistan'ın iç politikasına müdahalesi Cumhurbaşkanı Karzai tarafından Afganistan egemenliğinin ihlali olarak algılandı ve bu, hâli hazırdaki gergin ilişkileri körükledi.

Bu çalışmadan elde edilen sonuç, Obama'nın birlik artırma politikasının sadece Afgan ulusal güvenlik güçlerini değil, aynı zamanda koalisyonu ve ABD birliklerini de etkileyen Afganistan'daki güvensizliğin artmasına neden olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Ancak ABD'nin istikrar stratejisi yapıcıydı çünkü yüzlerce milyon dolar harcayarak çeşitli altyapı cephelerinde binlerce büyük, orta ve küçük ölçekli projeler hayata geçirildi ve bunlar Afgan hükümetinin meşruiyetini ve egemenliğini hayata geçirmesini sağladı.

ABD-NATO'nun geri çekilmesi Afganistan'ın iç durumunu etkiledi, güvenlik durumu kötüleşti ve bu da ülke içinde yerinden edilmeye ve Avrupa'ya göç etmeye neden oldu. Uluslararası güçlerin yerel iş gücü işlerini kaybetti, yoksulluk ve sosyal yoksunluk arttı, istihdam ve ekonomik büyüme azaldı. Bununla birlikte kilit ikili sorunlar; Afganistan'daki yolsuzluk, uyuşturucu üretimi ve güvensizlikten meydana geliyordu ve bu çalışmanın incelediği ikili fırsatlar, Hezbi-e-İslami Gülbuddin'in entegrasyonu, stratejik ortaklık anlaşması ve her iki devletin çıkarlarını sağlayan ikili güvenlik anlaşması imzalamaktı.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Artırma Stratejisi, Terörle Mücadele, Karşı Direniş, Güvensizlik, Gergin İlişkiler, İstikrar Stratejisi, Çıkış Stratejisi, Zorluklar, Fırsatlar*

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States (US) induced the global war on terror (GWOT), which became the crucial part of the U.S. security agenda (Walt, 2001). The U.S. President Jorge W. Bush unified the international community to participate in the fight against GWOT to eradicate the sanctuary of Al-Qaida. After the US request from Taliban regime in surrendering Osama Ben Laden rejected (Dobbins et al., 2008). The U.S launched military operation on 7 October 2001 (Larson & Savych, 2005, p. 95). The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was finally overthrown on December 9,2001 (Katzman & Thomas, 2017). The Bush National Security Strategy 2002 underlined targeting terrorists and its patrons with all possibilities of the United States stipulating that if terrorist or state patron intend to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. was supposed to eliminate the menace before reaching to its boundaries (THW, 2002). Subsequently, counterterrorism became the core charter of Bush administration's foreign policy agenda which was stated in his National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, known as Bush Doctrine (TWH, 2003).

During President Barack Obama presidency whom he inherited war legacy and perceived the continued approach of Bush. The concept and scope of terrorism changed with the emergence of some new terrorist group in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, Counterterrorism strategy was replaced to Counterinsurgency Strategy encompassing an indirect and population centric approach resort to soft power through capacity building and economic development in Afghanistan and targeting the nests by drone strike in Pakistan (Crowley, 2012). Therefore, the subject matter of this thesis encompasses assessment of US-Afghanistan's relations in Obama era challenges and opportunities.

Although this thesis is devoted to study U.S.-Afghanistan relations in the Obama era, it is however useful to briefly focus on U.S. President Donald Trump's policies towards Afghanistan and to see what changes have occurred.

President Donald Trump came to power and inherited a U.S. policy toward Afghanistan that was focusing on building Afghan security institutions and counterterrorism against a transnational threat (Tellis & Eggers, 2017). After several months his position was clarified in conjunction to Afghanistan when he declared his Afghanistan and South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, highlighting on removing Al-Qaida and Taliban and precluding Taliban not to re-dominate in Afghanistan and stop terror attacks against America (Naz & Jaspal, 2018). Trump's strategy was vague and his regional approach was identical to Obama's Afghan policy focusing on Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism, eradicating terrorist sanctuaries, conditionalizing U.S.-Pakistan future relations on Islamabad's policy towards fighting terrorism and pressured the Afghan National Unity government to rely on its own efforts that the U.S. support was not a blank cheque (Naz & Jaspal, 2018).

Trump opposed a continuing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan for two related reasons: first, he had campaigned to "end the endless wars" in faraway places; and second, the sustained mishandling of economic and security assistance, inflaming his instinct against so much frivolous spending in federal programs (Bolton 2020, p.189).

Subsequently, Trump changed his stand regarding Afghanistan's war in June 2018, through indirectly approaching the Afghan Taliban. In December 2018, the Taliban group also announced their willingness to meet U.S. officials to reach a roadmap to peace (BBC, 2020). Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. special envoy in September 2018 to facilitate an intra-Afghan political peace process to extricate the U.S. from the protracted war in Afghanistan (The National, 2018). The U.S. government signed a peace agreement with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar in 29 February 2020 after spending 18 months in negotiation (BBC, 2020).

The agreement explicitly stipulates that the United States still does not recognize the Taliban as state, focuses on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan within 18 months, but within 135 days the troops will reach to 8,600, while the coalition forces to same size and the U.S. and its allies will withdraw the remaining forces within nine and half months. The United States committed to secure the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners from Afghan prisons within three months, and 1,000 Afghan government prisoners to be released from Taliban prison by March 10, 2020 to start intra- Afghan

negotiations (DOS, 2020). Reciprocally, the Taliban are obligated to cut ties with terrorist groups and not to allow Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups to threaten the U.S. and its allies from Afghan territory. Thus, a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire includes an inter-Afghan negotiation agenda that the participants will then discuss the date and manner of permanent ceasefire (Shahriar, 2020). The United States will request the recognition and endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for this agreement (DOS, 2020). After 24 hours of signing peace agreement by both parties, it was confronted by President Ashraf Ghani's serious objection due to prisoners' swap, and he stated that prisoners' release is not in the authority of U.S., but in the authority of the Afghan government (BBC, 2020).

On the day of his new term of presidential inauguration ceremony he declared who had reached a point where the release of the detainees could lead to a reduction in violence and that they would soon be ordered to be released. The next day, he issued a decree that the Taliban prisoners be released in several stages after ensuring that they do not go to war again (BBC, 2020). The detainees exchange perceived as confidence building for both sides to facilitate and accelerate the direct intra-Afghan peace talks (Arab News, 2020). During Ashraf Ghani's tenure Taliban announced two rounds of short-term ceasefire each round lasted three days. The first round coincided in the Islamic Eid festival of 2018 and the second round in the same festival in 2020 which was welcomed by Afghan government (BBC 2020). As of 11 June 2020, Afghan government has released 3,000 Taliban prisoners and the Taliban 550 government prisoners from jails under insurgent controlled areas in Afghanistan in several stages (Gul 2020). Taliban have launched over 3,800 attacks against Afghan National Security Forces across Afghanistan since signing peace agreement with the United States killing 420 civilians and wounding 906 others (Saif, 2020).

### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Relations between Afghanistan and the U.S. can be traced back in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century after Afghanistan pronounced its independence from Britain in 1919, during King Amanullah reign. The king sent Mohammad Wali to Europe and America to obtain recognition of Afghanistan's independence (Poullada, 1981). United States recognized Afghanistan on July 26, 1921 and entered diplomatic relations during the rule of King Amanullah on May 4, 1935. Later, on June 6, 1942, the U.S. opened its legation in

Kabul. Subsequently, it was elevated in Embassy on June 5, 1948, after the exit of Soviet troops on January 30, 1989 from Afghanistan. And due to concerns felt by American government that the new regime would not be able to safeguard the U.S. diplomats the U.S. embassy was closed ( Office of the historian, n.d).

U.S.- Afghan relations can also be explained in accordance to the structure of international system. In the multipolarity era (1919-1945), the U.S.-Afghan relations had economic character. The economic interactions defined the core relations of both states during the bipolarity phase of international system (1945-1989), when cold war was going on between two poles. The international system was affected by cold war and the political nature was added in the equation of U.S.-Afghan relations followed by economic and military means (Ershad, 2014). Although the US-Afghan relations were not earnest, but the United States was specifying the Afghan Mujahedin ratio. In the isolation and silence phase (1989-2001), the United State forgot Afghanistan and there was no motivating reason for shaping relation with Afghanistan. The isolation policy of the United States caused domination of Anarchy and appearance of extremist group and insurgent elements in Afghanistan. The country witnessed the domination of Islamic Emarat of Taliban regime which also posed threat for the entire international system. Ultimately, resulted to the inducement of the eminent horror implication for United States 9/11 incident (Ershad, 2014).

## **1.2 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the research is to identify areas of the U.S.-AFGHAN governments' ups and downs in their relations along with the key challenges and opportunities posed for both states. Specially, for Afghan citizens that the U.S. government expanded its hard power by increasing number of troops in Obama era in Afghanistan with the intention to dismantle, vanquish terrorism, secure and stabilize Afghanistan. But the troop surge policy had negative impact, exacerbated the insecurity while, the stabilization strategy positively impacted the social, economic aspects. The Afghan society was the witness of the increase and implementation of diverse infrastructure projects.

U.S. troops has had active contribution with the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in the military operations to implement Obama strategy to put down and

eradicate Al-Qaida and its dependent organizations. But in the second phase of Obama administration, U.S. military operational role in the battlefield shifted in the context of providing advisory and technical training of ANSF. Its air strike and battlefield operations were adopted to support the ANSF; if necessary. The overall goal of my research is the following:

- 1- To provide a basic description to clarify what was going on between the U.S. and Afghan governments during the Obama Administration.
- 2- To explore whether Obama administration's policies and his relations with the Afghanistan government contributed to the decline of insecurity and stability in Afghanistan.

### **1.3. Statement of Problem**

The Obama comprehensive Strategy in Afghanistan encompassed troops surge which peaked more than one hundred thousand during his presidency and followed with an exit strategy. The international forces under the mandate of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had huge presence as well. Shahrani (2015) has discussed the impact of the 2014 U.S.-NATO withdrawal on the internal politics of Afghanistan. He has concluded that President Ghani and Karzai had same style of thugocracy, and Taliban theocracy remain more than ever a threat for the country, while, other dimensions of the impacts overlooked and has not been elucidated in his study. Therefore, this thesis addresses whether the U.S-NATO withdrawals in 2014 had impacts on the internal situation of Afghanistan, in addition, of U.S. troops surge consequences and the bilateral challenges and opportunities for both states.

### **1.4 Significance of the Study**

This research will produce some importance. It will convince the reader that this research is relevant to the discipline I study which is International Relations, as the U.S.- Afghanistan relations in the Obama era is studied. The U.S. military surge deteriorated security situation in Afghanistan, rather than, securitizing the country. The withdrawal of the U.S.-NATO forces impacted the internal situation of Afghanistan and the two states had some common challenges and opportunities in Obama era. The beneficiaries of this study will be the students of Political Science and International

Relations of Balkh University in Afghanistan that I will present it and I will also submit this thesis to the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the conclusions derived to be published in their quarterly magazine to spread the knowledge.

### **1.5 Research Questions**

The following research questions are answered in the final Chapter of this research.

- 1- What were the consequences of Obama's troop surge policy in Afghanistan in terms of security and stability in the country?
- 2- What were the impacts of the 2014 US-NATO military withdrawal on the internal situation of Afghanistan?
- 3- What were the bilateral challenges and opportunities for the U.S. - Afghan governments under the Obama administration?

### **1.6 Methodology**

The methodology used in this thesis is the secondary sources accessed from IAU library databases including scholarly journal articles, dissertations, eBooks, published reports of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), World Bank, Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and so forth. The mentioned sources enabled me to make comparisons between cases using other people's research findings and considering the new published perspectives on the importance of recent events and gained knowledge to strengthen my own arguments. I will also analyze that constructivism is best suited in the U.S.-Afghan relations in Obama era.

The World Bank SIGAR, DOS, DOD, and USAID are the main data resources that I have used in this thesis. In addition, all the figures and tables are arranged according to represented data from the abovementioned resources.

### **1.7 Limitation of the Study**

In this study, I faced to the limitation in terms of access to the security data of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). There was neither archive of security reports in

English nor even Dari version available in the formal website of the relevant ministry. However, efforts made to contact the ministry to get access to monthly and quarterly security publications to apply in this study. Unfortunately, I was informed that the U.S. forces influenced, controlled and restrained the office of publication of the MOD not to reflect the facts and figures from security incidents.

## **1.8 Thesis Outline**

Chapter 1 begins with introduction focusing on the background, the relevance and aim of the study, research questions, the structure and organization, methodology and limitation of the study.

Chapter 2 focuses on the literature review of IR theories; as Liberalism, Realism and Constructivism. In the realm of IR liberals are concerned how to develop a political state to protect from external threats without harming the individual liberty (Meiser, 2017). Sociological liberals argue IR is about relations between people, groups, and organizations beyond boundaries. The interdependence liberals claim that states and citizens are impressed in every incident in today's world in terms of trade, access to information, labor and investments and this interdependency among them consolidates the relations (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp.106 -108). On the contrary, institutional liberals claim that international institutions are collection of regulations or regimes which dominate state functions in special fields and facilitate to promote cooperation between states. Whilst, Republican liberals argue democracies do not fight each other due to enjoying common values in terms of culture of peaceful conflict resolution, common moral values and interdependency (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp.115-117).

Realist view international system is anarchy, because there is neither pervasive power nor world government, and the state is the supreme actor in the world politics (Kazemi, 1994, p .36). Classical realists argue that states were main actors in taking decision to enter war or surrender and act unitarily and no actors in the national level could abolish their decisions (Mingst & Toft, 2017, p.77). Structural realists view power is the most important tool in international relations. Kenneth Waltz argues that the essence of international structure is determined by its ordering principle and there is no official central power and great powers to divide the capabilities in the international system (Lobell, 2017). While, Mearsheimer claims States become intrinsically offensive due

to anarchy, because human is aggressive in nature and is greedy for power and dominance (Tang, 2008). Defensive structural realists claim that International system ensures motivations for states to pursue security in a chaotic international system (Taliaferro, 2000).

Constructivists view that states socially build up reality and act based on the constructed reality (Kaufman, 2013, p. 63). Thereby, the key significant facet of international relation is social that the social truth is subjective and does not deal with material forces (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 209). They claim ideas and beliefs effect the world politics. Thus, prospects change by the passage of time, because ideas and beliefs of the actors change. Identities and interest are another core argument of constructivists who underscore as a result of interaction between actors. States gain identities and identities shape interests and action that the interests of large and small states differ. While, small states concern for their survival and the large states pursue to dominate on the global politics (Theys, 2017). In this chapter it has been analyzed that the U.S.-Afghanistan's relations during Bush and Obama administrations are best suited in the constructivist theoretical approach.

Chapter 3 firstly, describes Afghanistan's strategic importance despite this study is related to 21<sup>st</sup> Century, but by briefly focusing on the very far history of BC the country's importance is elucidated. The country witnessed the rivalry between the empires due to its location in the significant trade path between Asia and the Middle East. Invaders could not retain a stable footprint in the rough land of the country (Runion, 2007, p. 1). The country also holds central location in the region possessing major geo-economic importance. Afghanistan's geo-political and geo-strategical place has been hindrance in the history, and its place in the ancient Silk Route, South Asia, and presence in the middle of crucial neighbors significantly plays key role. The country is the transit and transport point between Central and South Asia and links the markets of South Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and China due to its strategic position along the Silk Route (Akbari, 2018).

In the 1300 BC, the blue lapis lazuli stone used to send from Badakhshan province to Egypt and Iraq for the lyre laid to rest the monarchs of the old city of Ur. Most of them are currently in the British Museum (Omrani, 2010). In the second century BC, the Chinese Emperor had established relations with the northern people of Afghanistan in

Balkh which this place was the market for every type of commodities and the Silk Road. The massive bulk of commodities crossed through Kushan territorial control, containing silk from China, ruby and lapis azure from Badakhshan of Afghanistan, spices, tusk and chrysotile from India, silver products from the Persian empire and prepared commodities from the Roman Empire (Omrani, 2010).

The country is rich in terms of having natural and mineral resources with the estimation of \$ I trillion worth (SIGAR, 2016). The whole copper reserves in the country ranges to sixty million metric tons and copper reserves at Aynak approximated to encompass approximately thirty million metric tons (Akbari, 2018). Unexplored sumac stone of copper and skarn reserves approximated to cover 28.5 million metric tons of copper with extra silver and gold deposits. The estimation from Haji Gak deposit approximated to have nearly 2,260 million tons of iron ore with grades higher than 62 weigh percent iron (Akbari, 2018).

In the second part of this chapter Afghanistan's strategic importance for regional and global power has been discussed. Pakistan requires energy for the revival of its own economic condition. The Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI), gas pipeline provides energy origin that will be enough for Pakistan for the next 50 years. Therefore, stability and peace in Afghanistan has direct impact over Pakistan economic condition (Bangash & Jamal, 2016). Afghanistan obtains more importance for Pakistan, because Afghanistan provides nearby transit path between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs), due to less transportation costs. In addition, Pakistan lacks energy and access to surplus energy of CARs has immense importance for Pakistan (Khan, 2016).

Afghanistan also possesses geo-strategical importance to Iran due to presence of its rival in Afghanistan which posed threat for the national security of Iran. Iran uses Taliban as shelter and supports them in terms of fatal weaponry and intelligence assistance to challenge and entangle U.S. military operations in Afghanistan which undermines the U.S. interest in the region (Sarkar, 2019). Afghanistan's geo-economic importance for Iran paves the way to obtain its economic benefits (Mohammad & Yousefi, 2012). Iran aims to have economic influence in Afghanistan and Iran is the fourth largest importing source of commodities of the country. Hence, the Chabahar

port paves the way for Afghanistan to decline its reliance on Pakistan and would be linked to sea trade routes (Malikzada, 2019).

The key role of Afghanistan has been assumed by India the gateway to Central Asia, and relationship with Iran paves the way for India to pursue its maritime interests. And linkage with Afghanistan, and Central Asia is the initial goal for India's involvement with Iran to establish Chabahar port. Eventually, Afghanistan obliquely led India's maritime activity in the region and developing Chabahar port by India impedes China's progress not to access Gwadar port in Pakistan (Marjani, 2018).

Afghanistan has essential space in Russian foreign policy contemplation. Moscow is keen to improve security in Afghanistan and Central Asia since being extremely worried of the Afghan illegal narcotics trafficking and influx through central Asia. Russia wants to maximize its control over hydrocarbons of the cross path of Central Asia, secure its engagement in energy projects; likewise, TAPI, detect mineral reserves of lithium, copper, and to reach Central Asian and Afghan market for Russian commodities (Sangar, 2016).

Afghanistan has great importance in the strategic calculation of China (Khan, 2015). The strategic significance of Afghanistan in Beijing's foreign policy strategy has been raised since China showed intention in building One Belt One Road (OBOR), (Huasheng, 2016). Haggai (2016) denotes, "The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is a combination of two outward-facing concepts introduced by President Xi Jinping in late 2013 to promote economic engagement and investment a long two main routes". The first route, the Silk Road Economic Belt which passes through Central Asia and the second, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road crosses through Southeast and South Asia (Zimmerman, 2015). The Wakhan Corridor is located at the passage of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan possessing historical worth and is known part of ancient Silk Road. Afghanistan shares 47 km distance (Munir & Shafiq, 2019). Through this Corridor Afghanistan will be integrated with China and Pakistan, and its access to India through Chabahar port will be undermined. The Wakhan Corridor is the only option for China for the regional reach out, and China will be linked to Central Asia and Gulf states (Munir & Shafiq, 2019).

The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has great significance for the U.S. in order to have perpetual stay in the region and Afghanistan for diverse purposes; as aiming

to restrain China's expansion by consolidating defense and security collaboration with her guardian ally India, to reach out wealthy energy countries of CARs, and to have surveillance over the Atomic Missile power Pakistan. Ultimately, to draw the attention of the globe to sale its modern weapons which have been used in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan (Idrees & Anwar, 2017). By the establishment of permanent military stations in the strategic zone of the glob in Afghanistan. The United States wants to curb its rival Iran by creating pressure circles and strives to have control over energy reserves of the region (Afzali, 2012, p. 64).

The chapter also discusses the inception of U.S.-Afghanistan's relations post 9/11 attacks. The U.S. and its allies along with the Northern Alliances Forces jointly overturned the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the efforts for establishing a new government in Afghanistan agreed in Bonn Conference which paved the way for ratification of a constitution in 2004 and participation of Afghans to vote in the first direct presidential election held in October 2004 (Gul, 2006).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorized the establishment of ISAF to ensure interim government security in Kabul and its periphery. Five countries in Geneva Conference in 2002 committed to contribute in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program. Among those countries, the United States initiated ANA training in 2002, on the contrary, Germany the ANP (Kelly, Bensahel & Oliker, 2011, pp.21-22). The ANDSF establishment between 2001-2003 with the expansion in 2008 and Afghanistan witnesses huge increase of U.S. and international coalition troops. The security responsibility transitions to ANDSF in 2014 that the U.S. and NATO troops mission changes to RSM (Thruelsen, 2011).

Big powers were actively engaged in the process of reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The U.S. initially supported PRT later, other states participated in undertaking this team which enormously expanded across the country (ISW, 2007). PRT beside boosting the government legitimacy through ensuring security contributed in delivering U.S. and international aid to the insecure provinces and facilitates reconstruction projects (USAID, 2006).

After overturn of Taliban, Afghanistan witnessed emergence of social forces; as women, youth, media and civil society organizations and women engaged in key decision-making process and in the internal politics (Larson, 2016). The youth forces

included in the Ministry of Information and Culture's policy agenda to involve this force in the social, political, economic and cultural aspects in national and sub-national level (MIC, 2014). Afghan society was the witness of media development after the Taliban dark era that freedom of expression and press was absent. National and private TV channels and Radio stations launched their broadcasts and hundreds of newspapers and magazines began publishing. Besides, donors have played key role in capacity building in this regard (Hairan, 2008). Albeit, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and National Governmental Organizations (NGOs) enormously expanded in the country and in this respect donors like USAID supported the CSOs through implementing I-PACS and SPECS programs to enable Afghans with the aim to participate in the political process, promote democracy and enhance government legitimacy (USAID, 2012).

Chapter 4 evaluates the U.S. Afghan relations in Obama era along with the bilateral challenges and opportunities. The expulsion of both the UN and EU envoys from Afghanistan by President sparks the worsening relations of Karzai with the West (Glenn, 2015, p. 227). The U.S. troops deployment surge in Afghanistan confronts with opposition of Karzai and interventions of U.S. in the internal affairs of Afghanistan opens a new chapter of distrust and tensed relations between President Hamid Karzai and his counterpart Barack Obama.

Five views in this respect have underlined Obama and Karzai's relations; as Karzai view focuses on the U.S. intervention in the internal affair of the country. American view criticizes Karzai corrupt government, parliamentarian and analyst perspective underscores on the continuation of soft wrestling between Karzai and Obama, political critic divides into two parts Karzai politician supporters call Karzai an independent president, while, the rebellion puppet. Finally, Afghan sociological perspective highlights Karzai government decision with international community was based on traditional policy making (Arvin, 2013).

In addition, this chapter emphasizes on Obama's new strategy in 2009, and its consequences and the declaration of Afghan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) strategy underlying counterterrorism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Schweitzer & London, 2010). Additionally, focusing on security transition from U.S. and NATO troops to ANSDF in 2014, and respectively on Obama's exit strategy. Thereafter, CT gives its place to

COIN strategy and, in this chapter, I have tried to focus to develop discussions parallel to final goal of the study.

In Chapter fifth, I have concluded the entire body of theses along with research questions. Firstly, the U.S. troops surge did not have positive consequences on Afghanistan's security, but stability. On the contrary, troops surge policy of Obama caused escalation of insecurity in the country. The worsening of security not only affected ANA, but coalition and U.S. troops as well. Insecurity expanded from south to the west and northern province and as well as the capital, IEDS and suicide bombings increased. But Obama's stabilization strategy was constructive in terms of stabilizing of Afghan government to practice its legitimacy.

Secondly, the US-NATO withdrawal had negative impacts on the internal situation of Afghanistan. The security situation worsened; insurgency transitioned from south to the north, enemy attacks against ANSF heightened. While, Kunduz province in the north temporarily went under the control of Taliban. The internal conflicts also exacerbated and caused thousands of internal displacements and outmigration to Europe. Moreover, unemployment, poverty, social deprivation increased, and economic and GDP per capita income declined. Thirdly, the bilateral challenges and opportunities of the U.S. and Afghan government in the Obama era were corruption, narcotics production and insecurity in Afghanistan. The bilateral opportunities included integration of HIG in the Afghan government, signing of SPA and BSA agreements.

## **1.9 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the research questions discussed background, the relevance, purpose, structure and organization, methodology and limitation of the study.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON INTERNATIONAL RELATION THEORIES**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This Chapter focuses on the literature review of three major International Relations Theories, as Liberalism, Realism and Constructivism. The Liberalism has been discussed in detail where the idea first came from when and why it was originated? And with a glance to its variant's sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, republican liberalism and neoliberalism. Realism and its variants classical realism and structural realism have also been discussed with key arguments of political figures as well as the constructivism theory.

### **2.2 Liberalism**

The emergence of Liberal theory dates back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century when the hopefulness for enlightenment increased. The rationality contributed to liberalism depending on the Greek notion that individuals are wise and know, general laws dominant on nature and human community. Whereas, the people have competency to enhance their condition by founding a just society; if that is not fulfilled that would result in constituting of unsuitable entities and rotten sitting (Mingst & Toft, 2017). Liberalism is a customary notion that the focal importance emphasizes on the liberty of the individual which the individual right has strongly been violated by absolute regimes. The first constructive spark of this idea was shaped in the John Locke's mind and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it was prominently defended by John Calhoun the vice president of the United States in the mid-1900s. He was opposite of misapplication and concentration of power by absolute governments who also questioned fanaticism and vindicated minority rights (Domenico, 2011, p.1).

Liberalism is derived from the word of Liberteh in Latin language which means "liberty and freedom". In English language some consider liberty in the social context and others apply it in the philosophical context (Bayat et al., 2008, p.451). Liberalism is one of the most prevalent and most ancient philosophical, political and moral schools of the modern times. Liberalism in the broad sense, in almost all fields and in all its

forms is the philosophy of increasing individual freedom in the society as much as possible. From historical and social perspectives liberalism initially emerged in the form of anti-tyranny movement then, turned into the form of a school and became a comprehensive theory of economic and political organization which contained two stages (Bayat et al., 2008, p.452).

In the first stage, it was rebellion of the arbitrary tyranny of the church and there was a profound relation between religious reform movement of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The religious reform movement led by Martin Luther (1483-1546), and John Calvin (1564). This reform was the first step towards religious tyranny that ultimately resulted to the formation of Protestant sect against Catholic which Protestantism was an individualistic religion. Therefore, it was directed to tolerance which helped liberalism in theory and practice through promotion of individualism and liberty. But in the second stage, liberalism in the political direction was rebelling against authoritarianism and tyranny of the political leaders. After the collapse of the tyranny of the church through the revolutions absolute government created, and the liberals were willing to restrict the absolute government by law. In the economic direction liberalism rebelled against aristocracy and feudalism. When feudalism system collapsed due to the policies of new governments and the release of capital. The middle class grew and became stronger that this class was called bourgeoisie which became the main carrier of liberalism (Bayat et al., 2008, pp.453-454).

John Locke (1632-1704), the key philosophical figure of liberalism who argued that natural rights do not come from God and religion, but from law and nature. It is received by the intelligence of reason containing the right to life, freedom and equity which are the basic rights (Bayat et al., 2008, p.455). Locke was the founding father of political liberalism, he claimed that state principles are the products of human reason that humans are free to choose the system of governance. The purpose of forming state is to ensure natural rights that did not exist in the state of nature and the purpose of government is to protect the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to property of the people (Farhan, 2016, pp. 246-247).

In internal politics, liberals advocate the establishment of institutions to protect individual freedom by controlling political power, but in the international relations realm liberals are also concerned from the states which their foreign policies are based

on militarism. They argue that the core fear of states is that war oblige them to establish military power to defend foreign menace or states can also use for tyrannizing its citizens (Meiser, 2017). Hence, invasion for the purpose of territorial expansion is a concern for liberals which they also argue when the states attempt to found empires through invasion. It is not only solidifying the state at the expenditure of citizens, but military invasion necessitates durable obligations and political control. Albeit, the key anxiety of the liberals is how to develop a political state to protect from foreign threats without harming the individual liberty and to overthrow the rulers from power through institutional check of power and fair election. By division of political power in the different branches the system of check and balance limits and prevents from the abuse of power (Meiser, 2017).

Peace theory mostly contributes to the IR theory, it focuses that democracies do not fight with each other, because they are built up based on legitimate power. Conversely, democracies foster cooperation with each other, but in rare cases democratic states go into war with another and the reason is not certainly clear. If it is due to democratic peace or other factors of peace likewise; culture, economy and political alignment. In other cases, democracies can be aggressive towards non-democratic states; as the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 (Meiser, 2017). In democracies basically, rule of law dominates and the conflicts in the political level is resolved through faction rivalry, elections and safeguarding of minorities. In addition, the culture of live and let live exists in the democracies and in the international relations, citizens of the state's demand their political power to apply violence when seeking national interests. On the contrary, autocratic regimes are considered weak to resolve tensions peacefully they pose constant venture to international peace and security (Hasenclever, 2014). Liberal institutionalist Immanuel Kant suggested that 'republican constitution', commercial exchange embodied in 'cosmopolitan law', and a system of international law among republics governed domestically by the rule of law which would provide the basis for sustained peace.' (Russett, 2013).

Kant's focus on the republican government was based on the notion that the rulers were responsible for accountability, and individual rights were honored that would cause to nonviolent international relations. Since the final satisfaction for war would remain with the citizens of the state (Burchill, 2001). Kant's assertion indicates that despite natural flow of self-interest persuades intellectual individuals to act as a factor

to maintain peace. Thus, the liberal internationalism takes root from Kant's idea which permuted this notion to the international arena by focusing on the truth war. The conflict can be prevailed or pacified by bringing harmonized changes in the domestic and international anatomy of political regimes (Russett, 2013).

Liberalism is well known as the product of enlightenment era, this school of thought developed by the passage of time. The primary theories of liberalism were flourished by the early liberalist thinkers such as John lock advocating rule of law, Bentham stressing on the liberal states to respect the international law, and Immanuel Kant focusing on republican constitution that establishes perpetual peace. Subsequently, the liberal camp strand expanded in four main branches aftermath of the Second World War; as sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 102).

The contending theory of Liberalism is the realism which focuses that the key actors of IR are states, but this perception is refused by sociological liberalist. They argue that IR study is not only of relations between governments or sovereign states. The IR is about relations between people, groups, organization beyond borders and transnational connection are observed crucial in IR which they have key impacts on the route of occurrences (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 105).

The interdependence liberals constructed their argumentation on this notion that states, and citizens are impressed in every incident, and history proved that states increased their power by using military force and territory enlargement which it no longer results. In today's world trade, access to information, labor and investment, specially highly qualified labor in the international economy enhances the interdependence, consolidates the relations, decreases the level of severity and tensions between states (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p.106).

Institutional liberals argue that the international institutions, likewise North Atlantic Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) are collection of regulations or regimes. These regimes dominate state functions in special fields, such as aviation or shipping. The international institutions facilitate and promote cooperation between states, thus reduces the absence of confidence and apprehension between states as initially the trade norms were formed by World Trade Organization (WTO). The international institutions can be global like United Nations (UN), regional and sub-regional EU, if we consider EU member states, they share common functions to

accelerate their government task. They have set up a framework in a single market in the economic aspect, therefore, institutionalization decreases the shifty atmosphere of anarchy (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 110-112).

Republican liberalism proponents based their discussion on this notion that democracies do not fight each other, because they have three fundamental stones that their calm relations are founded. Internal culture of tranquil tension resolution, common moral values, and their reciprocally effective economic cooperation and interdependence. The political culture that the democracies hold in the domestic level are dependent on a peaceful conflict resolution. However, democracies persuade tranquil international relations, because these political systems are controlled on the behalf of their citizens who do not vindicate war. In terms of the common values it was primarily called 'pacific union' by Kant meant not a formal treaty of peace, but zone of peace. This carried the interpretation of domestic resolution of tension in a peaceful manner morally preferred to violent attitude which is shifted to international relations between democracies. The economic cooperation and interdependence pave the way for insuring peace between democracies, and due to the mentioned factors liberal democracies in the world could be strengthened and maintain peace in the world (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 115-117).

### **2.2.1 Neoliberalism**

Neoliberalism had dominated from 1980s until recently, which was promoted by American political governments since Ronald Reagan, and its emergence relies to the prominent economist figure Adam Smith and his famous work 'The Wealth of Nations' (Mammadov & Sehhat, 2016). According to Heywood (2011, p.90), "Neoliberalism (sometimes called neoclassical liberalism) is an updated version of classical liberalism and particularly classical political economy". Neoliberalism refers to an economic pattern that emerged in the 1980s and shaped upon the classical liberal ambition of the market which is self-regulated. Neoliberalism has several fields and to adequately present the core concept of neoliberalism, it deals with the three interlocked appearances: (1) an ideology; substantial groups in community adopt the accurate ideas and beliefs called ideologies or systems. These 'isms' render as perceptual plan and instruct people because of the complication of their political worlds. The organizer of laws makes ideologies to legalize political interests and vindicate power structures.

The codifiers of neoliberalism are the universal power elites, politicians, lobbies and so on (Roy & Steger, 2010, p. 11). (2) A form of governance is another dimension of neoliberalism that some core norms like the self-interest, competitiveness and decentralization form basics for neoliberal governments that this idea was firstly posed by French social thinker Michael Foucault. He argued that government workers see themselves as self-interested actors not servants (3) A policy package; constructs the third dimension of neoliberalism with the contraction of D.L.P stands for (1) deregulation of economy which means freeing economy from government, (2) liberalization of trade, and (3) privatization of state owned enterprises (Roy & Steger, 2010, p. 14).

In the realm of IR, neoliberalism asks how states and other actors cooperate between each other in the international system? Neoliberalism in IR deals with international institution and argues that the establishment of international institution has significant role in specifying the limit that general goals can be achieved, and related actors can establish these structures to achieve collective interests (Folker, 2013). Those neoliberals advocate establishment of institutions claim that cooperation and security can be attained; if the international institutions are created within state in diverse political, economic, security aspects. Ultimately, neoliberals deduce that collaboration is for the benefit of the states, and states will help each other in international system in the absence of a focal power. Thus, safety can be maintained through developing business and other collaborative proceeds that other engaged state take advantage (Kaufman, 2013, p. 61).

### **2.3 Realism**

This theoretical IR paradigm is summarized in this section and its historical roots will be discussed in different variant of realism in the following subsections.

Realism is another major theory which dominates in IR. Aftermath of second world war another key figure in the realm of IR theory Hans Morgenthau emerged and developed the theory of realism. Realists argue that in the international system nation state is the initial actor and its performance is based on rationality. States as institutions possess sovereignty which are responsible to act in the range of their frontiers to enhance their strength. From Morgenthau and other realist thinker's perspectives, the

main rules of realism are based on this perception that all relations have base in power, if that is the relationship in the individual level or nation level shows that struggle is unavoidable (Kaufman, 2013, pp. 52-53). Realists view that the international system is anarchy, because there is neither pervasive power nor world government, and the state is the supreme actor in the world politics. International relations are mainly relations of states and all other actors in international politics which are less significant or unessential. The behavior of a state is the reflection of its politicians and militaries rational measures which strives to attain its maximum interests in the logical range (Kazemi, 1994, p.36).

Another key central argument of the realists is on foreign policy. They argue that the core aim of foreign policy is to develop and defend the state's interests and the great powers are the most important actors in the world politics. International relations are the sphere of initial conflict between the great powers for hegemony and security, and weaker powers hold the second position in terms of importance (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 66).

### **2.3.1 Classical realism**

Classical realists' key features argumentations describe as, Thucydides viewed the rivalry and struggle between ancient Greek city- states, Hellas and non-Greek empires was indispensable. He also noticed Hellas and non-Greek adjacent states inequalities and spoke of great powers comprised of Athens, Sparta and the Persian Empire. This incongruence was called natural and indispensable. He reiterated that considering the moral and discretion in the implementation of foreign policy in an international world of great inconformity. If a state desires to retain and go forward must regard political exhortation of international relations (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 68). Thucydides argued, in war and political decision state namely Athens and Sparta are main actors, because when state takes decision to enter war or surrender, acts unitarily and no actors in the national level can abolish its benefits and decision (Mingst & Toft, 2017, p. 77).

Machiavelli marginalizes morality and Christianity values by omitting it from the field of political realism and international politics (Devetak, Burke & George, 2012). Machiavelli argues, rulers must have the characteristics of both lions and foxes that shapes two important instruments for implementing of foreign policy. The major duty

of ruler is to pursue the benefits and vindicate the interests of their respective states, and thereby, can survive. Loin refers to the characteristic of the ruler who would use deception; if need be brutality to seek the self-interest and the application of fox is resembled to this notion. If the ruler is not clever, and wise would lose the chance that would bring a lot of advantage for his state and in terms of realist statesmanship, the fox more than lion is important in politics (Barlow, 1999). He emphasized on being alert of prior to the occurrence of an accident, because the careful leader deflects the posed menace. He also rejects the application of Christian principles in the field of state's operation, because political competitors do not operate based on Christianity. If state leaders practice the mentioned ethics, they would immolate freedom, wealth and their citizens lives (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 69-74).

Thomas Hobbes saw human condition living in a state of nature before establishment of sovereign state. In the state of nature "human is the wolf of human", (Rossello, 2012). Who live with fear, there is no community, assurance, craft and importation of good by sea only fear and cruelty? And to get rid of these, he suggested the creation of a stable and sovereign state through which people could cooperate to ensure their safety. In addition, he also points out escape from international security dilemma is inevitable due to unfavorable establishment of universal state. The core matter concerning international state of nature is that is a situation of possible war in which there is no perpetual peace between sovereign states no international peace, but internal security (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 71-72). Hobbes claims domination exists in the internal aspect of the state. There is neither hegemon force nor global governance in the international arena, but state of war which has two implications firstly, nothing hurdles war and secondly, states have responsibility for their own survival (Devetak, Burke & George, 2012).

Morgenthau argues international politics is conflict for power (Nobel, 1995). Its instant and final aim is how to obtain, preserve and display power and to specify the mode of political operation (Algozaibi, 1965). If people wish to possess a political place without the interference of outsiders, it is required to rally, and place troops. They must also arrange for an authoritative state which can advocate their interests. The anarchical system of states treat international struggles which eventually leads to war (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 73). Morgenthau indicates states should pursue how to achieve its interests, and morality does not determine the state treatment. The outcome is a system

based on self-help that states perpetually pursue might (Leonard, 2018). The conflicts between state directs for legitimizing the menace and application of power in human relationships which is the focal normative tenet of classical realism. And a distinction is drawn from morality in both private and public fields pursuing the practices of Thucydides and Machiavelli by Morgenthau. He argued observing of morality is shrewd method used by powerless to defend themselves against and ultimately to gain power (Tucker, 1952). Morgenthau argues moral norms create misery, if you leave them it will disagree the demand of moral sense. Hence, actions must be assessed against transcendental standards both states, and individual must judge political action by universal moral principles (Murray, 1996).

When crises or emergency cases occasioned, conducting foreign policy and involvement in the international affairs in accordance to private morality: finking, fabricating, luring, larceny, plotting and so on would be observed dubious more vicious based on private morality scale. Sometimes it may be required to violate human rights because of national benefits. International ethics and moral dilemmas are known unpreventable in international politics. And one of his core focuses on IR theory and political realism indicates that the international politics is the field of contradicting state interests and the interests are unstable, because the globe is in transformation. The interests change and realism tenet answers for political reality upheaval (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 74-75).

### **2.3.2 Structural realism**

Structural realism, in other words neorealism, emphasizes that power is the most significant tool in international relations. The key figure who posed this IR theory in his 1979 book 'Theory of International Politics', was Kenneth Waltz. This theory has two subdivisions of offensive realism and defensive realism. He argues that the essence of international structure is specified by its ordering principle. There is no official central power and the great power to divide the capabilities in the international system (Lobell, 2017). Some IR scholars claim that there is difference between classical realism and structural realism. Knud Erik Jorgensen argues structural realism is an important segregation with classical realist theory, and Keith Shimko sees Waltz's theory as distinct notion of international politics. Waltz claims that his theory can illustrate significant international issues which structural realism cannot illustrate

all aspects of international relations (Jepson, 2012). On the contrary, classical realism can illustrate various contemporary phenomenon. However, Morgenthau authenticated domestic factors of the influence upon state behavior in different forms, as nationalism, ideologies, imperialism and the diplomatic skills. In contrast, Waltz overlooked the domestic aspect only stressed on the significance of power politics and centralization of the state power while, Morgenthau claims anarchy could not impede states to gain dominant power (Jepson, 2012).

Focusing on structural realism argumentation, there are some responsible institutions in a state level. In case of illegal act take emergent actions and that is common within each state namely police forces, militaries and courts. But there is no centralized authority above states to expect identical proceeds in an emergency case in international level, therefore, the states can only depend on themselves (Antunes & Camisao, 2018). Offensive realism pursues power and penetrates to attain security by domination and hegemony and from one side, defensive realism advocates that anarchy in the international system provokes states to preserve temperate policies to gain security. From the other side, defensive realism argues aggressive enlargement promulgated by offensive realists' overturns. The inclination of states to comply to the balance of power theory, hence, reducing the initial goal of the state which is maintaining its security (Lobell, 2017).

Defensive structural realists claim that International system ensures motivations for states to pursue security in an anarchical international system. Their major concern for their welfare is from other states which pose menace. States try to enhance their security and decrease the security of other states which this situation induces states to be concern about another's relative power (Taliaferro, 2000). They also offer this notion that a state effort to boost its security by enhancing its power is vain. In contrast, they indicate that states must pursue proper level of power. If states aim supremacy that is because of their internal created preferences. And to look for subordinate strength is irrational answer to outer normative force, thereby, states shape coalition to be safeguarded. This behavior is specified while they see menace and other state's force is only an element according to their account, and from Waltz perspective states calculate menace imported by their respective force, vicinity, purpose, assault and advocacy equilibrium (Elman, 2007).

Offensive structural realists contradict defensive structural realists' argument on pursuing proper level of power of the state. Mearsheimer claims States become intrinsically offensive due to anarchy, because human is aggressive in nature and is greedy for power and dominance (Tang, 2008). States envisage unknown circumference which other state would apply its might to damage another. And in that condition relative strength has importance and state need to enhance their strength in contrast to another state. He also claims that any state has most power in international system can stay safe. But in case of non-existence predominant, states strive to increase wealth and military force to attain resources. They enter war and involve rivals into lengthy and exorbitant struggles, and to surpass another state's enlargement a supreme power may trap another side to tackle the menace or balance against menace (Elman, 2007, pp.18-19).

## **2.4 Constructivism**

Nicholas Onuf was the figure who coined the term of constructivism in IR theory in the 1989. This theory's cornerstone dates to 18<sup>th</sup> century in the writings of Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico and German philosopher Immanuel Kant who argued that gaining knowledge about the world will always be subjective which is refined through human understanding (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, pp. 209-211). This theory emphasizes the significance of notions in which states socially build up reality and act based on the constructed reality (Kaufman 2013, p. 63). Constructivism is a social theory and extensively cares to build up the concept for the relationship between agents, likewise, states and the structures; as the international politics. It is not a substantive theory to offer hypotheses regarding the patterns of world politics; for instance, how it can be explained that why democracies do not fight each other (Barnett, 2014). Constructivists argue that the key significant facet of international relations is social which the social truth is subjective and does not deal with material forces (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 209).

Constructivists views focus beyond material reality that ideas and beliefs effect the world politics. They argue that reality is constructed, and prospects change by the passage of time, because the ideas and beliefs of the actors change. This IR theory argues both agency and structure are reciprocally established, whereas the structures penetrate agency and agency penetrates structures. The first one can be known as the

strength of individual to act and the latter attributed to the international system which are composed of material and ideational foundation. And to exemplify these concepts it is required to offer a clear example, for instance, 500 British nuclear armament pose lesser risk for the United States compared to five North Korean nuclear armaments. This reconnaissance is not due to nuclear armaments which is the material structure, but the meaning granted to the material structure which is ideational structure (Theys, 2017).

Focusing to the above example shows that the social relation of hostility between the US and North Korea demonstrates a subjective structure, likewise common ideas and beliefs among both states and both actors' capacity represents the concept of agency. The change in social relations of hostility relates on the both actors' ideas and beliefs and in case of alterations in these two, the social relationship can be substituted to sodality. Realists view that the anarchical structure of international system specifies the behavior of states. On the contrary, constructivists stress that anarchy is constructed by states. It transfers this meaning in the mind that anarchy is defined from various perspectives which relies on actors what kind of meaning they give it (Theys, 2017).

One of the core argumentations of the constructivists is based on identities and interests. They emphasize as a result of interaction between actors' states gain several identities that identities shape interests and actions. The interests of small and large states differ; likewise, the small state concerns for its survival, whereas, the large states pursue to dominate on the global politics, economic and military issues and the actions of the states should be arrayed with its identity (Theys, 2017).

Martha Finnemore has proposed another variant of constructivist, systemic analysis in her 1996 book, *National Interests in International Society*. Her starting point is the definition of states' identities and interests. But instead of looking at the social interaction between states, focus is on the norms of international society and the way in which they affect state identities and interests. State behavior is defined by identity and interest. Identity and interests are defined by international forces, that is, by the norms of behavior embedded in international society. The norms of international society are transmitted to states through international organizations. They shape national policies by 'teaching' states what their interests should be (Finnemore, cited in Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 218).

Another key argument of constructivism is norms, through regulative norms behavior is ordered and constrained. Constitutive norms establish new actors, profits or

categories of action, and prescriptive norms prescribe norms. A norm changes into behavior when it is accepted and internalized by actors. For instance, constructivists argue that most states agree to support from climate change policies for the retention of human being. Liberals would not support this notion and pursue innovative scientific solutions, and realists may oppose this, because of harmfulness of climate policies that may do to shorter-term national interests (Theys, 2017). Norms variates the manner of states in the international system, likewise in 1980-2000 era China confronted unipolar system ruled by the U.S. However, it was commonly oriented towards practical politics, and took part in the cooperation with international organization, treaties and protocols (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 219).

Constructivist also argue factors establish contexts and the contexts form factors with the stress on meanings, ideas and norms. Constructivists can illustrate alteration in the world politics. They demonstrate how states can run away the realist reasoning of anarchy, as the EU states changed their conducts, the context of peace and security was established despite of experiencing war in Europe. They can demonstrate how International Organizations helped to secure reciprocal profits? EU states proved what their demands are and who they view of themselves? They can demonstrate how U.S. altered its policy toward the South African apartheid because of actions of states in the world politics (Ba & Hoffmann, 2018).

Anti- apartheid norm ascended and embedded the conception of this notion that apartheid is admissible behavior in structuring a society or chemical weapons prohibited, as actors understood that chemical weapons are brutal, and any actor is conceived civilized must deny the usage. Constructivism finally simplifies the alteration in the international system wrapping up that the power of ideas in illustrating the action in the world politics. The significance of identity to indicating what is the will of actors, and the value of periodicity of relation between actor's interests, identities behavior and the social context which they live (Ba & Hoffmann, 2018).

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Initially, Liberalism in the first stage emerged towards anti-tyranny of Church through reforms movement led by Martin Luther and John Calvin and in the second stage against authoritarianism of political leaders through restricting their absolute

authorities by law. Finally, in the economic direction liberalism rebelled against aristocracy and feudalism and after the collapse of feudalism. The capital released and the middle class grew which was called bourgeoisie and became the main carrier of liberalism. John Locke the founding father of political liberalism argued that natural rights do not come from God and religion, but from law and nature, and the right to life, freedom and equity are the basic rights.

In the realm of IR liberals are concerned how to develop a political state to protect from external threats without harming the individual liberty. Sociological liberals argue IR is about relations between people, groups, and organizations beyond boundaries. The interdependence liberals claim that states and citizens are impressed in every incident in today's world in terms of trade, access to information, labor and investments and this interdependency among them consolidates the relations. On the contrary, institutional liberals claim that international institutions; as NATO and EU are collection of regulations or regimes which dominate state functions in special fields and facilitate to promote cooperation between states. Whilst, Republican liberals argue democracies do not fight each other due to enjoying common values in terms of culture of peaceful conflict resolution, common moral values and interdependence. Finally, neoliberalism also deals with international institutions. Those neoliberals advocate this institution argue that cooperation and security can be attained; if the international institutions are created within state's diverse political, economic and security aspects. Accordingly, collaboration is for the benefit of the states and states will help each other in the absence of a central power in the international system.

Realists view international system is anarchy, because there is neither pervasive power nor world government, and the state is the supreme actor in the world politics. Classical realists; as Thucydides argued that states like Athens and Sparta were main actors in taking decision to enter war or surrender and act unitarily and no actors in the national level could abolish their decisions. Machiavelli argument centralized in marginalizing morality and Christianity values from the political realism and international politics. He allows the ruler to have the characteristics of fox and lion in implementing of foreign policy. Thomas Hobbes saw human condition living in state of nature who called human is the wolf of human, stressed through establishing sovereign state people could cooperate to ensure their safety. He claims states are dominant in their domestic sphere, but there is neither hegemon force nor global governance in the

international arena. Morgenthau argues international politics is struggle for power and the final aim is how to obtain, preserve and display power and to specify the mode of political operation.

Structural realists view power is the most important tool in international relations. Kenneth Waltz argues that the essence of international structure is determined by its ordering principle and there is no official central power and great powers to divide the capabilities in the international system. Offensive and defensive realism are subdivision of international politics theory of Waltz and according to offensive realism, state pursues power and penetrates to attain security by domination and hegemony. While, Mearsheimer claims States become intrinsically offensive due to anarchy, because human is aggressive in nature and is greedy for power and dominance. On the contrary, defensive structural realists claim that International system ensures motivations for states to pursue security in a chaotic international system. Their major concern is from other states which pose threat, whilst states try to enhance their security and decrease the security of other states.

Constructivists view that states socially build up reality and act based on the constructed reality thereby, the key significant facet of international relations is social that the social truth is subjective and does not deal with material forces. They claim ideas and beliefs effect the world politics, thus, prospects change by the passage of time, because ideas and beliefs of the actors change. Constructivism theory argues both agency and structure have mutually established, the structures influence agency and agency penetrate structures that the first one is attributed to individual act and the latter to international system composed of material and ideational foundation. Realists view that the anarchical structure of the international system determines the behavior of the states conversely, constructivists claim anarchy is constructed by the states.

Identities and interest are another core argument of constructivists who underscore as a result of interaction between actors, states gain identities and identities shape interests and action that the interests of large and small states differ. While, small states concern for their survival and the large states pursue to dominate on the global politics. They also emphasize that the economic and military affairs and actions of states should be consistent with their identities. Constructivists also argue factors establish contexts

and the contexts shape forms with the stress on meanings, ideas and norms, constructivists can illustrate alteration in the world politics.

The constructivism theory is best suited in the U.S.-Afghan relations, because constructivists argue that the reality is socially constructed entailing state's identity, interest, relationships and so forth. Therefore, aftermath of 9/11 attacks in the United States President George W. Bush for the first time posed the question of the U.S. identity and the hatred of terrorists from America by placing identity in the center of the U.S. foreign policy. The president attributed the terrorist hatred to the U.S. freedoms applied the language of GWOT and oriented his foreign policy on counterterrorism. Whilst, unified the international community by declaring Al-Qaida terrorist network as a pernicious global threat. Thereafter, the identity of Al-Qaida was constituted and promoted across the world as well as representing Islamic ideology that launched attack against west. Thereby, Afghanistan was centralized in the axis of counterterrorism approach.

The Bush National Security Strategy 2002, underlined targeting of terrorists and its patrons with all possibilities of the United States stipulating that if terrorist or state patron intend to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. was supposed to eliminate the menace before reaching to its boundaries. While, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT 2003), emphasized that the U.S. would not remain calm until the global terrorism is detected and vanquished. It can be argued that how President George W. Bush socially constituted reality and acted based on the constructed reality. How his idea and belief finally effected the world politics through interaction between states and magnification made from the terrorist threat which convinced and harmonized the globe and made alliances to be unified in the GWOT. Finally, he made use of identity and gained interest to reach to the final goal of U.S. which was domination on the global politics. This later eventuated to the unilaterally attack of Iraq in 2003, which this decision can be attributed to this argument that the U.S. global hegemony throughout the globe established.

The U.S.-Afghan relations in Obama era which has been discussed in detail in chapter four can also be perceived within the constructivist theoretical framework. When Obama declares surge of 30,000 troops, he once again makes a clear justification of war against terrorism through directly refocusing on the 9/11 attacks as a rationale to

continue war against Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He demonstrates that how significant it was for the U.S. and its allies that he used the same language of president Bush. If we scrutinize deeply, Al-Qaida was denied, even its leader Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in 2011. This network did not have physical base anymore, but despite the existence of threat and transnational terrorism phrase which was constructed and used by President Obama provided a justification for continuation of the war.

Therefore, declaration of troops surge policy in Afghanistan was an articulation through which the menace of terrorism reconstructed and highlighted that the risk was heightened and decentralized. Thus, the language and practices of GWOT was remained and created the opportunity for the U.S. long term presence in the country. Obama administration stressed its action more on COIN, while most of objectives on the development and constructing security institutions achieved and paved the way for finalizing Strategic Partnership Agreement and Bilateral Security Agreement to have strategic presence. The implementation of Stabilization projects, especially supporting women and Civil Society Organizations can be perceived the Obama administration efforts on constructing political order that helped the development process in the country.

President George W. Bush had constructed GWOT by linking Al-Qaida with Taliban, while President Obama resorted to the usage of transnational terrorism justifying that the world had changed after the 9/11 and transnational terrorism should have been vanquished and thereby, AF-PAK strategy was declared to target terrorist to the areas that the designers of the 9/11 attacks habituated.

After Taliban opened office in Qatar Obama administration supported the inauguration and this behavior confronted with Karzai opposition. Since waning the Taliban relations with Al-Qaida felt by Obama, from one hand, he had realized that the threat was decentralized and from the other hand, drones' campaign had obtained result in terms of targeting terrorists in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hence, he strongly declared his troops withdrawal decision and limited remaining of troops in the country asserting that the U.S. combat mission terminated, and the limited number of troops would train ANSDF to prevent Al-Qaida not to establish secure haven and attack the

U.S. and its allies. Thereby, it marked how Obama by using safe sanctuaries justified the limited remaining of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Consequently, I can argue that how ideas and identity was created, evolved and put in to practice in the fight against the GWOT and shaped the core relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan and how the global powers were unified and jointly responded to CT and COIN in the sanctuaries of terrorism. When the Obama interest demanded how he increased his military forces in Afghanistan and when he saw his interest at risk facing American public dissatisfaction, how he withdrew the troops and justified the remaining number to assist ANDSF in non-combat missions.

### **3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. INVASION IN AFGHANISTAN**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This Chapter begins with a special focus on the strategic importance of Afghanistan for regional and global power and subsequently discusses historical background of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan briefly underlying on the U.S. covert support from Afghan Mujahedeen during USSR invasion in the country and emergence of Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. Hence, indicates that the 9/11 incident sparked global war on terrorism and paved the way for the huge presence of the U.S. and international troops presence in the country which caused disintegration of the Taliban regime and installation of a new government in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force was responsible to ensure the interim government security to practice its sovereignty and to train Afghan forces. The U.S. and international forces built the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. While big powers participated in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, specially, PRT teams, DOD, USAID and other involved donors have implemented diverse programs through expenditure of huge amount of funds. Finally, the chapter ends with a focus on emergent forces; as women, youth, media and civil society organizations after overturn of the Taliban regime which most of them were enabled by the USAID programs.

#### **3.2 Afghanistan's Strategic Importance**

Afghanistan's strategic location has drawn the attention of the great game players throughout its political history. This homeland witnessed the rivalry between the empires due to its location in the significant trade path between Asia and the Middle East. The external powers have frequently invaded but could not retain a stable footprint in the country, and such domination in the rough land of the country was momentary (Runion, 2007, p. 1). In other words, Afghanistan has been in the intersection of British and Russia competition which eventuated in three Anglo-Afghan wars in the ninetieth and early twentieth century. Due to harsh geographical conditions and the self-determined status of the nation. Afghanistan could safeguard

majority of its dominance in the imperialist wars and Second World War which was impartial. Despite of losing some parts of its territories to the British India and Russia, the country has never been under the occupation and subjugation to the colonial rulers (Vayrynen, 1980). Afghanistan is surrounded by land with no seaport and is mountainous country situated in the southern Asia, shares border in the east with Iran to the north west of Pakistan, in the eastern side of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and in the remote east to China. The country has occupied 250,000 square miles of land area (652,000 square kilometers) (Runion, 2007, p. 2).



**Figure 1.1:** Afghanistan Pakistan Region 2015-2017 Concept Notes

Source: (Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defense Denmark, 2014, p.1).

The country also holds central location in the region possessing major geo-economic importance. Afghanistan’s geo-political and geo-strategical place has been hindrance in the history, and its place in the ancient Silk Route, South Asia, and presence in the middle of crucial neighbors significantly plays key role. The country is the transit and transport point between Central and South Asia and links the markets of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and China due to its strategic position along the Silk Route (Akbari, 2018).

From other perspective it is located at the heart of Central Asia at the gathering place of old trade path known as “The Silk Road” connected to all part of Asia. Some to China, some into north of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva, and some to the south- east

of India, and to the east into Iran, which conduces to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. The merchandise had to cross these cities and Afghanistan. Hence, from strategical perspective some cities of Afghanistan located on these trade path used to gain as focal point of trade. Historically, the country had impact on the world trade for instance, in the 1300 BC, the blue lapis lazuli stone was sent from Badakhshan province to Egypt applied for Egyptian Pharaoh funeral mask. And very far back in two thousand five years before Christianity. Lapis lazuli was sent from Afghanistan to Iraq for the lyre laid to rest with the monarchs of the old city of Ur, most of them are currently in the British Museum (Omrani, 2010).

In the second century BC, the trade path had expanded even in China. The Chinese Emperor had sent representative named Zhang Qian to establish relations with the northern people of Afghanistan in Balkh. This place was the market for every type of commodities and the Silk Road had its peak between the first century BC up to third century AD, which the Kushan Empire was ruling not only across Afghanistan, but in some parts of neighboring countries likewise, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The massive bulk of commodities crossed through Kushan territorial control, containing silk from China, ruby and lapis azure from Badakhshan of Afghanistan, spices, tusk and chrysotile from India, silver products from the Persian empire and prepared commodities from the Roman Empire (Omrani, 2010).

Therefore, the Afghan government must provide the opportunity and create space for private enterprise to direct the country to attain a self-sustaining economy as well as Afghanistan's strategic location. The country is rich in terms of having natural and mineral resources and its mountainous environment is bed to diverse geological establishments with affluence of minerals, valuable metals, precious stones, and hydrocarbons. The value of these is estimated by the United States Department of Defense (DOD), Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to be over \$ I trillion worth (SIGAR, 2016).

Mineral deposits in each provinces of Afghanistan have been identified by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). As Mes Aynak copper deposit in Logar province was granted to Metallurgical Corporation of China in the year 2008 by Afghan government. The whole copper reserves in the country ranges to sixty million metric tons and copper reserves at Aynak approximated to encompass approximately thirty million

metric tons (Akbari, 2018). Gas and oil reserves located in the north zone of Afghanistan in the provinces which share borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The available production and transportation establishment for gas and oil are concentrated in Balkh, Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol provinces (SIGAR, 2016).

Based on the survey conducted between 2007- and 2008 by the Afghan and American Geological Surveys, quicksilver deposits, scarce earth elements, sulfur, chromite's, sand etc., were found in 20 mineral fields and unexplored sumac stone of copper and skarn reserves approximated to cover 28.5 million metric tons of copper with extra. The silver and gold deposits, and the estimation from Haji Gak deposit approximated to have nearly 2,260 million tons of iron ore with grades higher than 62 weigh percent iron (Akbari, 2018).

### **3.3 Afghanistan's Strategic Importance for Regional and Global Power**

In addition of the strategic importance of Afghanistan, the country has importance for the regional and global powers. Since aftermath of the 9/11 event the regional and global players involvements have increased in the context of contribution in diverse aspects in Afghanistan. The players have influenced their soft power to pursue their interests and keep an eye upon their rivals within Afghanistan. The aim is not to evaluate the players contribution, but to briefly assess the importance of Afghanistan for both regional and global powers.

#### **3.3.1 Afghanistan importance for pakistan**

Afghanistan and Pakistan geographically located in a rich energy zone in the Middle East and Central Asia. The needy energy countries such as India and China have potential capacity of economic growth in Afghanistan. Pakistan requires energy for the revival of its own economic condition and the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI), gas pipeline provides energy origin that will be enough for Pakistan for the next 50 years. Therefore, stability and peace in Afghanistan has direct impact over Pakistan economic condition (Bangash & Jamal, 2016). In the regional context, trade connectivity of Pakistan with Afghanistan obtains more importance for Pakistan. Because Afghanistan provides nearby transit path between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). And Pakistan's vicinity to Afghanistan and the

CARs is for the benefit of Pakistan due to less transportation costs; if assumed export destination. In addition, Pakistan lacks energy and access to surplus energy of CARs has immense importance for Pakistan (Khan, 2016).

Pakistan can be linked with the CARs markets or larger markets through seeking regional programs likewise, Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for enhancing connection with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The CAREC program expands regional trade with Pakistan and Afghanistan covering Transportation, business simplification, Energy and Trade Policy. Hence, 10 countries have its membership; as (China, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), (Khan, 2016). The CAREC corridor links regional economies to warm water ports of Gwadar and Karachi to reach global markets which crosses through Afghanistan. The ensuring security in Afghanistan is crucial for successful implementation of the program for both CARs to reach to global markets and for Pakistan to find way to CAREC markets. If security condition of Afghanistan will not improve another chance for Pakistan to access China and the Central Asian markets is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (Khan, 2016).

### **3.3.2 Afghanistan importance for iran**

Since the Iran revolution, Afghanistan was centralized in the foreign policy of Iran, despite, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been observed of great importance for Iran from different dimensions. The two countries have been sharing common culture; hence, Iran has always strived to gain from the factor of geo-culture to develop and pursue its advantage in Afghanistan. Specially, group of Hazara Shia people in Afghanistan who share same culture and religion has always been supported by Iran in order Iran maintain its role and influence in the future political structure of Afghan governance (Mohammad & Yousefi, 2012).

Afghanistan also possesses geo-strategical importance to Iran due to presence and penetration of major and powerful states in Afghanistan which posed threat for the national security of Iran. On the contrary, Iran has sought to restrict this influence by enhancing its influence in Afghanistan (Mohammad & Yousefi, 2012). Iran uses Taliban as shelter and supports them in terms of fatal weaponry and intelligence

assistance to challenge and entangle the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan which undermines the U.S. interest in the region (Sarkar, 2019).

Eventually, Afghanistan's geo-economic importance for Iran cannot be overlooked, as Iran presence in Afghanistan paves the way to obtain its economic benefits (Mohammad & Yousefi, 2012). Iran aims to dominate its economic penetration in Afghanistan with the future prospect to be the axis for crossing of commodities and services between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf, India and China. This economic goal leads to boost its security and political interests, and as of its influence Iran pledged \$ 560 million in the reconstruction of Afghanistan at the International Conference in Tokyo in 2002. In the year 2006, Iran also committed \$ 100 million in London Conference for the same purpose (Milani, 2006). The huge volume of Iran investments concentrated in the Herat city of Afghanistan which is in the proximity of Iran border encompassed foundational projects including road, bridge construction, education, agriculture and so on (Milani, 2006). Trade between Iran and Afghanistan ranges to 2 up to 3 billion dollars annually, despite of being under severe sanction of the United States. The United States has excluded Afghanistan from Iran sanctions and from March and August 2018, Iran exportation reached above \$ 1.43 billion value of commodities. Therefore, Afghanistan holds the fourth largest importing of Iran commodities. The Chabahar port paves the way for Afghanistan to decline its reliance on Pakistan and would be linked to sea trade routes (Malikzada, 2019).

### **3.3.3 Afghanistan importance for india**

India views Afghanistan as an important neighbor from multi- dimensions. In the first realm, it converges to enhancing India's extension for maritime safety and connectivity and in the second scope emphasizes on Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean region. Hence, the key role of Afghanistan has been assumed by India the gateway to Central Asia. The relationship with Iran paves the way for India to pursue its maritime interests, and linkage with Afghanistan, and Central Asia is the initial goal for India's involvement with Iran to establish Chabahar port. Eventually, Afghanistan obliquely led India's maritime activity in the region and developing Chabahar port by India impedes China's progress not to access Gwadar- [sic] port in Pakistan (Marjani, 2018).

Chabahar port Strategic location is on the southeastern coast of Iran in the continuation of Makran Beach of Pakistan and in the Sistan and Baluchestan province adjacent to the conflux of Indian Ocean with the Gulf of Oman which is announced as Free Trade Zone. It is situated in the 70 Km west of Gawadar port of Pakistan that both Afghan and Indian policy makers consider this port to be used instead of Pakistan port and Bandar Abbas of Iran which is presently being used by India to get linked to Central Asia (Mohammadi, 2018).

The connection between South and Central Asia have importance, because South Asia with the population of 1.7 Billion people is a good market for the products manufactured in the zonal countries. In addition, India has rapidly grown and has drawn the attention of CARs, which are rich in terms of energy reserves and want to find market for their goods. On the contrary, Central Asia is the most important consumer of the commodities manufactured in South Asia; for instance, Pakistan exports 42.5 % pharmaceutical to Central Asian Republics. In contrast to Pakistan India does export the total of only 25.5 % that Pakistan has high share of exports than India (Mohammadi, 2018). If Pakistan provides cross path for India to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia. India's Pharmaceuticals market surpass and would influence in Central Asian countries and Pakistan goods lose its market. And due to this reason Pakistan prevents India not to access these markets, and it shows linking South and Central Asia is important for the development of the region (Mohammadi, 2018).

#### **3.3.4 Afghanistan importance for russia**

Afghanistan has essential space in Russian foreign policy contemplation. Moscow is keen to improve security in Afghanistan and Central Asia since being extremely worried of the Afghan illegal narcotics trafficking and influx through central Asia. Russia wants to maximize its control over hydrocarbons of the cross path of Central Asia, secure Russian engagement in the energy projects; likewise, TAPI, and detect mineral reserves of lithium, copper, and to reach Central Asian and Afghan market for Russian commodities (Sangar, 2016). After the collapse of USSR, the geopolitical system of the region altered and Russia's benefit in Afghanistan has been dependent in the war on terror since 1990s. Russian political figures have always claimed that Russia was engaged in the combat of Islamic extremism, and aftermath of the 9/11 event the U.S. long presence is viewed a threat for Russia. Political commentators

specially, Moscow military apparatus has been doubtful from the U.S. presence in Central Asia. According to Brzezinski, 'the US had to limit Russia's influence in Central Asia and focus on cooperation with China and Turkey instead with Russia' (Brzezinski, cited in Sangar, 2016, p. 63). According to Mackinder (2005, p.1) 'who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World- Island; Who ruled the World- Island commands the world'. On the contrary, Spykman argued that Mackinder exaggerated, and he amended his theory by claiming that the pivot area and the world domination is 'Rimland 'rather than Heartland and argued, 'Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls destinies of the world' (Spykman, cited in Sangar, 2016, p. 64). The Central Asia zone is section of Heartland, and Afghanistan has been situated in the middle of the Heartland and Rimland. The northward of the country lies to Heartland and southward, beyond the Hindukush is situated within the Rimland (Sangar, 2016).

### **3.3.5 Afghanistan importance for china**

Afghanistan has great importance in the strategic calculation of China (Khan, 2015). The strategic significance of Afghanistan in Beijing's foreign policy strategy has been raised since China showed intention in building One Belt One Road (OBOR), (Huasheng, 2016). Haggai (2016) denotes, "The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is a combination of two outward-facing concepts introduced by President Xi Jinping in late 2013 to promote economic engagement and investment a long two main routes". The first route, the Silk Road Economic Belt which passes through Central Asia and the second, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road crosses through Southeast and South Asia (Zimmerman, 2015).



**Figure 1.2:** Investments Along China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Source: (Center for American Progress, 2015, p.5).

The first route namely, the new Silk path Economic Belt, crosses Central Asia ends to Europe. The 21 Century Maritime Silk Road shall curl South and Western Europe by sea stopping in South- east Asia, South Asia and Africa (Haggai, 2016). The OBOR aims on amelioration of regional foundation, enhancing regional economic cooperation, eliminating trade obstacles, and persuading cultural relation to vindicate the extensive projects (Zimmerman, 2015). The OBOR initiative geographically covers 60 countries throughout three continents, decreases transaction expenses and will simplify trade circulation through frontiers (Haggai, 2016).

The geo-economic significance of Afghanistan stimulated China to widely invest in Afghanistan and to boost their relations and extend economic cooperation. Therefore, the trade between Sino-Afghan increased over \$ 700 million, and between 2002-2010 the export raised from \$ 19.91 million to \$ 704 million. Conversely, China import volume raised from \$ 0.8 million to \$ 11.7 million (Rahman, 2017).

China gained first position as a foreign country to win oil exploration transaction with Afghanistan. In the 2011, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), along with its Afghan partner Watan Oil & Gas, achieved the right of crude oil exploration from northern provinces of Faryab and Suri-pul. And in the Northwest, as well as Amu Darya River Basin oil reserve in the northward of the country. The latter zone deposits

contain 1.6 billion barrels of petroleum, sixteen trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and five hundred million barrels of natural gas. The China initial investments covered four hundred million dollars to explore the oil reserves of the region (Khan, 2015).

The Wakhan Corridor is located at the passage of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan containing historical worth and is known part of ancient Silk Road. The swath situated in Badakhshan province of Afghanistan shares 47 km distance. In the Southward has 300 km distance with Pakistan, on the Northeast and west shares 260 km boundary with Tajikistan which in the contemporary era has major importance for the purpose of regional linkage and tourism (Munir & Shafiq, 2019).



**Figure 1.3:** Wakhan Corridor

Source: (Central Asia Institute, 2011, p.7).

Through this Corridor Afghanistan will be integrated with China and Pakistan, and its access to India through Chabahar port will be undermined. Hence, Afghanistan's political penetration will be enhanced, and the country will be able to balance its ties with major and regional powers. It will also pave the way for constructing the infrastructure of Afghanistan unlike, the Wakhan Corridor is the only option for China for the regional reach out, and China will be linked to Central Asia and Gulf states (Munir & Shafiq, 2019).

### **3.3.6 Afghanistan importance for united states**

Afghanistan holds strategic importance for the United States more than regional powers. Basically, the U.S national security is defined beyond its indigenous boundaries keeping busy and involving probable rival powers in the region which is one of the tactics requires offensive strategy. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the Middle East is not ordinary presence but is within the framework of offensive strategy aims to expand its influential sphere and turns down the probable rival's influential sphere which would pose threat for the U.S. in the future (Mohajer, 2018, p. 98).

The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has great significance for the U.S. in order to have perpetual stay in the region and Afghanistan for diverse purposes; as aiming to restrain China's expansion by consolidating defense and security collaboration with her guardian ally India, to reach out wealthy energy countries of CARs, and to have surveillance over the Atomic Missile power Pakistan. Ultimately, to draw the attention of the globe to sale its modern weapons which have been used in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan (Idrees & Anwar, 2017). By the establishment of permanent military stations in the strategic zone of the glob in Afghanistan. The United States wants to curb its rival Iran by creating pressure circles and strives to have control over energy reserves of the region (Afzali, 2012, p. 64).

### **3.7 U.S. and Mujahedeen Relations During Soviet Invasion**

The United States of America in the era of President Jimmy Carter established concealed relations with Afghanistan's resistance group to impede the Soviet penetration in Afghanistan and wanted to draw USSR into a backwater to waste and challenge Moscow's resources. Subsequently, President Ronald Reagan's policy was based on providing military and economic cooperation for Afghani Mujahedeen through Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI). The U.S. not only wanted to hit the Soviets, but through this was putting pressure on Soviets troops to leave Afghanistan. Therefore, U.S. provided 900 anti-aircraft Stinger missiles to the resistance group to pose threat for its rival (Bolan, 2009, p.117). Osama Bin Laden was a member of Mujahedeen combatant fighting against Soviets recruited Arab nationals who voluntarily fought alongside the Mujahedeen (Hartman, 2002).

Eventually, the Soviet troops left the country in the 1989, and put domestic implication for Afghanistan's internal situation which caused civil war that lasted until the 1990s. From one hand, the internal anarchy in Afghanistan was intensifying and from the other hand, those who had gained radical Islamic knowledge in Pakistan emerged in 1996 under the name of Taliban who occupied Kabul and northern provinces except Panjshir and ruled until 2001 in the country (Jones, 2008). Bin Laden returned from Saudi after failing to inspire Islamic revolution in his motherland Saudi and started recruitment of radical militia in Al-Qaida network. He issued an Islamic fatwa inviting all for Jihad against Americans. In the 1998 Al-Qaida targeted the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. However, President Clinton answered by cruise missile attack against Al-Qaida training sanctuary in Afghanistan and the battle flame between the U.S. and Al-Qaida sparked since that time and globalized after the 9/11 attacks (Bolan, 2009, pp, 118-119).

As mentioned above, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Afghanistan witnessed the appearance of the Taliban that ninety percent of the land was occupied which drew the U.S. attention excluding Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Taliban government was not recognized by the global society, and the fact behind overthrowing this regime by the United States was fear from 'Islamization' of Afghanistan which was conceived as driving factor for another Islamic trends in the Central and South Asian countries (Gul, 2006).

Aftermath of the disintegration of Taliban regime in 2001, the U.S. purpose for Afghanistan was to support in building a stable government encouraging Northern Alliance to share power in new government that would help the U.S. in removing Al-Qaida and terrorist haven (Fields & Ahmed, 2011). Therefore, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) prepared the military layout for Afghanistan containing three objectives, to eliminate Al-Qaida, eradicate Taliban regime by building capacity of coalition partners to impede the re-emergence of terrorism and to assist the Afghan people through rebuilding infrastructures ((Dobbins et al., 2008, p, 90). And very far back from the 9/11 event, the Taliban was accused by the U.S. for refuging and concealing Osama bin Laden who was viewed to had been involved in terrorist operation. Ultimately, the 9/11 event paved the way for the U.S. to remove the Taliban. Overthrowing the Taliban and Al-Qaida rationalized the U.S. grand strategy for a durable presence which had already been speculated after the destruction of the Soviet

Union to solidify its unipolarity by practicing unilateralist approach under the name of war against terror (Gul, 2006).

### **3.8 The 9/11 Incident**

The U.S. history witnessed terrible incident on 11, September 2001, attributed to an organized terrorist attack by four hijacked airliners which the two targeted the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the third targeted Pentagon in Virginia, and the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania, finally left 3,000 victims (Larson & Savych, 2005, p.91). The 9/11 attack was attributed to Osama Bin Laden leader of Al-Qaida network. President George W. Bush justified the existence of Osama Bin Laden and his network which was not only a serious threat to the U.S. national and security interests, but international community as well. Therefore, Bush unified the international community to participate in the fight against GWOT and to eradicate the nest and sanctuary of Al-Qaida. The U.S. administration requested the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban regime to surrender Osama Ben Laden and the Taliban regime rejected (Dobbins et al., 2008).

#### **3.8.1 Operation enduring freedom**

The refusal of Osama Bin Laden by Taliban to surrender him to the United States eventuated to the military presence of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan to overthrow Al-Qaida network and its affiliated organizations. Finally, the U.S military operation was launched on 7 October 2001 (Larson & Savych, 2005, p. 95). The combat firstly, covered U.S. air strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaida with the intention to support resistance of the Northern Alliance forces composed of different Afghan ethnic parties (Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara), and non- Taliban Pashtuns who were anti-Taliban. The Taliban drastically lost their rule in the major cities of Afghanistan within few months their regime terminated on December 9,2001 (Katzman & Thomas, 2017).

#### **3.8.2 Bonn agreement**

The United Nations Security Council had a prominent position in paving the way for organizing a meeting which resulted to the formation of an interim government in Afghanistan. On 14,11, 2001 the United Nations Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 1378 summoned for the United Nation to establish a transitional government, and member states were invited to participate to ensure security through deploying joint peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. The Afghan major political factions agreed on a deal for establishing an interim administration in Afghanistan. They signed the Bonn Agreement on December 4, 2001 in the hosted Conference of the UN that the interim administration was chaired by Hamid Karzai and the abovementioned agreement ensured the codification and approval of a constitution and national election (Dobbins et al., 2008, pp, 93- 94).

The interim administration duration was agreed for six months under the guidance of chairman who would rule until the establishment of a transitional government which would be formed by an emergency grand assembly (Loya Jirga). The transitional administration would subsequently lead Afghanistan for two years [sec] eighteen months and had to assemble next grand assembly to draft a new constitution and hold free and fair elections (Fields & Ahmed, 2011, p.5). It was also agreed to deploy international force under the patronage of the UN in Afghanistan to maintain security in Kabul. Thereafter, UNSC resolution 1401 formed the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with the intention to facilitate for implementing the Bonn Agreement and Lakhdar Brahimi the chairman of the Bonn Conference appointed the in charge for UNAMA (Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 94).

In the pursuit of Bonn Agreement on 12 June 2002, the grand assembly was held after 23 years. Hamid Karzai was re-elected as the head of the transitional administration for the next two years [sec] eighteen months. The U.S. was supporting Karzai behind the scene to have Pashtun nomination as head of the state. Finally, the new constitution was ratified by Loya Jirga in January 2004 which provided the opportunity for the Afghans to enjoy their political rights to vote in the first direct presidential polls held on 9 October 2004. While, the international community aim was to institutionalize democracy in Afghanistan at the first stage (Gul, 2006).

### **3.8.3 International security assistance force (ISAF)**


The UNSCR 1386 put the cornerstone of the establishment of ISAF for six months base on 20, December 2001, to support Afghan interim government in Kabul and its periphery in terms of ensuring security in the area of its responsibility made up of air,

ground and maritime units (Cambridge University Press, 2002). It initially was under the command of the U.K that 18 participant nation states were involved in ISAF. After a new mandate exported by UNSCR 1510, its scope of responsibility broadened beyond of the Capital of Afghanistan (ISW, 2007).

The ISAF command was undertaken by NATO in August 2003, and the phases of ISAF's enlargements had been overseen in the compliance with the UNSCR 1510. The development caused the creation of four zones commands to facilitate the Afghan interim authority to apply its sovereignty and penetrate throughout Afghanistan. Thereby, the expansion of ISAF took place in diverse stages as follows: 1- French and German troops fielded in the north in December 2003, 2- Italy and Spain settled forces in the west in February 2005, in December 2005 troops from U.S., U.K, Canada and Dutch expanded to south (ISW, 2007). The 4-5 stage ISAF troops scope of mission covered overall territory of Afghanistan and in October 2006 (Gallis, 2007).

The number of its troops reached to 62,000 from 42 countries (ISW, 2007). While, the number of ISAF troops in 2011, increased over 130,000 from 51 nations (Paris, 2015). Hence, the U.S. forces surged to 100,000 troops in 2011 as well (Sims, Lujan & West, 2012). Finally, ISAF mission terminated in 31 December 2014 (Maranian, 2015). The security responsibility transitioned to Afghan National Defense Security Force (ANDSF), and one day later NATO new mission under Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began which is non-combat mission (DOS, 2019).

The key major task of ISAF based on bilateral agreement between ISAF and interim government of Afghanistan was to help the interim authority in establishing security establishment, providing training for future Afghan forces and in the realm of rehabilitation of the country (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Based on SIGAR quarterly report the rehabilitation funding as of 31.12.2018 for Afghanistan since 2002 approximated to 132.30 billion USD, and the war costs totaled 737.6 billion USD that the expenses of Afghanistan's rehabilitation shapes sixteen percent of this amount (SIGAR, 2019, p.43).



**Figure 3.1: Afghanistan Annual Cost of War and Reconstruction Between 2002-2018 (\$ Billions)**

Source: (SIGAR, 2019, p.48).

### 3.9 Building Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)

After toppling down of the Taliban regime the situation was tranquil in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its international alliance presumed that Al Qaeda, Taliban and its affiliated networks had been fully broken down. Afghans were encouraged to be involved in rebuilding of their country by the United Nations mission in Kabul. In the beginning of January 2002 two kinds of international troops had presence in Afghanistan. The ISAF was responsible for the maintenance of security in Kabul and its periphery. From one hand, the U.S. military counterterrorism operations led by special forces under Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operating in the remaining points of Afghanistan and was under the U.S. Central Command (CENCOM), and from the other hand, the local armed forces could conduct operations with immunity and had competition in expanding their influence (Kelly, Bensahel & Oliker, 2011, p.19). Geneva hosted a Conference in April 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) were the member participants. The aim of the Conference was how to bring reform in the security aspect of Afghanistan. Five powers committed to contribute in the security sector reform (SSR) program, the U.S. took over military reform efforts; Germany the police; Italy the Justice aspect; the UK combating drugs; and Japan the process of disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR). The U.S. initiated ANA training in May 2002 in the Battalion level. Basic training offered for Battalions within 70 days but

expected capacity building of the ANA units required at least 6 months. And no such effort was made, and training of Afghan trainer started soon after officially training commenced with the intention that the training to be transformed from international to local trainers (Kelly, Bensahel & Oliker, 2011, pp.21-22).

The Afghan authority and contributing states representatives met outside Bonn in December 2002, known as Bonn II discussing the size and structure of ANA which was agreed that the recruiting of soldiers should be voluntarily with the size of 70,000 troops including the Afghan noncombatant and Defense Ministry staff that the composition of the Afghan ethnicity must be observed. Although the timeline for completion of ANA was not specified, but the U.S. military plan makers together with the Afghan representatives jointly arranged the ANA formulation. As 43,000 combat forces stationed in the Capital and 4 cities, 21,000 support personnel formed into commands for recruitment, education, logistic, communications and intelligence, 3,000 staffs for the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and 3,000 air force (Kelly, Bensahel & Oliker, 2011, p.24). The size of the recruitment in the ANA, and Afghan National Police ANP was in fluctuation between 2003-2017, because Taliban began to come back to Afghanistan from their havens in Pakistan (Kelly, Bensahel & Oliker, 2011, p.32).

**Table 3.1: Size of Afghan Security Troops on Duty, 2003-2017**

Month	Ministry of Defense Forces	Ministry of Interior Forces	Total Afghan Security Forces
End 2003	6,000	0	6,000
End 2004	24,000	33,000	57,000
End 2005	26,000	40,000	66,000
End 2006	36,000	49,700	86,000
End 2007	50,000	75,000	125,000
Apr-08	57,800	79,910	137,710
Oct-08	68,000	79,910	147,910
Mar-09	82,780	79,910	162,690
Jul-09	91,900	81,020	172,920
Nov-09	95,000	95,000	190,000
Dec-09	100,131	94,958	195,089
Mar-10	113,000	102,000	215,000
April/May 2010	119,388	104,459	223,847
Aug-10	134,000	109,000	243,000
Sep-10	138,164	120,504	258,668
Oct-10	144,638	116,367	261,005

**Table 3.2: Size of Afghan Security Troops on Duty, 2003-2017 Continue**

Dec-10	149,533	116,856	266,389
Jan/Feb 2011	152,000	118,800	270,800
Apr-11	164,003	122,000	286,003
May-11	168,037	128,622	296,659
Aug-11	169,076	134,865	303,941
Sep-11	170,781	136,122	306,903
Oct-11	173,150	139,070	312,220
Dec-11	179,610	143,800	323,410
Jan-12	184,437	145,577	330,014
Feb-12	187,874	148,932	336,806
Mar-12	194,466	149,642	344,108
Oct-12	178,501	148,536	327,037
Jan-13	177,579	149,775	327,354
Mar-13	177,725	151,766	329,491
Sep-13	185,817	152,336	338,153
Mar-14	178,617	152,678	331,295
February 2015**	174,120	154,685	328,805
May-15	176,762	155,182	331,944
Jul-15	161,461	148,296	309,757
May-16	171,428	148,167	319,595
Nov-16	174,950	147,635	322,585
Jan-17	177,711	153,997	331,708
Apr/May/2017***	180,031	156,011	336,042

Source: (Livingston & O' Hanlon, 2017, p.6).

**Table 3.3: Ethnic Composition in the (ANA) and (ANP)**

	Pashtun		Tajik		Hazara		Uzbek		Others	
	ANA	AN P	ANA	AN P	ANA	AN P	AN A	AN P	AN A	AN P
Officer	42.40 %	40 %	39.10 %	49 %	7.90 %	5%	4.50 %	3%	6.10 %	3%
NCO	51.80 %	32 %	38.20 %	55 %	9.60 %	5%	3.20 %	4%	1.50 %	4%
Soldier/Patrol man	43.00 %	47 %	29.20 %	35 %	11.00 %	4%	8.50 %	7%	8.20 %	7%
Total Force	45.70 %	42 %	33.30 %	42 %	10.20 %	5%	6.30 %	6%	5.80 %	6%
National Avg	44%		25%		10%		8%		13%	

Source: (Livingston & O' Hanlon, 2017, p.7).

Germany took over the burden of rebuilding the ANP in a Conference held in Berlin on March 2002 (Feilke, 2010). Representatives from eleven international organizations (Ios), and eighteen states in addition, of the U.S. had joined the Conference, Germany committed €10 million to bring reform in ANP only in the year 2002 (Caldwell & Finney, 2010). Germany presented the plan for expanding the ANP under the name of “German Project for Support of the Police in Afghanistan.” The plan covered five fields: reconstruction of the Kabul Police Academy, rehabilitation of police institutions, provision of equipment, advise on the establishment of the troops, and harmonization of the entire contributor operations linked into police. The international community agreed on the final ANP size of 62,000 police 44,300 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway patrol, and 2,300 counternarcotic police (SIGAR, 2017).

Discussing in detail the building and development of the ANDSF within 16 years is not the aim of this study, it requires a specific research, but a short overview needs to be done.

The era 2001-2003 was known as putting the cornerstone of the ANDSF with the aim to train and expand a professional army to be substituted as replacement to the international troops. Hence, the U.S. Special Forces (SF) were sent in Afghanistan to train the ANA in the passage of time, it was realized that training ANA was out of SF aptitude. Therefore, contractual troops stationed to train extensive military establishments rather than small infantry (SIGAR, 2017).

The era 2004- 2008 known Speedy Enlargement of the Troops which was due to the enhancing of deterioration of security situation. The U.S. concluded that division of security among another international contributor did not meet expected outcome. The Department of Defense (DOD) enhanced its endeavors in policing sector and focused on both ANA and ANP development in terms of coordinating, training and advising them, and to confront increased insecurity. The U.S. expanded number of ANP from 60,000 to 82,000 and the ANA from 75,000 to 134,000 (Kelly, Bensahel & Olikier, 2011, pp. 47-56). The special units training commenced, whereas, financial resources and necessities were ignored in the expansion of the ANDSF which posed shortcomings in financing and leaving the training program, conversely weakened ANDSF preparation (SIGAR, 2017).

The period between 2009- 2014 was Surge and Transition, the Taliban menace and violence intensified in 2009 (Miller, 2011). The ANDSF were fighting to ensure security in Afghanistan. Obama allowed the increase of the U.S. troops and accepted to enhance ANDSF fortification, thereby, authorized the U.S. troops huge latitude to target the Taliban (Kolenda, 2017). Obama adopted a strategy of intensively improvement of instability that this twofold path policy eventuated to a condition for replacement of capacity, because the U.S. trainers filled the vacuum in Afghan sufficiency to achieve success on the battleground. The participators in Lisbon Conference in 2010, adopted that security responsibility would be transitioned by the end of 2014, from international troops to ANDSF (Thruelsen, 2011). Thereafter ANDSF was equipped and involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. On the contrary, expansion and equipping of the troops resulted to the undermining of police operations which caused weakness of state and police not to effectively function in the fight of the crimes, ultimately this paved the way for Taliban utilization (SIGAR, 2017).

Between 2015 – 2016, while transition of security responsibility to ANDSF had already taken place. The U.S. and its allies' forces took the training, advisory and assisting role regarding ANDSF (GAO, 2018). Fatalities strongly weakened ANA troops resistance and ANP envisaged identity crisis due to attrition of contributors. Corruption in the military troops and related ministries affected the ANDSF preparation and struggling in the battleground (SIGAR, 2017).

### **3.10 Big Powers and Reconstruction in Afghanistan & Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)**

The U.S., Germany, Britain, and some other international contributors were engaged in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan, their roles are more tangible in some projects implemented through some key international organization. Likewise, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), PRTs and some other international organizations which were actively involved in Afghanistan development.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams were initially established with Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells program by the United States troops in early 2002 in Afghanistan. The aim was to make assessment of humanitarian condition, accomplish small projects, and get in touch with UNAMA and NGOs in Afghanistan (Makel,


2011). Hence, PRT was composed of civil-military units stationed in most part of the country with the aim to boost the legitimacy of Afghan government by supporting in terms of ensuring security and facilitating reconstruction projects (USAID, 2006). The Department of State undertook the improvement of stability and logistically backing in the area of operation and safeguarding of all PRT personals. The USAID was assigned in the reconstruction burden and Department of State was given the responsibility for political inspection, assistance and reporting (USAID, 2006).

The U.S. took the funding and directing responsibility of the PRT in the very beginning, later when PRT program expanded other states participated in undertaking some teams. The northern provinces Bamiyan, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz became under the possession of New Zealand, Britain and Germany at the end of 2003, and the number of leading PRT international contributors raised to sixteen nations in March 2009, (ISW, 2007).

The PRT teams of contributing nations differed in terms of size, management, and structure. Subsequently, number of PRT teams expanded to twenty-six teams which were operating in Afghanistan in different provinces. The U.S. PRT was consisting of fifty to hundred personnel, administered by military officer “lieutenant colonel” and focused on protecting of the troops and small- scale rapid impact building and supporting performances. The British PRT model was identical to the U.S. focusing on the reforms in the security sector and solving the struggles between Afghan warlords. Unlike, Germany had above three hundred staffs administered by an official from the ministry of foreign affairs segregating the military and non-military operation of the team. And satellite German assistance Agency apart from military station was created by German PRT model served as the PRT’s center (ISW, 2007).

PRT played a prominent role in delivering the U.S. and international aid beyond the Capital of Afghanistan specially, to insecure provinces. Therefore, the establishment of PRT Quick Impact Project (QIP) took place by the USAID in 2003 which accomplished by International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) with the aim to implement less than \$ 350,000 cost of each project in diverse aspect of security, reconstruction and supporting the Afghan authority. Whereas, 440 small scale projects implemented as mentioned in different fields irrigation, clean water supply, power system,

reconstruction of school, clinic, capacity building, job, micro- finance, gender, and media projects (USAID, 2007). According to SIGAR (2016), Department of Defense, State and USAID “spent approximately \$759.6 million on 39 programs to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan from FY 2002 to FY 2014”. Which 31 programs implemented by USAID, 8 by DOD and only 1 program by Department of State (SIGAR, 2016).



**Figure 3.2:** Spent Amounts in Programs by Agency in 2002 FY – FY 2014

Source: (SIGAR, 2016, p.22).

### 3.11 Emergent Forces: Women, Youth, Media, and Civil Society Organizations

After overturn of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan witnessed the emergence of social and political forces which became pledged to activism (Bose, Bizhan & Ibrahim, 2019). Advocative women organizations increased in support of women since 2001. Women came out of their homes after years of imposition of suppression and joined in different social, economic and political institutions (Saqeb, 2016). The Bonn Conference paved the way for drafting and ratifying of Afghanistan’s constitution and shaping of interim authority. These landmarks resulted in three elections in 2004-2005 at presidential, parliamentary and provincial level which 27% of seats out of 249 seats [sic] 250 in lower house (Wolesi Jirga), based on article (83) and with one sixth of seats out of 102 members in upper house (Meshrano Jirga), based on article (84) of Afghan constitution allocated for women. The seats reservation provision in the provincial council was foreseen later in the electoral law (Larson, 2016).

Women were given opportunity to participate in key decision-making process and domestic politics. Likewise, women involved in constitutional council called (Constitutional Loya Jirga) in 2003, Peace Council in 2010, and in governor and ministerial level (Larson, 2016). Afghan women has been enjoying women's empowerment, and gender programs that their skills to be enhanced in diverse aspects education, health, economic growth, agriculture and infrastructure in Afghanistan (USAID, 2020).

And to address briefly one program, the USAID funded \$ 68.2 million access on Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT). The program covered providing technical assistance to Afghan Supreme court training judges, supporting the Ministry of Justice to provide quality legal service, and educate citizens to be aware of their fundamental rights and women rights on Islam. The training has been delivered to 4500 men and women, 2880 women have been trained how to resolute traditional disputes and 256 female sharia law graduates have been trained to pass the judicial exam (USAID, 2016). The Afghan Women Network is an inclusive organization which is actively working with above 150 organizations and 3500 activists in the country (Cordaid, 2019). Youth forces shape the large potential force of a country and their energy and talent are positively used and are enumerated as fundamental capital of states. According to MIC (2014),” Based on the Central Statistics Organization’s (CSO) 2014 estimates 63 percent in Afghanistan 27.5 million people are under the age of 25 and those between 15 and 24 years of age comprise 17 percent of the population”. The prolonged years of unrest in the country affected the youths not to be able to enjoy their rights and to nourish their capabilities. Therefore, the Afghan National Youth Policy (ANYP) was designed in 2014 by the Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC) highlighting on the inclusion of youths in the political, economic, social and cultural aspects in the national and Sub-national levels. The aim was to provide chance via contribution with governmental and associated NGOs with youth affairs particularly, persuading them to be engaged in social, economic and political processes (MIC, 2014).

There are four types of political youth movements since 2001, one founded in 2011 by former guard politician with the aim to attract those youths to be partial of reforms likewise, Right and Justice (Haq wa Adalat). The leader members are consisting of ex-parliamentary members, diplomats, human rights and civil society members have had

influence and is led by Sardar Mohammad Roshan ex-Ambassador in Pakistan and Hanif Atmar ex-interior minister. The half of its members are youths 47 out of 75 candidates of provincial council elections had occupied the seats from this movement (Hewad & Johnson, 2014).

Solidarity of Afghanistan was established in 2004 by old guard leaders specially, those who were acting as commanders and activist in mujahedeen and communist period which their central committees control shifted to young people. The large member of this party was composed of youth generation and backed Hamid Karzai in 2009 presidential election. In 2010, a 31-year-old student from medical college Dawud Ramak was elected as party chairman. The newly elected young age chairman had good reflection for attracting youths to be represented in the provincial council leadership which 70% of its 47-member central congress was made up of youths. This party backed Karzai not to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (Hewad & Johnson, 2014).

The third youth movement post 2001 era was shaped under the name of Wadan Afghanistan with the platform to reach and provide services in provinces alleging to have high level of support among Pashtun people with active provincial council in the south and eastward of the Capital. Initially, in the 1990s, a group of students in Nangarhar University echoed for a non- mujahideen, non-tribal, non-Islamist political system with the goal of direct decision making in domestic politics. This movement once again revived after 13 years when Abdul Ahad Mohammandyar a University student from Kandahar was put under physical attack by Karzai guards due to his support from Ashraf Ghani campaign in the 2009 presidential election. The party 13 national council members along with commission chairman and 6 provincial council leaderships were from youth generation. Its area of activities are those areas under the domination of government opposition focusing only on Pashtun residential provinces and endeavoring to develop networks in rural environment (Hewad & Johnson, 2014).

The fourth type of youth movement represents young elites with little member in size but interested to drive policy at national level and has drawn international attention. Because its members have high level of education with the position in diverse diplomatic, governmental, media and international institutions, likewise, Afghanistan 1400, Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness (A3), which the first one was instituted in

2012. Rule of law, women's rights, and preservation of achievements are the areas that makes stand. And to address A3 the basic distinction between A3 and other youth parties is to operate as a think tank than a party (Hewad & Johnson, 2014).

In the Taliban ruling era, Afghans were deprived of fundamental citizen rights, specially, freedom of expression and press were absent. There was neither TV broadcasting Channels nor Radio stations, except one radio broadcasting Islamic issues. Only state run Bakhter news agency later became Taliban news agency, was active and supported by Taliban, and access to internet and computer was below zero. Aftermath of the dark regime, beside Radio and Television of Afghanistan (RTA) the state-run channel and some other private channels likewise, Tolo and Aryana TV were alternatively launched, and their programs acknowledged on international modules. Subsequently, hundreds of newspapers and magazines independently began publishing, Pajhwok Afghan News the internationally known agency Bakhar news agency commenced their activities, the entire Journalist gained association having membership in the international journalist organizations and Afghanistan Journalists Independent Association (AIJA) defending of the Journalists and media rights (Hairan, 2008). Media family expanded and number of private TV and Radio, newspapers and magazine publishing have increased since 2001. There are over 1400 independent medias more than 75 TV Channels 200 Radio stations and 1200 newspapers publish centers across the country. Around 12,000 male and female are working in medias assessing the situation and oversighting the state functions (AEI, 2016).

The USAID implemented the Afghan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) between 1 November 2010 – 31 December 2013 through an agreement signed with Internews Network. The cooperative agreement fund for one year was initially allocated \$ 21.9 million (SIGAR, 2015). The project implementation extended after thirteen modification and the budget covered \$ 32 million with the intention to enhance Afghan media throughout Afghanistan by improving broadcasting stations, access to media technology and capacity building of the outlets of local media. Through this project training offered for 21,557 people in 2,020 courses (SIGAR, 2015). Afghanistan ranks 121 out of 180 countries in the world rankings in 2019 (RFS, 2019). The Afghan media leading advocacy and professional training is affiliated to NAI since its foundation in 2005. NAI supports open media in Afghanistan and has trained above 11,000 students and practicing experts in media aspect (USAID, 2019).

The civil society phrase for the first time was used during Bonn Peace Process in 2001 that civil society vision should have been considered whereas, special conference was held for civil society participants (Winter, 2010). A comprehensive definition was proposed for Civil society contained profit, non-profits forms of work from charitable work of cultural to advocacy constructed the civil society term which entailed diverse classes NGOs, associations, women organizations, professional, trade unions, religious organizations and so on (Winter, 2010). It did not mean that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) did not exist pre-Taliban regime.

There were active NGOs and CSOs during the Taliban regime, operating in local associations and were involved with the United Nations agencies in provision of humanitarian aids, but CSOs developed post-Taliban era since 2001 in Afghanistan. The Afghan Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) declared that 1,119 CSOs in 2007 had active presence in 33 provinces except the Capital of Afghanistan. The number of registered NGOs in the Ministry of Economy (MOE) increased, to 1,468 in 2010, and 1,716 registered social organization in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and finally, in 2012 the number of registered CSOs reached to 4,280 in the country (Nijssen, 2012).

One of the key international organization which was involved in implementing and supporting civil society in Afghanistan was USAID. And under program called the Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS) started in January 2005 endured with second phase in October 2010, technical assistances, capacity building provided in the national level with the aim to enable Afghans to take part in the political process. Ultimately, through this program 374 SCOs capacities enhanced over 32 provinces, the 25 CSOs administered on the behalf of females supported and furthermore, annually five million USD budget was granted for the aim of supporting civil society initiatives within the context of the project timeline (USAID, 2012).

Strengthening Political Entities and Civil Society (SPECS) was another program implemented by USAID between July 2013- July 2016. This program expended \$ 18 million budget with the aim to promote democracy, enhance government legitimacy by actively inclusive taking part of aware citizens in the elections. The political and civil society paved the way for women to take part in the political process and to be elected as leaders in the country. And to illustrate some achievement of the program

encompassed organizing 114 meetings of provincial women's policy advocacy, hosting of female campaign, training of 280 provincial candidates across 34 provinces and fielding of internal supervisors to over four thousand polling stations in the presidential and provincial election of 2014, and so forth (USAID, 2013). The Civil Society Organizations have played significant role to connect public with government and to make government accountable and defend from citizens' rights. Hence, had role in rule of law, good governance, education and women's empowerments (USAID, 2015).

### **3.12 Conclusion**

Afghanistan is a landlocked mountainous country, empires like Britain and Russian have invaded, but could not retain footprint. The country is the transit and transport point between Central and South Asia. It links the markets of South Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and China due to its strategic position along the Silk Route. From strategical perspective some cities of Afghanistan located on these trade path used to gain as focal point of trade. Historically, the country had impact on the world trade for instance, in the 1300 BC, the blue lapis lazuli stone was sent from Badakhshan province to Egypt and Iraq which most of them are currently in the British Museum.

The country is rich in terms of natural and mineral resources, as TFBSO estimated the value of its minerals over \$ 1 trillion. The whole copper reserves range to 60 million metric tons and unexplored reserves approximated to 28.5 million metric tons of copper and 2,260 million tons of iron ore.

Afghanistan holds strategic importance for regional and global powers. Pakistan the needy of energy is relied on TAPI gas pipeline that passes through Afghanistan. The country also provides nearby transit path between Pakistan and CARs with low transport costs. The country possesses geo-strategical significance to Iran due to the U.S. presence threatening Iran's security which in respond to this threat, Iran undermines the U.S. interest by supporting the Taliban in terms of weapons and intelligence information. Iran is the fourth largest exporter of goods in Afghanistan and can link Afghanistan to sea trade through Chabahar port

India perceives Afghanistan the gateway to Central Asia to find market for its goods and through Chabahar port India precludes China to get access to Gwadar port in

Pakistan. Besides, Afghanistan has essential space in Russian foreign policy agenda. Moscow is keen to improve security in Afghanistan and Central Asia, due to the serious concerns from the Afghan illegal narcotics trafficking and influx through central Asia. Russia wants to maximize its control over hydrocarbons of the cross path of Central Asia, secure its engagement in energy project of TAPI, and to detect mineral reserves of lithium, copper, and to reach Central Asian and Afghan market for Russian commodities.

Afghanistan has great importance in the strategic calculation of China since it showed intention in building OBOR. The OBOR initiative geographically covers 60 countries throughout three continents. It decreases transaction expenses and will simplify trade circulation through frontiers. The first route, the Silk Road Economic Belt which passes through Central Asia and the second, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road crosses through Southeast and South Asia. The Wakhan corridor is the only option for China for the regional reach out, and China will be linked to Central Asia and Gulf states.

The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has great significance for the U.S. for diverse purposes; as aiming to restrain China's expansion by consolidating defense and security collaboration with India, to reach out wealthy energy countries of CARs, and to have surveillance over the Atomic Missile power Pakistan. Ultimately, to draw the attention of the globe to sale its modern weapons which have been used in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. By the establishment of permanent military bases in Afghanistan the U.S. wants to curb Iran by creating pressure circles and strives to have control over energy reserves of the region. Finally, Afghanistan possesses strategic importance in linking CARs, South Asian and the Middle East countries and through which how the competition is going on between the manufacturing countries which strive to influence and find market for their products and curb their rivals through gaining their geo-economic means in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the CARs states strive to export their energy to the needy Asian countries, but global powers such as the United States gained its geo-political goals from Afghanistan, especially in controlling her regional rivals. The Chapter reached conclusion that U.S. had covert relation with Afghan Mujahedeen during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. But the 9/11 attacks led the U.S. and its international allies through supporting the Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan targeted Al-Qaida and the Taliban which eventuated to overthrowing the Taliban regime. Thereby, this provided the opportunity for the huge

presence of the U.S. and international community forces in the country and entering a new relation with the Afghan government which later was established as a result of the U.S. and international community's support. The Bonn Conference was a milestone for inception of state building efforts after protracted civil war that put the cornerstone of six months interim government. Subsequently, eighteen months of a transitional government and ratification of a constitution in 2004 which paved the way for the Afghans to enjoy their political rights to vote in the first direct presidential election held in October 2004.

The UNSCR authorized the establishment of ISAF to ensure interim government security in Kabul and its periphery. The ISAF responsibility transitioned to NATO in 2003, and the scope of its mission expanded across the country in 2006. Hence, the number of ISAF troops increased as well. ISAF despite of ensuring security had role in the reconstructing of Afghanistan and training of Afghan national forces.

Five countries in Geneva Conference in 2002 committed to contribute in SSR program among those countries, the United States initiated ANA training in 2002, and Germany the ANP. The era 2001-2003 was putting foundation of ANDSF, and by the escalation of insecurity in the country. Between 2004-2008, entailed rapid expansion of ANA and ANP by the United States. The period between 2009-2014 was the U.S. troops surge in Afghanistan and the security transition to ANDSF which was already posed in Lisbon Conference in 2010. In the era 2015-2016, the U.S. and its allies played non-combat role in respect to ANDSF that included train, advise and assist under the framework of resolute support mission.

Big powers were actively engaged in the process of reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The U.S. initially supported PRT later other states participated in undertaking this team which enormously expanded across the country. PRT beside boosting the government legitimacy through ensuring security contributed in delivering the U.S. and international aid to the insecure provinces and facilitated reconstruction projects. USAID implemented PRT Quick Impact Projects through IOM and UNOPS in diverse aspects by disbursing huge amount of fund on water supply, irrigation, power, building school and clinic and so forth.

After overturn of the Taliban, Afghanistan witnessed emergence of forces; as women, youth, media and civil society organizations. Women engaged in the key decision-

making process and in the internal politics. USAID empowered women through implementing programs in different aspects. The youth forces included in the Ministry of Information and Culture policy's agenda to involve this force in the social, political, economic and cultural aspects in the national and sub-national level. Since 2001, four types of political youth movements emerged in the country, right and justice advocating reforms with half of youth members. Solidarity of Afghanistan with large member of youth supported Hamid Karzai in 2009 presidential election, Wadan Afghanistan with the aim to develop networks in the areas under the control of government opposition and Young elite a less populated movement, but well-educated functioning as think tank, rather than a party.

Afghan society was the witness of media development after the Taliban dark era that freedom of expression and press were absent. National and private TV channels and Radio stations launched their broadcasts and hundreds of newspapers and magazines began publishing. Besides, USAID implemented AMDEP throughout Afghanistan to promote media and capacity building of media outlets. Hence, Civil Society Organizations and NGOs enormously expanded in the country and commenced their activity after registration in MOE and MOJ. In this respect USAID supported the CSOs through implementing I-PACS and SPECS programs to enable Afghans with the aim to participate in the political process, promote democracy and enhance government legitimacy. The CSOs had significant role in linking public with government and making government accountable.

## **4. U.S. AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN OBAMA ERA**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter incepts with an assessment of the relations between President Hamid Karzai and Barack Obama and the bilateral challenges and opportunities of both states. The bilateral challenges were some factors led to the tensions in the relations, while insecurity, corruption and narcotics production were challenges towards the efforts. The Obama troop surge policy also leads to the deterioration of insecurity, but later in terms of stabilization of Afghanistan the U.S. strategy was constructive, because thousands of projects in diverse infrastructural aspects have been implemented and enabled the Afghan government to practice its sovereignty. After the security transition to Afghan National Defense Security Forces in 2014, and the exit of the U.S.-NATO forces impacts the international situation causes internal and external displacement, unemployment, poverty and economic declination in the country. The bilateral opportunities were integration of Hezbi-e- Islami Gulbuddin to Afghan government, signing of strategic partnership agreement and bilateral security agreement which ensured both states interests. Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion.

### **4.2 Views on Causes of Tense Relations**

The United States and Afghanistan relations became tense in the beginning of Barack Obama's presidency when two senior western diplomats Marvin Peterson, the United Nations special envoy and Michael Semple, the head of the Europeans Union's (EU) delegation, were expelled from Afghanistan due to having connection with the Taliban after the confession was taken from Afghan citizen by Afghan intelligence who had helped them both in secret visiting Mullah Mansoor in Musa Qala of Helmand province (Glenn, 2015, p. 227). Thereby, the seriousness of West was questioned by President Hamid Karzai in the fight against terrorism. From one hand Obama began his criticism from the survival of Karzai in power in the brink of presidential election in 2008 and increased the number of the U.S. forces from 36,000 to 101,000, and from the other hand, president Karzai was opposite of the military surge. He emphasized

that the fight against terrorism should take place out of Afghanistan's frontiers. Because he had called the Taliban were not terrorist but were unsatisfied individuals from economic condition and powerful influence in the government (Arvin, 2013).

President Hamid Karzai made harsh accusations against the United States stating that both the U.S. and Taliban had same goal in destabilizing his country. This had shadowed on the first visit of Chuck Hagel defense secretary (Rubin & Shankar, 2013). Then the tensions heightened in the Afghanistan's presidential election controversies of 2009. President Karzai accused some U.S. authorities who were trying to marginalize him from power. His skepticism over foreigner's interference in the election increased when the Afghan election complaints commission annulled hundreds of thousands of his ballots and dropped his vote below 50 percent (Sajjadi, 2018, p. 317).

When Obama travelled in Afghanistan at the end of 2010, he only had one phone call with President Karzai from the Bagram military base and ignored visiting him. There was no doubt remained in the fully tensed relations between Kabul and Washington and from one hand despite these tensions. The U.S. and Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement was signed on 2 May 2012 to affirm the cooperation between both states which were based on mutual respect and shared interest. The agreement content reiterated on protecting and promoting shared democratic values and strengthening Afghan Institutions and governance and so forth (TWH, 2012). On the other hand, half of 12 years of Karzai's presidency passed in verbal altercations with the U.S. whom he himself called soft wrestling and psychological warfare against his government which there were five views for underlying factors of the tensions.

American view stressed Karzai government was not only weak, but failed, in addition, Karzai has been vigorously criticized even, face to face in the presence of his Cabinet in dinner table. Senator Joe Biden had told him that he was leading a corrupt government (USIP, 2015). Whereas, Karzai government was criticized due to inability of realizing basic principle of state building by Karl Eikenberry U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009-2011 (Boon, 2010). The lack of White House attention to Afghan government views, as Karzai's opposed establishment of parallel structures, continuing of night raids, and detaining of suspicious detainees in the Bagram prison and establishment of Counter Heavy Crimes Center (CHCC) without Afghan

government notice were the crucial axes of U.S. interventions in the internal affairs of Afghanistan induced dissatisfaction from United States (Spanta, 2017, p 390). Karzai aim from parallel structure was foreign private security companies and the PRT team established in Afghanistan and were operating parallel to Afghan institutions. The direct disbursement of funds, support from provincial officials and granting contracts and spending resources through non-government structure of Afghanistan which undermined Afghan government and became challenge towards government structures development were his other criticism. Karzai called the Bagram prison as producing factory of Taliban where innocent people were prisoned and hatred fostered to them against their people and homeland by Americans ((Sajjadi, 2018, p. 322).

Karzai revealed the U.S. influence, pressures and interferences even, in appointing high rank official of the government. For instance, Americans and British put pressure in changing Helmand governor which caused to the deterioration of security situation. British Foreign Minister David Miliband obviously emphasized who should be Interior Minister of Afghanistan. Both the U.S. and British Ambassadors had precisely requested Karzai who should be chaired in the Interior Minister to realize reforms (Spanta, 2017, p. 220).

Another critic of Karzai from the U.S. and NATO allies was from their interventions and encroachments in the presidential election of 2009, as briefly mentioned above which resulted in the second-round. Despite, he won the election in the second round as a result of West mediation. But Karzai viewed that the U.S. and NATO did this with the aim to undermine Afghan sovereignty and to create fragility in his political legitimacy. According to his senior national advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta with posing such criticism Afghanistan's foreign policy was drawn in a new direction with the western countries and the United States. Hence, a heightened diplomatic tension of Afghanistan in the interaction with the West and the U.S. was displayed, which two factors had impact in the peak of tension firstly, U.S. approach towards Pakistan had never changed and secondly, night raids in rural areas of the country along with civilians casualties continued (Spanta, 2017, pp.923-924). Karzai seriously criticized foreign countries which had direct communication with the Taliban and armed opposition groups against the Afghan government and their interference in the dialog between the Afghan state and Taliban. Based on Afghanistan's foreign policy the peak of interventions in Afghanistan's affair escalated when Taliban opened office in Qatar

under the name of Islamic Emirate with support of the U.S. administration. This questioned Afghan national sovereignty and intensively confronted with Karzai's criticism. Subsequently, Taliban office was closed after U.S. brought pressure on the Qatar government (Sajjadi, 2018, p. 320).

Karzai viewed that the U.S. should pay respect to Afghan national interests in its priorities and programs. From his point of view dragging every issue in the circle of Afghanistan's national interest and national sovereignty would lead to tensions between the two parties (Roberts, 2014). Afghanistan's national interest lied on three things in the Afghan- U.S. relations: restricting scope of foreign forces operations, security and background for peace and strengthening government institutions specially, the armed forces. Ultimately, Karzai banned air strikes of foreign troops by issuing decree stating that no Afghan forces in any condition can ask foreigner's planes to conduct operations in the villages and home. Then, Gen Joseph Dunford the commander of the US-led NATO forces committed to respect Afghan sovereignty to avoid air strikes in the residential areas (BBC, 2013). And other combat operations of these forces were also greatly reduced. The president stressed; if the U.S. forces stay in the country should have limited presence under the condition and framework that the Afghan government sets.

Karzai accused the U.S. and NATO forces several times killing of Afghan civilians during an interview in BBC he mentioned based on UN statistics that 2,754 civilians were killed in 2012, and 587 of them were attributed to governmental and international forces. President had mentioned several times that killing of civilians were intolerable and pointed out who had contradiction with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism and defining of terrorism. He emphasized that the fight against terrorism should take place in the main centers refereeing Pakistan. Thereafter, Karzai believed that the Taliban are dissatisfied individuals and the U.S. can bring them in the negation table (Arvin, 2013). There was prevalent dominant belief that the majority of Taliban were moderate which was certified by Karzai regime. Whilst, the president had offered amnesty to all Taliban except some extremist leaders whom were not distinguished in order to marginalize Pakistan penetration and end the hostility. President Karzai had declared in 2003, that there were ordinary, honest and indigenous Taliban and those who were frustrating peace and deteriorating the instability of Afghanistan (Yadav, 2010).

President Karzai also emphasized that international aid should be made available to the Afghan government and should be spent according to Afghan priorities. He warned several times; if the U.S.- NATO did not equip Afghan armed forces his government would resort to other sources and even to the U.S. military rivals including Russia and China. Karzai also cancelled the PRT program due to having parallel functioning institution alongside government agencies in the field of reconstruction and security. This argument was firstly mentioned in Munich conference that private security companies and military reconstruction teams were hurdling his government to expand its authority across Afghanistan (Dempsey, 2011).

Public opinion was affected negatively as a result of the re-emergence of Taliban in 2006, due to escalation of instability in diverse parts of the country and inability of international forces in removing them, extensive intervention of foreign countries specially, the U.S. in the domestic affair of Afghanistan, expansion of financial corruption in foreign deals and establishment of security companies parallel to the Afghan governmental institutions, unilateral proceedings of the U.S. forces in launching night operations, inspection of citizens and suspension of some individuals in the Bagram prison by the U.S. forces. This negative mentality affected Afghanistan's foreign policy towards NATO and the U.S. (Sajjadi, 2018, p. 308).

President Karzai denounced the U.S. troops treatment of Afghan villagers and night inspection of their homes and due to not respecting the Afghan sensibilities and culture. Hence, the U.S. special operations and night inspection was called arbitrary which in some cases civilians were arrested and killed. Thus, Karzai's viewed Americans had challenged Afghan national sovereignty at three levels of central government, local government and rural communities both the U.S. and NATO had not respected the Afghan sovereignty and took action against Afghanistan when they had opportunity and this was a tense point in relation with them and Karzai (Sajjadi, 2018, p. 318).

The American media's revelations had also angered Mr Karzai. The United States was assured that Ahmad Wali Karzi the president's younger brother, a senior figure in Kandahar, was corrupt which was verified by Kabul U.S. embassy cables released by WikiLeaks. Accordingly, Ahmad Wali Karzi had access to economic resources, supporting licit and illicit investments in Kandahar and his authority derived from his

brother and elite position in the Popalzai tribe (Steele, 2010). Hamid Karzai confronted the U.S. media reports about corruption and his family's power and he accused the U.S. propaganda against his government and urged people not to listen to such propaganda.

Hamid Karzai's critics included mainly opposition political groups, number of the Afghan parliament and some media analysts had criticized from soft wrestling between Karzai and the U.S. and most of his key rivals were those served under his administration involved in corruption (Salahuddin, 2009). Critics have always stressed that with the presence of foreign forces and the international community in Afghanistan. The Afghan people have a unique opportunity to end the chronic political crisis and build economic infrastructure with international aid, but huge amount of money was lost due to widespread corruption (BBC, 2010). And from the critic's point of view, the tension between Hamid Karzai and the U.S. stems from three things.

Firstly, most critics of the Afghan president have explicitly accused him of trying to keep himself, his family and his team in power. When Mr Karzai failed to negotiate with the U.S. officials on the issue, this led to tension between him and the U.S. government. Secondly, some even considered the reconciliation program with the Taliban and the Islamic Party and his emphasis on the U.S. support for the program, whereas both Karzai and most members of these groups were Pashtuns. According to this analysis, because his interests in this field were in the contradiction with American and global values, the relationship between the two sides were in challenge. Thirdly, the cause of tension between Karzai and the United States was the influence of Iran and Pakistan in circles close to the president's office, as Iran and Pakistan opposed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Because the United States had restricted Iranian-Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. The two countries were trying to support dissenting voices against the presence of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan (Arvin, 2013).

President's political supporter's perspective stressed that Karzai aggressive policy towards the United States reinforced his position as an independent and elected leader of the people in society and this vision exemplified restriction of the U.S. strike operation, president's explicit criticism from U.S. mistakes in targeting civilians. But part of the society specially, Taliban and Haqqani groups conceived Kabul government as the puppet of America and due to the presence of international forces in

Afghanistan. They even used to target government official, citizens, educational centers, religious figures NGOs, and they were warned that their salaries and wages financed by non-believer's sources (Jones, 2008).

The Afghan sociological perspective emphasized that Karzai's government's decision in the interaction with international community units is the outcome of social policy making and some structures. The foreign policy makers were also affected by the country's culture, social traditions. And some of the deep-rooted concepts in people's culture were unconsciously influenced in the government decisions and the social traditions in Afghanistan remained strong and unrivaled. Whereas, these traditions affected all aspects of life. Liberalism and individualism based on the Western rationality had not yet opened much in the rigid culture of Afghan society which public policy and even foreign policy were affectable. As Mr Karzai's traditional dress – shirts, pants, hats and slippers – symbolized the importance of these traditions in covering the country first and the effect of these traditions had not only been on the cover of president Karzai, but also on his behavior. The president style of lectures and big decisions reflected this who used to refer to the Jirga, in the country's difficult decision makings, in most traditional way (Arvin, 2013).

### **4.3 The Obama Administration's New Strategy**

When Obama came to office in January 2009, the Taliban operations and cruelty near to Kabul was being intensified. Obama already was opposed to Iraq war asserting that the Iraq war was the outcome of unsuccessful policy. On the contrary, he was a proponent of war in Afghanistan. However, the request for 30,000 extra forces in addition of 35,000 already existed troops by NATO and ISAF U.S. commander Gen. McKiernan from the Bush administration had not been complied. Afghanistan was the priority for Obama who declared a comprehensive strategy by deciding to send 21,000 U.S. forces in addition to the 4,000 trainers training ANA in Afghanistan in March 2009 (Indurthy, 2011).

During Obama administration the concept and scope of terrorist groups in counterterrorism strategy changed. The Taliban and Al-Qaida were not only perceived international terrorist groups. But based on the United States Security Strategy that terrorist groups could pose serious threats for the United States and the globe covering

Neo-Taliban and Islamic party of Hekmatyar which were active and operating as insurgent groups included in the terrorist groups. Taliban and Al-Qaida and its allies settled beyond Afghanistan's boundaries in the region of Baluchistan of Pakistan who were operating as terrorist groups. From the other hand Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas stationed in parts of northern frontier state. And any form of small and large groups under the name of Taliban and Al-Qaida that kill people and disrupts public mental security in the world perceived terrorists (Hashimi, 2017, p. 94).

The second military surge request took place after the change of the U.S. ISAF Commander Gen. – McKiernan with Lt. Gen Stanley McChrystal. The primary evaluation of McChrystal from the security condition for the purpose of implementing the U.S goal in assisting the Afghan government and protecting its citizens delivered to the U.S administration. The administration was asked for 44,000 troops to counter Taliban insurgency on 2 October 2009, in a speech quoted at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (Indurthy, 2011).

On 1 December 2009, Obama announced sending 30,000 troops in Afghanistan to the Military Academy at West Point. This was termed AF-PK strategy aiming at counterterrorism and its neighborhood, stabilizing of Afghanistan and stressing a coercive approach to force back Taliban (Ali, 2010). The objective was to disrupt, mortify and vanquish Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to hinder their growth not to target the U.S. and its allies in the future (Centcom, 2009). However, Obama's high rank colleagues were opponent to this surge, finally after holding nine meetings with civilian and Pentagon officials. Obama declared the surge then the U.S. strategy changed from Counterterrorism to Counterinsurgency strategy (Samples, 2011).

The strategy stressed on three issues: The Al-Qaida sanctuary should be rejected, the Taliban movement should be rejected as well, time should be provided for Afghan administration to train its military troops to be able to undertake and ensure their country's security in the future and develop good governance that the U.S. and coalition forces could return home (David, 2015). And to reach to these aims three basic issues required to be applied. A military strategy should be implemented to collapse the Taliban movement and enhance Afghan's capacity within 18 months, work with the international colleague, the UN and the Afghans to follow up a significant civilian plan that the government to be able to gain from security. Obama

also focused on safeguarding of Afghan citizen and notified the U.S forces withdrawal from Afghanistan by July 2011; if the situation of Afghanistan well founded (Indurthy, 2011).

### 4.3.1 The new strategy consequences

The new Obama strategy led to deterioration of the security situation specially, in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan. The international troops along with the Afghan forces suffered from huge casualties in 2009, with the increase of fifty percent in contrast to 2008, which was fatal year for both. And around 1,000 ANA forces more than 500 coalition forces, including 300 U.S. troops were killed. Consequently, insecurity expanded from southern to west and northern provinces including Kabul (Mullen, 2009).

**Table 4. 1: Cause of U.S. troops Casualties, By Year**

Year	Improvised Explosive Device	Suicide Bombs	Mortars/RPG's/Rockets	Landmine	Helicopter Losses*	Aircraft Losses*	Other Hostile Fire	Non-Hostile Causes*	Total
2001	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (16.7%)	0 (0%)	4 (33.3%)	6 (50.0%)	12
2002	5 (10.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (2.0%)	1 (2.0%)	4 (8.2%)	18 (36.7%)	12 (24.5%)	8 (16.3%)	49
2003	1 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	19 (39.6%)	0 (0%)	12 (25.0%)	16 (33.3%)	48
2004	12 (23.1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.9%)	1 (1.9%)	2 (3.8%)	3 (5.8%)	10 (19.2%)	23 (44.2%)	52
2005	18 (18.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2.0%)	5 (5.1%)	36 (36.4%)	1 (1.0%)	20 (20.2%)	17 (17.2%)	99
2006	27 (27.6%)	3 (3.1%)	1 (1.0%)	1 (1.0%)	21 (21.4%)	0 (0%)	33 (33.7%)	12 (12.2%)	98
2007	33 (28.2%)	1 (0.9%)	9 (7.7%)	1 (0.9%)	13 (11.1%)	0 (0%)	35 (29.9%)	25 (21.4%)	117
2008	84 (54.2%)	4 (2.6%)	7 (4.5%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	36 (23.2%)	20 (13.3%)	155

**Table 4. 2: Cause of U.S. troops Casualties, By Year Continue**

2009	141 (46.1%)	8 (2.6%)	21 (6.9%)	0 (0%)	13 (4.2%)	2 (0.7%)	89 (29.1%)	32 (10.5)	306
<b>251</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>42</b>		<b>11</b>		<b>112</b>	<b>24</b>	
<b>936</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>Total</b>							
<b>(26.8)</b>	<b>(34.3%)</b>	<b>(1.7%)</b>	<b>(4.5%)</b>		<b>(1.2%)</b>		<b>(12.0%)</b>	<b>(2.6%)</b>	
	<b>(17.0%)</b>								

Source: (Livingston & O' Hanlon, 2009, p.6).

The UN reported that 2,021 civilians were killed by international, government and insurgent forces in the first ten months of 2009. And out of these casualties 69% was stated that had been killed by government opposition and 23% were attributed to coalition troops compared to same period in 2008. The civilian's casualties had peaked to 1,838 civilians (HRW, 2010). The increase in casualties of non-militaries destructed the image of the war endeavors and nourished hatred to the west, thought-out Afghanistan. Specially, the anger from Karzai government, and ISAF was growing. The 32 billion USD of international assistance, above hundred thousand ISAF and U.S. forces presence had not been able to maintain security. Whereas, aid agencies could not reach to the two-third part of Afghanistan due to risk and most casualties had root in the insurgency assaults. Taliban had been offensively operating throughout 2009, and their attacks increased to 60% between October 2008 and April 2009 (Ali, 2010).

The violence raised from June to April covering suicide bombings, roadside bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increased by seventy percent. By August the security situation worsened, the insurgency assault increased to 630 in 2009, and expanded to thirty three out of thirty-four provinces.

**Table 4.3: Comparison of (IEDs) by Province and Regional Command 2008-2009**

REGIONAL COMMAND/ PROVINCE	2008			2009			% CHANG E (Successf ul IEDs)	% CHAN GE (Total IEDs)
	Successful IEDs	File d IED s	Tota l IED s	Successful IEDs	File d IED s	Tota l IEDs		
<b>RC CAPITAL</b>								
KABUL	6	9	15	13	13	26	117%	73%
<b>RC EAST</b>								
PARWAN	3	1	4	3	2	5	0%	25%
WARDAK	9	5	14	18	20	38	100%	171%
PANJSHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
LOGAR	5	11	16	10	32	42	100%	163%
KAPISA	2	6	8	1	7	8	-50%	0%
KHOST	50	47	97	85	103	188	70%	94%
PAKTYA	8	19	27	20	21	41	150%	52%
GHAZNI	13	5	18	34	21	55	162%	206%
PAKTIKA	18	16	34	25	55	80	39%	135%
NANGARHAR	16	36	52	42	47	89	163%	71%
LAGHMAN	9	36	45	10	24	34	11%	-24%
NURISTAN	0	0	0	0	2	2	N/A	N/A
KUNAR	22	5	27	23	28	51	5%	89%
BAMYAN	1	0	1	0	3	3	-100%	200%
<b>RC EAST TOTAL</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>85%</b>
<b>RC SOUTH</b>								
KANDAHAR	70	58	128	108	147	255	54%	99%
HELMAND	49	20	69	47	50	97	-4%	41%
NIMROZ	6	2	8	1	10	11	-83%	38%
URUZGAN	10	13	23	27	29	56	170%	143%
ZABUL	20	13	33	41	19	60	105%	82%
DAI KUNDI	0	0	0	0	1	1	N/A	N/A
<b>RC WOUTH TOTAL</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>84%</b>
<b>RC WEST</b>								
BADGHIS	1	5	6	0	1	1	-100%	-83%
HERAT	3	3	6	5	8	13	67%	117%
GHOR	0	0	0	1	5	6	N/A	N/A
FARAH	4	2	6	8	6	14	100%	133%
<b>RC WEST TOTAL</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>89%</b>

**Table 4.4: Comparison of (IEDs) by Province and Regional Command 2008-2009 Continue**


RC NORTH									
FARYAB	7	8	15	3	5	8	-57%	-47%	
JAWZAN	1	1	2	2	1	3	100%	50%	
SARI PUL	0	0	0	0	1	1	N/A	N/A	
BALKH	1	2	3	1	2	3	0%	0%	
SAMANGAN	0	0	0	0	1	1	N/A	N/A	
KUNDUZ	6	5	11	9	23	32	50%	191%	
BAGHLAN	7	6	13	3	4	7	-57%	-46%	
TAKHAR	1	2	3	2	4	6	100%	100%	
BADAKHSHAN	0	5	5	3	5	8	N/A	60%	
RC NORTH TOTAL	23	29	52	23	46	69	0%	33%	
TOTAL, ALL REGIONS	348	341	689	545	700	1245	0.57	0.81	

Source: (Livingston & O' Hanlon, 2009, p.19)

In addition, military operations were launched to bring Kandahar in the east under the control. While, Helmand in the southward was not entirely liberated. Paktia, Paktika and Ghazni in the eastward and Kunduz in the north zone were still under the control of insurgents. Haqqani network and the Taliban insurgents were threatening ISAF with IEDs. The insurgents expanded their presence to the areas who had not appeared already. Eventually, the ISAF was unable to defeat them and take the control of the city (Indurthy, 2011).

David Petraeus the commander of the U.S. Central Command mentioned to the American Legion in Louisville that violence had maximized which had required sustainable pledge of the United States and international troops to overcome the enemy security achievements (Kruzel, 2009). A survey which was conducted by the International Republican Institute in July 2009, while, two thousand four hundred adults throughout Afghanistan had participated in the interview. The result shows the high percent of expectancy from instability. As shown figure 4.1 below:

Question: Is Afghanistan more stable today than it was one year ago?



**Figure 4. 1: Polling and Public Opinion**

Source: (Livingston & O' Hanlon, 2009, p.35).

A survey which was conducted by Pew Research Center survey from U.S. adults 49% responded that the U.S. has failed to achieve its goal during 17 years of military mission in Afghanistan. While, 35% of participants have optimistically responded for the U.S. success and 16% did not know whether U.S. has failed or succeeded (Oliphant, 2018).

#### **4.4 Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency**

Counterterrorism (CT), and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are different concepts. Counterterrorism definition covers offensive action to hinder, threaten, preempt and respond to terrorism (Rineheart, 2010). Counterinsurgency is defined by NATO doctrine as inclusive non-military and military endeavors to break down an insurgency and to address basic discontent (NATO, 2017). Based on 90 analysis of Rand Corporation, breaking down of an insurgency requires prolong time which endures averagely 14 years (Jones, 2008). In the case of Afghanistan, CT strategy focused on the hindrance of Al Qaida or other terrorist networks not to target the west from Afghanistan. This strategy did not pursue to sweep Taliban, because they were not physical menace to the American homeland. Conversely, this strategy implementation required to enhance operations in the intelligence and police level and withdrawal of

the U.S. troops. But COIN strategy required the elimination of Taliban and improving of efficient government by providing security, justice and employment with expansion of army to enjoy international support (Chaudhary, 2009).

John Nagl has distinguished two approaches to counterinsurgency direct and indirect approach. The first approach emphasizes on enemy- centric strategy eliminating the assailant by using hard power approach likewise, drone strikes, military operations and the latter approach focuses on population- centric strategy a “battle for the hearts and minds”. It involves the use of indirect soft power approach likewise, capacity building, economic development beside of removing the insurgency by the vindication of locals, simultaneously, targeting insurgency with military force (Rineheart, 2010). In conjunction to counterinsurgency the theoretical framework of both direct and indirect approaches has been practiced in Afghanistan as McChrystal had offensive approach. He has applied enemy centric strategy in the counterinsurgency using more drone strikes and by the substitution of General Petraeus in July 2010, he published the Field Manual FM 3-24 in June 2006 (Long, 2008). And in other words, this became his COIN doctrine which initially was reinforced in Iraq under his command. The situation was changed and prevented from internal war and gave a breathing room for Baghdad to shape a democratic state. He reversed the former U.S military commander counterinsurgency approach to prevent civilians’ casualties and air strikes were limited and resorted more to indirect soft power and population centric approach (Crowley, 2012). In the air strike operations drones have played key role to achieve U.S. objectives in the military intervention in Afghanistan. Drones strike campaigns have been used in both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and in other countries which the U.S. was involved in the war against terrorism. Drones have facilitated the military operations in terms of time, cost, integration of the intelligence collection and preventing military and civilians’ casualties.

Drones are equipped with missiles able to target individuals, automobiles, rooms and large houses and can collect intelligence data, distinguishes militants from civilians. The civilian casualties by drones have caused that the civilians do not be mobilized and integrate with insurgents. The most significant objective of drone’s strike campaign was to undermine insurgents’ networks that were based in Pakistan and used to target the American, Afghan, international troops and the nonmilitary people in

Afghanistan (Walsh, 2013, pp. 42- 44). Drones do not require the large presence of the U.S. troops in outside. Hence, counterinsurgency objectives are achieved with low cost, without occupying a foreign terrain to launch counterinsurgency operation. In contrast, it reduces the reaction from nonmilitary casualties and nonselective violence.

Drones have been used as an alternative in the counterinsurgency campaigns to demoralize and punish insurgents. But in terms of effectiveness there are different perspectives, as Michael J. Boyle argues drones achieve objectives in counterterrorism, because it depends on air force, special forces and the application of intelligence to eliminate foe and cut off terrorist organizations. While considering American public and decisionmakers view concerning external interventions, the drones can gain the military objective with low expense and risk. So, unmanned campaigns are conceived effective counterinsurgency tool (Walsh, 2013, pp. 45- 52).

Petraeus confessed during an interview with NBC News that COIN was an obscure strategy and reaching to success in the war through military option was not a solution to win hearts and minds of the local population. Unless to support the central and local governments in order to promote good governance to be able to provide services to Afghan citizens (Raddatz & Wong, 2010). Petraeus doctrine also stressed on the security of population, despite of promoting good governance in Afghanistan which focused on the enhancement of efficiency in the security sector that both military and civilians' endeavors considered important and equal. Therefore, civilian and military counterinsurgency efforts should have been unified to reach in success (Vizzard & Capron, 2010).

The U.S policy in Afghanistan under president Obama discussed by Taddeo (2010) indicating the counterinsurgency strategy of the U.S. also stressed on judicial reforms, constructing good governance, reputable police, and safeguarding non-military citizens by patrolling in rural areas to hinder insurgents not to terrify and enroll locals. And war in Afghanistan was not a choice, but necessity from Obama's point of view and deploying 30,000 troops were not only for the aim of re-appearance of Al- Qaida sanctuaries in Afghanistan, but to prohibit the government not to collapse and become the field of tribal battles.

#### **4.5 Stabilization Strategy**

The Obama administration pledged to a stabilization strategy in 2010 when David Petraeus had concluded that the war was not the only solution in Afghanistan. Unless to unify military and civilian efforts to fight insurgents in the insecure districts in the south and east part of Afghanistan. Stabilization was part of COIN approach, thereafter U.S. followed two-pronged policy both military and developmental. When the U.S. troops used to launch operations in the key terrain districts which were under the control of the Afghan opposition elements. The COIN approach suggested to clear, hold and build those areas which U.S. donors used to implement infrastructural projects to win hearts and minds of the Afghan local populations, thereby, they assisted the Afghan government to practice its sovereignty. Therefore, when Obama declared stabilization strategy, he added 50,000 more troops along with hundreds of non-militaries to fight insurgents in the insecure districts in the south and east parts of Afghanistan in order to hold and construct those sites that the Taliban would not be able to return. As mentioned above stabilization had nest in COIN doctrine stressing on clear, hold, and build, and these terms constructed the Village Stability Operations (VSO) phases (SIGAR, 2018). Clear phase meant to remove insurgents from target areas and reoccupy the target area. Hold phase emphasized on the improvement of local security by recruitment of Afghan Local Police (ALP) to establish deterrence for insurgents to pave the way for government presence. Build phase stressed on rebuilding cleared areas for public use through social and economic efforts to link village to government through establishing coexistence between informal connection of village council and district. Hence, the government had to provide resources and village had to maintain security to expand the ruling circle of the government (SIGAR, 2018).

When an area was cleared after conducting of a military operation, then stabilized by donor programs with the aim to assist the government to become legitimate and effective. Thus, USAID and DOD focused on expanding their resources and programs to vindicate the central authority to reach and practice its sovereignty in the remote areas (SIGAR, 2018). Yet, the number of the U.S. troops reached to 100,000 by August 2010 (Associated Press, 2016). Both DOD and USAID played major role in implementing the stabilization projects in Afghanistan above \$ 4.7 billion was disbursed through their programs which 75% of the efforts took place after 2009. The


DOD launched rebuilding of Afghanistan from the bottom up by implementing two programs Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) aiming to provide urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects. The VSO was implemented by the U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) between 2010 up to 2014 intending to stabilize villages with strategic location and to link the village to district and province and bring it under the shadow of formal government (SIGAR, 2018). The CERP program contained diverse categories of infrastructural large- and small-scale projects with noticeable expenditures of funds.

**Table 4.5: CERP Projects FY 2009- 2013**

<b>Project Category</b>	<b>Total Number of Projects</b>	<b>Total Obligations (\$ million)</b>
Agriculture/Irrigation	6,527	\$134.30
Battle Damage Repair	11,173	22.4
Civic Cleanup Activities	1,667	17.8
Civic Support Vehicles	254	14.1
Condolence Payments	1,462	4.8
Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements	1,855	28.4
Education	2,501	132.2
Electricity	787	262.1
Food Production and Distribution	126	4.5
Former Detainee Payments	502	0.0
Healthcare	1,347	40.7
Hero Payments	779	2.1
Other Urgent Humanitarian or Reconstruction Projects	2,901	51.8
Project measures	981	22.9
Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities	2,028	
Rule of Law and Governance	1,090	32.1
Telecommunications	249	5.4
Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Infrastructure	802	25.2
Transportation	4,376	652.4
Water and Sanitation	4,439	57.6
<b>Totals</b>	<b>45,846</b>	<b>\$1,534.1</b>

Source: (SIGAR Audit Report, 2018, p.4).

Between 2009-2013 years U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) implemented totally 45,846 projects in different levels and values, 254 large, 2,759 medium and 42,846 small projects. Figure 4.2 illustrates below.



**Figure 4. 2:** CERP Projects Between FY 2009 -2013

Source: (SIGAR Audit Report, 2018, p.5).

The projects budget used to come from the appropriated amount of money allocated by the U.S. Congress covered \$2.6 billion which was appropriated for 2009- 2013 fiscal years to be used in COIN and stability operations and upholding Afghan government. During this course USFOR-A became responsible for CERP activities in implementing 80 percent of CERP projects in Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2018). DOD has spent \$ 141.7 million through CERP projects and numerous of programs in support of primary and secondary education in Afghanistan have been implemented. The USAID has also helped CERP in implementing the programs which the efforts mainly included building and renovating schools, distributing of textbooks and training of teachers. The student’s enrollment from 900,000 in 2002, significantly increased to 8 million in 2013 (SIGAR, 2016). The USAID has printed more than 170 million school textbooks, trained 480,000 teachers, 3000 school principals and administrator and 3 million girls enrolled in community-based education classes since 2008 (USAID, 2020).

From 2002 -2014 USAID has disbursed \$614 million in supporting primary and secondary education in Afghanistan \$ 85 million of its fund has been spent for printing school textbooks (SIGAR, 2016). DOD and USAID were also involved in some

infrastructural projects in Afghanistan for instance, DOD has disbursed \$ 847 million on 4,700 projects building of roads implemented through CERP which 2,800 nearly 60% of the projects covered small scale projects on repairing of the roads destroyed by IEDs. The USAID has also implemented Community Development Projects (CDP) with the worth of \$ 335 million covered road building programs by which two thousand KM of national highways have been built in Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2017).

Under CDP some other small infrastructure projects implemented between 2009-2013 with the worth of \$ 404.8 million in the southern and eastern provinces. The focus of the projects was to establish short term employments for locals to get benefited not to join the insurgency. In addition, around 3,550 projects implemented with the contribution of Afghan government and Central Asian Development Group (CADG) which produced 13.3 million days of employment (SIGAR, 2018). The U.S. has committed overestimation of its capability in reconstructing and reforming Afghanistan's institutions as part of its stabilization strategy. The strategy was not appropriately consistent with the Afghan context, because unsafe districts were prioritized first to be cleared from insurgents. The expected development was not made by coalition troops to satisfy Afghans in unsafe areas and stabilization in districts endured for short term than physical presence of coalition troops (SIGAR, 2018).

On the contrary, stabilization was successful in the areas that were under Afghan military troops. From one hand the large amount of money which was appropriated for the purpose of stabilization by the U.S. government intensified combats, vindicated insurgency and expanded corruption. Because DOD, USAID have implemented the projects without having enough knowledge from social, political and local institutions of Afghanistan. Moreover, local power brokers had influenced and accessed to stabilization projects which were sold by them. Those Afghans their access in these competitive and profitable projects were cut off became allies of Taliban. Thus-refueled conflicts in the areas and from the other hand, monitoring and assessment of the U.S. agencies from stabilization programs were mainly insignificant due to re-domination of insecurity in the key terrain areas (SIGAR, 2018).

#### **4.6 The Security Transition to Afghan National Security Forces**

Since the military presence of the U.S. and international coalition troops under the mandate of NATO from the onset of 9-11 attack. The Afghan government had been enjoying security maintenance by jointly efforts of these troops. The U.S. and NATO have played constructive role in building ANSF capacities in terms of equipping and technical training to enable them to sustain security by their own. Building of 350,000 ANSF is enumerated the major achievement of international coalition forces (Rasmussen, 2014). The security transition for the entire country formally commenced in 2011, from NATO- led forces (BBC, 2013). With the intension to end in 2014 (Hakimyar, 2014). The transition was agreed to take place gradually, on May 2012 NATO's Chicago Summit declared the end of ISAF mission in Afghanistan and endorsed exit strategy from Afghanistan that 130,000 NATO-led forces would be withdrawn by the end of 2014, only training units would remain (BBC, 2012). It was stressed that the Afghan troops would lead security across country and ISAF combat mission would change to train, advice and assist mission. An agreement was also made for an enduring pledge to Afghan security after 2014. While, similar announcement already made by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on 1 February 2012, that U.S. troops were going to terminate the combat role and would change it to training, advising and assisting role by mid-2013 (Holland & Taylor, 2012).

The first phase of security transition announced on 22 March 2011 by President Hamid Karzai encompassed four provinces: Bamiyan, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul Panjshir and three districts, Surobi, Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam districts. The phase two announced on 27 November 2011 by President entailed some north, east and southern provinces and most of districts with which 50 percent of security responsibilities handed over to ANSF. And with the announcement of third phase which took place on 13 May 2012 by President that all the capital and provinces of the country by which 75 percent of security responsibility transitioned to the ANSF (Holland & Taylor, 2012).

The fourth phase was announced on 30 December 2012 that the transition was going to be executed two months later (UNAMA, 2012). Which 312 districts, 23 provinces out of 398 districts and 34 provinces came under the control of ANSF and 87 percent of Afghan population were brought under the responsibility of ANSF (Gulf Times,

2012). By termination of ISAF's combat role, the transition final phase completed by the end of 2014, and the support from ANSF did not terminate, but entered to a new phase of a small non-combat NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM), (NATO, 2015).

#### **4.7 Obama's Exit Strategy**

President Barack Obama while pointing out on troops surge in Afghanistan in his West Point statement had also clarified the U.S troops withdrawal from Afghanistan by July 2011. When Al-Qaida's leader Usama Bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 (Eklund, 2011). His death did not cause that the U.S. should have declared its victory and mission accomplishment in Afghanistan and counterterrorism in Pakistan. But determined Obama to re-evaluate his policy to realign an approach on a political persuasion in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region and to reduce the U.S. military presence and financial expenditures in Afghanistan (Wadhams & Cookman, 2011).

By announcing 33,000 troops withdrawal from Afghanistan on June 2011 that of 10,000 forces was clarified to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2011, and the rest 23,000 by September 2012 (CNN, 2011). Obama tried to recede the wave of war in Afghanistan, because U.S. paid significant price in both Iraq and Afghanistan's wars in terms of human and financial resources that 6,000 Americans were killed, and \$ 1-trillion had been disbursed in both wars (BBC, 2011). Therefore, he tried to win public views which a new shift had emerged in Americans public thoughts. Otherwise, he would have faced lack of support to his 2012 re-election campaign; if he had continued war in Afghanistan. A Pew Research poll found that 56 percent of Americans had insisted in pulling out the U.S. forces from Afghanistan as quickly as possible (Ryan & Holland, 2011).

Because since Obama had been in power unemployment rate boosted from 7.6 to 9 percent, national debt from \$ 10.6 to \$ 14.6 trillion and 49.9 million Americans were not having health insurance. All these were due to expenditures of both Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Dorani, 2019, p.173). The annual expenditure of 100,000 U.S. troops climbed to \$ 120 billion, while U.S. had spent \$12 billion on ANSF training and \$ 5 billion on nonmilitary assistance. And a survey showed that 77 percent Americans supported withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan into two years,

because they believed that the U.S. was unable to win the war (Dorani, 2019, p.175). Eventually, Obama declared final U.S. pull out in 2014, with only 9,800 troops staying for the purpose of advising and training ANSF in Afghanistan (The Guardian, 2014). The second aim of retaining limited troops was to hinder Afghan government not to fail that regional powers, as China, Russia, Iran do not pursue policies. Therefore, U.S. required enduring military presence and implement assistance programs to accompany Embassy and CT operations (Goodson & Johnson, 2014). When the security situation deteriorated in Afghanistan Obama revised his exit plan and postponed the troop pullout by end of 2016 (BTI, 2018).


#### **4.8 The Impact of the 2014 U.S.-NATO Withdrawal on the Internal Situation of Afghanistan**

There were some dominant multifaceted perceptions before the U.S and NATO drawdowns that foreign troops withdrawal would have implications on Afghanistan. The country may turn poorer, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) may decline due to reduction of foreign financial assistance and public investments will decrease (Jones & Crane, 2013). The implications affected the situation in Afghanistan did not entail only these areas, but multidimensional aspects as highlighted bellow.

##### **4.8.1. Security consequences**

In the security maintenance in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO troops had significant role whom were engaged in battlefield operations in combating CT and COIN along with the ANSF pre 2014 era. One of the implications of the withdrawal in the security field was that both the U.S. and NATO forces mission changed to (RSM) delivering training and advising services to ANSF. Whilst, in terms of personal U.S. has had half contribution in the RSM. (Jonegård, 2019). The total number of RSM in Afghanistan from 39 contributing nations in Afghanistan lessened to 17,000 troops (NATO, 2019). Hence, ANSF had to combat with insurgents and the Taliban without physical presence of coalition and the U.S troops in the battlefields. Based on Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed on 30 September 2014 between the U.S. and new National Unity Government (NUG). The U.S. possessed double role in the country besides, noncombat role part of NATO mission training, advice and assistance a counterterrorism mission against Al-Qaida and its dependent networks (Olson, 2015).

In addition, an exception had already been foreseen that the U.S. troops could launch air strikes and provide some limited combat support to Afghan troops after the approval of president Obama to assist fight Taliban- led insurgency (Goodson, 2015). On the contrary, security condition intensively worsened, insurgency boosted from southward to the northward of Afghanistan (Koshan, 2019). The enemy attacks against ANSF heightened which remained high injuries and casualties.



**Figure 4.3:** Initiated Attacks on ANSF In June 04- April 17

Source: (Livingston & O’ Hanlon, 2017, p.8).

President Ashraf Ghani who won the 2014 election in Afghanistan confessed in the World Economic Forum in Davos, since 2014 and after withdrawal of foreigner combat forces, 45,000 ANSF have been killed in the war in Afghanistan (BBC, 2019). It is not only military personnel who have paid heavy sacrifices since the withdrawal of the foreign troops, but Afghan civilians have also paid huge sacrifices and injuries. Considering the period of 1 January up to 30 September 2018 around 2,798 civilians have been killed and 5,252 wounded (UNAMA, 2018). Taliban had strongly progress in pushing back the ANSF, even they were able to temporarily occupy strategic province Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. As between 28 September to 13 October 2015 due to insufficient and weak coordination of unable security institution in Kunduz city. Taliban despite of freeing of their 600 male prisoners from jail committed huge brutalities against civilians and abuse of human rights. Around 848

civilians' casualties primarily were recorded by UNAMA including 289 deaths and 559 injures (UNAMA, 2015).

#### **4.8.2 Social and economic consequences**

The exacerbation of internal conflicts also led to 554,000 people being internally displaced (UNHCR, 2018). The internal displacement and repatriation were threat to welfare enhancing rare economic opportunities in Afghanistan (World Bank, 2018). From one hand, the year 2016 was the starting spike of volunteer repatriation about 693,000 refugees returned from both Iran and Pakistan, and 562,000 in 2017. Yet, large undocumented returnees whom have not been recorded by the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) added into unemployment market (UNHCR, 2018). From other hand, the foreign troops withdrawals significantly impacted the employment market and increased economic problems in Afghanistan. This was expressed by Sayed Hussain Alimi Balkhi Afghan Minister of Migration in his visit with Afghan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabani. Based on UNHCR declaration around 146,000 Afghan migrants had entered Europe in 2015, only 80,000 of them applied asylum in Germany (BBC, 2015).

The international troops employees were made up of local workforce in diverse services, for instance the U.S. army was depended more on contractors' employees to support operations in Afghanistan. As of March 2011, there were 46,389 Afghans as contract staff which had formed 51% of total contract personnel in Afghanistan. They were working mainly in base support services, maintaining ground, running dining facilities, laundry, construction, translation, transportation and logistics maintenance. Around 17,989 Afghan were security contractors of the U.S. Army, whereas some Afghans were employed in non-US foreign troops. As of March 2011, 42,000 international troops had presence in the country which 2,000 Afghan employees constructed 41 percent of German Army labor force. And around 1,200 Afghan employees worked in the UK Army as translators shaping 13% of their workforce (Nasery, 2014).

The employment rate declined from 55.4 percent in 2013-2014 to 53.9 percent in 2016-2017, and employment rate between 25 and 50 male ages declined from 93.4 in 2011-2012 to 84.3 percent in 2016-2017. Thereby, it is equal to reduction of employment

around 176,000 jobs (World Bank, 2018). The annual growth rate in Afghanistan ranges 3 percent with an estimation of 400,000 citizens adding in the labor market per year. Nevertheless, the country suffered from stagnant economic growth which imports exacerbated pressure on unemployment situation (World Bank, 2017). The drawdowns of the foreign forces after 2014, in addition, of security challenges has had negative impact on licit economy, investments, trade in Afghanistan. This was announced by Chief Executive Officer of the Afghan Chambers of Commerce that the traders were dramatically affected (Nasery, 2014).

Investment mood deteriorated due to domination of political instability in the country which undermined investors' confidence. Thus, expanded effect on the growth which resulted to the declination from 5.6 percent in 2013 to 1.5 percent in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). Afghanistan was experiencing rapid economic progress from 2007-2012, and since handing over of security responsibility to the Afghan government the economic growth descended. The economic growth rate was 9 percent annually between 2003- 2013 with an increase of GDP per capita income from \$ 200 to \$ 650 (World Bank, 2018). Since the withdrawal of foreign troops from 2014 onwards the economic growth plummeted to 2.1 percent in the period of 2013- 2016. The GDP per capita income stood bellow \$ 100 and international financial aid from both security and civilians aid on annual average base declined from \$ 12.5 billion from 2009- 2012 to \$ 8.8 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Poverty and social deprivation increased enormously and 38% of the population lived under poverty line, while, half of the population lived without having access to hygiene water. Poor investments could not provide progress and the absence of legal framework for market competition and bureaucratic procedure for opening business became key hindrance for private sector. The simple business running rank dropped to 183 in 2016 from 182 in 2015, due to regulator space, unsafety of property rights and domination of informal financial services (BTI, 2018). The rapid growth in the poverty rates to 55 percent in 2016-2017 in Afghanistan was attached to a sluggish economy which was relied on the implications of the international troops withdrawal. Because international expenditures fell, and conflict increased that remained high vulnerability to the Afghans. Eventually, welfare condition deteriorated, and poverty headcount rates increased among citizens, because unemployment of household had correlation with

high poverty rate. Those who were educated were ranged to 40 percent of poverty rate, on the contrary, uneducated households faced 63 percent on average (CSO, 2017).

#### **4.9 U.S. and Afghanistan's Bilateral Challenges**

Since the military presence of the U.S in Afghanistan in 2001 enormous efforts have been made in terms of state building and stabilization of Afghanistan by the U.S. and most of the challenges that were posed to the U.S. were under Obama's presidency. Therefore, in this part it has been tried to discuss key bilateral challenges that the U.S. and Afghan government have faced.

##### **4.9.1 Corruption**

Corruption was and still is one of the key threats to the U.S. funds appropriated and disbursed in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 2014, DOD joint staff report attributed the reason for isolation of Afghans, damaging the reputation of government, deteriorating mood of security forces, undermining international vindication, dismantling state function, hindrance to rule of law and economic growth to the corruption. The reduction of corruption and enhancement of accountability were part of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. It was reiterated in SIGAR 2010 report since 2002, \$ 50 billion had already been spent in the absence of anticorruption strategy (SIGAR, 2016).

Moreover, in the reconstruction efforts, the ignorance of sustainability while designing constructional projects and programs by the DOD, USAID and State was another challenge which has imperiled huge funds of the U.S. and international donors. The Afghan government was short of maintaining most of these projects in the absence of endured funds of the international donors. For instance, Afghan national budget of fiscal year of 2015-2016 from internal revenues was 31% the remaining 69% relied on external fund (SIGAR, 2016).

The corruption was not only a challenge to the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, but simultaneously, discrediting government legitimacy in the country. The U.S. was more focusing on transparency in the Afghan government, but corruption was expanding in Hamid Karzai's administration that paved the way for the insurgency as well. The U.S. Commander McChrystal was emphasizing on eliminating endogenous corruption and

exemption from punishment culture. Hence for this purpose the Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) was formed to assist Afghan administration to fight corruption and organized crime under the international mentorship. This initiative resulted to further irritation of the worsened relation between Karzai and international community. The notable example is the arrestment of Mohammad Zia Saleh in July 2010 a high rank official of the Afghan National Security Adviser who committed bribe crime. But soon after issuance of an immediate order by Karzai the MCTF-A was brought under the subordination of the Afghan structure finally, he was released (Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011).

Transparency International had conducted a survey in 2010 illustrating Afghanistan the third most rotten country in the world. The 60 percent of respondents affirmed that corruption had elevated compared to the past three years. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report in 2010 illustrated. The average cash paid in the Afghan administration in return to administrative procedure and facilitating the public paperwork under the name of grant for the civil servants between 2009- 2010 amounted \$160, while, the GDP per capita was \$ 425 annually. Based on UNODC estimation total amount of bribes paid during this period covered \$ 2.5 billion approximately one quarter of GDP in the country (Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011). The UNODC survey finding shows that bribe had no single purpose in the urban areas and in frequent cases 74% victims had offered bribe that their administrative task to be accelerated and finalized. While, 51% had reciprocal interest for both citizens and governmental employees to ignore paying fines to the government account (UNODC, 2010).

#### **4.9.2 Narcotics production**

Another key component and serious challenge for both Afghan government and the U.S. was narcotics production. The country's major GDP is consistently attached to agriculture and with the illicit production of poppy that has supported 12% of GDP (TAF, 2016). Production and trafficking of drugs has jeopardized the U.S. and international financing in building of Afghanistan. This illegal business was supporting insurgency, organized crime, spreading corruption, and opium industry perceived to fuel insurgency (Paul, Clarke & Serena, 2014). Since 2002 up to early 2015, the U.S provided \$ 8.4 billion for counter-narcotics to eradicate and promote

alternative livelihood programs. Notwithstanding, Afghanistan ranked the major producer of opium across the globe producing 90% of heroin supply in the global scale and 11% equivalent to 3 million Afghans had been estimated to be drug users. And an opium survey in 2015 estimated 183,000 hectares of land were cultivated opium poppy only 3,760 hectares 2% of cultivated areas were eradicated as a result of destroying efforts in Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2016).

#### **4.9.3 Insecurity**

While Obama took office, he had confronted with the legacy of Bush war in Afghanistan. A pessimism mood was already dominating in the U.S. and other diplomatic officials minds from deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. The British ambassador Sherard Cowper Coles was pessimistic from the success of U.S. strategy, because the Taliban were strongly growing and even nosing around Kabul. The U.S. Commander Michael Mullen had confessed that the U.S. was unable to win war (Blank, 2009). The escalation of insurgency in Afghanistan, reinforcement of terrorist foundation in Pakistan and Afghanistan and fare from accessing radical Islamic elements to nuclear weapons were serious security challenges to Obama's administration. It was perceived that the Taliban possibly could retake the control of Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban would refuge Al-Qaida and its dependent networks to launch similar attack in the world which was an instant menace to the U.S. national security and its allies as well. Whereas, Taliban used to cross from Pakistan border to Afghanistan and both the U.S. and its allies were already targeted by Tehrik Taliban Pakistani (TTP) in the Afghan soil (Schweitzer & London, 2010).

The TTP was composed of armed Pashtun tribes who were the residuals in the southern region of Pakistan. Their aim was to assist Afghani Taliban to fight the U.S – NATO troops and to establish an Islamic emirate in Pakistan. After a request made by Afghani Taliban leader, they were mobilized and unified in counter foreign occupiers and their local allies in the country. Eventually, the abovementioned issues resulted in declaring of Af-Pak strategy, deploying of large size of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, formulating and implementing COIN approach. Thereafter the terrorist havens in both sides of borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan were highly targeted by the U.S. airstrike campaigns. Specially, more during McCrystal mission in some extent in David Petraeus command mission (Schweitzer & London, 2010).

The USAID a key significant donor has played a constructive role in accomplishing of development projects and delivering humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. It has also been impacted from security challenges by working in the war zone. Its staff has tolerated threats, even, hundreds of aid workers have lost their lives and wounded by insurgents since commencing its activity. Thus, insecurity had precluded its oversight and assessment from projects, and disabled its communication. USAID staff were unable to supervise farmers in the fields, inspect schools and clinics to talk to teachers and health care providers and to do better monitoring, inspection and accountability. Most of development programs could not meet their goals due to escalated insecurity (Hammink, 2017).

Security has been consistently a fundamental challenge not only for the Afghan government, but Afghans as well. It had become part of daily life. The escalation of insecurity followed by the U.S. troops surge, especially, aftermath of the withdrawal of the U.S.-NATO troops as discussed above which led to losing of 45,000 ANSF lives and nearly 3,000 civilians.

#### **4.10 U.S. and Afghanistan's Bilateral Opportunities**

The United States despite of engaging in the war against terrorism has facilitated opportunities in peace attainment in Afghanistan. One of the main fruitful efforts with the involvement of the U.S. and UN, was reintegrating of anti-government groups in Afghanistan likewise, Hezb-e- Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The HIG was an armed group established in 1970s, in the Jihad era against Soviets. It was affiliated on the U.S. fund provided through Pakistan. The HIG restrained the reconciliation deal of former President Dr Najibullah in the 1990s, due to the fear of not accessing the Pakistan financial support (Johnson 2018). After disintegration of Najibullah government HIG also denied joining in power suggested by other Mujahidin parties and kept attacking Kabul, killed around 2,000 civilian and was one side of the civil war in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, Hekmatyar lived in Exile in Iran and after toppling down the Taliban regime, he was ignored in Bonn agreement 2001, political order. Hekmatyar declared Jihad against the U.S. and Afghan government later his loyalty from Al Qaida network who was added in the global terrorist and the UN Security Council's sanction list in 2003 (SIGAR, 2019).

Karzai government commenced negotiation with HIG in 2008, and to build trust his son-in-law Ghairat Bahir was released from a prison under the U.S. control in May 2008 (Ludin, 2019). Then Bahir joined the negotiation with Karzai that the UN and American officials restrained to participate. Ultimately, another formal meeting was held between Karzai administration and HIG representatives in 2010 reaching to no accord. Respectively, in 2011 reports reflected in media from direct talks between Bahir and senior U.S. officials including the U.S. ambassador and General David Petraeus that president Karzai was irritated from this visit due to his noninvolvement (SIGAR, 2019).

Karzai's administration efforts did not result to the peace deal with HIG, because HIG rivals from Jamiat-e- Islami party and former communist regime figures were in key position of the Afghanistan's security ministries and intelligence directorate sporadically, confronting with HIG in some provinces (Johnson, 2018). The NUG efforts working on a plan for peace draft, provision of limited feedback on the text of the plan by the U.S. Embassy Kabul resulted. Consequently, the agreement was signed on 29 September 2016 when HIG put its main precondition aside which was the pullout of foreign troops and Hekmatyar was removed from the UN sanction list. Four months later, he returned to Kabul on May 2017 accompanied by the U.S. optimism paving the way for future peace talks (SIGAR, 2019).

The Agreement stipulated mutual commitment between NUG and HIG. Based on that HIG pledged to stop all military operations and break up relations with terrorist and illegal networks, accept Afghan constitution and laws, act as significant political party and to assure Afghan government that his prisoners would not join illegal networks after releasing. On the contrary, NUG committed to remove HIG leader's and members name from the UN sanction lists, recognize HIG as political party, permit it to partake in official institutions, provide judicial immunity for Hekmatyar, releasing its 20,000 prisoners those who have not committed public crime and integrate eligible HIG members into ANSF (Ludin, 2019). As a result of the U.S. contribution along with the UN that delisted HIG leader's name from UN sanction and permitted for his integration to Afghanistan which paved the way for his political participation (SIGAR, 2019).

It proves that the U.S. has had significant role in creating opportunities to the Afghan government and fostering this idea that war is not the only solution to the conflict

resolution. But through negotiation there is possibility to reach in national peace settlement with dissatisfied and isolated individuals who are fighting against the Afghan government and international troops.

#### **4.10.1 Enduring strategic partnership agreement between u.s. and afghanistan**

On May 2010, initial talks between President Barack Obama and his counterpart President Hamid Karzai took place in Washington D.C., on arrangement of Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) for the future relationship of both countries (TWH, 2012). SPA was finally signed between both presidents on 2 May 2012, in Kabul and entered into force on July 4, 2012. Based on its final article it will remain in to force by the end of 2024, acknowledging cooperation between both states based on mutual respect and common interests (DOS, 2012).

Paragraph 6 article 3 of the SPA has created opportunity and facilitated the major interest for the U.S. with the prediction of BSA by obligating Afghanistan to provide U.S. troops permanent access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014, and beyond which might be accorded in the BSA to have noncombat mission. On the Contrary, the rest of entire SPA has indicated the provisions for the interest of Afghan government. As commitment of the U.S. in respecting sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, not aiming to have permanent military bases in Afghanistan, or pose threats for its neighboring countries, mutual commitment on safeguarding and extending common values of democracy, advancing long term security, improving social, economic progress, bolstering governance and institutions in Afghanistan and strengthening regional security and cooperation (DOS, 2012).

#### **4.10.2 Security and defense cooperation agreement between the united states of america and the islamic republic of afghanistan**

The agreement short form as mentioned already is BSA which its signing was a great opportunity for both U.S. and Afghanistan ensuring mutual interests of the parties. The former President Hamid Karzai had consistently restrained from signing this agreement due to interference of the U.S. in the domestic politics of Afghanistan. He had set some preconditions for signing BSA to United States, for instance, stopping night raids, closing Bagram prison, commitment of U.S. in holding transparent election and launching formal peace process with government oppositions (Sajjadi, 2018, p. 324). Finally, the long-awaited agreement was signed by NUG's National Security

Adviser Hanif Atmar and the U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham on September 30, 2014 (Evans, 2014). The agreement entered into force on January,1 2015 terminating on 2024 article 26 BSA (Olson, 2015).

This agreement by defining the status of the U.S. military troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, ensured mutual interest of both states, but mainly has secured the opportunity for the U.S. interest to enjoy the right of freedom of action in the country. Firstly, the agreement provision guaranteed Afghan government interests comprised enjoying support of the U.S. in terms of cooperation and enhancement of ANDSF capabilities, advice, train, equip, upgrading of ANDSF, its transportation, logistic system and building Afghan Air Force capabilities article 2 paragraph 2 BSA. In return the U.S. committed not to violate Afghan sovereignty over its territory, by restraining troops entrance to Afghan homes, except urgent risk deemed, and not to detain and keep arrestment facilities and imprison Afghan citizens article 3, 3 BSA. Thus, equipping ANDSF on the behalf of United States will be endured article 4 (4) BSA (Olson, 2015).

Article 6, in the event of foreign threat against Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, a clear response like NATO allies enjoy, in response to the threat, the U.S has not committed identical measure. But only resort to political, diplomatic and economic measures have been agreed (Voetelink, 2015). Article 8 in some extent ensures the benefit of Afghan government. When the government provides facilities and areas for the use of U.S. and any immovable buildings and non-relocatable structures are built by the party that are not furthermore possible to be used by U.S. and after their leave, the property ownership will be handed over to the Afghan government. The government based on article 9 BSA has also gained U.S. commitment in respecting Afghan laws and regulations. Specially, safety law and international norms binding U.S. not to store biological and other dangerous weapons within the territory of Afghanistan (Olson, 2015). The entire remaining provisions of the agreement have reflected the benefits of the United States. Article 7 bounded the Afghan government to allow the U.S. to practice all rights and authorities within the framework of adopted facilities and areas that the Afghan government provides without any charges for the U.S. to launch operation, defense, control and assume construction works. Article 10 BSA has granted full freedom for the U.S. aircraft, vessels, and vehicles enter, exit, movements in the space, water and territory of

Afghanistan, without any charges, registration and inspection, only relied on a pre-notification of the U.S. forces from enter and exit to the civil aviation authorities of Afghanistan (DOS, 2015). In terms of contracting procedures U.S. forces have fully bounded to their laws and regulations in enjoying services, goods and products from Afghan supplier even, in construction projects within Afghan soil. But the U.S. local contractors have been subjected to Afghan laws and regulations article 11 BSA. In terms of utilities and communications U.S. and its contractors enjoy same rate charges to ANDSF of using electricity, water and other services to the agreed areas and facilities. While, use of a radio spectrum to the U.S. forces has been foreseen free of charge article 12 BSA (Olson, 2015).

Based on article 13, the Afghan government granted exclusive right for the U.S. in terms of practicing jurisdiction of any individual committing criminal or civil crimes in the country. The trial should be held in Afghanistan, hence, members of forces and civilians cannot be arrested and detained by Afghans. In the event of arrestments must be surrendered to U.S. troops and such cases cannot be transferred to international tribunal courts in the absence of U.S. forces satisfaction. The U.S. forces and civilians have been exempted from passport control, registration or subject to the Afghan laws and regulation when entering and exiting from the agreed areas of embarkation and debarkation comprising airports in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Helmand, Shindan and Bagram and land ports of Torkham, Spinboldak, Torghundi, Hairatan, Sherkan Bandar, but their contractors have been excluded from this right, article 15 BSA (DOS, 2015).

The exemption from charges, custom duties, inspection, licensing and registration to articles which are imported, exported, re-exported and transported in Afghanistan by U.S. forces is another main area of interest which has been foreseen in article 16 of BSA. The U.S. forces, civilians, non-Afghan national contractors and subcontractors who are in support of the U.S. forces are exempted from paying taxes to the government of Afghanistan from their activities related incomes excluding Afghan national contractors of the United States article 17 BSA. U.S. forces, civilians and contractors have also been exempted from driving vehicles, vessels and aircrafts with the issued license of U.S. authorities without any registration, payment in Afghanistan. In addition, Afghan authority agreed issuing free of charge plates for non-tactical vehicles of U.S. forces and officials predicted in articles 18 -19 BSA (Olson, 2015). In

terms of service support activities U.S gained right to enjoy free services of mail shipping, telecommunication services. Thus, military postal service exempted from oversight, investigation and seizure by Afghan authorities while, forces have the right of launching television broadcast channel without holding Afghan license article 20 BSA.

#### **4.11 Conclusion**

The expulsion of both the UN and EU envoys from Afghanistan by President Karzai due to having covert relations with the Taliban sparked the worsening relations of Karzai with the West. While, Obama criticized from retaining Karzai to Power in the brink of presidential election in 2008. The U.S. troops deployment surge in Afghanistan confronted with opposition of Karzai pointing out that counterterrorism should take place outside Afghanistan's border. Interventions of the U.S. in the internal affairs of Afghanistan opened a new chapter in the tensed relations between President Hamid Karzai and his counterpart Barack Obama.

The relations further escalated when Karzai accused the U.S. and the Taliban in destabilizing of Afghanistan, eventuated in abstaining Obama from visiting Karzai in his travel to Afghanistan in 2010 while visiting Bagram military base. The intervention of the U.S. in the internal politics of Afghanistan added to the irritation of relations as well. The establishments of parallel structures likewise, CHCC, prison in Bagram, detention of Afghan citizens. Furthermore, continuation of night raids air strikes targeting civilians, searching Afghan homes, pressing Karzai in appointing high rank officials in the security apparatus of Afghan government and vindication of U.S. from Taliban in opening Islamic Emirate office in Qatar perceived violation and undermining of national sovereignty of Afghan government from Karzai perspective. It was not only U.S. treatment, but the revelation of U.S. medias attributing Karzai's brother in corruption, supporting illegal investment and misusing from his brother's power provoked president Karzai anger.

President Karzai critics included the intervention of the U.S. in domestic affairs of Afghanistan violating sovereignty of the Afghan government. In contrast, he had also confronted American criticism calling his government not only weak and failed, but

corrupt. Simultaneously, he had faced internal oppositions, parliamentarian and analyst critics called soft wrestling between Karzai and Obama, and according to them there were three factors in the tension between both parties. Firstly, Karzai tried to keep himself, his family and his team to power when Karzai and U.S. were unable to conclude this issue led to tensions. Secondly, in the reconciliation process with the Taliban and HIG Karzai wanted the U.S. to support this program while, most of this group were made of Pashtuns and his interest were confronting the U.S. and global values and thirdly, Karzai was surrounded by pro Pakistan and Iran elements in his office. The U.S. had restricted both countries influence in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pakistan and Iran used to back dissenting voice against U.S. presence in the country. President political supporter's perspective sounded due to his aggressive treatment towards U.S. Karzai was conceived as independent, elected president, but rebellion group called him as puppet of American for the huge presence of the U.S. military troops. Lastly, the Afghan sociological perspective was also dominant which viewed Karzai government's decision in the interaction with international community the outcome of social policy making. Thus, foreign policy makers were affected by Afghan culture and traditions that had shadowed in the government decision, as refereeing to key decision of the president to grand assembly.

When Obama came to power, he declared a new strategy in 2009, comprised sending large number troops in Afghanistan. The concept and scope of terrorism changed by inclusion of other armed groups likewise, New Taliban, HIG, and the Taliban beyond Afghanistan's frontiers who were conceived threat to the national security of the U.S. which eventuated in declaration of Af-Pak strategy with the aim to counterterrorism in the countries' neighboring. Thereafter, as noticed that the CT was changed in COIN strategy stressing disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. policy in Afghanistan included reinforcing beside COIN strategy stressed on judicial reforms, state building and reputable police.

This study aimed to explore the consequence of the US troops surge on Afghanistan's stability and peace. In this study I reached the conclusion that troops surge policy of Obama caused escalation of insecurity. The worsening of security not only affected ANA, but coalition and the U.S. troops as well. Insecurity expanded from south to the west and northern province and as well as the capital, IEDS and suicide bombings increased. All these accompanied with some incidents and loses among civilians which

deconstructed the image of the U.S., international community and the Afghan government efforts in the securitization of Afghanistan and fostered hatred in the public mindset. Moreover, A survey result by Pew Research Center showed that 49% had responded that the U.S. had failed to achieve its goal during 17 years of military mission in Afghanistan while 35 percent responded the success the remaining 16% did not know.

In this study it was also underscored that CT required an offensive act to respond to terrorism along with hampering Al-Qaida not to target the West from Afghan soil. It required boosting capacity in the police and intelligence level. Moreover, a distinction between direct and indirect approaches has been offered. The direct approach stressed on enemy centric eliminating the enemy through using hard power likewise, drone strike in military operations. And indirect approach underscored on population centric resort to soft power through capacity building and economic development. As discussed in the case of Afghanistan both approaches have been employed by the U.S. commanders firstly, McCrystal had offensive approach and after his replacement David Petraeus who was the initiative of COIN doctrine resorted more to indirect and soft power approach. Direct approach emphasized on the application of hard power air strike which has been effective in terms of cost, time, gathering intelligence data and preventing from military and civilians' casualties.

David Petraeus concluded that reaching to success through military option was not the solution unless, to unify civilians and military efforts to win hearts and minds of local population, support both central and local government and promote good governance to be able to provide service for Afghan citizens. Whilst, in terms of stabilization the U.S. stabilization strategy was positive and constructive which was declared in 2010 with a surge of 50,000 troops and hundreds of civilians to fight insurgency in the insecure areas. Subsequently, COIN stressed on clear, hold and build which these terms entailed special meaning. That after clearing an area and launching military operation USAID and DOD implemented thousands of large medium and small- scale programs in diverse infrastructural aspects through an expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars likewise, VSO and CERP to stabilize and enable government to practice its legitimacy and sovereignty.

The U.S. troop level peaked to 100,000 by August 2010, and between 2009-2013 USFOR-A implemented 42,846 small and 2,759 medium and 254 large projects with

disbursement of large amount of funds in Afghanistan. DOD spent around \$141 million through CERP project in education sector while, USAID disbursement in the education field amounted \$ 614 million. Respectively, DOD has disbursed \$ 847 million on 4,700 projects on building roads in Afghanistan and USAID has also disbursed \$ 335 million on CDP programs covered road building as well. And most of CDP projects was implemented between 2009-2013, in south and eastern provinces with the worth of \$ 404.8 million. Hence 3,550 projects have been implemented with the contribution of CADG produced 13.3 million days of employment in Afghanistan.

But DOD and USAID lack of knowledge from the social, political and local institutions of Afghanistan in implementing the projects was a challenge, because power brokers had influence and access in the stabilization projects were profitable for them. Those who were marginalized used to integrated to the Taliban group. The U.S. and NATO have played constructive role in building ANSF in terms of quantity and quality. The number of ANSF expanded to 350,000 forces. Subsequently, security responsibility transitioned to ANSF gradually in five phases, by the end of 2014. The combat mission of both the U.S.-NATO terminated and replaced to RSM included non-combat train, advice and assist mission. While, the U.S. combat role was exceptionally conditionalized to Obama's approval.

Although Obamas withdrawal decision of troops simultaneously by declaring of surge had already been stressed. When after Al-Qaida's leader Usama Bin Laden was killed president Obama realigned his exist strategy, because war cost in Afghanistan had been elevated, and human and financial resources had been wasted which were accompanied by American public dissatisfaction. Therefore, he tried to win American's public hearts and minds not to lack support in his 2012 election campaign that he finally pulled out troops by keeping only 9,800 in Afghanistan.

This study explored the second research question which was regarding the US-NATO withdrawal impacts on the internal situation of Afghanistan. After withdrawal of troops the security situation worsened; insurgency transitioned from south to the north, enemy attacks against ANSF heightened, as 45,000 ANSF and 2,798 civilians were killed. While, the fall of Kunduz province in the north to Taliban left 848 civilian's casualties. The exacerbation of internal conflicts caused thousands of internal displacements, outmigration to Europe, voluntarily repartition of thousands of

Afghans from Pakistan and Iran added to the unemployment market. Licit economic investment and trade rapidly suffered, poverty and social deprivation increased, and economic growth compared before 2014 declined as well as GDP per capita income.

This study also attained to the exploration of the third research question which is the bilateral challenges and opportunities of the U.S. and Afghan government in the Obama era. The key bilateral challenges were corruption, narcotics production and insecurity in Afghanistan. Firstly, corruption was a great challenge for both sides while, U.S. lacked an anticorruption strategy prior of disbursing \$ 50 billion. Ignorance of sustainability by DOD and USAID during designing construction projects jeopardized large amount of the U.S. funds that the Afghan government was short of maintenance in the absence of the U.S. support. Corruption isolated Afghans, damaged government reputation, deteriorated mood of ANSF, undermined international support, dismantled state function and was hindrance to rule of law and economic growth. Anticorruption and enhancement of accountability became part of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Expansion of corruption in Hamid Karzai administration even supported the insurgency which caused the U.S. Commander McCrystal to focus to eliminate and end the culture of exempt from punishment who formed MCTF-A under mentorship of international forces. Unfortunately, MCTF-A was subordinated in the Afghan structure after issuing an order by Karzai that his corrupt and detained official released in 2010.

Narcotics production was another key challenge which imperiled the U.S and international funds in reconstructing Afghanistan. Between 2002- 2015, the U.S disbursed \$ 8.4 billion for counter-narcotics to eradicate and promote alternative livelihood programs. But this illicit product was supporting 12 percent of Afghanistan's GDP and its trade was supporting insurgency, organized crime and spreading corruption. Thus, the country ranked major producer of opium across the world and known 90 percent of heroin supplier with having 3 million of addict population and 183,000 hectares cultivated land in 2015.

Insecurity has been consistently a fundamental challenge in Afghanistan. Therefore, while Obama entered office a pessimism from deterioration of security situation was dominant, even, in foreign diplomatic level in the country. Taliban was nosing around Kabul and U.S. commander in Afghanistan was uncertain from winning of war. The

fare from not accessing radical elements to nuclear weapons was a great concern for Obama administration. TTP had targeted the U.S and its allies by crossing to Afghan territory. The insecurity had shadowed on some donors' functions, for instance USAID was unable to accomplish projects and deliver humanitarian assistance in some areas or inspect and monitor from projects which had tolerated immense sacrifice of staff in the war zone. On the contrary, Afghan government and Afghans had gotten accustomed to insecurity, because 45,000 huge loses of ANSF and nearly 3,000 civilians represented the insecurity challenge in the country.

In the U.S. Afghanistan's bilateral opportunities this study explored three main issues integration of HIG, signing of SPA and BSA. HIG was an active armed group had significant role in the civil war, launching operations against the U.S and ANSF in the post-Taliban era and by expressing its loyalty to Al-Qaida. HIG was enlisted in the global terrorist and the UN Security Council's sanction list in 2003. Although efforts were made by Karzai to integrate HIG in the government, even, by releasing his son-in-law, but Karzai efforts failed due to the presence of HIG's rivals in the key security position of his government. With the emergence of NUG, efforts from U.S. and NUG sides were made on a plan that HIG put his precondition aside, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Finally, Hekmatyar was delisted from the UN sanction list when an agreement ensured both HIG and NUG benefits and after it was signed, he returned in Kabul.

Signing of SPA was an opportunity for both U.S. and Afghan parties. SPA had ensured the major interest for the U.S. by obligating Afghanistan to provide U.S. troops permanent access to and use of Afghan areas and facilities through 2014. The rest of agreement ensured the interest of Afghan government, likewise, enjoying U.S. commitment on safeguarding and extending common values of democracy, advancing long term security, improving social, economic progress, bolstering governance and institutions in Afghanistan and strengthening regional security and cooperation.

Moreover, signing of BSA has ensured more U.S. interest rather than Afghan government. Afghan government interest comprised enjoying support of the U.S. in terms of cooperation and enhancement of ANDSF capabilities, advice, train, equip, upgrading of ANDSF, its transportation, logistic system and building Afghan Air Force capabilities. Furthermore, enjoying the U.S. commitment in not violating

Afghan sovereignty over its territory, and in the event of foreign threat against Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the U.S. pledged to resort to political, diplomatic and economic measure unlike, a clear response like NATO allies enjoy in response to the threat. The immovable buildings and non-relocatable structures in the areas provided by Afghan government built by U.S. forces and after their leave agreed to be handed over to the Afghan government.

As mentioned, the BSA has ensured the U.S. interest, provided right of freedom of action in Afghanistan, likewise the U.S. aircraft, vessels, and vehicles enter, exit, movements in the space, water and territory of Afghanistan without any charges, registration and inspection. The members of forces and civilians exempted from arrestment and detention by Afghans. In the event of arrestments must be surrendered to U.S. troops and such cases cannot be transferred to international tribunal courts in the absence of the U.S. forces satisfaction.

The U.S. forces and civilian's exemption from passport control, registration or subject to Afghan laws and regulation when entering and exiting from the agreed areas of embarkation and debarkation comprising airports and land ports. As well as the exemption from charges, custom duties, inspection, licensing and registration to the articles which are imported, exported, re-exported and transported in Afghanistan by U.S. forces. Issuance free of charge plates for non-tactical vehicles of the U.S. forces and officials by the Afghan authorities, enjoying free services of mail shipping, telecommunication services, military postal service, exemption from oversight, investigation and seizure by the Afghan authorities. Moreover, the right of launching television broadcast channel without holding Afghan license were the main areas of the U.S. interest.

## 5. CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on the relations between Afghanistan and the United States during President Barack Obama's tenure. The main argument of the study is that President Obama and President Karzai had tense relations due to some factors. The Obama's military surge escalated the insecurity in the country rather than, securitizing Afghanistan, but his stabilization policy was constructive and helpful to Afghan government to practice its legitimacy and sovereignty. The withdrawal of U.S.-NATO forces impacted the security, social and economic situation in the country and the key bilateral challenges were corruption, narcotics production and insecurity while, the U.S. Afghanistan's bilateral opportunities were the integration of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin in Afghan government, signing of strategic partnership agreement and bilateral security agreement.

Chapter 1 introduced research questions, methodology, structure, general framework and highlighted the limitation of the study.

Chapter 2 discussed the literature on International Relations theories. It underlined that in the realm of IR liberals are concerned how to develop a political state to protect from external threats without harming the individual liberty. This chapter also stressed on the variants of liberalism. Chapter 2 also highlighted the Realism theory and its variants. As it was stated that the Realists view international system is anarchy, because there is neither pervasive power nor world government, and the state is the supreme actor in the world politics.

Chapter 2 stated that Constructivists view that states socially build up reality and act based on the constructed reality. Thereby, the key significant facet of international relations is social that the social truth is subjective and does not deal with material forces. They claim ideas and beliefs effect the world politics, thus, prospects change by the passage of time, because ideas and beliefs of the actors change. Identities and interest are another core argument of constructivists who underscore as a result of interaction between actors, states gain identities and identities shape interests.

The chapter offered a brief conclusion from the discussed international relations theories and analyzed that the constructivism theory is best suited in the U.S. Afghanistan's relations, because based on constructivism tenets the reality is socially constructed entailing state's identity, interest and relationships. Therefore, aftermath of the 9/11 attacks President Bush for the first time posed the question of the U.S. identity and the hatred of terrorists from America by placing identity in the center of the U.S. foreign policy. The president attributed the terrorist hatred to the U.S. freedoms and applied the language of Global War on Terror (GWOT) and oriented his foreign policy on counterterrorism whilst, unified the international community by declaring Al-Qaida terrorist network as a pernicious global threat.

Thereafter, the identity of Al-Qaida was constituted and promoted across the world as well as representing Islamic ideology that launched attack against west. Thereby, Afghanistan was centralized in the axis of counterterrorism approach. It can be argued that how President George W. Bush socially constituted reality and acted based on the constructed reality. How his idea and belief finally effected the world politics through interaction between states and magnification made from the terrorist threat which convinced and harmonized the globe and made alliances to be unified in GWOT.

It has been concluded that the U.S.- Afghan relations in Obama era also fits within the constructivist theoretical framework. When Obama declared surge of 30,000 troops, he once again made a clear justification of war against terrorism through directly refocusing on the 9/11 attack as a rationale to continue war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He demonstrated that how significant it was for the U.S. and its allies that he used the same language of president Bush. If we scrutinize deeply, Al-Qaida was denied, even its leader Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in 2011. This network did not have physical base anymore, but despite the existence of threat and transnational terrorism phrase which was constructed and used by President Obama provided a justification for continuation of the war.

Therefore, declaration of troops surge policy in Afghanistan was an articulation through which the menace of terrorism reconstructed and highlighted that the risk was heightened and decentralized. Thus, the language and practices of GWOT was remained and created the opportunity for the U.S. long term presence in the country. Obama administration stressed its action more on Counterinsurgency (COIN), while

most of objectives on development and constructing security institutions achieved and paved the way for finalizing Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to have strategic presence. The implementation of Stabilization projects, especially supporting women and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can be perceived the Obama administration efforts on constructing political order that helped the development process in the country.

President George W. Bush had constructed GWOT by linking Al-Qaida with Taliban, while President Obama resorted to the usage of transnational terrorism justifying that the world had changed after 9/11 and transnational terrorism should have been vanquished and thereby, AF-PAK strategy was declared to target terrorist to the areas that the designers of the 9/11 attacks habituated.

Consequently, it has been argued that how ideas and identity was created, evolved and put in to practice in the fight against GWOT and shaped the core relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan. And how the global powers were unified and jointly responded to Counterterrorism (CT) and COIN in the sanctuaries of terrorism. When the Obama interest demanded how he increased his military forces in Afghanistan and when he saw his interest at risk facing American public dissatisfaction. How he withdrew the troops and justified the remaining number to assist ANDSF in non-combat missions.

Chapter 3 assessed Afghanistan's strategic importance, specially the country's strategic importance for regional and global powers. Afghanistan is a landlocked mountainous country, empires like Britain and Russian have invaded but could not retain footprint. The country is the transit and transport point between Central and South Asia and links the markets of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and China due to its strategic position along the Silk Route. The country is rich in terms of natural and mineral resources and holds strategic importance for regional and global powers. The chapter underscored that Pakistan relies for its energy on Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) gas pipeline that passes through Afghanistan whereas, the country also provides nearby transit path between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) with low transport costs. It possesses geo-strategical significance to Iran due to U.S. presence threatening Iran's security which in respond to this threat, Iran undermines the U.S. interest by supporting Taliban in terms of weapons and intelligence information. The chapter also stressed other regional and

global powers views regarding Afghanistan; as India perceives Afghanistan the gateway to Central Asia to find market for its goods and through Chabahar port India precludes China to get access to Gwadar port in Pakistan. Besides, Moscow is keen to improve security in Afghanistan and Central Asia, due to the serious concerns from the Afghan illegal narcotics trafficking and influx through central Asia. Afghanistan has great importance in the strategic calculation of China since it showed intention in building One Belt One Road (OBOR.) The OBOR initiative geographically covers 60 countries throughout three continents, it decreases transaction expenses and will simplify trade circulation through frontiers. The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has great significance to the U.S. for diverse purposes; as aiming to restrain China's expansion by consolidating defense and security collaboration with India, to reach out wealthy energy countries of CARs, and to have surveillance over the Atomic Missile power Pakistan.

Subsequently, the chapter evaluated the historical background of U.S. invasion in Afghanistan first with a glance to U.S. support from Afghan Mujahedeen during Soviets invasion in Afghanistan. Then, the chapter stressed, the 9/11 attacks motivated the U.S. to declare war against GWOT. President George W. Bush unified the international community and supported Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan who jointly targeted Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Finally, the Taliban regime disintegrated, and this led to the huge presence of the U.S. and international military forces in the country.

Chapter 3 also focused on Bonn Conference that paved the way for the establishment of interim and transition government in the country and ratification of a constitution led to first direct presidential election in October 2004. In addition, stressing on the key powers efforts towards implementing reforms and structuring key security pillars of the new established government and the development of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces by the assistance of international community.

This chapter stressed on the contribution of some key donors in implementing quick impact projects. The Big powers were actively engaged in the process of reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

Chapter 3 evaluated that social forces strongly emerged in the post-Taliban regime and had active role in the social and political aspects in the country. As women, youth,

media and civil society organizations. Women engaged in the key decision-making process and in the internal politics. Since 2001, four types of political youth movements emerged in the country. Afghan society was the witness of media development post- Taliban dark era that freedom of expression and press were absent. National and private TV channels and Radio stations launched their broadcasts and hundreds of newspapers and magazines began publishing and civil society organizations linked people with government and media strongly evolved.

Chapter 4 strongly focused on the U.S.-Afghanistan's relations during Obama administrations. The chapter firstly assessed the tense relations of the two governments relations; as the U.S. and Afghanistan's relations irritated while President Karzai expelled both the UN and EU envoys from Afghanistan due to having covert visit with the Taliban high rank member. Subsequently, the opposition of Karzai towards U.S. troops deployment surge in Afghanistan tensed relation between President Hamid Karzai and his counterpart Barack Obama. Moreover, Karzai offensive behavior in the response to the U.S. interventions in the internal politics of Afghanistan opened a new chapter of distrust and added to the irritation of relations.

The chapter highlighted that there were five views dominating in this respect to Obama and Karzai relations; as Karzai view focused on the U.S. intervention in the internal affair of the country, American view criticized Karzai corrupt government, parliamentarian and analyst perspective underscored on the continuation of soft wrestling between Karzai and Obama, and political critic divided into two parts. Karzai political supporters called Karzai an independent president, while, the rebellion puppet and finally, Afghan sociological perspective highlighted Karzai government decision with international community was based on traditional policy making.

Chapter 4 also underlined Obama's comprehensive policies towards Afghanistan and its consequences. The Chapter drew the following conclusions. Firstly, the consequence of the U.S. troops surge on Afghanistan's security and stability that troops surge policy of Obama caused escalation of insecurity in the country. The worsening of security not only affected Afghan National Army, but coalition and the U.S. troops as well. Insecurity expanded from south to the west and northern province and as well as the capital, IEDS and suicide bombings increased. All these accompanied with some incidents and loses among civilians which destructed the

image from U.S., international community and the Afghan government efforts in the securitization of Afghanistan and fostered hatred in the public mindset. Moreover, American public were pessimistic from U.S. success in the war in Afghanistan.

The United States reached to conclusion that success through military option was not solution unless, to unify civilians and military efforts to win hearts and minds of local population, hence, to support both central and local government and promote good governance to be able to provide service for Afghan citizens. Finally, in terms of stabilization of Afghanistan the U.S. efforts cannot be overlooked. Therefore, U.S. stabilization strategy is concluded positive and constructive, because after declaring stabilization strategy in 2010 along with 50,000 troops and hundreds of civilians to fight insurgency in the insecure areas that the U.S. troops peaked to 100,000. While, COIN strategy subsequently, stressed on clear, hold and build which DOD and USAID implemented thousands of large, medium and small-scale projects in diverse infrastructural aspects including education, road construction and employments by expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars to stabilize and enable government to practice its legitimacy and sovereignty as well as Afghans to be benefited .

Secondly, the US-NATO withdrawal impacts on the internal situation of Afghanistan. After withdrawal of troops the security situation worsened; insurgency transitioned from south to the north, enemy attacks against ANSF heightened, roughly large number of ANSF and civilians were killed. While, the fall of Kunduz province in the north to Taliban left hundreds civilian's casualties. The exacerbation of internal conflicts caused thousands of internal displacements and outmigration to Europe. The voluntarily repatriation of thousands of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran added to the unemployment market. Thus, local workforce of international troops lost their jobs along with local contractors, and licit economic, investment and trade rapidly suffered. Poverty and social deprivation increased, and economic growth compared to before 2014 declined, as well as GDP per capita income.

Thirdly, this study also attained to the exploration of the third research question which is the bilateral challenges and opportunities of the U.S. and the Afghan governments in the Obama era. The key bilateral challenges were corruption, narcotics production and insecurity in Afghanistan. Firstly, corruption was a great challenge for both sides while, U.S. lacked an anticorruption strategy prior of disbursing billions of dollars.

The ignorance of sustainability by DOD and USAID during designing construction projects jeopardized large amount of the U.S. funds that the Afghan government was short of maintenance in the absence of U.S. support. Corruption isolated Afghans, damaged government reputation, deteriorated mood of ANSF, undermined international support, dismantled state function and was hindrance to rule of law and the economic growth. Anticorruption and enhancement of accountability became part of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Expansion of corruption in Hamid Karzai administration even supported the insurgency which caused U.S. Commander McCrystal to focus on eliminating and ending the culture of exempt from punishment who formed Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) under mentorship of international forces. Unfortunately, MCTF-A was subordinated in the Afghan structure after issuing an order by Karzai that his corrupt and detained official released in 2010.

Narcotics production was another key challenge which imperiled the U.S and international funds in reconstructing Afghanistan. Between 2002- 2015, the U.S disbursed billions of funds for counter-narcotics to eradicate and promote alternative livelihood programs. But this illicit product was supporting 12 percent of Afghanistan's GDP and its trade was supporting insurgency, organized crime and spreading corruption. Thus, the country ranked major producer of opium across the world and known 90 percent of heroin supplier with having 3 million of addict population and 183,000 hectares cultivated land in 2015.

Insecurity has been consistently a fundamental challenge in Afghanistan. Therefore, by entering Obama in office a pessimism from deterioration of security situation was dominating, even in the foreign diplomatic level in the country. Taliban was nosing around Kabul and the U.S. commander in Afghanistan was uncertain from winning of war. The fare from not accessing radical elements to nuclear weapons was a great concern for Obama administration and Tarik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had targeted the U.S and its allies by crossing to Afghan territory. The insecurity had shadowed on some donors' functions, as USAID was unable to accomplish projects and deliver humanitarian assistance in some areas or inspect and monitor from projects which had tolerated immense sacrifice of staff in the war zone. Conversely, Afghan government and Afghans had gotten accustomed to insecurity, because of huge loses of ANSF and

the increase routine of civilians' casualties was representing the insecurity challenge in the country.

Chapter also conclude that in the U.S. Afghanistan's bilateral opportunities this study explored three main issues the integration of HIG in the Afghan government, signing of SPA and BSA. HIG was an active armed group had significant role in the civil war and used to launch operations against the U.S and ANSF in the post-Taliban era. By expressing its loyalty to Al-Qaida, HIG was enlisted in the global terrorist and the UN Security Council's sanction list in 2003. Although efforts were made by Karzai to integrate HIG in the government, even by releasing his son-in-law, but Karzai efforts failed due to the presence of HIG's rivals in the key security positions of Karzai's government. After the NUG government shaped in Afghanistan, efforts from the U.S. and NUG sides were made on a plan and HIG put his precondition of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Finally, Hekmatyar was delisted from the UN sanction list when an agreement ensured both HIG and NUG benefits, and after it was signed, he returned in Kabul.

Signing of SPA was an opportunity for both U.S. and Afghan parties. SPA had ensured one major interest for the U.S. by obligating Afghanistan to provide U.S. troops permanent access to and use of Afghan areas and facilities through 2014. The rest of agreement ensured the interest of the Afghan government, likewise, enjoying U.S. commitment on safeguarding and extending common values of democracy, advancing long term security, improving social, economic progress, bolstering governance, institutions in Afghanistan and strengthening regional security and cooperation.

Moreover, signing of BSA has ensured more U.S. interest, rather than the Afghan government. The Afghan government interest comprised enjoying support of the U.S. in terms of cooperation and enhancement of ANDSF capabilities, advice, train, equip, upgrading of ANDSF, its transportation, logistic system and building Afghan Air Force capabilities. Furthermore, enjoying the U.S. commitment in not violating Afghan sovereignty over its territory, and in the event of foreign threat against Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity. The U.S. pledged to resort to political, diplomatic and economic measures unlike, a clear response like NATO allies enjoy in response to the threat. The immovable buildings and non-

relocatable structures in the areas provided by the Afghan government built by U.S. forces after their leave agreed to be handed over to the Afghan government.

This chapter also concluded that BSA has ensured the U.S. more interests which provided right of freedom of action for the U.S. troop in the country, likewise the U.S. aircraft, vessels, and vehicles enter, exit, movements in the space, water and territory of Afghanistan without any charges, registration and inspection. The members of forces and civilians exempted from arrestment and detention by Afghans. And on the event of arrestments agreed to be surrendered to the U.S. troops and such cases cannot be transferred to international tribunal courts in the absence of the U.S. forces satisfaction.

The U.S. forces and civilian's exemption from passport control, registration or subject to the Afghan laws and regulation when entering and exiting from the agreed areas of embarkation and debarkation comprising airports and land ports. As well as the exemption from charges, custom duties, inspection, licensing and registration to articles which are imported, exported, re-exported and transported in Afghanistan by the U.S. forces. Issuance free of charge plates for non-tactical vehicles of the U.S. forces and officials by the Afghan authorities, enjoying free services of mail shipping, telecommunication services, military postal service exemption from oversight, investigation and seizure by the Afghan authorities. Finally, the right of launching television broadcast channel without holding Afghan license were the main areas of the U.S. interests.

The signing of peace agreement between the Taliban and the United States demonstrated that things drastically and unexpectedly have changed in Afghanistan since Trump took over power. Neither U.S. political figures and international community nor Afghan government would not have even imagined ignoring and forgiving all imposed brutal acts, violation of human rights during 19 years of war and to sacrifice all for only bringing Taliban in the negotiation table in the intra-Afghan peace talks and with the unknown future that what will Taliban's next expectation from Afghan government be in the direct talks. If the Taliban's future demands would not be realized who would be the loser, the United States and the international community or the Afghan government? This is again a question of costs and benefits, because the Trump administration has been the architect of the peace plan for the benefit of the

U.S. to end the longest war in Afghanistan and withdraw the U.S. troops. This can also be perceived that the core argument of constructivists once again realized in respect to Afghanistan's case during Trump administration era that the constructivists argued that the reality is built up and ideas and beliefs change by the passage of time, because prospects change.

Trump's policies are an unpredictable, he was urging to eradicate insurgents in the beginning of his presidency;- later on, he resorted to peace talks with the Taliban within the timeline of 18 months and sought to construct the legitimate image of peace building in the global public opinion and legitimized his military forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan based on the peace agreement with the Taliban.

## REFERENCES

- Afzali, S.** 2012, *Devil Bases in the World*. Kabul, Shaheen Afzali.
- Ali M** 2010, 'Strategy for Peace: Af-Pak and Beyond', *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 63, No.1, pp.51-52.
- Algozaibi G, AR** 1965, 'The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics', *Background*, Vol. 8, no.4, p. 231.
- BA, DA & Hoffmann, JM** 2018, 'Social Constructivism the Power of Ideas and Norms', Leonard KE (ed), *Building Your IR Theory Toolbox: an introduction to understanding world politics*, 1st ed, Rowman & Littlefield, New York, pp.98-101.
- Barlow JJ** 1999, 'The fox and the lion: Machiavelli replies to Cicero', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 20, no. 4, p.637.
- Barnett M**, 2014, 'Social Constructivism', in Baylis J, Smith, S & Owens P (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed, Oxford University Press, UK, pp.157-158.
- Bayat, A.R & et.al** 2008, *Introduction to the contemporary schools of thoughts*, Iran, Institute of thought and religious culture.
- Bolan, J.C**, 2009, 'Risk in American Foreign Military Interventions', MA thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
- Bolton, J** 2020, *THE ROOM WHERE IT HAPPENED A White House Memoir*, Simon & Schuster, New York.
- Burchill, S** 2001, 'Liberalism', Burchill, S. et al. (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 55.
- Caldwell W, B& Finney N K** 2010, 'The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach', *Prism*, Vol. 2, no. 1, p. 122.
- Cambridge University Press**, 2002, 'International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-Interim Administration of Afghanistan ("Interim Administration"): Military Technical Agreement', *International Legal Materials*, 41, (5), pp. 1033-1034.
- Center for American Progress** 2015, *Investments Along China's Belt and Road Initiatives*, Center for American Progress, Washington D.C.,
- Chaudhuri R & Farrell T** 2011, 'Campaign disconnect: Operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011', *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. Vol. 87, no. 2, pp. 284-285.
- Chiaruzzi, M**, 2012, 'Realism', Devetak, R, Burke, A & Geroge J.(eds), *An Introduction to International Relations*, 2<sup>nd</sup>, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 38-39.
- Dobbins, J, Poole A.M, Long, A, & Runkle, B**, 2008, 'Post-9/11 Nation- Building: Afghanistan and Iraq', *After the war*, Rand Corporation, p.90.
- Domenico, L**, 2011, *Liberalism A Counter- History*, Verso. London.
- Dorani S** 2019, *America in Afghanistan Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump*, Bloomsbury publishing, UK.
- Elman, C.** 2007, 'Realism', Graffiths, M (ed), *International Relations Theory for the*

- Twenty-First Century*, Taylor and Francis, Routledge, USA, pp,17-18.
- Eklund H** 2011, 'Shakespeare and bin Laden's Death', *Modern Language Association*, Vol. 126, no. 4, p. 1140.
- Farhan, M.G**, 2016, *Fundamentals of Political Science*, Herat, Quds Publication.
- Folker, S.F** 2013, 'Neoliberalism', Dunne, T, Kurki, M & Smith, S, (eds), *International Relations Theories*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 116.
- Gallis P** 2007, 'NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance', *Connection*, Vol. 6, no. 3, p .12.
- Glenn R, W** 2015, *Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict*, 1<sup>st</sup> edn, Routledge, London.
- Goodson LP** 2015, 'The US and Afghanistan after 2014', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, No. 2, p. 271.
- Gul, N.** 2006, 'Post- 9/11 Afghanistan and the Regional Security Scenario', *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs*, 59, (1), pp. 46, 48.
- Haggai, K.** 2016, 'One Belt One Road Strategy in China and Economic Development in the Concerning Countries', *World Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities.*, 2. (1), p. 10.
- Hartman A** 2002, 'The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet- Occupied Afghanistan', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, no.3, p.480.
- Hasenclever, A** 2014, 'Liberal approaches to the democratic peace', in Schieder, S & Spindler M 2014 (des), *Theories of International Relations*, Routledge Tylor and Francis Group, London and New York, pp. 133.
- Hashimi M, S** 2017, *The United States Foreign Policy in the Pos-Taliban Afghanistan*, 1<sup>st</sup> edn, Saeed Publishing, Kabul.
- Heywood, A** 2011, *Global Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Huasheng, Z.** 2016, 'Afghanistan and China's new neighbourhood diplomacy', *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 92. (4), p. 901.
- Idrees, M. Anwar, K.** 2017, 'Afghanistan a Battle Ground for the Interests of Superpowers: A Special Reference to USA', *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 5. (2), pp. 2-3.
- Indurthy R** 2011, 'The Obama Administration's Strategy in Afghanistan', *International Journal on world peace*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 14-22.
- Jackson, R & Sorensen, G** 2013, *Introduction to International Relations*, 5th ed, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.
- Jones S G** 2008, 'The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad', *International Security*, Vol. 32, no.4, p.19.
- Kaufman, J.P** 2013, *Introduction to International Relations*. INC, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Kazemi S. AA** 1994, *International Relations in Theory and Practice*. Tehran, Qooms Publishing.
- Kelly,TK, Bensahel, N & Oliker, O** 2011, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, Rand Corporation, Arlington.
- Khan, R.M.** 2015, 'China's Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan', *FWU Journal of Social Sciences*, 1. (1), pp,1- 4.
- Mackinder, H.** 2005, *Global Geostrategy Mackinder and the Defense of the West*. London, Frank Cass.
- Makel, K** 2011, *Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team*, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Kansas.
- Mammadov, A & Sehhat, A** 2016, *Neo-Liberalism Theory in International Relations*,

- International Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies*. 2 (6), p. 292.
- Mieser, J.W** 2017, 'Liberalism', McGlinchey, S, Walters, R & Scheinpflug, C, (eds), *International Relations Theory*, International Relations, England, pp. 22-23.
- Milani, M.M.** 2006, 'Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan', *The Middle East Journal*, 60. (2), p, 251.
- Miller P, D** 2011, 'How the War in Afghanistan Can Be Won', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, no. 1, p. 61.
- Mingst, K. A & Toft, IMA** 2017, *Essentials of International Relations*, 7<sup>th</sup>, ed, Norton & Company, New York. London.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defense** 2014, *Denmark Peace and Stabilization Program for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region 2015-2017*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defense, Denmark
- Mohajer, M.A.** 2018, *The Role of U.S Strategy in Providing Security in Afghanistan Post-Taliban*. Kabul, Farhang Publication.
- Mohammad, A. & Yousefi, H.** 2012, 'Iran's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan: The Current Situation and Future Prospects', *South Asian Studies*, 27. (1), pp, 64-65.
- Mohammadi, Q.** 2018, Chabahar: 'The Decay of Geo-Strategic Importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan', *Journal of Economics and Management Sciences*, 1. (1), pp, 69-70.
- Mullen R, D** 2009, 'Afghanistan in 2009: Trying to Pull Back from the Brink', *Asian Survey*, Vol 50, No.1, p. 128.
- Murraray A, JH** 1996, 'The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau', *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 58, no.1, p.97.
- Naz, S & Jaspal Z N**, 2018, 'Afghanistan in the Snare of External Power Struggle', *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, Vol.38, no. 3, pp. 22,24,25.
- Nobel J W** 1995, 'Morgenthau's Struggle with Power: The Theory of Power Politics and the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, no.1, p. 61.
- Olson P, M** 2015, 'INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN & AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANSTAN ON THE STAUS OF NATO FORCES AND NATO PERSONNEL CONDUCTING MUTUALLY AGREED NATO-LED ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. *International Legal Materials*. Vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 273-305
- Paris R** 2015, 'Afghanistan: What went wrong', *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 11, no.2, p.538.
- Poullada LB** 1981, 'Afghanistan and the United States: The crucial years', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, no. 2 p.179.
- Rineheart J** 2010, 'Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency', *Terrorism Research Initiatives*, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 32,38.
- Rossello D** 2012, 'Hobbes and the Wolf Man: Melancholy and Animality in Modern Sovereignty', *New Literary History*, Vol. 43, no.2 p. 257.
- Roy, R.K & Steger, MB** 2010, *Neoliberalism A very short Introduction*, Oxford

University Press, New York.

- Runion, L.M** 2007, *The History of Afghanistan*. London, Greenwood Press.
- Russett, B** 2013, 'Liberalism', Dunne, T, Kurki, M & Smith, S, (eds), *International Relations Theories*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 95.
- Sachleben, M**, 2018, 'Realism and Neorealism Power Based Theory', Leonard, E.K, (ed), *Building Your IR Theory Toolbox*, 1st ed, Rowman & Littlefield, USA, p.16.
- Sajjadi A, Q** 2018, *Foreign Policy of Afghanistan*, 1<sup>st</sup> edn, Vazhah Publication, Kabul.
- Sangar, K.** 2016, 'Afghanistan's significance for Russia in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Interests, Perceptions and Perspectives', *Politics in Central Europe*, 12. (1), pp. 64,73,75.
- Schweitzer Y & London S** 2010, 'Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy: Challenges and Objectives', *Institute for National Security Studies*, Vol.12, no. 4, pp. 104-108.
- Shahrani M, N** 2015, 'The Impact of U.S.-NATO Withdrawal on the Internal Politics of Afghanistan: Karzai- style Thugocracy or Taliban Theocracy', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55. No. 2, pp. 296-298.
- Sims C, Lujan F & West B** 2012, 'Both Sides of the COIN: Defining War After Afghanistan', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, no. 1, p.184.
- Spanta R D** 2017, *Afghan Politic A Narrative from Within*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed, Azim & Parnian, Kabul.
- Taddeo, V** 2010, 'U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghan Campaign', *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 32.
- Taliaferro J W** 2000, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', *International Security*, Vol. 25, no. 3, p. 129.
- Tang S** 2008, 'Fear in International Politics: Two Positions', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, no.3, p.453.
- Theys, S** 2017, 'Constructivism', McGlinchey, S, Walters, R & Scheinpflug, C, (eds), *International Relations Theory*, International Relations, England, pp. 36-38.
- Tucker R W** 1952, 'Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, no.1, p. 216.
- Thruelsen P, D** 2011, 'The operational challenges to the comprehensive approach: ending the international involvement in Afghanistan', *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. 64, no.2, pp. 63-64.
- Vayrynen, R** 1980, 'Journal of Peace Research'. *Afghanistan*. 17. (2), p. 93.
- Walt SM** 2001, 'Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy', *International Security*, Vol. 26. No.3, p. 56.
- Yadav V** 2010, 'The Myth of the Moderate Taliban', *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 3, p.135.
- Afghan Embassy Iran (AEI)** 2016, *Free Media the Flaming Torch of Democracy in Afghanistan*, Viewed 26 February 2019, <<http://www.afghanembassy.ir/news/.html>>.
- Akbari, M.Z**, 2018, *What's the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan*, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Viewed 2 November 2019, <[http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post\\_id=21906](http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=21906)>.
- Antunes, S & Camisao, I** 2018, *Introducing Realism in International Relations*

- Theory*, E-International Relations Students, Viewed 10 July 2019, < <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/>>.
- Arab News** 2020, Afghan president to free up to 2,000 Taliban prisoners, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1679431/world>>.
- Arvin, A** 2013, *Soft Wrestling of Karzai and the U.S, five views*, BBC Persian, Viewed 2 March 2020, <[https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2013/12/131228\\_k02-karzai-us-tensions](https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2013/12/131228_k02-karzai-us-tensions)>.
- Associated Press** 2016, *A timeline of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001*, Viewed 21 March 2020, < <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/07/06/a-timeline-of-u-s-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-since-2001/> >.
- Bangash, K.Y & Jamal, U** 2017, *Understanding Pakistan's Strategic Interests in Afghanistan*, The News on Sunday, Viewed 17 November 2019, <<http://www.thenews.com.pk/tns.detail/560190>>.
- BBC** 2010, *Profile: Hamid Karzai*, Viewed 13 April 2020, < [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3135938.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3135938.stm)>.
- BBC** 2012, *NATO endorses Afghanistan withdrawal timetable*, Viewed, 27 March 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18154227>>.
- BBC** 2013, *NATO Accepts Afghan Leader Karzai's Air Strikes Decree*, Viewed 4 March 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21490432> >.
- BBC** 2013, *Afghan Security handover 'tough' says Nato chief Rasmussen*, Viewed 25 March 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-22949062/afghan-security-handover-tough-says-nato-chief-rasmussen>>.
- BBC** 2015, *The Number of Afghan Migrants in Europe has reached to 146,000*, Viewed 9 April 2020, < [https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/11/151116\\_k05\\_afghan\\_reugee\\_in\\_european\\_countries](https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/11/151116_k05_afghan_reugee_in_european_countries)>.
- BBC** 2019, *Afghanistan's Ghani says 45,000 security personnel killed since 2014*, Viewed 30 March 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558>>.
- BBC** 2020, *Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war*, Viewed 19 June 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443> >.
- BBC** 2020, *The United States and the Taliban signed a historic peace agreement after two decades of war*, Viewed 20 June 2020, <<https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-51689808> >.
- BBC** 2020, *Afghan conflict: President Ashraf Ghani rejects Taliban prisoner release*, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51695370>>.
- BBC** 2020, *Exchange of Taliban prisoners and the Afghan government; The Taliban delegation is a quest of the Qatari embassy in Kabul*, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-52121334>>.
- BBC** 2020, *Afghanistan: Taliban announce three-day Eid ceasefire with government*, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52785604>>.
- Blank S, J** 2009, 'Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration in

- Central Asia', *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, Viewed 4 April 2020, <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11263.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5004%2Ftest](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11263.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5004%2Ftest)>.
- Boon J** 2010, *WikiLeaks cables portray Hamid Karzai as corrupt and erratic*, *The Guardian*, London, Viewed 9 April 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-cables-hamid-karzai-erratic>>.
- Bose, S, Bizahn, N & Ibrahimi N** 2019, *Youth Protest Movements in Afghanistan Seeking Voice and Agency*, peace works no 145, USIP, Washington DC. Viewed 24 February 2020, <<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/pw145-youth-protest-movements-in-afghanistan-seeking-voice-and-agency.pdf>>.
- Brookings** 2009, *Afghanistan Index Tracking Variable of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan*, Viewed 10 March 2020, <<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20091222-1.pdf>>.
- BTI** 2018, *Afghanistan Country Report*, Viewed 31 March 2020, <<https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/afg/ity/2018/itr/aso/>>.
- Central Asia Institute** 2011, *Journey of Hope*, Viewed, 11 May 2020, <[https://centralasiainstitute.org/publications/2011\\_Journey-of-Hope.pdf](https://centralasiainstitute.org/publications/2011_Journey-of-Hope.pdf)>.
- Central Command (Centcom)** 2009, *President calls for 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan*, Washington D.C., Viewed 9 March 2020, <<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883960/president-calls-for-30000-more-us-troops-in-afghanistan/>>.
- Central Statistic Organization (CSO)** 2017, *Afghanistan Living Condition Survey 2016-17*, Viewed 2 April 2020, <<file:///C:/Users/90534/Downloads/Afghanistan%20ALCS%202016-17%20Analysis%20report.pdf>>.
- Chaudhary S** 2009, *Counterterrorism VS Counterinsurgency: Understanding Obama's Afghanistan Decision*, *Medill News Service*, Washington D, C. Viewed 17 March 2020, <[https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2009/11/04/chaudhary\\_coin\\_vct\\_1104/#sthash.a6ZbnZ68.9bFKmPoQ.dpbs](https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2009/11/04/chaudhary_coin_vct_1104/#sthash.a6ZbnZ68.9bFKmPoQ.dpbs)>.
- CNN** 2011, *Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan*, Viewed 26 March 2020, <<https://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/index.html>>.
- Cordaid** 2019, *Women of Afghanistan: We came out of dark, we will never go back*, Viewed 25, February, 2020, <<https://www.cordaid.org/en/news/women-of-afghanistan-we-will-never-go-back/>>.
- Crowley M** 2012, *Exit Petraeus and his Military Doctrine*, *National Security*, Viewed 17 March 2020, <<https://swampland.time.com/2012/11/12/exit-petraeus-and-his-famous-military-doctrine/>>.
- David SR** 2015, *Obama's Realist Policies*, *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*, Viewed 15 March 2020, <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep04748.6.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5004%2Ftest](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep04748.6.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5004%2Ftest)>.

2Fbasic\_SYC-  
5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A0c741bc91e22a10770157bfce812  
ae2c >.

- Dempsey J** 2011, *Karzai seeks End to NATO Reconstruction Teams*, The New York Times, New York, Viewed 4 March 2020, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/asia/07munich.html> >.
- Department of State (DOS)** 2012, *Agreement Between the United States of America and Afghanistan*, Viewed 7 April 2020, < <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12-704-Afghanistan-Relations.pdf>>.
- Department of State (DOS)** 2015, *Defense Cooperation Agreement Between United States of America and Afghanistan*, Viewed 8 March 2020, < <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/15-101-Afghanistan-Defense-Cooperation.pdf>>.
- Department of State (DOS)** 2018, *Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America*, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>>.
- Department of State (DOS)** 2019, *U.S., Relation with Afghanistan*, Viewed 2 March 2020, <<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/>>.
- Ershad, Z.H** 2014, *Four seasons of Afghan- American Relations*. Available from: [http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2014/10/141001\\_k04\\_afg\\_u\\_s\\_relation](http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2014/10/141001_k04_afg_u_s_relation). [27 February 2019].
- Evan J, R** 2014, *Bilateral Security Agreement: A New Era of Afghan-U.S. Cooperation*, Viewed 7 March 2020, <<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/09/30/bilateral-security-agreement-a-new-era-of-afghan-u-s-cooperation/>>.
- Feilke, M** 2010, *German Experience in Police Building in Afghanistan*, GRIPS Policy Research Center, German Federal Police College, Viewed 20 February 2020, < <http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/10-02.pdf> >.
- Fields, M, & Ahmed, R,** 2011, *A review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan*, no. 8, National Defense University Press, Washington Dc, Available at: <https://ndupress.ndu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspective-8.pdf> [Accessed: 3 March 2019].
- Goodson LP & Johnson TH** 2014, 'U.S. Policy and Strategy Toward Afghanistan After 2014', *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, Viewed 29 March 2020, < [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11889.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5055%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3Aad9d2a4a588f5cb7c05afbed127ffd98](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11889.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5055%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3Aad9d2a4a588f5cb7c05afbed127ffd98)>.
- Gulf Times** 2012, *Kabul announces fourth round of security handover*, GPPC Doha, Qatar, Viewed 25 March 2020, <<https://www.gulf-times.com/story/337165/Kabul-announces-fourth-round-of-security-handover>>.
- Gul A,** 2020, *Afghan Leader Vows Taliban Prisoner Release to be Completed*,

- Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-leader-vows-taliban-prisoner-release-be-completed>>.
- Hairan, A** 2008, *Media in Afghanistan Before and After the Taliban*, Ovimagazine, Viewed 26 February 2020, <<https://www.ovimagazine.com/art/3377>>.
- Hakimyar M, F** 2014, 'Afghanistan the Security Transition', *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Viewed 25 March 2020, < [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09380.4.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A1899f40c71876d5b69a80a0d2ecb3770](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09380.4.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A1899f40c71876d5b69a80a0d2ecb3770)>.
- Hamminck W** 2017, 'USAID in Afghanistan Challenges and Successes', *US Institute of Peace*, Viewed 4 April 2020, < [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12540.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A3df4fd48bb8eb7d4271aacd6e56c2419](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12540.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A3df4fd48bb8eb7d4271aacd6e56c2419)>
- Hewad, G & Johnson C.G** 2014, *A Rough Guide to Afghan Youth Politics*, US Institute of Peace, Viewed 25 February 2020, < [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12460.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-4946%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A0caa1988e50c774cff814b5c472c9d17](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12460.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-4946%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A0caa1988e50c774cff814b5c472c9d17)>.
- Holland L, B & T, C** 2012, *Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition*, Viewed 25 March 2020, < <file:///C:/Users/90534/Downloads/SN05851.pdf>>.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW)** 2010, *World Report Events of 2009*, HRW, U.S.A, Viewed 10 March 2020, < [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world\\_report\\_download/wr2010.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2010.pdf) >.
- Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** 2007, *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)*, Viewed 18 February 2020, <<http://www.understandingwar.org/international-security-assistance-force-isaf> >.
- Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** 2007, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS)*, Viewed 22 February 2020, < <http://www.understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prts> >.
- Jepson, V** 2012, *The differences between classical realism and Neoliberalism*, E-International Relations Students, Viewed 16 July 2019, < <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/24/the-differences-between-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/>>.
- Johnson C, G** 2018, *The Political Deal with Hezb-E- Islami*, no. 139, United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan, Viewed 5 April 2020, <[https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/pw\\_139\\_the\\_political\\_deal\\_with\\_hezb\\_e\\_islami.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/pw_139_the_political_deal_with_hezb_e_islami.pdf)>.
- Jones G, S** 2008, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, Viewed, 16 March 2020, <[file:///C:/Users/90534/Downloads/RAND\\_MG595.pdf](file:///C:/Users/90534/Downloads/RAND_MG595.pdf) >.
- Jones G, S** 2008, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, RAND

- Corporation, Viewed, 13 April 2020,  
 <[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf)>.
- Jones SG & Crane K** 2013, 'Afghanistan's Transitions: 2014 and Beyond', *Council on Foreign Relations*, Viewed, 30 March 2020, <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep05729.6.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5004%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ac9e824d389ce40f7849b4e4e0e3eab66](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep05729.6.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5004%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ac9e824d389ce40f7849b4e4e0e3eab66)>.
- Jonegård I, G** 2019, *The implications of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan Four scenarios*, FOI Swedish Defense Research Institute, Stockholm, Viewed, 1 April 2020, <<file:///C:/Users/90534/Downloads/FOIMemo6771.pdf>>.
- Karimi, S** 2018, *Confrontation of Superpowers in Afghanistan: China Envisages Military Presence in Strategic Wakhan Corridor*, Global Research, Afghanistan, Viewed 28 February 2020, <<https://www.globalresearch.ca/confrontation-of-superpowers-in-afghanistan-china-envisages-military-presence-in-wakhan-corridor/5652314>>.
- Katzman, K & Thomas, C**, 2017, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S Policy*, Congressional Research Service. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf> [Accessed: 2 March 2019].
- Khan, D.M.Z.** 2016, *Pakistan-Afghanistan Cooperation on Trade*, report no.32, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Islamabad, Viewed 18 November 2019, <[http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Islamabad\\_paper\\_No.\\_32\\_2016.pdf](http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Islamabad_paper_No._32_2016.pdf)>.
- Kolenda C, D** 2017, 'State of Play, Reactions, Risks', Center for A New American Security, Viewed 20 April 2020, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep06090.5.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9539524d70c2c2aee0614bad7591e5e4>>.
- Koshan A** 2019, *The Mission Book in President Ghani's Bookshelf*, Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS), Afghanistan, Viewed 30 March 2020, <[https://www.aiss.af/aiss/news\\_details/opinions/5c5ff57135de9](https://www.aiss.af/aiss/news_details/opinions/5c5ff57135de9)>.
- Kruzal JJ** 2009, *Tough fighting ahead in Afghanistan*, U.S. Central Command, Washington D.C, Viewed 7 March 2020 <<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883908/petraeus-tough-fighting-ahead-in-afghanistan/>>.
- Larson, E.V, & Savych. B**, 2005, 'American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad', Rand Corporation, Santa Monica. Available at: [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/Rand\\_MG231.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/Rand_MG231.pdf) [Accessed :11 December 2019].
- Larson, A** 2016, *Women and power: Mobilizing around Afghanistan's Elimination of Violence Against Women*, ODI, UK, Viewed 24 February 2020, <<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10277.pdf>>.
- Livingston, LS, & O'Hanlon, M** 2009, *Afghanistan Index*, Brookings, Viewed 5

March 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20091222-1.pdf>>.

**Livingston, LS, & O’Hanlon, M** 2017, *Afghanistan Index*, Brookings, Viewed 31 March 2020, < [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/21csi\\_20171002\\_afghanistan\\_index.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/21csi_20171002_afghanistan_index.pdf)>.

**Lobell, E.S** 2017, *Structural Realism Offensive and Defensive Realism*, Oxford Research Encyclopedia, viewed 11 July 2019, <<https://www.oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304> >.

**Long A** 2008, *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence the U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006*, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation Viewed, 18 March 2020, <[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional\\_papers/2008/RAND\\_OP200.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP200.pdf)>.

**Ludin Q** 2019, *How Peace Was Made: An Inside Account of Talks between the Afghan Government and Hezb-e-Islami*, no. 444, US Institute of Peace, Afghanistan, Viewed 6 March 2020, <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep20225.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A0c19771774db600d89a1e86662359ac2](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep20225.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A0c19771774db600d89a1e86662359ac2)>.

**Malikzada, E, A.** 2019, Iran’s interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism. *Global Security Review*. Viewed 21 November 2019, <https://globalsecurityreview.com/iranian-interests-afghanistan-black-market-currency-water-extremism/>.

**Maranian S, J** 2015, *NATO Interoperability: Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the Alliance*, NATO Defense College, Viewed 20 April 2020, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep10254.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A428b7cec37080d6d5953a295a84529cc>>.

**Marjani, N.** 2018, *Afghanistan’s importance for India is ‘multilateral’*, TIMES OF INDIA, Viewed 10 November 2019, <<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/nolimits/afghanistans-importance-for-india-is-multilateral/>>.

**Ministry of Justice (MIC)** 2014, *Afghan National Youth Policy*, Viewed 25, February 2020, < [https://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/media/2196/file/afg-publication\\_youth-policy.pdf%20.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/media/2196/file/afg-publication_youth-policy.pdf%20.pdf) >.

**Munir, D. M & Shafiq, D. M.** 2018, *Geostrategic Significance of Wakhan Corridor for Afghanistan, China and Pakistan*, Research Gate, Islamabad, Viewed 23 November, < <https://www.researchgate.net>>.

**Nasery J, A** 2014, *The Economic Shock to Afghanistan Caused by Aid Reduction and Troops Withdrawal*, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany, Viewed , 31 March 2020, < <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/183556/1/wp-202.pdf>>.

- NATO** 2015, *Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead*, Viewed 25 March 2015, <[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_87183.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_87183.htm)>.
- NATO** 2017, *Counterinsurgency A Generic Reference Curriculum*, Viewed 16 March 2020, <[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_09/20170904\\_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf)>.
- NATO** 2019, *Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures*, Viewed, 1 April 2020, <[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2019\\_06/20190625\\_2019-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_2019-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf)>.
- Nijssen, S** 2012, *Civil Society in Transition Contexts A Brief Review of Post-Conflict Countries and Afghanistan*, Viewed 27 February 2020, <[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC\\_Afghanistan\\_Civil-Society-and-Transition\\_Sept2012.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Civil-Society-and-Transition_Sept2012.pdf)>.
- Office of the historian** n.d, United States Department of State, viewed 26 February 2019, <<https://history.state.gov/countries/afghanistan>>.
- Oliphant JB** 2018, *After 17 years of war in Afghanistan, more say U.S. has failed than succeeded in achieving its goals*, Pew Researcher Center, Viewed 14 March 2020, <<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/05/after-17-years-of-war-in-afghanistan-more-say-u-s-has-failed-than-succeeded-in-achieving-its-goals/>>.
- Omrani, B** 2010, *Afghanistan and The Silk Road: The Land at the Heart of World Trade*, United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan, Viewed 6 November 2019, <<https://unama.unmissions.org/afghanistan-and-silk-road-land-heart-world-trade-bijan-omrani>>.
- Paul C, Clarke CP & Serena CC** 2014, 'Afghanistan 2001-2013', *Rand Corporation*, Viewed 5 April 2010 <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt7zvzdn.17.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ace741e1dc975c819b58436333555fdd1](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt7zvzdn.17.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5144%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ace741e1dc975c819b58436333555fdd1)>.
- Raddats M & Wong K** 2010, *Gen. Petraeus Exclusive Interview: Progress in Afghanistan Like Watching 'Paint Dry'*, ABC News, Viewed 18 March 2020, <<https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/gen-david-petraeus-discusses-war-afghanistan-koran-burning/story?id=11603031>>.
- Rahman N T** 2017, *Afghanistan and China Trade Relationship*, no. 82098, Oruj University, Kabul, Viewed 15 April 2020, <[https://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82098/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_82098.pdf](https://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82098/1/MPRA_paper_82098.pdf)>.
- Rasmussen SE** 2014, *NATO ends Combat Operations in Afghanistan*, the guardian, Kabul, Viewed 27 March 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/28/nato-ends-afghanistan-combat-operations-after-13-years>>.

- Reporters Without Borders (RSF)** 2019, *2019 World Press Freedom Index*, Viewed 26 February 2020, < <https://rsf.org/en/ranking#> >.
- Roberts D** 2014, *Karzai criticizes lack of US respect for Afghan sovereignty as relations worsen*, The Guardian, London, Viewed 9 April 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/karzai-criticises-respect-afghan-sovereignty>>
- Rubin A, J & Shanker T** 2013, *Afghan Leader Says U.S. Abets Taliban's Goal*, The New York Times, New York, Viewed 3 March 2020, < <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/karzai-accuses-us-and-taliban-of-colluding-in-afghanistan.html> >.
- Ryan M, Holland S** 2011, *Obama moves toward exit from Afghanistan*, Viewed 26 March 2020, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan/obama-moves-toward-exit-from-afghanistan-idUSTRE75L0QD20110622>>.
- Salahuddin S** 2009, *Analysis split Afghan opposition helps Karzai's chances*, Reuters, Viewed 13 April 2020, < <https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-39256220090426>>.
- Samples JR, M. E** 2011, 'Applying Realism Theory in Afghanistan', MA thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk. Viewed 5 March 2020 <<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545635.pdf> >.
- Saqeb, H** 2016, *Bold Voices: A Brief History of Women's Rights Movement in Afghanistan*, Viewed 24 February 2020 <<https://www.freewomenwriters.org/2016/09/14/afghan-women-history-post-taliban/>>.
- Sarkar, S.** 2019, Understanding Iran's moves in the Afghan Endgame, *South Asian Voices*, Viewed 20 November 2019, <<https://southasianvoices.org/understanding-irans-moves-in-the-afghan-endgame/>>.
- Saif S, K** 2020, Taliban blamed for over 3,800 attacks after peace deal, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/taliban-blamed-for-over-3-800-attacks-after-peace-deal/1845084>>.
- Shahriar Z,** 2020, What is the content of the US-Taliban agreement, BBC Persian Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.bbc.com/persian/51677036> >.
- SIGAR** 2016, *USAID's Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by Intenews Network*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 26 February 2020, < [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/Financial\\_Audits/SIGAR-15-64-FA.pdf](https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/Financial_Audits/SIGAR-15-64-FA.pdf) >.
- SIGAR** 2016, *Afghanistan's Oil, Gas, and Minerals Industries: \$488 Million in U.S. Efforts Show Limited Progress Overall, and Challenges Prevent Further Investment and Growth*, report no.2, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Afghanistan, Viewed 3 November 2019, < <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-16-11-AR.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2016, *Challenges to Effective Oversight of Afghanistan Grow as High Risk Areas Persist*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 2 April 2020, < <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-18-TY.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2016, *Primary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan: Comprehensive*

- Assessments Needed to Determine the Progress and Effectiveness of Over \$ 759 million in DOD, State and USAID Programs*, 32, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 23 March 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-16-32-AR.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2017, *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense And Security Forces*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 17 February 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-17-62-LL.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2017, *Afghanistan's Road Infrastructure: Sustainment Challenges and Lack of Repairs Put U.S. Investment at Risk*, no.11, Arlington, Virginia, Viewed 23 March 2020, <[www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-17-11-AR.pdf](http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-17-11-AR.pdf)>.
- SIGAR** 2018, *Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 21 March 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2018, *Commander's Emergency Response Program has not determined the full extent to which its program and projects, totaling \$1.5 billion in Obligations, Achieved their objectives and goals in Afghanistan from fiscal years 2009 through 2013*, no. 45. Arlington, Virginia, Viewed 21 March 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-45-AR.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2019, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 18 February 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-01-30qr.pdf>>.
- SIGAR** 2019, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, SIGAR, Arlington, Viewed 5 April 2020, <<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-58-LL.pdf#page=69>>.
- Steele J** 2010, *U.S. Convinced Karzai Half-Brother is Corrupt WikiLeaks Cables Say*, The Guardian, Viewed 4 March 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/02/us-karzai-half-brother-wikileaks>>.
- Tellis, A.J & Eggers J**, 2017, 'U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Viewed 19 June 2020, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep13076.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aaadb8762c88f1659dded2e2aa8dec56>>.
- The Asia Foundation** 2016, *Afghanistan in 2016 A Survey of Afghan People*, Viewed 2 April 2020, <[https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016\\_Survey-of-the-Afghan-People\\_full-survey.Jan2017.pdf](https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016_Survey-of-the-Afghan-People_full-survey.Jan2017.pdf)>.
- The Guardian** 2014, *Obama announces to keep 9,800 US troops in Afghanistan*

*after 2014*, Viewed 27 March 2020, < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/obama-us-afghanistan-force-2014>>.

**The National** 2018, Veteran US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad appointed special envoy to Afghanistan, Viewed 20 June 2020, < <https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/veteran-us-ambassador-zalmay-khalilzad-appointed-special-envoy-to-afghanistan-1.767181> >.

**The White House (THW)** 2002, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of American*, Viewed 27 April 2020, < <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>>

**The White House (TWH)** 2003, *The National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003*, The White House Washington D.C. Viewed 17 April 2020, <<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>>

**The White House (TWH)** 2012, *Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement*, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., Viewed 7 April 2020, < <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement>>.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)** 2012, *Afghanistan Announces Fourth Phase of Transition will Start Within Two Months*, Viewed, 25 March 2020, <<https://unama.unmissions.org/afghanistan-announces-fourth-phase-transition-will-start-within-two-months> >.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)** 2012, *Afghan civilians continue to be killed in record high numbers- UN Report*, Viewed, 30 March 2020, < <https://unama.unmissions.org/afghan-civilians-continue-be-killed-record-high-numbers-%E2%80%93-un-report>>.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)** 2015, *Afghanistan Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report on Kunduz Province*, UNAMA, Kabul, Viewed, 1 April 2020, <[https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special\\_report\\_on\\_kunduz\\_province\\_12\\_december\\_2015-english.pdf](https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_report_on_kunduz_province_12_december_2015-english.pdf)>.

**UNHCR** 2018, *Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees*, UNHCR, Geneva, Viewed 1 April 2020, < <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66534>>.

**UNODC** 2010, *Corruption in Afghanistan Bribery as reported by victims*, Viewed 3 April 2020, <<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf>>.

**United States Institute of Peace (USIP)** 2015, *Failed Relations Between Hamid*

*Karzai and United States*, no.373, USIP, viewed 9 April 2020, <<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR373-Failed-Relations-between-Hamid-Karzai-and-the-United-States.pdf>>.

- USAID** 2006, *Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., Viewed 22 February 2020, <<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/60031.htm>>
- USAID** 2006, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan an Interagency Assessment*, USAID, Viewed 23 February 2020, <[https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADG252.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf)>.
- USAID** 2007, *PRT Quick Impact Projects*, USAID, Viewed 22 February 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/node/51861>>.
- USAID** 2012, *Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society II (I-PACS II)*, USAID, Viewed 27 February 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Fact%20Sheet%20I-PACS-II%20Dec%202012%20-%20FINAL.pdf>>.
- USAID** 2013, *STRENGTHENING POLITICAL ENTITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY (SPECS)*, USAID, Viewed 27 February 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Strengthening%20Political%20Entities%20and%20Civil%20Society.pdf>>.
- USAID** 2015, *The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Afghanistan*, USAID, Viewed 27 February 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2015-CSOSI-report-Afghanistan%2009-16-2016--DEC.pdf>>.
- USAID** 2016, *Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency*, Viewed 25 February 2020, <[https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Assistance\\_for\\_the\\_Development\\_of\\_Afghan\\_Legal\\_Access\\_and\\_Transparency\\_ADALAT\\_-\\_December\\_2018.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Assistance_for_the_Development_of_Afghan_Legal_Access_and_Transparency_ADALAT_-_December_2018.pdf)>.
- USAID** 2019, *Nai Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan*, Viewed 26 February 2020 <<https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/nai-supporting-open-media-afghanistan>>.
- USAID** 2020, *Women's Empowerment and Gender*, Viewed 25, February 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/gender-participant-training>>.
- USAID** 2020, *Afghanistan Education*, Viewed, 23 March 2020, <<https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education>>.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)** 2018, *Security Force Assistance: U.S. Advising of Afghan National Army Has Expanded since 2015, and the U.S. Army Has Deployed a New Advising Unit*, Viewed 21 April 2020, <<https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696165.pdf>>.
- Vizzard, JW & Capron TA** 2010, 'Exporting General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Field Manual 3-24 and the U.S. Government's Implementation', *Public Administration Review*, Vol 70, No.3, p. 491.
- Voetelink J.E.D** 2015, *The status of foreign forces in Afghanistan post 2014*, Viewed 8 March 2020, <[https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2407192/157116\\_Status\\_of\\_Force\\_AFG\\_post\\_2014\\_Voetelink.pdf](https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2407192/157116_Status_of_Force_AFG_post_2014_Voetelink.pdf)>.

- Wadhams C & Cookman C** 2011, *After Bin Laden*, Center For American Progress, Washington D.C., Viewed 26 March 2020, <<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/05/03/9543/after-bin-laden/>>.
- Walsh J, I** 2013, 'The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns', *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, Viewed 19 March 2020, <[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11764.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ad7fb2e6bd4623b99119bc3205b003868](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11764.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3Ad7fb2e6bd4623b99119bc3205b003868)>.
- Winter, E** 2010, *Civil Society Development in Afghanistan*, London School of Economics, UK, Viewed 27 February 2020, <<https://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/Civil%20Society%20in%20Afghanistan-June2010.pdf>>.
- World Bank** 2017, *Afghanistan Development Update*, Viewed 1 April 2020, <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/471191495626000119/pdf/115229-REVISED-PUBLIC-AFG-Development-Update-Spring-2017-final.pdf>>.
- World Bank** 2018, *Afghanistan Development Update*, Viewed 1 April 2020, <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/985851533222840038/pdf/129163-REVISED-AFG-Development-Update-Aug-2018-FINAL.pdf>>.
- Zimmerman, T.** 2015, *The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central Asia*, Center on International Cooperation, New York, Viewed 23 November 2019, <[http://www.aiss.af/assets/aiss\\_news/zimmerman\\_new\\_silk\\_road\\_final\\_2.pdf](http://www.aiss.af/assets/aiss_news/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf)>.

## RESUME

### SAYED SABOOR ZAFAR



**Date & Place of Birth:** August 28, 1986, Afghanistan

**Nationality:** Afghan

**Email:** [ssz\\_400@yahoo.com](mailto:ssz_400@yahoo.com)

[Saboorzafar500@gmail.com](mailto:Saboorzafar500@gmail.com)

**Current Address:** Gültepe Mah. Aykırı Sok:20/04 Küçükçemece/ İstanbul  
İstanbul, Turkey

**Contact Number:** +90 5374520685

**Permanent address:** Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif, Zahiruddin Faryabi Project  
No.2 House No. 272

**Contact Number:** +0093 (0) 730963704

### KEY SKILLS

- Management Skills
- Project/Program Management & Coordination/Analytical Thinking and making arguments
- Technical Skills/ Communication Skills
- Critical Thinking/ Leaderships Skills
- Creative Mind/ Being Able to Negotiate
- Attention to detail/ Good Time Management
- Problem Solving/ Being able to Visualize
- Team-Player/ Passion for Learning
- Enthusiasm and Commitment/ Working under Critical conditions and Pressure
- Excellent Skills on writing English, Dari Reports
- Excellent Skills of Translation and Interpretation in English to Dari and vice versa
- Excellent writing of legal lawsuit, defendant statements, objection letter and other kinds of legal letters and contracts in the light of Afghan laws
- Legal dispute solving in the light of Afghan laws
- Identify invalid and illegal cases and documents based on Afghan laws
- Able to evaluate every civil, commercial and criminal cases and files based on relevant court procedures and laws
- Able to discuss and argue political events on regional and international arena

## CAREER STATEMENT

- I believe in devotion to working smart and dedication to excellence in my career's accomplishments. I am to be a key part of operations executions, organizational supervision and corporate decision-making in a well-reputed and well-disciplined organization.
- Key to my success: 1-Planing 2-Schedule 3-Time management 4-Focus on working 5- Self-starter 6- Flexible 7-Don't be panic 8- Do whatever the work is 9-We make mistakes 10-Don't look back just learn and improve.

## ERASMUS

Success in the Istanbul Aydin University European Union student exchange program (Erasmus) competitive exam nominated at Duisburg University in Germany for one spring semester covering 01.04.2019- 30.09.2019 to take six extra courses to match 30 ECTS one thesis semester and after visiting the host university, unfortunately, due to the illness of my father returned to Afghanistan to pursue his treatment in India and missed this opportunity.

## EDUCATION

<b>Master's in international Relations</b>	Istanbul Aydin University/Department of Political Science and International Relations / Social Science  Istanbul, Turkey	06/02/2017- 15/06/2020
--	--	---------------------------

### Major Subjects

- International Organization and world politics
- International Basic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy
- International Postmodernism and International Relations
- European Politics
- Principles of Research and Design Methods
- Seminar
- Comparative Politics
- Contemporary Development in Political Theories
- Restructuring State and Democracy in Turkey
- Thesis

**Bachelor of Law and Political Science**

**Major Subjects:**

- History of Political Views
- History of Foreign Relations
- International Organizations
- World's political History
- Fundamentals of Law
- Political Thought
- General Criminal Law
- Civil Law
- Human Rights
- Constitution of Afghanistan
- Financial Law
- Commerce Law
- Consulate Diplomatic Law
- Consulate Law
- Fundamental of Islamic Law
- Islamic Penalty Law
- International Penalty Law
- Political Philosophy
- Political Sociology
- World's Political Issues
- Organizational Management
- Globalization
- Administration and Management
- Comparative Political System
- Politics and Government in US
- Politics and Government in Europe
- Military and Strategic Issues
- Principles of International Relations
- Reconstruction and Development
- General International Law
- Human Rights and International Conventions
- Research Method in Political Science/etc.

Mazar-e-Sharif Aria  
University/ Faculty of law  
and Political Science/  
Department of Political  
Science Mazar-e-Sharif,  
Afghanistan

2008-2012

**Baccalaureate (High School Diploma)**

Istiqlal High School,  
Mazar-e- Sharif,  
Afghanistan

1991-2003

## PROFESSIONAL WORKING EXPERIENCE

- **Professional Member (Civil Attorney) of Samangan Justice Department Government Cases Directorate** 17, September 2017 - 12, December 2017

### **Duties and responsibilities**

- Design and prepare relevant work plan in accordance to the general plan and basic goal of the directorate.
- Study the collected documents in order to receive complete information concerning the modality of a case.
- Assign both litigants case documents to the relevant courts for the legal isolation in accordance to the law after taking relevant directorate order.
- File lawsuits, defense statements after being certified of the relevant directorate and participate in open judicial sessions of the courts to defend from public rights and government's interests.
- Present objection statements against judicial rulings and decisions of the relevant courts in order to assign the case to the higher court.
- Participate in the sessions to evaluate movable and immovable government properties based on the authorized director instruction.
- Participate in the relevant directorate work sessions and the Justice department.
- Receive incoming papers and petitions from the relevant directorate and prepare formal letter in order to get information from litigants' plaintiff and losing party.
- Travel in districts in order to identify the seized government property.
- Prepare report from the modality and progress of a case in court and present to the relevant directorate.
- Present quarter and annual work report to the relevant directorate.
- Enforce other tasks, based on the authorized deputy heads in the light of laws, regulation and basic goal of the ministry and administration.

- **Professional Member (Civil Attorney) of Balkh Justice Department Government Cases Directorate** 11, January 2013 - 16, September 2017

### **Duties and responsibilities**

- Design and prepare relevant work plan in accordance to the general plan and basic goal of the directorate.
- Study the collected documents in order to receive complete information concerning the modality of a case.
- Assign both litigants case documents to the relevant courts for the legal isolation in accordance to the law after taking relevant directorate order.
- File lawsuits, defense statements after being certified of the relevant directorate and participate in open judicial sessions of the courts to defend from public rights and government's interests.
- Present objection statements against judicial rulings and decisions of the relevant courts in order to assign the case to the higher court.
- Participate in the sessions to evaluate movable and immovable government properties based on the authorized director instruction.
- Participate in the relevant directorate work sessions and the Justice department.

- Receive incoming papers and petitions from the relevant directorate and prepare formal letter in order to get information from litigants' plaintiff and losing party.
  - Travel in districts in order to identify the seized government property.
  - Prepare report from the modality and progress of a case in court and present to the relevant directorate.
  - Present quarter and annual work report to the relevant directorate.
  - Enforce other tasks, based on the authorized deputy heads in the light of laws, regulation and basic goal of the ministry and administration.
- **Part time Database Account Manager in Adel Haroon, Co, Ltd in Mazar-e-Sharif 21, December 2009 - 27, December 2017**

#### **Duties and responsibilities**

- Managing the entire daily business sanctions.
  - Managing daily sold goods.
  - Managing daily imported goods accounts in the stocks.
  - Managing foreigner business dealer's accounts in Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who used to provide products, e.g. old and used metal for Adel Haroon Co, LTD.
  - Changing old and used metal into new produced construction metal in excel data worksheet which was a complex work.
  - Controlling high tonnage scale accounts in the warehouse weekly and monthly.
  - Responsible for logistic work, e.g. shopping of necessary goods for Adel - Haroon, Co, LTD and overseeing constructions work.
  - Writing each type of legal and business contracts for selling and buying goods for business stakeholders and constructional work contracts.
  - Managing foreign business relation of the firm with foreign stakeholders via internet.
  - Always responsible for showing local and foreign dealers accounts for director of the firm and the dealers.
  - Responsible to show the remaining goods in Adel Haroon Co, Ltd stocks.
  - Responsible for showing profit and loss at the end of fiscal year.
- **Secretary and local Project Coordinator in the Afghan Danish Karakul Project (ADKP). September 2004 – 1 April 2007**

#### **Duties and responsibilities**

- Day to day running of the local ADKP office
- Personnel management
- Budgeting and accounting
- Liaison with stakeholders and institutions and related to the Karakul Industry
- Arranging and coordinating meetings and seminars
- Translating documents from English into Dari and vice versa, and oversee logistical arrangements
- Feeding and forage trials at Mazar Agriculture Institute and Balkh Agriculture University
- Introducing registration system at karakul demo herds(Institute and private herds)
- Working with private karakul farmers on feeding and forage production
- Producing leaflets for farmers
- Arranging seminars for farmers
- Secretary for ADKP Committee
- Have regularly contact to the Karakul Institute

- Establish a good environment and collect the inputs from the Afghan professional experts involved
- Coordinator between the people and institutions in Afghanistan and the Danish professional advisory team
- Encourage the Karakul farmers around Mazar-i-Sharif to make use of the services provided by the **ADKP**-Office

## DIPLOMA/CERTIFICATES

- Diploma from Aria University and the transcript certified and stamped by the Ministry of Higher Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Certificate from English Language Center
- Driving license certified and stamped of foreign Ministry

## TRAINING

### Training Courses on Afghan Laws

Certificate from International Development Law Organization (I.D.L.O) on Basic Legal Training Course of State Cases	Ministry of Justice, Kabul	14.08.2014 23.09.2014
Certificate from Balkh Justice Department training on State Cases Law	Balkh Justice Department	07.05.2014 08.05.2014
Certificate from (I.D.L.O) on the Specialized Legal Training Course “Law on managing land affairs”.	Ministry of Justice, Kabul	19.04.2015 22.04.2015
Certificate from (J.S.S.P) Training on Management and Leadership	Balkh Justice Department	15.11.2014 19.11.2014
Certificate from (J.S.S.P) from training of prohibition of violence against women law	Balkh Justice Department	20.12.2014
Certificate from (J.S.S.P) training on Introduction to HR manual	Balkh Province	27.08.2014
Certificate from (J.S.S.P) training on Provincial Budgeting.	J.S.S.P Office Balkh Province	20.11.2016 21.11.2016
Certificate from (I.D.L.O) on Legal specialization training course on Heritage Law.	MOJ Balkh Justice Department	19.07.2017 13.07.2017
Certificate from (N.R.C) from training of House, Land and Property Law	MOJ- Balkh	20.12.2016 21.12.2016

Certificate from (J.S.S.P) training on Advanced Proposal Writing.	Balkh Justice Department	17.03.2015 18.03.2015
Certificate from (J.S.S.P) training on Introduction to Project Management	Balkh Justice Department	03.09.2016 04.09.2016
Certificate from (G.I.Z) training of Law on Managing Land Affairs and Law on Property Dealing Guidance	Balkh Justice Department	17.05.2017 18.05.2017
Certificate from (G.I.Z) training of Law on Managing Land Affairs and Law on Property Dealing Guidance	Balkh Justice Department	15.01.2017 19.01.2017
Certificate from (I.D.L.O) Legal Specialization training course on Commercial Procedure Code	MOJ- Samangan Justice Department	20.07.2017
Appreciation Letter from Balkh Justice Department	Balkh Justice Department	20.07.2017
Appreciation Letter from Afghan Parliament	Afghan Parliament	16.01.2017

### **Certificate in Computer Concepts**

MS Windows/MS Office Package, Hardware, AutoCAD, Internet	Ghafari Computer Institute Mazar –e- Sharif, Afghanistan	28.10.2005- 11.07.2006
E- Communication & operating Barlian accounting software	By own	05.04.2004- 30.01.2018

## SEMINARS & CONFERENCES

Facilitate Danish Advisors in Delivering lecture to Balkh University Students	Agriculture Faculty Balkh University	20, July 2005
Facilitate & Management of Seminar for Karakul Farmers	Veterinary Clinic of Balkh Animal Husbandry Directorate	11.March 2006
Leadership & Management Workshop	Balkh, J.S.S.P , Afghanistan	21, Feb 2016
Management and Marketing Summit	Chamber of Commerce Mazar, Afghanistan	15-19 Nov,2014
Adjusting land management law Conference across northern zone of Afghanistan	General Land Managing Affairs Department of Afghanistan	15 October, 2016
Conference on International Migrants Day	Istanbul Aydin University	18 December, 2018

## LANGUAGES

Language	Speaking	Reading	Writing
PERSIAN	Native	Native	Native
ENGLISH	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
UZBEKI	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
URDU	Excellent	Excellent	V. Good

## OTHER SKILLS

- Publishing of Political articles in domestic and international online newspapers in Persian and English
- Excellent Driving.
- Very familiar of using Internet, Fax, Scanner, digital camera, Photo Copier.

## REFERENCES

➔ **Soren Bech**

Danish Agricultural Advisory Services. National Center, Denmark,  
Project Manager of (ADKP), Afghanistan.

**Email:** [svb@landscentret.dk](mailto:svb@landscentret.dk) [svb@dansire.com](mailto:svb@dansire.com)

**Contact No:** +45 20 25 34 04

➔ **Soren Leerskov**

**Agri consult, Project Ruminant, Nutritionist** Of (D.A.A.S), Denmark & for (ADKP)

**Email :** [Leerkov@image.dk](mailto:Leerkov@image.dk) – [sorenleerskov@gmail.com](mailto:sorenleerskov@gmail.com)

**Contact No:** +45 40 27 97 94

➔ **Karsten Schleiss**

Danish Agricultural Advisory Services. National Center, Denmark  
Project Manager of (ADKP) Afghanistan.

**Email:** [kcschleiss@hotmail.com](mailto:kcschleiss@hotmail.com)

**Contact No:** +45 43 22 6782

➔ **Abdul Majid Nasratyar**

Managing Director of Aria University, Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif

**Email:** [info@aria.edu.af](mailto:info@aria.edu.af)

**Contact No:** +93 (0) 786137373

➡ **Mohammed Sharif Mosleh**  
General Manager of Adil Haroon, Co, Ltd  
Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif

**Email:** [ad.h.2007@yahoo.com](mailto:ad.h.2007@yahoo.com)

**Contact No:** +93 (0) 799273418

➡ **Sayed Mohammad Jafar Mesbah**  
Director of Balkh Justice Department

**Email:** [mesbah@yahoo.com](mailto:mesbah@yahoo.com)

**Contact No:** +93 (0) 777200172

➡ **Sayed Rafiullah Safawy**  
Director of Samangan Justice Department

**Email:** [sayed-rafiullah@yahoo.com](mailto:sayed-rafiullah@yahoo.com)

**Contact No:** +93 (0) 775105069