

**T.C.  
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS: GREATER ALBANIA AND THE  
KOSOVAN-SERBIAN CONFLICT**

**THESIS**

**Klajda ALLAJBEU**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations  
Political Science and International Relations Program**

**Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Celal Nazım İREM**

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T.C.  
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

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Not: Öğrencinin Tez savunmasında **Başarılı** olması halinde bu form **imzalanacaktır**. Aksi halde geçersizdir.



**I shall dedicate this work to all those Albanian people who feel a kind of attitude towards themselves when they leave their country for a better life. Also to my beloved family to whom I am greatly indebted since without their support and love I wouldn't be here.**

**Istanbul 2017**



## **FOREWORD**

Deciding for my Master Degree Thesis, it was quite tough since I had before me a lot of other choices which had their own heavenly importance. But when I was finally convinced that nationalism in the Balkans was the topic I wanted to write and search about I noticed that it was a whole empire on its own to understand, explain and talk about. Writing about nationalism needs a lot of preparations, courage and studies. One has to be impartial and careful while expressing because nationalistic feelings can hurt others who might have another opinion about it. Nevertheless I can't deny the help of my supervisor Prof. Dr. Celal Nazım İrem who was there for me whenever I had a doubt about the continuation of my thesis. I'm very grateful to him for his suggestions, recommendations and guide. Also I would like to give my special thanks to other important professors who played a crucial role in completing my knowledge's these two years with patience and courtesy.

My other sincere thanks go for all other collaborators, family members, my fiancé and best friends who either directly or indirectly contributed to the realization of this paper by giving me moral, support and courage all the way.

Last but not least I'm highly grateful to God for giving me the possibility to start and finish until the end with patience and love this Master Thesis.

The concept of nationalism is first and foremost the love of nation, love for the homeland, for the origin, where people relate to each other, to protect the nation, state, language, territory, etc. Through nationalism are made efforts and attempts to escape the hegemonies, to make the country and the culture sovereign and to protect the state policy. Wars in the Balkans, driven by Serbian hegemony, in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, led these nations of these countries to struggle and fight to protect its ethnic identity and gain freedom from the claims of Serbian colonizing state which aims to extend its territory.

On the other hand Albanian nationalism is one of the most complex and intriguing phenomena in the modern history of the Balkans and Europe as well. Like any other nationalism is built on several supporting columns. But this structure somehow has changed the architecture to fit the historical process. History and its interpretation have not been in the ontological nature or abstract to discover something primordial, essential and mummified. Albanians have been and are existential in nature. The study of history has been and is an epistemological nature, which means that Albanians fight to preserve, glorify and protect their existence. Above this line is also harmonized and build their nationalism. However, this is one aspect of Albanian nationalism. This thesis is basically

based on nationalism of the Balkans throughout history starting from the time of Ottomans until nowadays.

**June 2017**

**Klajda ALLAJBEU**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>EU</b>	:	European Union
<b>UN</b>	:	United Nations
<b>SU</b>	:	Soviet Union
<b>WWI</b>	:	World War One
<b>WWII</b>	:	World War Two
<b>NATO</b>	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>KLA</b>	:	Kosovo Liberation Army
<b>KFOR</b>	:	Kosovo Forces (NATO)
<b>UNMIK</b>	:	The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
<b>FYROM</b>	:	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia



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## BALKANLARDA MİLLİYETÇİLİK: BÜYÜK ARNAVUTLUK VE KOSOVA-SIRP ÇATIŞMASI

### ÖZET

Balkanları kaleme almak, yalnızca Balkan ülkelerinin siyasi yolculuğuyla kalmayıp kendine has göz alıcılığı ile bu devletlerin birinden diğerine farklılıklar gösteren tarihlerini de içine alan oldukça kapsamlı bir çalışma olacaktır. Balkanlarda milliyetçilik, günümüzde de canlılığını sürdüren bir olgu. Gerek siyasi gerekse sosyal, hayatın her alanında üzerimizdeki etkisini hissettiren taze olduğu kadar da eski bir konu. Bilhassa, son dönemde Kosova ve Sırbistan'da cereyan eden olaylar, milliyetçiliğin bölgede oynadığı önemli rolü açıkça ortaya koyuyor. Balkan ülkelerinin bir kısmı arasında süregelen anlaşmazlıklar ve çetin tartışma ve münazaralar göz önüne alındığında, bir Arnavut olarak, milliyetçilik üzerine araştırma ve yazma benim için özel bir yer tutuyor. Bu çalışma, yalnızca Balkan ülkelerindeki milliyetçiliğin arkaplanı ve ilgili tarihsel yaklaşımlarla yetinmeyip aynı zamanda Arnavut Meselesi'ni de kapsamaktadır. Milliyetçilik ilk kez Balkanlar'da ortaya çıkmamış olmakla birlikte orada, kimi kez de yabancı güçlerin gözetim ve teşvikiyle gelişmesine elverişli, verimli bir zemine kavuştu.

Bu çalışma, Balkanlar'da milliyetçiliğin üstlendiği önemli rolü ve Büyük Güçler'in nüfuz ve tesirlerini incelemektedir. Büyük Arnavutluk Savı'nın bir kez daha gündeme gelmesi ve Kosova-Sırp çatışması, bu çalışmanın en başlıca iki cephesini teşkil etmekte. Argümanların çoğu kez yanlı ve öznel olduğu, muhtelif inceleme ve araştırmaların her iki tarafça da gerçekleştirilmiş olduğu görülüyor. Bu tez, tarihi delillere dayanmak suretiyle, Arnavut Meselesi ve Kosova-Sırp çatışması sorularına tarafsız bir cevap sunma gayretindedir. Günümüz olaylarının siyaset, tarih ve jeopolitik mülahazalarına dayalı argümanlar getirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, hikayenin her iki tarafını da göz önüne almak suretiyle uzlaşma ihtimalini sorgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Çatışma, savaş ve tarih sürecinde göze çarpan pek çok kargaşanın sebebi olduğu düşünüldüğünde, ideolojik kimliğiyle milliyetçilik insan yaşamının hemen her alanında etkili olmaya devam ediyor. Konuyu aslında önemli olduğu kadar ilginç kılan da bu. Günlük devlet işleyişine uyarlanması ölçüsünde ülkelerin gelecekleri de birbiriyle bağlantılı. Eksik ya da fazla olduğu durumlara bağlı olarak, milliyetçiliğin kendine özgü avantaj ve dezavantajları olması mümkün görünse de Balkanlar için bir felaket olduğu ortaya çıkıyor.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Milliyetçilik, Balkanlar, tarih, Arnavut Meselesi, Kosova-Sırp çatışması, çatışma, savaş*



## **NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS: GREATER ALBANIA AND THE KOSOVAN-SERBIAN CONFLICT**

### **ABSTRACT**

Writing about the Balkans is quite a broad topic which covers not only the political journey of the Balkan countries but also their history which differs from state to state and has magic on its own. Nationalism in Balkans is a phenomenon which continues still now days. It is a topic which is as old as fresh, a topic which affects us in every aspect of life, whether it is political or social. Especially the latest events occurring in Kosovo and Serbia make it clear that nationalism in this region continues to play an important role. Given the fact that some Balkan countries have quarrel and fierce debates between them for me as an Albanian writing and researching for nationalism is quite special. This work covers not only the background of nationalism in the Balkan countries and its historical approaches but also the Albanian question. Nationalism did not originate in the Balkans but the Balkans became a fertile ground for it to grow, sometimes under the protection and encouragement of foreign powers.

This paper examines the importance of nationalism and influences of great powers in the Balkans. The re-emergence of the Great Albanian Case and the Kosovo- Serbian conflict are two of the important aspects of this study. Many studies and researches have been done before from both sides, even though the arguments are in most of the cases partial and subjective. This thesis, based on historical evidences, tries to give an impartial answer to the Albanian question and Kosovo-Serbian conflict. It tries to give arguments based on the events of today's politics, history and geopolitics. It also tries to inquire the possibility for reconciliation by taking into account both sides of the story. Nationalism as an ideology continues to play an important role in every aspect of human's life since it is often the main cause of fights, wars and many disorders as it has been seen throughout history. That's why this topic it's interesting as much as important. The future of countries is inter-connected somehow with the level of their adaptation of nationalism in day to day state affairs. A little or too much of "nationalism" has its own advantages and disadvantages, but for the Balkans it has proven to be disastrous.

**Keywords:** *Nationalism, Balkans, History, Albanian Question, Kosovo-Serbian Conflict, War, Conflict*



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Most of the modern contemporary historians relate and connect the emergence of nationalism in the Balkans with the French Revolution and Napoleon, but in fact the national hatred among Balkans was evident in earlier periods. Balkan people had a family system and their ethnic ties were stable. As Michael Mitterauer states on his article "Family contexts: The Balkans in European comparison"

"The Balkan area is not a region characterized by a single form of family composition. Of the highly diverse patterns to be found here, particular significance can be attributed to the pattern in the western mountainous regions—producing the well-known *zadruga*—because of its very long history, the extent to which it was transmitted to other regions and, above all, because of its uniqueness on the European continent." (Mitterauer, 2012, p. p.387)

At the same time it should be noted that the Balkans were within Europe although they remain detached from the European culture. They had a culture on their own. One should not forget that Balkans were part of the Byzantine administration and for years served to it. Nationalism in the Balkans is as old as the notion of nationalism. For that reason it affects all of the Balkan regions in different aspects, whether it is political, social or cultural. Nationalism is one of the reasons why most of the Balkan countries have conflicts between them. It is an important issue since it affects directly the individuals of these regions. However, talking about nationalism one should link it with the notion of nation. Throughout history, societies are build upon a structure which organizes the society in extended families and tribes, as well as in wider communities due to their collective identities such as religion, ethnic, city-state or provincial identity. E.J.Hobsbawm in his book "Nations and Nationalism Since 1780" states that:

"Attempts to establish objective criteria for nationhood, or to explain why certain groups have become "nations" and other nor, have often made, based on single criteria such as language or ethnicity or a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, common history, cultural traits or whatever else." (E.J.Hobsbawm, 1992, p. p.5).

Thus, the nation is relatively a new source of collective identity that has emerged in Europe since the eighteenth century. Naturally, the national idea emerged as the

development and continuity in the course of people's need for belonging to a specific community. However, the need to belong to a group and to join its members is not something new in the history of mankind. Nevertheless, what is new is the phenomenon of national identity itself. What is new about this is the political and geographical dimension, as alleged in nationalism. Unlike other forms of collective identities, nation is politically a group of people which are aware that have a common sense of belonging due to certain characteristics and circumstances, let it be language, religion, ethnicity, or culture. It is clear that nationalism is related with a kind of identity. Nationalism has its own ideals. Nations through nationalism have changes and manage to win their state and be independent from other colonizing states. These are the moral ideals of nationalism, which states, nations, are organized and have sacrificed in the name of nationalism, to fight and to defend from the colonial states. Furthermore, through nationalism, many nations and countries have developed and embraced modern values and have also made institutional reforms. Despite this, nationalism beside the fact that has made major changes in many countries has also left major consequences, which has been as a devastating weapon, causing bleeding and destruction of material in many countries. Nationalism is very closely linked to the nation, especially since the eighteenth century, as mentioned above.

“Defining key terms in the study of nationalism is as problematic as in the social sciences in general, if not more so. As Walker Connor pointed out decades ago, the interchangeable use of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ has caused serious confusion over what nationalism is all about. However, the problem is not confined to this. Because most of the terms used in the study of nationalism are taken from everyday language, they require clarification before they are employed in a scholarly discussion.” (Ichijo, Atusko; Smith, Anthony D.;, 2004, p. p.7).

“The idea of an Albanian ethnicity or national identity encompassing people of varied religions had not yet taken root. However, there were a few individuals who had expressed such ideas before 1878. Between the 1820s and 1840s Naum Veqilharxhi attempted to write the first primer for the Albanian language or Evetar, a book which was well received in parts of southern Albania. He urged Albanians to study their language to lift the country out of its backwardness.” (Pahumi, 2007, pp. p.3-4)

The existence of three different religions proves the embrace of epistemological perspective of the history of Albanians. Nationalism is basically a reaction to suit the

specific historical circumstances. It cannot be excluded ideological and political connotations as a response to contemporary developments. This study is focused upon one hypothesis which is the Albanian nationalism and Serbian nationalism and how these two subjects affect Kosovo. The purpose of this study is to understand the consequences, the effects, outcomes, repercussions and results in regarding the Kosovo case. By coming to a conclusion the hypothesis will be helpful to draw a clear picture about the future of these two countries. Nevertheless it should be also noted that this thesis is especially concerned with answering the basic questions of why and how much important is nationalism in Albania and Serbia in relation with the old conflicts in regarding today's issues using the qualitative methodology. But since this term has a broad meaning when it comes to the Balkans, this thesis examines some of the most important events and cases which are crucial in the historical and political journey of the Balkans now days. Also this thesis examines the Albanian inspiration of a Greater Albania based on different studies, articles, books and most importantly in the political situation regarding the respective countries. The desire for national unity outside the framework of the European Union, in the view of the international situation, remains a utopia and could be called a folk in the sense of being a nice story. This does not mean that it should not be kept and fed, but should not feed illusions about its achievement in concrete terms. One should take into consideration the external factors when talking about a Greater Albania. In fact that's what this thesis studies, the possibilities and the future of Albania without forgetting that international relations have changed and developed in terms of the modern world which increasingly is becoming more intertwined and interdependent. The concept of state sovereignty as a basic element of the nation state is changing more and more towards popular sovereignty, the observance of human rights and freedoms. Consequently, the modern world is always more inclined towards open society, multi-ethnic states and freedom of human rights rather than in support of ethnically pure autochthonous states. The creation of ethnically pure states is not based on the philosophy of the international community to regulate international relations. Despite this fact, nationalistic feelings for a greater Albania are fed day after day although the challenges and obstacles that it faces. What can be the future of it is still to be seen and discussed.

On the other hand, another matter mentioned in this thesis is the Kosovo- Serbian conflict which is as solid as fragile at the same time, thus it needs a fair review, seeing it from both sides of the coin. Nationalism in Albania and Serbia are two important clues in solving and concluding the Kosovo-Serbian conflict. The present of Kosovo cannot be understood without its past, like Kosovo's future cannot be built without the knowledge of the realities of its present. The broader context of resolving the Kosovo case shows that Kosovo's issue is an ethnic conflict for territory. The resolution of ethnic conflicts over territory always carries regional and international dimensions. Outside of those dimensions cannot be seen nor raised the issue of Kosovo. The state of Kosovo inhabited 95% by Albanians, has been increasingly important for Serbs in geo-strategic sense and of course because of the fact that it is the richest region in the area of natural resources. This case represents a vital sense in the Albanian Question and both cases can be somehow related with each other.

## **2. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1. Methodology**

Writing about such an important subject needs a lot of analyzes, studies and researches in order to give comprehensive as well as argumentative understanding to this thesis. That is why is used the qualitative methodology based on various, books, articles, and other studies done before. To conduct better and understand in a proper way the subject, it is important to firstly know the definition of nationalism and on the other hand to get informed about the Balkans, in order to become better acquainted with the topic.

### **2.2. Scope of the Thesis**

This thesis focuses on the Kosovo conflict and nationalism. Many authors think that nationalism has been closely associated with the most destructive wars of human history (Van Evera, 1994; V.P. Gagnon, 1994). However, it must be noted that whilst there is a great deal of academic literature surrounding nationalism as a social and political phenomenon, there is little concerning the causal link between nationalism and war, scholars often taking the ‘war-causing character of nationalism for granted’ (Anderson, 1983).

Nationalism has the potential to be either a direct or indirect cause of war. The likelihood that war will occur as a result of nationalist confrontations is dependent on several factors; the nature of the nationalist group or state in question (their likelihood to resort to force over diplomacy, for example), the galvanizing effect of nationalism in the face of a perceived external threat or indeed conflict within a state either due to the suppression of national minorities whose national identity is under threat or the use of violence as a political tool by secessionist nationalist groups within the state. Hence the likelihood that nationalism will lead to war depends on context – the nature of the

nationalist group(s) in question as well as the political and socio-economic environment; a wealthy, politically-stable nation state that holds 'healthy' nationalist sentiments is less likely to turn to violence than a politically unstable, poor and nationalist state or group.

As for this conflict, the thesis investigates which elements of nationalism have contributed and continue to contribute to the ongoing (sleepy) conflict over Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. It also tries to give an answer of whether there is a possibility that parties resort to war to resolve their issues. Whilst the study has tried to incorporate all four characteristics of a nationalist group that determine the likelihood of such a group using violence to achieve its goals, we will focus mainly on the second characteristic. The second characteristic deals with a nationalist group's stance towards the legitimacy and sovereignty of other states, particularly those bordering such a group's territory or state borders; if another state's borders are seen to be encompassing territory deemed to be rightly the possession of a nationalist group, the likelihood of war is increased (Van Evera, 1994; Bingham, 2012). In relation to our case, the study will try to find out what Serbia thinks and the path it will choose now that Kosovo is an independent state and what will be the possible reaction of Kosovo in case Serbia undermines their will.

The main aim of this thesis is to give an answer to the question of whether nationalism has been and can be a direct or indirect cause for previous or future wars between Serbs and Albanians. This gives rise to the subsequent research questions?

- What drives the Kosovo-Serbian conflict?
- Is nationalism still a divisional force between Serbs and Albanians?
- How real is the 'Greater Albania' claim?
- Can nationalism be again a source for a future conflict in the region of the Western Balkans?

The answer to these questions will not only lead to the creation of a better understanding of the nationalism in the Balkans but it will also contribute to the wider debate of whether nationalism is still a force, which if not dealt properly will only cause more bloodshed .

### 2.3. Literature Review

Therefore, to better understand and conduct the thesis based on evidences and arguments about the importance and definition of nationalism it is needed to look at different literatures and studies. Second, it is crucial to search about various arguments from different researches about the Balkans and nationalism. Third, the most important events based on cases such as the Albanian questions and Kosovo-Serbian conflict needs to be reviewed to give a better framework. There are many studies and researches done however most of them are unilateral and not all provide a solution. But there are cases when different authors agree and comply with each other.

In her research: *"False Opposites in Nationalism"* Margareta Mary Nicolas (1999)

states that:

"Nationalism is an umbrella term covering elements such as national consciousness, the expression of national identity, and loyalty to the nation." (Nikolas, 1999, p. p.3).

Basically what she states is that nationalism itself is a wide spectrum and covers many issues which are vital and are a kind of a force for each nation's identity. There are different ways to express it, feel it and show it to the world. It could be an ethnic nationalism or just a civic nationalism. However in both cases nationalism in itself is of great importance for the nation and loyalty to it is reflected from the actions of people. Their ideas and believes shape nationalism as well.

In his book: *"Nationalism and National Integration"* Anthony H.Birch (1989) notes that:

"For all its limitations and problems, nationalism has proved to be the most successful political doctrine ever promoted. At the time of the French Revolution, there were only about twenty of what we would now recognize as national states, the rest of the world consisting of sprawling empires, unexplored territories and a host of tiny independent principalities." (H.Birch, 1989, p. p.25).

What is clearly stated from Anthony H.Birch is that nationalism is a strong political doctrine without which nations would not have sovereignty over their territories. Thanks to this doctrine or ideology many nations gained their independence and survived to

manage through difficult times. The author notes also the power and the speed with which nationalism grew after the time of the French Revolution.

On the other hand Josep R. Llobera(1999) in his book '*Recent theories of Nationalism*' also agrees that:

“The word nationalism expresses different realities: a love of country, the assertion of national identity and national dignity, but also the xenophobic obsession to obtain these things through violence and sacrificing other nations. Nationalism builds on ethnocentrism towards the in-group and xenophobia towards the out-group.” (Llobera, 1999, p. p.7).

What Josep R. Llobera states is quite the same but with a broader meaning of what Margareta Mary Nicolas agrees on her book. Llobera clarifies that nationalism is aimed at strengthening the nation. But even nations with large dose of nationalism harm themselves and others. Man dies without water consumed, but also one that consumes more water than needed dies.

J.B.L. Mayall and J. Jackson-Preece (2011) in their book '*Nationalism and International Relations*' argue that:

“Nationalists want an independent state of their own. Once they have got it, however, nationalist ideology will not tell them what to do. Recall that the doctrine itself reduces to the simple proposition that every nation should have its own state. All over the world people have repeatedly shown that they are willing to sacrifice themselves for their nation. But when it comes to framing a policy, nationalists find themselves forced to borrow from other ideologies which do have ideas about how to organize society and pursue their goals.” (J.B.L. Mayall, J. Jackson-Preece, 2011, p. p.39).

What Mayall and Preece refer to is how nationalism is build and achieved, and once a state has it, they tend to take into account other ideologies which can relate to nationalism and organize their society. It is needed rule and order in order to exercise the power over the society. The nature of a nation determines the nature of nationalism, which is produced by elites, carried out by the middle class and being consumed from the lower class. This process of nationalism is enhanced and obvious when nationalism is indulged and overdosed.

Moreover another claim about nationalism is also done in the book: '*Nationalism*' Craig Calhoun (1997) which states that:

“Nationalism is distinctively modern. It is a way of constructing collective identities that arose along transformations in state power, increased long-distance economic ties, new communications and transportation capacities, and new political projects.” (Calhoun, 1997, p. p.39).

In his book about nationalism Craig Calhoun discusses that nationalism in itself is also related with the identities of society in general, and helps building any kind of political ties across the boundaries. However this fact does not mean that everything about nationalism is something new.

Nevertheless it is examined by Robert Andersen in his book, (2001) ‘*National Identity and Independence Attitudes: Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales*’ that:

“Nationalism can be generally thought of as an ideology that uses national identity as the basis for social and political action. The ultimate goal of a nationalist movement is the achievement or maintenance of power in the form of the nation state. Few would deny that nationalism is a powerful social and psychological force. Even though it is seldom a populous movement, nationalism is usually presented as such, and many argue that it is generally able to gain support from individuals of all social backgrounds so long as they identify with the nation.” (Andersen, 2001, p. p.4).

It is clear that nationalism for modern world most of the times is seen as a threat, because it is often used to bloody conflicts, while the patriotism of anyone who has national values is a sacred task on the other hand. However what Andersen states is that each individual perceives a different concept of nationalism. Nationalism can have a dominative or protective nature; it depends on the countries culture, history and ethnicity as well. So it varies and has various perceptions as a term.

Regarding to nationalism in Balkan countries, Andrey Ivanov (2012) in his study ‘*Minority Nationalism in the Balkans: the Bulgarian Case*’ states that:

“The Balkan nations had not attained independence up to the beginning of the 19th century. Since they are therefore new nations with strong primordial roots, and since national affiliation was not historically synonymous with a sense of belonging to a state, relatively objective pre-state attributes such as language, ethnicity, tradition and culture functioned as common denominators for social cohesion or inclusive/exclusive criteria. The sense of a common destiny for the Balkans’ ethnic and ethno-national groups was strengthened even further by oppressive empires. As a result, nationalism was and often still is typically an instrument for building statehood.” (Ivanov, 2002, p. p.1).

What Ivanov, points out is that all nations of the world are divided into nation-states. Nations, ethnicities, races, and countries have different cultures, different religious

beliefs and other social ceremonies and state that differ among themselves. For the Balkans in order to have their own nation it was needed to follow the path of nationalism, because it happened to be denied the will, freedom and the right to self-determination to them. So until now days, Balkan countries use nationalism as a tool to build their own state.

Boriana Marinova-Zuber (2007) argues on her book, ‘*Rebirth of Nationalism in the Balkans in the 1990’s: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions*’ that:

“Nationalist and separatist characteristics have been preserved over time for if we look at the late 20th century manifestations of nationalism in East Central Europe and especially in the Balkans; the tendency is again for separation and independence rather than for unification” (Zuber, 2007, p. p.7).

It is clear that Marinova is agreeing with what Ivanov states in his study that in Balkan countries nationalism is being used for the creation and independence of a nation rather than for any other thing. Nationalism is a doctrine which contains ideas, such as that the people of the world are divided into nations, and that these nations should have the right of self-determination, and the full self-determination requires a nation, a state. In a way or another, this is what nationalism reflects for most of the Balkan countries.

As for the Albanian case and its inspiration of a Greater Albania nationalism also has a crucial meaning. As it is mentioned from Bashkim Iseni (2009) in his study, ‘*National Identity, Islam and Politics in the Balkan*’ that:

“Albanians national main characteristics were: an inspiration to create a common history, the building up of a common language and the claim for national identity linked with a territory. This process led to the adoption of Albanian autonomist attitudes, rapture with the Porte and the breaking out of a bloody conflict with the Ottoman power.” (Iseni, 2009, p. p.2).

What Iseni notes is that, Albania has always claimed for a unification based on its identity and ethnicity as one. This process has its root since the League of Prizren in Kosovo in 1878 when a new nationalist rhetoric emerged, starting a new area for Albanian nationalism. As thus Albanian nationalism consists of Albanian, of Kosovo and Macedonian nationalism, with one common inspiration of becoming one.

Another integral part of this study is the Kosovo- Serbian conflict, therefore different reviews and searches are of heavy importance. In his research Stefan Troebst (1998)

‘ ‘*Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998*’ ’

makes a powerful statement stating that:

“Although not proclaimed publicly even by militant Serbian nationalists, the project of cleansing parts or even all of Kosovo of its Albanian population is on the hidden agenda of the regime and the nationalist opposition alike.” (Troebst, 1998, p. p.26).

The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is an ongoing issue which continues for decades and yet is still unclear even though Kosovo gained its independence, if it will end one day or not since Serbia fails to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. The above statement made from Troebst is about the genocide which has been done over the Kosovan Albanians for years from the Serbian part using nationalistic feelings, claiming that Kosovo is Serbia. However, although such genocide has been done, yet is still unclear if they still pretend to clean all of the Kosovan Albanians in the Kosovan Lands.

It is important to mention that the Kosovo- Serbian conflict is a conflict which went through many wars. These wars cannot be considered as simple wars. At the end war is a war and the effects of it are huge. In the book: ‘ ‘*Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans. Nationalism and the destruction of tradition*’ ’ Cathie Carmichael (2003) notes that:

“During the 1990s and the Yugoslavian Wars of Dissolution, fought primarily in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was used in the world media to describe the killing and forcible movement of populations deemed to be different on the grounds of their ethnicity, religion or language.” (Carmichael, 2003, p. p.16).

As it is seen in the above statement nationalism by Serbians in this case was used as a tool to clean the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. The war in Kosovo actually made possible the movement of population of Kosovo toward Albania, Macedonia and even far in the European countries. The movement was by force and the killings were macabre. Thousand were killed and the others were obligated to exile whether by force or by their own will in order to survive from the barbarities of the war.

Another statement done by Troebst in another study (1998) ‘ ‘*The Kosovo Conflict*’ ’ argues that:

“The conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians over Kosovo is a territorial one with strong ethno political, cultural and linguistic connotations. Considerably less prominent are economic factors and the religious dimension. The claims on the entire territory of Kosovo by Serbian nationalists and the

present Serbian régime are based on historical arguments, since from the 12th to the 15th centuries; Kosovo formed the core of medieval Serbia. Albanian nationalists and the Kosovo Albanian élite also argue in historical terms referring to an ancient Albanian state called Illyria and covering the whole territory of Kosovo.” (Troebst, 1998, p. p.1).

It is obvious that the Kosovo- Serbian conflict has deep roots and is an old fierce debate which has various arguments from both Serbians and Albanians. In the above quotation is noticed that both countries Kosovo and Serbia have not only political reasons but also ethnical reasons that make this conflict have stronger nationalistic feelings from both sides.

However, Gagnon.Jr. (2002) on his research “*Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The case of Serbia*” argues that:

“I argue that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. It thereby constructs the individual interest of the broader population in terms of the threat to the community defined in ethnic terms.” (Jr.Gagnon, 1994-1995, p. p.4).

What Gagnon.Jr. notes is that the nature of this issue is political. And that ethnicity is being used by the elites for their own purposes and interests. The genocide and all the cleansing of Kosovo Albanians have a geopolitical nature. The geographic position of Kosovo in the center of the Balkan Peninsula makes it quite favorable for the Serbs.

In conclusion what is aimed by these studies and researches is that nationalism in Balkans has a vital, crucial role in one way or another for all the regions. It is aimed to understand that Balkans is a mosaic of nations that distinguish between them by ethnicity, religion, language and culture. The wealth of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and economic elements, has served as an incubator for a series of conflicts in the Balkans.

“Most of them have a historical background and nationalistic approaches. This is because the above elements have been an integral part of national decisions and are used, in many cases, to influence policy making in separate countries. One of the latest evidence had been the repressing of Serbs against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The resettlement of more than a million Albanians removing from their lands by the Serbs and their paramilitary forces put in danger the stability throughout the Balkans (Bajrami, 2005, p. p.1).

Also by these studies is understood that the war of Kosovo is a matter of history of Albania as well. Kosovo has historically been the place of successive armed clashes, mainly between Serbs and Albanians. It is given that Kosovo is just one of the Albanian territories and Albania, the Albanian state or its policies have always represented Kosovo Albanians after 1913. On the other hand the problem of regions and that of Albanian nation in the years of World War II is very wide. However even only in this regard the Albanian region problems still remain in discussion from the foreign history and especially is marginalized and distorted by the Yugoslavian Serbian historiography, especially when it comes to Kosovo Albanians and those of other annexed areas from the former Yugoslavia. Thus today is difficult to assert that the Kosovo-Serbian war did not effect at all Albania as well since Kosovo has always been inhabited by high percentages from Albanians through centuries.



**Figure 2.1:** Albania's Map

**SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA**  
AS OF JANUARI 1991



**Figure 2.2:** Ex Yugoslavia's Map



### 3. NATIONALISM IN THE ALBANIAN AND SERBIAN CONTEXT

#### 3.1. Albanian Nationalism

Nationalism, an ideology of modern times appeared in history when nations were presented. Nationalisms main aim is to strengthen the idea or the concept of the nation. The truth is that nations without nationalism cannot be held as the man who cannot live without water. But despite this fact it must be noted that nations with large dose of nationalism harm themselves and others as well. Man can die without consuming water, but also the one that consumes water more than needed dies. Just as man needs a certain measure of water consumption daily, weekly, monthly and annually the nation needs the same way to certain degree a dose of nationalism. The more appropriate the dose consumption of nationalism is, the healthier and stronger the nation will be.

As Brendan O'Leary states on his article '*On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism*'

“Nationalism, the most potent principle of political legitimacy in the modern world, holds that the nation should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals.” (O'Leary, 1997, p. p.191).

Finding the appropriate dose of nationalism is mastery on itself. From here also depends the sustainability and the strength of the nation. The power of the nation, of course, also depends on the numerical size. But size is not the only component that determines the power. Israeli nation is 10 times smaller than the Egyptian one, but is much more powerful than the nation of Egypt.

“Nationalism was arguably the most powerful force in international politics in the twentieth century. Its ideas revolutionized international politics, affecting everything from trade to the number of states in the international system itself. It aided in the collapse of the central, eastern, and southeastern European empires; it contributed significantly to the events of World War II and its horror; it led to the end of colonialism; and it played a crucial role in the breakup of three federal Communist states; the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.” (W.Barrington, 2006, p. p.3).

The nature of a nation determines the nature of nationalism. If a nation is mono-ethnic or mono-religious as the Greek nation, Serbian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Bosnian, etc, the religious and ethnic iconography of nationalism are part of the nation in question. However if the nation is mono-ethnic and multi-faith at the same time as the Albanian, Hungarian, German nation etc, then the religious iconography is not part of nationalism. On the other hand, if the nation is multiethnic mono-religious as the Turkish, Belgian nation, then the ethnic iconography is not part of nationalism.

Albanians in this case, have a complicated relation with nationalism; in the symbolic level can be regarded as great nationalists. The Albanian majorities are nationalists, but not always and not all exhibit nationalism in the same way. Some appear as folk-nationalist patriots and some are modern and their performances are not significantly different from nationalism of developed countries of Europe. As Albert Doja on his study “Folkloric Archaism and Cultural Manipulation in Albania under Socialism” states that:

“Although the people did not entirely lose a spiritual life, the religious, magical, and ceremonial functions of folklore were assumed to have ‘atrophied’, and to have been replaced by a sense of the decorative. Folklore was ‘increasingly activated in the spiritual life of society with its artistic-aesthetic functions”  
(Doja, 2013, p. p.158)

Also Albanians are reactive and spontaneous nationalists but this does not mean that Albanian nationalism is declining. Stark Draper in his book *“Ethnic and Racial Studies: The conceptualization of an Albanian nation”* states that:

“The case of the formation of an Albanian national identity is especially elucidating as the proto-nationalist bases for such an identity were both unclear, and claimed by multiple groups.” (Draper, 1997, p. p.4).

History shows that Albanians have showed their nationalist sentiments when they were occupied as well. The process of formation of the nation and the Albanian state and the spread of these feelings were justified because Albania did not exist for a long time while ruled by the Ottoman Empire.

“Balkan nationalisms in general and Albanian nationalism in particular, before being a danger to the preservation of Ottoman Empire, have been products of political transformations permeating the Empire. “An exogenous” ruling class

dominated ethnic groups which occupied a compact territory but lacked, their own nobility, political unit or continuous literary tradition” (Rrapaj, Jonilda; Kolasi, Klevis;, 2013, p. p.194).

This has been the nature of the formation of nations, states across different countries of the world, even in Europe. Also for Albanians these feelings have appeared clearer in the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. In the late twentieth century when Kosovo made an activity of its own for national liberation and as a method of activity used the quotes "Love yours", "Love your nation", "Do not accept to be occupied, enslaved" evoked feelings of nationalism and this makes Albanians nationalism to love itself, to save itself, to be free from occupation.

“Prior to the nineteenth century, the territorial bounds inhabited by Albanians had endured close to five hundred years of Ottoman invasions and had been gravely fragmented. As the Ottoman Empire began to weaken during the beginning of the nineteenth century, the neighboring Balkan nations found it a good opportunity to address their interests in the territory. The Albanians responded to such tensions by mobilizing the people inhabiting the territory in the movement of the national awakening of the nineteenth century.” (Sako, 2011, p. p.4).

There was never seen or shown in its history nor in the nineteenth century, twentieth century, and even now that points out that the Albanian nationalism or Albanian national feelings had invasive aspirations against other nations. (Aberbach, 2015). Albanians have historically cultivated the sense of nationalism; especially the areas occupied such as Kosovo and other Albanian territories in Macedonia, Montenegro, the Presevo Valley, and others territories, which have always seen nationalism as the only alternative to resist assimilation, to gain freedom and their national rights of citizens. But it also must be noted that Albanians have a complicated relation with nationalism. At the symbolic level Albanians can be regarded as great nationalists. They do fierce nationalistic debates between them, celebrate with fiery emotions, and yet create folklore that is largely based on the epic bravery and heroism of Albanians. This love to the nation most of the time is not proportionally in practice, which is best seen in the lack of investment in the development of cultural grounding, education and national economic development. The Albanian politicians play a crucial role in this. As Aydın Babuna notes in his work *“Albanian National Identity and Islam in the Post Communist Era”*

“Albania was the last country to be affected by the political changes in the former communist bloc countries after 1989”. (Babuna, 2012, p. p.4)

Even today people can be classical nationalist, but risks to seem archaic, because the reality makes such a thing impossible, mainly due to large migrations and changes of the structure of the population, or for reasons of economic impositions. Albanian classical nationalism was moderate and humane in its ideological content. Thanks to these great values it accelerated the establishment of the Albanian nation, the Albanian question was affirmed in the international arena and their training took place in a hostile encirclement of Balkans. Albanians continued ceaseless efforts for national identity of the national state. It is important to mention that patriotism expresses the spirit of love, respect and responsibility for the homeland, it reflects a relation closely connected between the homeland and the compatriots of one nation regardless of where they live and work. On the other hand, nationalism expresses a political determination with regard to a nation, a territory, political and international structure. Being related with a kind of patriotism with political, popular, national and international territorial background, nationalism has its own history and in this process has taken different forms. "Nationalism has assumed a multitude of forms, both historically and in the contemporary era, most of which are generally related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or performance of the central state" (Pamir, 2014, p. p.25)

Historically, have crystallized ten types of nationalisms. Civil nationalism or otherwise liberal nationalism, ethnocentric nationalism, fascist nationalism, pure nationalism, left nationalism, territorial nationalism, pan-nationalism, proto-nationalism, ultra-nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism. "Many scholars argue that there is more than one type of nationalism. Nationalism may manifest itself as part of official state ideology or as a popular non-state movement and may be expressed along civic, ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological lines. These self-definitions of the nation are used to classify types of nationalism." (Watson, 1977, p. p.1)

The Balkans have historically taken the epithet 'box fire' from two oldest nationalisms of Serbians and Greeks. Both these nationalisms were ethnocentricity movements and territorial. As such they have produced wars, ethnic cleansing, colonization and they left behind even in the present day's xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry and territorial claims. As it is described by Timothy Less on his article "The Balkans: Still the Powder Keg of Europe?"

“There is a part of Europe that sits directly at the intersection of all of these dynamics: the Balkans. The Balkans are often lost in the shuffle when people consider the current state of European geopolitics. But the Balkan region has always had a way of dragging outside powers into its own instability – and right now the Balkans seem to be a powder keg waiting to blow.” (Less, 2016, p. p.1)

On the other hand the traditional Albanian nationalism has been a European nationalism, that means Civil or Liberal nationalism, mainly influenced by the ideas of the French Bourgeois Revolution. As such, the Albanian nationalism did not had in its center or as a priority the ethnicity, but it evolved around national identity, a sense of being part of a particular political entity with equal rights for all citizens within it, regardless of ethnicity, race or religion. Albanian civil nationalism does not carry nor promotes xenophobia, ethnic hatred and fanaticism, nor religious or territorial claims against other nations. Civil Nationalism relates naturally with the policies of liberal democracy with national identity.

However, being part of the Balkans, and often part of the negative regional image about the Balkan nationalism, the Albanian nationalism as the latter and the most suffering one, has not been able to clearly articulate and understood nationally and internationally. Simply, often the Albanian nationalism is defined in the international plan, in the framework of Greek and Serbian nationalist models as a "Dangerous nationalism that produces conflicts and wars" (Bashkurti, 2005, p. p.56). Albanian nationalism needs great theoretical and practical efforts at the national, regional and especially international level to differ from the traditional Balkan nationalisms.

Back to the history Albanians survived enjoying the fruits of the Ottoman Empire in a disproportionate way. Four centuries later, their existence was threatened again. Balkan Wars of 1911-1912 served as catalysts for the removal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, which meant an invasion of Albanian territories from the aggressive Balkan neighbors. Although Albania was declared an independent state, was not considered as such for many years, even when it was, it was unable to bear on its agenda the previous nationalist program for the creation and the nation-state formation.

“National independence is often the culmination of a national movement. In the Albanian case, independence, required by the Balkan Wars, was in a way the beginning of the national movement. Independence saw the creation of a state but not a nation. Independence certainly spurred Albanian intellectual nationalism along, particularly since the state that was recognized by the London

Conference of Ambassadors and confirmed by the Peace of Paris, was severely restricted territorially and included no more than 50% of all Albanian speaking people in the Balkans. The creation and confirmation of the Albanian state created a focal point for this growing nationalism, but perhaps more importantly; it provided negative reinforcement for the national movement.” (Fischer, 2014, pp. p.36-37)

The deeper crisis that Albanian nationalism has experienced in the twentieth century is fighting to survive in the period of Communist rule, as in Albania and the former Yugoslavia too. But recently, even in this decade is really happening a degree of consolidation of Albanians; there are no serious signs of returning to the classic program of neither Albanian nationalism nor its adaptation to today's geopolitical circumstances. Nevertheless the Albanian nationalism followed the European model, the epistemological instinct came back to help for survival. Although Albanians are conservative by nature, religion was not in their first plan that means it became something not essential. For that to answer the questions why Albanians have not those strong religious feelings binds tightly to the character of the Albanian nationalist movement. In contrast to neighboring countries such as Serbia and Greece, where nationalism emerged as a “Anti Turks” movement calling for help the religion to the point that Serb and Greek nationalism including here also the Serbian and Greek Orthodox churches could hardly be separated from each other, the Albanian nationalism was born in another historical and religious context. Albanian nationalism as a political movement started after the Russo-Turkish War with the League of Prizren (1878) primarily as a need of the union of Albanians for protection from the risk of dividing their lands between Serbia and Greece. As Nevila Pahumi states that “the League was instrumental in developing an Albanian national identity. Its program for Albanian autonomy influenced the political thinking of the future generations. “ (Pahumi, 2007, pp. p.4-5)

In this context, the Albanian nationalist movement found itself facing some problems not so easy to solve with sharp contradictions: the necessity of creating a national identity to unite all Albanians faced the four religious identities; the need of this identity to differ from Serbian or Greek identity in terms of religion brought them nearer the Muslim religion, but, on the other hand, this identity needed to divide them from the Turkish-Muslim identity as it was already clear that the Ottoman Empire was in

dispersion and Albanians were threaten to disappear along with. Therefore, Albanians used nationalism as a tool to survive as a nation. Kolasi argues on his study ‘‘ The Curious Case of Albanian Nationalism: the Crooked Line from a Scattered Array of Clans to a Nation-State’’ that:

‘‘Albanian nationalism, considered as delayed or a ‘‘late comer’’ as such, is argued to have constructed a distinct character both by its adherents and critics alike. Yet while it is true that Albanian nationalism as a political movement emerged as a direct reaction not to the Ottoman Empire per se, but directed against neighboring states nationalist expansions like Serbia, Montenegro and especially Greece, it is also true that Albanian nationalism was shaped in competition with Serbian, Greek and Turkish nationalism.’’ (Kolasi, 2013, p. p.200)

The words of Vaso Pasha a famous Albanian writer supported this idea. In his nationalistic call he addressed to Albanians with the poem "Oh Albania" published in 1878-1880 who served then to establish the secular religion of Albanian nationalism with the words: ‘‘Do not look churches and mosques, the religion of Albania is Albanianism’’

‘‘Albanians, you are killing kinfolk, you're split in a hundred factions, some believe in God or Allah, say 'I'm Turk,' or 'I am Latin,' say 'I'm Greek,' or 'I am Slavic,' but you're brothers, hapless people! You've been duped by priests and hodjas to divide you, keep you wretched, when the stranger shares your hearth side, puts to shame your wife and sister, you still serve him, gaining little, you forget your forebears' pledges you are serfs to foreign landlords, who have not your blood or language...Wake, Albanian, from your slumber, let us, brothers, swear in common and not look to church or mosque, the Albanian's faith is Albanianism!’’ (Licursi, 2011, p. p.57).

So, synergism between Albanians and the Ottoman Empire was exhausted, was in shutdown. Irredentism was the only option for survival. Meanwhile nationalism was the mean to change the political structure, making it possible to seize and take control of the material resources of territories inhabited by Albanians. ‘‘Also in a similar vein, Vasos poem in Albanian, O moj Shqypni, turned into a national myth in the following years. On the other hand, the political reaction of the Albanianists, in line with the activities of the Albanian League, brought about against the partition of Albania two memorandums dispatched to the Great Powers in which Vasa was involved.’’ (Bayraktar, 2011, p. p.24)

Albanian Nationalism resembled in a way the romantic European model, taking into account autochthony, the primacy of ancient Albanian ethnos in existing territories, the approach of culture and language as a homogeneous block which distinguishes Albanians ethnically from other neighboring populations. ‘‘Albanian nationalism contains a series of myths relating to Albanian origins, cultural purity and national homogeneity, religious indifference as the basis of Albanian national identity, and continuing national struggles, also this need for a nation was a divisive factor in the formation of Albanian nationalism which resembled Western European nationalisms.’’ (Aberbach, 2015, p. p.1)

These are the fundamental pillars mentioned at the beginning of introduction. Albanians use nationalism as way to go back to the essence of being, in the nature of existence of Albanians. It should be mentioned that Albanians genesis research is a recent phenomenon, which belongs to the history of modern developments. The fates of nations are recycled through major events. History in later on will come up with definitions and logical conclusions which interrelate not only with the events of a nation but also with the whole theatre of actions and operations done. Albania was found somewhat alone in its rebel fight for liberation, on the eve of the century that just went. It was clear for Albania that had to revamped, to get up again as it was, that should be yelling instead of crying and complaining, that had to wake up instead of standing still with eyes closed.

Obviously at this conclusion, a new nationalistic spirit had just begun was conceived with the vital efforts of Albanian patriots.

While the Albanian neighbors, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece directed their nationalism towards new territorial claims, Albanians did not fall at all into this dangerous trap. There were also patriots in the years 1900-1921 which recognized the boundaries of Illyria, and had been living from the Albanian Alps, up in Preveza, but none of them had ever thought how to pass these boundaries violating and massacring neighbors. ‘‘Religious tolerance is a characteristic that Albanians have historically been associated with’’ (Bunjaku, 2014, p. p.1) Seen in this regard, Albanian nationalism can be said that remains the most advanced nationalism compared to its neighboring nationalisms. Relating it with today’s ethnic conflicts, as are happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Macedonia, the Eastern part of Kosovo, are unacceptable, as now all states are independent from each other. Today in the Balkans there are the two countries that raise serious nationalism which have in its content interethnic conflicts, such as Macedonia and Serbia want the rise of a nationalism that can lead to conflicts that seek to create walls between ethnic minorities. These are not nationalist politics, to reform the state institutions and prepare to embrace and accept other cultures that are non-Slavic ethnicity and have different religious beliefs. Balkan states should cooperate together with each other against ethnic discrimination, racism, extremism and terrorism to build good ethnic relations, interstate and to not have violent provocations in this region of Europe.

However, back on time since the Albanian nationalism arose, and since it was fresh and fragile the Albanian nationalism was hit in a fatal way. As Pasha states on his study ‘‘Albania and its partition’’, ‘‘In January 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, negotiators from France, Britain, and Greece agreed to divide Albania among Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece as a diplomatic expedient aimed at finding a compromise solution to the territorial conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia. The deal was done behind the Albanians' backs and in the absence of a United States negotiator.’’ (Pasha, 2011, p. p.10)

The partition of Albanian borders according to the interests of neighbors was a deadly blow for the newly born national Albanian state. In contrary, the Serbian-Greek nationalism being in a dominant position at that time in the Balkans became a powerful push up to their governments for military expansions. The partition of Albania in 1913 was nearly fatal. Europe "took care" (Louise, 2011, p. p.35) to take the best parts of its territory, the urban areas as well by cutting the possibility of Albania to communicate with European civilization. It is understood that even in the context of nationalism, the partition would affect the nationalistic feelings of Albanians. The newly born feeling, the newly created structure which sought help to rise and conceived, was being hit with the stroke of the pen. In this way, Albanian nationalism had to face new challenges, yet without being dried the blood of wounds that were opened in the evil year of 1913. However what is worth to remember is the fact that Albanian nationalism, although faced these challenges did not surrender. Inside it, there were never born and never grow

up chauvinistic aspirations which would have been normal for that time. ‘‘The Albanians were relatively free to lead their traditional lives, fragmented into a myriad of tribes and Albanian loyalty was to their ethnic group or culture’’ (Sigler, 2013, p. p.48) This soft nationalism survived because of the nature of Albanians which want peace and not war, which dream of prosperity, but also remember the blood that was shed. Albanians have sought for what unites them and not for what divides, thus have always sought for freedom and not servitude. Despite the two world wars, the Albanian nationalism managed to survive safely. It already won not only security and maturity, but in many cases tried to be a leading progressive force with approaches to solve the national problems. Moreover this national nationalism had begun in the years of 1918-1920, to make efforts before the European circles to affirm and be known. Even during the period of King Zog, the Albanian nationalism greatly felt his responsibility.

‘‘While the post First World War Zog period certainly contributed to the process by breaking down some of the internal barriers, it was the communist regime which consolidated the forging of an Albanian nation with its policies of forced conformity, social mobilization and control, and state of siege nationalism.’’ (Fischer, 2014, p. p.37).

A passing glance of events in the period during 1920-1939, provides an accurate idea about this. Many Albanian famous patriot were led by the Red and Black Flag to protect the Albanian territory. However what would give a new spirit to this nationalism would certainly be WWII. ‘‘A nationalist resistance to the Italian occupiers emerged in October 1942. Ali Klissura and Midhat Frasheri formed the Western-oriented and anticommunist Balli Kombetar (National Union), a movement that recruited supporters from both the large landowners and peasantry.’’ (Frasheri, 2010, p. p.5) At the beginning of this war Albanian nationalism started from his first attempts to regroup thinking that his word was worth much more powerful. The first attempts, made by the great Mid'hat Frashëri and his affiliates, already come to light. But if not enough of all suffering, Albania would live with another drama. Unfortunately for Albanians, the imported communism from communist Slavic-Orthodox's would be the first cause of uncompromising war which the communist ideology would do to the Albanian nationalism. ‘‘Although this war in many cases was manipulated, although a tragic part of Albanians destiny it was hidden and corrupted, today archival sources suggest that the Albanian communists to

maintain their seats approached by Tito were about to commit the inhuman massacre to the Albanian nationalism. (Johnson, 2009, pp. p.58-59)

It is known by all that a nation whoever it may be, no matter the civilization it has, it cannot hold on strong and solid, without a pure nationalism within morals and values. This is because nations are always surrounded by others, are always ongoing relationships with them in every field and the tendency is to assimilate together with the historical flow that a nation can have. It is precisely nationalism, which serves as a regulator, which does not let the nations be assimilated by the most powerful nations, who keeps staring moral codes and spiritual traditions of the people of a nation. If some of the Albanian nationalist leaders fled to the west, the bad luck or fate in this case followed the nationalists generations who remained later in Albania. Using Bolshevik methods, the Albanian communist party, called these "enemies" or "Albanian nationalist leaders" dangerous to people and the nation. (Closs, 2012, p. p.10) The demolition made to Albanian nationalism in these years, the shot to death of it by the red dictatorship, led to a reduction of national feelings among Albanians. This phenomenon was clearly reflected on the fact that Albanians completed years of studies and universities but they could hardly recognize the warriors of Albanian nationalism, because it was forbidden to talk about them. They knew nothing about the traditional sculptors or famous writers who wrote literary masterpieces about nationalism and Albania in general. They didn't even have much information about Kosovo as a part of the Albanian territory. But what they had to memorize was where the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was born, how he learned and studied, what he had eaten during his childhood and what he liked during his youth. The extreme psychological violence was forcing not only the little remaining of nationalism, but also Albanians as human beings fade and create another concept of world and nationalism.

### **3.2. Nationalism of Enver Hoxha**

Today, in Albania in the mass media, is hardly to be found anywhere the term nationalism, yet is at the same time spread and discussed in each aspect of life. But not only that, when mentioned, this term is always associated with a surname: folkloric nationalism. But once upon a time, when the communists did not come to the scene of

Albanian life, this term was highly respected. Moreover for the exaltation of the meaning of this term the highest structures of the Albanian state were concerned directly to King Ahmet Zogu himself. And such interest was not accidental. This is because nationalism, in essence, represents in itself an ideology and a political orientation which has as a basic principle and a fundamental tenet, the value of the nation, as the highest form, the supreme social unity in the process of statehood. "Albania's two principal interwar politicians, Fan S. Noli and Ahmed Zogu, both opted for policies that would preserve the existence of Albania within existing borders." (Austin, 2006, pp. p. 235-253)

Nationalism, as a political movement aims to protect the national interests of the community in relation to state power. At its core, nationalism preaches loyalty to the nation, political independence and works for the good of people, raising his cultural and spiritual affection, the joining of national awareness for the protection of the living conditions of the nation of the territory where the nation lives, of economic resources and spiritual values. It is based on national feeling, which means patriotism. As an ideology, nationalism aims to bring together the different layers of society, although they may also have not compatible interests. But during the Hoxha's regime the nationalistic feelings among Albanians suffered a drastic change. They began to fade and took another meaning and understanding of it. It was not easy for nationalist and the ordinary Albanian people to adopt the new system but yet many started to accept the reality of this regime and continue the game of their leader Enver Hoxha.

"The emergence of the Communist Party of Albania on November 8, 1941 as a powerful current enlivened the energies of the Albanian people, roused their hopes in the future and terrified the enemy. This was a decisive event, a most important act, because for the first time in the many centuries of the history of the Albanian people the Party of the working class, the only Party which, having the revolutionary ideology as its guide, would lead the people in the struggle and to victory, had placed itself at the head of the people." (Hoxha, 1984, p. p.9)

Nationalism during this period of time was not anymore about sharing, loving and caring about the existence of Albanians. It changed in caring and loving their leader. Nationalism was to be Albanian, to have no religion. Nationalism during Hoxha's time was to not let the western world effect the Albanian nation. Albania became the first

country in the history to declare itself an atheist state. The only thing that mattered was to work for the good of the party, to stay away from the world's news and culture.

“Isolation of the spirit is one of the most important principles upon which Albanian communists base their dominance. Nearly three quarters of the Albanian people were born after Enver Hoxha's seizure of power and so know no other political system than the so-called "worker's control". The remaining quarter, the middle-aged and older generation, consist in the main of illiterates - a late legacy of Ottoman domination. Thanks to this isolation, the ideologists of the communist Albanian Party of Labor are able to falsify the recent church history of their country and their own propaganda from the years immediately before and after the end of the war to suit current requirement.” (Tonnes, 1975, p. p.7).

Doing a precise and comprehensive analyze of Enver Hoxha is a difficult mission which needs a lot of attention given the fact that his figure is complex which has its own negative and positive sides. Writing about Enver Hoxha and being neutral is a little difficult, especially when analyzing his politics in relation with democracy and human rights. This is understandable, inevitable and necessary. He belonged from the start to a world and ideology which violated the individual's freedom and rights, in the name of a pursuit of a utopian project which would bring for everyone the happiness and well being of the Albanians. As described by Fredriksen on his book *‘Biographical Dictionary of Modern World Leaders:1900–1991’*

“Private property was confiscated, agriculture collectivized, and political liberties extinguished. Worse, thousands of suspected opponents of the regime were summarily lined up and executed.” (Fredriksen, 2003, p. 4).

His political opponents, from his closer fellows and associates, to the representatives of "the overthrown classes", were sentenced with a cruelty which was not seen even in the Stalin's Russia.

“Hoxha had been alerted to Tito's schemes for bringing Albania into the Yugoslavian fold, and in 1948 he executed Koci Xoxe, minister of the interior, for alleged "Titoist" sympathies. Thereafter Albania settled firmly into a pro-Soviet orbit and broke off relations with Yugoslavia.” (Fredriksen, 2003, p. p.5).

In particular, the exploded repressive hysteria after 1970, after the clashing with US and the USSR, the regime was about to break relations even with China, therefore needed more than ever an "inner peace" since the political and intellectual degradation of Hoxha's regime had begun.

“Enver Hoxha, through his policy, excluded the Albanian people as an underdeveloped society from Europe and thereby deprived them of taking part in the dynamic life of the present-day world, and this portion of the Albanian people in Kosovo.” (Kesler, 2006, p. p.2).

But for Enver Hoxha's negative relationship with democracy and human rights has been discussing since 1990. Even biographies about him, written in recent years, inevitably revolve around this motif. Meanwhile, the state's repressive aspect and personality of Hoxha himself does not represent all his being as a politician and a statesman. For a detailed and historic analysis, it is necessary to investigate the relationship of the communist leader with the wide range of state and party activities which he led with no doubt with an iron hand fist for more than 40 years. However what is specifically treated here and which certainly will irritate many, is the reports that Enver Hoxha had with nationalism and Kosovo, as the core of the Albanian national issue. Most of the foreign authors and texts which deal with the history of Albania after war, are on one mind when declare that Enver Hoxha is a nationalist communist. Of course, in the land of eagles in Albania is risky to say such a thing: is a risk of drowning in a sea of hate, from the so-called "nationalists". Therefore, it is needed to clarify the terminology of it. Now it has become a trend in Albania to categorize as nationalist many figures and not only Enver Hoxha, however the nationalism of these figures was simply a regional nationalism. During World War I and World War II each of these nationalists agreed with the invaders. Terms of the deal were simple: do not enter on the borders of our village, and we will help to press any resistance out of our village. Of course such deal was done in return of payment. Thus, these brave nationalist while swearing for an "Ethnic Albania", crossed the border of their province only to kill, and to cut other Albanians, even those who fought for the freedom of their country. So they did in Vlora, Berat, Shkodra and Tirana in the winter of 1943-1944. (Hoxha, 1984) Of course, in comparison with them, the nationalism of Enver Hoxha was quite another. Hoxha declared Albania intangible. In relations with Tito's Yugoslavia, he put importance to the issue of Kosovo and its unification with Albania. In 1943, Tito acknowledged that Kosovo was Albanian and after the war it was supposed to join Albania. (Hoxha, 1984) In January 1944, with the Albanian communist initiative, it was gathered the Bujan Conference, where he reinforced the will of the people of Kosovo to unite with Albania.

Nowadays however there are still a few Albanians, who think that Hoxha was great patriot and a great nationalist. But on the other hand the rest of the Albanian population seeing where Hoxha's policy led Albania, don't think so at all. Nevertheless there are scholars and foreign journalists who occasionally claim that Enver Hoxha was a nationalist. In the same way there are few Albanians who think that Enver Hoxha was a great patriot as well. These Albanians claim that Enver Hoxha's policy and nationalism defended and strengthened the independence of the country. But was really Hoxha a patriot and nationalist? James S. O'Donnell argues in his book '*A Coming of Age. Albania Under Enver Hoxha*' that:

“Enver Hoxha remains an enigmatic figure, not only because of the secretive nature of the Albanian regime and Albanian society but because of the contradictory facets of his character.” (O'Donnell, 1999, p. p.194).

In his half century career he urged the nation's political allies from the historical enemies of the Albanian nation and on the other hand, the real friends and natural allies of Albanians, primarily the United States of America was declared Albanians eternal enemy. Enver Hoxha during this time gave an end to the relations with Belgrade being so side of Stalin, who was stronger.

“Enver Hoxha was the most loyal follower of Stalin. In fact, he was the quintessential Stalinist. Many of the descriptions Nikita Khrushchev used to denounce Josef Stalin in his "secret" speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 could easily be applied to Enver Hoxha. Thus, it is not surprising that Albania was one of the few places in the world where a mammoth statue of Stalin was the center of attention in the main square of the capital as late as 1990. Despite Hoxha's devotion, Stalin remained suspicious of his Balkan ally.” (O'Donnell, 1999, p. p.195).

After that relations with Russia started. But these relations also soon came to an end as well, when Khrushchev began the liberalization. From Moscow went again in East, in Beijing but also those relations came to an end because China was taking steps toward the west. And so this led to the isolation of Albania for decades.

“Then, Mr. Hoxha cut his ties with the Soviet Union, too, at the height of Nikita S. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign in 1961, about the time of the Chinese-Soviet split. Mr. Hoxha began to rely on China for material support. True to the old Balkan saying that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Mr. Hoxha became a vocal, albeit increasingly irrelevant, supporter of Mao Zedong

when he found himself isolated from the Soviet bloc. But again Mr. Hoxha grew disillusioned. The thaw in Chinese-American relations chilled Albania's friendship with China, and their cordiality turned into a rift that, by 1982, stopped just short of a break." (Wolfgang, 1985, p. p.1).

If this string of failures would have had as a base or as a purpose the protection of national interests of Albanians, Enver Hoxha should have approached or open Albania to the West. If not much, at least he should have tried to bring Albania closer to the west as Tito of Yugoslavia did. In the name of "proletarian internationalism" and not that of Albanian nationalism, at the end of World War II Enver Hoxha began with the partisan missions to help brotherly peoples of Yugoslavia. It is the only case in the Europe during the World War II, when a small country with no potential military aid goes and helps a place several times greater and surprisingly this country is Albania, the smallest and the poorest at that time. The aim has been to fulfill the agreement of Hoxha with Tito to suppress the national movement of Albanians in Kosovo and in other Albanian territories in the former Yugoslavia with the weapons of Albanians themselves. The national movement of Albanians in Kosovo was driven from the right of people to self-determination. For Albanians, this right was legislated in the First Conference of the National Council for Kosovo Liberation, known as the Conference of the Bujan (Bujane - Tropoje, 31 December 1943 - 2 January 1944). In the last document of the conference signed by Serbs and Albanians institutional representatives is reported that Kosovo from the Dukagjini Part is populated in large parts by the Albanian population which always wants to be part of Albania even now days. For this purpose as the only way out is seen the common war with other territories of Yugoslavia against invaders, to gain freedom where all the nations, including here Albania as well, will be able to declare its own fate with the right of self determination until the secession. The Bujan conference was the second historical act of the Assembly of Vlora in 28 November 1912. In its conclusion the Assembly of Vlora declared the independence of the Albanian state but this independence was proclaimed only for the half of the ethnic territories of Albania. The Bujan conference would bring together not the half, but all Albanians in a single state; would unite them not with the blood and war against the neighbors, but in a democratic way, in agreement with them and in accordance with the right of people for self-determination.

The idealists of Bajan Conference and other Albanian patriots had made free accounts without Tito and Hoxha. Moving the partisan brigades in Kosovo, Enver Hoxha made to Beograd a invaluable service as it was tested the Albanian patriotic movement was crushed down by Albanians themselves.

The fact that nationalism is an ideology that operates on a system of its own is also proved by fascism itself. But what history of totalitarianism and not only, has proven over the last century even along the present is that nationalism is a project that matched well with the totalitarian or fragile democracy. In short, nationalistic rhetoric's and actions are factors that positively influence especially in a society where the people are easily manipulated through these intense emotions. In the Albanian case, nationalism has been a good way not only in the most beautiful times when the latter was in vogue, but also during the dictatorship of a proletariat that had not a nation, but had an ideology. Albanian King Ahmet Zogu, along with others before him many times has used nationalism. However the effects of nationalism were during the communist era much more.

“Zog recognized that adherence to three different religions whose clergy were answerable to hierarchies outside Albania not only presented a barrier to unity but allowed for considerable foreign interference in Albanian affairs. Through the construction of autocephalous churches, Zog sought to bring as many as indigenous church leaders as possible under his control. While his religious policies enjoyed some success, Zog understood that the key to both modernism and nationalism was an aggressive education policy. In this regard, he experienced some success as well.” (Fischer(b), 2005, p. p.4).

However, it must be recognized that communism in Albania brought another kind of nationalism, different from the countries of former Yugoslavia, Greece and so on. The strange thing during this time begins at the moment where a communist internationalist as Enver Hoxha, appointed by a Serb at the top of the Albanian Communist Party, turned suddenly into a nationalist. In 1945 the Albanian and Yugoslav government signed an agreement to reunite Kosovo with Yugoslavia as an autonomous province, while Yugoslavia would recognize the government of Hoxha as a legitimate government. This agreement obviously was prescribed and was the main element that the nationalists were separated by communists in fighting the fascists. The Albania's dependence on Yugoslavia was visible and quite clear through multiple loans which the latter gave to

Hoxha's government and which was further reinforced after the 1946 pact where were decided all annual planning's and division of labor. Thus, Albania slowly was turning to be part of Yugoslavia, just as the queen of the East (Soviet Union) had been agreed.

Enver Hoxha, sensing the danger of elimination made the right moves and eliminated the Yugoslavian influences to approach to the Soviet Union. This merger was used by Hoxha, who not only declared Stalin as a national hero who saved us from the clutches of Yugoslavia but also took care to put himself a ladder below. He called himself a hero of freedom who fought against the Yugoslavian enmity which for centuries had been pressing the Albanians. From nowhere, Hoxha brought that folder of history to attack the one that wanted to destroy him. So history repeats itself even with the Soviet Union, where after the death of Stalin and when felt that his chair was in danger, Hoxha, began pressing down more over the power of nationalism and nation which, according to him, it enabled the implementation of Communism in its most pure form.

“Despite the violent rhetoric of Stalinism, Hoxha really had no choice but to become as ardent a nationalist as Zog had been. Indeed, given the narrow base of support the communist movement had (in 1942 when the Albanian communist party was formed, it had a membership of perhaps 130) and given Hoxha's need to downplay the Kosovo issue, extreme nationalism was the best means, added of course to the extensive use of the army and other security forces, by which he could remain in power and progress toward a modern socialist state.” (Fischer(b), 2005, p. p.6)

Also these years of detachment from the Soviet Union had another significant element. Albanian social sciences had started floating in the field of knowledge and so it was easier for the Albanian communist government to enable printing the publication of books with ideological and nationalistic tendency. Thus, Enver Hoxha had already built an ideology where he always was the savior, where the nation was justification and where communism and proletarian dictatorship was the ultimate goal. Surrounded by this holy trinity Enver Hoxha created one of the strangest dialectic of national-communism, a dialectics which has remained still to this day in the Albanian society.

“For more than four decades, the Communist Party leader struggled with ruthless determination to transform the region's most backward nation into a modern, industrialized state that he hoped would serve as a political and social ideal for the rest of the world.” (Trimborn, 1985, p. p.1).

However in 1946, Yugoslavia's ambassador in Albania, who accompanied Enver Hoxha during the latter's visit to Belgrade, stated that during the talks with Tito, the Albanian leader asked in an inappropriate manner the promised unification of Kosovo with Albania. On the same occasion, Hoxha insisted that the issue of unification of Kosovo with Albania should have been included in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which the two countries were ready to sign. After breaking with Yugoslavia in 1949, Hoxha wrote a long letter to Stalin, where after presenting a detailed history of the Albanians under the regime of Tito, concluded that the unification of Kosovo with Albania would strengthen the latter, the ally of the USSR, and would weaken Yugoslavia's Tito-Rankovic. There is no doubt that the closing relation of Khrushchev with Tito in 1955 was one of the main causes of the crisis in relations with the Soviet Union and Albania. Hoxha could not forget that after 1948, Yugoslavia had become the main base where were organized activities for Yugoslavian discoveries, against the regime of Tirana. Above all, between Albania and Yugoslavia remained acute the problem of Kosovo.

“Apart from the fact that Stalinism is always a nationalist deviation from true Marxism, the truth is that Hoxha was merely a Stalinist dynast of the usual sort, using and being used by his superiors until the opportunity arose to cut loose on his own, like Mao, Togliatti, and Tito himself. This emerges quite clearly from his behavior at the time of the conclusion of the Mukje agreement in 1943. At that conference with the Balli Kombetar (an alliance of right wing nationalists and the Djarri group, influenced by Greek Archeiomarxism) Ymer Dishnica signed a pact for a joint resistance struggle on behalf of the Albanian Communist Party. One part of the agreement was that after the war the future of Kosovo should be decided by a plebiscite, Kosovo being the Yugoslav province with a high proportion of Albanians in it. The Yugoslavs, enraged, ordered the Albanians to repudiate it immediately, which they did, Hoxha himself making an abject ‘self criticism’ some time afterwards.” (Halliday, 1989, p. p.2)

Enver Hoxha's attitudes after 1960s regarding the Kosovo issue were more and more divested from the ideological cover and were dominated by nationalist rhetoric, sometimes even racist. Hoxha talked with the same anger against Macedonians which in 1969 terrorized Albanians, but also at the same time against Albanian servants of the

Belgrade regime. In 1966 Enver Hoxha wrote the article "Who is responsible for crimes of genocide committed at the expense of the Albanian population of Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia", where underlined as key moments the killings of young Kosovo's in Montenegro in the city of Tivar, and the ones committed in Kosovo against opponents of war and the terror during the action of weapon collection. Denationalization policies were also denounced from Enver Hoxha as they were in the damage of Albanians through continuous struggle for national rights, ranging from that of education in the Albanian language. Hoxha was scared of what would come after Tito's death, taking into consideration the fact that even when he was living there was a wild war between various clans within the League of Yugoslavian Communists. Hoxha noted in 1966 that in the framework of the chaos between cliques of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and its Albanian inhabitants were always exposed to risks. Hoxha showed that he knew well the situation in Kosovo, when making the leading responsible for anti Albanian policy the Serbian clan represented by the old acquaintance Dusan Mugosha and as Hoxha called the executioner Rankovic. The elimination of Rankovic in 1966 and the denunciation that Hoxha and Tito made to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, created the conditions for a normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. Hoxha had undoubted merit to channeling this approach almost entirely in terms of Kosovo, though the Yugoslavians insisted that relations should be developed in parallel with all the Yugoslavian republics. The recognition of Kosovo's autonomy and its sanctioning with the constitution of 1974, the establishment of the University of the Academy of Sciences and other scientific learning institutions of Kosovo, the exchange of teachers, researchers, artists, athletes between Tirana and Prishtina, the organization of scientific activities with high national tonality, as were those for the 500th anniversary of Skanderbeg in 1968, the consultation of Prishtina for the unification of the language in 1968, the Conference on the 100th anniversary of the League of Prizren in 1978 and many other activities created a warm climate between the two sides of the border, and above all they pulled out to the surface a new layer of Kosovan intellectuals and students, who would become the protagonists of the events to come.

Thus, Enver Hoxha designed and followed up in details these developments. Even by correcting himself. Until 1981 he was expressed against the slogan "Kosovo-Republic"

and defended the project of its simple union with Albania. For this reason, in 1973, he had refused to sign the Helsinki Final Act, which sanctioned the non changing borders in Europe. After the events of March and April in 1981 in Prishtina, Hoxha expressed no hesitation in protecting the student demonstrations and their slogans, foremost among which was "Kosovo- Republic". Taking into consideration the developments in Kosovo, Hoxha also revised its position on the Western democracies. For the first time after 40 years, the preferential relations of the regime with France recognize a period of crisis. Hoxha himself explains why. According to him France, worried by the disintegrated processes in the post-Tito Yugoslavia, had taken under protection the repressive policy against Albanians in Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. Meanwhile did not escape from Hoxha the support from the press which was given to the movement of Albanians and the political environment of West Germany on the other hand. In May 1981, in an article published in Albania in the "Voice of the People", Hoxha articulated the thesis of rights of the German nation to live together, which after a month he strongly emphasized it even more in the Labor Party Congress. Enver Hoxha expressed his belief that in the absence of whatever relationship with the US, Germany would be precisely the one which would raise awareness and would withdraw the US ally in the war support of Albanians in Yugoslavia. The signal did not left without being caught in Bonn. It was the beginning of a very important relationship, which took shape with the surprise visit of Franz Joseph Strauss in Albania in 1984, but that unfortunately, Hoxha's descendants left it to go because of their fears and indecisiveness. Of course, this entire rapid trajectory of Enver Hoxha's positions on the Kosovo issue, as the essence of the Albanian national question in the twentieth century, is marked by his own allegations and uncertainties. Sufficient is to recall, that the negative experience of relations with Yugoslavia, during and after World War II made the Hoxha's regime to suspect as Tito's agents, and often mistreat, many Kosovan patriots which crossed the border to escape the persecutions of the Yugoslav authorities. What is even worse is that the great political commitment in defense of war of the youth and the people of Kosovo was not accompanied by at least a relaxation of the struggle of classes and a liberalization of the super collectivized economy of the helpless Albania. On the contrary it remained the same. But, apparently one could not expect more from Enver Hoxha. He can be called as

was nationalist, but he was also a communist. His nationalism occasionally was covered by waves of an ideological dogmatism, which by the passing years became increasingly more and more suffocating.



Figure 3.1: Map of Serbia before 2006

### 3.3. Serbian Nationalism

As mentioned before nationalism is a doctrine which has its origins in Europe since the French Revolution as a result of industrialization and Illumination, which played an important role in the formation of nations in Western Europe (Jensen, 2016). This impact was spread in other countries including here the Balkans who began the process of creating nations since the late nineteenth century, as the Serbian nation, Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian, etc. It can be stated that no modern social phenomenon in social theories, has attracted more attention of researches than the nation and related issues

with it such as: the myths of common origin, nationalism, and clashes between nationalisms, interethnic hatred, the myth of ethnic purity, myth on common language, and common myth about the history. These not only have attracted the attention of researchers, but have contributed to spread throughout the world, causing so many conflicts between the nations (Yinger, 1994).

While nationalism that spread in Western Europe as a result of economic and social developments was leading to the creation of modern nation states, the Balkans were still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire which based its existence upon 'millet system', which was the opposite of nationalism. Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia indirectly led to the spread of nationalist wars within the territories of the Ottoman Empire which in itself accelerated the breakup of these territories from the Empire (Roudometof, 2001). This influence was the reason that Balkans remained a source of conflict for most of the nineteenth century, although these conflicts by time took a different dimension. Out of fear of losing their cultural identity, they began raising ethno nationalistic castles and thus using these cultural differences as a pretext to launch wars not only against the old ruling elites but also between each other. This paper which explains the Serbian nationalism is divided into two parts. The first part gives an overview of Serbian nationalism from 1844 until the end of World War II. The second part deals Serbian nationalism during the Yugoslav Tito's leadership, and in particular Serbian nationalism implemented by Slobodan Milosevic.

The setting of Serbs in the Balkans between VI-VII centuries was soon accompanied by an expansionist spirit which led to the enlargement of their territories (Fine, 1991). This was noticed especially in the creation of the medieval state of Serbian King Stephan Dusan. Nevertheless after the collapse of Dusan Empire for Serbs it was a moment of political silence mostly because they were placed under the rule Ottoman rule. The creation of a Serbian autonomy and Serbian rebellions, led the Serbian novelists to try and revive the Serbian medieval Serbian empire. After they failed to garner any support for their case and the crush of their revolution, Serbs become more and more convinced that their fate lay somewhere else. Ideas for achieving national greatness through expansion started to circulate freely among the elites. All this national reawakening would become true only with the resurrection of Dusan's medieval Empire

(Djokic, 2009). As the Serbian state came into being, its political elites came to the conclusion that Serbia is too small and it cannot remain as such, especially in a region such as the Balkans. Thus, they thought of uniting all the land that Serbian medieval empire comprised including here Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the Northern Albania with its exit to the Adriatic (Judah, 1997).

The Serbian Orthodox Church played an important role in the rise of Serbian nationalism. It had already started the pan Slavism movement to realize this unification of the above mentioned territories (Calini, 2010). To realize this project of uniting territories it was necessary the support of Russia and known contact centers as London and Paris. These programs began to be realized after the Eastern Crisis, where Serbia managed to realize a part of its plan with the help of St. Stephen's treaty. Although it was not supported by the Great Powers, the Congress of Berlin gave Serbia the right to enlarge its territories but obliged it to give back some of the occupied territories such as Sandzak (Kolovos & Anastasopoulos, 2007).

Religion has also played an important role in the nationalist discourse of the Balkan states. While culture and language are distinctive factors of each nation they have rarely been used a unifying force. Instead, the religion has always been used a mobilizing tool by all nations states, particularly by Serbia. The reason for this is that in long periods of political repression people have often regarded churches as homes of cultural freedom. Such is the example of Serbian-Orthodox church which cared not only for the preservation of the faith, but also helped maintaining a cultural ethnic consciousness. By this it can be said that the Serbian church serves in a way to Serbian policy and not its real mission (Dobrijevic, 2001).

The policy of Balkan states began to take shape during the Balkan Wars. What started as a war of independence from the Ottoman Empire would soon take chauvinistic features. Balkan states set their eyes into each other's territories, starting thus a predatory war aimed at enlarging their territories and bringing grandeur. Two countries suffered the most although none of them had any real links to the savagery taking place: Albania and Macedonia.

The conflict would soon bring the Great Powers into the game as they saw their interest being threatened. For example the Serbian efforts to occupy Albanian territories clashed

with the policies of Austria-Hungary and Italy who feared a Serbian enlarged state (Apponyi, 1915). To solve the Balkan mess, the London Conference was convened in 1913. While Serbia managed to get what it wanted, Albania had to accept the harsh consequences of the conference decisions which let a large part of the Albanian lands outside of Albanian state especially Kosovo and Macedonia which were given to Serbia (MAPO, 2014).

The unconstrained Serbian nationalism was the cause for the start of First World War which in itself was triggered by the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 during a visit in Sarajevo. The Serbian state which had managed to enlarge its territories after the end of the Balkan Wars saw itself in a difficult position as the army of Austria-Hungary invaded their country. However after the war Serbia managed to get back all the pre-war territories. The post-war period saw the creation of Serbian-Croat-Slavonic Kingdom (Sotirović, 2014). In the period between the two wars, this kingdom whose the real leadership was in the Serbs had prepared several programs such as the Program 1920 which foresaw the crackdown of Kosovo Albanians (Trifunovska, 1994). The program of 1924 on the other hand foresaw the destruction of the National Defense Committee of Kosovo (Woehrel, 1999). The program of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1935 aimed to expropriate and colonize Albanian territories. The Serbian Cultural Club in 1935 was for the impact and influences on other Balkan nations, especially against Albanians. The program of Vaso Cubrilovic aimed to eliminate the minority problem in the new Yugoslavia in 1937, focusing particularly on the displacement of Albanians. The program supported a gradual colonization by exerting pressure in various forms, including imprisonment, violence and murder, adding the psychosis of fear in every aspect (Woehrel, 1999). In 1938 Yugoslavian - Turkish Convention foresaw evacuation of Albanians, but this was not realized because World War II began. The second program of Vaso Cubrilovic in 1944 aimed the displacement of Albanians to Turkey (Latif, 2002). Over 246,000 people from all over Yugoslavia were displaced (İçduygu & Sert, 2015). During this time a second wave of colonization began. By bringing in Kosovo Serbs who knew reading and writing they tried to change the demographics of the province. This policy was managed by the Interior Minister Rankovic. These actions continued until Tito put an end to his plan. He

stated that these policies towards the Albanians were made without his knowledge and he fired the Serbian Minister from his position. He was accused of being guilty that during his rule as an interior minister a lot of Bosnians, Croats but no Serbs were arrested. After this event Serbia was considered as guilty for everything that had happened in Yugoslavia.

This marks the beginning of a new era for republics and autonomous provinces under Yugoslavia. Each republic and autonomous province was given extended rights but without the right to secession. Albanians also profited from the Tito's policies and managed to gain back some of their rights, something which led to major political and economical developments (Shan, 2012). However Tito's policies would be reversed soon after his death. The policies of 1976 and 1977 foresaw getting back the rights that were given to Albanians or the autonomy that the two provinces had gained. Serbia was looking for a constitution which would enable the domination over all the republics and provinces in Yugoslavia, and the implementation of the second plan for the Greater Serbia (Petković, 2009). This hegemonic desire led Serbia to war with other republics and then with Kosovo as well. For Yugoslavia and the Balkans peace in general was possible only when a great imperial power was put in the role of judge between nations and religions, placing so an intercultural order. This for centuries was done by the Ottomans. However after the WWII, the Soviets along with Tito dictated the rules of the game. After his death, Yugoslavia had to deal now with the difficult job of balancing the competing communities of religions, languages and nations. Tito's death marks the reemergence of Serbian nationalism in every sphere of Yugoslavia's political and social life. This resurrection of nationalism zeal can be attributed mostly to a new political figure such as Slobodan Milosevic. Taking advantage of the internal and external needs of the Serbian nation he embarked on a nationalist crusade which would prove to be disastrous (Pesic, 1996). The other Yugoslavian republics and autonomous regions such as Kosovo and Vojvodina started to feel threatened by this reemergence of nationalism by the part of Serbia (Pesic, 1996). The economic situation and reversal of constitutional rights led to increased dissatisfaction with the political elites which in themselves turned to nationalism to save their image. This is perhaps what made Milosevic believe that he could play with nationalism without being burned. But this proved to be disastrous

policy as the first demonstration started to take place all over Yugoslavia. But the demonstration in the province of Kosovo was the one to be met by using excessive force and revoking all the rights guaranteed by the constitution. It is the first time when someone would hear calls of establishing another republic or even declaring full independence (Biserko, 2012).

However Serbian politics was not ceasing in its nationalist rhetoric, especially the Serbian academic circles. They began to openly support the then leader Slobodan Milosevic. From here it all began: 'the construction of their dream of complete domination emanating from the Middle Ages'. Unable to draw any support from the communist elites which saw the problem associated with nationalism rhetoric, Milosevic turned to an old ally -the Serbian Church. With the government power and with the blessing of church leaders he vowed to protect Serbian people and the church from harassment and intimidation of others (Ingrao & Emmert, 2009). On the other hand the political and academic circles did not stop working on drawing plans to justify power grab. This is better demonstrated from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and their famous memorandum. The memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which was published in 1986, quite openly supports the Serbian nationalism and the politics of Serbs against other people living in the state of Yugoslavia (Morus, 2007). The memorandum envisages some segments of life which state that Serbs were the most oppressed people in Yugoslavia. The propaganda maintained that there is a physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serbian population in Kosovo. This was referred as unacceptable and thus was regarded as a humiliation and a serious defeat for Serbia (Morus, 2007). It also stipulated that the condition of Serbs in Croatia and other parts of Yugoslavia as vulnerable and in danger, even though its claims were far from the reality. It can be said that the memorandum is a summary of opinions and publications of the entire Serbian issue.

On the other hand the memorandum foresaw several economic, political and cultural aspects. With regard to the economy the referendum provides a general economic overview of Yugoslavia maintaining that some parts of Yugoslavia and Serbia in particular remained the most non developed republic in the whole federation. The Yugoslavian constitution of 1974 was portrayed as the main source of this

backwardness. It stated that the constitution of 1974 had transformed the country from a federation to a confederation, thus putting the integrity of the country at risk and allowing each country to use its resources for its own development. The Serbian academics claimed that eleven years have not been enough to note the serious difficulties presented by the constitution and develop means to solve them, indirectly putting it in the center of the criticism of the political system. With this was stated that the reason for this situation was the policy of the 70s of the twentieth century. To revive nationalism, academics used some real facts and hyperbolized the others. They argued that Serbs are the only people who do not have their own state. Their original state was becoming smaller because the constitution had allowed the disconnection of two of her provinces such as Kosovo and Vojvodina. Based on this, academics came up with an official map of a Greater Serbia blessed by the Serbian Church, which included large parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, who had come under Serbian domination and of course the territory of Vojvodina and Kosovo (Samary, 1995).

To understand the Serbian nationalism during that time one has just to look at the used language. It's a language resembling a slow acting poison, poison which over time poisons all of the body which in our case is the whole segments of the Serbian society. It can be said that the language used played a key role in the mental and emotional preparation for crimes. The rhetoric used, once again influenced the emergence of Serbian nationalism ending decades of silence (Busch & Holmes, 2004).

The memorandum mentions several cases which the Serbs consider serious violation of their rights and tries to present it as signs of violence against them. They even dare to include the demonstrations of 1981 and some local murders as act of violence aimed directly at their community. This memorandum which was presented by Serbian academics shocked the whole political Yugoslavian spectrum although some political figures did seem to enjoy the momentum. This new political figure that was satisfied by the rhetoric was none other than Slobodan Milosevic, who advocated and supported this memorandum. Meanwhile the Kosovo issue contributed to his transformation from a little known man of the party, in a political demagogue leader. Another important moment in his political career was the speech that he held in in Fushe-Kosovo, where he said that no one should dare to beat you. By you he was referring to Serbs. This

somewhat transformed Slobodan Milosevic into spiritual leader, the Serbs have been waiting (Gil-White, 2005).

The rise of Milosevic caused numerous problems which led to a complete control of the Yugoslavian government by radical politicians. By 1989 the new government took away the autonomy of Kosovo and from the 1990s onwards began implementing the plan which saw Serbia taking control over Yugoslavia. The will and desire to implement the plan led to the beginning of the war in Croatia, Bosnia and in Kosovo in 1998-1999. The memorandum and the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic contributed in the disintegration of Yugoslavia while the leader who began its implementation of the memorandum was indicted for war crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo by the Hague Tribunal (Waters, 2015). Talking about Serbian nationalism of the late 1990's one can clearly see that it is a nationalistic rhetoric whose main aim was re-organizing Yugoslavia not according to the necessities of the day but according to the rhetoric of nation state, a state which the Serbs were the rulers and other people the servants. The effect of such policies would be disastrous wars, displacement of millions, massacres, ethnic cleansing and hate. Serbian nationalism which was presented during the years through many programs clearly includes statements and claims for a Greater Serbia. The only difference was the name these nationalist ideas were served to the public opinion. The recent projects of Vaso Čubriolvič, Ivo Andrić and others, and finally the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, clearly points out that Serbia is too much interested about the issue of medieval Serbia and especially its interest over Kosovo which is considered as a sacred land of Serbia (Drezov, et al., 2001). Albanians in Yugoslavia suffered because Serbs practiced a state of violence especially during the Ranković's time. After 1966 Albanians gained some rights thanks to the new introduced constitution of 1974. These rights lasted until 1989. This period is known as the period of absence of nationalism in Yugoslavia, but in reality it was a silent form of Serbian nationalism, which would re-emerge again after the death of Tito. Serbian nationalism actually is in full synchronization with the 1986 memorandum. The only differences are the actors behind its application. While political elites have always been the ones to promote nationalism, in the case of Serbia we have both political and religious elites which promote nationalistic rhetoric. The role of Serbian Orthodox Church should not in any

case be denied since it has been the institution which has given the blessings for violence for years. Without any doubt there is no other country in Europe, where religion and ethnicity are so strongly with one another as it happens in Serbia. Orthodox Church has not only been the place for safeguarding and promoting Serbian culture but it has played an important role in the formation of the Serbian nation and shaping its state policies (Dobrijevic, 2001).

This chapter discusses how the Serbian elites' pursuit of territorial expansion over the past thirty years ended in military defeat and in the demoralization and general criminalization of Serbian society. It also explains why, despite the heavy loss of life, including on the Serbian side, the devastation of the region as a whole and the political departure (and subsequent death) of Milošević, these elites still hanker after some form of Greater Serbia.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Serbian nationalism took on an even more conservative form, pushing Serbia ever further away from modern trends and values. The brutal removal of the first democratic premier, Zoran Đinđić, shows how deep the resistance to modernization runs. The legacy of crime, genocide, and waging war on four fronts will burden Serbia and its relations in the region for a long time unless it comes to terms with the new reality and faces the catastrophic consequences of Milošević's policy honestly. Serbia continues to pursue a policy of consolidating an ethnic state while relying on the SPC and the Army and, to a large extent, Russia. Regardless of her aspirations in the Balkans, Russia has not been able to fulfill the expectations of the Serbian elites.

Confrontation between these two diametrically opposed options obstructed the postwar transition and left Serbia lagging behind the rest of the region (especially after the assassination of Đinđić). It became increasingly evident that, without substantial assistance from the EU, Serbia would be unable to distance itself economically, politically, and morally from its recent past.

By doggedly pursuing the Greater Serbia project, Serbia's elites have brought the country to the brink of socioeconomic collapse. Since Kosovo's declaration of independence, the state of Serbia has been actually giving up Kosovo step by step while disguising that process with rhetoric to the contrary. The global financial crisis, which

diminished the flow of foreign aid to a bankrupt Serbia, has laid bare the reality that Serbia does not have the capacity to manage Kosovo. Its aspirations for partition are also becoming less and less realistic. It is obvious that on its way to EU membership Serbia will have to recognize regional realities, which includes an independent Kosovo. Serbia's top officials did not strongly campaign against Kosovar Serbs' participation in local elections in Kosovo in November 2009 and a considerable number of Serbs in Central Kosovo went to the polls and thus became a constituent part of Kosovo's sociopolitical reality (Biserko, 2012). However, Kosovo will still play a role in the consciousness of Serbia as a part of its grievances over lost territories. The amputation of Kosovo is not the problem in itself; it is more that compensation in Bosnia was not achieved.

#### **3.4. Effects of Albanian and Serbian Nationalism in Kosovo**

Using nationalism as a tool to influence and effect in another state is something very serious and risky. It may, at a certain time jeopardize the stability of the entire regions. Nationalism in itself is a threat but when it is applied in cases such as Kosovo, it then becomes it a time-bomb (Hajdinjak, 2004).

Kosovo is now an independent state, claimed by two countries. Albanian nationalist's state that Kosovo's population is overwhelmingly Albanian. They argue that Kosovo and Albania are one of the few countries in the Balkans which speak the same language, are of same ethnicity and share the same traditions, culture and religion. On the other hand we have the Serbian nationalists who aspire for a re-union with Kosovo (Judah(a), 1997). Although having ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious differences, Serbia bases its claims on their rights over territory. It still considers the territory of Kosovo as being sacred and a land where all Serbian history is focused (Silber & Little, 1997).

Albanians and Serbs have clashed over Kosovo in numerous occasions. Starting back in the medieval ages, the conflict intensified especially during the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This was attributed mainly to the rise of nationalism ideas and their spread throughout the Balkan Peninsula. The fall and retreat of Ottoman Empire from the Balkans cleared

the way for Balkan countries to pursue their own nationalist agendas, often annexing the land of weaker or countries that lost the war (Koulouri, 2009).

“Starting with the advancement of the Ottoman Turks deep into the European continent in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the Balkans, being a borderland between Christian civilization and the Islamic world, became a region of great instability for centuries. Kosovo, situated in the heart of the Balkans at the crossroads of major north-south and west-east communication routes with its rich natural resources, fertile soil and Mediterranean climate, is a home for two peoples, the Serbs and Albanians, who claim the right to possess it. Throughout the turbulent and complicated history of the region, filled with stories of bloody wars, the sacrifices of the population, and the never-ending struggle for independence and self-determination, two peoples developed conflicting national identities and contradicting positions over the status of Kosovo.” (Vaschenko, 2004, p. 7)

However, the period after Second World War saw communist regimes taking power in most of Balkan states. Their rule was based on communist ideology of proletariat and brotherhood rather than nationalism (Nation, 2003). This contributed somewhat to a nationalism retreat, a retreat which would last only for 45 years. European stability and safety was put under serious test during the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup>. The breakup of Yugoslavia, led to numerous wars, the recent one being the bloody conflict of Kosovo, which saw Serbs clashing with Albanians. While forgotten for some time, the Balkans becomes once again the main focus of international politics and media. The disinterested international public opinion had now to the breaking point and wished nothing else but to put an end to this bloody episode among ethnicities, whose role in the international arena was somewhat limited (Harmon, 2007).

Before analyzing the impact and effects that Albanian and Serbian nationalism have over Kosovo, it is important to note that Albania and Serbia have always had a complex relationship between them. This is mainly due to the persistent ethnic tensions and territorial aspirations. Albania has always supported Kosovo's independence since 2008 which the latter managed to win back in 2008, while Serbia continues to resist international pressure to recognize it (Marinova-Zuber, 2007). Seeing it from this aspect there are two possibilities which can be concluded.

Although the tensions between the two countries are on the rise, it is likely that that they will remain only in the form of apolitical rhetoric aimed to attract votes during electoral

campaigns. It is very unlikely that things can escalate to another dimension, but in a region such as Balkans none should have solid and permanent opinions. The Balkan is made of people who celebrate together at night, only to find themselves fighting the next day (Popa, 1999).

Serbia, which still considers Kosovo as a province of her own opposes the independence of it. According to Serbian officials, Belgrade has no intention to regain Kosovo by force, but on the other hand it also determined to oppose any movement for its unification with any other state. In a region which is so geographically and ethnically complex, where state borders do not correspond at all with ethnic, cultural and linguistic divisions and where all countries claim the territories for their own, war seems only days away (Csurgyai, 1998). Such cases are the perfect opportunity for anyone wanting to light up the gunpowder. It is the perfect situation which radical actors within each state look for and it is this kind of state which often ends up being used as a pretext for violence, destruction. The wars of the 90s are the most recent example of this.

But how did all this started? Which triggered such hate and why do Albanians and Serbs hate each other? To find an answer to such questions, one has to go down into history. In the early twentieth century, as the Ottoman Empire was nearing its total collapse, saw a rise in nationalist among Balkan nations. They started to see this event as a good opportunity to chew up territories of the empire or even detach territories from their neighbors. The first Balkan War in 1912 to 1913, which resulted in the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, led to major conflicts between countries in the region. As the war was nearing its end, Albania declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. It soon became clear that Balkan countries did not care much about the declared independence and soon started to march in its territory. Among the many armies that marched through the Albanian territory, the Serbian invasion proved to be the most painful one. Belgrade saw the war as an opportunity to gain access to the Adriatic (Stefanaq & Pulaha, 1978). Although the London Conference recognized the independence of Albania in 1913, and decided that Serbia should withdraw its troops from Albania, the damage was already done (Gibbons, 1914). The conference had managed to create an Albanian state but the new imposed saw half of the Albanian

population being left out. Albanian irredentism existed during the Ottomans time but the London Conference fed it even more. Albanians have been used to be last in many things; Albanians were the last people from the Balkans that declared independence from the Ottoman Empire; Albania was the last to break up from the Stalinist type communist rule; they are also the last to benefit from the visa-free travel and it is the last country opening EU integration chapters. But the most painful delay in the history for Albanians is the possibility to not solve the national question (Rrapaj & Kolasi, 2013). Politicians and intellectual elite officials say with a kind of satisfaction, that is history itself delayed in the case of Albanians and this turns out for good since escapes from further troubles with nationalistic myths and helps to fit more easily and quickly by modernity, globalization and Europeanization (Rupnik, 2004)

Currently, Albanians are using nationalism as a clue for a greater ethnical Albania, and they claim not only Kosovo but also a good part of today's Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro and southern Serbia (Draper, 1997). However, these desires oppose with Serbian nationalist agenda and the project of a "Greater Serbia" which includes today's Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and some territories that were mentioned above (Greenberg, 2006). The situation of the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslavia has become many times a source of conflicts between officials in Tirana and Belgrade. Albanians make up about 90% of the population of Kosovo, which has traditionally been under Serbian control. In the 1990s, the official Tirana urged the international community to intervene in Serbia and Kosovo to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo (Gashi, 2016). At that time, Belgrade accused Tirana that was supporting separatist groups in Kosovo. Bilateral relations were strained again in 2008, when Kosovo was declared independent. Albania immediately recognized its independence and such a fact greatly irritated Serbia. In the recent years, Albania and Serbia have had alternating diplomatic relations but constantly provoking nationalist rhetoric (Balla, et al., 2014). But with all the possible tensions, borders in the Balkans have much less likely possibilities to change right now. For most of the Albanians, the idea of a Greater Albania is more of symbolic and spiritual meaning. The map of territory with the Albanian-majority is more related to solidarity and identification with

the other ethnic Albanian groups outside the country of Albania rather than with territorial claims.

Some Albanian political leaders have used the idea of a Greater Albania as a political tool to get some support, but there has not been until now any political action to risk the instability in the region (Batt, 2008). Albania is a member of NATO and aspires to integrate into the EU. So it is very unlikely to have any territorial claims. Polls show that Albania is more focused towards the EU and the dream to join Kosovo is just a dream which will never stop. Also on the other hand, Kosovo is facing a deep economic crisis and Albania cannot afford joining such a place, where unemployment is reaching frightening figures. The question of Serbia is similar. For political reasons, Belgrade cannot recognize Kosovo yet. Serbia's government knows it has lost Kosovo and it cannot be part of Serbia. On the other hand, the EU has given priority to the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, making it as a necessary condition for Serbia's EU integration (Abazi, 2008).

However, Albania's relations with Kosovo could generate problems in the future. Although Albania is known for political instability, there are no ethnic tensions there. But the shaky situation in Kosovo is a risk for Albania for several reasons. First, the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo may create a division between Tirana and other regional actors, particularly with Serbia (Zhelyazkova, 2000). Second, poverty in Kosovo will force Albania to absorb a number of unemployed Kosovo Albanians for a long time. According to the World Bank, over 14 per cent of Albanians live in poverty, creating the potential for social unrest conditions (Guyen & Mykola, 2016). The Albanian government is using the idea of union with Kosovo, as a pressure to EU to speed up the accession process. However, seems like Serbia and Albania will not likely join within this decade. The general popularity of EU membership within Albanians explains why Tirana is pressuring the union. However, Albania's negotiations with Brussels are going over many years and the lack of progress may jeopardize this balance and could lead to regional instability. Of course, that nationalism as hatred for the other countries, for the neighbors of another nation, for a variety of reasons, historical and non-historical, is also present in other nations of the Balkan states not only in Serbia,

Kosovo and Albania. But in Serbia, he continues to maintain a specific feature, being influential in political and governmental elites as well (Šešelj, 2011). So that means that it is influential even in the Serbian official policy and other institutional authorities. So, if in Albania is find nationalism, in Serbia along this ordinary nationalism is also find the nationalism of elites and political-diplomatic one. The attitude that keeps Serbia towards Kosovo is the most obvious illustration of this official nationalism (Bieber, 2002).

From the other side, Kosovo continues to be the center of Albanian nationalism. The process of formation of the Kosovo State is undermined by four factors. The first one is from the Serbian nationalism, who cannot accept the loss of Kosovo. The second factor is the risk of institutional corrosion due to high corruption. The third deals with the ideological danger of religious radicalism which if it is not tackled tends to become a problem. Finally is the national and unitary Albanian nationalism (Lehne, 2012). National union is an ideal, an integral of Albanian nationalism, which also is the principle of any ethnic nationalism. This means that the boundaries of the political unit, must comply with the limits of ethnic or cultural entity (Sabanadze, 2010). Albanian nationalism has been divided into two main streams: one stream was that of institutional nationalism of the Albanian state which main preoccupation was the preservation of the Albanian existing state borders and the other stream was the nationalism of ethnic Albanian regions which remained outside the state, whose goals were national liberation of these territories and their union with Albania. The center of this nationalism undoubtedly was Kosovo. The ratio between these two Albanian nationalisms has been largely a conflicting report. Only in the short lived government of Noli in Albania, is the case when these two nationalisms were in line with the interests of each other. After Noli, the regime of King Zog was responsible for the destruction of the only nationalist movement fighting for the liberation of Kosovo, which was the Committee of "National defense of Kosovo", while Enver Hoxha's period on the other hand being a leader of a communist party which was under the tutelage of the Communist Yugoslavian Party in 1946 agreed with Tito to not to speak anymore over Kosovo. His speeches decades later on Kosovo are not more than a nationalistic rhetoric which Hoxha used in situations when he felt threatened in his power (Hilaj, 2013).

The isolation of Albanian borders shows most clearly that his concern was the preservation of these borders which he ruled with an iron hand and not what was happening with the Albanians outside these boundaries. After the fall of communism, when Western countries made it clear that there would be no change to the external borders of the former Yugoslavia in Kosovo, the ideal of national unity was happy about the idea of an independent state of Kosovo, which became reality in 2008 (Aydın & Progonati, 2011). The transformation of the political program of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo by the idea of national unity in the idea of the state of Kosovo is contested over the years by the Self-Determination Movement, in Kosovo which came on the political scene right through the opposition of this transformation. But what it is seen today clearly is that the movement "self-determination" has failed in its basic aim to mobilize Kosovo Albanians under the flag of national unity (Daskalovsk, 2012). This is an indication that in Kosovo currently there is not a real enthusiasm for this political idea. Albanian nationalism as well as the Serbian one it is somehow a threat to the process of Kosovo's statehood. It is a unitary nationalism which is built on the idea of "a nation a state" and is a risk for the now independent Kosovo, because if the ultimate goal is the unity with a common state in Albania then it is considered that the state of Kosovo is only a temporary state in transit and being such will not be taken so seriously from other powers and not only. This can be translated then into non-compliance and a non-respected country because why should be respected something which is temporary (Gunaratne, 2013). Moreover this culture may then take the features of corruption. Something which is not respected can be easily abused. Relations between Kosovo and the Albanian state should be designed in one way or another despite the impact that nationalism has on them.

From numerous debates that have been made about how these reports should be designed are noticed the emergencies of four main models. The first model can be called the state dualism model. The idea of this model is the idea of a nation with two independent states which follow their own particular way of integration into the European Union. This model is supported by the political elites in the respective capital cities of Prishtina and Tirana. So, while the official position of Tirana does not require union with Kosovo, Kosovo has also regulated in its Constitution to not join any another

country (Bytyci & Robinson, 2015). The second model is the unitary model the idea of which is one nation one state. This model has the support of the Self-Determination Movement and various intellectual circles in Albania and Kosovo, but so far appears to be uncompetitive with the first model. The third model is the national dualism, the idea of which is two states two nations. This model is elaborated by various publicists who consider that the birth of the state of Kosovo will inevitably be followed by the birth of a new nation of Kosovo (Stefani, 2015). This is a hypothesis which will take time to be confirmed or refuted for the simple reason that historical and political processes that results in the formation of a national consciousness do not just happen overnight. They take decades. It can also be talked about a fourth model which can be called a co federalist one. According to this model the maximum which can be achieved is the advancement of relations between Kosovo and Albania, is the building of a co federal link between the two independent states, which retain and protect their subjective states, but build common policies for certain sectors with a common interest (Bataljevic, 2012).

Despite the nationalistic feelings which are fed more and more, Albanians are aware that for them this twenty-one century, the century in which freedom and human rights have now become a standard universal value of assessment of democracy, and thus is time to enjoy the denying freedom of the twentieth century, over ruled from ethnic nationalism, extreme ideologies and the Cold War. For this reason Albanians should contribute as much as others for the construction of a long-term peace in the Balkans, viewing the past as a historical reflection taking lessons from it and not as a worthless instrument which is subject only to the museums stands (Sulçebe, 2011). Albania's pro-European orientation for more than two decades has allowed the embrace of European values, and many examples are given in this regard.

What about Serbia? Did it escape from its past and nationalistic feelings over Kosovo? The Milosevic's shadows and all platforms which set fire to the Balkans continue to wander like ghosts in human tragedies in the region. They often show up in forms of threatening in government coalitions and regressive attitudes of Serbian government which rather than witnessing an independent politics, are expressions of nationalist political tumor from which Serbia has not yet been treated (Bakic, 2013). These facts

should not be forgotten and in the name of building a long term peace in the Balkans it should not continue to be tolerated as something obvious and acceptable feature of Serbian society, but it has to be criticized almost like it is criticized any Albanian declaration which is considered by the European Union that exceed expectations and fall within the realm of genuine ethnic nationalism. Serbia is a phenomenon that requires multi dimensions approaches. It is impossible to include everything about Serbian nationalism, for Serbian Orthodox Church and its role in the Balkans and in Albanian lands such as is the case of Kosovo. Without any doubt Serbian nationalism has a great influence in Kosovo. From the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo which cover 90% of populations this is a negative influence, having into consideration all the war and ethnic genocide that was done by Serbs to them (Posen, 2000). Serbian nationalism still remains vivid in Kosovo and it will continue like this until it recognizes Kosovo as a state. However looking from the political and geographical aspect the scope of strategic and geo-strategic interests is the main goal of any state, wherever it is. In the presented region of Western Balkans in which mainly are included countries from Croatia to the FYR of Macedonia, the only state that all the time claims to extend its influence is Serbia. Serbian state after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has proved in any constellation of circumstances to extend its strategic and geostrategic influence in the countries of the region. Croatia mostly has narrowed this impact of influence, but not entirely, and this happened while having a Serbian minority within their own country (Caspersen, 2003). The Serbian minority has sought assurances from the European Union for a favorable position within the Republic of Croatia as a member of the EU. Serbia has seen this minority as the hand of themselves within the Croatian state and so it remains. The state of Kosovo with all challenges that already has, even now days continue to have Serbia as a challenge as well, with all its influencing mechanisms. In the external aspect for Kosovo, seeing the defects of its isolation, Serbia changes the course, by not being that hostile to those countries that recognized Kosovo, but working closely as collaborative and through this cooperation to stop the recognition of Kosovo from other states (Traynor, 2010). This is a tactic of Serbia to stop the progression of the state of Kosovo, especially with the recognition in the international arena to its membership in the UN. The impact of Serbian nationalism over Kosovo between the

years 2007 to 2009 was actually in the lowest point of her own, but this period was not taken as an advantage from the state of Kosovo, from the side of leaderships in Pristine. There is a variety of reasons for this. Today, the impact and the influence of Serbian policy and nationalism of Belgrade are doubled and is the largest since the liberation of Kosovo in 1999. The influence of Serbian policy of Belgrade on Kosovo begins when Serbia gave up from its isolation with the world, especially with states that recognized the Republic of Kosovo. The end of self-isolation was used to the maximum to stop the number of recognitions and to bring the state of Kosovo, in a moment of waiting (Cendrowicz, 2010). Nevertheless Serbia was not satisfied with this. Of course, it cannot be said that the number of recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo will stop, but that opportunity and challenges might be heavier than ever. What Serbia failed to do at that time was to influence its minority within the state of Kosovo. However it is trying to do it nowadays through putting an end to political pluralism Kosovo's Serb, by reintroducing old nationalist principles. The first attempt has been deemed as somewhat successful although there are some differences within the Serbian political as if this is the way to conduct diplomacy. As for the second attempt, that of influencing the Serbian minority in Kosovo, Serbia is pushing hard for the formation of the Association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. Even though Belgrade considers this as a tool of its diplomacy; many see it as an expression of nationalist feelings, which run deep in the Serbian politics. Many analysts see it even as a platform whose main aim is to support the project of for a "Greater Serbia" against Muslims in the Balkans, especially against Albanians, Kosovo Albanians and Bosnians (Petković, 2009). It seems that Serbia too is no longer looking for another conflict, which it cannot sustain. But this does mean that Serbia has let go of its dreams. The only thing that has changed is the way these dreams are to become true. Serbia understands that world and its own public opinion cannot accept another conflict and thus has chosen the tool of diplomacy. This diplomacy uses the Serbian minority in countries such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and even Montenegro, to achieve its goals (Rose, 2016). What is strange however is that all this happens before the eyes of a democratic world, which still believes that Balkans are a place where security and peace are taken for granted. Today the impact of Serbian policy and nationalism of Belgrade on Kosovo is at the highest point since 1999 and for that

Belgrade cannot be the only one to be blamed. Kosovo's political leadership must also be held accountable for the grim situation of the country.

As for Kosovo, a state which continues to be bombarded by both Albanian and Serbian nationalism, it is still to come up with concrete and precise conclusions. The country still remains fragile despite the fact that it is progressing and developing. . This development is slow and it needs time to be achieved. While development is something, getting recognized by Serbia is completely something else. However one should not forget that a small country such as Kosovo will unquestionably have the fate of many small countries whose diplomacy is conducted or controlled by the big powers (B92, 2013). But not forgetting nationalist feelings can be said that Kosovo nationalism is still at the level of national movement nationalism and not at the level of a nation that has already born and exists. Most of Kosovo Albanians feel themselves more as a minority rather than members of a nation. Most of Kosovo's, call Albania as a mother country because they don't feel the state of Kosovo as a state (Duijzings, 2000). The reason is that Kosovo is set up more as a state due and thanks to the contribution of the protecting states, rather than with the contribution of its citizens. Kosovo nationalism appears more as an anti-Serbian feeling rather than a mobilizing feeling of a community for institutional buildings. Kosovo's political leaders are more dependent on the attitudes of US embassy rather than at the quality of the Kosovo social organization and they don't feel the necessity for the establishment of strong nationalist sentiment. Only for electoral reasons, Kosovo's politicians 'consume nationalism off folkloric type which is not in function to strengthen the institutions of Kosovo (Ljepojevic, 2008). Kosovo's people must renounce from the folkloric nationalism and increase the dose of nationalism to strengthen institutions and develop the country. This type of nationalism must be generated by the intellectual elite, through the filtration of literary history textbooks, through reading books in primary and secondary schools, through the adoption of regulations from the Independent Commission for Media, and preaching in churches and mosques. All these can be operated by a special law that would be in the spirit of the Constitution of Kosovo, which actually does not lack a spirit of patriotism but it is not implemented properly by the laws.

In conclusion although the Albanian majority in Kosovo, in reality, does not equate the nation with the state, but see it through the prism of language, culture and common blood, this does not mean that they are against Kosovo as a political entity. This circumstance is a theoretical specific which is linked with meaning of Kosovo Albanians nationalism. But unlike others, many Kosovon see the state and the actual citizenship of Kosovo just as a transistorized stage and a subsequent step towards national unity with Albania (Duijzings, 2000). Thus, the idea of unity still remains among them. Albanian nationalism affects the Kosovo nationalism more because it is bounded by something much stronger than just territory. It is more preferable because of their ethnicity, their language, religion and love for one nation. However many think that although postponed or delayed, the unification of Albania and Kosovo will occur and the main reason for this will be the Albanians of Kosovo and Albanians in Albania (Blushi, 2017). It is the prejudice that the world has in general and it has reason to have, about the inadequacy to generate and keeping the states alive that has given Albania and Kosovo historic deficit. Even today, Kosovo is a country that raises many questions about its ability to build statehood and Albania will have more reasons in the future to seek unification with Kosovo, rather than Kosovo itself, which is a little bit more reflective (Qafmolla, 2016). As for Serbian – Albanian relations, they have never been as good as they are now but the hostility is created more because of many conflicting interests on the issue of Kosovo's territory. The youngest state in the Balkans, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008, is recognized by more than one hundred countries, among them twenty-three European countries (Mamun, 2017). In one way, the government in Belgrade does not want to recognize the sovereignty of its former province, but on the other hand has to accept the reality, that it has already lost it.

## **4. SERBIAN-KOSOVO CONFLICT**

### **4.1. Background of the Conflict**

Albanian-Serbian conflict has its own history. Therefore, for scientific enlightenment of Albanian-Serbian interethnic conflict, we must first one have a look at their historical background. Firstly, it is known that Serbians gained its national state in the Balkans before the Albanian nation. Reasons for this can be sought and found in historical circumstances which put Serbs in a more position. This was made possible by the intervention of great powers, mostly due to the support of Czarist Russia was giving to the Slavic and Orthodox people of the Balkans (Quateart, 2005). Beside this fact, an important factor which led to the split is the sharp ethnic differences in religion between Serbs and the Ottoman Empire. Serbian Principality of the nineteenth century emerged as an independent state at the Berlin Congress, having expanded borders towards territories inhabited by ethnic Albanian but without including Kosovo (Marriot, 1917). However, what Serbia failed to achieve at the Congress of Berlin, Serbia gained through the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. It managed to occupy Kosovo and Macedonia at the same time (Marriot, 1917).

The birth of Albania as state was accompanied by historical paradox. This was geopolitical fragmentation of the Albanian nation. While it's true that Albania was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire was under foreign ethnic power, but at least it was within the borders of a state which was internationally recognized, as it were all the lands inhabited by Albanians. The historical paradox is the fact that national states with their inherent logic are not only a frame of expression of national sovereignty, but also of national unity in dominant territorial lines (Penrose, 2002). Although Kosovo is now an independent state, there are still debates and discussions from Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, on the question of who settled in Kosovo. Who lived in those territories

before the Slavic arrival and how did the population of the country changed over the centuries.

“Many Albanian scholars argue that Albanians are descendants of Illyrians and Dardanians, who lived in Kosovo long before the first Slavs arrived there. They have always constituted a majority of the population in the region, even in the medieval Serbian kingdom. Therefore, they are completely within their rights to claim the territory of Kosovo.” (Vaschenko, 2004, p. p.11)

Besides the numerous problems it is sure that the region of Kosovo was inhabited by Albanians, descendants of Illyrians, even in the time of the medieval Serbian empire of Nenmanjic and the empire of Dusan (Vickers, 1998). At the same time, it is a fact that during the period of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo was inhabited mostly by Albanians. This is not something which doesn't happen since such changes have been anywhere across Europe. However, the integral ethnical part of a country plays an important role before is attached to another state. Nevertheless, after the Ottoman conquest, Muslim Kosovo Albanians were treated as collaborators and thus perceived as a valid enemy. Serbia's annexed of Kosovo in 1912 claiming that Kosovo is a holy land for Serbia, and pretended to civilize Kosovo by turning its lost identity through colonization and populating it with Serbs (Vickers, 1998). For Serbs, Kosovo Albanians were Serbs who adopted a wrong religion and a wrong language. However this way of colonization brought no success to Serbia. Also, as indicated above about Serbian nationalism their plan to remove Muslim Kosovo Albanians toward Turkey failed until the beginning of World War II. During this war the occupying powers such as Italy and Germany, promised to Albanians a comprehensive greater Albania (Micheletta, 2013). In addition, Kosovo Albanians accepted and were ready to collaborate in order to escape from another Serbian rule and oppression. However, despite the desire for a united and a greater Albania, population remained politically divided.

At the end of 1941 in Albania with the crucial support of the Yugoslavian communists Dusan and Popovic helped creating the Albanian Communist Party, whose members were primarily from the southern Tosks of Albania (CIA, 1962). In its struggle for power the party under the leadership of Enver Hoxha remained dependent on the support of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The price for this was the withdrawal from

Kosovo, a decision that was held hidden. While Kosovo Albanians never thought about such a betrayal, they, except small groups stayed away from the communist insurgent movement. The future of Kosovo under the communist rule initially remained unclear. From one hand Tito emphasized all the time the right of people to self-determination and the respect of the will of the people, including the right of secession, hoping to find more support from the Albanian population of Kosovo. The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia different from Enver Hoxha never thought seriously of giving up from Kosovo, because by doing so, would lose the support of a part of Serbian society (Ceku, 2016)Creation of a Balkan Communist Federation which would be led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and include Bulgaria and Greece brought hopes that the Kosovo and Macedonian issue would be solved. But these plans failed due to Stalin's tricks. Even when Enver Hoxha broke up relations with Belgrade and allied with Moscow in 1948, the Kosovo's status did not change mainly because the communist leadership feared that it would incite an internal between Tosks and Gegs of Albania (Krieger, 2001). Due to these developments Albania and Kosovo were divided more and more from one another, although Albanians due to limited traveling opportunities knew very little about this. With the fall of communism things changed somehow since now Albanians were able to see the reality and have another perception of the world. On the other hand it cannot be said that for Kosovo things changed for better. Serbia was always seeking any kind of opportunity to limit the tight the province of Kosovo enjoyed. But why Serbia urges to have Kosovo's lands?

This is a topic which even now days has not come to a common point from both Serbians and Albanians. Both these countries see Kosovo as theirs and both are right according to them. For Serbia as well as for Albania, Kosovo is considered as a holy land given the fact that Kosovo has been under the rule of Serbian medieval empire of the Nemanjic dynasty and their successor states from the early 13th century until the mid of 15<sup>th</sup> century. Serbia claims over Kosovo are based on legacy, history, churches and monasteries which are found in Kosovo's territory but are build by Serbian kings and that belong to the most beautiful monuments of Serbian medieval culture. In today's capital city of Kosovo, Prishtina, in 1389, at the day of St. Vid or St. Veitstag took place

the Battle of Fushe- Kosovo, which is woven with different kind of myths (Djokic, 2009).

“For most Serbs, Kosovo is an indisputable part of Serbia, the center of the mediaeval Serbian state established before the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans took place, and a spiritual and cultural nucleus that serves as a basis for creating a national identity of the Serbs. The territory of Kosovo is considered to be a sacred land, an important religious center, and its significance is often compared with the importance of Jerusalem to the Jews.” (Vaschenko, 2004, p. p.7)

The captain of Christian Coalition troops, Prince Lazar, on that occasion lost his life fighting against Islamic religion, and immediately afterwards he was declared from the Serbian church as a holy martyr. Therefore, this land of Kosovo is as sacred to them as the Prince Lazar himself. But on the other hand Albanians are also based on facts and historical data that Illyrians, from which Albanians have their origin, lived historically in the lands of Kosovo. Albanians are based on ethnicity and not territory; they are based on statements done by Kosovan that they feel Albanians and not Serbs. However leaving behind the history and moving toward broader political views, it is known that Kosovo is a permanent space with enormous geostrategic values. The union of majority of Kosovo people with other regions of Albania brought positive consequences for Albanians, strengthening ties, unity and national feelings. Kosovo being 92% inhabited by Albanians has been always increasingly important for Serbs in geo-strategic terms, and of course for the fact that it is the richest territory in the region with natural resources (Brunborg, 2002). So the official name of the administrative unit of Kosovo almost all the time during Tito’s era was called as Kosovo and Metohia, often shortened to a single word as KosMet. The fact why it became the name of a territorial component is somewhat unclear. This name was never used as a territorial name from medieval Serbian kings before where for the first time it is presented in the analysis of the large battle of the 1389-es in Fushe- Kosovo. According to sources it is said that the word ‘Kos’ means Black Bird in Serbian and ovo is simply a suffix to complete the word (Judah(b), 2008). However Kosovo is not an unusual name in the Balkan country. Some villages or districts are named Kosovo but have no connection with Kosovo itself. Geographically Fushe- Kosovo can be described not only as the battlefield, but as a whole highland that extends on the north and the south of the territory of Prishtina.

There were also small administrative divisions called Kosovo at the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, exactly in the north of Prishtina is a sub region known as little Kosovo. Despite all these facts about the term of Kosovo, all written documents refer to the geographical region in accordance with borders after 1945, the so-called Kosovo and Metohia, with the name Kosovo. So, the western half of Kosovo is called Western Kosovo and the other half is called the Eastern Kosovo. It must be said that geography and geology give essential reasons to understand the historical significance and the continuity of Kosovo especially for its eastern half because it contains large concentrations of minerals as the whole Southern Eastern Europe. Trepca mine near Mitrovica, in the north of Prishtina, which recently was a source of conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, was initially explored and developed by a British company in 1920 (Palairt, 2014). It became after the interwar period one that it was one of the most important and largest suppliers of Southern Eastern Europe in zinc and lead. This mine was reopened in 1960 by providing 56% of these reserves in Yugoslavia and 100% of production of nickel (Qafmolla(b), 2016). Also important in both parts of Kosovo are also large coal mines and copper as well as those of iron. The rich land with many minerals has made Kosovo a goal of invasion for many militaries, from the Romans to the Nazis. But among Kosovo's mineral resources, the most important throughout its history was its assets in gold. Even in the last two centuries of Ottoman rule, the rich land in soil of Kosovo, remained unused and out of the attention of the Ottomans. Geographical data's explain the fact of why the wealth of this territory has always been important in strategic terms. Despite numerous the ridge and mountains, Kosovo has always been a crossing point for caravans of traders and different hosts. Kosovo had important roads that connected it to Shkodra, a large center in the north of Albania and to many other regions of Albania. The Albanian and Kosovo question is not displayed now rather it is new; this problem has existed since the middle Ages. For expansionist states it has been impossible to back up the Albanians. This is achieved only through gradual colonization and history is a fact of it. Albania is the only nation that achieved during the last millennium not only survived from different occupations, but also to create the nucleus of an Albanian state with Albanian ethnicity. The whole history of the land where Albanians and their descendants have lived, that means Illyrians in this case,

is written in blood. To protect every inch of this land are made great efforts. Many different enemies throughout history have attack these people to evict and through them from their land, from the homeland which is an inheritance from their ancestor.

In 1912 when the Albanian state was established and declared independent, half of the Albanian lands with history and population of Albanians were unjustly annexed to the neighboring states (Marriot, 1917). This is done through several agreements where international politics of course supported the Serbian annexation policy on Kosovo. To prepare the ground for the occupation of Kosovo, the Serbian chauvinists, served their nation a terrible anti-Albanian propaganda. There are 150 years that is played this tragedy as a part of European bloody policy without stopping the hand of the murderer. Serbia has occupied Kosovo driven by its own economical, political and geographical interest. Kosovo Albanians always fought for freedom and independence since the London Conference in 1913 which tore Kosovo without mercy from Albania and attached it artificially to Serbia (Destani & Elsie, 2016). Since the Balkan wars, many of Albanian territories were under occupation of neighboring countries, up to 1999 in which NATO forces interfered (Roberts, 1999). This was the year in which eventually the old myth of Serbian tale for Kosovo as the heart of Serbia took the final blow.

The Kosovo-Serbian issue is a conflict which at its bulwark has nationalistic rhetoric's and hate accumulated through numerous conflicts and wars. It's a history on its own since it goes through many stages. Political and regional stability has always been a problem for Kosovo. The struggle of people for peace has never been easy and it cannot be said that it is now that Kosovo is independent; there are still tensions which can be exploited by nationalist groups on both countries and serve as a justification for further instability. It is well known that in Balkans there is a great potential for conflict, the most feared one that between Serbia and Kosovo. In fact, no country in the Balkans can intervene and make the judge of this conflict. It is up to the Serbian state and that of Kosovo to resolve the prolonged conflict. For this purpose there are continues efforts from Washington and Brussels to prevent an escalation of the situation to full out war (Gray, 2017). There has been forever an investment and part of the Serbian diplomacies to sell the Kosovo-Serbian conflict as a conflict between Serbs and Albanians, and not as

a conflict between states. Taking such approach, the aim is more than clear. Through this maneuver is totally ignored the independent state of Kosovo and is opened the game for territories. Both of them are in the interest of Serbia.

#### **4.2. The war of 1998-1999 in Kosovo**

Before examining the war of Kosovo and Serbia, it is important to mention that Kosovo, were inhabited by ethnic Albanians. During the First Balkan War in 1912, these lands were occupied by Serbia and Montenegro. The London Conference of 1913 left these Albanian territories outside the borders of independent Albania. First World War and the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 did not settle the matter and the case of Kosovo, thus leaving the region under the rule of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which in itself had just been created on the ruins of the Austro-Hungary (Macmillan, 2001). During World War II, Albania and most of Kosovo was occupied by the fascist Italy and Germany. Albanians, in general, took an active part in the Anti-Fascist War with a promise that they will earn the right to self-determination and the dream of unity under one nation. Yugoslavian communists, didn't not only allowed the Albanians the right to self-determination, but chopped the Albanian compact space, in many federal units of socialist Yugoslavia. As for Kosovo, Serbia managed to subdue it through the military administration and provided only a limited status of autonomy. Deterioration of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia in 1948 further worsened the position of Albanians in the socialist Yugoslavia. In 1968, Albanians in Yugoslavia organized demonstrations, demanding the use of Albanian national symbols such as flag or language, the raise of Kosovo's status to a Republic, university in the Albanian language and a new constitution (Trifunovska, 1994; Samary, 1995). Yugoslavian communists under the pressure of Albanian demonstrations were forced to allow the opening of the University of Kosovo in 1970, and use of the Albanian flag, while Kosovo with constitutional changes of 1974, gained the status of a constitutive unit of the Yugoslavian Federation. Although there were some cultural and political improvements on a general level, Kosovo didn't gain the status of the Republic and Albanians didn't gain the status of the nation. They continued to be considered as a minority. In the spring of 1981, student youth and the Albanian people once again came out in demonstrations. The main

demand of demonstrators was for Kosovo to become a republic. Yugoslavian communists responded to these demonstrations with military and police force, declaring even a state of emergency (Ingrao & Emmert, 2009). The spring events of 1981 were labeled as counter revolutionary. This marked the beginning of a new era, one that would be marked by a rise anti-Kosovon and anti-Albanian policy in the socialist Yugoslavia. The violence and the state terror against Albanians were characteristic of all periods but during the period of 1981-1990, it was extreme. With the emergence of political pluralism on the stage, the socialist Yugoslavia was going through its way of disbandment. At this time, the Assembly of Kosovo on July 2 in 1990 proclaimed the Constitutional Declaration for the independence of Kosovo. While in 1990 in Kacanik was declared the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (Biserko, 2012). On 26 to 30 September of 1991, the Albanian population of Kosovo declared itself a sovereign and independent state. On May 1992, the first parliamentary elections took place in Kosovo, which were won by the Democratic League of Kosovo and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was elected as the first president of an independent but unrecognized Kosovo (Ceku, 2016). The new Socio-Political developments in Kosovo during the entire period of political pluralism were accompanied by police and military violence, daily murders and torture of Albanians. The situation of the state of Albanians day by day was becoming unbearable. In November 1997, at the funeral of a teacher killed by Serbian police for the first time in history, Kosovo Liberation Army, or UCK as it is called from Albanians, made its first public appearance (Clark, 2001). The war to liberate Kosovo began in Prekaz of Drenica in February 1998, when AdemJashari and Jashari tribe began the armed resistance against the police and Serbian military. Right after this moment the struggle of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) spread throughout Kosovo and lasted until Serbia withdrew all its military and paramilitary forces. While this battle was between the Kosovon Liberation Army and Serbian forces was going on, some Serbian policemen were killed by Albanian guerrillas. As a sign of revenge Serbian forces surrounded Likoshan and Qirez villages and executed 24 civilians (Armatta, 2010). This is known as the first massacre against Albanian civilians by Serbian forces in Kosovo. The massacre of Ahmeti family and the massacres taking place all over the country shocked not only the nation but the civilized world. The war between the Kosovo

Liberation Army and Serbian forces took place over a period of time from 28 February 1998 until 23 March 1999. During this period, according to calculations nearly 20,000 thousand Albanian women were raped and violated (Chick, 2016). In the period of March 1998 to June 1999, the paramilitary units and the Serbian heavy artillery had destroyed and burned partially or totally about 1.100 Albanian villages and over 200,000 homes, apartments, shops, craft workshops, factories, schools, libraries, cultural and historical monuments, objects of cultural, scientific and religious affiliations were burned or destroyed (Tweedie, 2009).

As from 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1999 until 10<sup>th</sup> of June 1999, NATO the (North Atlantic Alliance) started daily bombing of Yugoslavian military targets. NATO with the ground support of KLA forced the Serbian-Montenegrin forces and Slobodan Milosevic to sign the capitulation in Kumanovo (NATO, 1999). NATO involvement is explained by the fact that after the great tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, democratic and progressive forces of the world couldn't stand away from the developments and events in the former Yugoslavia. That's why as soon as the Kosovo crises began; they were forced to intervene against the destructive machinery of Milosevic. The prosperous world could not allow again a new tragedy like that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On March 24, 1999, the worldwide television channels, such as "CNN", "Euro News", "RTL", "Rai", "Italia Uno" etc, announced the start of the NATO bombing over former Yugoslavia (CNN, 1999). According to news reports, the attacks began around 19:40 to 20:00. The next day, in the morning, the radio "Voice of America" informed about the bombing in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis, and Podgorica (CNN, 1999). After the first NATO bombing over Yugoslavia, in Kosovo began the revenge of Serbian military forces. Thousands of Kosovar people of all districts across Kosovo were tortured and told to leave their ancestral homes by force toward Albania and Macedonia (Rohde, 1999). This process was aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The largest number of Kosovars forced to leave their homes, was launched in both directions across the border of Albania and FYROM. But passage to Macedonia was complicated and deeply hard especially in the checkpoint of Bllace (RTE, 1999).

Macedonian circles failure to open the border crossings angered antagonized the Albanian political factor. These circles were led by the current president of that time Kiro Gligorov. He gathered the National Security Council and decided, in the name of security, to close the borders hermetically. Meanwhile, at the time of the Kosovo crisis a meeting between Gligorov and Clinton was held in Washington, in which the American president sharply criticized the Macedonian President for the unfriendly attitude towards Kosovar people (Lancaster & Rupert, 1999). According to the records of the Red Cross of the city of Tetovo, on this date were recorded around 1547 people, who were settled mainly in Albanian families in Albania. With the start of the NATO's bombing over the former Yugoslavia, the number of refugees from Kosovo grew rapidly. On March 26, 1999, the number reached 13,626 persons (Lancaster & Rupert, 1999). From April 1, 1999, it began the long columns of refugees from Kosovo who entered the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. A day later, that number, according to humanitarian association "El Hilal", amounted to 50,000 persons, located in Kumanovo, Skopje, Tetovo and Gostivar (UNCHR(a), 1999). On April 16, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia had recorded the total number of refugees from Kosovo who had entered the FYROM, up to 122,895 persons. On April 27, this number rose to 180.000 persons (UNCHR, 2000).

However unlike NATO had expected, Milosevic after the bombing on March 24, 1999 did not give up on his policy. The political goal of the Alliance and NATO was to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. But in fact the opposite happened. Although the airstrikes managed to destroy Serbian military's commanding centers, warehouses, heavy artillery positions and many other things, it could not stop the ethnic cleansings carried out by paramilitary gangs. Many Serbians as well as Kosovo Albanians died during the bombardment campaigns but at least it managed to stop the fight. After the beginning of air strikes the escape and expulsion of the Albanian population of Kosovo received significantly larger dimensions as mention above. From the fear of retaliatory acts of Serbians within a few days more than 800'000 people left their homeland to save their lives toward Albania and Macedonia. Thousands Kosovo Albanians were killed and buried in mass graves. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the Defence Minister Scharping noticed evidences of the existence of the Serbian plan for the

systematic expulsion of Kosovo Albanians to Albania (Josse, 1999). But the existence of this plan was never actually proved. However, even if this plan did not exist, the action of the former Yugoslavian army and police units of the Interior Ministry received a unique scheme with or without detailed plans. Milosevic expectations that the international community would force NATO to stop the attacks and that Russia would support Serbia did not become a reality. Also the Serbian population discontent with its government was significantly increased from the beginning of May, since NATO had visibly intensified air strikes, which were initially hampered by the inadequate planning and the bad weather. On June 3, after the visit of Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari in Belgrade, the Serbian Parliament adopted prepared a plan which was completed on June 9. It meant that the war had finished and an armistice would be signed in Kumanovo in the northern Macedonia (Weller, 2015). A day after NATO ended its aerial campaign against Yugoslavia. The UN resolution, adopted on the same day, foresaw among other things the deployment of an international peacekeeping body (KFOR) and an interim administration (UNMIK) in the province of Kosovo (Reitman, et al., 1999). The resolution once again did not specify the future status of Kosovo. Creation of an interim administration of the UN, the vague formulations over the future of Kosovo, a commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as well as the NATO's failure to march through the former Yugoslavia, enabled Belgrade's regime to end the war without losing its face. At least so it seemed. The destruction of Yugoslavia, which began in Kosovo in 1989, would be complete after ten years, with the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Of course the 1999 war could be avoided. It could be avoided if the Milosevic regime would have respected human rights and the principles of the constitutional state much earlier or if the international community would have reacted in a more consistent way to reacted to the crisis and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, neither one nor the other did happen.

The postwar period is probably as crucial for the future of a country as the flow of battle. It rarely occurs in the history of states, that they may to the war, but on the same time to build an enviable future. Such is the case on Germany after World War II. But it also happens for states to come out victorious to lose their future. Such is the example of

Eastern Europe, including Albania, which were technically victorious in World War II, but by attempting to implement the principles of communism in they plunged themselves into a 50 year stagnation, the consequences of which they face still to this day.

Sixteen years after the NATO's bombing against Yugoslavia in seeing in a retrospective one comes to the conclusion that what happened then, that means the Western military, was necessary to punish the crime of the Serbian state over Kosovo, and it seems useless the efforts of those who saw this intervention as a mistake and a violation of international law at the time when state sovereignty could not be used as a shelter to justify a policy and a hegemonic ideology.

When seeing the attitude of international centers of decision-making at that time, especially on the issue of the political status of Kosovo, one realizes how much it has changed the situation of Kosovo. Most of the western countries have recognized the right of Kosovo Albanians to statesmanship, something which Albanians have been looking for years. Although there may be different opinions, but one thing cannot be denied; that the war of Liberation Army of Kosovo and later the military intervention of the US and the EU resulted in the freedom of an entire nation, which was occupied since the Balkan wars of the years 1912 and 1913. And, coincidentally, it was exactly Kumanovo, a city which marked the beginning of the First Balkan War and sealed the fate of the Albanian lands, was the place in which in June 1999, NATO and the remaining Yugoslavian Army signed the Military Technical Agreement. The agreement foresaw the withdrawal of military and police troops and the whole repressive apparatus of the occupying state of Serbia in Kosovo and the deployment of multinational forces KFOR. It seemed like the conflict had handed.

To conclude, despite the fact that the war came to an end, the question of Kosovo's status remained open. Serbia did not give up from its ambitions, to restore Kosovo within its sovereignty. Although the issue of the status of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 found its framing and constitutional democracy, with the declaration of its independence, Serbia still keeps alive the spirit of nationalism sown by Milosevic, since

the Kosovo issue for them is an old goal for a greater Serbia (Bilefsky, 2008). Kosovo will always be a part of Serbian history. Despite this, the war of Kosovo changed international politics and marked a new beginning in the international diplomacy and became the model of humanitarian intervention (Greenwood, 2002). The war of Kosovo in the late twentieth century and the West's intervention proved that in the period after the end of the Cold War, human rights were getting precedence over state sovereignty. This war affirmed the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This intervention of Atlantic Alliance is an example of the increased concern for regional responsibility and a new milestone in international law. So, Westerns intervention in Kosovo's war to end the killing of people in a serious crime against humanity marks also the beginning of a process of development of international law.

#### **4.4. The hatred between Serbia and Kosovo based on nationalistic feelings**

The hatred between Serbia and Kosovo is not just a hate beyond the borders of the two countries. There is evidence that Serbia does not hate only Kosovo but its hatred targets all Albanians in general. The same can be said for the Albanians whose hate takes a racist dimension (Mejdini, 2015). This hatred is based on nationalistic feelings which grow day by day, for years. From generation to generation there are no changes and the future seems unclear and vague. The history describes the ancient conflict between Albanians and Serbs as a 600 year old scum. Serbian-Albanian conflict began on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, when Serbia occupied Kosovo and Albania in the fall of 1912. During this process, the Serbian army destroyed entire villages and systematically committed crimes against Kosovo Albanians (Todorova, 2013). It was this violent campaign of Serbia against Albanians which made the latter to become sworn enemies of the Serbians. This violent campaign was developed on the medieval Serbian claims on Kosovo, and thus the Serbs annexed it and from that moment the hatred between Albanians and Serbs began to cultivate further, turning into an old century's war between the two nations. One of the most efficient ways to portray the bloody conflict and hatred in Kosovo is to define it as a product of old century's ethnic hatred between the people of this region. The cause of this conflict starts from the perspective of hate that stems from old time. Serbian saw nationalism as

an opportunity to hold political power under new rules that seeking competitive pluralistic elections. Economic crises after the dissolution of Yugoslavia created a ground for awakening and strengthening of nationalism and their Serbian ancient dream for a Greater Serbia. Hostilities which were followed by periodic wars and violence were transferred from generation to generation and continue to define the Serbian - Albanian relations even today. Today in Serbia, the Serbian majority remains convinced that they will ever improve their relations with the Albanians of Kosovo or Albania. This situation is also valid for Kosovo Albanians and Albanians. The peace between them seems impossible.

In addition, Serbian nationalist hatred is based on an epic which became history and history returned to their myth (Djokic, 2009). A myth they strongly believe in, and hope to make it reality even though Kosovo now is independent (Djokic, 2009). In the nineteenth century the entire Serbian superstructure, including here intellectuals, military and priests gave their help in the rise of nationalism feelings over Kosovo. In contrast to Serbian nationalism, Kosovo nationalist hatred is a hatred that stems from the oppression they have been enduring for years, starting from the denial of their rights, the sufferings of the war to the demanding of their freedom. It is a fact that could not be denied that these two states hate each other, a hate which finds itself exposed in every generation, ranging from children to the adults. Many negative stereotypes dominate since the early twentieth century. To normalize relations with Kosovo definitely will be need decades. For the two countries it will be difficult to extend the hand of friendship to each other in the near future.

This hatred from the Serbian side against Albanians takes the form of prejudice, discrimination and harassment, particularly against ethnic occupied Kosovo Albanians. This Albanophobia is displayed in the form of vicious wild racism and fascism; it is the belief that the Albanians are a lower race type, inferior to them. Anti- Albanian feelings of Serbs are reflected in different ways, expression and different wars made against the Albanian people (Popov, 2000). Albanophobia rate in Serbia began to increase in the early 20th century and is closely related to the foreign policy goals of the Medieval

Kingdom of the Serbs which through Albanian territory to get the Port of Durrës which is an ancient Illyrian city in the Adriatic Sea.

For this purpose, the Serbian press spread distorted images of Albanians as wild people, incapable for independent state life. Even many Serbian scientists before the creation of an independent Albania in 1912, tried to show the inability of Albanians to create their own state, arguing that the Albanian tribes don't need a state, nor have the ability to save their people for this therefore they need a tutor a supervisor to manage them (Pearson, 2006). They considered that only colonial influences or the inclusion of Albanians and their territories in the Serbian state could train them to become civilized. During the Balkan Wars, racist press in Serbia for months and years spread distorted thoughts towards the Albanian people, promoting hatred against the "wild Arnauts" hiding Serbian army atrocities committed against them (Boeckh & Rutar, 2016). After the riots in Kosovo in 1981, Serbia launched a supposedly organized propaganda against genocide of Serbs in Kosovo reporting of mass rape of Serbian women and Serbian emigration from Kosovo. Serbian fascists, the voluntary departure of Serbs from Kosovo made it appear as a result of pressure and as the confirmation of the great injustices supposedly committed by Albanians against them. In the mid-1980s, the hate speech in Serbian media is focused more and more on Albanians. Together with the Albanian name they also use additional words such as "genocide", "tying", "banditry", "rape", so the mentioning of Albanians in private speech was given a negative connotation. In 1986 it came out the publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which called the demonstrations of Albanians in Kosovo 1981 as "neo fascist aggression" and stresses that over the Serbian population in Kosovo is organized a physical, political, legal and cultural genocide (Ash & Roberts(b), 2009). Since 1990, thanks to the propaganda of the Milosevic regime, Albanians become enemies of the Serbs (Yoo, 1999). Serbian intellectuals write primarily the dominant features of Albanians allegedly putting various epithets as primitive people, robbers and thieves. The largest number of print and electronic media in Serbia continues sequentially the spread of hate of speech against Albanians. With time, their hatred does not decrease but increase. And this wildness is mounted on the nationalistic language of hatred which is growing even at numerous organizations and neo-fascist fan groups in Serbia. The

hatred against Albanians with the government approval is publicly expressed in numerous pro-fascist rallies organizations in the form of slogans: "Kill, and massacre so Albanians will not exist", "Serbia for Serbs, axes for Albanians" "Killing is my business and business is so good" etc (Skutsch, 2005). These threats and incitement to terrorism are heard everywhere among Serbs. Serbs, the hatred towards Albanians have made it as a central part of their national identity to show who they are, and how strong they are. Hatred is a powerful force in many contexts, when it comes to form and maintain individual and collective identities. And it can happen that beside ethnic identities, religious identities to pass on hatred as well. On one hand, to hate the evil deeds can be exemplary, especially if one loves the perpetrator regardless of his evil deeds. On the other hand, Serbian hatred is often directed toward innocent human beings. Albanians have always been subject to hate, because they represent to Serbian eyes or even personify the values of hate or sin. It seems clear that their hatred towards Albanians is a goal which is fed since the middle Ages with a single orientation to have Albanian territories and become a Great Serbia. This hate is not a spontaneous feeling, but a passion, a perverse mood of spirit which runs against an "object". This "object" can be a person, a group, an organization, or something else, but for the Serbs, the "object" of pathetic hatred is all Albanians, and everything which is Albanian.

Such a situation of mutual hatred is a guarantee for the conflict. Meanwhile, it should not be forgotten that hatred against other people of any kind of nation, of their human dignity and fundamental rights, is terrible and inhuman. Serbians nationalism is established and maintained on the basis of hatred towards other nations or religions, as we have seen throughout history; as such it is necessary to fight such hatred and such identities that lead to conflicts, destructions and wars.

The hatred against Albanians is putted deep in the cells of present Serbian leaders and through all the nation of Serbia. Their hatred towards Albanians, when the civilized world has forgotten the hate against human beings , when the world and scientific discoveries have reached as far as being able to go to other planets, has become pathological. These Serbian leaders still cannot understand that they are living in a democratic world, in a world where everyone has the right to live in peace and freedom,

in a world where slavery, oppression and exploitation have been forgotten long ago. Apparently these Serbian leaders live and enjoy the misery and oppression of other peoples, especially the Albanians. This hatred between Serbians and Kosovo Albanians irritates the democratic world and reminds them, respectively the Serbian genocidal power that did the killings, expulsions and massacres in the territory of former Yugoslavia (Ristic, 2013). It is indisputable the fact that between Serbians and Kosovo Albanians, exists a hatred from both sides and this hate is motivated and has nationalistic grounds.

The hatred between these two countries has nationalistic feelings which exceed the expectations. It is very difficult for both sides to forget about the consequences and traces that history leaves. Both sides claim about their rightness's and each time seems like the same old song is repeated several times. For Serbians is very difficult to break away from the past and the hate for Kosovans and Albania in general. In Balkans especially in Serbia there is still dry powder, there are still forces that cannot live without conflicts through nationalism and through folkloric policy which yet still has followers in the Balkans, especially in Serbia and Kosovo.

But in fact it is not only politics and structures of Serbian institutions that hate Albanians and want to undo them, but it is the Serbian people as well responsible who elected these representatives and leaders. Therefore, the Serbian people cannot be totally justified for a fault they consciously want to be responsible for. On the other hand if the Serbs have reason to hate Albanians, the Albanians have also many reasons to hate Serbians. Although their hate is somehow different taking the fact that one is the oppression and the other the oppressed. However this is a situation that must end as soon as possible for the sake of peace in the Balkans region. Institutions and Kosovo Albanians also must end soon the hate toward the Serbians since now war is a part which belongs to the past and the most important thing is the future of Kosovo and their people. Peace cannot be achieved with fights and hate from the victim but with the apology and account from aggressor. The fuel of Serbians and Albanians will not lead them to peace but to aggression and conflicts again. In the name of stability and multi-ethnicity international community should suggest Serbians how to meet their desires, ambitions and

expectations to heal their hate, but not at the expense of the future of a country which risks to remain on the pit of hatred for centuries. However, talking about the hatred of Kosovo and Albanians against Serbia it is the same but in different motives and different conclusions (Kolasi, 2013). Albanians and Kosovo Albanians in general, have in their consciousness the kindness towards others, though sometimes they are introduced intentionally as barbarians. In all their codes of honor which is essential are the approximation and closeness, not hatred and conflicts toward other nations. This is probably also one of the reasons that, through the bloodshed that has been done to them, they are lined on the borders of today's politics and lives by breathing from all sides of her compatriots. There is not any evidence, even in the basic documents of this country from the beginning of its creation, even a single case, where the hatred is sanctioned or legitimized the expulsion of other nations in Albania even from simple ethnic territories. Although over Albanians are done unusual massacres, especially from northern and southern neighbors, a few times later, as a general pardon to the losers, the Albanians always raised from the pain and have forgiven, sometimes more than what was required by not displaying any sense of hatred or savagery.

The Serbian army committed major massacres in the provinces of Dibra in Albania during the First World War retreat through the territory of Albania Although defeated, disarmed and shattered by the Austro-Hungarian forces, from the last soldier to princes, , no one was threatened, no one was killed, nor was despised from Albanians (Clark, 2000). This was the opposite of what Serbian political thinkers, leader and common people had thought of Albanians. Perhaps a 'dead Albanian' was not the savage, the uncivilized people they thought. The massacres that have committed during the end of past century in the Kosovo war were not only perpetrated by the military or special forces but also by Serbian militants which often were Albanians neighbors (Anon., 2013). This is another proof that venom of nationalism can kill even the right judgment. But the hatred that occurs even today proves that something is left from the past and the hatred based on nationalistic feeling are hard to vanish and bring peace between Serbians and Kosovo Albanians.

Northern Albanians, especially the north of the Albanians, could have all the right in the world to avenge itself because for more than two hundred years they had been killed and massacred. However, Albanians are based on nationalistic feelings for freedom and saving their country and their people from oppression. It's a hate based on the history of war and terror. This hatred has nationalistic motives which are folkloric as well but always this nationalistic hatred toward Serbians does not exceed their limits. Nevertheless, anyone who happens that Serbian forces in one day kill all their family members, from more than 40 people; normally it would raise the hatred and have an attitude toward them (Hedges, 1998). For anybody who saw the massacre moments, in two villages associated with the name of the great patriot, where in one day were killed more than 160 men, from children to elders, the hatred would seem normal. However, fortunately, Albanians have made the difference between the structure of the state and normal people. While they have been alienated and enemies of the Serbian state, they have not been enemies with Serbs who live near them. The attitude of Albanians toward the Serbian state, although most of the time has been skeptical, sometimes allergic to it, has never a hate toward the Serbian nation. Contrary the anti Serbian nationalistic feeling of hate is associated with the war and with the Serbian desire to possess Kosovo and not only. It is related with the fact that this hatred is fueled by the Serbians themselves which never considered Albanians able to build a state but traitors of their religion and culture falling to the trap of Ottomans (Yoo, 1999). This hate is further increased with the war of Kosovo in 1999 where human's rights were violated and history of these two countries took another dimension.

The gray cloud of primitive nationalism in the region has its root from the non distant past of the dictatorship in the region and the security services that have been controlling everything, moreover this wild and primitive nationalism has come out of these mists of darkness and is being fed today, when the whole region wants peace. Some nationalists of the past seem to seek conflict, a regional conflict by provoking and promoting ethnicities. This is the case of hate between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a hate based on ethnicities and a sick nationalism that endangers the future of the region. This extremely damaging nationalism must come the end in the Balkans as a while and the political classes in Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia and the wider region should be

aware that integration, coexistence, influx of civilizations is the greatest value for the region and Europe itself. Albanian state is a responsible state and although comes from a dictatorship, in these 25 years, was not the best but has done a lot at various times of various governments. Today is in negotiations for the status of EU candidate, is a member of NATO, with the structuring of a democratic state, with a formal constitution and legislation to improve, but above all with Albanian politicians who for the case of Albania have understood the core issue of coexistence in the region and today lead the regional stability. The Albanian state is today in a leader of stability in the region and this is thanks to Albanian politicians who have a political orientation towards the EU and the West (EU, 2014). Kosovo on the other hand is also launching more and more of its aspirations towards the EU trying to leave behind the traces of history and war.

Albanian issue, particularly the issue of the national rights of the Albanian people in the former-Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, continues to be an important issue for political events. This issue cannot be considered nor be resolved in isolation, outside the context of overall relations in the areas of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, and cannot just suddenly change in the current relationship of political powers. This issue should be considered as aging historical process of a nation. The position of Albanians in the Balkans is only a part of the so-called "Balkan issue" which has come to the front plan of political relations in Europe during the last century, due to permanent weakening of the Turkish Empire.

Kosovo remains the least developed part of the state not only because of the legacy of underdevelopment centuries, but also because of the war which has left convincingly deep marks that are turned on used to fuel the ethnic nationalism. To permanently avoid social and national conflicts in Kosovo the state is obliged to reduce the chasm between Kosovo and Serbia and vanish the feelings of nationalism that lead to hate. Without reconciliation and without building bridges between Serbians, Albanians and Kosovo Albanians there is no peace and prosperity in the Balkans. This is quite simple. Therefore, if there are not found common objectives, common understandings and common view for a common future, then the fail will be so bitter in this region. Despite this fact taking into consideration all the occurring events of recent years the word

nationalism in Kosovo and Serbia is not diminished but reinforced. Kosovo's independence paradoxically seems to give a strong impetus to this process. This nationalism is based on the higher level of a national identity sending to the loss of others. Nationalism in itself is difficult to survive without denying the other, especially the neighbor. The psychological effect that it produces is based precisely on the fact of being superior to another. The unity of identity is fueled above all by the image of risk that comes from another state. Not another fictional state but a state that is close to you perhaps even within the nation itself (Andersen, 2001). But Kosovo has no need for this kind nationalism, what it actually requires is patriotism and accountability to society.

Today Kosovo is an independent country. It can be hard for every country which suffered from war to forget and forgive the loss of their beloved ones, the mass destruction of the nation, and the violation of human rights, but in order to develop, to live in peace, and to integrate into a democratic system needs to turn the hatred into their benefit. The stability is important for all the countries of the region in the Balkans. The hate based on nationalistic feelings between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians is known now from everyone. In Kosovo, the peace achieved is considered stable no matter how fragile it can be. Justice on the other hand, deeply depends on understanding of the individual and ethnic groups that represents a threat to the fragile peace (Gunaratne, 2013). While for most, independence is understood as the final judgment and with this are vanished all threats for example the threat of Kosovo to come again under the rule of Serbia, for Kosovo Serbians it may present a renewal of threats in the sense that they will become victims of retaliation from Kosovo Albanians. Taking into consideration all the events on these two countries, the peace seems achieved yet not complete. This is for the simple reason of nationalistic feelings that these two countries have for each other. The hate based on nationalism is something difficult to disappear, looking at the history that those two countries have between each other. However as mentioned above it is necessary to find a common language and a common attitude, in order to build relations, to have a democratic view of politics and live in harmony with each other. Because there is no other way out now that Kosovo gained its independence. Serbia and Kosovo should build policies and bridges to bring together their people by forgetting the past and the hate which brings more hate and war.

In conclusion, we can say that hatred between Serbia and Kosovo is not only based on the nationalistic feelings that exist between the people. An important role is also played by politics. It's the politics in one hand that should give a break to all this hate. It is the politics with its policies, with their interest that put fuel to the fire. As for Kosovo it can be said that it is still building its institutions and trying to strengthen democracy at all level. However it should use the past experience as an instrument to promote new social norms in the areas of justice, good governance and human rights. The acceptance of the fact that there is a urgent need of citizens to information, truth and open talks would represent a big step for Kosovo society. Kosovo's government should recognize the public perception of various forms of transitional justice and to take them into consideration to develop strategies that will be well understood and accepted by the population. Time is regarded as a prerequisite for working with a society which is awakening from a long inflicted trauma. In the case of Kosovo, this it should not be considered as an excuse to hide the issues of the recent past which require further debate. Many concerns about accountability and especially for finding the truth will continue to burden the citizens and ethnic relations, if they are not given a proactive attention. Kosovo is in a unique position to set an example for the entire region in the initiation of a comprehensive program to deal with the past. What they should do is forget about the war and become an example for everyone in the Balkans. Kosovo is still a new, fragile country which needs to achieve more in the aspect of progress rather than being victim of nationalism which in would result in further conflicts with Serbia.

Despite the fact that Kosovo now is an independent state, this does not mean that Serbia will accept it or that it will see a decrease in its dose of nationalist feelings. The successful transitional justice is a precondition for reconciliation in Kosovo. However, the reconciliation also has a political dimension. A full reconciliation between Albanian and Serbian communities can be achieved only if Serbia accept full responsibility for the crimes committed by its institutions and apply justice to the victims of all communities in Kosovo (Milanović, 2007). Otherwise, their hostility and hate based on nationalistic feelings will start growing more and more, generation after generation. Such an increase of nationalistic feelings would result fatal for the stability of region and the peace in

between those two countries. Thus, diplomatic agreements and discussions are needed from both sides.

Serbia on the other hand needs to understand and accept that Kosovo now is an independent state. The nationalism fueled by history, belongs now to a chapter which is theoretically closed. It is necessary for this country to be in peace and harmony with its neighbors. The hate cultivates hate and it brings nothing else but misery and underdevelopment of the country. Thus, although the claims over Kosovo and the numerous wars, it has come the time for Serbia to build bridges and have zero conflicts with its neighbors.. At the same time, Serbians attitude has shown how the property class politics brings hatred between peoples. But freedom cannot exist where the middle class is not given any right and where nationalism serves as a means of extinguishing the struggle for fundamental social rights. However the main problem is the lack of a progressive movement, which would lead the fight against both Serbian and the Albanian nationalism. It is ideology which still continues to be used by both political circles in the two countries to gain electorate and advance their political goals. Sometimes this shortsighted policy can be the source for conflicts in this area.

The recognition of Kosovo is a condition for membership of Serbia to EU (Gazeta Express, 2016). Member states have agreed that the road to European integration of Serbia and Kosovo passes through the normalization of relations between them and. This is the right way and the only way to give an end to this conflict. The only way that can lead to the future, is not the past. In the European Community borders would simply disappear and there would be two states that can live in peace and maintain good neighborly relations. Such a thing is a dream from many Kosovo people as well as Serbian ones. Nevertheless there are many nationalists who don't agree to leave the Kosovo behind. These are the ones that put in danger the stability of not only these two countries but the stability of the whole region in general. The question is not who is wrong and who is right; the question is to live in peace and give an end to this conflict which seems to lead nowhere but to a vague and unclear future.

#### **4.5. Future Plans Regarding Kosovo**

Speaking about the future of a country that is still fragile and faces many conflicts is something not concrete, because the future of states depends on many factors both internal and external, as well as unexpected events affecting the policy of a state. Speaking about Kosovo and the future of it, it must be taken into account the transformation of this country that means the displacement of it from a transitional situation in a comprehensive consolidation which would enable it to fight different battles in the future. The case of Kosovo takes place in the registry pages of world history, where in international relations terminology is described as an ethnic conflict (Atanassova, 1999). It is clear that ethnic conflicts emerged almost like mushrooms after the breakup of the Soviet Union, here can be given the example of the Cold War, which was dominated by two superpowers, the Soviet Union and USA, the world architecture during the Cold War imposed almost the block and the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflicts. It happened that American diplomacy, based on the balance of forces, tried to raise the ethnical upsurge, reserving currently the integrity of Tito's Yugoslavia, describing the latter as such challenge against the Soviet Empire (Marolov, 2012). From its part, the communist Russia had almost a kind of pathology in relation to any secessionist movements or ethnic strife, historically fatal for stability and greatness of Russia, given the fact of how it was created and expanded and was still operating. In the post cold war ethnic strife erupted chain in Europe and around the world.

In the post cold war ethnic strife erupted as a chain in Europe and around the world. Kosovo was one of so many countries that have ethnic conflicts however the question that derives itself is: what future or final solution will have to ethnic conflict, after much suffering and bloodshed. Regarding the Kosovo case what is of greater interests is the future of it, which is closely related with the existence and the future of the entire Albanian issue (Aberbach, 2015). Often in different conversations among some Albanian there can be heard different opinions about this issue which are expressed in an affirmative way by the simple answer that the final integration of Kosovo, Albania or Serbia in Europe will automatically close the issue of Kosovo. To reach in this conclusion should be noted first that the Kosovo issue is a clear case of ethnic conflict,

perhaps even more acute cases against other countries which have such kind of conflicts. History teaches us that in the psychology and the nature of ethnic conflicts, compromise is almost inaccessible since its appearance from early generations and so on, generation after generation the two rival ethnic groups are filled with emotion and psychosis that this territory belongs to them and that the opponent is considered as the embodiment of evil, and centuries after centuries, ranging from traditions, later through writings and until now in the era of modernization, where everything immediately is diffused everywhere although in a superficial way nationalism remains and has strong roots regarding ethnical problems (Andersen, 2001; E.J.Hobsbawm, 1992).

The attitude of Serbia regarding Kosovo has overcome centuries and ages maintaining the same essence. Shortly, Kosovo has been and is considered though already independent an inseparable part of Serbians. Thus the lifelong obsession becomes into a possessive pathology, that means that this newest state in Europe as well as Albanians have to face this challenge in the future, which is already here and has shown and proved that these challenges won't be easy at all for Kosovo Albanians which still are under the shadow of an old ethnical conflict (Nikolas, 1999; Marinova-Zuber, 2007). That means they have to face a Serbia in the era of globalization and the new world order which is under construction, equipped with the psychosis of the past. Also the unifications with the western parts which means full integration in Europe has become as a fundamental goal for the states in the eastern part of the continent. Admission to European Union is seen as vital in the socio economic, ethical and cultural stabilizing, by never forgetting the gifts of races that these countries represent, and their specific traditions (Less, 2016).

The next question is, if Kosovo and Serbia member of the concert of European countries would come together despite the historical controversy between them? The necessity to build a comprehensive European entity is dictated by its past, that means from the lessons of history, which unlike the laws of nature which explain and don't describe, teach through analogy, and not identity (Diez, 2011). And thus the pivot of the foundation of Europe were the two big states, but also those who had fought in the most savage way during one hundred years each other, Germany and France. A compromise of the first hours as it was the fundamental of Europe was transformed into a huge

project, probably the most revolutionary on the whole planet in the twentieth century (Rifkin, 2005). So it continued the expansion with Italy, the artificially member UK, which traditionally had been preaching and encouraged a balance of forces in the old continent, which was favorable for it (Wilson, 2014). Having the origin in a huge compromise, to put a temporary cap of the past, from a core of Western states it expanded progressively decade after decade including in its community almost all former communist countries. The great dilemma with which it is faced this great community of states wearing common system of rules and acts which is supervised by a retinue of bureaucrats, named the European Union, is the lack of a common foreign policy, which means the representation in a homogeneous way through a single voice (Howorth, 2010).

Exactly in this Europe will accede in a near future, Serbia and Albania, and later Kosovo. One thing is clear that none of the countries in the future also those recognizing Kosovo, will not be able to force Serbia to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Serbia is and will be embedded in its continuous efforts to sabotage Kosovo's independence, then the competition will continue between the two nations, alongside the inevitable course of history, as in the past. The challenge that will face the Kosovo Albanians is to what extent they will succeed, to build a complete state of law that first would prove their capacity, and as well would neutralize self destructive nature of Albanians and would produce the versatile homogeneity, the essential element that enables the fulfillment of the missions of the nations (Gellner, 2008). Regarding Serbia, its permanent dilemma has been and will be steering the alliance. Even a Serbia in the era of modernization, economically consolidated and somewhat militarily, by not learning from the lessons of the past, stripped of self analysis system, or a general pardon addressed to the nations that have suffered from it will remain the same. The strengthening and the deepening of the traditional alliance with Russia, from the lack of any agreement with its traditional opponents, mainly the US would turn it again into a problematic state for the Balkans, probably even in any combination of world politics (Ramani, 2016; Deutsche Welle, 2016). To exploit the moment is a sign of the wisdom of a nation and its governing elites. To fulfill the duties means, to prepare the nation to cope with the contingencies of history, and so in the distant decades, historians will

write that Albanians in the XX-XXI century fulfilled in the best possible way their part of the mission in the universal history. The possibility is offered, to what extent it will be used from Kosovo remains still to be seen.

The declaration of independence of Kosovo and its recognition by the US and most of the European countries constitutes a milestone triumph for all Albanians in the world. But this moment in history should not be seen only as a triumph of the Albanian factor in the region and in the world, this moment in history must be experienced as a historic opportunity for the Albanian people to demonstrate with concrete steps that shares the same democratic principles and values as the other part of the free world. The recognition of Kosovo's independence from countries like USA, Germany, Japan, England, France, shows the belief that these countries have that the Albanian people deserve a chance to prove themselves to be worthy for a place at the table of the European family and in the world (Champion, 2016). It is the duty of the Albanians to prove with deeds and not with words that this trust and this colossal investment being made in Kosovo is on the benefit of not only Albanians but also international investors living in a free democratic society, it means to live in a society that is always changing. Change in Kosovo is extremely welcomed by the simple people that have almost a life that expects a better promised future. It is the responsibility of the Kosovo government to put in place the democratic authority of law, to end criminal groups operating in Kosovo, to end various traffics, to end corruption in the administration, to give solutions from the simplest problems such as the device with an ID of all its citizens, to the biggest problem, as it is the privatization of plants, factories and mines of Kosovo, or the legal recognition of private property (Castillo, 2008). This is in itself the biggest challenge for the future of Kosovo as if it is not addressed correctly and quickly, that means that development will be slow and will take time. Kosovo's government does not only has a historic responsibility towards citizens of Kosovo, it also has a direct responsibility to investors countries in Kosovo that sponsored in the Kosovo's independence such as the US, EU and NATO. If these countries do not see positive changes in Kosovo in the coming years, they will be less inclined to invest in Kosovo, and also hesitant to their own mission in Kosovo (Tota, 2015). This is a great historical responsibility for the government and democratic institutions of Kosovo. The declaration

of independence was the first relatively easily step, the embodiment of an independent and free Kosovo is the greatest historical challenge for all Albanian factor in the world and Kosovo as well. Another extraordinary challenge is the integration of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, in the life of the new state of Kosovo (Merki, 2015). If the Serbs living in Kosovo reject this state, black clouds of division will remain in Kosovo in the future. Kosovo's future plans should give particular importance to this aspect and the problem which could lead to the disintegration of the country as a whole. This challenge should be seen as a race of the Prishtina's government and the Belgrade's government as well, to win the hearts and minds of the Serbian minority in Kosovo (Szpala, 2016). The parties' positions are understandable when we take into account the history between the two nations and their emphasized nationalism which always led to conflicts and war. But this does not mean that with the declaration of independence, the coexistence between Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo is ended. Instead, foreign countries sponsoring of independence of Kosovo recognize this independence because they think they can build in Kosovo a new democratic state where the rights of all minorities are respected (Rashiti & Prelec, 2015). The greatest damage that Kosovo would suffer in the world's public opinion is a potential ethnic confrontation in Kosovo that would create waves of Serbian refugees leaving Kosovo or the outbreak of a potential conflict. Now days sixteen years after the independence of Kosovo there is still confrontation and ethnic conflicts between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian minority in Kosovo. This is a conflict which has nationalistic motives and to put an end to this, the governments of both countries need to plan possibilities for fair, democratic relationships. However, the government of Kosovo should be the one to take concrete steps in many ways, not just gestures and words in media, in the future they should create opportunities for the Serbian minority to integrate into the life of the new state of Kosovo. What good will indicate for good more than any other thing this challenge are successfully applying democratic reforms in Kosovo to spark the economy of Kosovo, they open green light to investment of foreign countries, and the citizens of Kosovo, Albanians and Serbian, would have so more job opportunities that will lead to increase the welfare of the country. This will raise awareness more than anything to the Serbian minority in Kosovo to become a party to an independent and sovereign state of Kosovo, rejecting Belgrade's

support in this regard. Another advantage that the Kosovo's government has compared to the Belgrade's government is the support of the European Union (Lilyanova, 2016). The European Union will play a leading role in the logistic and economic assistance to new European state, as well as will offer to Kosovo the same package that the government in Belgrade rejected many times, that is a membership agreement in the European Union and NATO which already is in the process of happening, even though it might take time. The benefits that come with the membership in the European Union would be another great card for Serbian minority tempting to embrace the identity of the citizens of Kosovo. The last thing which is very important to address these challenges about the Serbian minority is the active role which should be played by men's of the state of Kosovo. Frequent meetings with the Serb minority, the Serbian minority representation in all levels of the state of Kosovo, addressing their problems with the Kosovo's government investment, the promoting of coexistence creating concrete conditions of the education system and that of medical, the close cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church leaders in Kosovo will open over time the closed doors of the mind and heart of the Serbian minority in Kosovo (Visoka, 2017). It is important for Albanians to understand, that from the moment of independence, it is the responsibility of the Albanian majority in Kosovo to give the hand to the Serbian minority in Kosovo. And this is not simply because Europeans say so, this is because with the integration of the Serbian minority to the life of Albanians, is depended also the country's future on the state of Kosovo. The success in front of this challenge means a lasting peace in Kosovo and the failure means cleavage or destruction of everything that Kosovo has managed to build so far. The attitude that the government of Prishtina will hold against minorities will affect more than anything else in the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the Serbian state. So it is better for Kosovo to reconsider in the future the position of Serbian minorities in Kosovo. On the other hand the biggest threat to the security of Kosovo and the stability of the region depends on the attitude that Serbia will keep on Kosovo in the coming years. Many might label someone Serbia today as a destabilizing factor in the region (Today Online, 2017). The hope of international community is that with time, the Serbian side will reflect on its position and will recognize the new reality created in Kosovo. Positive is the fact that Belgrade has not chosen a violent reaction in Kosovo to

have a military confrontation with NATO troops in Kosovo. Positive is also the fact that Serbia has not taken any internally destabilization effort. Nevertheless until today, Belgrade has not given any sign that it is ready to give up the attempt to regain Kosovo as a part of Serbia (Bytyci(a), 2017). The dream of having Kosovo's lands still continues. In such conditions, the stance of the Kosovo's government together with international mediation, have a historic role to play in the following weeks years, to reach in the brake of the curfew of Serbia over Kosovo. What role should play the government in Kosovo is this case must be clear. Firstly, it is important that the leaders of institutions in Kosovo to seek earnestly the establishing of diplomatic relations with Serbia. In current conditions, the Albanian position should be a pragmatic attitude devoured of excessive triumphs and confidences. Restoring of relations with Serbia, in the new reports between two sovereign states should be the objective of Kosovo's government. This will neutralize the threat and will give a chance of permanent peace in the region. It is understood that the Serbian side will reject any kind of communication regarding the Kosovo's situation, meeting with leaders of the Albanian state, since does not want to recognize Kosovo's independence fairly or indirectly. This thing should not discourage the Albanian side in constant search of recognition of Kosovo's independence. Belgrade finds itself in difficulties in Kosovo, but Serbians drama does not end with Kosovo. Kosovo for them is the last act of a drama that is being played for decades and has the name of the drama of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Belgrade is aware that could not provoke a military conflict with NATO forces in Kosovo, as it is aware that if trying to destabilize Kosovo from inside, the Serbian minority in Kosovo will be the one who will suffer the consequences of such policy. In such conditions, Belgrade's only option is military and economic curfew of Kosovo as an investment to turn the European experiment in Kosovo as a failed experiment. On the other hand, the other only hope of Belgrade is to discourage military and economic pledging of international community in Kosovo and their departure from Kosovo, leaving it at the fates of mercy. Therefore the Serbian side will continue to reject any kind of contact and communication with the Albanian side in Kosovo for diplomatic relations and recognition of Kosovo. Kosovo's government from its part should begin itself the public offensive to win the hearts and minds of the Serbian minority in Kosovo. It is easier for

the Albanian government to win the mind and heart of those Serbians who live in Kosovo than the statesmen in Belgrade. And the attitude that the state and the Albanian majority in Kosovo will hold against the Serbian minority in Kosovo, is also key to the degradation of this curfew. If the Serbians in Kosovo feel safe in their homes, if they have an education and employment, and if Kosovo is accepted into the European Union will not be far the day that Serbian minority will elect the participation and not the boycott in the new Kosovo society (Zulfaj, 2015).

The second attitude of the government of Kosovo which will play a major role in the changing of the Serbian public opinion is the position and reports that the government of Kosovo will create with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. Kosovo's government must put into motion everything to gain trust and lines of the communication with the Serbian Orthodox clergy in Kosovo. This is a pressing matter since the Serbian people and all Slavic peoples are very sensitive to the Orthodox heritage in Kosovo (The Economist, 2013). If the news coming from Kosovo is about the handshake of leaders of the Albanian state with Serbian clergy, this will help enormously in reducing and cooling the anger in Belgrade and beyond and in the instinctive awareness that Albanians are supposedly not as bad as they thought. But if the news from Kosovo will not be such, Kosovo would automatically turn into the Palestine of the Balkans since the Christian people's reaction would be quite large. The ideal solution would be over time the acceptance of the Serbian party time that an independent Kosovo does not mean a lost Kosovo. Serbians may have lost the sovereignty and the administrative control of Kosovo, but it does not mean that they have lost the ability to move freely and to celebrate their religious holidays in Kosovo as they can do in any other country. International presence and the commitment would help mediate between the parties and achieving this solution acceptable for both sides.

The future plans of Kosovo without leaving behind the problems that come from Serbian nationalism, at this moments evolve around it integration in EU. The process of European integration is the key national priority of the Republic of Kosovo which is displayed from the moment of its independence (Tanasijević, 2015). The main

challenges for Kosovo in the path towards EU membership have to do with understanding of the process and its consequences, the commitment and the dedication of the government who should treat the European integration as a priority of the first order, stable and powerful institutions, administrative capacity to prepare and implement strategies and consistent plans, which have to be coherent and well-coordinated, to ensure the economic growth with rapid steps toward the European Union (Krasniqi, 2015). According to the EU criteria, for a country to be a member and join it should undergo some stages and steps, such as the study of feasibility, negotiations on stabilization and association, stabilization and association agreement, the implementation of the stabilization and association agreements, application for membership, European Commission opinion, accession negotiations and finally the full membership of a country (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012). To switch to these stages Kosovo needs a big commitment, from not only the governmental institutions but also from the citizens who can give a great contribution toward the integration process. Leaving behind the membership of European Union and looking forward at the future of economy in Kosovo it must be said that there is still a lot to be done.

Regarding economic activities and development of Kosovo, the inclusion and the dimensions of economy are an important venture not only for investment but also for the development of research activities in the field of transition, market economy and entrepreneurship in this country (Krasniqi, 2016). The future plans regarding the economy should be tightly strengthened. For this is a reason to increase the possibilities of a further conflict with Serbia. The stronger the economy the stronger the country and such the less are possibilities to be under oppression from a nationalistic state as is the case with Serbia. The development of an open market economy and democratic structures of society in Kosovo are considered as a necessity for stimulating the economical activity. Kosovo's economic system must be compatible with the goals of people of Kosovo for the building of a free democratic society (Krasniqi, 2016). Given the human resources, natural and other resources created, a good economic system should stimulate the creative abilities and free initiative for development. Human resources, with their quality, represent the most important factor of development in terms of a modern education for entrepreneurship. In function of this need in Kosovo is

necessary a business education program. Economic aspects of the issue of Kosovo from its complexity and implications require strong commitment to international factors.

This situation of ethnical conflicts and hate is against not only to the will of the people of Kosovo but also with important international acts and international order. This is an obstacle not only for the development of Kosovo, but also objectively even for Serbia and Albania with very negative implications for the region. A troubled Balkan without deep economic and social transformations, without a free market economy and without open borders, will be the source of tectonic processes that are expressed in migrations and population movements, which now pose a significant problem in Kosovo. It is considered essential and of great importance for Kosovo to make important strides in the economic development of the country. The integration of every citizen and the opening of jobs or businesses with strong international allies would lead to an increase in the economic level throughout the country. Kosovo in the future should accelerate its moves towards a road that leads to the European Union. Otherwise the slower the process of development the rapid will be the possibility of conflict between Serbian and Kosovo nationalists (Tellmann, 2015). This is something that should be stopped at any cost by Kosovo; otherwise acceleration toward fights for territory could happen again.

Kosovo plays an important role for peace in the Balkan region and therefore in the future needs to develop education and work development programs across the country (Phillips, 1996). Also on the other hand it is vital for the interest of the state of Kosovo to continue dialogue with Serbia in order to normalize the reports permanently, it is important for both parties to cooperate to resolve the issues they have, but without doubt it has to work for very good relations with all the neighbors in the common path to EU integration. Good relationships between the Balkan countries would lead to the strengthening of the region and would change its role in the world.

The EU attaches special importance to deepening the cooperation between the Western Balkan countries; the steps of close cooperation between the Western Balkan countries are something also necessary (Rettman, 2016). It is estimated as something of great

importance in Kosovo to undertake economic reforms, to promote the economy, which will promote the competitiveness of Kosovo and will lead to growth and job creation. Thus Kosovo's future plans should be taking into consideration most of the important issues which now constitutes a problem in the country and the region as well.

In conclusion what can be said about the future plans in Kosovo is that although gained the independence Kosovo is not fully successful in its reforms and developments. Some of the factors that have affected in the low economy of Kosovo are a destroyed economy after the war and the lack of investment in sectors where employment is provided. To overcome this situation, Kosovo must develop a genuine strategy with clear visions. Investments in the road infrastructure and less in the development of the real economy and the healthy economic growth have made Kosovo be in this economic situation. Above all, the lack of a medium term development plan with clear visions, the business environment not suitable where it is difficult to ensure the arrival of foreign investment, the protection of domestic investments, have made the economy of Kosovo to not be at the appropriate level (Synovitz, 2013). After the war, Kosovo inherited a damaged economy. Kosovo's economic problems were as a result of many factors, as Kosovo has been the most underdeveloped country in the former Yugoslavia, then the multiple damage during the 1999 war, the lack of capacity, both in terms of infrastructure and human resources, the lack of policies to address social issues, have challenged the development of Kosovo and its future. Economic development and the improvement of economic and social situation of citizens remains one of the biggest challenges for institutions of Kosovo (Loxha & Rogova, 2012). Nevertheless many things need to be done and taken into consideration from the government of Kosovo. The government should adopt a strategic plan, a real plan, and engage in improving the environment of economic development of Kosovo. It is a must for the market of Kosovo to be organized and the financial market to be in the favor of economic development and not in the development of itself. Of course, this can take time; maybe decades and a generation will have to sacrifice for the next generation. The future plans seem to evolve around the development of economy, around the end of ethnical conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, and the integration to EU. One can never know what will happen in the future

decades between these two countries, whether Serbia will recognize its independence or not is still to be seen.

## **5. CASE STUDY – GREATER ALBANIA**

### **5.1. Introduction**

To write about the Albanian case it should be taken into consideration its history and other involved countries of Balkan region. Ethnic Albanian concept begins after the Berlin Congress in 1878, which recognized the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, who achieved to take within their territories many of Albanian recognized centers. In an effort to counter the Berlin Congress, the League of Prizren, created a sensibility in the region.

Interests of foreign powers intertwined with those of its old allies, managed to extinguish the first serious attempt of Albanians to save their homes intact, included within 4 vilayets, those of Kosovo, of Shkodra, of Manastir and that of Janina, who remained incomplete. Since 1912 when Albanians created their fragile state and imposed the world the recognition of Albania with the today's borders as an autonomous principality under the sovereign guarantee of the six Great Powers, the concept of ethnic Albania being to reinforce. The secret Treaty of London, held in 1915 could make possible the partition of Albania in a larger scale, reducing it to a small principality that included the rivers of Mat and Shkumbin. (Batt, 2008) These disasters came to Albania, mainly due to the lack of powerful allies inside the old continent. Its Slavic neighbors traditionally helped from Russia, managed to win more lands and spaces. As regarding

Italy, it has always been hesitant and tended to have a part of Albania in the other side of the Adriatic. Bickering among Albanians, which were associated with the lack of a government of Albanians during WWI, made Albania that at the end of it to have a neutral stance and to not be part of any warring camps. Despite the request based on the concept of true Albania, or as it was called Ethnic Albania, which the Albanian mission would openly show at the Peace Conference of 1919, the demands of neighbors were much more drastic and consisted the further separation of Albania, under which Serbia could come at least until the Drin River, Montenegro would receive the Shkodra region, Greece region of Korca and Gjirokastra, and Italy that of Vlora. However Albanians managed to maintain its borders which were set in 1913, while in the remaining lands outside the motherland, lives nearly half of the population of Albanians. However despite the partition of it, the desire for an ethnic Albania still exists among nationalists of Albania.

## **5.2. Recent Events**

To draw a better framework regarding the possibilities of a Greater Ethnic Albania, the recent events of May 2015 in Macedonia were a spark of fire which woke up the Albanians nationalistic feelings again (Pajaziti, 2015). What happened on 9<sup>th</sup> of May 2015 somehow remained unclear for many Albanians and Kosovo Albanians as well. However what is being claimed from Albanians and Kosovo Albanians is that despite the inflammatory nationalistic feelings they have for a Greater Albania, in the recent events of the city of Kumanovo-Macedonia in fact there is nothing Albanian, nothing ethnic, nothing Muslim and nothing to implicate the two Albanian states, Albania and Kosovo. These two countries do not remain behind the crisis of Kumanovo. Until now all the analytical options lead to Gruevski's government and its ties with its favorite neighbors in the regional and in Russia. What is being said is that in order to remove attention away from tapping scandals against Albanians in which Gruevski was implicated it was necessary such a terroristic scenario (Mejdini(b), 2015). The failure of such a scenario was a powerful slap for the Gruevski's government in internal plans, regionally and internationally. The autocratic regime of Gruevski has already broken the

dark scenarios. So it is completely outdated and stigmatized. But what happened in Kumanovo and why all this hate against Albanians of Macedonia?

In the early morning of 9<sup>th</sup> of May the city woke up by powerful gunfire, helicopters and a terrible situation in smoke and fear. Albanian citizens in this city were not expecting this event, which is bringing back the year 2001. Children under tears, women and elderly people terrified by the shots and the real war had engulfed the city, especially the famous neighborhood "neighborhood of the braves". Action in Kumanovo between policemen and the so-called terrorist group from Kosovo ended with 10 killed, one of them committing suicide. In one article of *Balkan Insight*, Sinisa Jakov Marusic (2015) states about this terrorist group that:

“The police neutralized "one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the Balkans, whose founders are former NLA members" that had more than 40 well armed and well trained members. The group had five more prominent members or leaders, all Kosovo citizens, Muhamed Krasniqi known as commander Malisheva, Mirsad Ndrecaj known as commander Nato, Sami Ukshini known as commander Sokoli, Beg Rizaj alias commander Begu and Deme Shehu alias Juniku” (Marusic, 2015, p. p.3).

In this clash between Macedonian police and terrorist group were arrested 26 other people from the attacking group. The “neighborhood of the braves” in Kumanovo was turned into a powerful battle between police and a group of heavily armed mass which terrified residents from 05:00 am in the morning of 9<sup>th</sup> May. At about 20:00 pm, after the shootings that had intermittently throughout the day, 26 of them from the armed group surrendered with white flags, while the rest refused to give in, therefore just at the moment it was realized the final intervention of Special Forces. Albanian citizens of “neighborhood of braves” were evacuated, and one part of the city of Kumanovo was in full curfew by Macedonian police, action in which the military was involved. Local media was the first to give information about the victims. According to the media, beside the policemen’s and the striker group, also lost their lives Albanian civilians, among them three of the elderly, an 8 year old girl and her parents (Pajazit(a)i, 2015). Residents still don’t have a clear truth, except gossips that there are terrorist groups from Kosovo and that police is hunting in their direction. What is stated by the interior Minister of Macedonia *Ivo Kotevski* is that:

“the group entered Macedonia at the beginning of May to launch attacks on state institutions and hid out in Kumanovo's western neighborhood, where police found a huge arsenal of weapons.” (Kotevski, 2015, p. p.1).

Such scenarios have always targeted this poor and damaged area of the Albanians. Such scenarios, serve as an alibi to the current power, to attract the attention from the political crisis. Albanian political leaders are also responsible for the recent events and this evil situation that occurred in Macedonia. All have a responsibility because thanks to them today Kumanovo and Albanians in Macedonia are experiencing an ominous scenario and horror of terror. Exactly political leaders of these regions have the great responsibility, to account, to explain and to prevent this scenario and play of the devil. Behind these recent events where police officers, Albanian civilians and an eight year old child were killed it's a dark hand which masters this entire evil plan from the government of Macedonia (The Guardian, 2105).

What is happening these days in Macedonia deserves abstinence without doubt, and even deep reflection. And if Macedonians and Albanians both need more maturity the deep reflection needs to be trilateral, including here Kosovo as well, as neither eternal imprisonment of six Albanians, nor the reaction with the flags of a religious radicalization which conflicts with the Albanian interests, cannot be justified. These are the consequences of partial implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and a loss of confidence among Albanians, for which the guarantors should not require all reasons outside the scope of their responsibilities (Iseni & Bajrami, 2014). Religious radicalism flags and ethnical problems are not just the reason of such a conflict, but the corrosive social sores, impoverishment, unemployment, bad education and isolation, cause the most aggressive reactions in social organization of a community (Iseni & Bajrami, 2014). And for these problems should be discussed not only between parties in Macedonia and Albania but all parties in the Balkan region. The crisis of Kumanovo is a crisis of Macedonia as a whole. It is a political, ethnical, democracy, security, socio-economical and geopolitical crisis. The cause of the crisis is Gruevski's government with all its members, which includes political allies, security structure, stakeholders and geopolitical neighbors factors. Kumanovo was found as a position for crisis for reasons of its very delicate location. The city of Kumanovo is a triangle between Kosovo,

Macedonia and Serbia. In that area it crosses the highway, electric railways from Greece to Paris and Germany. Exactly there, it is thought that certain regional factors support the Russian South Stream project as an alternative to Western TAP project. Such a statement was also done and written by *Kurir* newspaper in Greece (2015) which writes that:

“Recently Macedonia and Serbia were mentioned as countries that will be on the line of Turkish Stream – the new Russian backed gas pipeline. Greece is working with Russia to have the pipeline cross its territory, before it turns northwards through Macedonia, and commentators in the region have connected this proposal with the calls for instability in the Balkans.” (Kristina, 2015, p. p.2).

So, obviously, it was found the right place to detonate a crisis that would implicate many political, ethnic, economic and geopolitical aspects. The more time passes, the more it becomes clear the malicious script done in purpose. It can be said that the most recent events in Macedonia, damaged the Albanians in Kumanovo who live in the most remote point in the northeastern of Macedonia, it damaged all of the Albanians in Macedonia but also in the Presevo Valley and Albanians in general. Albanians at this moment do not need any armed clashes, neither near the borders nor in the territories of neighboring states. These acts and attacks damaged in Kumanovo the opposition in Macedonia, because recently it has solved many unwashed clothes and secrets of the current government. However, the benefit of this entire situation is only of the Macedonian authorities and Gruevski’s government, who overshadowed by these acts what the opposition is revealing for it. Nevertheless all these events were used as a catalyst from Serbia and Greece as well claiming that this is something done from Albanians following their politics and inspirations for a greater Albania. In one of the Greek newspapers *Kurir* (2015) it was stated that:

“there were recent nationalist comments from Albanian politicians, from both Albania and Kosovo, about creating a greater Albanian state.” (Kristina, 2015, p. p.2).

It is true that nationalistic feelings spurred among Albanians because no one can stay and watch what is happening to their Albanian citizens without giving an opinion or a handful help, even though the Albanian government remained quiet and acted with

diplomacy toward such provocations saying that such events have nothing to do with the desire of Albanians for a Greater Albania. Thus, claims that Albania and Kosovo is doing all this scenario to open possibilities for a greater Albania were all rejected. This claim is also rejected by the president of Albania Mr. Bujar Nishani in 2015 in which he states that:

“Interethnic coexistence in Macedonia is a treasure that needs to be cherished. In opposition to that someone is interested in destabilizing Macedonia, by expanding the gap of intolerance between the Albanians and Macedonians. An interethnic conflict would be devastating for Macedonia. Albania has been the first to recognize Macedonia, supports its Euro-Atlantic integration, taking into account the existence of the Albanian factor as a constituent factor. Albania has a consolidated foreign policy and support edits involvement in the Euro-Atlantic processes.” (Nishani, 2015, p. p.1).

What Nishani said is that, Albania is very interested in its road to European Union and has always been a support for Macedonia in doing the same. Interethnic conflicts cannot be part of the Albanian political agenda between these two countries. This situation is unclear and needs an analytical view from both sides. It is necessary to solve this problem with diplomacy, rather than falling into the trap of provocations from powers that want such a conflict to happen between Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. On the other hand regarding this recent conflict it can be said that failure in governing the country creates always a climate in which different organized groups or semi-organized groups coming from outside or from within, things which little matters, manage to find ground. They are based on the depreciation of the Albanians in the government; their corruption causes anger among Albanians. 52 percent of Macedonian Albanians are not represented in politics (Bugajski, 1994). This dissatisfaction culminates in such incidents. This has nothing to do with the concept of a "Greater Albania", with Kosovo, Albania and so on. This is a frustration within the Albanians in Macedonia and in way is addressed to their representatives in the government. However the situation remains unclear and many doubts are gathered over the conflict. This conflict served as a ground for Serbia and Greece to attack Albania and Kosovo by saying that the acts happened in Macedonia are hidden politics and agenda of Albanian government to achieve their dream of a Greater Albania. Nevertheless such claims are not based on facts. What can be said is that Albanian nationalistic feelings arose again but after the accidents that happened in

Macedonia. But taking into consideration the actual political situation in the Balkans but not only, Albania is more focused on its membership of EU rather than on the desire of a Greater Albania. What's going to happen is still to be seen.

### **5.3. Possibilities of a Greater Albania**

On 28<sup>th</sup> of November 1912, the Assembly of Vlora, declared the independence of the so-called Ethnic Albania from the Ottoman Empire (BBC, 2012). In 1912, the Ottoman Empire had started the irreversible process of decomposition, and in Europe only eight vilayets were left, of which four were of ethnic Albanian majority and presence (Boeckh & Rutar, 2016). Who and what was named Albanian in that period was not so easy to define as it is today. Albanian renaissances tried to define it but it needed time to run down their ideas to the Albanians. Albanian nation was an idea, a project, like all other European nations. When the assembly of Vlora declared the independence of Albania, the unilateral declaration of independence did not include the entire territory of the four majority Albanian vilayets . Vilayet of Shkodra and Janina were declared part of the new Albanian state almost in their entirety, but from the Vilayet of Manastir and Kosovo only some Sandzaks (subdivision within sainthood) were included in the boundaries of the state. (Kolasi, 2013). From the Vilayet of Kosovo, part of Albania were pleaded and declared only the Sandzaks of Prizren, Novi Pazar and Pristina, while from the Vilayet of Manastir were declared as Albanian territories only the Sandzaks of Korca, Elbasan and Dibra (Kolasi, 2013). Albania's present borders were recognized by the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913. Certainly the partition and contraction of the borders in the territory that Albania has today is a great injustice for the Albanians that is why the nationalistic sentiments for a greater and united Albania are not missing among Albanians of Albania and Kosovo mostly (Louise, 2011). The injustice done to them years ago should come to an end according to them, because only so Albania would be much stronger and in peace. But such claims are not welcomed by the other Balkan regions and neighbors. They clash with the Serbian idea of a Great Serbia, with the state of Greece and Macedonia, as well as with many other regions involved.

However, in various political and diplomatic academic circles is talked about the so called "Greater Albania". Albanians regardless of where they live, the term "Greater Albania" is considered a foreign term. Instead they use different synonyms as "National Unity", "Ethnic Albania" or "United Albania" (Kolasi, 2013). Albanians, especially the intellectual elite say that national unity and a "Greater Albania" is not the same thing. They explain that the national unity is a simple national union of territories which were separated throughout history, or a kind of re-arrangement of a historical error done in 1912-1913. This has been made by many other nations. While the "Greater Albania" is a territoriality approach which means gaining access to new territories. Milosevic in Serbia has tried to do the same on the plan of "Naçartania" to realize the project of a "Greater Serbia". It is known his

‘idea that wherever there are Serbian graves, there is Serbia’ (Colovic, 2002, p. 27).

Nevertheless, internationals and foreign powers have a different viewpoint on the national unification of Albanians. What they say is that the unification of Albanians in one state by the term ‘Greater Albania’ means undermining and destroying the current borders in the Balkans (Balla, et al., 2014; Ardolic, 2009). If Kosovo and Albania, and other areas populated by Albanians (Sothern Serbia or Eastern Kosovo, Cameria in Greece, parts of Macedonia and Montenegro) come together, then this is called by internationals as a pan-Albanian state which is dangerous in the Balkans. On the other hand, a part of the Albanian intellectuals especially some intellectuals in Albania with a Kosovo origin oppose it, saying they have all the rights to join the separate parts of Albania during the Balkan wars. In fact do Albanians want to come together? Are there anyplans for a "Greater Albania"? Do Albanians want a single Albanian state in the Balkans? Do they have to face with the challenges of a Greater Albania? Although the myth about a "Greater Albania" or as Albanians like to refer a united Albania, is not that powerful, foreign politicians refer to it as a risk that one day might become a reality. Such intense and broad articulations that represents the idea of ‘Greater Albania’ from official regional and international policy environments, from analysts and from media, does not conform with the support, influence and impact that this idea has in reality in Albania, Kosovo or Macedonia. Actually Albanians in Macedonia and the Presevo

Valley have not that strong feelings regarding the union of nation based on nationalism or patriotism to become one in the future (Balla, et al., 2014). With the exception of some part of the population, the parties in Macedonia and in Presevo Valley that are in power, deal more with the rights and problems that exist in this country rather than with the idea of a "Greater Albania". Wars that have been made in these countries have proven that the Albanians want to gain their rights and participate equally in the political, economic and other fields in the country. Beside this, however there are politicians and analysts in all territories inhabited by Albanians who say that national unity should actually happen. Even the Academy of Science of Albania since 1998 came up with a document titled "Platform for resolving the Albanian unresolved question". The interpretation of this platform was the movement for the liberation of Albanian lands from foreign invaders and their union in a single national state. Many politicians and analysts have discussed about this issue. What they say is that this platform is much more mythical than practical. However, this platform although it has quite positive values, didn't have that much importance due to the intensive developments and the tendency of European integration in the Balkans.

Also some of the political parties in Kosovo believe that the platform of national unity for a "Greater Albania", is unfeasible and impossible because of geopolitical circumstances that oppose such a dream (Ardolic, 2009). But it is not just geopolitics that makes it impossible such a unity. What it lacks Albanians for so long is the power. Albanians are people who have always struggled being occupied by various powers. This fact makes Albania powerless and helpless in a way. Albanian dream to one day unite it is a part of their collective consciousness and nationalistic feelings and it continues to remain so, but until now without passing to a political program because Albanians have always been poor and weak, without support from the big powers to achieve such a dream. Undoubtedly whenever talking about the awakening of nationalism among Albanians they mostly refer to the life and work of Skanderbeg, Albania's greatest hero. Skanderbeg was the first fighter and statesman who gathered all Albanians of that time in the war against the Ottoman Empire. He liberated the country reaching so a great success, for which he now enjoys the epithet of Albania's greatest hero and not only that, he is also respected from a large part of Europe. Besides the

national hero of Albania, Skanderbeg, another movement that reinforces the myth of national unity is the Albanian National Renaissance; this movement was influenced by the so-called "Eastern crisis" in 1875- 1878. The reason of this nationwide organization from the Albanian elite of that time was the very critical national situation after the signing of the Russian Treaty of San Stefano. This treaty attaches to many Slavic states, territories traditionally inhabited by ethnic Albanians. This treaty had forced the Albanian Renaissances to gather in Prizren the representatives of all Albanians in the Balkans, to protect the lands, which the treaty distributed to the Slavic states. From the Albanian League of Prizren came out the requirement that all the territories inhabited by Albanians to unite in a single country. But this demand was rejected by the Congress of Berlin in July 1878 (Marriot, 1917). As is known in the later years Albanians would face tense situations. Ottoman Empire would further exacerbate the relations with Albanians, trying to make the assimilation of Albanians. In a multinational society, such as that of the Ottoman Empire, the life of its citizens, was organized around faith, which they belonged, that means, the line between the governed and governors or more specifically the hegemonic population was religion and not the nationality. Obviously as throughout the Empire, Muslims would benefit a privileged position which in the case of Albania was an objective obstacle to achieve the national unity of Muslims with Christians let them be Orthodox or Catholic (Fischer(a), 2005). Albanians were in a difficult position because the Sublime Porte considered Albanians despite the nation, as Muslim based on the terms of Islam. So religion was the most important instance for the Ottomans. Nevertheless, this tendency of the Sublime Porte had encountered resistance from Albanians because religion for them played always the second role after the nation. It is known the attitude of Albanians that "religion of Albanians is Albanianism" (Misha, 2012). However, researches show that these differences or the Albanians wearing with the Islamic culture of the Ottoman Empire was a serious obstacle to national unity for Albanians. The Sublime Porte was tolerant with the non-Muslim civilians, for example with the Greeks that were allowed to be educated in their mother tongue. While on the other hand it was strictly forbidden for Albanians to be educated in their mother tongue, although the majority of them belonged to the Muslim religion (Fischer(b), 2005). In the years of 1912 - 1913 when the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse in the Balkans,

was held the London Conference. In this conference it was decided the independence of Albania but without Kosovo, which would become part of Serbia and Montenegro. The year of 1913 is the most unfortunate year throughout the history of Albania. Since then, Kosovo Albanians have dreamed and fought until later, to unite with Albania and become one. The number 13 is considered as an unlucky number for many Albanians. However, as years passed by and Albania was an independent country with its own government, when it comes to Kosovo Albanians until 1997 when asked about the unity of Kosovo and Albania the answer is somehow negative (Aydın & Progonati, 2011). This is as a cause of the communist regime of Albania. During the communist rule of Enver Hoxha, Albanians of Kosovo and Albania did not have communication with each other because of the poor relations between Albania and the former Yugoslavia. This long lasting lack of communication made Albanians from Albania and Kosovo, especially Kosovans to idealize Enver Hoxha and Albania. Enver Hoxha, hiding the truth regarding Kosovo had benefited the sympathy of them. Their sympathy for Enver Hoxha came as a result of television sophisticated propaganda by hiding the truth regarding his regime. Like all dictators he was quite popular, especially in Kosovo. Regarding this fact, analysts in Kosovo and Albania agreed in one fact, that the difference between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians is that Albanians hate Enver Hoxha, while Kosovo loves him (BotaPress, 2016). After the fall of the regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania, Albanians destroyed this kind of Berlin wall between them and Kosovo, so the communications and interactions become more frequent. When Kosovo Albanians began to go in Albania (Albania for Kosovo was the state of development, freedom, equality,) they discovered the disaster that had served the regime of Enver Hoxha and remain terrified. They found nothing in the Albania they used to watch on TV or from Albania they heard from their parents. Some of these young intellectuals in returning to Kosovo showed their emotion when they discovered the real Albania and the myth of Enver Hoxha took another form of consciousness among Kosovo Albanians. Other intellectuals shocked by what they saw in the land of eagles reacted in different ways by writing articles and news all over the country so everyone would see the reality in Albania.

Among other things as the fall of the Berlin Wall or as the great failure of the negative utopia such communism, did not plagued the wall between Kosovo and Albania, but this authentic crash of utopias caused the fall of the wall and the positive image of communism in their heads. Finally, Kosovo was able to compare its authentic utopia which was Albania with itself. The awakening from anesthesia caused a monumental despair and disappointment. Images and ideals that Kosovo had conceived for this utopia that she called Albania, soon while comparing with the reality in Albania crashed to the ground, in a tragic apocalypse for Kosovo Albanians. The ships in the port of Durres a city in Albania, carrying people, tired from communism and isolation, in a radical and extreme way, escaped towards another utopia which carried the name Europe (Mai & King, 2008). The difference between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians is the change of people to those who were dressed with the sense of homeland, and those who were naked from the concept of homeland. Nothing was important anymore after the collapse of communism for Albanians, except the fact to leave the country toward Europe away from isolation for a better future and life. This part of intellectuals who "discovered" the truth of Albania realized that Albania could not be part of their homeland even though they loved and wanted it. Albania of which Kosovo Albanians had suffered was only in their collective consciousness but the real Albania was really miserable and far poorer than Kosovo when communism collapsed (Pearson, 2006). The ugliness and misery of reality which was discovered destroyed their dreams of uniting with Albania. However with the passing of years and Albanians development and democracy things started to change and the relations between Albania and Kosovo remained always stable and firm. Connected by the feeling of brotherhood, one language, one flag and one culture nationalistic feelings started to rise again and the idea of a "Greater Albania" become much more stronger among these two countries that shared a common blood. The demand of Kosovo to unite with Albania directly has to do with the protection of identity and with the overall national and state interest of Ethnic Albania, which is in accordance with the right of self-determination as a principle and a fundamental value of the international rights. However taking into consideration the possibilities of a greater autochthonous Albania it is needed a fair review not only of its history but also that of the political situation in the Balkans, and the role that international community plays.

Balkans today seems to be put into a spiral of loss, whether it is economical but also geopolitical. What has remained unchanged is the permanently thirst for nationalism, not in a state but in almost all the states of Balkans, the consequences of which is the design of a new geopolitical crisis, and in the horizon is seen a non clear perspective, sometimes even suspicious with division scenarios and others that await the moment and the right time to come out in the scene of contradictions (Amato & Bildt, 2005). These scenarios are what hold the territory in a dilemma, a territory which by chance happens to be in the most privileged geographical part of Europe. In the Balkans continues the pledge of a historical past, where religions, civilizations and ideologies in dimensions that crossed the region and the world further in size clashed all the time. For this reason, its territory has always attracted regional and global power to achieve their interests and hence, by which require a starting base, to expand to other regions of the world (Apponyi, 1915; B92, 2013). Without looking at the evaluation of Balkans nationalism, for Albanians the journey of its history, it is still a bleeding wound and if it continues this way will continue to flow pain. Situated in this reality of Albania, anyone named Albanian, somehow feels guilty and wants, somehow in its own way to contribute to this injustice by turmoil of Europe in that time. For Albanians, the great powers, fearful of a great Albania used the political and military mists, and chopped the vital body parts (Batt, 2008). Undoubtedly, in this ethnic anatomic assessment, Albania is what drives the boat of nationalism in the Balkan rough waters, with countries where European mentality is felt. It seems that the Albanians threw the nationalism card for many reasons, carefully present in the market, waiting with optimism for its solution of this pending desire. Even military strategists reassess the unification of Kosovo with Albania and other Albanian parts of Macedonia, Montenegro, eastern Kosovo, and Cameria as a powerful Albanian state in the region, economically and militarily, in other words, a geopolitical and geostrategic force in the Balkans (IBP USA, 2013). On the military side such a fact, in theoretical terms, as the need of the movement of national spirit is just an initiative that opens the way to create the lacking strategic vision for the future of Albania. However, a union of Albanian territories based on nationalism for territories can lead to disputes and conflicts with other countries in the region. Albania before the possibilities and the opportunities for union, should take into account the many other

political and strategically elements, influencing directly on the Republic of Albania. A strategic ally of Albania such as the United States of America is against a change of borders in the Balkans and nationalism which can lead in disorders and conflicts in the Balkans (B92(a), 2012). Therefore to see the Albania's prospects for an ethnic Albania, must be reviewed first a proper format and acceptance of these borders by international political external factors, such as the US and European countries. Greater Albania is simply an idea based on nationalism and an ancient history of blood, wars and occupation. Therefore before coming up with such ideas, should be disposed major preparations with strong bases and then a presentation of this idea before Albanians in the Balkan lands. Europe today is not that of the early years of the 19th and 20th century, but is a Europe that lives in the time of globalization and protection of human rights, such the borders are and remain imaginary lines to it. It seems quite impossible to have a consolidated nation while Albanians are wandering across Europe and around the world as there are no opportunities to find a better living within the borders of Albania. The Republic of Albania and Albanians dream of such a union but with all the political and economic changes, with all the changes of recent years, Albania cannot be fully ready for a merger of its territories, this for the fact because it is not just in the hand and in the desire of Albanians for such a reunion, but are the great powers and external factors that also play an important role in the acceptance of such an idea (Visoka, 2017). But on the other hand it should not be forgotten the importance that have internal issues and their solution to reach the idea of a Greater Ethnic Albania.

Taking into consideration the recent conflicts between Serbia and Kosovo and Macedonia as well, the dream of a greater Albania has increased even more, but at the same time is faced with even greater challenges. Also another reason that could delay and make it seems somewhat impossible the unification of Albanian territories is the Albania's membership in the European Union. Albania is working hard to achieve such a goal, and with an acceptance of it in the EU, ethnic Albania will continue to remain an utopia or a dream in the drawer for a while, this for the fact that Kosovo is now on the other hand, also an independent country which has the same aspirations for membership in the EU. However none of the above reasons can lead to inability to unite the Albanian territories in the near future. The fact that Albania has strategic partners and allies can

facilitate the merger of the ethnic Albanian lands in comparison with Serbian dream for a Greater Serbia as well. To do so, it must create conditions for work and continuously efforts with a high commitment of responsibility and professionalism, to witness the positive and negative, sides for all the events and actions as they were. Only in this way it would be much easier the union of Ethnic Albanian lands. Resolving the old issues and questions that has with its neighbors are an important fact that play a crucial role in the regions. It is risky for Albania and stability of the Balkans, a union without resolving its conflicts. Other Balkan countries would not let such a thing to happen that easy and turmoil would emerge throughout the regions. In order to have peace Albania must take into considerations all these facts.

#### **5.4. Challenges and Obstacles that Albania Faces**

For Albanians are not acceptable the accusatory theses of propaganda policy, of journalism or that of history graphical pseudoscience of Serbians and Slavic people that allegedly the legitimate claims and the right to reunification of Ethnic Albania is contributing to the creation of a "Greater Albania", which would trigger erosion of interstate borders in the Balkans, as well as imbalances of existing inter-Balkan relations as security, stability, democracy, peace, etc. Nevertheless what Albanians claim is that, Albanian national reunification is only in the function of the return and protection of the territorial integrity of Ethnic Albania, and not to create a "Greater Albania", whose territorial expansion means absorption of the neighboring Slavic territories. However despite the claims of Serbia and other involved nations in this issue it cannot be said that Albania doesn't face any challenges and problems regarding the national issue of its country.

Albania faces many major challenges and obstacles; therefore the union of Albanian territories is delayed and prolonged so far. One of its greater challenges is its integration in the society, combating corruption, its political transition which has not been fully recovered, the past and its weakness in between the Balkan states. As Marsida Nencestates about corruption in Albania in her article *"Corruption, Albania's biggest challenge for integration in E.U"* (2013):

“Some of the most common phenomena of corruption found in Albania are, bribing public officials, faulty privatization, discriminatory application of laws and taxes, illegal funding of political parties to outright theft of state property and revenue. Corruption is also closely interlinked with organized crime with many of the senior state officials being involved in smuggling, contraband, tax evasions and land grabbing” (Nence, 2013, p. p.4)

On the other hand it cannot be denied the fact that Serbia plays a key role in this matter because aspires to the same idea for a Greater Serbia. A fragile and small state as Albania needs first and foremost to strengthening its military power and army, its policy and its role in the Balkans. The author Mimoza Ardolic clarifies on her research: *Greater Albania – The Next Crisis in the Balkans (2009)* that:

“Even if Albania had the will and capacity to lead a unification movement, it is highly unlikely that other countries would not interfere. If the reaction to Kosovo’s independence is any indicator of what effect a move towards a Greater Albania would generate, it will not be an easy matter. Serbian opposition is guaranteed. Serbia not only has not recognized Kosovo yet, but has said that it never will. Serbia’s big powerful friend Russia would also quite possibly oppose any such move.” (Ardolic, 2009, p. p.50).

Despite the fact that Albania has Serbia as an enemy against the inspiration of a “Greater Albania” no doubt that it also has an important role in the peace and stability of the Balkans and it is a challenge which must be considered carefully and with precision so that the security in the region can continue to remain intact. If Albania despite its aspirations for EU integration continues to aspire for a Greater Albania as well that would lead to deep conflicts between the relevant countries as well as break of relations with its allies and the greatest powers. It is absolutely not easy to undertake major steps and to claim for border changes when the greater powers are against such a kind of nationalism based in ethnicity. A step like this, such as “Ethnic Albania” requires deep reflection not only from Albanians but also from its allies. Such a problem in the region would be fatal for the Balkan countries, expanding further the problem into wars and conflicts with loss of lives. However, on the other hand another challenge that Albania faces are its internal matters and issues within the territory of the Republic of Albania. Without solving its internal problems it will be difficult for Albania to undertaken steps that can lead to a Greater Albania. Albania is a country that seeks peace that is why it would not put under threat and risk the lives of its civilians. As

Mimoza Ardolic states on her research: *Greater Albania – The Next Crisis in the Balkans* (2009) that:

“what is of great importance is that the ones willing to go to extreme measures to realize an Albanian union appear to be very few in number” (Ardolic, 2009, p. p.48).

Here it is clearly seen that Albania despite the great desire and inspirations for national union, is not willing to pass the limits and put in danger the stability of its country and those around it. Albania needs to strengthen its power and position on the region, needs to focus on its integration on EU. After retaking its position in the region, and passing the challenges that it faces, only than a possibility of a greater Albania would be much easier to become reality and put into life.





Figure 5.1: Map of Central Balkan Region

### 5.5. The future of Balkan countries

The violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia has left as a legacy a deep mistrust and hostility between the majority and minority ethnic groups in the new states that emerged from it. The exception of this is Albania, where inter-ethnic relations between the Albanian majority and the Greek minority, Macedonian and other, are relatively good.

Another aggravating issue in all the countries of the region, except Montenegro is the disagreements about the number of members of minority communities residing within these countries. An additional feature of ethnic minorities is the undeclared nationality in the national records. Also, these countries, with the exception of Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, have undergone dramatic changes in the composition of their ethnic structure because of the wars and atrocities that are associated with the problems of people who have become refugees and the internally displaced from their countries. Pavlos Hatzopoulos in his book ‘*The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity*’ (2008) states that:

“Ethnic nationalism has been viewed as a potentially spreading virus that has hit Bosnian – and more generally Yugoslav – society with the collapse of Tito’s regime. Authors who support this position – playfully baptized the ‘save Bosnia bunch’ – employ a prevalent writing strategy of resistance against the forces of ‘ethnic nationalism’ they lend their warring pen to the ‘desired’ end goal, the establishment of multicultural communities in the Balkans.” (Hatzopoulos, 2008, p. p.15).

In addition, the accounts for the positions of ethnic minority communities in the states of the region, except in Albania and Croatia, to some extent are still open. Croats and, especially, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina have yet separatist ambitions, regardless of their equal status to Bosnians and federal nature of this state (Jukic, 2013). On the other hand, In Kosovo, Serbian community still requires strong territorial autonomy, while those living in the north are notoriously prone to separatism and unification with Serbia in the near future (Rose`, 2016). Also, Albanians in Macedonia are dissatisfied with their position, and are seeking more rights at the national level. The situation is more or less likely the same as the Serbian ethnic minority in Montenegro. In Serbia, also the Bosnians in the Sandzak and Albanians in the Presevo Valley are seeking territorial autonomy and are inclined to separatism and unification with Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Kosovo (VisegradPost, 2016; The Economist, 2011). Inter-ethnic and inter-state relations and in and between individual countries of the Western Balkans are components of the same equation. Improvements or deteriorations of relations between individual countries of the Western Balkans have a direct impact on inter-ethnic relations within these countries. Despite the improved relations, mistrust still prevails in bilateral relations between neighboring countries in the Western Balkans, mainly due to

fear of exploitation of ethnic minorities from neighboring countries for destabilizing separatist purposes.

However despite all the ethnic conflicts and claims over territories, Balkans is working on its integration as a single union in the European Union in the future, as every wound of one state hurts the other ones, because of the overlapping and divisions that planted last century in these regions. In one of the reports of Christos Pavloudis "*Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Southern Balkans*" (2002) is stated that:

"The last conflicts in the Balkans have clearly shown that the future of the region is uncertain, and the reappearance of territorial and other claims by ethnic minorities and the continued tension among several neighboring states is going to last for long time. The ethnic conflicts create not only internal state instability, but regional instability as well. The problems of any country or province necessarily affect neighboring countries through cross-border ethnic ties, refugee flows, and economic transaction and deeply influence the domestic politics, national economy, foreign policy, and national security of each country in the region." (Pavloudis, 2002, p. p.16).

Any act of violence in the region of Balkans feeds nationalism. The culture of the Balkans, as the colors, culture, music, have their myths in common, therefore now the interests and coexistence between them, are the main condition for joining the Western countries in the near future. A lack of cooperation and coexistence would lead to turmoil and conflicts in the region. Balkans must look beyond borders, colors and ethnic hatred, for the future of the Balkans children, who are seeing the policy of hatred that some politicians feed in the Balkans as a barrier to their freedoms and lives. Nationalism in this sense for Balkan countries is a curse, a rinse of values that brings hatred, divisions, and conflicts that is why the century left behind brought inhumane tragedies, as violence and conflicts today sound like a setback in the future. This is a great reason to stop the hatred between Balkan countries for a better future. Stable relationships with the neighbors mean peace and stability for the whole regions in the Balkans.

As a result of ethnic nationalism, the conception of democracy in a place as it is the troubled Balkans, as a result of great injustice and successive wars is difficult to achieve its stable democracy and long lasting peace (Dempsey, 20). The international community in the Balkans to achieve a stable democracy should forget the stories of the

past by looking towards the future with hope and work for its integration in EU. However in the case of the Balkans the achievement of a sustainable democracy can be only with the eradication of nationalism among the peoples in the Balkans. The wars in the Balkans between different nations, brought innocent victims, rapes, massacres, extermination, genocide, forced eviction from their land, a terrifying sight not seen since the end of World War II, called the Holocaust of the XX Century. These are a key factor, sometimes even insurmountable and unforgettable for a sustainable achievement of democracy in the Balkans. Ethnic nationalism is one of the main challenges that Balkans will need to face in the future in eliminating the ethnic divisions between countries. Harry Booty in one of his studies “*was nationalism the primary cause of the wars in the former Yugoslavia*” (2011) states that:

“the concept of nationalism when applied to the Balkans Conflict should be seen more as a means to motivate the people by the political elites of the time, rather than an ends to which those political elites used their forces to fight for” (Booty, 2011, p. p.1)

Every nation boasts and is proud of its nationalism; however in this case despite the positive sides that has nationalism, also has its negative sides (Dimitrova-Grajzl, et al., 2016). To achieve a sustainable democracy in the troubled Balkans, the access and approach to the solutions of the problems that have been made by the international community, since the beginning has been wrong and until now has failed. The aggressor and initiator of all wars in the Balkans need to be condemned in order to have peace and stability in the region. The situation in the Balkans cannot continue like this for another century based on nationalistic feelings that are more harmful than helpful. Nationalism that leads to wars and victims cannot be something to be proud of. That is what Balkan countries need to understand in the future, and apply a peaceful platform between them. They need to recover from their pathological disease of the past and look towards the future; this is the only common way of peace among Balkan people, notably between Albania and Serbia. As Ivanka Nedeva Atanassova states in one of her reports; “*The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe.*” (1999):

“The phenomenon of political forces advancing extreme nationalist sentiments that are further reinforced by the state media fit adequately into the Serb political culture of xenophobia and authoritarian attitudes. These features of

Serb political culture found particularly strong manifestation in the realm of the issue of Kosovo.” (Atanassova, 1999, p. p.54)

The lasting peace in the Balkans can be achieved only when the countries will rely on the basic principles of democracy. The basic principle of sustainable democracy, where humanity can live in peace and coexistence with others, is the principle of self-determination. To identify acts of crime, to open crime files, folders of victims that are still missing, admission of guilt from the aggressor, to be given the right of self-determination to other ethnicities belonging to a country, because the country belongs as well to them, and this is a right guaranteed to every nation. Nationalism is a reason of the lack of a lasting peace in the Balkans, as well as the idea that nationalism is how one identifies himself; As an Albanian, Serbian, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Croatian, Macedonian etc. Between a mix of ethnicities and pride of nationalism, future generations, which were not part of such chaos, hope will identify themselves correctly and leave in peace far from the hatred which is spread today in the Balkans.

However not everything seems vague and impossible for Balkan countries to achieve the stability and peace in the region. Efforts have been done from many countries, and relationships between countries aren't the same as before. Nevertheless the last events in Macedonia as mentioned in this section show that still exists possibilities for future conflicts. As Giuliano Amato and Carl Bildt state on their report *“The Balkans in Europe's Future”* (2005) that:

“the region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air.” (Amato & Bildt, 2005, p. p.7).

Actually such cases have been repeated in the entire Balkan region, but recently these tones were also overshadowed and managed to extinguish for a period relatively small, as the political climate in the Balkans had a new stage of positive developments. Serbia made progress in conversations with Kosovo, and managed to achieve progress in European integration and cooperation. On the other hand, yet Albania acquired and achieved the status of EU candidate and this has definitely been a mitigation policy for the Balkans as a whole. Kosovo is also making progress in solving problems with

controlling of the north of the country and gradually is reaching the long-awaited peace, as a good omen for civilization, coexistence and integration of the region as a whole in the EU. These efforts without doubt show the progress that Balkan regions are making in order to have a brighter future far from regional conflicts and hatred among them. As Hajrudin Somun notes in an article *“is the future of the Balkans within the European Union”* (2013) that:

“With regard to European integration, it is widely believed that the Balkans is a complicated and fragile area” (Somun, 2013, p. p.2).

Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten the fact that Macedonia, as shown recently continues to repeat extreme cases among ethnic parties even after the Ohrid Agreement on the presence of international communities (Mejdina(a), 2016). This shows that nationalism there still has primitive doses driven by internal or external factors which has not done anything else but increased the tensions in the region, as in the latter case when the system of justice, sentenced some Albanians to life imprisonment, thus Albanians translated it as an ethnic revenge and provocations (Marusic(a), 2014).

The issue of Albanians in Macedonia does not belong only to the Macedonian state institutions, it is complex issue, because the rights of Albanians there are supported by the international law, by human rights, and protected by Albanian states that are neighbors of the Macedonian state and Macedonian Constitution itself. Now the situation is calm, but if the problem will continue, the risk of a deep political turmoil will take proportions as will endanger the existence of Macedonia, as millions of Albanians around the world are closely following the developments therefore the policies on the other hand should follow the situation closely and improve the lives of Macedonians as well as their economical system. Also governments and international community should follow and take measures about the violence committed against Albanians in Macedonia. In their report *“The Balkans in Europe’s Future”* (2005) Giuliano Amato and Carl Bildt clarify that:

“At the same time the international community should not neglect the major problem facing Macedonia today. The country is in urgent need of economic growth and new jobs. The combination of cuts in the public administration and the appointment of ethnic Albanians to public sector jobs in accordance with the

quotas agreed at Ohrid may lead to renewed tensions between the two communities if the unemployed are not absorbed elsewhere.” (Amato & Bildt, 2005, p. p.27)

In addition, new policies and relationships should take another form in order to not put in danger not only the state of Macedonia but the stability of all Balkan countries as well. Coexistence is the solution; the conflict is in favor of the countries that want to have rights and control over other territories. It is easy to create a conflict that can lead to war, but what is the harder part about all this, is the victims, the damages and the danger that all the Balkan regions are threatened. All these problems can be solved with the will to live together in peace and in harmony with equal rights for a better future. Balkans must be integrated as a single union in the European Union. It is time to end the primitive selfish nationalism and look forward for having peace, cooperation, and stabilization in the region. Stopping to the issue of Albania and its role for the future of the Balkan regions, it can be said that for Albania to live in harmony and good neighborliness, working under the motto of integration and development, it is undoubtedly significant and meaningful. In its history, Albania has shown that it knows how to be a factor of peace and stability in the region and beyond. With its policy, it has motivated Albanians, wherever they live and work, to become powerful state maker factors, to contribute towards the development, to upgrade and effect the modernization of these countries as well as to serve peace and prosperity, to be an example of harmony and coexistence in the region wherever they are (IBP USA, 2013). This position and the care that Albania shows in relations with its neighbors has been assessed with and awarded from the United States of America as a strategic partner, but also by all the European Union countries and beyond. Living in diversity has always been the motto of the Albanian Presidency of the Council of Europe which Albania promoted during her tenure, showing once again strongly that all together can develop the region, but in particular the Balkans which is the everyday home of the Balkans. A strong neighbor, developed in any direction is ubiquitous and important for the other regions.

Referring to the past of its history, Balkans has suffered precisely from the conflicts leaving behind its regions in terms of the integration of the countries to the large European family. In this new reality, in this speed of change and development of

inclusive processes, Balkans must as soon as possible save themselves from the clutches of the debates, from clashes, quarrels and ethnic conflicts between them in order to have a brighter and peaceful future. At all times, at any meeting or position expressed by Albania, through diplomatic exchanges, political, economic and every other field, it has become clear that Albania has a good neighborhood policy, being a factor of peace and stability in the region. This is a fact which is accepted from everyone. In the Albanian government's program is clearly stated that foreign policy is put in the service of Balkan integration and good neighborly relations (IBP USA, 2013). So clearly is expressed and followed, as can never be left room for discussion or speculation regarding its claims for territories. For everyone it is estimated the fact that Albania through its foreign policy gives priority and considers of particular importance the relations with its neighbors. Following this policy today Albania remains a positive factor that strongly affects the fulfillment of the objective of European integration of the Balkans. It is a fact that today Albania has increased and has high levels of political, economic, social or cultural relations with to all countries of the region in the Balkans. For Albania special importance assumes the field of security as in the optics and its evaluation at any moment Balkan region is regarded as a hotbed that should generate stability, mutual understanding and integration (Zharri, 2012). Albania's relations with Italy and Greece as two NATO members continue to remain strategic and in the nature of trade and economic partners. Through its activity, foreign policy aims to increase capacity levels and relations between the Balkan countries and the region with the intent of improving, expanding and strengthening the multiple relationships with all these countries. The better the climate of cooperation between the Balkan countries, the stable and mutual are these relationships, the more integration and development will be for all the Balkan countries. On the other hand has come the time that the relations between the neighboring Balkan countries to go beyond the rhetoric of positive relations and the desire to have good neighborly relations. Mentioning the example of the issue of Albania and Serbia in their relations, much remains to be done. Albania from its side seems to have a strong will to bring these relations forward. It is time for these relations to materialize in concrete areas of cooperation, the signing of concrete agreements that give the green light alignment between these countries and the common mission which

is the Euro Atlantic integration by outpacing hatred and ethnic nationalism that lead to conflicts and wars. In the whole Balkan's full picture, is still seen today the projection of a harsh environment, frozen and inhospitable to large investments, and improvements inherited from ancient times.





## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Nationalism as a term is used in different contexts and meanings, depending on the situations that the country is found. In conclusion it can be said that someone interprets it as positive, often confused with patriotism and nation, while some others qualify it as a dangerous idea and inadequate for our times. However nationalism is a very controversial topic in every space of thought and political, social, cultural and ideological action. About the years of 80s and 90s years many scholars thought that this phenomenon was going slowly towards extinction and fading away, by the march of modernity and globalization. According to them, globalization is the latest technology that creates aspirations for a new world without national divisions and conflicts, reigniting once again the Marxist utopian dreams of a world order. In fact in many cases this does not seem to be happening at least in the last two decades, which is obviously seen also in the case of Balkans and its regions. Nationalism is reappearing powerfully in the scene of social interaction, surprising and exalting numerous people across the globe such as in the case of Balkans.

The XIX century is known as the golden age of nationalism, or even the time of the birth of practical nationalism. In this century, nationalism flourished thanks to those who are considered as the founder of nationalism. In America it was Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine who established the foundation of American nationalism. In Italy was Garibaldi, in France Victor Hugo, and Otto Bismarck in Germany who founded the nationalism of the respective states. The main cause of birth of nationalism is the ideological vacuum that had prevailed at the time, but such reason still remains today in those countries where nationalism is more pronounced. When to a nation lacks the spiritual aspect and the lack of proper treatment of different religions, then inevitably it is necessary for the nation to have something that supports and identifies it. It is widely

known the time and the method of the separation of religion and state, where nationalism took the place of faith and eventually became "religion" in itself. The same happens today in some countries, including Balkan regions and Albania as well, where nationalism lists the state, nation, and ethnicity before religion and anything else. In conclusion without any doubt one of the key features of nationalism is the overestimation of the people of one nation and the depreciation of other nations and its people. On the other hand, nationalism in itself abandons realism as an ideology and allows dominating in society the idealistic vision. The XIX century discovered nationalism and corrupted all nations in some ways. Every nationalist considers his place as a land which chosen by God, while the rest of the world is full of wickedness and barbarism. Regarding the issue of nationalism in the Balkans can be said that most of the regions are build and formed based on the columns of nationalism. It is an obvious, historical fact that countries are eager to protect their nationalism as it was their religion and everything that represents them. Unlike the universalist ideologies such as Communism, Cosmopolitism and monotheistic religions, nationalism usually invites people to protect what is close to them what is rough, what they know, no matter if what they are protecting is fair or unfair. This is one of the key elements that make nationalism attractive to many people. The protection of the symbols of nationalism stands above everything else.

Nationalism is a separate law and ideology. Even when it is attacking someone else, nationalism presents and justifies it as a defense of what the man wants and sees as right. In essence nationalism is a totalizing ideology since it monopolizes historical symbols of a nation, then it also monopolizes the relations of people with their environment, with the love of the country, the culture, the nature, and the historical figures. Nationalism takes all these elements and appropriates them as its own. But the love of country is not the property of nationalism, as the language is not its property. There were languages and love for the homeland, even when there was no nationalism and nation in the sense that it takes after the French Revolution. Language exists before the nation, as well as the history in which people are identified. Similarly, nationalism also it monopolizes the wars for liberation. The struggle for liberation from occupation that requires morality and human dignity, nationalism depicts it as a struggle for nationalism and liberation. To

sum up that's what kind of effects nationalism has in Balkan countries. It has monopolized all of the countries and spread all over the region. In this sense nationalism creates a suffocating atmosphere in the Balkans, because it censors human freedom to form the love and the history of his country based on hatred about the other regions. It imposes uniformity on human relations and monopolizes the way the history is taught and how it should be loved the past. But there are nationalist dissidents in the Balkans, who think that there are other ways of expressing the human relationships that are more humane and tolerant, but also more comprehensive and acceptable from society. However, the effects that nationalism has in the Balkans it varies in different ways. It has its own negative and positive sides, as well as its advantages and disadvantages. Seeing how nationalism was found and developed in these countries makes it clear that foreign powers and occupations of these regions played also a great role in its growth. In short, Albanian nationalism is based on the protection of their identity, it's a kind of folkloric nationalism but has its own importance in the sense that the dream of a "Greater Albania" or "Ethnic Albania" is based exactly in those feelings and ideas. Nevertheless, Albanians are naturally peaceful and never aspire to achieve territories and lands in the expense of others causing wars and conflicts among the region. What also can be said about Albanian nationalism to sum up is that they have a complicated relation with nationalism. There are cases when they become too patriotic, and they are also other cases when these feelings remain just in the frame of a nice picture and nice stories. All this comes as a consequence since Albania was the latest country to develop politically and economically in the Balkans. Despite this fact what is important to mention at the end, is that Albanians always fought for national identity, and had strong ethnical ties and feelings with Albanians of other regions such as Kosovo, Macedonia and even Montenegro. However, their desires for expanding its territories that include Albanian majority are not only based in their national identity and their recognition of human rights. Nationalism as an ideology, which has existed among Albanians for centuries and their patriotic feelings makes them love their brotherhoods and countries around which consists of Albanians. In addition, another great influence was also that of Enver Hoxha and his communist political system in the country. Albanians isolated and in misery where unknown of the realities in the rest of the world. They were feed with

the idea of Albanianism and no religion. Even though Albania is a country which consists of three different religions and now has harmony and peace between them, during that period of time, religion for them was Albanianism and the love for the state, for their leader which taught them how they don't need any allies and friends. Thus such feelings for the love of the state, the protection of the country from the enemy with any cost, was one of the most important factors that Albanians were raised again with the feelings of nationalism during the communist period. However after the fall of communism and the death of Enver Hoxha, things started to change for Albania and Albanians. Moreover they began to see that democracy and equality in the world in order to have peace and stability were the main ideas for a country to develop and integrate. Even though a new system was now founded in the country, nationalistic feelings and the Albanian desire for reunion with Kosovo especially, remained untouched and unique growing more and more during and after the war of Kosovo with Serbia. On the other hand Albanian nationalism also affected Kosovon nationalism as they also wanted to unite with Albania as well. A country as Kosovo which had been for years under the occupation of Yugoslavia wanted to liberate and gain independence as soon as possible.

While summarizing Serbian nationalism it can be said that their nationalism has expansionary feelings and goals. Their idea of a Greater Serbia based also in their own kind of nationalism also has historical roots as they claim, but also as the other researcher do, has political and territorial purposes. Kosovo is one of their dreams which seem to be torn apart with the independence of it in 2008. The state of Serbia after the separation of Yugoslavia has made approaches and attempts to extend its influences in the Balkan regions. Serbia yet has not recognized Kosovo, based exactly in the nationalistic feelings for expansion that has in this region even though Kosovo's majority is Albanian and their mother tongue is Albanian. For Kosovo the influence that Serbia has over its territories is still felt, even now that gained its independence. The traces of war, genocide and political attempts of Serbia regarding Kosovo are felt all over the country.

To sum up the identity of Belgrade and Serbia generally is seen with a tough language, the language of hatred and intolerance towards non-Serbian people, who live in Serbia, but also toward the ones that are adjacent to Serbia, and to the Serbian minority living in Kosovo and practicing this language. Belgrade is also somehow disconnected from the multi-national, multi-ethnicity, multi-language, and respect for the rights of minorities living in Serbia seeking only the extension of its territory and power in the Balkans. Serbia actually such as yesterday is also today; it has not changed, and is still not out of the mentality of the past. Serbia moreover is based and operates on military policies and templates of nationalism that have characterized Serbia as a state since its establishment. However, it is imperative and question of time the fact, that Serbia must come from the darkness of nationalism and chauvinism if it really intends European and global trends. In conclusion it can be also said that Serbian state policy further relies on icons and medieval religious heroisms, continuing to refer to the pasting myths that continue to lead Serbia towards the moral destruction and decadence in the eyes of many other Balkan countries and not only. Also another feature of Serbian nationalism which is of great importance to mention is religion. The church in Serbia plays an enormous role in the spread of nationalism through religion, making other countries to look unfaithful or not strong enough to keep their identity and religion which was of them before the period of Ottoman Empire. For Serbians, Albanians and Kosovo Albanians betrayed their countries and their religion because of their weakness in front of the Ottomans. Unfortunately even now days, Serbia still continues to not have good relations with Kosovo, with Vojvodina, Bosnia, Montenegro, Eastern Kosovo and Albania as well. Somehow is still felt the hatred, the national oppression, denial of identity of the free speech, violations of human rights, till' the denial and degradation of basic rights to be free. Albanians on the other hand claim that if this is the condition for entry into Europe, to become part of the European family, they will certainly remain without being part of the big family because Albanians are not such, there have been and will not be like this even in the future. Regarding the Albanian case and the future of Albania and the Balkans as well, it can be said that the effects of the past still are vivid in the present. In a nutshell, the future remains vague and unclear right now for most of the Balkan regions. With all the desire of an Ethnic and Great Albania, the country still

needs to go under some steps and follow the number one rule to not cause bleeding and destruction in the region. The possibilities for a Greater Albania now seem impossible as well as possible at the same time. It all depends on the will of Albanians to strengthen their economy and military before and foremost. It's a must for Albania to face its challenges with diplomacy and maturity, as well as keeping strong its relations with the western world, even though Europe and United States of America as countries with great influence in the world, would not agree for a change in the borders of today's Balkans. Albania along with keeping alive its nationalism and desire for a Greater Albania is also keeping alive on the other hand the opportunity to join the EU. It doesn't seem far the day that it will be part of European Union, so maybe after achieving this dream will have the possibility to continue with its plan for a Greater Albania. To conclude for the Balkan countries it can be said that it is clear that the path of the Western Balkans towards the EU integration must be considered as the only option for solving the existing problems in bilateral and regional relations, highlighting the integration of values, peace consolidation and economic development of the region in general. Overall, the regulation of relations between Serbia and Albania should be priority for both countries, as they both risk the stability of the region. Even though, nationalism will always remain their strongest tool when it comes to their dream of a Greater Albania and a Greater Serbia, both nations need to see the future and work for their integration in EU as the only possible solution for a long lasting peace in the region of the Balkans.

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