

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**JORDANIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF
REGIONAL CHANGES: 2003-2020**

MASTER'S THESIS

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

DECEMBER, 2020

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations
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Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Alp Yüce KAVAS

DECEMBER, 2020

DECLARATION

I hereby declare with respect that the study “Jordanian-Turkish Relations In The Light Of Regional Changes (2003-2020)”, which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the Project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (13/12/2020).

Radwan Ali Radwan Batayneh

FOREWORD

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Alp Yüce KAVAS from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. The door to Dr Alp Yüce Kavas office was always open whenever I ran into a trouble spot or had a question. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work but steered me in the right the direction whenever he thought I needed it. I would like also to thank Istanbul Aydin University and its library for providing me with an access to all the books and articles that I needed to finish this.

December, 2020

Radwan BATAYNEH

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ABBREVIATIONS

AD	: Annon Domini
AKP	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
DEİK	: Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu
FTA	: Free trade agreement
GDP	: Gross domestic product
IAF	: Islamic Action front
ISIS	: İraqi and Syrian territory by the Islamic State
IAF	: Islamic Action front
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
MP	: Mundane issues
MENA	: Middle East as well as North Africa
MB	: Mundane issues
NATO	: North Atlantic treaty organization
NTC	: National Transitional Council
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
PJD	: Party of Justice and Development
PYD	: Democratic Union Party
SEATO	: the Southeast Asian treaty organization
UNFICP	: UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus
US	: United States
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
USD	: United States Dollar
UNRWA	: United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UN	: United Nations
UNFICYP	: UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus

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JORDANIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF REGIONAL CHANGES (2003-2020)

ABSTRACT

The aim of this Thesis is to present discussion on how relations between Turkey and Jordan has been enhanced as a result of both shared values and history that has ultimately resulted in strong bilateral relations between them. The first Chapter which comprises the introductory part of our master thesis presents background information about the two countries and their leaders and the initial time that the relationship between the two countries was established. In this chapter, we aim to discuss further the statement of the purpose and significance, and the research questions regarding research paper. It also comprises of the method that was used in carrying out the study.

The second chapter will comprise the historical background of the bilateral relations between Jordan and Turkey being held in three stages. The first stage mentions early years of the bilateral relations while the second one is focusing on the Jordanian-Turkish relations during the Cold War Era whilst the last stage is concentrated on the bilateral relations between 1990-2002. The third chapter of the thesis. The fourth chapter is a discussion regarding the economic and relations between Jordan and Turkey. Our thesis presents a summary of all the contents of the research paper through a conclusion which is the last section

Key Words: *Jordanian-Turkish, Region, Relation*

BÖLGESEL DEĞİŞİKLER IŞIĞINDA ÜRDÜN-TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ (2003-2020)

ÖZET

Yolsuzluk, tevdi edilen otoritenin kişisel ve özel çıkarlar için suiistimal edilmesi manasına gelmektedir. Kamu yöneticilerinin, memur olarak kendilerine verilen yetki veya güveni, mali veya maddi olmayan kazanımlar için suiistimal ettiklerinde meydana gelmektedir. Afganistan'daki yolsuzluk problemi 2001 yılından bu yana o kadar yaygındır ki bu ülke, Uluslararası Şeffaflık Örgütü tarafından yolsuzluğun en yaygın olduğu ülkelerden biri olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Afgan hükümetindeki yolsuzlukla ilgilidir ve çalışmanın odağında, Taliban'ın uzaklaştırıldığı ve yeni hükümetin kurulduğu 2001 yılı bulunmaktadır. Bu tez, Afganistan'daki yolsuzluk sorununun ne kadar önemli olduğunu anlatmaktadır. Birinci bölümde, araştırmayı yapmak için kullanılan yöntem de anlatılmaktadır. Kitaplar, sivil toplum örgütleri, uluslararası örgüt raporları, makaleler ve dergilerden elde edilen ikincil veriler kullanılmıştır. İkinci bölümde, yolsuzluk tanımlamaları ve çeşitli şekilleri ile kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Sonraki bölümlerde, Afganistan'daki farklı yaygın yolsuzlukların türlerini açıklamaktadır. Bu eğitim sektörü, vergi değerlendirme, tahsilat sektörü ve kamu hizmeti sunan kurumlardaki yolsuzluğu gözler önüne sermektedir. Sonrasında, Afgan hükümetinin yolsuzlukla mücadelesindeki çabaları açıklandı ve son bölümde yolsuzluğun Afganistan'a etkisi açıklanmıştır. Afgan hükümetinin yolsuzluğu kontrol altına alması için tavsiyeler bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Afganistan, Yolsuzluk, Hükümet, Kurumlar, Performans.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Relations between the two countries are gaining a strategic force stemming from history and shared values, which contributed to maintaining the strength of bilateral dates back to the thirties of the last century, after the founding king relations between Jordan and Turkey. The Turkish-Jordanian relations are considered the most ancient in the entire Arab region, as it extends to the founders of the two countries, King Abdullah I Bin Al Hussein (1882-1951), and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). The history of Jordanian-Turkish relations Abdullah I paid an official visit to the Turkish Republic as the first Arab leader to do so, after the end of World War I, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In 1937, Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk received King Abdullah I in Turkey, to begin the journey of building bilateral relations between the two countries.

Several months after Jordan gained its independence, on January 1, 1947, King Abdullah I visited Turkey, where he signed with the then Turkish president, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This important document is still in force to the present day, and the document states that "peace and friendship will always prevail between the Turkish Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and their peoples." With this treaty, which aims to consolidate and strengthen relations, and to enhance the level of relations between the two countries and to promote and make them in the official framework, the first Turkish embassy in Amman was opened in 1947.

In the years of the Cold War, Jordan and Turkey retained the same pro-Western and strongly anti-communist views, and this consensus extended to other issues and affairs, specifically with regard to the Palestinian issue, which went beyond foreign policy bonds and became a historical and ideological dimension of the Turkish people.

The Turkish-Jordanian relations witnessed a remarkable development during the era of the Justice and Development Party (2002-2020), characterized by mutual

respect, interspersed by mutual visits between officials of the two countries, which dealt with regional and international affairs in addition to the bilateral relations between the two countries, and common areas of cooperation, especially in the Palestinian issue, Where Jordan and Turkey meet in opposing Israel to annex Jerusalem and their criticism of the Israeli occupation government and its repressive practices against the Palestinian people.

As for the Arab Spring period, which followed the Arab and regional setbacks (2010), the two parties realized that their occurrence in the field of regional and international conflicts requires joint cooperation, especially as they are exposed to the same security threats resulting from these revolutions, as both Turkey and Jordan committed to bear heavy burdens, Refugee crisis, and Jordan currently hosts nearly two million Syrian refugees, while Turkey embraces twice this number, making it the largest country hosting Syrian refugees.

The failed coup attempt that occurred in 2016 in Turkey came to re-strengthen relations between the two sides after the Jordanian ambassador to Turkey announced that Jordan stands beside Turkey's war against terrorism and supports it in its position towards the Fethullah Gulen terrorist organization, as the Jordanian government quickly closed the only school affiliated with the organization in Jordan.

1.1 Statement of Significance

Turkey played a decisive role in history at the regional and global levels, as it formed the intersection of the various ancient human civilizations in the heart of the ancient world. Istanbul was the capital of three of the largest and strongest empires throughout the ages from Roman to Byzantine and ended in the Ottoman Empire and ended in the Ottoman Empire. The ruins of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923.

The arrival of the Islamic Justice and Development Party to power in (2002) had a great impact on the trends of Turkish foreign policy, as Turkey adopted a foreign policy changing according to the international moving conditions, and Turkey also developed its diplomatic style to form a central country in crisis management that works to resolve it peacefully, as well as Turkey has moved

from rigid politics and impartiality to movement and permanent interaction with international and regional changes, and activating its communication with all countries important to it. Hence, this study is worthy of presentation and study at the scientific (theoretical) and practical (applied) levels, in light of rapid changes at the regional and international levels, and based on that the importance of the study lies in two aspects:

Scientific aspect (theoretical):

The ancient historical link between Turkey and Jordan, as Turkey is linked to Jordan with ancient historical results dating back to 1937, and Turkey aspires to use this historical link to play a regional role in regional conflicts, as an attempt to enhance its role in linking East and West, and seeks to exploit the so-called new Ottomanism in its favor, the importance of the geographical location that Turkey represents for the Arab countries, as it is linked geographically to the borders and waterways linking the Arab and Western worlds.

The contribution of this study to shed light on the reality of Turkish-Jordanian relations and their direct repercussions on the relations between the two countries, reading and analyzing the reality of Turkish-Jordanian relation and also Turkish-Arab relations, within specific time periods that are strongly affected by the region's rapid changes in the international and regional arenas.

The practical side:

Turkey is one of the most prominent regional actors in the Middle East, and therefore, its foreign policies towards the region and its countries, including Jordan, have an impact on these countries and on the overall situation in the region. Hence the importance of the study, an interest in its handling of Jordanian-Turkish relations, and the transformation trends in Turkish foreign policy and its implications for Turkey and the crises of the region. And this kind of study may contribute to provide a scientific article that benefits the specialists in international affairs, and thus enables them to form reliable visions and future ideas to produce special data that enable them to stand on an understanding of the political reality of the nature of this relationship and thus come up with interpretations based on certain facts.

1.2 Statement of Purpose

1. This study seeks to achieve the following goals:
2. Explain the nature of Turkish-Jordanian relations, while clarifying the nature of Turkey's foreign policy with Jordan.
3. Knowing the characteristics of Turkish-Jordanian relations, its internal components and their dimensions.
4. Explain the internal and external factors and determinants of relations between the two countries.
5. Define the fields through which the Turkish-Jordanian relations can be strengthened to serve the ways to enhance the cooperation in bilateral relations, especially since Turkey has the strength and regional and international standing that makes it a central and important player in the issues of the Arab region.

Clarifying the determinants of Turkish-Jordanian relations in light of the Justice and Development Party's coming to power in 2002. And the reflection of these determinants on the relations between the two countries.

1.3 Research Questions

After the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002, the Turkish policy makers found that they must adapt Turkey's foreign policy in a way that is compatible with the international and regional realities in light of the international and regional changes that were reflected in the Middle East region, especially the developments of 2003, war in Iraq (2003), The developments of the political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab Spring revolutions (2010), in addition to the emergence of Iran as a regional power that has influence in the Arab Gulf region, these variables were imposed on Turkey reshape its foreign policy towards these regional variables. Which made its relations with the Arab countries in general and Jordan in particular, not going at the same pace, and through this the study problem can be determined from the following central question:

What is the nature of Turkish-Jordanian relations after 2002?

It is subdivided into the following sub-questions:

What are the local and regional factors affecting Turkish-Jordanian relations after 2002?

Are they cooperative or conflictual relations?

1.4 Research Method

This study will be based on a set of curricula that serve the topic and cannot be overlooked because this will affect the nature of the presentation of the topic, so it will first depend on:

1- Historical approach: The identification of historical circumstances and influences is necessary to accommodate the circumstances surrounding relations between countries in their contemporary forms. Historical links and conflicts are considered in estimating the historical curriculum among the main forces that govern the external political trends of states.

2- Systems Analysis Approach: The curriculum aims to analyze the nature of Turkish-Jordanian relations, focus on the dimensions of this relationship through the inputs of the Turkish and Jordanian political system, and analyze the dimensions of this influence represented by (Turkish influence in Syria, Iraq, Jordan's position, Turkish-Russian-Iranian alliances and Jordanian position). And outputs and include the form of interactions that occur between Turkey and Jordan as a result of perceptions of the new Turkish role in the Arab region.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkish-Jordanian relations are historically deep, dating back to 1516, meaning that relations exceeded 500 years ago when Jordan (eastern Jordan) was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1916 and an important part of the Ottoman Empire's strategy to impose sovereignty in the Levant in the face of its rivalry with a number of European powers, particularly Britain and France (Musa, 2016). After the Ottomans took control of Damascus in 1516, Salim I's forces headed for Egypt, which was captured in 1517. Palestine and eastern Jordan were then controlled to be under Ottoman rule for four centuries, during which the current Jordanian territories were subordinate to (Sanjak) the Ajloun Brigade consisting of several provinces (districts) Kora to the north, Ajloun to the south, and Beno Alwan (exhibitions) to the east, in addition to three northern provinces, Namely Benno al-Asser Benoj, and Banona Kana, adjacent to Yarmouk-entire state of Damascus at the time. (Abu Al-Sha'ar, 2013) .

In the Ottoman era, as is the general image of the Levant, Jordan continued to follow the administration of Damascus, the center of the Levant province and at the beginning of Ottoman rule in the 16th and 17th centuries it was under the Tamar regime - a feudal system in which the state distributes land to the military and senior administrators of the state. Instead of salaries, they would oversee tax collection and land management within the laws of the Tamar instead of the state while at the same time pledging to secure the state of the combatants in case of need, and the military and administrators have distributed Jordan's territory, some of which belonged to the Sultan.

This system made the people mere peasants working in the service of the feudal non-natives, isolated them from the world, weakened the trade system that was active in the Mamluk era, and with the eighteenth century the era of feudalism faded and replaced the power of local families that collect Taxes were (committed), and the great change in the Ottoman era with the arrival of Muhammad Ali Pasha to Syria, and of course Jordan is part of it, where the rule

of Muhammad Ali Pasha changed the data on the ground, and the Ottoman Empire was forced to begin reforms and modernization in what is known as (Ottoman organizations) since the middle of the nineteenth century, Until the end of the state militarily in 1918. On the morning of September 27, 1918, the Turkish army stationed in northern Jordan withdrew, followed by the Turkish army stationed in Palestine, which was led by General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and soon became all areas of eastern Jordan under the control of the English colonists who In 1921, the Emirate of Eastern Jordan was founded and called the Emirate of the Arab East, the embodiment of the Arab and unitary spirit that prevailed over the feelings of the East Jordanians.(Alhair,2019).

2.1 Early Years of Jordanian-Turkish Relations

Relations between the two countries are gaining a strategic force stemming from history and shared values, which contributed to maintaining the strength of bilateral dates back to the thirties of the last century, after the founding king relations between Jordan and Turkey. The Turkish-Jordanian relations are considered the most ancient in the entire Arab region, as it extends to the founders of the two countries, King Abdullah I Bin Al Hussein (1882-1951), and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). The history of Jordanian-Turkish relations Abdullah I paid an official visit to the Turkish Republic as the first Arab leader to do so, after the end of World War I, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In 1937, Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk received King Abdullah I in Turkey, to begin the journey of building bilateral relations between the two countries.

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Interactions between states in regional systems depend largely on the degree of compatibility or ideological homogeneity between states within the system, and the more the system enjoys a high degree of ideological compatibility, the more it is to stabilize and strengthen political cohesion within the system and encourage engagement in cooperative relationships. And complementary. The political system's awareness of regional and international sources of threat is reflected in its patterns of relations in the primacy of relations of competition and conflict over relations of cooperation and integration (Edreas, 2000).

The foreign policy of any country arises and determines the outcome of internal and external demands or inputs, and is influenced by the international and regional system in which you live, so the study of Turkish-Jordanian policy relations is linked to the regional and international circumstances that have constrained the interactions of this behavior towards events and developments in the Arab region as well, and the Palestinian issue in particular.

The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, the Turkish army liberated several wars against The Anatolian Allied Forces in Turkish territory, and Turkish historians call it the War of Liberation led by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Gemaye,1997).Since its independence in 1923, until the end of the Cold War, Turkey's job has been to militarize the state and society, and to consider Turkey's geographical location, the heart of the world, "is the axis state located on the largest plot of land in the world, consisting of Europe, Asia and Africa or the island of the world in a geopolitical (Dallah, 2017) sense" and as a result of this strategic location, Drawing the boundaries of the role and function of Turkish foreign policy and its internal, regional and international identity. Based on a strong political-military system, active and active in the shaping. of Turkish domestic and international politics (Bilgin, 2017) .The only interest in Turkish foreign policy throughout the Kemalist period has been to act as an advanced military force for NATO, and to establish organic relations with the European Union and the United States to ensure Turkey's national and strategic interests, and the negative independence role towards Arab and Islamic countries and towards issues (Kubicek et al., 2015). Arab countries - except for coordination with Arab geographical

neighbors (Syria, Iraq, Iran) in the face of the threat of Kurdish nationalist ambitions in south-eastern Turkey (Ahmad,1985).

The Turkish side supported the Arab position against the partition resolution towards Palestine and stood against it in the session held on November 29, 1947 to vote on the partition project and was among the 15 countries that did not support their solution. Turkey began its diplomatic activities in Israel on January 7, 1950, with the appointment of the first head of the diplomatic mission at the Turkish representative in Tel Aviv. Turkey wanted to claim its relations with Israel to win the United States of America alongside it.

These changes have had a major impact on the nature of 1938, those relations. In World War II (1939-1945), Turkey and eastern Jordan also had a unified position against the 1941 Rashid Ali Al-Kilani revolution in Iraq, which attempted to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (Al-Ghariri & Al-Kilani, 2001).

With the end of World War II, Jordanian-Turkish relations developed, Especially after Turkey realized the importance of the Middle East and Jordan in particular, Turkey was the first country to congratulate Jordan on the occasion of independence in 1946, where relations witnessed a major shift in diplomatic and economic matters, especially after king Abdullah's visit to Turkey in 1947, as saw Jordanian-Turkish relations later diverge due to the Turkish position on the recognition of Israel in 1949. 1950, Before the Turks, in 1951 saw the last visit of King Abdullah I bin Al Hussein, which confirmed the depth of diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries, and in the second half of 1951 the killing of King Abdullah I bin Hussein and this incident had an impact on the Turkish authorities, they expressed their fears, especially since King Abdullah had a great impact on the security of the Middle East and the region.(Brownlee, 2019)

Under King Hussein, Turkish-Jordanian relations have witnessed a harmony of positions and intensive contacts based on constructive understanding, friendliness and honesty in all fields.

In February 1954, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran signed a treaty of mutual cooperation, the beginning of the establishment of the Baghdad Alliance, whose

main stated objective was to resist the communist tide and Soviet influence whose ideas invaded the Middle East and began to permeate the peoples of the region. Jordan was the second Arab country after Iraq to enter the alliance due to British influence, so Britain worked to create the atmosphere in Jordan for its introduction of the Alliance. In November 1955, Turkish President Celal Bayar visited Jordan, met with King Hussein and Prime Minister Saeed al-Mufti, and the purpose of the visit was to persuade Jordan to enter the Baghdad Alliance.

During his five-day visit, the Turkish President held continuous talks with King Hussein and The Mufti on Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, which ended with an extended meeting held on the last day of that visit on 7 Th. 2, 1955 at the Royal Palace of Jordan in Shona addressing the opportunities and possibilities that Jordan can have if it joins the Alliance.(Çakmak & Özçelik, 2019).

On May 8, 1955, the Turkish President and his delegation left Amman without expecting any formal agreement, despite the statement sought by King Hussein and Prime Minister Sa'id al-Mufti of their desire to join the Baghdad Alliance in the event of Jordan's military and economic demands are fulfilled, and the Turkish government has agreed to provide Jordan with military assistance if it joins the alliance, and the Iraqi government has agreed to provide Jordan with economic assistance if it joins the Alliance, despite the tendency of King Hussein bin Talal and his prime minister to enter the alliance but the massive demonstrations that took place in all Jordanian cities to refuse to enter the Baghdad Alliance, and consider it anti-Arab liberal and weaken the Arab ring states, forcing the Jordanian Parliament to refuse to join the alliance and officially declaring Jordan not to enter the alliance (Abu Diya, 2010) .

2.2 Bilateral Relations During Cold War Era

In the years of the Cold War, Jordan and Turkey retained the same pro-Western and strongly anti-communist views, and this consensus extended to other issues and affairs, specifically with regard to the Palestinian issue, which went beyond foreign policy bonds and became a historical and ideological dimension of the Turkish people.

After the 1948 war, and the unification of the two banks, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, became a subsidiary of Jordanian rule, and Jordanian guardianship of the holy places returned. Despite the 1988 legal and administrative disengagement, Jerusalem and the Holy Places remained legally subordinate to the Kingdom, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Peace Agreement, otherwise there would have been a large vacuum, and the occupation controlled all the holy places, and changed the status quo, contrary to international law.

The Cold War prevailed over the nature of relations between the two countries where Jordan and Turkey retained the same pro-Western views, despite their reservations on American security projects in the Arabian Gulf while varied in the rise, where the Kingdom realized that the Soviet Union and the communist movement are the most serious sources of threat to security and stability in the Kingdom, by regional states strategically linked to the Soviet Union. While Turkey was keen to maintain a strategic friendship and partnership with the Soviet Union and to sign a cooperation and friendship agreement with it.

That's why Turkey found the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan an opportunity to get aid, especially after the West realized that the communist threat to Europe might come through Turkey, and for a Soviet encirclement strategy, America sought to include Turkey in NATO in 1952, and pushed Turkey to join the 1955 Baghdad Alliance, with the aim of reducing the limited distance between NATO and Southeast Asia. (SEATO). (Al-Olaywi, 2019).

It is very clear that, before the Baghdad Pact and in the midst of unlimited cooperation between Turkey, the United States and the West, the Middle East was not a significant figure in Turkish foreign policy at the time, as Turkey's relations with Middle East countries were secondary compared to Turkey's relations with the West (especially the United States). Any Turkish attempt to improve cooperation relations in the region (such as the Baghdad Charter) has addressed the suspicions and concerns of Arab countries, particularly Syria, Iraq and Egypt, towards Turkey, as the Arab countries did not consider Turkey a trust worthy partner, but rather a Western body in the middle of Islamic countries (Sharqi, 2010).

In 1958, the military coup in Iraq led to the collapse of the Jordanian-Iraqi (Al-Jubouri and Khalaf, 2009) political union, and the collapse of everything

planned by Turkey and the Western countries on the policy of alliances, so the Turkish reaction to the coup reached the point of preparing to send an army to the Turkish-Iraqi border in order to abort the revolution and restore the monarchy, but the American opposition position prevented these from happening (Abu Diya, 2010).

The first official reaction by the Turkey government to the political developments in Iraq was made by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Ruştü Zorlu, at a press conference held in Ankara on July 17, 1958, when he stressed: For us, the issue of the new Government of Iraq cannot be discussed, the president of the Iraqi-Jordanian Union today is King Hussein, and the legitimate government is that government that was under the administration of King Hussein, and Turkey not ready to recognize the new regime in Iraq. After the Baghdad Alliance countries held their meetings in London on July 28, 1958, in which it was recognized that the regime must be recognized in Iraq, Turkey can announced on the 31st of the same month that it recognized the regime in Iraq for fear that its abstention would harm its interests and relations with neighboring Arab countries, and allow the Soviet Union to strengthen its influence in the region (Al-Sabawi, 1986) and the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad presented on the same day the official recognition of his government's official government of the Iraqi Republic.

But the first shock that led Turkey to re-establish its relations with the Arab East was the Cyprus crisis, which began in December 1963, when Greek Cypriot leaders overturned the constitution, which was adopted in 1960, and went on to treat The Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic and religious minority, not as partners at home (Hamid, 2016).

In the light of these developments, on March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 186, which recommended the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which began operating on March 27, 1964, and continues to function to this day. More than 10 years later, on July 15, 1974, a military coup in Cyprus was carried out, in cooperation with Greek officers, by Greek Cypriot elements calling for the island's integration with Greece. Against the background of this development, Turkey, as one of the guarantors of Cyprus' security, has intervened militarily to prevent genocide

against the Turkish Cypriot group, which was eventually concentrated in the northern part of the island. The UN Security Council requested a ceasefire and established the basis for negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Britain. Cyprus was the turning point in Turkish foreign policy towards the west and east, and when it found itself alone in front of the West after it severed its relations with the Arabs and went to redraw its foreign policy to be more balanced, but the problems that were ravaging the Turkish interior were a factor of frustration. For their part, most Arab countries took positions opposed to the Turkish position on the Cyprus crisis and voted against it at the United Nations in 1963 (Abdullah, 1990) and Jordan took a neutral stance on the crisis and considered that a solution can be found based on the maintenance of Cyprus' independence and respect for the legitimate rights of the two sides guaranteed by international conventions (Hamid, 2016).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing end of the Cold War, led to structural transformations in the international system after 1990. These developments have had a major impact on Turkish foreign policy, creating security challenges and new opportunities. The new post-Cold War situation (Al-Nuaimi, 2010) has opened up new opportunities for Turkey.

The Gulf War (1990-1991) was the main event that paved the way for a more effective Turkish policy in the Arab world. Turkey's support for the coalition against Iraq marked departure from its usual policy of non-interference in regional conflicts and wars. Turkey played a key role in the United Nations military and economic campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime, closing the two oil pipelines transporting Iraqi oil exports, and allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base in southern-eastern Turkey to strike northern Iraq. Turkish President Turgut Ozal was able to maneuver brilliantly amid strong domestic opposition, putting Turkey firmly on the side of the alliance (Al-Maliki, 2018).

His calculations were because there was no risk of engaging in the war because Iraq could not succeed in the face of the U.S.-led military campaign. Turkey's participation in the Gulf crisis had achieved key objectives for his country, including

- Turkey's political role expanded and influence in regional affairs increased.
- Access to facilities from Washington in the areas of defense and bilateral trade.
- Access to facilities from Brussels with the aim of achieving full membership in the European Community.
- Increasing business and financial opportunities in the Middle East, especially with the Gulf States.

The Turkish president's strategy (Ozal) has led to conflicting results. Although the Gulf War clearly demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance to the West in the Gulf region, this did not necessarily lead to better relations for Turkey with the West. The expected economic hopes were also not met, as Turkey's exports to the Middle East had not increased. More importantly, the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Iraq cost Turkey about 20 billion, so Turkey's pursuit of a regional role between 1990 and 1994 did not lead to a regional role. Ankara's economic projects, such as the \$21 billion project to transfer surplus water from the Sihan and Jihan rivers to Arab countries and Israel through the so-called peace pipeline, have not seen the light of day. The unexpected result: Arab capitals worry about the return of Turkish hegemony in the region (Sabri, 1992).

Turkey's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict during Cold War Era and its Reflections on Jordanian-Turkish Relations

Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, and the Turkish justification was for recognizing that it wanted to form a Middle Eastern alliance in order to counter the communist threat (Ghazi, 2010). A phase of consensus and rapprochement began in Turkish-Israeli relations, but these relations went through a period of tides, where the Palestinian issue was the main factor in the rapprochement between the Arabs and Turkey, where the Turkish position moved towards a more pro-Palestinian, and this shift is due to the internal dimension of internal political pressures and the role of Islam growing in electoral politics including also the external dimension of the Turkish leadership's desire to establish better political relations with the Arab

world, at a time when Turkey has seen tensions in its relations with European countries and the United States, after the Cyprus issue (Kilani,1996).

Turkey supported Arab positions and called on Israel to withdraw completely from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and called for a just solution to the Palestinian issue, as the issue of (Saeed, 1987). a people with rights, and Turkey voted in favor of recognizing the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people by voting with the resolution 2535 On 10 December 1969, and to affirm the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people in all means for free and self-determination, as stated by the vote on Resolution 2787 on 6 December 1971. The Turkish position also came in support of Resolution 3379 of 10/11/1975, which stipulates that Zionism is considered a form of racism (Tahimeh, 1993).

2.3 The Post-Cold War Era (1991-2002)

In the post Cold War era, it has been established that Turkey was threatened by the government of the Soviet Union due to the NATO alliance. In such situations, Turkey tried to keep a balance between the two poles of the world. The conditions became worse and influenced Turkey to be a part of the NATO treaty. This led to Turkey indulging into a fight with the Korea so that they could easily be a part of the NATO alliance. It was in December 26th, 1991 that there was a total collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was rule of the 49th Turkish government formed by the coalition of two parties, the truth path and the Social Democrat Populist Party led by Mr. Demirel and Erdal Inonu. During the post cold war era from 1991-2002, Turkey was busy dealing with its internal issues. PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) is enlisted as a terrorist organization by Turkey and also by United States, NATO and the European Union. The last three stated that PKK started its terrorist attacks in the Eastern Turkey “against the enforcement of the Kurdish civilians”. (wested,2017)

The relationship between Turkey and Syria normalized in 1988 with the sign of the Adana agreement that was about cooperation against the terrorist attacks committed by PKK and ensuring security. There developed a perfect neighborhood relation. There were some disputes between the two countries in

this era that included dam projects, Euphrates and Tigris River and the border issues.

In Oslo in 1991, Turkey strongly supported the Middle East peace process as an important step towards regional stability, as- a starting point for increased economic cooperation and opportunities for exchange and investment between the countries of the region. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has been criticized by both sides, especially from Arab countries. Since 1992, Turkey has participated in multilateral talks on the Middle East peace process, particularly on economic growth, arms control and water, through the Peace Water Pipeline Project, which, in the event of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, aimed to provide the countries of the region with surplus water from the Two Rivers (Sihan and Jihan) Turkey, where the idea of this project began in 1987 and was strengthened in the multilateral committees after the Madrid Conference. For peace in the Middle East in 1991, the project consists of two lines: the first: starting from Turkey and passing through Syria, Jordan, Palestine (Israel) and Saudi Arabia to the border of Medina (2650 km), and the second: from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and The daily pumping volume of both lines (6 million m³) (this project achieves for Turkey if it carries out economic revenues of \$2 billion per year) and enables it to swap Water with gas and oil. Some Arabs have expressed their fear of this project while others are enthusiastic about it, Syria refuses to pass through its territory before the end of the Syrian-Israeli track in negotiations and fears with some Arab countries that the issues of development, water security and Arab food will become hostage to Turkish political will (Al-Sarhan, 2013). And It also supported the new Palestinian government, and was the only NATO member, which diplomatically recognized the Palestinians on 32 November 1988, after raising its diplomatic representation to both the PLO and Israel to ambassadorial level in December 1991, and Turkey sought closer economic and political ties with the Palestinians, particularly in the area of housing and other infrastructure. Visits by high-level official delegations, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat opposed the strong Arab criticism of Turkey for signing the Israeli-Turkish agreement (Abu Dyer,2013).

In 2001 the economics of Turkey had been worst affected. The majority of the famous Turkish politicians performed their roles as Minister of foreign affairs after the cold war era. In April 2002, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said, “Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinians” (Abu Dyer,2013).

At that time Jordan didn't have enough oil sources and strategic shipping paths. The role of Turkey in the security of Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan in post-cold war period gained fame fundamentally because the finalization of the cold war refers that Turkey will no longer rely on its place in terms to the enmity among the former USSR and USA. The novel justifying the aspect for the Turkey's position in security of Europe is now unstable and uncertain surroundings gone through the vacuum of politics of the Soviet Union's ruin. It was the time when the Middle East region is highly impacted by the post-cold war growths. Also, the Jordan and Middle East were troubled through the uncertain environment. Those countries always troubled through the historically rooted unfriendliness, legitimate government, border issues, lack of effectiveness, and its upcoming days is going for further polluted by problems such as oil scarcity, water politics, and Kurdish issues. Turkey's place was become important in the world as it started new relations with the Middle East countries. It provides Jordan and other Middle East countries sense of security and help economically. The relations between both the countries become better for trade (Elseoud et al., 2019).

3. POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND TURKEY (2002-2019)

After the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) coming to power in 2002, Turkey began to realize the importance of its regional neighbor and included the countries of the region as one of the main pillars of its foreign policy, so it does not want to adopt clear positions regarding its relationship with Israel for fear of the reactions of Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle East, and in the same time, it wanted to maintain cooperative relations with Israel, even if it did not appear because it also recognizes the strategic importance of Israel militarily, economically and security. Turkey has become more sympathetic to the Palestinians in their ongoing conflict with Israel and this sympathy is increasing with the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 2000, at which point Turkish politicians began to respond to Turkish public opinion, which demanded a reduction in support for Israel and standing with the Palestinians.

The geopolitical proximity of Jordan Turkey to the region of tensions, especially after the internationalization of the Syrian crisis, and the occupation of large areas of Iraqi and Syrian territory by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) enlisted as a terrorist organization by the international community, has created new political and security challenges that have affected and continue to affect Turkey and Jordan, prompting them to adopt complex approaches at the level of foreign policy, sometimes based on political intervention, bias towards one party at the expense of another party, and sometimes undeclared military intervention, while trying to create complex approaches at the level of foreign policy, sometimes based on political interference, bias towards one party at the expense of another party, and sometimes undeclared military intervention, while trying to create a complex approach to foreign policy for the dialogue in order to solve the crises of the region. The position of the two countries on the Hashemite guardianship of Jerusalem.

The Jordanian trusteeship of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, during the reign of King Abdullah I bin Al Hussein, the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Jordanian trusteeship of the holy city of Jerusalem in 1924, was entrusted to Sharif Hussein bin Ali, in what is known as the "Sale of Sharif", under a law passed by the British Mandate before its end, since Jordan was still under the authority of the British Mandate (Hashemite Guardianship of Holy Places in Jerusalem, 2013) .

3.1 Main Political Developments That Occurred Between 2002-2019

It was in 2002, that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) also called officially AK PARTI in Turkish, came into force in the general elections. This party has faced some of the oppositions and objections from the Turkish society stating that the secular foundation could be harmed. The new government was formed in 2003 and Erdoğan became the new prime minister. The tension between JDP and Republican People's Party (RPP or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP in Turkish) as the Turkey's secularist main opposition party continued to rise in the 2007. Despite the tensions, Abdullah Gul, as an Islamist political actor and member of JDP, became the President of Turkey after the elections of 2007. In the year 2010, a package of constitutional amendments were observed leading to the victory of JDP. These changes included increasing the legislature power and the rules of the military. The growth of Turkey in 2003 in its foreign policy was observed through the following decisions made on the occupation of Iraq.

3.2 Occupation of Iraq 2003 and Gaza 2009:

* Turkey refused to respond to American demands regarding its initiative to occupy Iraq in 2003, which was the first real scene and the new face of the new Turkish foreign policy (Kafarneh, 2018).

* Turkey's attempt to mobilize the Arab and regional position to prevent the option of war on Iraq.

* Turkish public opinion's opposition to the option of war on Iraq.

* Turkish fears of the growth of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq as a result of the U.S. intervention and its impact on The Kurds of Turkey in southeastern Anatolia.

* Turkish fears of Kurdish migration within Turkey due to the consequences of the war and the economic consequences.

* Turkey agrees with the European issue against the war on Iraq, especially as Turkey looks forward to joining the European Union.

After Hamas's election in January 2006, Turkey expressed to Hamas representatives in Damascus its intention to mediate between Hamas and Israel (Radwan, 2006).

In 2007, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres met in Ankara to draw up a plan for a comprehensive peace between the Palestinians and Israel, but this attempt failed, as were other failed attempts.

The Israeli aggression on Gaza (2009-2008) and the rejection of the Turkish side of the aggression, and then the rebuke of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the Israeli President (Shimon Peres) at the Davos Economic Conference in January (2009) and the accusation of killing children, represented a central turning point in relations between the two countries, where this period was marked by tension and great disagreement, which provoked a great shock to Israeli politicians who believed that the strategic interest of the military is above all tensions between the two countries. On May 31, 2010, tensions between the Turkish and Israeli sides increased, and it was considered a major turning point in Turkey's attitudes toward Israel and toward the Palestinian cause, especially after the Israeli attack on the Freedom Convoy, and the Israeli Navy's special forces on the Turkish ship Marmara, killing dozens of people.

The Turks, which made the Turkish president require three conditions for the restoration of relations between the two countries, the first condition, Israel's apology, and the second condition, the payment of compensation to the families of the victims, and the third condition, the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. After the realization of the first and second conditions, and the trend during the return

of diplomatic relations between the two countries came the second aggression on Gaza on July 8, 2014 to prepare relations to the first square (Najm, 2017).

In 2013, King Abdullah II paid his second visit to Turkey, at the invitation of Turkish President Abdullah Gul. The talks discussed the future of relations between the two sides, Turkish investments in Jordan, as well as the latest regional and international developments, notably the Syrian crisis. There are several factors and determinants that have played a major role in the direction of strengthening Jordanian-Turkish relations or in the direction of tension, and the following is a demonstration of those factors.

3.3 The Arab Spring Revolutions

The Arab Spring revolutions contributed to the emergence of three major power blocs in the Arab region:

First, a pro-revolution and change bloc, which includes the countries where the Revolutionary Movement and the political forces that are involved in the revolution have succeeded and have found sympathy and support from Turkey and Qatar. It considered the counter-revolutions in those countries to be military coups, and it is dedicated to the policy of the return of the army and the forces of domination and dictatorship to the exercise of the political process, under the guise of protecting the identity of the State, and hindering the process of democratic development.

Secondly: A bloc seeking to restore the status quo and considered what happened in the Arab countries as correct for the course of the revolution, and it is dedicated to stability in the region and includes that bloc, kingdom, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan (Salameh, 2013).and in order to do so provided military assistance and logistical and economic support to those countries in their counter-revolution.

Thirdly: a sectarian bloc that seeks to preserve the geopolitical gains it achieved in the 2000s, including Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

Turkey supported the Arab Spring revolutions from the beginning, and considered that the Arab peoples (Onis, 2012), had the right to rise up to change the situation in their country and considered former Turkish Foreign Minister

Ahmet Davutoglu the "Arab tsunami" that hit the regimes in the region, as a natural flow of history, a spontaneous and necessary event, which came late, as it should have happened in the 1980s and 1990s. Arab leaders must stay away from the winds of change. This perception prompted the need to re-adapt Turkey's role in the region in an effort to exploit the opportunities that the Arab Spring could pose, especially after the Arab revolutions confirmed the importance of Turkey, the role and model, to the countries (Ghaz,2014),of the region and Turkey raised the slogan of non-interference in the internal affairs of The Arab States, but the fall of the Ben Ali regime quickly made Turkey declare its support for the Tunisian revolution. Tunisia, worth half a billion dollars, is being repaid over a 10-year period with little interest, dedicated to reviving the Tunisian economy and the two countries have also agreed to abolish the visa regime between them. Since the beginning of the Egyptian revolution (Wesal, 2013). Turkey has supported the revolution, demanded that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down and respect the will of the Egyptian people. The legitimate president of Egypt, made Turkey refuse to recognize the interim president and the transition phase where Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, stressed that it is unacceptable to overthrow a government that came to power through democratic elections, through illegal means and even a military coup, as it refused to recognize President Sisi after his election and strongly opposed, and embraced the Islamic opposition, and between the divergent stakes between the two countries, the relationship ended to the severing of diplomatic relations.(Al-Zoubi, 2011).

As the contours of the Libyan revolution became clear, Turkey played an active role in supporting the revolutionary movement, supporting NATO operations and Western intervention in Libya. After the Fall of Gaddafi, Turkey recognized the NTC as the sole representative of the Libyan people, which played a major role in facilitating the task of concluding political companies and major economic agreements with the new Libyan regime (Aria Foreboding Thanked,2017).The constant change in Turkish foreign policy was the only constant in its position on the Syrian revolution, and that permanent change was based on the interaction of three factors: the Syrian field reality, the internal Turkish landscape, and the international position on the revolution-crisis. The

Turkish position of attempts to convince the Syrian President of the legitimacy of the demands of the demonstrators and seek to achieve them peacefully, to support the armed opposition (Free Army), embrace it politically and militarily and demand the departure of Bashar al-Assad after the Syrian regime's repression of the demonstrators by killing (Abdel Fattah,2014) then call for the establishment of security zones for Syrian refugees and areas prohibited for Syrian military aviation, and then participate in international conferences calling for the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis, provided the departure of the Assad regime, taking into account coordination with Russia and Iran, the most important allies of the so-called official Syrian regime and not (Hajj, 2016) Collision with them. During those stages, Turkey opposed any arming of Kurdish-Syrian forces on its borders and intervened militarily to eliminate them through Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 and beyond.

After The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Yemen, as well as Egypt, announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Qatar accusing this country for“its interference in their internal affairs and supporting terrorism”, the Turkish Parliament passed a bill, allowing (ParliamentTurkey,2017) the deployment of Turkish troops in Qatar (Erdogan,2017). Meanwhile, had a different attitude to the Arab Spring revolutions, along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which take hostile positions from the Islamist political current that emerged at the forefront of the outcome of the Arab Spring, which Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) counts on.

The Jordanian political system was not enthusiastic about the removal of Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood's control of power in Egypt, although it was done through elections that did not even the losers object to its results, as it supported the military coup in Egypt against president-elect Mohamed Morsi, and sent King Abdullah II a telegram to the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour after he temporarily took over the administration of the country, in which he affirmed his support for "the choices of the Egyptian people and support for Egypt to overcome the circumstances that are witnessing to achieve its security and stability." Egypt "in its serious pursuit of the rule of law, restoring its health,

restoring security, security and stability to its people, fulfilling its will to renounce terrorism, and all attempts to interfere in its internal affairs." She also praised Saudi Arabia's position that supported the coup authority on the pretext of countering an attempt to destabilize Egypt's security. Jordan has expressed that ha is not comfortable with Turkey's support for the Islamic movement in Syria and Egypt. (Institute Arab studies,2012). (Alzazeera,2017). The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan issued statements and organized meetings and sit-ins in front of the Egyptian Embassy in Amman and the Egyptian consulate in Aqaba, rejecting the military coup and denouncing the Brotherhood as a "terrorist" group. They also considered the Egyptian president's visit to Jordan after the coup d'état un welcome, it is the visit of a serial killer who violated the freedom of his people, and turned on the outputs of the fund, and today he is besieging the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, and leading a holocaust against the people of Sinai".

These statements coincided with significant differences within the Muslim Brotherhood movement in dealing with new variables, in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf and Yemen. The state with the conservative camp (Egypt and the Arab Gulf states) and the Brotherhood are closer to the Turkish-Qatari Bloc, which supported the Arab Spring, and the rise of the Arab Spring. Islamists, channels of communication and communication between the two parties have become almost uninterrupted, and the level of trust has reached the bottom, especially with the regime (Muhannad, 2013).

The Arab Spring revolution shave soured the close and historical relations between Turkey and Jordan, and drew new lines and the file of Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, had the most important impact in shaping the shape of that relationship at the height of the Arab Spring revolutions, especially after the decision of the State of The United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to consider a group The Muslim Brotherhood is a banned and terrorist group. Turkey's support for Arab political Islamist movements has affected Jordanian-Turkish relations, which have been trusted by its traditional alliance with the UAE and Egypt.

As for Jordan's foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis, it lacked a unified, political and security reading about the volatility of the Syrian situation, while

Jordan, in addition to Turkey, supported the Syrian opposition and the so-called "Free Army", training, arming and supervising in cooperation with several Gulf and Western countries, he did not wish to clash with the official Syrian regime, and the Syrian embassies in Amman and Jordan in Damascus remained active and diplomatic representation remained uninterrupted throughout the crisis (Khediat, 2012).

After the Syrian government took control of Aleppo at the end of 2016, and then most of Syria' territory, Jordanian policies have changed toward coordinating with Russia and establishing understandings for safe areas on the Jordanian border, with the aim of preventing any presence of allied groups in Southern Syria to reduce the flow of more refugees into Jordan, which is suffering from financial crises and security burdens, and also to limit exploitation of displacement spills to form its own cells in Jordan.

As a result of the suffocating economic crisis that Jordan has experienced since the beginning of this year (2018), the goal of Jordanian foreign policy has become inclined towards calm in Syria, especially in southern Syria, hence the Jordanian pressure on the Syrian armed factions to hand over the border crossings between the two countries, in order to restore trade between the two countries to ease the burden of the economic crises that Jordan has been going through.

In 2019, the Turkish Army launched operation "Spring of Peace" against Kurdish separatist armed groups in Syria considered by Ankara as in line with PKK and took control of large areas of Syrian territory as 145 kilometers long and 30 kilometers deep, areas from which Turkish President (Erdogan), confirmed that his army will not withdraw from it until all foreign forces withdraw from Syria and reach a final solution to the crisis in Syria (Laaed, 2018).

The Jordanian Foreign Minister criticized the "Spring of Peace" operation and called on Turkey to withdraw immediately from Syrian territory, rejecting any erosion of Syrian sovereignty, describing the Turkish military operation as aggression. "Jordan rejects and condemns any aggression against Syria and any threat to its territorial integrity and security, and we call on Turkey to immediately stop the attack on the Syrian north and that the political track is the

only way to resolve the Syrian crisis, “he said The President of the Arab Parliament, the Speaker of the Jordanian Parliament, condemned the Turkish attack on the northeastern border of Syria, calling for "an immediate and urgent halt to this brutal aggression. The need to respect Turkey’s right of neighborliness and to preserve the ties of history and geography" (Ammon News,2019).

Jordan fears that the Turkish campaign against Syria will cause a return to chaos, particularly in southern Syria, where the Jordanian border is feared to be re-hatched by terrorist organizations and a new wave of asylum in Jordanian territory.

The Arab League issued a final statement to the emergency Arab ministerial meeting in Cairo on 12-12-2019, supported by Jordan, condemning the Turkish intervention in Syria, and demanding an end to what it called "Turkish aggression against northern Syria", stressing the unity of Syrian territory, and blaming Turkey for the repercussions of its "aggression". The league's statement also called on the UN Security Council to "intervene to stop the Turkish aggression against Syria," blaming Turkey for the spread of terrorism, adding that "measures that affect the level of Arab-Turkish relations and cooperation in several areas will be considered" (Rai Al Youm Newspaper, 2019).

Explaining the Turkish President's policies and actions toward Syria, King Abdullah II said that Erdogan's motive in following this approach is the Islamist and neo-Ottomanist ideology he espouses in the region. For example, in Syria, he said that Ankara was seeking to provide a religious solution to the Syrian crisis, while Jordan sought a peaceful political solution led by moderate elements in southern Syria, as Amman offered a different option from the Turkish option, to thwart its plans to impose an Islamic solution. The Jordanian King told to the U.S. senators that Ankara is using the Kurdish paper as a pretext to intervene in neighboring countries, particularly Syria in order to justify its “violation of Syrian sovereignty and the invasion of Syrian territory in the eyes of the world” (King Abdullah II, 2020).

3.4 Turkey's General Foreign Policy Stance in the Middle East and its Reflections to Jordan-Turkey Relations

According to majority of the foreign analysts, it is contented that majority of the states across the world used religion and even mobilized its religious actors in order to serve the interests that were empty of any actual religious identity or significance (Abbott et al., 2020). The analysts thus viewed the foreign policy of a nation as being a clear reflection of the economic and political concerns in each country. However, such an approach does not present an actual picture or representation of a situation especially in circumstances where politicians who have been religiously motivated both formulate as well as implement the foreign policies.

The limitation of such a given approach is thus quite evident when taking into analysis at the reasons as to why the Arab Spring was ultimately embraced by Turkey. However, it is important to note that there were no compelling or obvious political or economic reasons that drove Turkey in embracing the Arab Spring. This is because on the emergence of the Arab Spring, it was noted that the major force behind the "Turkish Foreign policy" was instead connected towards the ideological factors (Mansour, 2019). This is because having hailed from the Islamist background, the ruling JDP which is the "leadership of Turkey" saw in the "Arab Spring" an opportunity for making history which could ultimately help in the sweeping away of the ruling elite that was culturally alienated in the "Arab World" and thus helping in bringing the true or genuine voice of the people in the country to power (Yom, 2019).

3.4.1 The Position of Turkey on Arab and Islamic Issue

Turkey as a country has had an on and off relationship when it comes to Arab and Islamic issues. For instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, calls on Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to ensure that he heeded the calls of people as well as their most "humane demands" in the year 2011. This was an indicator that Turkey as a country was embraced the Arab Spring which was unfolding at the time (Alrwajfah et al., 2020). This was indicated as being a fateful statement since Erdogan had essentially put to risk all the economic and political gains that had been made by Turkey in the Arab world at the time. This is true since

Turkey found itself being totally isolated 3 years later in the region and it was also known to have been deeply embroiled or involved in Civil war that was raging in the neighboring Syria (Cain, 2020). A lot can be said as to why Turkey took the quite “risky path” of embracing the “Arab Spring”. However, to make sense of what proved to be a disastrous choice can be possible through taking into consideration the “Islamist and Neo-Ottomanist ideology” of the foreign policy makers based in Ankara. There is therefore need to take into consideration the aspect of “*Ittihad-i Islam*” (the political unification of Muslim World) that has since time immemorial been a vital component of the aspect of Islamism in the country of Turkey as well as the “prism” through which the leadership of the Islamist leaning party of “*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*”(Justice and Development Party-JDP) has effectively interpreted both regional as well as the world developments (Khokhar et al. 2020). It is also important to note that in the presence or eyes of the “Turkish Sunni Islamists” known to comprise the leadership of the JDP, it can truly be asserted that the “Arab Spring” was indeed a “harbinger” of the most renown “Islamist Transformation” in the “Middle East and North Africa” mostly known as MENA. It is important to note that JDP which is a ruling Party in Turkey headed by Erdogan rose to power in the year 2002 through calling itself as democratic and conservative. However, it is important to note that the leadership cadres of the party hailed from the Islamist backbench of Turkey who were all the former associates and followers of the Necmettin Erbakan. It is important to note that Erbakan was a leading Islamist politician in Turkey right from the early 1960s till the founding of JDP in the year 2001 (Hathaway, 2019). It is noted that during the entire political career or reign of Erbakan, the leader had always or suggested that Turkey as a country should always aim at the development of even stronger relations or ties with the “Muslim World” as opposed to the Western countries. This made Erbakan to refer to the “European Union” or the EU as being a “Christian Club” and led to the formation or establishment of D8 which was a Muslim global organization comprising of 8 Muslim nations. However, it was quite unfortunate that despite heading a major political party with a majority, Erbakan never ascended to power and as a result, was forced to cut viable deals with different political parties (Harahsheh et al., 2019). In addition to that, Erbakan was also faced by a formidable or strong “Kemalist” establishment” that was strengthened through

controlling of the judiciary, media, armed forces, and universities. Having received painful lessons as a result of failure by Erbakan in challenging the Kemalist establishment, the JDP leadership upon coming to power in the year 2002 therefore resorted to soften the ideological rhetoric through not only embracing democracy but also through partially embracing secularism as well. This ultimately helped the party in building a wider or broader “societal coalition” (Achilov, 2020). Upon coming to power in the first election after separating with the leadership of Erbakan, the leaders of JDP thus began a lengthy process of ensuring that the Kemalist establishment was ultimately dismantled, a process that took about a decade. As a result, from the initial decade of between the years 2002 to 2011, the leadership of JDP thus remained more or even more loyal towards the traditional or conventional foreign policy “prerogatives” that had been set by Turkey (Çarkoğlu et al., 2019).

The leadership of JDP even made attempts aimed at joining the EU which was an action that was more ambitious as opposed to any past Turkish governments. Erdogan together with the leadership of JDP further kept the commitment of Turkey towards NATO and thus worked towards ensuring that the country’s relationship with the US was improved tremendously. This can truly be ascertained through the publication of an opinion article by Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan in the Wall Street Journal which was titled as “*My Country Is Your Faithfully Ally and Friend...*” (Magued, 2019). This was in the wake of the United States invasion or war to Iraq. In the article, it was ascertained that Erdogan went further and stated that Turkey as a country was determined to ensure that there was maintenance of close cooperation and relationship with the United States and hoped and prayed that the “brave young women and men” come home with lowest casualties and that the Iraq suffering ended the soonest. It is important to note that despite of the above; JDP is known to have pursued on another level a “subtle Islamist” foreign policy that hailed from the Turkish Islamist thoughts. According to the JDP leadership, it was strongly believed that the Muslims are one nation but however, they were divided superficially into the “national-ethnic-sectarian” identities (Kumru et al, 2019). However, the feelings held by most JDP leaders was that there is need for Muslims to aspire in going beyond whatever makes them become divided and work in ensuring

that there is development of just “one Muslim State”. As a result, under the successive government of JDP starting 2002 till 2011, Turkey as a country aimed at ensuring there was realization of this vital political ideal regardless of how dystopic or utopic it seemed. The rising of the “Islamist Foreign Policies” in Turkey were done through step by step and despite being not obvious during the 2000s, this began from 2010 to 2011 after the ruling party JDP negated about all the influence that Kemalists had in and over the country. This is when the Islamists based in Turkey started speaking louder regarding the “Islamist leaning foreign policy” objectives that were associated with JDP. In the year 2020, supporters of JDP who hardcore Islamist were started portraying Erdogan in role that was more religious through the repetition of the famous slogan of “.*You are thus ummah’s dream come true...*” (Abduljaber, M., &Kalin, 2019) beyond the media and the slogans portrayals, the leadership of Turkey by Erdogan has actually undertaken viable steps that are aimed at ensuring that there is the development of viable ties with the “non-Turkish Muslims”. For instance, Turkey as a country has significantly increased the overall trade ties that it has with the “Muslim world Eightfold”. This is attributed to the numerous efforts that have been made by various leaders in JDP holding numerous capacities. This ultimately made the trading of Turkey with the Muslim majority countries to increase right from 8.4 billion dollars in the year 2002 to 69 billion dollars in the year 2018 (Heraclides and Cakmak, 2019).

Turkey as a nation embraced the “Arab Spring” as a vehicle for the “*Ittihad-I Islam*” just like their “Islamist brethren” located in other parts of the “Middle east” make the Islamists in Turkey to become jubilant regarding the “Arab Spring”. Indeed, the views that were made by Ahmet Davutoglu, the then Foreign Affairs Minister in Turkey is the best exemplary view regarding the “Arab Springs” and what was seen by JDP during the early days in 2011 (Budhwar et al., 2019). The Minister claimed at an Al-Jazeera Forum based in the Doha in Qatar that since the collapsing of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East had actually undergone two major tragic experiences each one of which had deepened alienations among individuals in this region. The first tragic experience was colonialism while the second experience is the “Cold War”. However, according to Davutoglu, it was claimed that the entire period was not

only abnormality, but it was also an “unnatural aberration” in the region’s history (Alder & Basmechi, 2019).

It can truly be asserted that Turkey as a country utterly embraced and supported the “Arab Spring” more any other nation despite of having excellent political and economic relations or associations with all the “pre-Arab regimes and states” Syria included. There was indeed no compelling geopolitical or economic reasons behind the “whole hearted embrace” except that the leadership of the JDB though that the occurrence of the “Arab Spring” paved the way for the occurrence of “*Ittihad-I Islam*” (Ashwarya & Alam, 2019). As it can truly be argued, this had been the major political ideal and goal of the Islamists in this great country Turkey. It is important to note that two years after Davutoglu had made the speech on at Al-Jazeera, he was quite confident regarding the future which was waiting “*Ittihad-I Islam*” in the Middle East. In a speech made by Davutoglu in March of the year 2013 in Dicle University based at Diyarbakir, the former Minister declared that Turkey will render the borders to become meaningless in the blowing wind of change that was occurring in the Middle East and thus work together and in collaboration with the relevant administrations which came to as well as those that will ultimately come to power (Altindag & Kaushal, 2017).

It is worth noting that just 4 months after the Turkey’s Foreign Minister speech, its dreams regarding the Middle East future were ultimately “dashed to dust” through the events that occurred in Egypt as well as through the ouster of Mohammed Morsi who was the President of the “Muslim Brotherhood”. In addition to that, the continuing as well as deepening “civil conflicts” that were happening in various parts of the world such as in Yemen, Libya, as well as Syria had already signaled that the history tides would not actually flow as expected for both Davutoglu as well as the other Turkish Islamists in the country (Haddad et al., 2019). As a result, during the summer of the year 2013, Turkey as a nation found itself totally isolated in that region and thus ultimately turned or resorted to the only other nation located in the Middle East that was encountering similar setbacks and this was Qatar.

It is important to note that 2013 was indeed a dramatic year due to various reasons and one of them was the “massive street protests” also referred to as the

“*Gezi Park Protests*” which occurred in Istanbul during late May in the year and quickly spread to other bigger cities in Turkey. A corruption investigation was therefore launched in December of the same year (2013) that led to the implication of numerous high-ranking officials of JDP (Alsharari&Alhmoud, 2019). The Islamist supporters of JDP thus interpreted the developments without a critical eye. Through having the charges dismissed, JDP’s base and the Turkish Islamists ultimately gave credit to the century old “*ittihad-i Islam historical imagination*” regarding the Middle East. As majority of the Islamists made explanations to the Turkish readers through opinion articles and newspaper columns, other powerful global actors were working surreptitiously through making collaborations against the administration of Erdogan (Alam&Seifzadeh, 2020). The taking over of Egypt by the military, the “Gezi Park Protests”, and the corruption investigations were according to the “Turkish Islamist Pundits” in both 2013 as well as 2014 aimed at the preservation of the “Status quo” in Middle East to make it possible for the continuation of the “exploitative global system” that was beneficial to only the US and Europe.

It was noted that since the year 2013 and 2014, lots of changes both locally as well as abroad have been experienced in Turkey. However, it can truly be asserted that Erdogan as a leader has swum through numerous tidal waves associated with the year 2013 and even tried very much in ensuring that there was consolidation of his power in Turkey (Kurzman, 2019). It is also worth noting that the orientation of foreign policy for Turkey has drastically changed in that its ambition of playing a leading and active role in Middle East has not totally been diminished. However, the country has revised the priorities that it has in the Middle East on a serious note since Erdogan has made alliances with the Turkish nationalists to maintain his own power in the country. Just acting like the “good Turkish Nationalists”, Erdogan and the entire leadership of JDP stated that the prime objective of Turkey in Middle East is actually ensure that there was eradication of the “People’s Protection Units” in Northern Syria as well as the YPG which is regarded by the Turkish State as being a “Syrian Branch of the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” or PKK thus being a potential threat to the country’s national security (Elseoud et al. 2019). As a result, this made Turkey to undertake military incursions in the country and even though Erdogan

makes several moves aimed at ensuring that the Turkish nationalists remain in power, it is evident that JDP as well as the base support of the President are truly with the Turkish Islamists.

The issue of Islamism is actually what the “Islamists” say it is and therefore whether the new “foreign policy orientation” of Turkey is compatible with the global comprehension of Islamism is not actually an issue that can be settled by any outsider. That apart, most of the Islamists both in Turkey as well as abroad have at least publicly declared embracing the application of a foreign policy that based on Islamism by the regime of Erdogan (Mikkelsen, 2019). Indeed, most of the Turkish Islamists have continued seeing Erdogan as being a clear reincarnation of different figures such as Abdul Hamid and Ertugrul Ghazi who were depicted in two renowned Turkish series namely *Payitah* and *Dirilis Ertugrul* (Hatina, 2020). It is prudent to note that Ertugrul Ghazi was actually Osman Ghazi’s father who was also the Ottoman Empire founder and indeed, it is contented by Turkish Islamists that Ertugrul not only survived but also defeated most of the local and “international conspiracies” (Ayvazoğlu&Kunuroglu, 2019). On the other hand, it is prudent to note that Abdul Hamid II was actually the 19th century Ottoman Sultan whom majority of the Islamists highly believed that he supported most of the Muslims all over the world and thus used the Caliphate institution in confronting Western Imperialism.

3.5 Jordan’s General Foreign Policy in the Middle East and its Reflections to Jordan-Turkey Relations

3.5.1 The factors and priorities governing Jordanian foreign policy and Jordanian-Turkish Relations

Jordanian foreign policy is controlled at the regional and international level, the positions of states on the developments of the Palestinian issue or developments in the peace process and settlement projects towards Israel, the resolution of two states and refugee issues and the right of return in accordance with international resolutions, the file of the city of Jerusalem and the Hashemite Guardianship over it, and the issue of Syrian refugees.

With regard to his foreign policy with Arab countries, the Jordanian foreign decision maker stressed the importance of continuous cooperation and deepening the so-called axis of Arab moderation (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain), with Jordan seeking to contain the effects of the Arab, especially the Syrian revolution with its security and political dimensions, and to work to prevent the extension of the crisis to Jordan.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Jordan on August 21, 2017, is Erdogan's first since he became President of Turkey, which has moved political relations between the two countries from a period of extreme insecurity (2011-2015). To the stage of cooperation (2016-2020), where relations between the two countries since the rise of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister, since 2003, and as head of state since 2014, have varied sharply, in visions and positions towards regional issues, especially in the Arab Spring, and beyond. Jordan viewed with deep suspicion the Turkish role and bet on political Islam as the new emerging ruling powers in the region, as opposed to Jordan's presence in the other Arab camp, which includes the Arab Gulf states and Egypt (excluding Qatar)..

Since 2015, relations have been increasing, especially after the change of Turkish approach to ISIS, and the intervention of the Turkish army in the "Euphrates Shield" campaign, to Syria and its elimination of a large part of the group's influence in Syria, and then at a later stage disengagement between Turkey and Jabhat al-Nusra (later Fatah al-Sham), which received direct support from Turkey. These relations were integrated and repeated after the failed coup attempt in Turkey against Turkish President Erdogan in 2016, pushed towards a Turkish-Jordanian rapprochement, after Jordan rejected and condemned the military coup, and then came the balanced Jordanian position the Gulf crisis between of Egypt and The State of Qatar, to strengthen the existence of common denominators on which the two countries can stand together to confront Regional challenges (Abu Rumman, 2017).

Despite these positive changes in the relationship between the two countries, there is still a gap that remains linked first to the disparity in their relations with the UAE and Egypt, Jordan is an ally of the latter, while Erdogan is considered an adversary, and Jordan is afraid of the growing Turkish role in Jerusalem and

al-Aqsa Mosque, In November 2014, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu asserted that the soil of Jerusalem was sacred to the Turks, because it was their case, while Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned in September 2015 that The Jerusalemites expelled the Jordanian judge and prevented him from speaking from the Salah al-Din pulpit in Al-Aqsa on May 22, 2015, and attacked the Jordanian delegation, which included the Jordanian Minister of Endowments, and removed him from the courtyard of the Temple Mount. While the Head of Turkish Religious Affairs, Mehmet Gormez, ascended the pulpit and sermons on Friday one week before, he went missing (May15, 2015) and toured the courtyards of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Abuamer,2015).

Jordanian-Turkish relations improved during the period (2017-2020), after Turkey stood by the Kingdom in the response to Trump's decision to move the U.S. Embassy to occupied Jerusalem, recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, and at the Emergency Islamic Cooperation Organization conference held in Istanbul (13/12/2017) between King Abdullah II in his speech to the conference rejecting the resolution, and considered that the decision is working to change the legal or historical status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy (King Abdullah II,2017). In the final statement of the summit, the conference expressed support for the role played by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a patron of the holy places in Jerusalem, and of the consistent position of the Jordanian Waqf regarding the preservation of the sanctity of the Haram al-Sharif and its historical status as a place of worship (Extraordinary Islamic Summit,2017). Following the move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Turkey invited the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to hold an emergency conference in Istanbul to discuss developments in the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. King Abdullah II chose to go with a high-level Hashemite delegation to the emergency summit that included his four brothers for the first time in a single delegation outside Jordan, in letters indicating the parish of the Hashemite throne and the royal family in Jerusalem (the centerpiece of the conference), and considering that the Hashemite family sees Jerusalem as its basic legitimacy and not only as a city under Hashemite guardianship, and here cannot separate

guardianship and legitimacy, where the Hashemites realize that their historical religious legitimacy Today it is the guardianship of Jerusalem. Turkey confirmed by Turkish President Recep Erdogan its support for the Hashemite Guardianship of the holy sites and described Turkish President King Abdullah II as "the protector of The Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem against Israeli attacks.". Donald Trump said that the presence of King Abdullah II of Jordan at the Islamic summit in Istanbul was important to us, stressing that King Abdullah II is the protector and guardian of The Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, this city as the capital of occupation (Match Positions between Jordan and Turkey, 2018).

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also stressed his country's support for the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and said that Turkey's position will only be the same as that of King Abdullah, the guardian of Islamic and Christian holy sites, calling on Arab countries with Turkey to form a unified position in support of Jordan and King Abdullah II bin Hussein (Cavusoglu et al., 2019).

The presence of King Abdullah II for the first Istanbul Summits (2017) and the second (2019) before and after the transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem represented more than a political significance and meaning. The second indication is that Jordan is able to change its political alliances in accordance with its higher strategic interests, Turkey has refused to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and has strongly supported The Jordanian Guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, where the final statement of the Istanbul Summit emphasizes the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem..

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also stressed Jordan's role in protecting Jerusalem's holy sites, "the importance of Hashemite guardianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and Jordan's special role in taking this responsibility in his visit to Jordan in 2017 (Hammad, 2017).

On February 2, 2019, King Abdullah II visited Turkey, where the king's talks with the Turkish president focused on the strong relations between Jordan and Turkey and ways to strengthen and develop them in all fields During the discussions, which were attended by several senior officials of the two

countries, it was emphasized to maintain coordination and consultation between Jordan and Turkey on issues of common concern and developments in the Middle East region. On the Palestinian issue, the king stressed the need to intensify efforts to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the two-state solution, leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and during the discussions stressed the importance of continuing efforts to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to enable it to continue to provide its relief, education and health services to refugees. The talks also addressed developments related to the Syrian crisis, where His Majesty the King stressed the importance of reaching a political solution to the crisis that preserves the unity of Syria and its people, and guarantees the safe return of refugees to their home and .Regional and international efforts in the war on terrorism were reviewed as part of a comprehensive strategy.

In summary, Turkish foreign policy under the JDP represents a major departure from the previous trend of foreign policy, particularly regarding foreign relations, particularly with Jordan. The tendency to develop such relations and enjoy more diverse relations, and to emphasize dialogue and negotiation as a means of resolving disputes, has increased, despite the wide divergence between the two countries in dealing with some regional issues and crises.

3.5.2 The Position of Jordan in Arab and Islamic Issues

Jordan's Hashemite Kingdom is known to hold a strategic position in the entire of the Middle East because it shares its border with the West Bank, Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. As a result, the domestic affairs of Jordan are highly impacted and influenced by the political happenings in the countries that surround it such as the "Arab Spring" that is known to constitute a significant change in Jordan's "home policy" (Koch & Stivachtis, 2019). This has made Jordan to be referred to as the "Nation of Security and Security" or the "*Belad al-Amnwa al-Istighrar*". This was a "niche characterization" in a place or region that has been marked with civil war, occupations, and violence and which needed both economic and political developments. In comparison to Turkey as well as other nations across the world that were swept as a result of the Arab Spring, it can truly be ascertained that it was less affected (Robins,

2019) this is despite of the fact that Jordan is indeed the “Nation of Security and Stability”, a mantra that is relative and true to its neighboring nations. This implies that Jordan’s future is linked inextricably to the neighboring nations to an extent that its internal economic and political situation would indicate otherwise.

Just like in Turkey, Jordan shares some similarities with it because of the prevalence of the Islamic groupings in the Kingdom such as the Muslim Brotherhood which is highly affiliated to the biggest and largest Islamic party that prevails in Jordan known as the IAF. However, unlike in Turkey where the ruling party JDP has a great or immense influence on various political reforms in the country, this is quite different in Jordan since it is evident that the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF scarcely have any influence on any of the political reforms that occurs in the country (Al-Krenawi, 2019). It is also quite important to note that in the “Resistance Movement” that occurred during that Arab spring revolutions in Jordan, the Islamic groups in the country had a minimal impact as opposed to those in Turkey that had a great influence and impact on the political outcomes. This implied that the former support and cooperation that prevailed between the “Hashemite regime” and the IAF which were founded on the basis of common interests ultimately came to rest (Alrwajfah et al., 2020). Experts in Jordan therefore feared that there could be an escalation with the possible “radicalization” of the Islamic powers.

Endeavors aimed at establishment of more democratic structures in Jordan have therefore been fully disputed. This is because it seems the most vital challenge in the whole of the Arabic World was taking Islamic movements on a serious note and ensuring that they were integrated simultaneously while pressing ahead with efforts aimed at ensuring the society is democratized. It can truly be ascertained that the Middle East is in upheaval due to the Arabic Spring that has significantly contributed towards questioning and reorganization of structures in the society (Zayani, 2019). It was noted that while the issues of human rights and democracy are known to take an ever-increasing role in global or international contexts, this appears not to be the actual case in Arabic world and in Jordan in particular. In Jordan’s case, the nation presents itself as being a “constitutional monarch” in a “democratic system”. Even though the Jordanian

constitution is known to guarantee Western “liberal democratic freedoms”, these are never implemented in practice.

Unlike in Turkey that upholds democracy and human rights, Jordan just like other countries in North Africa and Middle East have been least free. Even though the aspects of democracy stopped being a phenomenon that is associated with Western countries, the Arab World, Jordan included is in turmoil (Elseoud et al., 2019). The absence of a “single democratic regime” in Arab world is thus a “striking anomaly” even though the core values of democracy and human rights are on the rise across the world. On the other hand, while the “Arab Spring” or the “Islamic Spring” was an attempt aimed at founding a way out of the situation, this terribly failed five years after it began. Jordan’s Hashemite Kingdom was closely watched in the early events associated with the “Arab Spring Revolutions” in the year 2011 (Sidani, 2019). This is because it was expressed by most of the Western Analysts that Jordan would indeed be the next nations that could be marked with large protests as well as political and social mobilizations that would result in the shifting of the power scales from the country’s ruling regime to street protestors (Abbott et al., 2020). However, despite of the anticipation by popular media coupled with widespread desires for economic and political reforms on the populace of Jordan, neither did the nation encounter any form of mass mobilizations or did even the population in the Kingdom articulate calls that were aimed at ousting of the Hashemite Kingdom or monarchy.

It can truly be asserted that the “Jordanian Islamist Movement” has had a great impact on various causal factors that have ultimately influenced the success as well as failure of Jordan’s democratization processes (Brownlee, 2019). The movement has therefore had a significant impact on democratic consolidation, democratic transitions, democracy, the capitalist and market reforms, political culture, gender equality, and even evidence regarding the role that is played by political institutions in Jordan. It is such movements that have ultimately influenced international support, the military power, political culture, and the civil society in Jordan

It can truly be ascertained that there has been a special relationship between the Jordanian State and the “political Arm” of the “Muslim Brotherhood” also

known as the Islamic Action Front or the IAF (Visser, 2019). The analysis and the evaluation of the influence that IAF has numerous democratic elements can be ascertained by determining whether the relationship of the Islamists to the Jordanian government and more specifically to the royal family is indeed an “obstacle” or a promotional factor in promotion of democracy in the Jordanian Kingdom (Hays & Abudabbeh, 2006). In answering the question as to whether the Jordanian Islamist Movement is an obstacle or a threat towards the democratization process in Jordan or whether it helps in the promotion of the democratization process in the Jordanian Kingdom, it can truly be ascertained that the movement helps in promotion of democratization. It is worth noting that national identity is an important and sensitive aspect in Jordan and even though the country is not actually the “ancestral land” of the “Hashemite Kings”, they are the ones which were placed in charge to rule it. As a result, the national identity in Jordan was highly constructed based on loyalties towards the royal family and this included Islamic components that were connected to this “royal family” through the “*Hashemites*” that descended from “Prophet Muhammad” (Abduljaber&Kalin, 2019). This is an indicator that the Hashemites played a great role in the “Great Arab revolt”.

3.5.3 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The internal crisis that is unfolding in the Muslim Brotherhood also known as MB in Jordan is known to play a great role in the determination of not only the future role but also the political relevance that is associated to the movement in Jordan. Apart from the crisis occurring against a background of the “regional political chaos”, it is also an outcome of “unresolved tensions” between members of MB on the need for having internal reforms (Al Subhi& Smith, 2019). Indeed, numerous calls for reforms have been in place since the year 2010 and this was in response to the organizational opportunities and challenges that emanated from the Arab Spring revolutions.

It is therefore important to note that prevailing crisis is a testament towards the internal turmoil in the movement that will ultimately represent a political chance that will be used for the encouragement of serious reforms in Jordan (Ghani et al., 2019). Unlike in Turkey which has JDP as the major ruling party in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its Islamic Action Front party

is known to depict the major force of political opposition. However, it is important to note that even though the Muslim Brotherhood has been historically acted as being a loyal opposition movement in Jordan through opposing some of the policies that are made by the government; it has been known to largely cooperate with the government. This implies that both the palace and the MB have always kept the door or offices quite open for any form of cooperation (McKenzie, 2019). For instance, the Palace permits MB viable space in operating while the MB on its hand is known to respect the King's authority as well as the continuation of the Jordanian Monarchy.

Parliamentary elections were held in Jordan in November 2010 and were boycotted by vital political stakeholders' chief among them the "Muslim Brothers" or the al-Ikhwan al-Musliminar together with the "Islamic Action Front Party" which is its political arm. The stakeholders boycotted the elections on the basis that the Jordanian government applied the infamous law of the "one vote law" despite being promised by King Abdullah II, the "Jordanian ruler" upon dissolving of the parliament in the year 2009 that the elections would not only be transparent but they would also be free and fair (Safinejad et al. 2019). However, it is prudent to note that the significance associated with this election boycott does not lie in this boycott itself but rather in the reflection of the tension that prevailed between this regime and the MB movement.

The MB movement was at most times accused by other political stakeholders or currents such as the nationalists and the leftists as being a "toy" in the hands of the Jordanian regime. It is prudent to note that the relationship that prevails between the society of MB and the Jordanian state has been marked through mutual interests and benefits especially so because of sharing common forces namely the Baathists, Nasserites, and the Communists (Kizilkaya, 2019). However, it was noted that the history associated with this relationship has experienced diverse changes or alterations that ranged from "amicable containments" to even cautious engagements up to this period of confrontation (Hillman, 2019). It can truly be asserted that the relationship or association of the Jordanian state with MB is based on a pattern of legal political participation that ultimately precludes this group from participating or involvement that is known to preclude this from not only assuming to power but also not permitting

it to become a political force that is capable of threatening the regime's structure as well as its strategic orientations.

3.6 Similarities on the Position of Jordan and Turkey on Arab and Islamic Issues

It is important to note that the Arab World is known to stretch right from Morocco up across Northern Africa and up to the "Arab Gulf". The Arab World is thus more or even less equal to an area called as the Middle East as well as North Africa or MENA. It is important to note that this though excludes countries such as the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, and Somalia which are also part and parcel of the Arab World (Kuru, 2019). It can further be asserted that Arab countries are also nations whose dominant language is Arabic. Another key characteristic of such countries is that majority of the Arabic countries or nations are ethnically and religiously diverse and have Islam as the most dominant religion. The Arab areas or countries does have 22 nations namely Djibouti, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Comoros Island, Bahrain, Yemen, United Arab Emirates or the UAE, Tunisia, Syria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, Palestine, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, and Oman (Cavusoglu et al. 2019). It is prudent to note that Turkey and Iran are therefore not "Arab countries". It was noted that despite not being an Arab country like Jordan, Turkey shares some similarity with Jordan in that it also has Muslims and is indeed in addition to Iran Muslim Nations that are most popular in Middle East.

Another great similarity between Jordan and Turkey is that the population in the two countries is mostly Muslim and thus regards each other as vital partners in this region. Just like many of the Jordanians, most of the Turks also profess towards the Islamic faith and therefore the two countries have a shared Islamic vision which they can also use in pursuing of shared goals (Abduljaber&Kalin, 2019). For instance, the refusal by Turkey in supporting the invasion of Iraq by the United States was an important turning point regarding the perception of Turkey by Jordan and the entire of the Muslim and Arab world. In May 2003, the Parliament of Turkey planned not to support the armed forces of the US in

invading Iraq thus ultimately making a historic “turning point” in the perception of the Arab world about Turkey.

Being a member of NATO, Turkey ultimately “broke out” of the West Atlantic as well as from the American consensus. This was indeed a similar position that had been held by Jordan as well as the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the new approach by Turkey was met with the approval of Jordan and the majority of the Arabs especially when making a comparison that had been taken by Turkey to that of their Jordanian Kingdom (Kirdiş, 2019). There were numerous articles that were published by the Iraq press at the time which praised the position of Turkey and urged other nations to learn from it on how they could “Say no to the United States”. This was indeed an indicator that Turkey was capable of aligning itself more “towards the Arab interests” just like Jordan does regardless of having majority of the members in parliament from the JDP.

Just like Jordan criticized the invasion of Iraq by the US, Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan also criticized the military operations of the US in Iraq as well as the murder of the Hamas Movement Founder Sheikh Yassin. In addition to that, the government of Turkey also received and welcomed Khalid Mash’al who was the head of the political office for the Hamas movement in Ankara and this was despite of the diplomatic pressure from the United States and Israel (Aras &Keyman, 2018). Turkey just like Jordan is also a strong mediator on Arab and Islam issues. For instance, Turkey is now known to work very hard and with lots of commitment as a mediator in various conflicts in the Arab region where it was involved in indirect and secret negotiations between Israel and Syria (Salameh & Alkatatsheh, 2019). This is even though Syria as a country was indeed the “fiercest critic” of the Israel-Turkish relationship of all the countries in the region but it is now reaping the fruits emanating from the relationship.

Jordan and Turkey are regarded as being “moderate countries” by the United States and could therefore be ultimately useful in deterring of terrorism and serving as role models for other Muslim countries across the world.

3.6.1 The position of the two countries on the Hashemite guardianship of Jerusalem

The Jordanian trusteeship of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, during the reign of King Abdullah I bin Al Hussein the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Jordanian trusteeship of the holy city of Jerusalem in 1924 was entrusted to Sharif Hussein bin Ali, in what is known as the "Sale of sharif", under a law passed by the British Mandate before its end, since Jordan was still under the authority of the British Mandate (Al-Rai Newspaper, 2013).

After the 1948 war, and the unification of the two banks, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, became a subsidiary of Jordanian rule, and Jordanian guardianship of the holy places returned. Despite the 1988 legal and administrative disengagement, Jerusalem and the Holy Places remained legally subordinate to the Kingdom, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Peace Agreement, otherwise there would have been a large vacuum, and the occupation controlled all the holy places, and changed the status quo, contrary to international law.

Under the guardianship, the Jordanian Ministry of Endowments oversees some 144 holy sites in Jerusalem, most notably the Tribal Mosque, the Dome of the Rock Mosque, and the Hashemite Commandments, also Christian shrines. The Hashemite guardianship is based on religious and legal aspects, and the Hashemite guardianship is established from a religious, ideological and political point of view; The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1994 enshrined the Legal and Political Guardianship of Jerusalem, where the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Treaty states: "Israel respects the current special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. When negotiations on permanent status are held, Israel will give high priority to Jordan's historical role in these places." (Palestinian Studies Foundation, 1994).

The Palestinians also approved the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic holy sites through the agreement signed in Amman in 2013 between King Abdullah II and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, which stipulated that "Based on the role of King Al-Sharif Hussein bin Ali in protecting and caring for the holy places in Jerusalem and its ages since 1924, this role continues in a continuous manner in the King of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of the Dynasty of Sharif Hussein

bin Ali until today, based on the allegiance under which the guardianship was held. On the holy sites of Sharif Hussein bin Ali, which was confirmed by his allegiance on March 11, 1924 by the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, the guardianship of the holy places in Jerusalem was entrusted to His Majesty King Abdul-L.II, son of Hussein, including the Roman Patriarchate. The Orthodox Jerusalem is, which is subject to Jordanian Law No. 27 of 1958,". the Convention considered that "the king's continued patronage of the holy places in Jerusalem makes him better able to work to defend the Islamic holy sites and to maintain the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Al-Haram al-Sharif)."". The 1988 agreement also included the exclusion of Jerusalem's holy sites from the 1988disengagement decision between Jordan and the West Bank. (Guardianship Hashemite on the Holy Places in Jerusalem,2013)

Turkey's position on the issue of Jerusalem can be recognized by the nature of its vote in the United Nations, wherever the first UN resolutions on Jerusalem are issued, except that Turkey stands by the Palestinian right in it. The same applies to Resolution 2253 of 4/7/1967, in which the Turkish voice supported the resolution, which calls on Israel to immediately cancel all measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem, which are considered invalid and invalid. Turkey also voted in favour of resolutions rejecting Israel's settlement policy, particularly in the Jerusalem area, and voted in favor of Resolution No. (54/12/2009) on 1/12/1999, which stipulated that Israel's decision to impose its laws on Jerusalem was invalid, as well as its support for Resolution 64/94) of The Date (10/12/2009), which provided for the drafting of the Committee on Matters of The Termination of Israeli Practices, which stipulated that the establishment of the Committee on Matters to End Israeli (Practices It affects the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem. The Turkish follow-up on the excavations under the Al-Aqsa Mosque carried out by Israel also came, as it sent a Turkish committee to confirm these acts, which demonstrates Turkish interest in the holy city of Jerusalem and its holy places.

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Despite these positive changes in the relationship between the two countries, there is still a gap that remains linked first to the disparity in their relations with the UAE and Egypt, Jordan is an ally of the latter, while Erdogan is considered an adversary, and Jordan is afraid of the growing Turkish role in Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, In November 2014, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu asserted that the soil of Jerusalem was sacred to the Turks, because it was their case, while Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned in September 2015 that The Jerusalemites expelled the Jordanian judge and prevented him from speaking from the Salah al-Din pulpit in Al-Aqsa on May 22, 2015, and attacked the Jordanian delegation, which included the Jordanian Minister of Endowments, and removed him from the courtyard of the Temple Mount. While the Head of Turkish Religious Affairs, Mehmet Gormez, ascended the pulpit and sermons on Friday one week before, he went missing

(May15, 2015) and toured the courtyards of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Abuamer,2015).

Jordanian-Turkish relations improved during the period (2017-2020), after Turkey stood by the Kingdom in the response to Trump's decision to move the U.S. Embassy to occupied Jerusalem, recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, and at the Emergency Islamic Cooperation Organization conference held in Istanbul (13/12/2017) between King Abdullah II in his speech to the conference rejecting the resolution, and considered that the decision is working to change the legal or historical status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy (King Abdullah II, 2017). In the final statement of the summit, the conference expressed support for the role played by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a patron of the holy places in Jerusalem, and of the consistent position of the Jordanian Waqf regarding the preservation of the sanctity of the Haram al-Sharif and its historical status as a place of worship (Extraordinary Islamic Summit,2017).

Following the move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Turkey invited the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to hold an emergency conference in Istanbul to discuss developments in the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. King Abdullah II chose to go with a high-level Hashemite delegation to the emergency summit that included his four brothers for the first time in a single delegation outside Jordan, in letters indicating the parish of the Hashemite throne and the royal family in Jerusalem (the centerpiece of the conference), and considering that the Hashemite family sees Jerusalem as its basic legitimacy and not only as a city under Hashemite guardianship, and here cannot separate guardianship and legitimacy, where the Hashemites realize that their historical religious legitimacy Today it is the guardianship of Jerusalem. Turkey confirmed by Turkish President Recep Erdogan its support for the Hashemite Guardianship of the holy sites and described Turkish President King Abdullah II as "the protector of The Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem against Israeli attacks.". Donald Trump said that the presence of King Abdullah II of Jordan at the Islamic summit in Istanbul was important to us, stressing that King Abdullah II is the protector and guardian of

The Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, this city as the capital of occupation (Match Positions between Jordan and Turkey, 2018).

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also stressed his country's support for the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and said that Turkey's position will only be the same as that of King Abdullah, the guardian of Islamic and Christian holy sites, calling on Arab countries with Turkey to form a unified position in support of Jordan and King Abdullah II bin Hussein (Cavusoglu et al., 2019).

The presence of King Abdullah II for the first Istanbul Summits (2017) and the second (2019) before and after the transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem represented more than a political significance and meaning. The second indication is that Jordan is able to change its political alliances in accordance with its higher strategic interests, Turkey has refused to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and has strongly supported The Jordanian Guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, where the final statement of the Istanbul Summit emphasizes the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also stressed Jordan's role in protecting Jerusalem's holy sites, "the importance of Hashemite guardianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and Jordan's special role in taking this responsibility in his visit to Jordan in 2017 (Hammad, 2017).

On February 2, 2019, King Abdullah II visited Turkey, where the king's talks with the Turkish president focused on the strong relations between Jordan and Turkey and ways to strengthen and develop them in all fields. During the discussions, which were attended by several senior officials of the two countries, it was emphasized to maintain coordination and consultation between Jordan and Turkey on issues of common concern and developments in the Middle East region. On the Palestinian issue, the king stressed the need to intensify efforts to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the two-state solution, leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and during the discussions stressed the importance of continuing efforts to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to enable it to continue to provide its relief,

education and health services to refugees. The talks also addressed developments related to the Syrian crisis, where His Majesty the King stressed the importance of reaching a political solution to the crisis that preserves the unity of Syria and its people, and guarantees the safe return of refugees to their home and .Regional and international efforts in the war on terrorism were reviewed as part of a comprehensive strategy.

In summary, Turkish foreign policy under the JDP represents a major departure from the previous trend of foreign policy, particularly regarding foreign relations, particularly with Jordan. The tendency to develop such relations and enjoy more diverse relations, and to emphasize dialogue and negotiation as a means of resolving disputes, has increased, despite the wide divergence between the two countries in dealing with some regional issues and crises.

3.7 Divergences in Jordan and Turkey's Foreign Policy Stances in the Middle East

The problems in the region of Middle East straightforwardly impact Turkey's attention from security and safety to economy. Though, at the time of cold war, the country Turkey didn't include influentially and directly to the affairs of the Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries. The post-cold war growth provided some opportunity for Jordan and Turkey to re-assess the political concerns and chronological misperceptions and create new kinds of involvement with each other. But still, Turkey had political, economic and strategic purposes to create intense connections with the Jordan (Aras, 2017). After finishing the cold war and disintegration of Soviet Union, Turkish's foreign policy was reformed by the novel political authorities. Turkey considered to give priority to European region instead of the Jordan and other middle east countries. Also, the contemporary Turkey did not familiarize and include the countries such as Jordan.

At the same time Jordan was not independent and under the British Rules. Turkish political authorities focused on few specific points such as preventing national unity, maintaining stability of regions, creating friendly connections and extending trade relationships. Turkey began to create diplomacy on multilateral and mutual basis (Tsourapas, 2019). On the other hand, Jordan's

foreign policy is managed at the global extent, the locations of the regions on the growth in the peace procedures, refugee issue, etc. Jordan's political authorities emphasized on giving importance to the constant cooperation and increasing relation with the Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc. The country was looking to obtain the impacts of the Saudi, mainly revolution of the Syria with political aspects and also looking for preserving the expansion of the Jordanian Crises.

According to the researches, the Libyan revolution became clear, at that time Turkey supported that revolutionary movement, Also supported the Western interferences and operation of NATO in Libya. After Gaddafi breakdown, Turkey considered the NTC the single representative of the population of Libya. It plays main role in providing the work of developing the financial agreements and political organizations in novel Libya (Cole and McQuinn, 2015). But Turkey successfully secured profitable agreements in Libya approx worth \$23 billion, and lot more agreement were to be approved. But it could be unreasonable to presume that Turkey's single motive was to acquire financial profit. It observed the potential threats in the Western agenda which desired to hijack famous uprising and utilize it as pretext to wide oil assests of Libya. But Turkey failed to protect the foreign interference in Libya, Turkey protected its place and joined the intervention of NATO in regarding to become influential decision making.

The condition in Libya becoming entrenched. The restricted NATO operations of air doesn't look to be driven to the Gadaffi fall down, while the population support for this is quite diminishing, creating it enhancing unlikely to obtain the consensus from active role of NATO. Turkey hosted meeting in the Libya's Istanbul which involves representators of Libya opposition, including foreign minister of western countries. It was essential meeting because they expected that it will establish the base for constructing the compromise among Benghazi and Tripoli to ignore further insecurity and instability when Gaddafi leaves eventually. According to the Turkish proposal, it included establishing the reforming commission for Libya post-Gaddafi, methods for supplying the fundamental requirements to cities which were damaged due to war situation and potential exit approachhes for the Gaddafi from nation. Though, the acceptation of the UN security resolution council 1970, that involved referring

the condition in Libya to the global criminal court might have decreased the chances of the leaving of Gaddafi – which was warned by Turkey.

Arab Spring policy has strated to alter the political landscape of the Middle East. It is special opportunity for the Turkey to verify its novel foreign policy strategy can have optimistic outcomes for the province in promoting and motivating the democratic regions and political stability. In the scenario of Libya, the reaction came late. (Aria Foreboding Thanked,2017).

Syria was the most delicate and complicated for the Turkish Foreign policy, due to Turkey pressurized them to provide concrete solution, as the Syria crises was nearby to the houses in various manners (Fuat Keyman, 2016). The consistent alteration in the foreign policy of Turkey was only consistent in its place on the revolution of Syria. This permanent alteration was dependent on the interface of the three main aspects: the global place of the crises of revolution, field reality of Syria, and the inside Turkish landscape.

The position of Turkish tries to convince the President of Syria of the legitimacy of desires and wants of the demonstrators and look to attain them silently with maintaining peace, to support the forces of army, embrace it militarily and politically and demand the release of Bashar-al-Assad afterwards the provinces of Syria repression of the representators through killing and then ask for setting up the secure zones for the refugees of Syria and fields prohibited for the aviation military of Syria and then contribute in the global conferences for saying for the peaceful resolutions of the crisis of Syria, give the release of the Assad regime, taking into the consideration with the Iran and Russia, the most crucial allies of the official regime of Syria and not collide with them (D'Alema, 2017).

In 2009, Turkey and Syria signed the cooperation agreements and in 2010, they approved the agreement of counter terrorism for effectual campaigns in opposed to Kurdish Workers Party. At that time, Turkey opposed the arming of Syrian-Kurdish militaries on its boundaries and interfered the military to remove them by operational “Euphrates Shield” in 2016. For Turkey, it became point of consideration that they have to prevent Syrian Kurds from the restructuring and resettling the self governing models in north east and north west of the country that is already destroyed by the Turkish troops during the invasion. They

supported the Syrian government after attaining an treaty with the armed forces. (Brown, 2018)

Syria displays the primary foreign policy issue of ruling party JDP third tenure. After the ending of the Presidents relationship of both the countries, Syrian President As-Assad failed to launch the assumed restructures and the ongoing attacks on population through the forces of security (Kösebalaban, 2020). Erdogan personalized the Syria's breakdown as 'inhumane' and at that time Turkey supported the UN council of security resolution which accusing the regime – something China and Russia opposed.

Turkey conducted conference in regarding with the Syrian opposition about its territory, and as per the JDP, the President of Syria is irredeemable. Also, sharing boundary with the Syria directly impacts the Turkey, as they would receive huge amount of refugees. Policy of Turkey about Syria, and the extent of synchronization with its allies in West in developing this policy, has outcomes for the relations of Turkey with the Israel and West (Başak, 2017). Also, likely to regime alter in Syria enhances consideration in Iran, that has crucial approach towards the deepening role of the Turkey in Syria. In such context, the crisis of Syria may react as litmus exam for the restructuring of dynamics of foreign policy in this province.

Jordan used to practice its policy of " the stick in the middle", that is what Jordan's situation has been in terms of the Syrian crisis that is still ravaging sisterly Syria until now, and Jordan, which separates it from its Syria about 375 km, and it is the most affected by what is happening on the Syrian arena. Confused and confused now, which appeared through its positions, decisions, and accepting foreign policy, depending on the circumstances. The internal pressures that the Jordanian decision-maker is exposed to, which is represented in particular by the Jordanian fear of the war being dragged into the interior, especially since there is a Jordanian fear of the spread of the spark of the Arab Spring into the interior of Jordan, through the statements of several MPs and political persons about this and warning them of that, and external pressures Which is represented by the pressure exerted by the Arab Gulf states and the United States of America, which has not yet decided its issue regarding to the president (Khediat, 2012).

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan embraced the opponents of the Syrian regime at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, and allowed them freedom of expression, allowing the opposition movements to carry out their activities, and among the most prominent of these movements is the Islamic Movement in Amman, support for Arab League decisions against Assad's actions, the most important of which is the decision to freeze Syria's membership as well as Economic, commercial and financial sanctions, including stopping dealings with the Central Bank of Syria, stopping government trade exchanges with the Syrian government except for strategic goods that affect the Syrian people, calling on Arab countries to withdraw their ambassadors from Damascus, and inviting all parties of the Syrian opposition to meet at the League's headquarters to discuss and debate the new vision. Due to the Syrian crisis and the transitional period, Jordan withdrew the ambassador from Syria, and in return, Syria responded with the same action and withdrew its ambassador. (Laaed, 2018).

Jordan's participation in the Astana meetings aimed at finding political solutions to the Syrian crisis, which was under the auspices of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian Operations Committee, the cessation of hostilities in Syria and the ceasefire. Also, the Jordanian government struck ISIS sites in Syria, on the second anniversary of the burning of pilot Moaz Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS, according to the Jordanian Armed Forces statement, "Airplanes from the Royal Jordanian Air Force, and for the memory of our martyrs who died in our war against terrorism, flattened this evening." Friday, various targets for ISIS in southern Syria, including a military outpost it had occupied, and it was previously belonging to the regime's army. On the part of the Jordanian position regarding the Libyan revolution, Haftar met King Abdullah II of Jordan in May 2015, and after that his official visits followed, during which he met senior officials in the Jordanian state. (Al-Zoubi, 2011).

Turkey is probably to pursue nearly the developments and growth in Syria and attempts to play the constructive part in discovering the solution. Following the clear transformation from the supporting Asad to sum disengagement from the present regime in Syria, So Turkey's Syria foreign policy emphasized more on the continuation of the long term goals of attempting to protect the sectarian issues and civil war, while protecting its normal but constructive place. But the

growth and development on the site developed, Ankara held the strong and robust anti-Asad place and clearly declared that he must be eliminated. Based on such opinion, Turkey acts with global community and Arab association in its attempts to bring the peace and stability to Syria. Turkey introduced sanctions for the country Syria in 2011. It involved bands on deals and transactions with the government of Syria. Turkey did not want to influence the people of the Syria so it did not implement the policy directly. Moreover, the Jordan and Turkey share various traits similar due to their historical background. Their relations are based on the strong basis of the brotherhood which ties between the people of both countries. But still they have politically major issues, they also have differences in the trading amounts. But still the people of both countries have strong knot in their relations. (Başak, 2017).

With regard to Jordan's position on the Libyan revolution, Jordan has lined up alongside the Libyan insurgents, since it's out break against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, while Jordan has been an important station that will not accept Libyan political figures, expressing the Kingdom's support for Libya's efforts to form frameworks of the political process, with its parliamentary and governmental arms, through public support for members of the Libyan General National Congress, and its previous recognition of the Transitional Council. The Libyan National Congress is a legitimate representative of the Libyan people, and then supports the formation of the interim Libyan government headed by Abdellh .Al-Thani Jordan immediately supported operation "Dignity", announced by Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army on May 16, 2014, with the aim of "cleansing Libya of terrorism, gangs and out laws, committing to the democratic process and stopping assassinations", as part of the Kingdom's position in support of efforts to combat terrorism and counter so-called "Islamic State" (ISIS), particularly as it is part of the "international coalition" led by the United States of America, because of the organization's unorthodox threat to Jordanian national security (Saadeddine, 2017).

Jordan's support for Haftar stems from his appointment as commander of the Libyan army by an elected government of the internationally recognized parliament (Arab Center for Research and Policy Study, 2019), which strives to restore order and stability to the Libyan scene, and therefore it is natural for the

Kingdom of Jordan to provide its technical, training and military expertise to the legitimate forces there, as part of its keenness to end the fighting and establish security and stability in Libya. In doing so, Jordan wants to maintain its traditional line within its coordinating alliance with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, both in Libya and elsewhere in the region.

As for the Turkish-Libyan security agreement, where the Turkish government and the Libyan Government of National Accord signed on November 27, 2019, two memorandums of understanding, one on security and military cooperation between the two countries, and the second: on sovereignty over maritime areas, stemming from international law, which are aimed at protecting the rights of the two countries, and allows Turkey to use Libyan airspace and establish bases according to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Tobruk (eastern Libya), which supports Haftar's forces fighting the Government of Accord (western Libya). The memorandum states that the parties "decided to work to determine the maritime areas of the Mediterranean fairly and in accordance with the powers arising from international laws, while the rest of the chapters of the memorandum relate to the control of the boundaries of the "continental shelf and exclusive economic zone" according to precise geographical coordinates, procedures for registration with the United Nations by the parties, ways to resolve disputes around them, and mechanisms for reviewing and amending them. The map attached to the memorandum shows the boundaries of the maritime sovereignty zones between the two countries (Arab Center for Research and Policy Study, 2019).

On the Jordanian position on the Turkish-Libyan security agreement and the Turkish intervention in Libya, King Abdul-H. II bin Al Hussein, expressed in an interview with France 24, on January 14, 2019, in which he warned of the repercussions of the Turkish military intervention in Libya and the Arab and European controversy and saw this intervention as making the situation more complicated. Turkey's dispatch of troops to Libya will create more confusion (King Abdullah II,2020).

The Jordanian approach in the Libyan file is based on the support of Jordan, the commander of the Libyan army, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who made several visits to Jordan, Haftar met with Jordan's King Abdullah II in May 2015,

and the King stressed "Jordan's constant keenness to stand with Libya in its quest to restore its security and stability and to confront terrorist organizations targeting the unity of its people and territorial integrity" as discussed during the meeting "discussed relations of cooperation between the two countries, especially in the military fields," the statement said. He then continued his official visits, during which he met with senior officials in the Jordanian state (Al-Arab, 2015). According to international reports, Jordan has delivered military vehicles to Haftar, a production and design of the Abdullah II Center for Design and Development, and Jordan has graduated from various units in its military college's successive batches of Haftar's forces since 2015 (Al-Fadhilat, 2015). This also makes Jordan's engagement with the crisis in contrast to Turkey. That supports the internationally recognized Libyan government (the government of national accord) (UN confirms Jordan, 2019).

4. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND TURKEY (2002-2019)

On the aspects of the economy, Jordan as a country is known to have a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about \$12,500 while the GDP of Turkey is \$26,900. On the aspects of unemployment, it is ascertained approximately 18.5 percent of adults in Turkey are unemployed while in Turkey, the percentage is 11.2. Approximately 14.2% of people in Jordan stay below the “poverty lines” while in Turkey, the figure is 21.9%. Jordan is known to have a “top tax rate” of 20 percent while Turkey has 35% (Kizilkaya, 2019). On the aspects of life, it was ascertained that about 58.0 in 100,000 of women die during the time of labor while in Turkey, 16.0 of women die. In addition to that, it is ascertained that about 14.2 of children are known to die before reaching age 1 while 17.6 of children in Turkey do die before reaching age one (Kuru, 2019). In Jordan, there are about 23.9 babies in the country per 1000 individuals while in Turkey; there are 15.7 babies in 1000 individuals (Kadioglu, 2019). On the aspect of expenditure, Jordan is known to spend approximately 7.5 of the country’s total GDP on its healthcare while Turkey spends 5.4 percent.

On the other hand, Jordan is known to spend 3.4 % of the country’s GDP on matters education while Turkey is known to spend 4.4% on the same. On the geographical aspects, Jordan is known to possess 26 kilometers of the coastline while Turkey has a total of 7200 kilometers. Jordan as a country is approximately nine times smaller as opposed to Turkey. This is because Turkey has about 783,562 square Kilometers while Jordan is about 89,342 square kilometers thus making Jordan as a country to be 11.4 percent Turkey’s size (Kirdiş, 2019). On the aspects of population, Turkey has about 80.9 million individuals and this is 70.6 million fewer than the people living in Jordan.




Figure 1.1: Refugee crisis between Turkey and Jordan

(Source: orphic magazine.com)

4.1 Economic Relations between Turkey and Jordan

Centered with the Nation of Turkey on Economic, Foreign Direct Investment collaboration and, on the opposite hand, benefiting from shared experience, they did not neglect Jordan in some of the commercial aspects. This is because Turkey performs a significant function in the sector but is, on the other hand, Jordan's nearest and very truthful but secure faith, culture, reputation, and practice. On Nineteen February 2016, the Turkish publication Milli Gazete reported that perhaps the Turkey-Jordanian Economy Conference organized the conference with the involvement of Cengiz Eroğlu, the head of the Jordanian Yunus Emre Community center (Ediger et al., 2020). The conference, ventures in Turkey were planned by King Hussein Entrepreneurs System, which considered generating diverse knowledge to be conveyed to Arabs. Talking at the conference, a Jordanian entrepreneur stated that Turkey is indeed a vast country and that there are ventures, business opportunities. Jordan and the faith of Turkey, customs, and culture are commonplace.

Ultimately, Jordan is calling on Turkey to contribute, will show Arab riyals worthy of Turkey a strong incentive and buy shares. The trade treaty between

these two nations that is Jordan and Turkey about the dispute surrounding the Trade treaty in Jordan and Turkey, whereby Oman interrupted research, a conflict between priorities and resources among proponents of its revocation and requests to reconfigure the deal and was sealed in the year 2009 December(2020). If it became signed, it should pass for all nations (Magued, 2019). Several of the goals of this Treaty have been to strengthen and improve economic integration between both parties and to lift the living standards of the populations of the two nations, slowly eliminate barriers and constraints on the flow of goods, especially agricultural commodities; enhancing harmonious trade connections between both parties by growing their reciprocal economic activities; Providing equal opportunities for competitiveness in commerce across two parties, establishing profitable opportunities including promoting investments, and in specific developing cooperative venture initiatives in each Nation, Exchange and partnership between both sides on developing world markets, Open mobility of products and formation of a free market region (Huijgh&Warlick, 2019). The formal Jordanian news organization published on November third that Alain Al Kabariti, president of the Jordan Business association, asked the government to rethink the decision to remove the free trade deal with Turkey and take into consideration the Country's economy's desires.

Alkhaleej-online publication Turkish Commerce Minister Ruhsar Pekcan reported on that the adoption of a comprehensive trade treaty for Jordan, which took place at a press briefing in the capital city of Ankara after a summit of four overseas officials and trade ministers from both nations, The Turkish secretary identified the four means conference in Ankara as very productive, the two parties will keep working towards increased economic collaboration, with Turkey and Jordan having excellent opportunities for coordination and reflecting strongly in both parties and their ecosystems (Dimitraki & Win, 2020). With a resolution developed by Jordan some months back to terminate the joint trade deal between both countries.

The Turkish diplomat has suggested, the mutual economy and market concerns, in particular, would be discussed throughout such negotiations, and they expect that both sides would benefit from it. The Turkish minister to Amman, Murad

Karaguz, identified his Nation's ties with Jordan as historical, profoundly embedded, and reliable, and both countries are eager to expand these agreements. The two parties marked the 70th commemoration of bilateral relations last year, considering that, in 2015, the amount of growth between both countries achieved USD 1 billion. In addition, during 2017, Jordanian expenditure in Turkey exceeded \$1.2 billion in Jordan's actual property in Turkey; on February third in the year 2019 Al-Quds media conference reported statistics of Jordanian travel to the Nation of Turkey in modern times substantially developed (Adam, 2020). And the last period saw a rise of nearly Fifty percent in the face of growing discussion regarding the current preference of a significant segment of Jordanians towards their domicile from Jordan to Turkey, including the allocation of resources to Turkish accounts as well as the acquisition of immovable property.

On Sixteen April 2019, the Jordanian media outlets reported the Turkish Economic Team serving twenty-three industrial towns as well as 1652 companies exploring Jordan. The Jordanian Office in the Nation of the Turkish city of Ankara recently began a professional trip to a delegation serving the commercial field in the Turkish city of Bursa to know concerning development incentives and the prospect of establishing the Turkish factories in the Country (Al-Krenawi, 2019). The tour is part of the Department of External Relations including Expatriates as well as Jordanian ministries' initiative to promote national business transformation initiatives via its ongoing interaction with foreign economic players. The Jordanian Minister to Ankara arranged for that tour by conducting multiple consultations with both the shareholders of Turkish industries to demonstrate the advantages the Monarchy obtained via its characteristic geographic position and by signing treaties that enable various possibilities at the international and domestic level for shareholders to gain from the numerous provisions and services.

In response to research tours to multiple manufacturers in the town of Bursa so as to examine the developed standard achieved by Turkish industries, whereby the feasibility of moving Turkish talents to Jordanian manpower was addressed via a collaboration plan to educate Jordanian labour in Turkey, whereby the likelihood of transmitting Turkish expertise to Jordanian employment was

resolved via a partnership program. I derive out of this relationship in the fields of hospitality, commerce as well as industrial Exchange to Jordan and Turkey in terms of development and economic prosperity in these two countries or two parties and lead to the growth and success of both countries which reinforces and supports this relationship in terms of security and stability.

An Arab proverb states, “*There is nothing on this earth to be prized more than true friendship.*” This proverb best sums up the over 70 years relationship between Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Turkey (Çakırlar& Marston, 2019). The Turkey-Jordan relations were founded on a mutual basis of close-knit ties by the two nations that bound its citizens through their strategic geographical proximity and the rich history. This was aided through the signing of “Treaty of Friendship” on the 11th of January in the year 1947 and which has been extended up to contemporary times. The Turkish embassy in Jordan has been in operation since 28 April 1947 and still operates up to now.

Up to date there has been close to 40 if not more of economic agreements and memorandums of understanding that were signed between the two nations, these agreements have led to a solid legal cooperation framework between the two countries. In the year 2009, Turkey and Jordan enacted the Free Trade Agreement and the Agreement on Visa Exemption that elevated the level of economic cooperation and this was entered into force in March 2011 (Özdemir & Bayraklı, 2019). These agreements saw the exchange of most agricultural products between the two nations. There was a growing trend in relations between the two countries economically and commercially, in 2013 where trading between Turkey and Jordan reached a new high totaling 815 million USD. Turkish investments on Jordanian soil stood at USD 300 million whilst the total value of contracts that were awarded to Turkish companies reached USD 2.4 million since 2000. Jordan on the other hand boasts of USD 300 million worth of investment in Turkey that cuts across various fields that include Infrastructural projects, foodstuff companies, military, and garments (Aliyev, 2018). Due to its small size and economy, Jordan injects more resources in terms of investments into the Turkish economy but this was projected to change as Turkey promised to inject a lot of investment

opportunities in Jordan during the marking of Seven decades of diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations.




Figure 2.1: FDI inflow in Turkey (In US dollar)

(Source: researchgate.com)

There has been a bilateral cooperation mechanism established between the two countries that was solely concentrated on boosting the economy and infrastructure of both Turkey and Jordan, this has deepened the dependency on each other for growth. First and last meeting of Partnership Council Meetings was on the 28-29th April 2014, and this cycled on the Free Trade Agreement that was signed by H.E Abdullah Gul, Former Turkish president who had visited Jordan in 2009. Business Forum/Business Council established in the year 1994 and its last meeting was on 3rd February 2016 in Amman, the capital of Jordan, the meeting was attended by H.E Nihat Zeybekci, former Minister of Economy of Turkey when he visited Jordan, Turkish-Jordanian Business Forum held on 28th of April 2014 oversaw the signing of the newly revised agreements on the establishment of the Business Council (Conker& Hussein, 2020).

The DEIK/Turkish-Jordan Business Council which was established in the year 1994 by the Jordanian Businessmen Association would act as the Counterpart Organization. Its primary objective was to encourage bilateral trade and industrial cooperation and joint ventures. It lobbied both for the private sector

and authorities for the Free Trade agreement. Jordan concluded the Free Trade agreement with the United States of America. This is an attractive destination for the Turkish investors. The Council highlighted the advantage in its promoting of investments in the country, particularly on the Turkish textile industry. For its future activities, it intends to focus on sectors that are new and Jordan’s potential role as a gateway to the Middle East and the gulf countries. As per the ongoing Syrian wars, Turkish exporters will need to find new routes for trade. Turkey is currently holding further talks with Jordan about the commencement of the much-anticipated Roll On-Roll Off ships Services.




Figure 3.1: Turkey exports from 2002-2019

(Source: www.aljazeera.net)




Figure 4.1: Jordan exports to Turkey

(Source: www.aljazeera.net)

Jordan exports to Turkey	Value	Year
Fertilizers	\$16.69M	2019
Tobacco and manufactures tobacco substitutes	\$9.26M	2019
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	\$3.44M	2019
Lead	\$3.40M	2019
Pharmaceutical products	\$3.18M	2019
Plastics	\$2.13M	2019
Edible fruits, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons	\$1.59M	2019
Electrical, electronic equipment	\$1.39M	2019
Articles of iron or steel	\$1.25M	2019
Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric	\$974.24K	2019

Figure 5.1: Jordan exports to Turkey

(Source: www.aljazeera.net)

4.2 The Cultural Relations between Turkey and Jordan

Turkish ambassador to Jordanian Murat Karagoz stated that Turkey and Jordan are both strong allies and geopolitical associates in the Middle East, experiencing good international and institutionalized ties (Almog& Sever, 2019). Both parties face big problems in that region; he informed The Jordanian News in an interview on the basis of the international day of his Nation that would be marked by the embassies this year. Via greater collaboration and teamwork, they are investing tremendous abilities to resolve those challenges. Because the recent public awareness survey reveals, there are good affections and pleasant links in both the populations of both nations in terms of individuals-to-people relationships. She also stated that they deeply value that. After Jordan's revocation of the Free Trade Agreement in 2018 termed as (FTA), both parties had agreed to sign the Trade and International cooperation deal on the First October 2019.

Since of the cancelation of the FTA, the rate of trade and investment in 2019 has been partly through. Trade amount between both parties in 2018 was \$855 million while in the initial eight months of 2019 this was \$365 million (Moore, 2019). Sadly, the sales of Jordan to Turkey declined a couple of times further.

Nevertheless, in the new future, the country intends to rectify this path. On the other side, he said, mentioning more than 400,000 Jordanians that had toured Turkey that year. They foresee hosting half a million Jordanian residents in the year. Passport-free system and joint flights with multi destinations are increasing tourism creativity. We would also like to invite enough Turkish visitors to explore Jordan.

With respect towards the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, Karagoz emphasized that Turkey together with Jordan are defending the similar ideals in respect of Jerusalem's position including the Palestine issue (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019). Turkey genuinely wants a fair and permanent solution to the dispute between Israel as well as Palestine, that resides underneath the complexities of the Middle East, via joint talks on the foundation of a dream of both countries residing hand by side inside safe and accepted borders; East Israel representing the capital, as much as that concept of ground for peace, the path plan including the Arab Unity Plan in the context of the applicable UN Legislative Committee initiatives.

Turkey shares Hashemite control of Jerusalem's holiest grounds, the site of collaboration among Turkey and Jordan discussed by the delegate is UNRWA. Turkey, it said, raised its annual allowance to \$15 million to finance the programs of UNRWA. Touching on the occasion of the New Republic declaration, Karagoz said that the Republic is really the biggest achievement of the 96 old Turkish governments. Since the first 20th century, ninety-six years later, a ruined nation of wars, Turkey has been the seventeenth strongest Nation globally, including the fifth most in Europe (Zencirci, 2020). Given all the obstacles it confronts, Turkey, as a nation with a demographic of eighty-two million, a "dynamic financial sector, innovative governance as well as a large army, persists to be an imperialist country in its area, whose alliance is invaluable towards its allies". Turkey already has a widespread cultural profundity outside its boundaries.

Drawing on the outcome of the Intervention Peace Revolution and the negotiations for both Turkey and the USA as well as the former Soviet Union, the envoy said that Turkey's significant security issues arising from PYD extremism had been acknowledged and the national sovereignty of Syria has

also been verified. Such innovations have also laid the foundation for refugees and migrants to travel to their hometown peacefully and in safety. Turkey is the world's biggest migrant resettlement country, with 3.5 million Syrians on top of the scale within provisional security. They allocated almost \$45 billion for their main concern, without any external aid (Gregou, 2019). Turkey and Jordan are currently championing a diplomatic response to the Syrian problems. They are also threatened by acts of terrorism through their shared partners. They are the only nations that opened their borders to thousands of their Syrian sisters and brothers, and this destructive war has hampered their trading routes.

Turkey thus intends to continue working alongside Jordan to address those difficulties in every way; they find Jordan to be a reliable partner. Turkey and Jordan greatly connect through a shared history, popular heritage, and strong human relations. They find the almost 3,600 Turkish people residing in Jordan and the nearly 7,000 Jordanians one-fourth of whom are students living in Turkey to be the link of cooperation between both the two nations. They like to get to understand the populations of both nations more. 2020 was proclaimed a Shared Year of Heritage between these nations that is Turkey and Jordan, for this reason. Mutually beneficial shows, visual art exhibits, events, gatherings, and reading programs in both parties are amongst the projects scheduled for 2020 (Conker & Hussein, 2019). As a prelude to every significant event, previous month, a joint partnership with the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre in Amman, their envoy organized the Turkish Social Days, where they showed Turkish films, hosted an artwork exhibition, arranged an archaeological conference, supported Turkish culinary including music as well as gained acknowledgment through their Jordanian friends.

5. CONCLUSION

The thesis provides an analysis of the fact that the relationship between Jordan and Turkey is essential since the two have common values and history that have made their relationship to be even stronger. It is worth noting that the relationships between these two countries are indeed deemed to be ancient in the Arab region because it is attributed to the founding fathers of the two nations. It is quite evident that the two countries share some similarities and differences that make them to be even more closely knit. For instance, it is evident that the relationship between the two countries is founded on the basis that both Turkey and Jordan are known to have shared similar pro-western as well strong anti-communist opinions especially with reference to the issue of Palestine that is known to have gone beyond the foreign policy bonds.

It can truly be discerned that the relationship between Jordan and Turkey encountered great developments especially during the “Justice and Development Party” and this was from the year 2002 to the year 2020. This relationship, the aspects of not only mutual respects but also through interspersed mutual visits that occurred between the leaders as well as significant officials from the two countries that dealt with both the local, regional, as well as global affairs. The relations between the two countries were further attributed to bilateral economic, military, and cultural relations that enhanced their ties to the better.

It was quite evident that the Arab Spring revolution affected both Turkey and Jordan in one way or another and that the two countries also shared similarities and differences on how the whole issue was approached. However, complains were raised by Jordan that Turkey was gaining from this relationship more than it and therefore these calls for relevant stakeholders to sit together and ensure that their differences are duly resolved. Another common similarity between the two countries that is worth noting is that Jordan and Turkey are against the repressive practices that were being executed by Israel against the Palestinians. As on the aspect of the Arab Spring revolutions, it can truly be ascertained that

the two countries noted that their cooperation was highly needed in effectively handling other countries in one way or another.

According to the above discussion on the relationship between Jordan and Turkey, it gives insight knowledge of their connections. It is observed that the relations between Jordan and Turkey have been quite smooth and this is evident from a range of agreements on various issues that affect each of the two countries. It is evident that the two countries have strong desires in ensuring that the bilateral relationship between the two is highly enhanced especially in view of the regional developments. Both the countries had different motives for their foreign trade policies. Jordan wanted to work with mutual understanding and cooperation for the sake of the other country while Turkey's government concentrated on developing the national unity and work for their preservation, expanding trade connections with other countries and maintaining stability. It is also observed that both the countries have better trade relations. The thesis presents an overview of the numerous visits that have been conducted by top officials from the two governments aimed at signaling a discussion on the important issues facing the two countries and how they can effectively handle them to the mutual benefits. For instance, the two countries have maintained similar stances on issues that affect them and for instance, one of the main impetus is when the administration of the US President Donald Trump made the decision of relocating the United States embassy right from Tel Aviv and moved it to Jerusalem in a move which unilaterally aimed at the recognition of this contested city as being the Israel capital.

According to our researches that both the leaders from Jordan and Turkey have therefore been quite keen on ensuring that the Muslim rights were duly protected in the Region and that there was stability in the Middle East. It can therefore be truly concluded that both Turkey and Jordan see lots of advantages in having better relations among them and therefore they are highly interested in ensuring that their political, cultural, and religious relations are maintained for a longer period of time. For instance, on a broader regional scale, it is apparent that Turkey as a country also needs the support of Jordan especially as it makes attempts that are aimed at rebuilding its influence in the Arab region that crumbled right from the "Arab uprisings" that occurred in the year 2011.

The highly profile visits that have been made by Turkish officials to Jordan made it possible for Erdogan of Turkey to easily “push back against” the notion that the Turkish government had actually been isolated in the “Arab world”. It can be ascertained that Jordan on the other hand warms up to Turkey and relies in its support in efforts that are aimed at staving off any of the potential “anti-government pressure” that may be posed by the Islamists in the Jordanian Kingdom especially during periods of harsh economic austerities that the country may encounter. The relations between Turkey and Jordan have generally been too good and this is evidenced through a range of “bilateral economic” trade agreements between the two countries. The two countries have indeed been involved in the signing of a good number of trade agreements that will help in ensuring that the relations between the two countries are duly enhanced. Despite of the new challenges and constraints that face the two countries, their leaders are concerned that the relationship between the two should never be constrained and indeed, there is a lot of political will from both sides aimed at ensuring that the ties between the two are duly improved for the benefits of their citizens. All in all, it is important for the leaders from the two countries to work hand in hand in the identification of any challenges that might hamper their otherwise good relationship.

There exists a diplomatic relation between Turkey and Jordan. A Treaty of Friendship has been signed since 11th January 1947. But with the end of the cold war, Turkey shifted their attention from the Middle Eastern region to European province for maintaining stability and expanding the trade connections. The current Turkish-Jordanian relation has been formed on the basis of brotherly relations bounded by the history and geography of the territories. There exist more than 40 memorandums and agreements signed and agreed upon by both the countries. These are based on the foundation of laying down legal bilateral cooperation. The relations of the countries have been upgraded with the implementation of FTA and the Visa exemption in the year 2009. There has been an increase in the trade volume to 815 million USD as observed in the year 2013. The amount investments made by Jordan in turkey have increased owing to the stronger bond of the relationship. Turkey ensures that full cooperation

and solidarity is showed towards Jordan with a view to ensure peace and stability in both the regions.

The bilateral relation between the countries is influenced through the growing cultural cooperation. The facilities for improvement in learning of the Turkish culture are organized so that the Jordanians finds best facilities while being employed in Turkey. There are nearly 3500 Turkish citizens that reside in Jordan presently. The Jordan's move to open up with Turkey and develop strong friendly ties is tending to increase in the future due to the economic and political considerations of the economy. The military cooperation's are also improved through discussions between the Jordanian King Abdullah II and Turkey's Chief of the General Staff General Hulusi Akar. It has been observed that the ties and relations between Jordan and Turkey are progressively improving with time. It is also noticed that their trade relations are improved now and they import and export various things according to their foreign trade policy , the growing culture and cooperation have to lead to a bilateral relation between Jordan and Turkey, the Turkish culture is organized, so the Jordan citizens found it convenient to work in Turkey , Not only this, the report concludes the diplomatic relations between both Turkey as well as Jordan, Since 1947 the friendship is their between Turkey and Jordan things changed after the end of the cold war the Turkey's attention shifted from Middle Eastern region to European province for maintaining stability and expanding the trade connections with them, this somewhere benefited Turkey, but the relationship between Turkey and Jordan got affected, then with the introduction of new relations between Jordan and Turkey has been formed on the basis of brotherly relations bounded by the history and geography of the territories also the military corporations, We need to take into consideration that the relationships between Tukey and Jordan are indeed deemed to be ancient in the Arab region because it is attributed to the founding fathers of Turkey and Jordan. the thesis above also concluded the relationship and similarities between Turkey and Jordan even more closely knit. Arab Spring revolution affected both Turkey and Jordan in one way, or another complains were raised by Jordan that Turkey was misusing the relationship for personal gains. The stakeholders sat together and discussed the issues with the intension to resolve them.

Both the countries, i.e. Turkey and Jordan, noted the importance of their healthy relationship to run the business successfully. Hence they focused on resolving the issues and maintaining healthy business terms. The overall thesis concluded that the relationship between both countries have been excellent and beneficial for business and trade purposes; this enabled a prosperous and bright future of Turkey and Jordan as well.

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RESUME

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Education:

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Work Experience:

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- English (writing, reading and speaking)
- Turkish (writing, reading and speaking)

Skills:

- Very Good skills in computer
- Communication skills
- Tact and ability to persuade
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