

**T.C.  
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**POST 9/11: ANTI-ISLAM DISCOURSE ON TERRORISM AND  
ITS IMPLICATIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN  
RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NETHERLANDS**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**Reyhan BULCA**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations  
Political Science and International Relations Program**

**December, 2020**



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**December, 2020**



## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare with respect that the study “Post 9/11: Anti-Islam Discourse On Terrorism And Its Implications On Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights And National Security In The Netherlands”, which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the Project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (27/11/2020)

**Reyhan BULCA**



## **FOREWORD**

I would like to deeply express my Gratitude to my precious supervisor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Filiz KATMAN for her supervision, support and help. I also would like to thank my husband Nuri Bulca and my family members, Metin Canavar, Nilgün Kırmılı-Canavar, Sümeyye Canavar, Ömer Canavar for their encouragement, patience and their therapeutic support in times of hard times. Lastly, I want to thank myself for not giving up, and for finishing my thesis despite many setbacks in past months.

**December, 2020**

**Reyhan BULCA**





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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AIVD</b>	: Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst
<b>CTS</b>	: Critical Terrorism Studies
<b>CSS</b>	: Critical Security Studies
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>EC</b>	: European Commission
<b>EUROJUST</b>	: European Judicial Cooperation Unit
<b>EUROPOL</b>	: European Policing System
<b>EWA</b>	: European Warrant Association
<b>FBI</b>	: Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FLN</b>	: The Algerian National Liberation Front
<b>GPRA</b>	: Government of Algerian Republic
<b>IRA</b>	: The Irish Republic Army
<b>ISIS</b>	: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>OTS</b>	: Orthodox Terrorism Studies
<b>PVV</b>	: <i>Partij van Vrijheid</i> (Part of Freedom)
<b>RaRa</b>	: Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action
<b>SHV</b>	: Subsidiary of Coal and Trade Association
<b>SP</b>	: Socialist Party
<b>TREVI</b>	: Terrorism, Radicalization, Extremism and International Violence Group
<b>UN</b>	: United Nations
<b>US</b>	: United States
<b>USA</b>	: United States of America
<b>VVD</b>	: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie



**POST 9/11: ANTI-ISLAM DISCOURSE ON TERRORISM AND ITS  
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**ABSTRACT**

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks many European governments have been dictated by a state-centric discourse on terrorism in which human rights have taken a backseat to state security. In doing so, civil liberties have been trade-off for the stake of state survival. In particular, European Muslims have fallen victim for these policies as they have been subject to repressive state practices, which are most often justified under the guise of war on terror. However, this sort of radical approaches usually hit hard back since the victim become more prone to take up radical thought, and thus become more willing to engage in terrorist activities, with the aim to take revenge. Consequently, on the long run this may aggregate the threat of terrorism even further, and thus may pose a greater threat to the survival of the state. Hence, the purpose of this study is to break free from a state- centric discourse on terrorism and move towards a human right framework in which terrorism and its responses are approached with all its consequences on state behavior, human security and state survival. This study focuses on the link between counter-terrorism measures and human rights violations, with a particular focus on the Dutch context. To be more precise, it examined to what extent the Dutch anti-terror policies infringes on civil liberties and points out the long-term effects on the social cohesion and the national security of the Netherlands. The study is based on a case-study in which qualitative research methods are used. In doing so, twelve peoples were interviewed by means of semi-structured questionnaire. The results have evidentiary shown that the Dutch counter-terrorism measures are at odd with the human rights of certain groups. In particular, the Dutch Muslim community seems to be hit the most ever since the political debates around terrorism are dictated by an anti-Islamic political discourse. In this way, terrorism have been equated with the Islam, and portrayed as a danger to the Dutch society. The securitization of the Islam has led to false security narratives, and paved way for extreme proposals to stop Islamification. Consequently, this opened door for the introduction of harsh measures. The Dutch media seems to play a prominent role in reinforcing the anti-Islam sentiment since it provides podium for extreme thoughts about the Islam. Especially, the right-wing extremist groups have exploited the anti-Islam sentiment to gain popular support. Although, since terrorism is seen as an Islamic problem other forms of radicalization have been overlooked. In this way, the government have provided the base for radicalization within own group. Consequently, this have led to a dichotomy between Muslim and non-Muslim groups, which have crashed the togetherness of the society and led to radicalization on both sides. This have resulted in a vicious circle in which terrorism has feed itself, and with that endangered the national security even further.

**Keywords:** *Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights, The Netherlands, National Security.*

## **11 EYLÜL SALDIRILARI SONRASI TERÖRİZM ÜZERİNDEN İSLAM KARŞITI SÖYLEMLERİN, TERÖR KARŞITI POLİTAKALARIN, HOLLANDA'DA İNSAN HAKLARI VE MİLLİ GÜVENLİK ALANINDAKİ ETKİLERİ**

### **ÖZET**

11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından birçok Avrupa hükümeti, terörizm konusunda devlet merkezli bir söylem tarafından dikte edilmiştir. Bunu yaparken, devletin bekası için sivil özgürlükler ikinci plana atılmıştır. Özellikle, Avrupalı Müslümanlar, çoğunlukla teröre karşı savaş kisvesi altında baskıcı ve ayrımcı devlet uygulamalarına maruz kaldıkları için bu politikaların doğrudan kurbanı olmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte, radikal düşünceye daha yatkın hale gelmeleri ve böylece intikam almak için terörist faaliyetlere katılmaya daha istekli olmaları nedeniyle, ulusal güvenliği daha fazla tehlikeye atmış olur. Sonuç olarak, uzun vadede bu, terörizm tehdidini daha da artırabilir ve dolayısıyla devletin hayatta kalması için daha büyük bir tehdit oluşturabilir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmanın amacı, devlet merkezli söylemden kurtulmak, terörizme karşı devlet politikaları, insan güvenliği ve devlet bekası üzerindeki tüm sonuçlarıyla yaklaşılan bir insan hakları çerçevesine doğru ilerlemektir. Bu çalışma, özellikle Hollanda bağlamında, terörle mücadele tedbirleri ile insan hakları ihlalleri arasındaki bağlantıya odaklanmaktadır. Daha doğrusu, bu araştırmada Hollanda'nın terörle mücadele politikalarının, sivil özgürlüklerin ne ölçüde ihlal edildiği incelenmiş ve Hollanda'nın sosyal bütünlüğü ve ulusal güvenliği üzerindeki uzun vadeli etkilere işaret edilmiştir. Çalışma, nitel araştırma yöntemlerinin kullanıldığı bir vaka çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken açık sorulardan oluşan yarı yapılandırılmış sözlü mülakat aracılığıyla on iki kişiyle görüşülmüştür. Sonuçlar, terörle mücadele önlemlerinin belirli grupların insan haklarıyla ters düştüğünü kanıtlanmıştır. Özellikle, terörizm etrafındaki siyasi tartışmalar İslam karşıtı bir siyasi söylem tarafından dikte edildiğinden beri, Hollanda'da yaşayan Müslüman topluluklar bu politikaların doğrudan kurbanı olmuştur. Bu, genel olarak terörizm söyleminin sıklıkla İslam'la özdeşleştirilmesinden ve İslam'ın Hollanda toplumu için bir tehlike olarak gösterilmesinden dolayı kaynaklanmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, İslam'ın güvenlik konusu haline getirilmesi, yanlış güvenlik anlatımına, İslamlaşmanın durdurulması için radikal önerilere ve baskıcı politikaların başlatılmasına neden olmuştur. Hollanda ana akım medyası, İslam hakkında radikal fikirlerin propagandasını yapmak isteyenlerin kürsüye çıkmasında ve İslam karşıtı duyarlılığı daha da güçlendirmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Özellikle aşırı sağcı gruplar, halk desteğini kazanmak için İslam karşıtı duyguları kullanmaktadırlar. Terörizm İslami bir sorun olarak görüldüğü için diğer radikalleşme biçimleri göz ardı edilmektedir. Böylelikle hükümet kendi grubu içinde radikalleşmenin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu, toplumun birlikteliğini bozan Müslüman ve gayrimüslim gruplar arasında ikiye bölünmeye ve her iki tarafta da radikalleşmeye yol açmıştır. Sonuç olarak, terörizmin kendi kendini beslediği bir kısır döngü ile sonuçlanmış ve bununla birlikte ulusal güvenliği daha da tehlikeye atmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Terörizm, Terörle Mücadele, İnsan Hakları, Hollanda, Ulusal Güvenlik.*



## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The issue of terrorism has been dominated by a state-centric discourse wherein human security takes a backseat to state security. For decades, neo-realists and positivists thoughts have shaped the way terrorism is studied. In this way of thinking the human aspects has been erased and state survival have become a top priority (Kerr, 2003). This also resonates with government officials who decide upon the course of anti-terrorism related policies. Especially, in the aftermath of 9/11 many Western countries took massive counter-terrorism measures to preserve their interest of national security. However, a large number of studies and real-life events have proved that those efforts are most of the time ad odd with human rights. Despite, this sort of counterproductive policies has succeeded in gaining legitimization due to the right states have to abandon human rights in time of fear or crisis (Hoffman, 2004). Although, it does not matter in which case, the consequences of undermining human rights are disastrous since it gives states the ultimate power to put limitations on civil rights even if it is not necessary. In particular, the Muslim residents of Western countries seems to be the first victims of those counterproductive policies. Especially, after 9/11 the discourse on terrorism has been built upon false narratives and stereotypes wherein terrorism is equated with the Islam (Corbin, 2017). This, in turn, has paved the way for discriminative policies, detention without trial, torture, ethnic profiling, the rise of anti-Islam hate-speeches, Islam hatred hostility, violations, and even murder of Muslims, which all have been justified under the guise of the global war on terror (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2001).

However, the current global war on terror and its counterproductive policies are claimed to be posing a far more dangerous threat than terrorism itself. Ambiguously, many scholars have argued that the same security policies that ought to prevent terrorism have pushed the terrorism threat even further (Wolfendale, 2007). In particular, the ones who feel threatened by those policies

may start relying on self-help to take revenge or oppose the oppressive government through this way (Aydin 2016).

To make a long story short, it is obvious that prioritizing state security over human security is devastating, as it may morph into illiberal state practices, or provoke terrorism thus aggravate the problem even further. Although, since the state-centric discourse is dominating the field of terrorism many scholars have been negligent about the human aspect and thus the essence of what underpins terrorism. In addition to this, many studies have evidentially shown that there is a causal correlation between state security and human security, which means that protecting human security will help to ensure state security (Kerr, 2013). Hence, the aim of the study is to break through this state-centric discourse on terrorism to bridge the gap between state and human security through the adoption of a dialectic security approach in which both state and human security are found a prerequisite for state survival. This study examines how the tension between liberty and security takes form in the recent global war on terror and takes a critical stance towards previous studies by adopting a comprehensive approach in which terrorism and response to it are examined with all its consequences on state behavior, human security, and state survival.

## **1.1 Topic**

The topic is about the tension between counter-terrorism policies and human rights, with a particular focus on the Dutch context. It examines whether the Dutch anti-terror measures curtail the civil liberties and fundamental rights of its citizens, especially Muslim communities. The interest arose from the fact that today there are many examples in which human rights violations have taken place under the guise of the so-called war on terror. In particular, Muslim residents of Western countries seem to be hit the most by the side effects of these counterproductive anti-terrorism measures (Goold & Lazarus, 2019). Especially, after 9/11, terrorism narratives have been built upon anti-Islam statements that equate terrorism with the Islam, and depicts it as a religion of intolerant backwardness, ignorance, violence, woman repression, and thus a threat for the West (Funk & Said, 2004). Consequently, this anti-Islam discourse on terrorism has led to an irrational fear for the Islam and has also

resonated with policymakers who decide upon anti-terrorism related policies. Consequently, European Muslims have become a suspect community in which they have been perceived as a potential danger to Western societies. This, in turn, has paved way for oppressive and discriminative policies and made them victim for anti-Islam hatred hostility and violation, or even worse murder (Ghazali, 2012). A recent example of Islam hatred murder includes the twin mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, where 51 innocent Muslims were killed in a shooting on a Friday prayer, a holy day for Muslims. In a short time, the intention of the perpetrator become clear, after a 73 pages long manifesto, dubbed the "Great Replacement" was discovered on his social media account. The document was full of anti-Islam and Anti-migration statements. In the chapter titled as "Europe for Europeans" he advocates for the deportation of immigrants and justified the murder by calling immigrant invaders (Canavar, 2019). Another example that shows that discrimination towards Muslims is gradually getting institutionalized includes the European court's headscarf ban decision that allow companies to ban workers from wearing the headscarf (Bilefsky, 2017). A similar case occurred in the Netherlands when Dutch governments recently introduced the ban on the Islamic face veils in public spaces such as universities, hospitals, public transportation, and the Like. But its enforcement is doubted and concerned by many since it gives authorization for citizen's arrest in case someone is breaking the ban (Jack, 2019). In the following days after the announcement of the ban, many other Dutch politicians, including far-right Freedom Party leader Geert Wilders have advocated for uplifting the ban to the normal headscarf (Engelbart, 2019). In a more worrying example, some far-right parties in Australia and The Netherlands have even campaigned for a total ban on the Islam as a whole. In case, the head of Austria's far-right party, Heinz Christian Strache said that he fears for an Islamic conquest of Europe, and that it will come to an abrupt end. Hence, he proclaimed that the Islam, which he dubbed as "fascistic Islam" is posing a dangerous threat to Europe and made a call upon European policymakers to put an end to Islamization (Amanda, 2017). However, various international human rights organizations have expressed their concerns and strongly condemned the anti-Islam state practices as well as the anti-Islam hatred speeches, violence and murder. For instance, the Amnesty International has proclaimed that the

problem is deeper than we think and said that it is willing to stand Muslims by during harsh times. Besides, it made a call for all Western countries dealing with terrorism to respect human rights and beat Islamophobia and hate towards Muslims before things getting worse (Bhutta, 2019).

In case of the Netherlands, a study on Islamophobia and discrimination have shown that there are similar patterns of discrimination and the rise of populist parties fed by Islamophobic statements in the Netherlands. In numbers 65% of Dutch Muslims experience discrimination. Furthermore, in the following years the Dutch populist parties such as Party for Freedom (PVV) has gained popular support after being disgraced and labeled a threat to the society for many years. Astonishingly, this party is currently the second-largest party in the Dutch parliament running on a platform of restriction of the freedoms of Muslims in the Netherlands such as banning the headscarf in public spaces, shutting down Islamic schools and mosques and banning the Qoran and Muslim migrants. How it may have come this far is a mystery for many but concerned by few. For instance, El Mouradi (2019) is one of the many Muslims in the Netherlands that has expressed her concerns in an opinion piece, published in a national Dutch newspaper about the rapidly increase of anti-Islam fed hatred and violations against Dutch Muslims. She gave an illustration of a real-life experience and said that she is regularly offended as a terrorist, which often makes her feel unsafe on the street. In spite, she said that the Dutch government is not taken the problem seriously and added that the violence against Muslims seems to be normalized. Hence, she advocates for a prompt solution to the problem, but adds need to recognize the problem to make it tangible and measurable, just like with antisemitism. Because, now if one speaks about Islamophobia, one often speaks about feelings, while it is obvious about actions too.

Moreover, not less important, the Western mainstream media seems to play a crucial role in reproducing and reinforcing the Anti-Islam rhetoric, especially in Western societies. Hence, the examination of the relationship between Media and terrorism really matters since it helps us to get a better understanding of how the Muslims in the many Western countries have been constructed as the significant "other" and have become victims of Anti-Islam related practices (Powell, 2011). To add, many analyses have shown that the media plays an

immense role in the reproduction of anti-Islam related content and shaping the public opinion and behavior towards Muslims in a negative way (Smith, 2013). Especially, after 9/11, media coverage about terrorism have been strongly associated with the Islam (Powell, 2018). The distorted and unbalance media representation of Muslims has led to false narratives wherein innocent Muslims all over the world have been unlawfully perceived as potential terrorists. This way of reporting has resulted in an irrational fear for Islam, in which illiberal state practices, anti-Islam hatred hostility and violence against Muslims have been justified under the guise of the recent global war on terror (Asmal, 2008). However, since Jihadist fundamentalism is portrayed as the only greatest threat to European security the rise of other extremist groups has been overlooked. In particular extreme far-right populist parties in Europe have been increased rapidly as they have been successful in gaining popular support through the anti-Islam rhetoric on terrorism, in which they are exploiting the fear for Islam to mainstream repressive policies towards Muslims (Grierson, 2019). Although, since many Western countries have been negligent about those groups, they have been the blind spot of counter-terrorism that have endangered the fundamental European values of peace, democracy and human rights and thus aggerated the problem of terrorism even further (Kundnani, 2012). In short, the media seems to function as an amplifier for those aiming to propagate their extreme thoughts and ideas about certain issues to gain popular support, regardless in whether their ideologies are leaning to the left, right or religion (Ingram, 2017). For instance, whereas the governments use media as a platform to influence the public opinion to legitimize certain policies, terrorist/extremist groups use the same media to infuse fear, increase terrorist recruits in order to influence the political decision processes.

In consideration of all, it seems that many Western countries have failed on the global war on terror since it hurts more than it does good. The anti-terrorism policies who were ought to prevent terrorism and preserve peace have at the same time create other insecurities for some segments within the society. Hence, many counter-terrorism measures are found counterproductive due to the fact that they have been dictated by an anti-Islam discourse, which has opened a podium for the rise of other extremist groups. Especially, far-right populist

parties seem to have partly succeeded, as they have managed to propagate the fear for Islam further through negative media outlets in order to form a legal basis to enforce policies to suppress Muslims. However, since many Western countries have been stuck to a narrow definition of terrorism, the devastating consequences of counterproductive measures on Muslim groups, and the rise of other extremist groups that poses a far more dangerous to the national security have been overlooked. Hence, the study aims to examine how security-based policies and narratives might cultivate other insecurities as it may bring the national security in further danger. Furthermore, similar patterns are also traceable in the Netherlands, but so far, the problem has received little or no attention. Hence, the study narrows down to the Dutch context and aims to provide a deeper explanation for the impact of anti-Islam led security narratives, produced by the media on counter-terrorism policies, human rights and national security. The central research question is; *How has the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism in the Netherlands, reproduced by mainstream Western media, in the aftermath of 9/11 have had an impact on counter-terrorism policies, human rights of Dutch Muslims, and the national security?*

## **1.2 Purpose and Importance of Research**

The purpose of the research is to break free from a state-centric discourse on terrorism and move towards a human right framework in which terrorism and its responses are approached with all its consequences on state behavior, human security, and state survival. However, since former studies have been carefree from human security, they deemed to fail in providing deeper explanations for what underpins terrorism (Jackson, 2007). Hence, the study aims bridge the gap between state security and human security and aims to understand how the interplay of irresponsible media coverage and illiberal state practices takes form and may lead to a vicious circle that feeds terrorism and pushes the threat even further. Unfortunately, many terrorism studies have been found inaccurate and poorly supported by strong evidences due to the overreliance on second-handed information based on value-free and numeric/statistical data. Hence, the study aims to fill the gap in the literature by adopting an interpretivist approach, which seems more suitable to squeeze everything out of topics related to

societal problems. In this context, the study aims to delve into the world of both policymakers and citizens in order to understand the experiences, feeling and emotions of both policymakers and citizens within the context of the war on terror. Furthermore, the outcome of the research provides implications for further research, as it provides valuable insights for policymakers that may contribute to the designation of appropriate counter-terrorism policies without trade-offs between human rights and state security.

### **1.3 Research question**

How has the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism in the Netherlands, reproduced by mainstream Western media, in the aftermath of 9/11 have had an impact on counter-terrorism policies, human rights of Dutch Muslims and national security?

The following sub-questions are used to provide a clear answer to the research question;

- To what extent plays the mainstream Western Media a powerful role in shaping and reinforcing the anti-Islam discourse in the Netherlands?
- In which way does the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism influence the Dutch policymaker's decision on policies related to counter-terrorism related?
- What are the consequences of anti-Islam based counter terrorism policies on human rights of Dutch Muslims?
- What is the impact of anti-Islam based counter-terrorism policies on the national security of the Netherlands?

The main argument central to this research is that the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism is highly present in the Dutch society and with that it exerts a great influence on the way Dutch counter-terrorism policies have taken form. This in turn, have led to human right violations and put the Dutch national security in further danger.

## 1.4 Field, Data Sources, Location And Time, and Support

The study is based on a field research, related to the Netherlands and aims to understand how the anti-Islam rhetoric on terrorism have had an impact on the Netherlands' counter-terrorism policies, human rights of Dutch Muslims, and national security as a whole. The time period selected for the study is the period after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. But it also gives a snapshot of the present day and moves back to the historical context as well. Therefore, the study can be seen as a journey between the past, present, and the future for the reason that historical context matters in understanding complex social problems and their possible consequences in the near future. Hence, prior to the fieldwork, a preliminary study is required to understand the historical context of certain issues. Furthermore, the sources that are going to be used are based on both secondary and primary resources. The secondary resource includes historical analysis, scientific journals, news articles and books and they are going to be used to briefly introduce the historical background of the following concepts such as terrorism, counter-terrorism, media, the anti-Islam discourses, and human rights.

### 1.4.1 Preliminary study

- *Terrorism and counter-terrorism* → The selected time periods for this concept are the pre-modern history of terrorism (first, 11<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> century), the modern history of terrorism (19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century), and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The selected periods give a clear image of how terrorism and counter-terrorism has evolved and how the meaning of terrorism has shifted over time.
- *Human rights* → Aiming to explain the historical developments of European human rights framework and its relevance from its establishment after the second World War until its actual form within the context of the war on terror.
- *The role of the media and anti-Islam discourse on counter terrorism (orientalism)* → This concept is going to be studied together with Media studies, aiming to understand how orientalism has laid its root, and has been reproduced by the Media in the present day. Moreover, it explains



how it made a comeback to have an impact on the recent global war on terror. The selected time periods are the early constructions of orientalism in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

#### **1.4.2 Field study**

The data acquired from the field work relies both on secondary and primary resources, used to gather evidence for the main argument, which is central to this research, and to compare if the reality draws parallel lines with the theoretical frame work or figure out some discrepancies that may provide new data and thus may valuable for the development of the field of terrorism.

- *Contextual analysis* → a brief introduction of the problem within the Dutch context. The resources that are going to be used includes statistical data, government documents and policies, newspapers, scientific journals.
- *Political Discourse analysis* → aims to analyze the current political discourse on terrorism through newspapers, former Media-analysis and Media footages.
- *Interviews* → based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with Dutch Muslims, non-Muslims and politicians. The outcome offers insight into how the problem is experienced from different perspectives.

#### **1.5 Methodology**

The research strategy is a single case study in which one particular case is studied in a specific context. The study is based on an argumentative approach, aiming to gain deeper knowledge from different perspectives to establish a position on the topic. Furthermore, the research is taking conduct within the constructivism paradigm of IR theory in which terrorism is considered as a social construct rather than a brute fact. This paradigm takes discourse as a starting point and emphasizes the crucial role of metaphors in making the reality (Hülse & Spencer, 2008). Hence, this meets the research goal to the fullest, as

it may provide a better explanation for how the reality about terrorism and its responses has been constructed and perceived by different groups.

### **1.5.1 Data collection**

The data collection technique is based on qualitative research methods, including in-depth interviews and discourse analysis. The interviews are based on open conversations, but to ensure the consistency the questions are semi-structured in which the topics to be included in each conversation were determined in advance. A total of twelve respondents were interviewed, including three politicians, seven Muslims and two non-Muslims. The sampling method that is used to select the respondents is based on the purposive sampling method, also called judgment sampling. This way of sampling is based on the researchers deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses. It is mostly used in qualitative research to select the information-rich cases to draw relevant information from the available resources. This means that the researcher selects the respondents based on what needs to be known and makes a selection of individuals that are proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of interest (Etikan et al., 2016). In relation to this research, the respondents selected for this study are divided into three categories: politicians, Muslims, and non-Muslims, consisting of 5 men and 7 women. Those groups are of different ages and are coming from different socio-economic backgrounds. The respondents are consisting of individuals who have a high level of education and are selected based on their level of social and political involvement. This is a conscious choice, especially because these respondents have the necessary information and can provide valuable information about the subject. Furthermore, a discourse-analysis is used in order to understand how the narratives and stories about how the anti-Islam led terrorism narratives has been constructed and evolved over time.

### **1.5.2 Data analysis**

The techniques that are used for the data analyzing process is based on qualitative research methods includes a content-analysis and coding. The first is used to analyze Media content such as newspapers, video footage of political speeches and the language used in government documents. Secondly, the data

gathered through interviews are analyzed by the technique of coding, in which labels are attached to lines of text, and the information is grouped and categorized. Furthermore, similar or related pieces are compared in order to trace patterns, or to spot deviations.



## **2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM, AND MEDIA**

The tension between liberty and security is the most debated issue within terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. In particular critical scholars have expressed their concerns about the notion that states have in which human rights can be turned-off whenever it is found necessary. This idea has been challenged by many critical scholars as they have warned for potential state abuses of power in the name of state security (Goold & Lazarus, 2019). Hence, scholars, as well as politicians have tried to find a balance between security and liberty, which seems nearly impossible (George, 2005). The problems arise from the fact that there a plenty of diverging ideas on what is considered to be moral and what not. This part gives a brief historical explanation of how the debates about liberty and security has developed over time and have come back within the context of the war on terror.

### **2.1 Historical Perspective: Liberty Versus Security**

Moral issues related to political matters are not new and date back to ancient Greece in which Socrates firstly spoke out about Morality as he claimed that it is all about “how we ought to live”, and why? But today there are lots of rival ideas on what it means to be live morally, nor a consensus on a definition is reached yet (Fabian & Fordyce 1990). In modern times, many great thinkers have underlined the importance of morality in political analysis, which has found ground for modern political thought. However, different than their predecessors they argued that the answer on what morality is could be found in freedom itself, hence the problem of morality is often referred to as concerns about how freedom-restricting principles may be justified (Carter, 2003). Similarly, many scholars have welcomed Kant’s account of moral education base on the principle that freedom presupposes morality (Giesinger, 2012). However, this idea has been found problematic since freedom itself poses a

challenge to morality, which subsequently caused more confusion and the rise of questions such as to what extent are limitations on freedom acceptable, and for what purpose? or what is more important security or liberty? Hence, due to diverging ideas a clear-cut answer to those questions seems quite problematic, as many scholars have failed to find a generally accepted definition for morality (Allhoff, 2018).

However, the following great thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke are marked as a key on this matter as they have provided valuable insight into liberty and security issues. However, even if they share a similar focus, they disagree on their justifications for limitations on freedom (Onbasi, 2013). Hence, in order to understand the different conceptions on liberty and security, it's important to delve into the historical context and take the diverging ideas of the leading figures into consideration.

The main roots of liberty can be traced back to Hobbes idea of absolutism in which he advocates for the concentration of power in the state apparatus in order to ensure security for the commonwealth (Malcolm, 2016). Given the reason he believes in, Hobbes describes human nature as evil, egoistic, and cruel, and if individuals would enjoy their full rights to do whatever they want then they would harm each other. Hence, he advocates for a handover of individual freedoms to the state in exchange for protection from a powerful state. This gives the state the ultimate right to restrict the individual rights of citizens in order to maintain the social order (Steele, 1993). This Hobbesian conception of a strong state draws somehow parallel lines with proposals earlier made by Machiavelli in his great work "The Prince", in which he advocates for the conditional right the prince has use violence, only if it serves for security matters (Frazer & Hutchings, 2011) However, this way of thinking about morality has offered him a worldwide reputation as an immoral but is at the same time ambiguously admired as a prominent figure who has brought real politics into political thoughts (Lamus, 2016). In contrast, while Hobbes and Machiavelli have some commonalities, Locks perspective is quite different. First of all, in opposition to others, Locke has built his work based on religious principles. Accordingly, he describes the human nature as rational and peaceful, rather than evil. Hence, this has led to different perceptions on freedom and

security as well. In this context, human beings are believed to be born with reason, and that they have the capacity to be guided by their own reason. Therefore, according to Locke state power should to some extent be reduced down, and individuals should give back their freedoms and basic rights of self-regulation (Huyler, 1997).

Moreover, speaking about the present day the discussion about restrictions on freedoms, or nowadays as it is called human rights violations is still prevalent. When lifting up the discussion to the current state of war on terror, similar patterns can be drawn in terms of government restrictions on freedom, or human rights violations that take place under the guise of the war on terror, and national security. Especially after 9/11, the tension between security and liberty is continuing its existence, and has been intensified even further (Gearty, 2010). In case, particularly, Western countries have sought ways to utilize their national security through counter terrorism measures that are most of the time at odds with human rights. Although, even if the effects of those measures are devastating for some groups, it has been justified by states national interest to provide security (Aradau, 2008). In relation to this, prioritizing national security over everything else is in fit with the realism paradigm, which is currently recognized as the most dominating school of thought in world politics. It also has had an impact on state attitude and behavior towards certain issues such as terrorism (Booth, 2011). Especially, in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks the realists seem to have set the parameters for the debate concerning the war on terror, in which state survival is prioritized over human security (Dornan, 2011). In a similar way, this immoral language is also traceable in a great part of terrorism studies, as many scholars have claimed that the field of terrorism has been dictated by the state-centric discourse on terrorism in which state security have been put at the center (Gunning, 2007). This has led to a biased, weak, and state-centric research, which also found the base for counterproductive policy recommendations or policies. In response to that, many scholars have expressed their concerns, as they have adopted a more critical stance towards the existing knowledge, and proposals are made for bringing the human aspect back into terrorism studies (Blakeley, 2007). Hence, it is important to understand the dynamics that have shaped and dominated the field of terrorism for decades.

After having said this, the next part deals with a literature review in which former studies on terrorism have been surveyed. The goal here is to get a better understand of whether previous studies have contributed to the development or have led to the stagnation of terrorism studies.

## **2.2 Literature Review: Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Media**

This part deals with the main developments in terrorism studies, aiming to figure out what is already known about the topic in order to map the shortcomings of current studies. The literature review is divided into two parts. The first part surveys the main argument of traditional terrorism studies, while the second part deals with the work of critical scholars, which have challenged former studies on their ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations. In consideration of all, this chapter ends with remarks on the literature review and lists some points that are crucial in doing research on terrorism.

### **2.2.1 Terrorism**

Today, terrorism is the most frequently used word in the political vocabulary. Especially after the 11<sup>th</sup> September attacks, terrorism has become increasingly concerned by both scholars and governments. In response, many Western countries have developed counter -terrorism strategies and the number of terrorism studies has been rapidly increased (Silke, 2008). In consideration of the latter, a vast majority of traditional scholars have argued that a well-defined objective definition is crucial in order to fight terrorism effectively. Hence, many traditional studies have ben stick to the definitional problem. Despite, many efforts, a widely accepted definition is not there yet. Instead, the debate about the definitional problem is still going on, and is considered as the most prominent issue, which is continuing to dominate the field of terrorism (Begorre-Bret, 2005)

### **2.2.2 On the definition of terrorism**

A vast majority of traditional scholars argue that terrorism cannot be combated effectively in the absence of a legal definition. Rather, a lack of a well-defined



definition can be dangerous as it may lead to abuse or misuse of the word, encourages double standards, and stands in the way of international cooperation. (Golder & George, 2004). In this regard, many scholars have made efforts to arrive at a commonly accepted definition, among them, the most prominent scholar is Schmid (1984) who has examined over 200 definitions in order to figure out some common features of terrorism, determined by their frequently appearance in other definitions. By doing so, twenty-two core elements of terrorism have been identified, including violence, political, criminal, fear, threat, civilian target, and the like. However, Silke (1996) states that Schmid's definition has been criticized for being too broadly defined and insufficient since it does not draw a clear line between other forms of violence. But on the other hand, Byman (2014) concludes that it has helped to extract some key features, as it has been used as a guideline for both governments and scholars. In a similar move, Garrison (2004) states that while there is no unanimous conclusion on how to define terrorism, an intensified study on definitions has shown that consensus has been achieved on some elements. Accordingly, Zalech (2019) states that the most common elements are as applied in the following definition. Terrorism is a *strategy* that involves the *illegal use of violence/force* against *innocent civilians* to realize certain political, religious, or ideological goals. As Sinai (2008) and many other states, the main intent of terrorists is to change the status quo by *inducing fear*, which goes *beyond the immediate target*. In addition, the impact that terrorists want to realize is often seen as *physical* as well as *physiological*. Although, Beggore-Bret (2006) claims that the physiological impacts are deeper than its physical consequences precisely because it aims to frighten a population in order to have a greater impact on a wider public.

However, even if there is consensus on certain features, a well-defined universal definition is not achieved yet. In relation to this Schmid (2004) argues that the complexity of arriving at an objective, or universal definition comes from the fact that terrorism is tried to define in different contexts, or within different frameworks. In relation to this, Setty (2011) claims that most definitions are too broadly defined for the reason that the appearance of “the use of violence in order to create...fear” in many definitions can encompass any kind of violence.

Hence, the existing definitions are falling short in drawing a clear boundary between terrorism and other forms of political violence. However, Scremin (2017) states that for a better understanding of the phenomenon a clear distinction between terrorism and other forms of violence is needed. Likewise, Hoffman (2006) claims that making such a distinction is essential and adds that distinctions are a path to definitions.

### **2.2.3 The nature of terrorism**

A number of scholars argues that the nature of terrorism is an essential factor in making a clear distinction between terrorism and other forms of violence. For instance, Jackson (2008) states that terrorism can be best understood and defined by the nature and characteristics of the act itself. Similarly, Wang & Zhuang (2017) argues that understanding the nature of terrorism also matters for the reason that it helps to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence. In relation to this, Stevens (2005) warns for the fact that a lack of such a distinction might lead to poor research and counter terrorism efforts. Although, even if terrorism has distinctive features, the fact that it bears a close relation to crime makes it difficult to draw a hardline between other forms of violence such as revolution, guerrilla warfare, and rebellion, conventional warfare, and the like.

In contrast, how blurred the line might be, Hodgson & Tadros (2013) considers this issue as one of the central dilemmas that must be confronted in order to fight terrorism in an effective way. Accordingly, Black & Deflem (2004) states that terrorist's intent and target are commonly seen as key factors in differentiating terrorism from other acts of crime. For instance, speaking about terrorist intent it is often described as symbolic or emotional, rather than materialistic. This means that terrorist groups are often seeking ways to realize a psychological impact on a wider public to bring about change. Likewise, Schmid (2005) refers to the oldest definition of terrorism descended from the ancient Chinese in which the central idea of terrorism is "Kill one, to frighten ten thousand ". Hence, the way a terrorist act differs from other criminal acts is that the direct victim is not the ultimate target. Rather, the victims are used to serve as an amplifier to send a message to a wider public. In a similar way, Bakker (2012) states that terrorism is all about exploitation of fear in order to

force the target audience into concession. Likewise, Özdamar (2008) argues that terrorism may be described as a criminal act, but claims that the purpose, or intent behind all criminal acts are not identical. For instance, while a terrorist aims to cause a physiological effect that goes beyond the immediate target, a freedom fighter is mainly concerned with weakening the power of security forces or, criminals may act out for economic gains while a psychopath may have no clue.

Moreover, as Walzer (2006) states, the terrorist target is another crucial element in making the distinction. In case, violent groups, such as guerilla, or freedom fighters are characterized by their selective use of violence against military, or police forces, while terrorist acts are often described as randomly, or unexpectedly use of violence against innocent civilians. In a similar move White & Clear (2003) argues that *randomness* and *innocence* are crucial elements in terrorist's victim selection, which makes terrorist acts unpredictable, and therefore far more dangerous than any other violence.

However, Elsea (2001) argues that the legal discourse on terrorism has been changed over time. Especially in the wake of 9/11 attacks, many politicians as well as academicians tend to label terrorism as an act of war, instead of a criminal act. Consequently, this has led to concerns about how terrorists should be prosecuted, by criminal, or by law of war. However, Essig (2001) concludes that putting terrorism in the same category as war crime has some legal implications. For instance, in law of war states have the legitimate right to use force, or violence for the sake of self-defense. For this reason, putting terrorism on the same foot as war may elevate the status of terrorists to that of legitimate states in which acts of terror may become a legitimate use of violence. Similarly, Schwenkenbecher (2012) argues that the law of war is inapplicable on terrorist activities for the reason that it is carried out in the absence of a substantively just legal process. According to Jinks (2003) key to law of war is that it should be formally- declared by a sovereign state and carried out as an inter-state armed conflict in behalf of the state's policy ends. On this occasion, Bradley & Goldsmith (2004) argues that no matter for what reason, a terrorist commitment cannot be categorized as war, because it lacks authorization for the use of

force. This means that how reasonable the terrorist cause might be the act itself can never be legitimized.

Furthermore, in consideration of all it may be clear that arriving on a general accepted definition seems nearly impossible due to diverging perceptions on what terrorism is all about. Although, Saul (2014) urged to bring a legal definition of terrorism within the law in order to prevent political abuse of the term. In a similar way, Acharya (2008) concludes that a lack of a clear-cut idea on what constitutes terrorism paved the way for unlawful state practices under the guise of the war on terror. As Corbin (2017) concludes, especially after 9/11, the West has adopted a narrower conception of terrorism, reduced to the Islam. This has resulted in the notion that terrorist attacks are only carried out by Arabic-looking people and non-civilized societies, which in turn have led to discriminative policies towards certain groups in Western societies. Likewise, Hodgson & Tadros (2013) concludes that the discourse on terrorism determines the way terrorism is tried to combat. In a similar move, Bruce (2013) states that the definition of terrorism affects the response to the issue, and thus the fight against terrorism without knowing the real enemy, or having any clue of what constitutes terrorism may turn out in counterproductive anti-terrorism efforts, which are claimed to be even more harmful than terrorism itself.

#### **2.2.4 The challenges in defining terrorism, media and its implications on counter-terrorism policies**

In consideration of all, it may be clear that defining terrorism is not an easy task, but not less important. Accordingly, Martini & Njoku (2017) argues that the success of counter- terrorism policies depend highly on a proper designation of the definition. Hence, a focus on the challenges that have complicated the road to an accepted definition, and its implications on counter-terrorism is found important.

Laqueur (1977) argues that a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist, nor it will be in the future. Because, definitions are built upon one's political or ideological beliefs, and so arriving on a universal definition seems nearly impossible. Accordingly, Schmid (2004) argues that the concept of terrorism is a man-made construct, because it tends to reflect the interest of the

definer. Likewise, Richards (2014) concludes that defining a terrorist act is a subjective process, as it depends highly on one's personal, or political outlook. A phrase that supports this argument is the well-known "*one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*", which is often used to underline the complexity of defining terrorism. In addition, Ganor (2002) argues that given the fact that all definitions are a product of one's subjective view it seems impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism. In a similar way, Schmid (2011) concludes that terrorism tend to reflect the political interest, or rest upon the moral judgments of the definer. For instance, if there is a sense of identification with the victims of a terrorist attack, then the act is considered terrorism, but if one feels more attached to the perpetrator it is not. Consequently, Goppel (2005) argues that since our moral thinking, and our subjective interpretations plays a role in many definitions; the word terrorism has not been applied equally, or fairly to everyone. In relation to this, Jenkins (1980) argues that terrorism has become a sloppy used word, which means that there is a high tendency to label violent acts as terrorism even if the act itself is not strictly terrorism by definition. Likewise, Dearth (1986) states that terrorism, as a label tends to be sticky, which means that one's a group carried out a terrorist act, then every act regardless their motives will tend to be labeled as terrorism in the future.

Moreover, Ghetti (2007) describes terrorism as an attention-seeking word used by media to sensationalize violent acts, with the aim to increase attention, regardless without any evidence that proves the act is intended to terrorize. This leads to false narratives, which may turn out in irregular fear, and even worse it may lead to immoral counter-terrorism measures. Similarly, Perešin (2007) argues that a vast majority of scholars have claimed that there exists a symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism. This means while the Media tends to use terrorism for sensational reasons it also may operate (un) intentionally as an amplifier for terrorist groups trying to exploit media coverage as a tool of communication to create publicity, spread fear among a wider public, and to increase terrorist recruit. On the other hand, Nelis & Savages (2012) warns for the implications of execration terrorism events in the Media on anti-terrorism policies. Consequently, the inflated media hype around terrorism may increase

the fear among the public, and may turn out in harsh policies, restrictions on civil liberties, or unnecessary security measures that diminish quality of life.

Last but not least, Greene (2017) concludes that the meaning of terrorism rest upon ideas that are related to a specific context, location and time-period. This clearly shows that terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon that evolves over time. For instance, the original meaning of terrorism dates back to the French Revolution in which the word was used to describe state terrorism, carried out to control the society. But over the time, the meaning of terrorism has shifted from that of state terrorism into non-state terrorist practices in which violent act is being labeled as terrorism only if non-state actors carry it out. From a different angle, Stuurman (2019) states, that the changes in terrorism meanings are not only linguistically; rather changes in ideology, and in the political landscape are also influential in the way meanings are attributed to the term terrorism. In short, due to the subjectivity of the word, and the changing structure of terrorism a one size fit all definition of terrorism seems utopic. Yet, paradoxically the search for a universal definition is not over, as many scholars have reached consensus on the idea that the absence of a legal definition may have legal implications.

Moreover, in consideration of the current state of terrorism debates it seems that both academicians as well as politicians have adopted a narrow conception of terrorism. In case, Gofas (2012) states that many scholars have tried to make a distinction between old and new terrorism. Especially, after 9/11 the international community has become convinced that the world has entered a new era of terrorism, which is unlike terrorism in the past. The main difference here is that the so-called new type of terrorism is far more dangerous. Because first of all, it is transnational and well-organized on international level, and the organizational structure is based on a looser network, which makes it difficult to trace terrorist groups, or to predict the probability of potential terrorist attacks in the near future. In relation to this Spencer (2006) states that another crucial element that distinguish the new type of terrorism from traditional ones is that the first one is motivated by religious concerns, while the second is claimed to be more secular from character and is seen as having a political rational reason for their acts of terrorism. However, Corbin (2017) and many others have turned

a critical eye on the concept of “New Terrorism” and have argued that reducing terrorism to religion seems quite problematic. Especially, in the aftermath of 9/11 the word terrorism is frequently equated with the Islam in which a terrorist is often seen as the one with brown eyes and an Arabic look. Consequently, this have resulted in false narratives and stereotypes about Muslims and their religion, paved way for discriminative counter- terrorism measures, which in turn jeopardized the security of many Muslims and made their daily life miserable. Likewise, Welsh &Williams (2014) claims that the term “New Terrorism” is often used to justify the expansion of restrictive counter policies, which are by definition not even necessary. Besides, Kundnani (2012) states that due to an overemphasize on new terrorism, or Islamic fundamentalism other extremist groups fed by motives other than religion have been neglected.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is obviously that a lack of a universal definition has some legal implications. In case, Setty (2013) states that since the word terrorism is attributed to the subjective meaning of the definer it has become more prone for misuse and manipulation. For example, those who support terrorist groups might try to convince others by defining terrorism in such a way that it would be stay outside the definition, or in reverse, some governments might label their opponents as terrorists in order to justify state policies to discredit opponents. In addition to this, Wilson (2005) states that attempts to combat terrorism in absence of definition on an international level have also paved the way for illiberal state practices, potential human rights abuses and diversion from rule of law. Similarly, Bruce (2013) claims that the definition of terrorism determines the way of response to the terrorist threat and so in turn have serious political as well as social consequences. Furthermore, as stated by Schmid (2004) the absence of a definition is widely seen as a crucial factor that will encourage terrorism even further in the long run.

#### **2.2.5 Beyond the definitional problem: Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)**

While the field of terrorism studies has been dominated by conventional terrorism studies, seeking for a widely accepted objective definition, other scholars took the existing knowledge with a pinch of salt, and have adopted a more critical stance towards traditional terrorism studies (Lutz, 2010). The critical attitude flourished out of concern for the poor status of terrorism

studies, suffering from state centrality, weak assumptions, lack of historical context and self-reflexivity, which even have morphed into counterproductive anti-terrorism measures, or illiberal state practices as well (Jackson, 2007). All those shortcomings have resulted in the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), inspired by Frankfurt school, which draws parallel lines with Welsh School Critical Security Studies (CSS). The critical camp of scholars has taken a critical stance towards existing knowledge and have made proposals for a new research program (McGowan, 2016).

In line with this way of critical thinking, Jackson (2007) argues that traditional Terrorism Studies (OTS) have been challenged on their epistemological, ontological and methodological foundations. In relation to this, Beyer (2006) claims that traditional terrorism studies are mainly criticized for being dictated by the paradigm of realism, and positivism, which perceives the state as the only relevant actor in World politics and neglects others. Consequently, this has led to the emergence of state-centric terrorism studies that have placed the security of the state above human security. In turn, this has led to the notion that terrorism is a non-state commitment, hence the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism has been left out. Accordingly, Jackson, Smyth & Gunning (2009) have underlined the danger of state centrality. In particular, the predominant belief that non-state actors possess a greater security threat have also resonated with policymakers, in which the war on terror itself has at one point morphed into state terrorism. In a similar way, Jackson (2008) also warns for the devastating consequences of the state-centric discourse on terrorism and claims that it functions as a legitimizing tool for governments who are trying to justify their illiberal policies of military intervention or extension of new regions, regime changes, state's abuse of power, human right violations and the like. Similarly, Al-Kassimi (2019) argues that the current global war on terror have been dominated by a militarized pedagogy wherein human security takes a backseat to security of the state. This have ensured governments to perceive their citizens as a potential threat to their national security. Consequently, the reversal of the social contract has led to undemocratic measures wherein the fundamental freedoms of citizens are traded for vague promises of safety. All in one, since the exclusion of the state harms more than it does good; a number of



critical scholars have proposed to bring the state back into terrorism studies. For instance, Martini (2019) advocates to include other forms of violence - such as states terrorism, hence insulating the state into terrorism studies have become one of the core commitments in CTS.

Moreover, many scholars like Mannes & Goldbeck (2005) have been critical about the ontology and epistemology of traditional terrorism studies, in other words, how terrorism is perceived and studied. Accordingly, Blakely (2007) concludes that since terrorism studies have been dictated by the problem-solving theory and neo-realist approaches no space have been left for questioning its own reference of framework. This means that the existing knowledge have relied upon overgeneralized and taken for granted assumptions in which the reality about terrorism is perceived as a brute fact that is given, rather than a social construct. However, Jackson (2009) advocates for broadening the vision towards terrorism and claims that deconstruction of fixed assumptions is another core commitment in critical studies. Similarly, Wittebols (1991) states that the reality about terrorism doesn't exist out of our consciousness, rather its construct which is influenced by social processes. Furthermore, Ramsay (2015) argues that scholars need to move beyond the definitional problem in order to understand the essential point of how the reality of terrorism has been taken shaped by powerful circles such as politicians and the Media. Likewise, Greene (2017) goes beyond the orthodoxy of many mainstream terrorism studies and argues that there are powerful forces at play, which are influential in defining the terrorism discourse. For this reason, he advocates for a refocus on the important role of institutions, power relations play in defining terrorism.

Moreover, number of scholars have been critical about the methodological choices of many traditional scholars. For instance, Bunyavejchewin (2010) a great part of traditional studies has approached terrorism as an objective and stable phenomenon and has tried to catch the reality in numbers and statistical data based on qualitative methods. However, this have led to overgeneralization, poor assumptions and lack of empirical evidences. In relation to this, Greence (2017) argues that scholars need to move from an actor-based approach to a discourse approach, in which the lens should be directed on understanding

discourse surrounding terrorism, rather than the label itself. In case, a constructivist approach is found more suitable since it reveals the narratives and the powerful subjective forces at play in constructing terrorism. Further critics expressed by Jack (2009) is based on the fact that that traditional studies have relied too much on secondary data, hence, many existing knowledges on the topic is found to be weak, as it is seeming to be poorly supported by strong evidence. According to numbers only 20% of the publications are actually providing new information about terrorism. Silke (2001), one of the scholars who have a keen eye for the roots of this problem, argues that despite thirty years of effort, a lack of primary sources has led to a failure in terms of reaching academic maturity. In a similar way, Schuurman & Eijkman (2013) states that a great part of traditional studies has acquired data from second-hand sources rest upon citations of other books, articles and news items. Consequently, this has led into what Ranstorp & Dolnik have called “A highly unreliable closed and circular research system, functioning in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop”. At the same time, a lack of empirical testing has complicated the assessment of whether existing explanations are possible, likely, or proven to be valid.

### **2.2.6 Remarks on the literature**

So far, after surveying the literature on terrorism it became clear that many traditional studies have felt short in providing adequate information, as they have failed to give better understanding about what underpins terrorism. Instead, a vast majority of the studies have been dominated by the definitional problem, hence, not less important the essence of what drives terrorism have been faded away.

Moreover, the over-reliance on the problem-solving theory has put the state at the heart of terrorism studies in which state security is prioritized over human security. Consequently, this has paved way for illiberal state practices, undemocratic policies undermining human rights. Hence, many scholars have expressed their concerns as they have taken a critical stance towards existing knowledge. This has resulted in the formation of Critical Terrorism Studies-CTS that has challenged the ontological and epistemological foundations of mainstream studies and have made proposals for a new research agenda.

First of all, the main commitment is a deconstruction of all taken-for-granted assumptions and theories that have prevailed the field for decades. Especially, the notion that terrorist acts are only carried out by non-state actors have led to biased terrorism research that have close ties with the state. Therefore, critical scholars have urged to untie the link between terrorism scholars by including the likelihood of state-sponsored terrorism. Furthermore, the leading notion that terrorism is a brute fact has led to a gap between theories and realities and has distracted scholars from the essential point of what feeds terrorism. In order to close this gap, critical scholars suggested a constructivists approach that goes beyond the belief that terrorism is a given reality, rather than a product of human being. Hence, a discourse approach seems more suitable since it unravels how narratives, power relations, institutions play an immense role in constructing the reality about terrorism.

Last but not least, traditional studies have relied too much on secondary sources, as they have been dominated by the paradigm of positivism. This means that terrorism, as a social construct, is tried to catch by value-free, numeric data, in which the human aspect is omitted. Instead, a constructivist approach is seen to be more suitable to squeeze everything out of the topic. Further, the human aspects should bring back into terrorism research, and a comprehensive orientation should be adopted in which the discourse on terrorism should be studied with all its consequences on counter-terrorism and human rights.



### **3. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: HISTORY OF TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

In the present-day security concerns and its associated policies have become a top priority for many Western countries. Especially in the wake of 11<sup>th</sup> September attacks in 2001, many Western governments share the common believe that the world has entered a new era of terrorism as they took extensive measures to combat terrorism. The new wave or the so-called new terrorism, motivated by religious concerns is claimed to be far more dangerous than terrorism in the past (Tucker, 2001). However, a number of scholars have been skeptical about this conceptualization since there are many historical examples of terrorism driven by religion. Furthermore, a narrow conception of terrorism is claimed to be far more dangerous than the threat itself. In particular it may lead to false narratives about Muslims, normalize repressive policies and other forms of extremism may be overlooked (Spencer, 2006). In consideration of the latter, it seems that the discourse on terrorism matters since it determines the designation of counter-terrorism policies. Hence, it is essential to go back to the historical roots of terrorism to understand how the narratives around terrorism has evolved over time and how their meanings have shifted. This part starts with a brief history of terrorism, followed up by the developments of counter terrorism measures and its consequences on human rights.

#### **3.1 Pre-Modern History of Terrorism**

Today terrorism is among the most concerned and debated issues worldwide. Although, terrorism is old as mankind as its existence goes a long way back before the word was even introduced yet (Zalman, 2009). According to the pre-modern history of terrorism political violence was for the first time used by groups driven by religious concerns. Those groups are the best-known as the Zealots-Sicarii, Assassins and the Thugs. Despite, there are parallel lines in terms of the methods they have used, their orientations were totally different.

For instance, Zealots-Sicarii took reference from Judaism, the Assassins carried out their acts in name of the Islam, and the Thugs tried to seek justification under the aegis of Buddhism (Rapoport, 1983).

### **3.1.1 The Sicarii and Zealots, Assassins and Thugs**

The Sicarii and Zealots are claimed to be the oldest terrorist organization that have laid its roots in the 1<sup>st</sup> century. The Jewish resistance groups carried out terrorist activities to resist against the Roman domination in Judea. The Sicarii, which means dagger was at that time used to stab Jews who had accepted the Roman occupation. The tactic of the Sicarii was to blend into the crowd and carry out secretive killings in order to spread fear and force insurrection against Roman rulers in Judea (Horsley, 1979). However, the assassins are claimed to be the first terrorist group driven by religious motives, also known as a secret Islamic Shia sect of Nazari's that have split up with the orthodox Sunni Islam (Gonzales, 2013). The name assassin derives from the Arabic word "*Hashishijya*", which refers to the use of hashish, a sort of drugs. Hence, the assassins or the hashish smoking killers owe this name for the reason that they killed people under the influence of drugs (Boboc, 2014). They were active between the 11<sup>th</sup> and the 12<sup>th</sup> century in the area of Syria and Persia (Modern Iran) and are remembered by their killings of spiritual and political leaders, scholars and low-rank officials, aiming to oppose the power of the Seljuks in Persia and resist against emirs and crusaders in Syria (Chojnowski, 2017). They attempted to gain legitimization by claiming that they are defending their religious authority from the orthodox Islamic domination and any other threat that has endangered the survival of the community (Lutz, 2005). The Thugs or the Thugees is a secret cult of murder and terror, which started their operations in the seventh century and took their blessings from Kali, the Hindu Goddess of death (Windle et al., 2018). The word Thug stems from the language of old Hinduism and means deceiver or swindler. The members of this groups lead double lives: officially virtuous and secretly criminals. In the winter they hunt on people to kill them, but when the killing season is over, they turn normal and melt into ordinary life as employees and orderly citizens (Çaya, 2015). The victims in particular travelers were killed with clothes wrapped around their necks, a quiet method that left no blood (Çaya, 2015). The killings, which were

seen as a part of their religion were carried out to help their goddess to eliminate all bad demons from the earth. In return, they were given the right to kill and take their belongings (Thornton, 1851).

### **3.2 The Beginning of Modern Terrorism**

In modern terms the word terrorism originates from '*terrere*', a Latin word, which means to frighten'. The first use of the word was officially during the Reign of terror in France from 1793-1794, considered as the first organized terror employed by states to maintain power and suppress political opponents (Männik, 2009). However, in the present day, the idea of state terrorism has faded away, and terrorism has become a non-state commitment (Aliozi, 2012). Hence, in order to understand the developments of modern terrorism the historical context is claimed to be an essential starting point (Duyvesteyn 2004). In this regard, the four waves model of terrorism, proposed by David Charles Rapoport provides a systematic overview of how terrorism groups have occurred and crumbled down in a certain time of period. Furthermore, the model is claimed to be the most valuable theory in terrorism studies since it gives a clear image on how the current state of terrorism shares commonalities or is in discrepancy with terrorism in the past, and help predicts what future threats may look like (Parker & Sitter, 2016). Having said this, Rapoport traced four waves of terrorism, ranging from Anarchist (1880-1920), Anti-Colonial (1920-1960), Leftists (1960-1979) to Religion wave of terrorism (1979-?) (Rapoport 2013).

#### **3.2.1 Anarchist terrorism**

The first wave is marked as the Anarchist wave, and is considered as the beginning of modern terrorism, initiated during late nineteenth century and continued its existence till the early twentieth centuries (Abbasi & Khatwani, 2014). The word 'anarchism' or 'anarchy' derives from medieval Latin *anarchia* and means literary without a ruler. The strongly held believe here is that the government system possess a danger to human liberties thus it needs to be abolished (Clark, 2016). The first well-organized anarchist revolutionary group was established in Russia, dubbed as Narodnaya Volya (1878-1881), or in

English people's freedom. They held the common belief that all governments are a source for violence and thus are found harmful and unnecessary. Hence, they championed for the replacement of the government systems by a new social order based on self-governed societies managed by individuals or voluntary associations. According to Narodnaya, the best way to force political reform and put an end to the tsarist autocracy was through the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (Hopkins, 2009). After a few failed attempts they succeeded to assassinate the tsar in 1881. Although, they were not only concerned with bringing down their own government but aimed to communicate a message to a wider public worldwide. Hence, they used terrorism as a communicative tool to propagate fear and stir up the spirit of revolt beyond their borders (Garrison, 2003). Rapidly, the idea of demanding political reform through assassination has spread over to the Americas and the Western World. Especially, in the period after the Russian experience, described as the "Golden Age of Assassinations" the numbers of assassinations of public figures in different parts of the world had been considerably increased (Walls, 2017). The use of terrorism was not an end in itself, rather the main goal was to produce fear in order to liberate the society from the state throughout the use of political violence. Back then; under the guise of liberation, many public figures around the world were subject to murder. For instance, the most prominent figures at that time, the president of the French Republic, Carnot (1894) and the president of the USA, McKinley (1901) were both victims of assassinations (Borum & Tilby, 2005).

### **3.2.2 Anti-colonial terrorism**

The second wave, known as the anti-colonial wave of terrorism, occurred between the two World Wars. In the wake of the World War I, when the defeated empires crumbled down the borders of Europe were redrawn and many new independent nation-states appeared on the world map (Abbasi & Khatwani, 2014). Suddenly, this has instigated the developments of new political trends like nationalism, independence and liberation. This in turn, has spilled over to other parts of the world as it has been a catalyst for the rise of anti-colonial movements worldwide (Kennedy, 2016). Especially, people living in undeveloped non-European countries came together to resist against European



colonial powers with the ultimate goal to liberate their country from a subordinate position and gain national independency. In the period after the World War II, the anti-colonial sentiment has been further intensified and continued its existence until 1960 (Chojnowski, 2017). The tactics used by those movements were mainly based on terrorism and guerrilla warfare techniques, targeting police and military forces. However, physical harm and murder was not an end in itself, rather terrorism was used as a mean to realize a physiological impact on the long-term with the aim to alter the attitude towards colonial powers and gain support for their cause (Hutchinson, 1972). In this regard, the second wave of terrorism is considered as being more effective because it has succeeded in getting a wide range support from governments and diaspora groups who were fighting to get their independence, which in turn have facilitated the fall of the colonial system (Lutz & Lutz, 2009). In case, the most successive example of national liberation struggle through organized political violence are claimed to be The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) and The Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Fortuna, 2015). In 1954 the FLN made a call for unification to begin an Algerian anticolonial struggle against French occupation. Back then, a group of Algerian insurgents used violence against French imperialist powers to bring an end to the colonization (Arieff, 2013). In the following years, the FLN has expanded its terrorist practices through the adoption of large-scale guerrilla warfare techniques. In 1958, after lots of bombings and killings from both sides, the FLN proclaimed independence through the formation of the Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). It was only two years after the declaration, the French president de Gaulle agreed to enter into peace negotiations with GPRA (Brown, 2018). Like Algeria, the IRA is another example of national struggle that used unconventional means to liberate the Northern part of Ireland from British rule. In 1919 the Irish War of Independence was fuelled after the IRA had shot two policemen in Tipperary. Although, one year later the leader of IRA, Collins decided to intensify the war due to the belief that the war was not delivering the intended performance. Consequently, in the following days, the attacks on police forces have been doubled as over 40 people have lost their lives. The Anglo-Irish Treaty, which was signed in 1921 brought an end to the war and paved way for the establishment of the 'Irish Free State', under one condition which is that it

would remain within the British commonwealth (Johnston, n.d.). However, the opinions were divided when it comes to in whether it is just to label those anti-colonial or national liberation groups as terrorists or freedom fighters. In most of the cases, it is the other that put the label of terrorism. For instance, the preparators often perceive themselves as freedom fighters struggling against oppressive governments, while the opponents mostly tend to label those groups as terrorists (Merari, 1993).

### **3.2.3 The new left-wing terrorism**

The third wave, or better said new left-wing terrorism, started in 1960 and continued until 1990. It flourished out of concern for increased social inequality, which was in their view caused by industrialization and its associated capitalist system. The unrest occurred in particular among working-classes, believing that industrialized governments and their elites were exploiting the people for the profit of few (Seger, 2001). The sole reason for the discontent was the US invasion in Vietnam, which was seen as a component of a larger strategy to expand the capitalist system to exploit third world countries and workers around the globe (Lutz & Lutz, 2005). As response, in particular students and labours in Europe started to see revolution through armed struggle as their legitimate right for self-defence as well as a strategic tool to raise awareness, increase support to revolt against class distinctions. The ultimate goal was to get rid of the capitalist system and realize a fair distribution of wealth and power (Arnsion & Perales, 2007). In preservation of this cause a number of leftists' groups popped up, among them the most well-known are the Red Army Faction (Germany), The Italian Red Brigades (Italy), The Red Army (Japan), and the *Action Directe* (France). Those movements often took reference from an Marxists orientation where the creation of a revolutionary situation to overthrow the capitalist system was at the core (Mareš, 2007). The ultimate goal was to create awareness among the lower layers of the society and encourage them to stand up against exploitative governments to break the chain. For the reason they believe in, on the long run it would pay off as it may contribute to the emergence of a utopian society based on ideal perfection in laws and social conditions (Rinn, 2013). To pursue these goals, they employed violent tactics as they resort to the use of assassinations, bombings, hijackings, kidnapping,

robberies and random destructions. In turn, the acquisitions through robberies and hostage-taking provided funds to its members and ensured the existence of those movements. The target groups consisted mainly of businessmen, political figures and everything else that symbolizes capitalism (Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2018). However, just like the anticolonial and national liberation movements, the opinions are divided when it comes to the question of whether those groups should be considered terrorists or guerrilla freedom fighters (Shughart, 2006).

### **3.2.4 Islamic fundamentalism**

The last wave of terrorism, better known as the religious wave, is in comparison to other forms considered as uniquely different. On that note, while former waves are claimed to have secular orientations, the latest is said to be driven by religious concerns (Gregg, 2014). A number of scholars asserted that 9/11 served as a milestone in the emergence of the religious wave of terrorism. However, many scholars claimed that its roots go a long way back to 1979 when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran took place. Those two historical events are found a crucial starting point to understand the main roots of the today's Islamic fundamentalism (Utomo, 2019). Consequently, the idea of participating in Jihad to eliminate the 'infidel' occupiers have been revived as many Islamic fundamentalists have even started to see it as a personal duty (Bar, 2008). At the other side, the Islamic Revolution in Iran has given another extra boost to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in other parts of the world (Wring, 1989). In particular certain groups living in countries where the Muslim population is majority started to make demands on the establishment of an Islamic state ruled by the *Shariah* law. These developments have been marked as the point at which the Islam started to become a serious actor in World Politics, seeking alternative ways to gain political power with the aim to spread the Islamic way of life (Halliday, 1994). Although, in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks the threat of Islamic fundamentalism has become more salient as it has been placed on the top of the political agenda of many Western countries. In the present day, it continues to hit the headlines as it has become the most examined subject within academic circles (Bakker, 2006). The religious wave nicknamed the "Jihadi terrorism" is widely regarded as posing a far more dangerous threat to world peace than

terrorism in the past due to the notion that they are operating in loose networks and are a way better organized on international level. This means that the threat could come from any angle, which in turn makes any coming threat in the near future unpredictable (Bakker, 2011). The Islamic fundamentalists are taking reference from their holy book *Quran* with the aim to put the very extreme interpretations of God's word in practice. In the reason they believe in, the *Quran* permits the use of violence against non-believers as an optional strategy only if it serves to protect the integrity of Islam and defend the *umma*, which means Islamic community (Venkatraman, 2007). In accordance to the *Sharia* law, codes for living that Muslims believe they should adhere to, force is only permitted in situations wherein the *Sharia* is violated, and Muslims are attacked because of their religious beliefs. The use of violence in all other occasions is highly forbidden. In spite, the use of violence, or in Arabic *Jihad*, which means literally "The Holy War" is often misunderstood or abused by those who are trying to utilize their personal gains (A'la Maududi, 1980). Additionally, some have even claimed that religious terrorism is often driven by altruistic motivations. For instance, Islamic terrorists often carry out violent acts for the belief that they would in return get rewarded in the afterlife. Accordingly, being in obedience with the jihadi spiritual leader would guarantee the path to the paradise and made the promises for unlimited freedoms in which a full permission is given for all that was forbidden in the world. In case, in terms of rewards, they strongly believe that they would get the right to marry 72 black-eyed virgins (*houris*) of unnatural beauty and are permitted to drink wine and have unlimited sex with them (Perry & Hasisi, 2015).

In the present day, the well-known Islamist terrorist organizations are Al-Qaida, Hezbollah and ISIS. According to these groups the West and its related secular system is being perceived as a common threat to Islamic values as it has been seen as an endangerment for Islamic life. On this occasion, Al-Qaida, the brain behind the 9/11 attacks was mainly established as a response against US presence in the Middle East. The use of violence in form of armed struggle was seen as the only way out for this situation (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018). In case, they carried out plenty of terrorist activities in particular meant to attack Western targets around the world. In addition, they also worked on the creation

of new cells worldwide with the aim to get better organized on international level (Schanzer, 2005). When Speaking about the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), formerly allied to Al-Qaida seems to share the same ideology and long-term goals and uses terrorism as a technique; indeed, it seems to fit the description of a terrorist organization, but some have claimed that it is more than that. This has to do with the fact that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida do not hold territory and are not capable to make a direct call on military forces. On the other hand, ISIS is considered as a pseudo-state that holds territory over Syria and Iraq and is governed by a conventional army that has the capability to fund itself to carry out military operations (Cronin, 2015). Unlike Al-Qaida, the ISIS is not only concerned with wiping out foreign forces from Islamic lands. Instead, they also tend to overthrow the dictatorial system of middle eastern countries and replace it with the caliphate regime, a government form controlled by Sharia law. They often use new forms of media to promote the Islamic state in order to obtain popular support, increase terrorist recruit and instil fear in order to gain recognition as a legitimacy 'Islamic State' (Courty et al., 2019).

### **3.3 Terrorism Strategies**

In consideration of the historical context of terrorism, it is noticeable that the structure of terrorist groups has changed over time, while their strategies remained the same. In case, no matter which period, it is rightfully to conclude that the use of violence to spread fear is at the core of terrorist organizations. In all cases discontent seems to be the main trigger for terrorists, as the aim to bring about change seems to be the end for all. In relation to this, when analyzing the four waves of terrorism it becomes clear that carrying out deadly attacks were at the heart of all terrorist movements that occurred in different time periods. Hence it is rightful to conclude that terrorism is a strategy to change minds by destroying bodies, regardless to what ideology they adhere to. For instance, in consideration of the first wave, anarchist movements are well-known for their assassinations of prominent figures. This also applies to the following waves such as the anti-colonial and national liberation movements, the revolutionary terrorists as well as terrorist organizations driven by religious concerns. However, causing dead bodies is not an end in itself, rather it is used

as a strategy to serve varied goals. For instance, the anarchists used terrorism to propagate fear and encourage individuals worldwide to put an end to the government system. The anti-colonial and national liberation movements were driven by the ideas of self-determination and national liberation as they employed unconventional means to resist against colonial powers with the aim to break free from colonial structures to enjoy their full right of national independency and autonomy. Similarly, the new-left wing terrorist groups used political violence as a mean to revolt against exploitative governments in order to create awareness among the lower layers of the society. In doing so, the ultimate goal was to bring down the capitalist system to eliminate class distinctions. The contemporary Islamic terrorist groups is said to be quite unique due to religious orientations. Those groups often try to seek legitimization through the claim that they are defenders of their faith and the believe that in turn they would be rewarded in the afterlife. Although, not only religious, but national concerns play a prominent role as well. In this sense, the emergence of al-Qaida can be seen as a reaction to Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and US foreign policy in the Middle East.

In short, we can conclude that terrorism is a strategy of a deliberate use of violence to harm people physically with the aim to realize a psychological impact that goes far beyond the immediate target. The ultimate goal is to inject fear among a wider audience in order to bring about change (Richards, 2014). To pursue these goals terrorists often make use of the following five general strategies that consist of attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and outbidding. In attrition, terrorists usually try to give the enemy the impression that they are strong enough to impose costs if the enemy continues with the implementation of a particular policy. The terrorists using intimidation are trying to influence the public opinion towards the belief that terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience, but that governments are weak to stop this. In doing so, terrorists are aiming to make the population behave as terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is a tactic to incite the enemy to respond with indiscriminate violence in order to push the treat of radicalization further to gain support and increase terrorist recruit (Kulig, 2012). The spoiling strategy refers to a tactic used by terrorists to undermine the implementation of an

already reached peace agreement (Stepanova, 2006). The strategy of outbidding is used to convince the public that terrorist groups are greater in solving problems than rival groups thus are worthy to support. Hence, understanding terrorist strategies are found crucial since they contribute to the effective designation of counter-terrorism policies (Kydd & Walter, 2006).

### **3.4 Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York counter-terrorism have been placed at the top of the European security agenda, as many Western countries took extensive measures in order to fight against terrorism. This part gives a brief outline of the main developments in Europe's counter-terrorism strategies. It starts with a brief history of EU counter terrorism strategies, prior to 9/11. After, it gives a brief outline of how Europe's security policies related to counter-terrorism have been shaped by 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and the following attacks, including Madrid (2004), London (2005).

#### **3.4.1 The Origins of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

In the present day the European Union (EU) has become an important international actor in the fight against global terrorism. Although, Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11. Instead, throughout its history, it had to deal with all kind of political violence, ranging from left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, to religious terrorism (Coolsaet, 2005). Even though prior to 9/11, counter terrorism in Europe was not more than a domestic matter. Only in the early 1970s it started to become a part of the European integration process, when the members of the European Community (EC) came together to foster counter-terrorism cooperation on European level. On that account, in 1976 the first platform for European cooperation was set up under the name of TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremisms, and International Violence group) (Coolsaet, 2010). The TREVI was established by European police officials in order to organize co-operative arrangements to combat terrorism. The TREVI was held responsible for two core tasks, including the exchange of information about suspects and providing mutual assistance to counter-terrorism related issues (Bunyan, 1993). In 1992 with the signature of the Maastricht treaty the

TREVI and other European institutions dealing with judicial, policing, asylum, customs and immigration issues were merged together under the name of Title VI of the treaty of the European Union (Casale, 2008). Title VI was formed to improve police and judicial cooperation on issues that might coincide after the removal of border controls across European countries had been accomplished. Hence, it was assigned to take compensatory measures to prevent terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, corruption, and fraud (Tomescu, 2014). In the following years, with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) the abolishment of border controls between all EU members have ensured the free movement of people, goods and services between European countries (Thieffry et al., 1989). Unfortunately, opening up the frontiers have created new opportunities for criminals to operate across borders and run illegal activities such as, arm sales, money laundering or organized crime with ease (Bunyan, 1996). Soon after, international crime on European soil has grown on a rapid pace as domestic law enforcement organizations failed in terms of meeting the threat. Subsequently, member countries have agreed on that an effective response to international crime and terrorism requires an urgent need for policing on European level (Monaco, 1995). However, proposals for international policing were already conceived a long time ago within the Maastricht treaty (1992), which have been mandate for the establishment of the European Police Office (EUROPOL). The EUROPOL stands for the promotion of international police cooperation to overcome national differences between law enforcement authorities of EU members. The organization is tasked for facilitating the exchange of information related to organized international crime and providing support in coordinating member states on operational level (Nunzi, 2006). But in practice, its implementation encountered many problems as it faced many critiques from member countries. Unlike integration in other areas, the integration in policing seemed to be quite sensitive and did not run smoothly for the reason that it had a direct impact on the sovereignty, national security of member states and privacy of European inhabitants (Berkelaar, 2016). Hence, after a long debate, in 1998 EUROPOL became operational after its authorization and tasks have been set within the EUROPOL convention signed in 1995. At first, EUROPOL was given limited tasks, mainly related to combatting drug-trafficking and organized crime. But, after the 9/11 attacks in



2001, it has been reformed twice and started to play a more active role as an intelligence system with extensive power (Bernardi, 2013).

### **3.4.2 Counter-Terrorism Strategies After 2001**

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks the International community has been convinced that the world has entered a new era of terrorism that is far more dangerous than in the past. In response, many countries, especially in the West have emphasized that new counter- terrorism measures are required in order to fight new terrorism in an effective way (Van de Linde et al., 2004). In this regard, plenty of radical reforms are made and new counter-terrorism measures have been adopted to promote deeper judicial and police cooperation that goes beyond the scope of the traditional exchange of information (Bigo, 2008). In doing so, the police and intelligence services are given unprecedented powers to detain and prosecute individuals involved in terrorist activity and question people that are suspected of having terrorism-related information (Wolfendale, 2007).

The United Nation (UN) is the first international organization that provided a prompt and decisive response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Only one day after, on 12 September 2001, the UN security council passed resolution 1368, which represents the states right for self-defense through the use of force in order prevent terrorism (von Einsiedel, 2016). Although less than two weeks after, the council took on another decision and introduced resolution 1373. The outcome of this resolution is far more binding than the former. It proclaims that the terrorist acts are posing a threat to international peace and security, hence it imposed binding obligations to all UN member states to build upon their capacity to fight against terrorism. It also made a call to modify domestic anti-terror laws in harmonization with international best practices, with the aim to improve inter-state cooperation in order to root out terrorism on global level (Messmer, 2010). In this sense, the UN has taken the lead and has been forefront of the global champing against terrorism as it has succeeded to set up the direction for the current international framework for counter terrorism (Dhanapala, 2005). In spite, at first glance, some member states were not compliance to these obligations, as its implementation is being criticized as slow, poor, and inadequate. Back then, some European countries in particular,

which did not fall victim to terrorism directly, did not consider counter-terrorism a top priority (Cortright et al., 2007).

### **3.4.3 EU Legal Framework For Counter-Terrorism**

Initially, the EU did not consider counter terrorism a top priority for the reason that 9/11 was not a direct attack on European soil. Although, this does not mean that it kept silence in front of those attacks. Instead, if not immediately, a few weeks following the 9/11 the EU proclaimed that the attacks aimed at America means an attack against the Western world as a whole and made a declaration to work closer with the United States to combat international terrorism. Following this decision, on 21 September 2001 the European Council established the EU Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, which provides member countries a roadmap for the fight against terrorism. It also provides a clear outline of Europe's strategic objectives on preventing and combatting terrorism such as freezing of terrorist assets and funds, enhancing judicial and police cooperation, maximize executive powers to detect, investigate and prosecute suspects, and to prevent radicalization and terrorist recruit (Casale, 2008). In pursuance of these goals a range of measures have been taken and new institutions and international organizations have been established. At present; EUROPOL, EUROJUST, and European Commission (EC) are acknowledged as one of the prominent international organizations within the EU that takes on an essential role in Europe's effort to combat terrorism (Casale, 2008).

#### **3.4.3.1 EUROPOL**

EUROPOL, an international police organization established in 1992 was given limited operation only related to drug enforcement, which was later extended to other areas such as organized crime. In 1998, further extensions took place when counter-terrorism has been added to its operations (Scheibenreif, 2009). In 2001, after 9/11 attacks EUROPOL started to have an active role in the international fight against terrorism as it signed agreements to collaborate with non-European organizations on the exchange of information (Funk, & Trauner, 2016). In the following years, EUROPOL has evolved into an intelligence gatherer FBI-like agency. Especially, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and in London (2005) it starts working closely with the US-led FBI and other

non-European organizations such as Interpol in the context of intensified exchange of personal information about suspects (Bosilca, 2013). However, until today the operations of EUROPOL remain limited to a coordination role. Unlike the FBI or national police forces, it does not wear a uniform and is not assigned the power to initiate its own investigation, carry out ID-checks, and arrest and interrogate suspects (Czepek et al., 2013).

### **3.4.3.2 EUROJUST**

Like EUROPOL, another important international organization that functions on the operational level is the European Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST), officially created in 2002 with the aim to strengthen the fight against terrorism at the level of judicial cooperation. Although, the idea to establish such an organization was for the first time brought up during the Tampere summit in 1999 (Bigo et al., 2007). Back then, just like the idea of a European policing system (EUROPOL) the European Council underlined the need for a European prosecutorial agency that cements national judicial authorities together, provide assistance on judicial matters in order to persecute suspects and bring to judgement the perpetrators of terrorist activities in a more effective way (Wade, 2013). Although, the idea of a supranational prosecutorial system with the infinitive power to arrest and prosecute have received criticism from many member states. Instead, a vast majority have rather chosen to appoint EUROJUST as a coordinating body, without adding any executive powers to its authorization (Suominen, 2008). Currently, Eurojust is operating as a permanent network unit composed of national judicial authorities that have been brought together to ensure a smooth-running legal process to tackle terrorism and organized crime (Bonansinga, 2015). In particular after the Madrid bombings in 2004 it started to play a more active role as a facilitator of cooperative arrangements among member states in the context of counter-terrorism. It also has been assigned as a coordinative body between competent judicial authorities that provide member states with crucial knowledge, expertise and recommendations for international crime investigations and prosecution processes on counter terrorism-related issues (Bures, 2010).

### **3.4.3.3 The European Commission**

The European Commission (EC) is also playing an indispensable role in Europe's counter-terrorism efforts. Whereas, Europol and Eurojust have their contribution on operational level, the EC is considered as an essential actor that operates on legislative level. Hence, it is a strong player in proposing new legislation and has laid foundation for the European legal framework for counter-terrorism (Casale, 2008). A few days after the 9/11 attacks the commission decided to accelerate the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which is marked as a milestone in European counter terrorism framework (Cevik, 2015). It has provided a solid framework for counter terrorism to ensure deeper European cooperation. In doing so, it has adopted a common legal definition and took significant steps to realize legislative harmonization. In parallel to these efforts, in 2002 the European Arrest Warrant (EWA) have been approved to substitute for the multilateral complex structure of extradition of suspects (Argomaniz & Rees, 2011). The EWA is seen as Europe's legal pioneering instrument for counter-terrorism, which is considered an important step towards legal harmonization and Europeanization of criminal law. In the first stance, the warrant requires all member states to recognize the national judicial institutions of other member states. Secondly, it obligates all national judicial authorities to arrest and surrender convicted criminals and suspects on request of other member states (Siegel, 2008).

### **3.4.3.4 EU counter-terrorism framework after 2004**

The Madrid and London terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005 injected a greater sense of urgency into strengthen European counter terrorism capabilities and minimize barriers among national law enforcement authorities (Archick, 2010). In this context, the commission have broadened the European framework for counter-terrorism and adopted new measures towards a more comprehensive approach, aiming to bring all measures within a single framework based on the following four pillars: 'Prevent', 'Protect', 'Pursue' and 'Respond'. The first pillar 'Prevent' is about stemming the radicalization process, with the aim to hinder terrorist recruitment. The second pillar 'Protect' is concerned with safeguarding citizens by protecting infrastructure and public spaces from new

terrorist threats. The third pillar 'Pursue' is aimed with initiating investigations on terrorist networks across European borders. The last pillar 'Respond' is intent to improve capabilities to combat terrorism (Ejova, 2016). In 2005 after the EU justice and interior ministers agreed on this new framework the head of the European governments started to formally adopt this new strategy. However, in practice, the process in the four different pillars have been uneven as the most successes have been obtained in the pillars prevent and protect, while less progress has been recorded in the remaining pillars (Coolsaet, 2011). In this context, the commission has taken a leading role in serving the first pillar of prevention radicalization and terrorist recruitment, which is considered a key component in combatting terrorism. In this regard, a wide range of actions has been deployed to assist member countries in tracing radical groups and bring halt to the financial aid for terrorist groups (Bakker, 2015). Further, the commission is also providing a great effort on the protection of infrastructure and public spaces against potential terrorist attacks to safeguard its citizens. A total of these efforts has resulted in a range of new measures that tighten up external EU border controls to make it easier to trace terrorist networks. For instance, one of the crucial steps towards this goal is the adoption of high-tech instruments such as the application of biometrics technology on passport and the visa information system (Casale, 2008). This tool is considered one of the key instruments in counter terrorism in Europe since it provides useful information that goes beyond traditional personal data. It verifies whether the traveler is using someone else's personal data, and is capable to link personal data to specific activities, persons and locations to prove or disprove someone's involvement in a terrorist activity (Organization for Security and co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 2019). In the following years the counter terrorism efforts in Europe had been slowed down due to the fact that it had not faced any major terrorist attack until 2010.

However, the fight against terrorism in Europe regained momentum right after the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 and thousands of EU citizens, especially European Muslims as well as converts traveled to Syria and Iran with the aim to join the so-called Islamic State-led terrorist activities (Scherrer et al., 2018). Since then, European countries have been concerned with foreign fighters

(returnees) returning back to European soil as further radicalized, well-trained in terrorist camps, and likely to pose a dangerous threat in case they decided to act as recruiters or get involved in terrorist activities in countries they are permanently residing (Zuijdewijn, 2014). These developments have brought the homegrown terrorism dimension into the counter terrorism program and have placed the first pillar of preventing radicalization at the heart of the EU counter terrorism framework (Wensink et al., 2017). This has resulted in a paradigm shift in which counter radicalization gained increasing prominence in European response to terrorism. Subsequently, understanding and interrupting the radicalization process of vulnerable individuals have become the ultimate target for many Western countries (Richards, 2015). According to many European governments the increase of homegrown extremists is blamed on a failed integration process of Islamic communities into Western countries. Consequently, many Western countries became skeptical about multiculturalism and started to see it as a stumbling block for national unity and security (Baker-Beall et al., 2014). Hence, integration and assimilation policies have become intertwined with counter- radicalization programs. Those programs have paved the way for the introduction of new repressive strategies to prevent radicalization, which are often conducted on national level rather than on EU level (Martins and Ziegler, 2018). However, the new prevent strategy, which is ought to stop radicalization and secure citizens seem in practice quite repressive and discriminatory for certain groups in the society. In particular, European Muslims have become a suspect community and are hit the most by the (un) intended side effects of those policies that also have the risk of marginalization, stigmatization and depoliticization of these groups from the wider society (Awan, 2012). For this reason, those strategies are mainly found counterproductive since it turns out in human right violations, social exclusion and isolation of Muslim communities, which makes Muslim groups more vulnerable for terrorist recruit. Henceforth, counterproductive anti-terror policies are found far more dangerous than terrorism itself since it violates human rights and aggregates the terrorism threat even further (Martin, 2006).

### **3.5 Counter-Terrorism And Human Rights**

In the present day many governments hold on to the belief that in time of crisis human rights should be trade-off for the stake of state security (Exterior, 2005). However, placing one above the other have negative consequences for both as it may endanger the state survival even further and hence put the lives of its citizens at the risk (Kerr, 2003). Hence, this way of curing the problem is seen as more dangerous than the disease since it opens door for repressive policies that may turn out to have devastating implications for the innocence, especially for Muslim communities living in Europe (Wolfendale, 2007). Besides this, repressive government response to terrorism may also have a negative impact on the society as a whole ever since many cases have shown that victims who are subject to government repression are more likely to disconnect from the wider society as they become more open to embracing radical thoughts, and turn out to become more vulnerable to engage in violent political activities (Michealsen, 2006). In this context, a considerable body of research have evidentiary shown that there exists a positive correlation between human rights violations and terrorism. This means that states that undermine the fundamental rights of their citizens are more likely to invite terrorism and become a popular target for terrorist groups than those who have fuller respect for such rights (Piazza and Walsh, 2010).

Moreover, plenty of studies have also shown that the threat of terrorism is in most cases execrated to justify illiberal state behavior. In this regard, states often have the tendency to abuse counter terrorism measures to find justification for human rights violations under the perplex of combatting terrorism (Von Schorlemer, 2003). As mentioned earlier, on the long run those violations might be hit back since victims of counterproductive measures become an easy target for terrorist recruit (Davis & Craginl, 2009). Hence, as time passed by the conventional wisdom that an effective combat of terrorism requires repressive means have become outdated and a common consensus has been built upon the argument that terrorism should be fought in accordance with the human rights standard (Ramchran, 2002). Consequently, safeguarding human rights within the context of counter-terrorism have sparked renewed interest on the international level as many countries, in particular European ones have

necessarily considered protecting human rights as crucial aspect to root out terrorism in an effective way. For that matter, many Western governments have decided to conduct their national anti-terror policies in harmonization with the International law on Human Rights (Hedigan, 2004). Hence, the next part approaches the subject of counter-terrorism through a humanitarian lens, and gives a brief explanation of how the European designation of counter terrorism have taken form within the framework of human rights. Although, in practice, many counter-terrorism efforts are claimed to be non-efficacious since they are not adherent to the human rights framework. In other words, many governments have seemingly failed in striking the right balance between human security and national security, which is going to be discussed in the following sections (ODIHR, 2007).

### **3.5.1 A humanitarian approach to counter-terrorism**

In the present day, a great awareness has been raised on the issue of human rights violations caused by ineffective counter-terrorism measures. Hence, assessing the effectiveness of anti-terror policies have increasingly become one of the most concerned and examined topic within both academic as well as political circles (Spencer, 2006). In this context, great efforts have been made to point out the shortcomings of anti-terror measures with the aim to positively contribute to its effectiveness. However, the opinions are divergent when it comes to the questions of how to define and measure effectiveness within the context of counter-terrorism. So, are recent examinations criticized for being poor since they are only concerned with the direct link between counter-terrorism and the number of terrorism activities, while the indirect negative societal impacts of counter- terrorism has been neglected. Consequently, the underlying indicators, especially on the human rights dimension, which is claimed to be an important determinant for the success or failure of those measures have remained untouched (Londras & Doody, 2009). In relation to this, scholars on the critical camp have found evidence for the argument that counter-terror measures that are at odd with human rights norms are non-efficacious to the extent that it poses a great danger to human security, even more than the threat itself. This has to do with the fact that many policymakers consider terrorism as a military issue, hence they tend to believe that it can be



only destroyed through the means of harsh and militarized measures (Al-Kassimi & Simons, 2019). However, as mentioned earlier an aggressive response is not the best way to deal with it, instead sacrificing human rights for the stake of national security threatens the fundamental principles of a democratic state as it puts both the lives of its citizens as well its own survival in danger. In spite, to date many anti-terror policymakers still remain anchored to a militarized approach as they keep being negligent about human security (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011).

However, whatever the case might be for the utilization of both human security and state security many international bodies, among others the UN, EU, and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have found common ground to place primacy on human right norms. In this regard, many legislative bodies on international level have made a call upon democratic states to adopt a human rights approach to counter-terrorism, and hence act in accordance with the universal norms of human rights (Kielsgard, 2005). The next part deals with how the European human rights regime has been developed over time and gives an outline of what points are found crucial within the context of counter-terrorism.

### **3.5.2 The European Convention on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism**

As mentioned earlier, in state of emergency governments have often the dangerous tendency to break away from the rule of law, which can seriously impair the fundamental rights of citizens, and may even pose a greater threat to the constitutional structure and the well-functioning of liberal governments. This in turn, may even have deeply troubling consequences on the maintenance of international peace and security (Dragu & Polborn, 2014). Hence, many International Human Rights bodies have governments urged to respect the rule of law in their efforts to combat terrorism. The next part explains how the EU has grown into a human rights regime and points out what important role it plays in de current fight against terrorism.

### **3.5.3 The European Convention on Human Rights**

After being theater for two bloody wars, the most prominent figures of European countries called for a unification to prevent another World War from

happening (Borchardt, 1987). In pursuit of these goal, it has built up a great heritage based on the fundamental principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Over the years, this unification has grown into a well-integrated union that has become successful in achieving sustainable peace and prosperity along the European continent (Manners, 2008). It owes its success to the myriad agreements signed on trade, political integration, and not less important the protection of the fundamental rights of its citizens. In consideration of the latter, respect for human rights is seen as the main catalysator for longstanding peace on European soil (Stivachtis et al., 2013).

Over the years, the EU obtained the reputation of being the biggest peace project in the world that has built up its own human rights regime (Krisch, 2008). The European Human Rights system have taken root within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), drawn up in 1950 in Rome, primarily to protect individuals from state coercion. Hence, at first glance, the fundamental aim of the ECHR was to contain against totalitarianism in order to make space for a more resilient political system based on shared democratic values, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights (Donald et al., 2012). Today, the convention has grown into an almost universal legislative system wherein the decisions are binding for both member states as well as for states who are in candidacy for a full member status. This means that all the states that are party to the convention are obligated to integrate the convention into their domestic legislation (Macovei, 2004). Even in times of emergency, signatories to the convention are required to balance between human rights and their national interests. This applies also to counter- terrorism efforts, which means that states dealing with terrorism are still in obligation to comply with those rules.

The articles in the convention that are related to the protection of human rights are as followed (Hedigan, 2004).

- *Article 1* - Obligation to Respect Human Rights
- *Article 2* - Right to Life
- *Article 3* - Prohibition of Torture
- *Article 5* - Right to Liberty and Security
- *Article 6* - Right to a Fair Trial

- *Article 7* - No Punishment Without Law
- *Article 8* - Respect for Private and Family Life
- *Article 9* - Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
- *Article 10* - Freedom of Expression
- *Article 11* - Freedom of Assembly and Association
- *Article 14* - Prohibition of Discrimination
- *Article 17* - Prohibition of Abuse of Rights
- *Article 18* – Limitation on Use of Restrictions on Rights

To ensure that those commitments are life up to, the convention provides for the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, which are proclaimed to be the legislative machineries of the convention (Buergethal, 1963). So are both bodies responsible for the enforcement of legislation set out within the convention. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is tasked with monitoring contracting states in whether they are complaint to the convention and is assigned to evaluate filed complaints against governments that have violated the fundamental rights of their citizens (Boyle, 2009). When it comes to the European commission of human rights, it is initially appointed for starting investigations to alleged human rights violations and is held responsible to promote conciliation by effecting a peaceful settlement of these disputes (White, 1977).

However, the reactions to the 9/11 attacks pose a great challenge to the human rights regime. This has to do with the fact that many governments have frequently departed from the rule of law in their responses to terrorism, which have resulted in human rights violations (Brauch, 2013). In illustration of this, the next part provides for some real-life cases in which human rights abuses have taken place under the auspice of counter-terrorism.

### **3.6 Human Rights Violations In The Aftermath of 9/11 Terrorist Attacks**

In the wake of 9/11, many European and US-led law enforcement agencies have given unprecedented powers, which have led to the emergence of new measures to

combat terrorism. Although, while those measures are ought to increase security, they have often led to human rights violations (Goderis & Versteeg, 2012). This section explains in a brief how these unconventional measures have ensured legitimacy and provide for some real-life cases with regard to human rights abuses carried out under the guise of counter terrorism.

The US has taken the lead in the global fight against terrorism due to the fact that it was a direct victim of the terrorist attacks in 2001. Back then, the Bush administration made an immediate declaration for the war on terror and proclaimed that terrorism can only root out through the use of aggressive means (Abdolian & Takooshian, 2002). In doing so, George W. Bush signed the USA Patriot Act, with the intent to give authorization to military force, and extensive powers for investigation and enforcement at the expense of civil liberties. This, in turn, paved way for the normalization of repressive policies that infringe on universal human rights standards (Ackerman & Grimmett, 2003). Even though the act was disfavored by many, it was enacted with overwhelming bipartisan. All of this was intended to create a legitimate base for a law-free zone in order to punish suspects free of any legal constraints. This in turn has led to mistreatments, such as torture, detention without trial, ethnic profiling, secret surveillance, invasion of privacy, and the like (Scheinin et al., 2011).

### **3.6.1 The Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp**

The Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, a detention site for terrorist suspects is a good illustration of the US war of terror in practice. It was established after 9/11 terrorist attacks with the ultimate goal to imprison individuals who have been captured amid military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since day one, the detainment facility has faced lots of criticism through the world and has become a global symbol for injustice and is known as a place that stands for abuse, torture, and indefinite detention without any trail (Col, 2003).

Although, it is not always clear what exactly happens behind the close doors of the prison, but one thing is clear and that is that the detainees are held and proceed in harsh conditions. So, are the prisoners identified as unlawful commandants and tried by military tribunals in a vacuum of a free-law zone in which the Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian laws are not applicable

(Nemish, 2009). Subsequently, the Guantanamo Bay prisoners have been exposed to military prosecutions as they have been deprived of many rights, including the right to speak with their lawyers, the right for judicial review and access to all relevant evidences, and not less important the right to assess the legality of their detention (Steyn, 2004). Even worse, the prisoners have also been put under physical and mental duress, for example, torturous techniques are employed to coerce prisoners to confess. In doing so, the detainees have been subject to barbarous interrogation methods, such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme cold, walling, forced nudity, sexual and religion humiliation, and the like (Malin, 2012). Despite many criticisms and political promises to close the camp, it is to date still open as it holds 40 prisoners and continuous to carry out unlawful military prosecutions without any interference (The National Interest, 2020).

### **3.6.2 After 9/11: human rights violations in Europe**

Unlike, the United States militarized language on counter-terrorism, the European approach is often claimed to be soft, or better said in respect with the rule of law. Although, off the grid, it seems to have harder consequences then it looks like (Hoffman, 1999). The side-effects of anti-terror policies in Europe are less visible due to the fact that they are interwoven with migration and integration policies. These three have been blended since the source of terrorism is frequently faulted on multiculturalism and a failed attempted to integrate citizens, especially with an immigrant and Islamic background into the society (Rahimi & Graumans, 2015). The securitization of migration created a formal link between migration and counter-terrorism and have even more become related to terrorism (Young, 2012). In particular, after 9/11 migration is considered as a destabilizing factor for the internal cohesion and thus a threat for the national security of many European countries. Subsequently, these security narratives have resulted in racist and xenophobic state practices at the expense of civil rights of, especially people with a migration background. (Huysmans, 2006). In particular, Muslim communities in Europe seems to be the first who fall victim ever since they are branded as potential terrorists and thus obtained an infamous reputation as suspect communities (Cherney & Murphy, 2016).

The Madrid bombings on 2004, followed by the London attacks in 2005 reinforced the perception of the Islam as posing a dangerous threat to the European values (Klausen, 2010). Those incidents also led to an alteration in threat perception, in which a shift took place towards homegrown terrorist who did not have any direct link to international terrorist organizations (Precht, 2007). This has resulted in the emergence of new counter- radicalization policies that are aimed to recognize radicalization at an early stage to prevent individuals from being engaged in terrorist activities.

However, to put this in practice, it is not an easy task to determine at what stage someone is in the radicalization process or willing to engage in terrorist activities. A reason for this is that the process of radicalization is uniquely different for each individual, which means that no clear profile can be given (Fiaza, 2011). In spite, since radicalization is predominantly equated with the Islam, its response has had a disproportionate effect on the fundamental rights of ethnic and Muslim minorities, residing in host countries (Eijkman & Schuurman, 2011). So are moderate Muslim residents often subject to ethnic profiling, social surveillance control, religious discrimination, and the like. Besides, there are many other efforts justified to limit Islamic growing, either its visualization in European countries, as the ban to minarets, headscarf, and the surveillance of imam speeches (Motilla, 2018). At the same time, the anti-Islam discourse on security also has had a negative impact on the public opinion. In this context, the Islam and Muslims have been irrational feared by a great part of the native folks. This in turn have invited for terrifying events, such as discrimination, anti-Islam hatred hostility, violence, and even murder of Muslims (Kedikli & Akça, 2018). A devastating example of the latter is, the twin mosque attacks in Christchurch on 15 March 2019 when a far-right extremist killed 50 innocent Muslims in a random shooting amid the Friday prayer, a holy day for Muslims (Sumpter, 2019). Another example of an Islamophobic incident happened in 2016, French police forced a Muslim Woman to take off here Burkini suit and ordered her to remove her clothes at the beach. Next, there are numerous cases of vandalism, in which bricks, eggs and stones are thrown to the mosques. Besides, pig's head, pork, and bacon have been put down next to mosques, and many hate letters have been sent to

Islamic centers. Those messages often contain offensive language and threatens the Muslim groups in the region (Lambert & Githens-Mazar, 2010). However, those hate crimes have been more often legitimized by terrorist activities, but even more also through intensified Islamophobic prejudice about Muslim minority groups. At the side with discriminatory state practices, the negative Media portrayal of the Islam have also reinforced these prejudices about Muslims and have created an environment that signals the normalization of threatening vibe toward Muslim communities (Perry & Poynting, 2006). Hence, the next chapter explains which role the mainstream Western media plays in reproducing and reinforcing the anti-Islam discourse and how it contributes to the normalization of repressive counter-terrorism measures.





#### **4. THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN MAINSTREAM MEDIA IN REINFORCING THE ANTI-ISLAM DISCOURSE ON COUNTER-TERRORISM**

The media, as a communication outlet, provides us simplified information about complex issues within our society but also around the globe (Luhmann, 2000). In doing so, the media is held responsible for providing their audience with a true representation of the reality. Meanwhile, it acts as a watchdog over the powerful, especially those in authority by monitoring the happenings of the government as it plays a vital role in exposing and preventing wrongdoings and corruption (Gianaka, et al., 2019). Other than that, the mass media forms the backbone of democracy and thus has the commitment to protect human life and guarantee the preservation of a democratic society (Dalei & Mishra, 2009). However, in real life it seems that it does not meet this criterion ever since the media is often misused as a manipulative tool to shape the public opinion as well as to influence the political decision-making processes, with the aim to serve for certain political interests (McCombs, 2018). On top of that, media systems are also bent to produce sensationalized content to attract the audience that is needed for journalistic and economic purposes (Vettehen, et al., 2008). In doing so, the objective facts have been replaced by a dramatic representation of news events, which often leads to disinformation, oversimplification, and distortion of the reality (Milburn, 1992). Especially in the political context, disinformation is often used to mislead the audience, with the intention to promote personal or ideological objectives (Fetzer, 2004).

In case of news coverage about terrorism, the threat has been often exaggerated in order to inspire an outcry for a response, that may not be legitimized. Although, magnifying the threat skews the perception of the risk, which in turn tends to activate a set of emotions and attitudes, such as feelings of fear, or anger in which hostile attitude can be directed to the ones who are unlawfully conceived as suspects (Mitnik, 2017). Especially, after 9/11 terrorism is often

equated with the Islam, which in turn, have led to false narratives wherein the Islam is framed as barbaric, backwardness, a religion of violence and murder thus a danger for Western values. On the long-term, this may have serious implication that goes beyond individual reactions as it may result in stereotypes and invite policy makers to propose heavy-handed solutions that are at odd with the human rights of, in particular Muslim minorities (Edmunds, 2012).

In short, it is important to understand how sensational media contributes to the construction of an overall disproportionate terrorism risk perception and how this may affect the public opinion and policy-making processes. Hence, the next part deals with the relation between media and terrorism. After, it provides clarification for how the anti-Islam talks have been constructed and maintained through repeated media exposure, and how this along this line organized into severe and biased anti-terror arrangements.

#### **4.1 A Symbiotic Relation: The Media And Terrorism**

There is a commonly held conviction that the media and terrorism are in a symbiotic relation. Basically, this implies that both entities are interconnected as they purposely take advantage of this situation. In doing so, the media uses terrorist event to create sensationalized content to attract their audience or to support the officials to hold on power, while terrorist organization seek ways to exploit the same media coverage to reach out to a wider public to propagate fear on a large scale (Biernatzki, 2001). Speaking of the latter, the media is often seen as the oxygen for terrorist publicity hence, if no attention has been paid on terrorist events it would simply withhold this oxygen, which means that terrorism without publicity would basically pass on. For this reason, critical media studies advocate for a more responsible and neutral media coverage of terrorist activities, although exiting terrorist stories has an inherent news values as they may increase the number in views and sales (Camphuijsen & Visser, 2012). On this matter, the mass media is often seen as an entertainment tool that got to maximize profits along the line of sensationalized content, rather than keep on the duty to inform the public with accurate and unbiased reports around occasions (Eid, 2013). However, sensationalizing terrorist events lead to a disproportionate risk perception and exaggerate the possibility of a terrorist

attacks in such a way that it does not correspond to the real world (Slone, 2000). In doing so, at first glance it gives free publicity to terrorist groups and helps to reach out their goals. Secondly, it provides the audience for distorted information about terrorist- related activities, which in turn leads to untrue stories that have a negative impact on the public opinion as well as on anti-terror policies, that are most regularly not in fit with the genuine danger (Corbin, 2017).

In particular, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, international terrorism or as it is called Islamic fundamentalism has received lots of media attention. Since then, the Islam has been closely linked to terrorism and is repeatedly framed as evil and an irrational religion that stands for backwardness, ignorance, and a source for violence, and murder (Brunet, 2013). The mediated view of the Islam has resulted in false narratives, stereotyping, and prejudices against Muslims living around the globe. Subsequently, this have created a breeding ground for anti-Islam led statements, anti-terror policies, hatred, violence, and even murder of Muslims (Sultan, 2016). The next part deals with how the anti-Islam discourse has been taken root from a historical perspective, and how it made a comeback through the lines of neo-orientalism. After, it explains how the mass media plays an immense role in reproducing and reinforcing this discourse, and how it affects the means in which terrorism is tried to be root out.

#### **4.2 Neo-Orientalism: Representation of the Islam in Post 9/11**

The anti-Islam rhetoric has day after day became more visible in Western societies. The mainstream media has frequently portrayed the Islam as evil, a source of violence and murder, and thus delineated as incompatible with the Western values such as freedom and democracy. This negative portrayal of the Islam has been recaptured and intensified after the 9/11 incidents in which terrorism is regularly equated with the Islam. Consequently, this narrow conception contributes to a misrepresentation of the Islam and frames its followers as a protentional danger for Western societies (Shadid & Koningsveld, 2002).

#### 4.2.1 A brief introduction to Orientalism

However, (mis)representing the Islam as a soil adversary to the West is not a modern wonder and can be associated with an old conception, better known as orientalism. In this setting, orientalism is a system of representation in which the Islam, or better said the East as entirety is represented to the Western world (Rossow, 2004). Although, this representation has been constituted through a Western lens, and is not truly fancy at this point. (Kalmar, 2013). So is the Islam, as said prior delineated as barbaric and uncivilized, and in this way an extraordinary threat to the existence of Western civilization. Consequently, this delusive representation created a division between the West, the Occident and the Islamic world, the Orient, in which everything that is non-Western has gotten the name as the barbarian other. This, in turn, advertised the West a strong sense of identity and control of mastery over everything that is non-Western (Kerboua, 2016). In other words, Orientalism can be seen as a Western invention, which is created to provide the West with identity and power in order to run the show over the other. To be more precise, it acts as a built-in system to work out control over the Orient through the utilize of knowledge (Burney, 2012). The construction of orientalism knowledge to hold power is drew upon a Foucauldian perspective, which is framed by the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony (Said et al., 1993). Both Foucault and Gramsci have focused on the relation between power and knowledge but from a different perspective. Although, the Gramscian assertions of knowledge and power is often described as positive, in which the knowledge is a seen as a useful tool for the subordinate, to built-up their own set of knowledge and values in order to develop a cultural hegemony to break free from their subordinate position (Qi, 2010). On the other hand, the Foucauldian perspective, foremost its famous work *discourse* appears to fit more with orientalism as it is considered as a crucial focal point to understand this construct (El Aidi & Yechouti, 2017). In consideration of this, discourse in Foucault's mind alludes to a set of statements that trigger a specific way of seeing and thinking about certain topics. Although, those statements do not only contain simple words or stances, instead, it can be seen as a system in which words become invested with particular power

relations that have an intent, which is other than the presumably declared one (Escobar, 1984).

#### **4.2.2 Neo-Orientalism and the War on Terror**

In the present, this authoritative knowledge, or better said the orientalism construct still pervade today's politics and journalism about the Arab World. In particular after 9/11 it has made a comeback as neo-orientalism within the context of the "Global War on Terror". In regard to this, Islam and Muslims are frequently represented as the source of terrorism, and thus a danger to the entirety of the Western world (Gol, 2010). However, this anti-Islam discourse is often deployed as a power structure, or a strategic tool to gain legitimization for American expansion of hegemony within the Arab region, with the ultimate goal to serve for certain economic and political purposes, such as ensuring access to Middle Eastern oil (Altwaiji, 2014).

In spite, while the Western representation of the Islam is most often criticized for being a misconduct it has been institutionalized and transmitted from era to era and resulted in a never-ending Western cultural domination (Güven, 2019). This authoritative knowledge has been propagated through education, painting, cinema, not less important the media and science. In consideration of the latter, the Western media is claimed to be a key player in propagating a distorted image of the Islam. Besides, academics, foremost from the Eurocentric camp are too playing a divisive role in upholding this age-old tradition (Mora, 2009). For instance, Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* has promoted the Western cultural hegemony and preserved the imaginary division between the West and the East. In specific, within the post-Cold War period, the Western hegemonic power and control were fading due to a lack of a singular danger through which to define the future for the West. Hence, the West was in need for a new enemy in order to bring about a renewed purpose and crafting of the Western and American self to keep the dichotomy between the West and East alive. In this context, Huntington's seminal work gave impetus for a renewal of the Western identity and offered a new framing for the post-Cold War era, which was needed for birthing the new world order (Bazian, 2018). Accordingly, Huntington argued that the conflicts in the new world will not be primarily political or economic, instead, it will occur between nations and different civilizations, in which the

dominating source of conflict will be through the lines of culture and religion (Allen, 2010). To be more precise, the *Clash of Civilizations* as said by Huntington, is going to be between the Islamic world and the secular West (Allen, 2010).

However, this kind of infamous Islamic orientations has not only led to false narratives or shaped the way people think about the Islam. Instead, it also has had great resonate with Western policy makers, as it has contributed to the creation of a new bogeyman to serve Western global interest and position in order to justify the continuation of Western domination and its interventionist policies in the Middle East (Abozaid, 2018). Especially after 9/11, the notion of *Clash of Civilization* has regained momentum and became the frame in which the justification for the contemporary global war on terror have been recorded. Moreover, the association between terrorism and Islam became accepted, so much that the words terrorist and Muslim have almost got to become synonymous (Eid & Karim, 2011). Consequently, over time these views became institutionalized and have set the norms and rules for anti-terror policies as well, in which intolerant behavior and institutional anti-terror practices targeting Muslims became socially acceptable (Jackson, 2005). In consideration of the latter, the next part deals with the anti-Islam discourse on counter-terrorism in consideration of its political and societal implications.

### **4.3 The anti-Islam Discourse**

The contemporary war on terror has often been criticized as oppressive due to the fact that its targeting Muslims and infringing their fundamental rights (Kundnani, 2014). This is because, the anti-terror policies are guided by the feeling of fear, which is fueled by the directives of the anti-Islam discourse, in which Islam and Muslims are unreasonably feared and casted out as the enemy within. Although, this notion led to Islam-hatred prejudices and stereotyping of Muslims (Beshara, 2018). Or even worse it paves way too for the normalization of restrictions on civil liberties, in which Muslims are often casualty of oppressive state practices that carries the hazard of excluding, stigmatizing and alienating Muslims from the society (Fekete, 2004). This in turn has made the average Muslim more vulnerable for terrorist recruit, paved the way for anti-

Islam hatred hostility and violence, which in turn put the social cohesion and the national security of many Western societies at the risk. Hence, the next section gives a brief introduction to Islamophobia and figures out its political as well as its societal implications.

#### **4.4 Islamophobia**

The concept of Islamophobia is presented in the late 1990s and early 2000s to draw considerations to hurtful talks and actions coordinated at Islam and Muslims living in Western liberal democracies. In the following years, especially after 9/11 the word Islamophobia has hit the headlines as well as it became a popular subject to study within academic circles (Bleich, 2011). Yet, there is no commonly agreed definition on Islamophobia, instead there are some common elements that are often used to describe the word. Accordingly, Islamophobia is often referred to an irrational fear and anger towards Islam and Muslims. In some senses, it is often claimed to be a modern extension of orientalism, which refers to an old tradition of hostility to Islam on part of the West (Zebiri, 2008). However, Islamophobia is not about a set of emotions and feelings only, but it also has been manifested in the form of verbal abuse, physical violence on Muslims and property, and discrimination (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006). Besides, Islamophobia is often seen as a form of racism, specifically against Muslims, which is fueled by a negative image of the Islam/Muslims (Lems et al., 2018). So are, Muslim groups often subject to discrimination in public spaces, such as schools and workplaces. In relation to this, a study has proved that unemployment rates among Muslims in Europe almost twice as high as those of non-Muslims (Triandafyllidou, 2010). To be more precise, Sayyid (2006) have conducted a systematical overview of what Islamophobia may consist of and how to make it measurable. In doing so, he grouped attacks described as Islamophobic in six main clusters, which are listed below. Islamophobia may occur in the form of:

1. *A physical attack on Muslims*, in the form of shouting, abuse, pulling Hijabs of Muslim woman, beating and even murder.
2. *Attacks on property*, and thus may include vandalism in the form of arson, smashing windows of mosques, or throwing pig heads.

3. *Intimidation*, which is considered as more organized than the former two since they would involve a number of persons acting together to intimidate Muslim communities. Those activities may come in the form of anti-Islam hate campaigns, burning of the Quran, demonstrations against the building of mosques and Islamic centers.
4. *In intuitional settings*, in which Muslims may be disadvantaged by receiving less favorable treatment than peers who work in similar sites.
5. *A systematic elaboration of comments in the public sphere that demonize Islam and Muslims*, which could be articulated on hate sites, magazines, newspapers, books, factual and fictional programs, or other media.

Not less important, the state also plays an active role in supporting and implementing those Islamophobic practices that are imprecisely applied to very diverse phenomena, ranging from integration, migration to anti-terrorism/radicalization (Ciftci, 2012). To put it as an example, the Muslim looking population living in Europe is often target for intensified surveillance and subject to a biased criminal system, in which they are treated less favorably than others (Duderija & Rane, 2019). Besides this, the state policies related to integration and de-radicalization are most often approached throughout an Islamophobic lens, which have resulted in oppressive policies that curtail civil liberties and fundamental rights, especially that of Muslims (Coolsaet, 2013). For example, many European countries have tried to regulate the Muslim dress through the implementation of the burqa ban and, in some countries, it even prohibited the wearing of the headscarf in working spaces and schools (Karimi, 2018). In addition, it also led to the implementation of discriminatory legislation in the form of social inequality in jobs, housing, and social services (Atnahev, 2016).

In consideration of all above, it seems obvious that these Islamophobic practices do more harm than good. Despite this, they are often claimed to be successful in terms of gaining legitimization and being normalized and socially accepted with the idea that it will serve for the common security (Cohen & Tufail, 2017). Although, this has led to a false security narratives and paved way for repressive policies that are more dangerous since they are discriminatory and carry the risk to exclude Muslim groups from the wider society. Hence this may



turn out to have a negative impact on the social cohesion, and thus endanger the national security in its entirety (Martín-Muñoz, 2010). The next part points out the implications of those policies on the societal as well as political level.

#### **4.5 The Political and Societal Implication of Islamophobia**

It is obvious that Muslim communities are the first victims of Islamophobic security narratives. In this regard, Muslim citizens are often constructed as suspect communities and thus seen as a danger to the West. Consequently, this has led to false notions as it has led to the normalization of hate crime against Muslims. So are Muslims often subject to anti-Islam hatred led hostility, violence, and even murder. Besides they have been exposed to various discriminatory state practices too, that are mainly in curtailment with their civil liberties and fundamental rights (Cherney & Murphy, 2016).

Although, these negative public attitudes towards Islam/Muslims plus wrongfully state behavior have had political as well as societal implications in the long run. To be more precise, an overemphasize on Islamic fundamentalism have turned a blind eye to rise of far-right extremist groups that are often claimed to be far more dangerous than religious-based terrorist organization (Kallis, 2018). This has to do with the fact that they tend to gain popular support and legitimacy by using an anti-Islam discourse to provoke feelings of sadness, fear, and anger to the wider public. In other words, they are exploiting these feelings to preserve their political ends. In doing so, they are creating an environment in which hostility and violence against Muslims are starting to get socially accepted and institutionalized (Kundnani, 2012). However, this is gradually leading to a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims, and in the long run, it may have a negative impact on the social cohesion as well. In this setting, there is a high probability that Muslims who receive ill-treatment become more vulnerable to disconnect from the wider society and thus are more prone to absorb extreme ideas or willing to participate in terrorist activities to take revenge. In a similar move, non-Muslims who are in fear for the Islam may turn out violent against Muslims and may commit hate crimes to express their feeling of fear and anger (Aydin, 2016). On the other side, the negative language about the Islam may have political implications as well, as may also

resonate with policymakers and thus threaten the structure of democratic institutions. For example, the anti-Islam rhetoric may have a negative influence on political decision-making processes, and thus may lead to discriminatory and oppressive policies that are targeting Muslim groups (Beydoun, 2017).

In short, the societal impact of islamophobia is devastating, especially since it threatens to exacerbate the current social order by creating a dichotomy within the society in which Muslims and non-Muslims live in ignorance and fear of each other. This, in turn, weakens the social cohesion, that usually functions as a social glue to keep people together to protect the established order. Hence, a weak social cohesion may threaten the public safety and as well as put the national security in danger (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2015). Besides, since the anti-Islam rhetoric affects the political decisions as well it may convince political leaders to pass law that are most often at odd with civil rights of certain groups, which in the long run may challenge the resilience of democratic political institutions (Gould, 2019). Hence, many critical studies advocate for tackling Islamophobia by deconstruction dominant paradigms and taking a more neutral and impartial stance towards the global war on terrorism (Bryan et al., 2011).

## **5. TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS**

The Netherlands has never been in witness of a major terrorist attacks, although it has taken tight preventive measures to prevent such an attack from happening. These measures are mainly focused on the dimension of homegrown terrorism and has the ultimate goal to detect people holding extreme ideas at an early stage (Den Boer, 2007). Although, since the radicalization process is uniquely different for each individual and thus no clear profile can be given for an extremist, the moderate Muslims as well as Muslim-looking migrants and civilians have been stigmatized and become unlawfully target of those measures (Noppe et al., 2010).

However, the scrutinization of Islam has led to the simplification of the Islam in which it is irrationally feared and hated. In doing so, Muslims and Muslim-looking citizens have been constructed as suspect communities and have been subject to harsh anti-radicalization policies that are at odds with the civil liberties and fundamental rights of the aforementioned groups (De Koning, 2020). Especially, in the years after 9/11, the anti-Islam rhetoric in the Dutch society have been reinforced dramatically. In relation to this, since the Dutch mainstream Media is using a quite negative frame in reporting about Islam and its people it also has reinforced the Anti-Islam sentiment even further (Voos, 2018). At the same time, the same media has been an amplifier for those, in particular, far-right populist parties to share their extreme thoughts about the Islam. Consequently, this have led to an environment in which oppressive government policies, anti-Islam hatred hostility, and violence against Muslims have brought into the mainstream (Vossen, 2010). This way has led to further polarization as it has created a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, since this division is fueled by the feelings of fear and anger from both sides, the Dutch national security has been put in further danger. This has to do with the fact that both sides have become more vulnerable to adopt

extreme ideas and willing to take a more radical pathway. For example, while marginalized Muslims are seen as a potential target for terrorist recruit, the ones who fear Islam are more prone to join far-right extreme groups (Moors et al., 2009). The next part consists of a case study and examines to what extent the Anti-Islam discourse is prevalent within the Dutch context in consideration of its implications on counter-terrorism, human rights, and its long-term impacts on national security.

## **5.1 Terrorism in the Netherlands**

As mentioned earlier, unlike New York, the Netherlands has never fall direct victim to an upscale international terrorist attack, instead, the Dutch experience of terrorism is merely based on attacks carried out by homegrown terrorist organizations (Janse, 2005). The first occasion, in this sense, can be traced back to 1970 when a group of young man, entered the residence of the Indonesian ambassador and took those present hostages. In this particular way, they attempt to enforce the Indonesian and Dutch government to take seriously their ideal of an independent republic of South Moluccas. Another attack that happened in the same period was by a member of the Palestinian Liberation Front that have thrown a hand grenade into the home of the Israeli ambassador in The Hague. On March 14, a group of Palestinian commandos blew up a Gulf tank in Rotterdam. In August 1971 a Dutch woman of Palestine origin was caught with explosives in Tel Aviv airport and on February 5, 1972, a commando from EL Fatah carried out attacks on gas installation in Ommen and Ravenstein (De Graaf, 2010). In the 1980s, the Netherlands was confronted with another wave of political violence perpetrated by anti-globalist groups and squatters' movements (Gijsbertse, 2008). The most prominent group in that period is known as RaRa (Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action), that came into existence to speak out against the apartheid regime in South-Africa. To raise attention to their cause, RaRa has been regularly involved in arson attacks, particularly on large companies whom they suspected for providing support to maintain the apartheid regime in South-Africa (Van Buuren & De Graaf, 2014). In 1985, a fire was set at a Makro branch, a subsidiary of the Coal and Trade Association (SHV), which was active in South-Africa, and accused of stimulating and

maintaining the apartheid regime. Hence, the rationale behind the arson was to inflict financial damage on SHV on leaving Africa. In the following there was a continuation of those attacks on multiple establishments, including the Makro branch in Duivendrecht (1986), and in Nuth (1987) (Kruijf, 2016). However, in the early 1990s the RaRa struck again to make clear that the struggle against apartheid does not stop at the borders of South-Africa. The unrest arose in particular as a response to the former refugee policies, which dates back to 1989. In concrete terms, these policies were strongly based on a distinction between economic and political refugees, in which they were only concentrated on controlling the refugee flows to the Netherlands, instead of ensuring asylum-seekers of full protection. Regarding the refugee policy, RaRa spoke about a “refugee phobia” and demanded to scrape away the word economic refugee and give asylum to everyone, including those fleeing poverty. In doing so, in 1990 the RaRa attacked the office of the Marechausse in Arnhem to express her displeasure with the immigration policy (Gijsbertse, 2008).

However, at the time, all these activities in the past were not put under the definition of terrorism, rather they were referred to as political violence. In the following years of the 9/11 attacks, in particular after the murder of Dutch moviemaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist in 2004, (homegrown) terrorism became a more salient topic and has entered the public as well as the political realm (Van der Woude, 2009). Immediately after the murder, an emergency debate took place, in which the most prominent public figures expressed their concerns and have been in advocacy for the reconsideration of terrorism as a terminology. In this setting, Geert Wilders, political leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), was first to speak, and linked the word terrorism frequently with the Islam and Muslims. For example, he repeatedly used the following terminology for terrorism, consisting of “*Islamic terrorism*”, “*Muslim terrorism*” and “*terrorist Islam*” (Kruijf, 2016). In a similar move, Jozias van Aartsen, member of the Dutch Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) made also a direct association with the Islam but did that more explicitly than Wilders did, and argued that this attack was much different than former attacks, and thus described it as a new form of (Islamic) terrorism, which is out to destroy the principles of the Dutch society. Accordingly, he

made a declaration for the war and added that the Dutch government will do everything it can do to win this war (Hajer & Maussen, 2004). On the contrary, Jan Marijnissen, leader of the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) called the attack a dastardly act, rather than an act of terrorism. He advised the cabinet to introduce nuance to the current terrorism debate and argued that a language of war on terrorism would lead to further escalation (Kruijf, 2016).

However, the link between terrorism and Islam became further intensified after the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 and Dutch Muslims (foreign fighters) started to travel to Syria to join ISIL-led terrorist activities. Although, the idea that they were born and became radicalized in own land, and thus may return back further radicalized and well-trained have led to a moral panic (Weggemans et al., 2014). This in turn has resulted in a rigorous change in thinking and acting against terrorism, and thus led to a paradigm shift in which terrorism started to be seen as a religious and domestic matter. Hence, over time the threat of homegrown aspect became more acute and salient, and preventing radicalization has been placed on the top of the political agenda. This has opened the door for the emergence of new anti-radicalization policies that are claimed to be more hardhanded than the former ones (Schuurman & Horgan, 2016). In consideration of the latter, the following part gives a brief introduction to the Dutch framework on counter-terrorism and points out how it has evolved over time.

## **5.2 A Historical Perspective: the Dutch Counter-Terrorism Framework**

The first modern terrorist attack in the Netherlands occurred in 1970 when a group of Moluccan youths took people hostage to create unrest and thus draw attention to the idea of an independent republic of South-Moluccas. At the time, the Dutch government response was quite mellow as it sought ways to solve the hostage situations in a non-violent and liberal manner to protect their reputation as a tolerant nation based on the principle of harmony (Van der Wal, 2018). In this particular way, the *Dutch Approach* have been brought into existence, which usually refers to as a pursuit of nonviolent solutions based on negotiation techniques, or also known as the talking to terrorist's method. At first glance, these techniques were used to address the underlying cause for the political as

well as economic grievances of the distressed Moluccan minorities. In the meantime, it was deployed as a strategy to stretch time to create a bond with the hostages, with the ultimate goal of tiring them out, and thus, prevent the murders from happening. Back then, the liberal climate in the Netherlands have been praised by many Western countries ever since it has been successful in reducing the hostage situations (Schmid, 1992).

In 1980, the Netherlands entered a new era of political violence inspired by the new-left wave of terrorism. This period is also characterized as a period of mass arsons, in which organizations, suspected for supporting the apartheid regime in South-Africa were set on fire by anti-imperialist groups. This have led to another turning point in the Dutch counter-terrorism policies. In this setting, intelligence services such as BZC, predecessor of AIVD have been given executive powers to initiate investigations, collect data, and exchange information about suspects to identify planned incidents at an early stage. Hence, these efforts were merely based on intensified international cooperation with the police and other international organizations, with as goal to disrupt the import of political conflict into Netherlands (Nimwegen, 2006). Although, the principle of a liberal and non-violence approach of the 70s kept its continuation in the 80s response to terrorism. Hence, the Dutch secret services have been limited in their executive powers to prevent such institutions from growing into a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) like agency. To be more precise, they have been prohibited to intervene in private life by, for example cross-border investigations, house searches, secretly eavesdropping, and the like. After a turbulent period in the 70s and 80s, the 1990s have been marked as a quite stable period, in which counter-terrorism efforts fell into the background of Dutch policymakers (Tolboom, 2016).

### **5.2.1 Post-11 September: the Dutch framework on counter-terrorism**

In 2001, after the 9/11 attack the political climate surrounding terrorism has drastically changed, counter-terrorism have returned to the forefront (De Graaf & Graaff, 2008). However, only after the murder of Dutch moviemaker, Theo van Gogh in 2004 the terrorism threat, especially the homegrown dimension become more salient as it has been placed on the top of the political agenda. Back then, many public figures, such as Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm

proclaimed that the Netherlands has entered a new era of terrorism that is far more dangerous than the past. Hence, he adopted a hard and robust tone by saying that ‘We are at war’ and made a call to take tougher action (Korteweg, 2005). Although, until 2004 the Netherlands was not at the disposal of an emergency legislation for terrorist incidents or had not signed any specific Act that criminalized terrorist offences. This means that at that time no one could be sentenced for being member of a terrorist group or for being engaged in terrorist activities. This situation has changed in a rapid phase, direct after the Netherlands had experienced its first homegrown jihadist terrorist attack in 2004 (van der Heide & Kearney, 2020). The assassination acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands and opened door for a radical shift in criminal justice and law enforcement policies. The most significant legal response to the homegrown terrorism threat is the Law on Terrorist Crimes (*Wet Terroristische Misdrijven*), which have been inserted as a separate category in the criminal law and entered into force in 2004. This means that terrorist activities and recruits have been criminalized by law and thus can be convicted as a criminal act (Den Boer, 2007). Another turning point in the Dutch debate about terrorism was in 2011 when Dutch Muslims (foreign fighters) started to travel to Syria to join ISIL-led terrorist activities. Although, the idea that they were born and became radicalized in own land, and thus may return back further radicalized and well-trained has led to moral panic (Weggemans et al., 2014). This in turn has resulted in a rigorous change in thinking and acting against terrorism, and thus led to a paradigm shift in which terrorism started to be seen as a religious and domestic matter. In this setting, in particular, far-right politicians, such as Geert Wilders have proclaimed that “*Islamic terrorism*” has been taken deep root in the Netherlands and that the existence of the Dutch society is endangered by the wave of Islamization. Hence, he called to take prompt action to stop Islamization, and thus have called for retribution and the introduction of harsh measures against radical Muslims and terrorist suspects (De Koning, 2012).

However, the scrutinization of the Islam have created a disproportioned image of the Islam, in which the Islam is frequently framed as barbaric, backward, and a religion of violence and murder. Hence, the Islam is claimed to be incompatible with the Dutch values and thus have been displayed as an enemy



to the Dutch society (Motilla, 2018). Consequently, this has led to false security narratives, in which moderate Muslims citizens are irrationally feared, stigmatized, constructed as suspect communities, and thus became unlawfully target for harsh anti-radicalization policies. Despite, the Dutch parliament did agree on radical changes in legislation and law enforcement, as it has introduced new preventive and repressive anti-radicalization policies (De Graaf, 2014).

Unlike the past, the recent government started to adopt a war-prone language and thus tempted to drift away from the fundamental principle of the Netherlands as a liberal state that stands for tolerance and harmony. To be more precise, former counter measures which were mainly based on a relationalist law theorie, which advocates equilibrium between the opposing functions of *instrumentality* and *legal protection*. This means that the government action in dealing with terrorism was at that time restricted in order to protect citizens from state abuses of power. Although, the recent fight against terrorism is often dictated by an instrumentalist approach, in which the legal protection function, or better said civil rights is perceived as hampering the achievement of an effective fight against terrorism. This notion has found a legal base for the implementation of oppressive counter-terrorism measures that have sacrificed civil rights in the name of security (Roex & Riezen, 2012).

### **5.2.2 A wide-range approach on counter-radicalization**

However, it is not always clear what measures the Dutch government has been taken to tackle the radicalism issue. This is mainly due to the fact that they are often shredded and fragmented and are not brought together in an integral approach. This has to do with the fact that issues surrounding radicalization are often approached broadly, in which the core of the problem is often seen as more than religious based. Instead, the cause of radicalization is often blamed on multiculturalism too as it has been seen as a failed attempt of integration, especially citizens with a migration background into the wider society (Akerboom, 2003). In other words, the anti-radicalization policies are mainly directed to a broader population, in which moderate Muslims, as well as citizens with migration background have been seen as a potential danger. For this reason, the anti-radicalization policies in the Netherlands are often referred to the so-called *wide-range approach* in which policies regarding to de-

radicalization are strongly intertwined with integration and migration policies. Those policies are introduced to signal radicalization at an early stage, stop further radicalization, in order to decrease the likelihood of terrorist engagement (De Graaf, 2008). The ultimate goal is to win the hearts back of those who are in their initial phase of radicalization, with the aim to reintegrate them to the Dutch society. Although, determining the extent to which someone is radical or not is quite problematic for the reason that the radicalization process is uniquely different for each individual, and thus no clear profile can be given for an extremist. This ensures that a large part of the population, even well-integrated Muslims and citizens with a migrant background, are unfairly portrayed as a potential danger to the Dutch society and thus fall victim to harsh measures (De Koning, 2020).

### **5.2.3 The Dutch anti-radicalization policies**

The Dutch response to radicalization consists of a combination of both preventive and repressive measures, which is captured in the Dutch National Counter-terrorism strategy (Roodnat, 2016). The most prominent step towards counter-radicalization is the introduction of the Netherlands comprehensive action plan to combat jihadism, conceived in 2014 and has significantly evolved since then. The plan was primarily designed to protect democracy and the rule of law, weaken the jihadist movements in the Netherlands in order to take away the breeding ground for radicalization (Van Zuijdewijn, 2017). The action program is designed on the five lines of policy: risk reduction, intervention, tackling radicalization and societal tension, social media, and exchanging information and (international) cooperation. Those policies are performed on a broad front in which cooperation at international, national, and local level is of great importance (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2014). In doing so, the central government works together with the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), police officers, primary care providers such as youth care, and municipalities, but also with schools, mosques, and Islamic organizations. In this particular way, the government tries to improve the information traffic on radicalization cases, with the aim to identify and tackle radicalization at an early stage (Witte & Jacobs, 2015).

In addition, polarization has been seen as one of the crucial factors that lead to radicalization, hence the Dutch government has also committed to improve the social cohesion and protect the mutual solidarity in the society. In this regard, an action plan for polarization and radicalization has been set up in order to win the minds and hearts back of radicalized citizens and to reintegrate them into the Dutch society. The ultimate goal is preventing the processes of further isolation, polarization and radicalization by closing in people who are at risk of turning away from the Dutch society and democratic legal order. On this matter, particular attention has been drawn to reducing discrimination, promoting the participation of young people in the job market, prevention early school leaving, providing parenting support, fighting crime, and the like. This sort of issues is primarily a matter for local governments, and is based on close cooperation between municipalities, professionals such as community police officers, youth workers, teachers, CWI employees, compulsory education officers. Those policies are captured in local safety policies, with an overall focus on prevention, identification and intervention and are based on a combination of soft and hard measures. The soft measures mainly consist of the organization of meetings and gatherings in order to bring people with different ideologies together. In contrast, the hard measures are mainly based on enforcement, for example, more surveillance on street, the establishment of boarding schools where problem youths can be captured.

Although, those measures differ from one municipality to another, for which it is not always possible to clearly describe what measures have been taken (en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007). In relation to this, the outcome of the interviews indicates that a great part of the respondents is not aware and well-informed about what measures have been taken to combat radicalization: *'I deduce from what I read from the media that AIVD and NCTV (which is not "the government") have specific people in the picture and/or even infiltrate networks to discover plans and intervene in time. I am thinking of the group that was arrested in a holiday park. But of course, I don't know exactly what the government does'* (Dutch convert politician man, 33). This has to do with the fact that counter-radicalization policies are based on a wide approach in which the measures are often interwoven with migration and integration policies, and

thus splintered and fragmented. However, while all respondent agree that the government response is necessary to prevent terrorism, its effectiveness has been doubted by many. In this sense, comments can also be made, regarding the effectiveness of radicalization policies. For example, many respondents indicated that effectiveness measurements of radicalization policies are often insufficient, in which the side effects have been out of the public eye: *'It is good that they try to prevent things with these kinds of measures, but I have mixed feelings. I think the impact analysis of the government is very bad. I am not against introducing and implementing the measures at all, with all due respect, because I also want to live in a good and safe society. But the measures they choose for this I do wonder what the impact is'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman manager, 36). On top of this, the enforcement of those policies is often perceived as harsh and unethical, hence most often at odd with human rights: *'In most cases there is a great deal of tension between anti-radicalization measures and various fundamental rights in the Netherlands'* (Dutch convert politician man, 41). The next part provides some real-life examples in which human rights are violated under de guise of counter-radicalization.

#### **5.2.4 Counter-radicalization, the Dutch constitution and human rights violations**

As mentioned earlier, the issue of radicalization has been fixed to Islamic fundamentalism and blamed on a failed attempt of integration. In this particular way, the Dutch anti-radicalization, migration and integration policies have been knit together in which Muslims and citizens with migration background have been fall direct victim for those policies. In this broad approach, a great part of the population has been categorized as 'dangerous classes' and become target for harsh anti-radicalization policies (Bakker, 2017). In spite of this, on paper those policies seem to be harmless and have been displayed as necessary to serve the national security, although, in reality, the opposition turns out to be true. Instead, the counter-radicalization policies are most often claimed to be harsh and discriminative, and not even meet the threat of terrorism. At first glance, some respondents have indicated that those policies are most often one-sided, or better said secular oriented in the sense that they are only fixed to the radicalization processes among Muslim youth and Muslim looking citizens with migration background:

*'Good that they also focus on prevention, but current policy is one-sided and limited. If we focus on jihadi terror, it is a great lack that individual policy is all secular oriented' (Dutch convert politician man, 41).* For this reason, the Dutch response has been often criticized for being harsh, repressive, discriminative and thus having a great tendency to turn into assimilation, in which individuals are forced to adhere to the Dutch norms: *'These measures all go hand in hand with migration and integration policy, but also with xenophobia towards refugees and often turn into assimilation policy where citizens with a migration background are, as it were, forced to adapt to Dutch norms' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37).* The Dutch Muslims seems to be the first victims of those repressive policies ever since the threat of terrorism is perceived as something Islamic. Consequently, this has a stigmatization effect in which Dutch Muslims, even those who are well-integrated are seen as a potential danger and thus become increasingly confronted with it: *'We see terrorism very quickly as something Islamic, while that is not the case at all and the stigma that Islamic Dutch people are dangerous then becomes very strong and they are increasingly being confronted with those harsh measures' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37).*

Despite this, the Dutch government deemed to failed in conducting an effective impact analysis to address the side-effects of those policies and have fallen short to review these measures with the constitutional court to see whether it is in violation with the Dutch constitution. For this reason, the consequences of those policies are not always clear as they have remained out of the public sight. To this effect, a great part of the interviewees indicates that a great part of the counter-radicalization program is most often at odd with the civil liberties and fundamental rights of, especially Dutch Muslims. In case, some have even claimed that they have experienced human rights violations, or said to know at least one or more people in the vicinity who experienced it: *'There is a great deal of tension with the various Dutch fundamental rights with regard to all the measures mentioned above, only these are not sufficiently tested at the constitutional court' (Dutch convert politician man, 41).* As an illustration, the following section contains experiences and stories of respondents who have

been victim of human rights violations or at least know someone who has experienced them.

### *The Dutch experiences and stories on human rights violations*

In consideration of the stories of the respondents, it becomes clear that most of the policies to counter-radicalization are in contrast with the fundamental rights of, especially Dutch Muslims. These rights are captured in the Dutch constitutional law and are conducted to protect citizens from state's abuse of power. Although, a great part of the respondent's states that the Dutch government tends to drift away from the rule of law in time of emergence. In particular, when it comes to counter-radicalization the Dutch government seems to be harsh ever since it has adopted a war-prone language, in which human rights have been turned off, with the aim to bring an end to radicalization: *'The measures do feel strong with regard to the terrorist threat in the Netherlands. I think that the Dutch government is old-fashioned in counter-radicalization in the sense that it maintains a war mentality in which they deploy very strong measures and do everything they can do without thinking about the consequences'* (Dutch-Surinamese non-Muslim man policy advisor inclusion and diversity, 38). Unfortunately, this turns out to have devastating consequences for minority groups. In this setting, based on the experiences and stories gathered from the interviews it became clear that some have fall victim to human rights violations, while the rest knows at least one person who has experienced such a case. On this matter, based on these stories it became clear that the most frequently violated fundamental rights captured in the Dutch constitutions are as followed: Article 1, the prohibition of discrimination on religion, race, and sex or on any grounds, Article 6, freedom to express religion of belief, Article 8, The right of association and Article 10, respect for the right for privacy. As follows, some examples will be given for each article that has been violated.

To start with Article 1, nearly a quarter said that they have been often targeted for ethnic profiling compared to European looking friends: *'I always go to work on my scooter, I usually take a slightly longer route because I stopped by the police almost every day. They ask if I have papers, and recently I also faced a very nasty situation, in which the police asked if I had stolen this scooter'*

(*Dutch-Turkish Muslim man mechanic, 27*). The rest claims that they know at least one Muslim friend who has been often stopped by the policeman, or have been subject to tight controls at the airport on a regular base: *'Islamic Dutch people are confronted very firmly, in the sense that Islamic friends are stopped more often, or are checked at the airport and that kind of things'* (*Dutch non-Muslim woman youth worker, 28*). Hence, it is rightful to conclude that the act of profiling and controlling based on ethnic or religious grounds is in contrast with Article 1 of the Dutch constitutions that prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, sex, or on any other grounds. Another example that violates article 1 is that the Tax and Customs Administration has been guilty of ethnic profiling for years when checking income tax returns. Between 2012 and 2015, people were selected for extra checks, partly on the basis of having dual nationality: *'At the tax authorities there it has become known that people with a dual nationality were checked more often than people with a single nationality. This is an example of discrimination purely on something that people have not chosen by themselves'* (*Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37*).

In the second, article 10, the law on privacy seems to be the most violated article. For example, more than half have cited an example in which the right for privacy, especially that of Dutch Muslims is infringed. To name a few, the Dutch government has started a referendum to implement the *sleep wet law*, also known as the wiretap law, which gives extensive authorization, in particular to the Dutch intelligence services such as the AIVD and MIVD to intercept online information on a large scale without having hard evidence for any criminal offense. This means the AIVD may hack all digital devices, such as phones, or laptops to collect data, from citizens who have nothing to do with terrorists. In other words, this means that the whole neighborhood, in which the suspect lives may, as it were wiretapped: *'I notice this especially in the discussions about wiretap law that is tried to be enforced in which people are being watched, but also the loved ones of these people. So, on the one hand, you have the security utopia that is being pursued, which then clashes with the right to privacy that we as humans have. And I don't know where the boundary is, there is certainly a tension between security and privacy'* (*Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28*). Although, this law seems to target all Muslims who have

been suspected for something they didn't even commit; hence this law is concerned by many and have been perceived as an invasion of privacy without having any legal ground to do so: *'If you look at privacy law, it is not respected, chasing people, wiretapping, eavesdropping. I think people are wrongly placed within the radar of AIVD. But people like Breivik and perpetrator of other terrorist attacks, like the on the Christchurch mosques have never been within the radar. The measures are not exhaustive, they only target a specific target group. So, one is humanized, like probably has problems at home but the Muslims are dehumanized it doesn't take into account where someone comes from, so the physiological side of it'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33). In addition to this, it appears that not only individual Muslims, but also Islamic schools and institutions have been subject to secret surveillances. For example, a respondent who worked at an Islamic institution said that one day a technician came by to lay cables for the internet and telephone line. As soon as the IT department found out that eavesdropping equipment was built in, it turned out that they had been bugged for a long time: *'I remember well we were newly opened, and someone came by to connect the network and lay cables for the telephone lines. but later I heard from someone from the IT-crew that we have been bugged all this time, because the man who came to lay cables has secretly built in an eavesdropping device'* (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28). Thirdly, the interviews revealed that Muslims, especially visible Muslims such as women with a headscarf or face covering are more often restricted in their right for freedom to express their religion of belief, which is captured in article 6. This appears to be evident from the most recently enacted burqa-ban law, which prohibits Muslim women from wearing a face veil and may deny them from entering public places such as hospitals, public transportations, schools, and government institutions. However, more than half indicates that such a ban is not even a bad idea, because they do believe it is nice to see who you are talking to and it also gives you a sense of safety: *'It's a little uncomfortable of what's underneath you don't know. I understand that they have forbidden it, you are allowed to walk with it, but it is good that they prohibit it in public places because you want to know who is opposite you and it is also a lot safer'* (Dutch non-Muslim woman dentists, 26). To add some nuance, the ban in itself has not been seen as a



problem, although, its enforcement has been for a great part described as inhumane. This is mainly because, the government has portrayed the wearing of the Islamic veil in public as a criminal offense, and for that, according to Article 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has given the ordinary citizens the authorization to hold a civil arrest, i.e., to push the woman in case to the ground in order to carry out a civilian arrest. Hence, this provides evidence that the ban is in violation with the article of the law on freedom of religion, because the state interferes with the dress of women is also in violation of self-determination. *'To be honest, I think the ban is a bit exaggerated and unnecessary, especially because there are only 300 people walking around in a burqa in the Netherlands and there has never actually been an incident in the Netherlands in which a woman with a burqa blows herself up. So, I wonder what this is good for, and what the underlying thought here is' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman manager, 36).* If you look at it this way, it only concerns a small group, the Muslim women without a burqa do not feel directly addressed by this ban. However, they do indicate that they are making certain unconscious choices regarding their clothing choice. For example, a number of them indicate that they no longer wear long skirts, because they do not want to be associated with this group. In short, they indicate that they feel forced by the society to make such conscious choices and are therefore not really free to fully practice their religion: *'I've never experienced weird things where I felt like I'm being judged based on my beliefs or looks. I prevent it and that you are subconsciously working on it anyway. I've never asked myself if I want to wear a burqa you don't even get to that question, or I also don't wear long skirts, because you know you're going to be accredited with that group. So subconsciously you are being forced by society to make those unconscious choices, because you are literally not free in that' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman manager, 36).*

Last but not the least, there are many cases that shows that article 8, the right of association is violated on a regular basis. This becomes clear after many proposals and application on funds for Islamic schools and institutions have been hindered or even denied. The underlying reason given for this is often related to the problem of radicalization. In other words, there is an inexplicable

fear and distrust towards Dutch Muslim communities within society. In this way of thinking, they are often unlawfully suspected for coming together to organize themselves against the Dutch state. As a result, their right to association is often violated and existing associations such as Islamic schools are closely monitored or even attempted to be permanently closed without any rightful justification. A recent example, in 2019 the director of the Cornelius Haga Lyceum in Amsterdam has been suspended and prohibited to have contact with students and parents. Although, his suspension was not legally valid, nevertheless, the judge ruled that he had to step down: *'In addition, you can also see Islamic schools in Amsterdam such as Haga lyceum, in 2019 the municipality of Amsterdam reacted very hard and suspiciously to this, while they stand on their right in many respects'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). When speaking about subsidies to religious organizations, an investigation into the subsidy policy of local municipalities has shown that only a limited number of Dutch municipalities have clear rules for subsidizing religious organizations. In this way, some organizations are being favored, while others are not beneficiary of a full subsidy. So, is a great part of the grants given to Cristian organizations, 37 % were given to the Protestants organizations, and 26% to Roman Catholics. The humanist organizations received no less than 15%, followed by the Islamic organizations that only received 14%, and thus belong to the lowest subsidized religious group: *'Its counterproductive, especially if you are going to cut back on subsidies to religious institutions, because these are precisely important institutions that makes a major contribution to the society and want to give young people a good foundation, hence you have to support organizations that reach many young people. Besides, it is a bit hypocritical if the government subsidizes synagogues and churches and other religious institutions, but do not subsidize Islamic institutions'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim politician woman, 26).

However, all irregularities above are tried to be justified under the name of security in which the Islam is most often depicted as an enemy, and thus a threat to the society. Although, the securitization of the Islam turns out to have societal implications as well. To start with, the government's perception and approach to radicalization, in whether (un)intentional or not, usually relies on a misplaced mistrust of Islam/Muslims. This has led to a distorted image, in

which Dutch Muslims are in general seen as a potential danger. This in turn has sent out a signal to the average Dutch population that terrorism always occurs among Islamic people, and that it is normal to see Muslims as a danger and thus to act harshly: *'Those measures give the average Dutch citizens the signal that terrorism always only occurs among Islamic people, while it is not correct. So, emotionally it feels focused. I understand that it is a reaction to the numbers of radicalized people, and we do not have school shootings or another radical group, but maybe we do, but I don't know maybe it was not put in the media. So, the signal they give to the average Dutch person and the effect of it in society feels bad'* (Dutch-Surinamese non-Muslim man policy advisor inclusion and diversity, 38). This in turn has opened door to an aversion to Islam and has provided a breeding ground for the rise of the anti-Islam rhetoric. As a consequence, it appears that injustices against Muslims have been increased and spread further into multiple aspects of social life, and thus have become socially accepted as well as it has been brought into the mainstream: *'The double standard has an effect on everything, almost everywhere you see that Muslims have been often subject to discrimination, such as in the job market, schools, housing association and much more'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). For instance, Muslims and Muslim-looking citizens are more often victims of discrimination and exclusion on grounds of their religion, or ethnic background. For example, many studies have shown that the unemployment rates among Muslims and immigrant groups are higher than native Dutch citizens. This is due to the fact that those groups are most often discriminated in the job market, and thus face more complications in finding a job, especially in top positions. When speaking about discrimination in school, it is often proven that children with a migration background are much more likely to receive under-advice than their native fellow students. When it comes to the housing market, persons with a foreign name, especially that of Arabic origin have to wait much longer to get a rented house, or it is made harder for them to buy one. This became evident after a social experiment was conducted in which it became clear that people with a different name who wanted to buy a house were not given an appointment or were not even called back at all: *'An investigation has been carried out, in which they systematically called estate agents and give them a foreign name and say that they want to buy a house and call them with a*

*Dutch name and ask for a house it turned out that the person with a foreign surname in many of the cases was not given any appointment or not even called back' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37).* In short, it is rightful to conclude that the Dutch anti-radicalization policies are one-sided ever since it is fixed to Islamic fundamentalism. This in turn has led to false security narratives, in which a great part of the Muslims is portrayed as a potential danger. This has resulted in harsh and discriminative measures and led to an irrational fear and aversion for the Islam as it has laid down the base for the anti-Islam discourse in the Netherlands. By the day, the anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands continues to grow and poses a threat to Dutch Muslims in particular, but also to citizens with a migrant background. Although, according to the stories of the respondents the Dutch media is seen as a culprit in the reproduction and reinforcing this sentiment. Hence, the next chapter clearly points out whether the Dutch media contributes on the reproducing and reinforcing of this sentiment.

### **5.2.5 The Dutch media: terrorism, counter-terrorism and anti-Islam propaganda**

In consideration of the previous, it is rightful to conclude that the Dutch anti-radicalization policies are dictated by the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism, in which Islam and Muslims are portrayed as a threat to Dutch society. This means that the Islam and its people are often irrationally feared and seen as a danger. In consideration of the interviews, the Dutch mainstream media seems to play a crucial role in the reproduction and maintenance of this false anti-Islam security narratives: *'The media is a real culprit in this, because they don't really see objectively. The media is stronger and more powerful than the government thus the media has much more influence than the government in creating perceptions. The media is like a hand above our heads turning the direction of our heads in the direction they want' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman manager, 36).*

This has become more evident after the reporting about terrorism and the Islam is examined more closely. According to the interviewees, the media coverage about terrorism in the Netherlands seems to be quite biased and prejudiced. So, is terrorism often portrayed as an Islamic problem that poses a great danger to

the existence of the Dutch society. Especially, after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, the link between terrorism and Islam has even grown stronger and a kind of consensus has been reached on what constitutes terrorism. In relation to this, a recent study on Muslims in Dutch newspapers have revealed that 80% of the Dutch media coverage on terrorism is about Muslim terror, while similar incidents carried out by non-Muslims are not placed under the same label (Balçık, 2019). For example, the word terrorism is never applied on the attacks on two mosques in Christchurch or the air bombings regularly carried out by Israeli armies on Palestine territories. This has to do with the fact that the media community consists mainly of white content makers and editors that finds itself in a fairly progressive secular and nationalist setting. This means that the definition power of terrorism is in white hands: *'I think that terrorism is mainly approached from a white perspective and is also very racist. So, it is certainly not a reflection of Dutch society. This is mainly due to the fact that the media is not complete and often gives a Western impression, because only white editors work there'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). In the same setting, the traditional media is often characterized as one-sided and way much Eurocentric since it maintains a Western perspective in reporting. However, this way of reporting has been concerned by all interviewees, ever since it leads to a distorted view of the reality. For this reason, a great part said that they have little faith in Dutch reporting, and thus often choose to read news reports coming from other sources. In this particular way, they concluded that they get the opportunity to compare different perspectives to get a complete picture of the reality: *'If big things happen, I will just google things about okay what other media say about it. Then I often end up with British media, Aljazeera but also Surinamese news. I'm not sure it's more objective, but comparing different perspectives feels more solid'* (Dutch-Surinamese non-Muslim man policy advisor inclusion and diversity, 38). In spite of this, when it comes to the reliability of the Dutch media it scores relatively high, for example, a great part of the interviewees indicates that the factual information in the Dutch media is often credible. But the problem is more that the news is often misplaced in a certain frame and therefore often distorted and incomplete. According to the interviewees the choice of words and the tone of voice really matters in news reporting since it gives a different turn to the representation of an actual event:

*'The news is always subjective, sometimes it can be the truth, but sometimes half the truth. I trust the hard figures, but the way the tone and the choice of words can give it a different turn to the story'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33). When speaking about Islam and Muslims the frames used by the Dutch Media seems to be quite negative. According to a great part of the respondents, the media coverage about the Islam and Muslims is found problematic ever since the Islam has been displayed as a religion that stands for backwardness, women oppression, and violence, hence this, in turn, has led to false narratives in which Muslims in the Netherlands have been most often perceived as uncivilized and barbaric, and thus seen as incompatible with the Dutch values: *'Reports of terrorism are always negative and related to Islam. All the reporting about Muslims is then quite often negative and it is mainly about women's oppression, and it gives the image that as a Muslim you are very retarded'* (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28). Consequently, this has led to misconceptions about the Islam for which Dutch Muslims often have to pay the hard price. On top of this, not only Muslim groups, but also people with a migration background appear to be disadvantaged. For example, they are often seen as problem groups that are not properly integrated into Dutch society. However, stereotypes have given a total misplaced representation of those who are well integrated. Hence, as a large part of the interviewees argued the traditional media is still very much back in time when it comes to reporting about especially, Dutch Muslims and citizens with a migration background. These groups are often put in negative daylight, in which the positive developments that show that these groups are much better integrated, growing and thus doing better than 20 years ago are often underexposed: *'The media does not show that certain groups are growing and doing better than 20 years ago and that a child from a guest worker family is studying, working and better suited to society. If you look at it that way, the media is still very much back in time, when you talk about the image of people with an Islamic and migration background. Certain perceptions are still there, while a very large group has changed'* (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28).

Unfortunately, this quite negative and biased media frame has a stigmatization effect, in which innocent citizens, especially the moderate Muslims who have never used any violence in their entire life are discarded as a danger for the society: *'But even the moderate Muslims who have never used violence in their lives are often stigmatized by being called terrorists'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). However, the securitization of the Islam seems to have devastating consequences ever since it activates the feeling of fear and aversion against the Islam and its followers, and thus contributes to the further reinforcement of the anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands. However, the anti-Islam rhetoric has also a negative impact on policymakers that decide upon anti-radicalization related policies. So, are most Dutch policymakers dictated by false security narratives, in which moderate Muslims have been cast out as suspect communities. Subsequently, this have laid ground for the anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands and paved way for the normalization of harsh policies and injustices against Muslims: *'The anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands is often presented from a perspective that these anti-feelings are not strange, so very dangerous. A Muslim woman in the street is being scolded or something like that, which is very unpleasant, but I devote that very much to the media and the image the media has created of it. even at a larger level, at the political and administrative level, things can also go wrong, for example certain laws can be passed that can have dire consequences for Muslim groups'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33).

Furthermore, some interviewees have claimed that the Dutch media and politics are in kind of a hold on to each other. To be more precise, the media stirs up politics with the anti-Islam sentiment, which is then taken over by politicians. as a result, negative anti-Islam statements by political parties are in turn brought back to the attention by the media once again: *'I think that the politics and the media are in a kind of hold on each other. So that media that makes politicians warm with the anti-Islam sentiment and then the politicians are put under pressure and then you have politicians such as wilders, that makes harsh and Islamophobic statements that is then broadcasted, reproduced by various media'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). Besides this, some respondents argued that the media has even become a playground for those who

are ought to propagate their extreme thoughts about the Islam, Muslims, and immigrant groups. This in turn has been a trigger for the rise of other radical groups. In particular, in the recent years the far-right extremist groups has enormously grown stronger in the Netherlands as they have been exploiting the anti-Islam sentiment, or fear for the Islam to gain popular support and legitimization for anti-Islam led policy proposals: *'The media also plays a role in the sense that there are more and more people who have the anti-Islam stigma and stereotype deeper in their heads and are also going to propagate it to the supporters of the radicals, so the extreme right is very often getting bigger and that makes their power increasingly and dangerous'* (Dutch-Surinamese non-Muslim man policy advisor inclusion and diversity, 38). However, since the Dutch anti-radicalization policies are fixed to Islamic extremism only, other extreme groups, especially far-right radical groups have been overlooked as they have become the blind spot of counter-radicalization policies. The next part examines in whether the anti-Islam sentiment is present in the Netherlands and how those sentiments have become a breeding ground for the rise of far-right extremist groups.

### **1.1.1 The anti-Islam narratives and the rise of far-right extremism**

In recent years the political landscape in the Netherlands has dramatically changed in the sense that there is a clear shift to the far-right wing within the political spectrum. In this setting, the far-right populist parties have grown gigantic strong as they seem to be the crucial actors in upholding the anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019). In consideration of the last figures, it appears that the majority of the political parties on the top adhere to the extreme right-wing ideology. To start with, the VVD (Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy) that takes place on the right side of the political spectrum is with 33 seats the ruling party in the Netherlands. Next, according to the results of the last parliamentary elections in 2017 the PVV (Party of Freedom), which is known for its extreme anti-Islam statements have become the second-largest party in the House of Representatives by winning 20 (out of the 150) in the parliament (Kiesraad, 2017). In addition to this, the most recent opinion polls clearly show that the support for this party continues to grow and is expected to increase further in the near future. On top of that, in the



last provincial elections on 20 March 2019 the Forum for Democracy (FvD), also known for its radical statements about the Islam, has become the largest member party in the Netherlands in a very short time (eenVandaag, 2019). Further, the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), which is positioned at the center-right has gained 19 seats to become the third-largest part (Akkerman, 2018). When counting all of this together, this is more than half of the electorate, which means that the anti-Islam sentiment is not only visible within political circles, instead, it seems to be also strongly present among the constituencies too, thus a large part of the population.

However, this is quite alarming, because it undermines the sense of belonging to the society and leads to undesirable behavior and injustice towards minorities, especially Muslim groups and citizens with a migrant background. In relation to this, a great part of the respondents has expressed their concerns as they have claimed that the voice of the right-wing is getting louder and that with it the aversion to Islam and Muslims is getting more visible in the political realm: *'I see more a shift to the right, I saw that with the provincial state elections when forum democracy has scored well. So, you see the right voice much more in the Netherlands, which ensures that the left voices are less and actually even unheard at all. This is worrying, because those parties have mostly an anti-Islamic agenda. For example, religious institutions are more often asked to give an account their financial situation. I find it shocking and you can see that there is too little trust in those institutions, even though it was founded by Dutch people with a migrant background'* (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28). As a matter of fact, the anti-Islam sentiment seems to be a breeding ground for the far-right extremist parties ever since it is often getting exploited to gain victory in the elections. In doing so, the Muslims and people with a migration background are being made scapegoats as they have been most often blamed for the negative outcomes of neo-liberal policies, such as economic problems, inequalities in the society and the like. This has created a kind of aversion towards a multicultural society in which cultural diversity is often seen as a major problem rather than an enrichment of the society. In this point of view, people with a different background are often seen as profiteers of the Dutch welfare state that causes many troubles within the Dutch society: 'As

*one columnist wrote, it is a monocultural drama in which the native cannot accept different cultures. This has various reasons, a feeling of superiority, but also economic reasons, for example, economic reasons are not going so well in the Netherlands anymore and that is portrayed as if it were the foreigners. So, the outcomes of the neo-liberal policy, especially the negative outcomes, are blamed on people with a migrant background. The Netherlands is becoming more unequal, and migrants and Muslims are being made scapegoats' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37).*

Although, according to the interviews, the Dutch Muslims seems to be the first victims as they have been hit the most by these hateful statements about minority groups. In relation to this, all respondents have indicated that the anti-Islam sentiment is very much present in the Netherlands. In a similar move a couple of interviewees have even referred to the centuries-old concept of orientalism and have claimed that it is still very much alive in de Dutch society ever since there is a strong sense of superiority and contempt towards the Islam and Muslims: *'Orientalism is still alive in the west, but also in the Netherlands you still see a Western Eurocentric view in which non-Western people such as migrants with an Islamic background are very often described in a way as violent, and that all Muslim men try to rape white women look that are the cliché images, but that is very old, but it still lives on in how people are described, it is mainly mistrust of Islam and that is a fixed thing and the west is another thing and that never comes together and the Islam is seen as a threat and that is the rationale behind why Muslims are always associated with terrorism'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). In particular, in political circles the feelings of aversion against Islam seems to play an dominate role, which has also become a platform for anti-Islam led hate speeches. For example, the PVV, who is the second biggest political party in the Dutch parliament is completely based on anti-Islam statements, hate speeches, and has an Islamophobic and xenophobic political agenda. For example, Geert Wilders, political leader of PVV is known for his bold and extreme statements about Islam and Muslims. He often cites, that the Islam is a dangerous ideology, hence never compatible with the Dutch liberal democratic state. In his speech in 2017, he claims that the Islamic faith is even more dangerous than Nazism in which he

compares the mosques to Nazi temples and calls for the closure of all mosques (Algemeen Dagblad, 2017). In addition to this, most recently, he started a campaign to stop the Islam and proposed to introduce a travel ban on Islamic countries to counter the wave of Islamification. On top of this, Wilders submitted a comprehensive bill in the same vein, including the ban on Islamic utterances such the face covering, mosques, call to prayer and anything else related to Islam (The Post Online, 2018). Another prominent figure that is known by its radical views on Islam is Thierry Baudet, the political leader of FvD, nicknamed as the Dutch bad boy of the new face of the European Alt-Right. Like Geert Wilders, Baudet has repeatedly shown an aversion towards migrants with an Islamic background. In his speech he repeatedly stated that Europe has been overrun by immigrants from Islamic countries and radical ideas. Add to this, he argued that orthodox Muslims are having many more children, and if the current demographic trend continues then the European freedoms would have been wiped out and then the Netherlands will no longer exist in fifty years (Algemeen Dagblad, 2018).

Furthermore, it is evident to say that the anti-Islam sentiment also seems to strongly alive on a societal level ever since the affirmed political parties are built upon the commitment to discredit Islam and Muslims and have nevertheless succeeded to receive the majority of the votes. However, this is quite alarming, because this indicates that anti-Islam led hate speeches and hostility towards Muslims is at some point become socially accepted and thus has started to become institutionalized in about every aspect of social life: *'But if a political party only consists of a racist anti-Islam and Islamophobic agenda then it lives within society too, people can just openly say all kinds of things about Muslims you can feel it. If you already see that in politics, that already says enough and so many people voted for such a party. But I actually find Forum for Democracy even scarier, because more highly educated people vote for it and they say the same thing, but only with more elegant words, Baudet and the like. So, I see it very much in politics and politics is a reflection of society'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33). In relation to this, a few respondents said that they could name at least one case in which they had been fall victim to anti-Islam-led hatred and hostility. For

example, one respondent indicates that she has been insulted enough, after she was converted to the Islam at first, she was bothered by her family. In particular, after she started wearing the headscarf, she claimed to have lots of troubles with her father, who she said is anti-Islamic in heart and soul. Another incident that has stayed with her was on the train when she was insulted by a man who called her a stupid Muslim and that she should therefore shut up: *'Another incident that has stayed with me was on the train, then there was a gentleman and I stood up for an elderly lady, but that man sat down in her place and then I said I get up for this lady but you sat down, but he called me a stupid Muslim and told me to shut up'* (Dutch Muslim convert woman dentist, 26). Another example, a female respondent who is wearing a headscarf said that she is often viewed as a stranger, hence that people often walk past her as if she does not even exist. Especially, when she started her new job, her colleagues ignored her in the first and did not greet her, while native newcomers were warmly welcomed. In addition to this, she states that people are often biased when it comes to Muslims. So, are people often surprised when she says that she has a university degree, or if she says that she is working as a teacher. According to her, this has to do with the fact that a great part of the native Dutch population holds negative and false beliefs about Muslims in which they are often perceived as, uneducated, troublemakers and criminals: *'I notice that people in the workplace approach me differently, have different expectations, do not expect you to have a university education. They let go of the prejudices a little when they start a conversation. But they don't approach me quickly, and walk past me, they don't look at me, they don't say good afternoon when I come in. So, I notice the difference when someone new comes in with a Dutch appearance and someone with a non-Dutch appearance'* (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28).

Another heartbreaking example is a mother of three who lives in a fairly white neighborhood. she indicated that she has often been a victim of false reports to the police by her white neighbors. For example, her neighbor has often called the police for no apparent reason to report her. She would have said that her son is being abused by her mother. As a result, they often visited her on the floor and tried to force her son out of the house and then place him with a Dutch

foster family with the reason to give her son a Western so according to them a better education: *'My neighbor has often made false reports by saying that I was abusing my son. One day they came to me to force my son out of the house. I have had sleepless nights and now I still wake up at night and often have crying fits'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim housewife, 52). Last but not least, among the respondents were also a number of public figures who have been converted to Islam. A few of them have indicated that they are daily confronted with allegations via different online platforms. One has even said that he is often called a "traitor" and even worse frequently threatened with death: *'I think there is no doubt that there are anti-Islamic sentiments in Dutch society. I am treated unfairly on social media almost daily on the basis of my religion. An arbitrary example here to illustrate is that the most commonly heard swear word for a convert is traitor'* (Dutch convert politician, 33). This implies that the Islam and "the country" are in a conflict where someone chooses for Islam chooses against the country. Although this war mentality against the Islam and the growing hostility against Muslims has major consequences for the social cohesion and as it seems to aggregate the threat of terrorism even further, and hence put the Dutch national security in further danger. The next part figures out the negative consequences of the rise of far-right extremism and the growing anti-Islam hostility against Muslims in consideration of its implications on both political and societal level.

### **5.2.6 Implications on social cohesion and national security**

In consideration of the former, it is evident to say that the Dutch society has become strongly polarized over the years. In particular, the rise of far-right populist parties has ensured that the polarization within Dutch society has even taken deep root. Especially after the murder of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, the Netherlands has turned out to become very nationalistic in terms of white nationalism from the indigenous community. In this particular way, citizens with a migration and Islamic background, or better said the whole concept of multiculturalism has been displayed as a major problem that threatens to undermine the Dutch democratic state and bring an end to the survival of the Dutch folks. Consequently, this has led to false security narratives that have infused an irrational fear about the Islam that has paved way for the introduction

of harsh measures that most often curtails the fundamental rights of, in particular the Dutch Muslims. Although, this turns out to have devastating consequences on political as well as societal level, which is going to be discussed in the following part.

To start with the implication on the political level, in recent years the political climate in the Netherlands has become rougher in the sense that extreme far-right populist parties have succeeded in obtaining a powerful position within the parliament. This development seems to be quite dangerous ever since those parties are most often propagating the anti-Islam sentiment to infuse fear, with the aim to gain popular support for harsh and repressive policies that are most often in conflict with the Dutch constitutional law. In spite of this, these groups continue to grow as it has been successful in gaining legitimization for illiberal state practices. This, in turn, has serious implications on political level, for example in this way the Netherlands tends to drift away from the rule of law, hence it threatens to undermine the fundamental principles of the Netherlands as a democratic state. In relation to this, a great part of the respondents has expressed their concerns by saying that if the extreme right populist parties continue to grow, it could end dangerously if one of those parties win victory to become first after the elections. For example, some of the interviewees have even referred to the Second World War, in which they said that they see a similar pattern of Hitler's scenario returning back. To add some nuance to it, unlike the Jews, the Muslims are not deported to gas chambers to be subsequently murdered, as was done with the Jews in World War II. But similar patterns are demonstrable in the sense that the same sort of propaganda that preceded the murder of millions of Jews is also very visibly applied to Muslim communities living in the Netherlands: *'In the Second World War, the Dutch government played a major role in handing over Jewish people to have them deported to concentration camps, for me it is already too far. If the Netherlands continues to report negatively about the Islam, it could be that you will get such a Hitler scenario in the future. Let's say Geert Wilders comes to power who really put things on Muslims that really don't make sense, all that propaganda and media preceded the second world war in Germany, some things look like it now so that's very scary. That is the most extreme case where things can go*

wrong. *On a larger level, on a political and administrative level, that things can go wrong where people in power can really do wrong things'* (Dutch-Surinamese non-Muslim man policy advisor inclusion and diversity, 38). In this setting, like the Jews in the past, the Muslims are often displayed as a danger that are ought to undermine the fundamental liberal principles of the Dutch society, as it has seen as incompatible with the Dutch values. Instead, as many prominent figures, such as Geert Wilders have stated that the Islam does not even belong to the Netherlands. For the reason they believe in, a war-prone language against the Islam and its people has been adopted and many radical proposals have been made to fight against Islam. Over the years, the anti-Islam sentiment have grown stronger and taken deep root, within political circles. Subsequently, this has paved way for the normalization of repressive policies in which Muslim communities are often systematically downgraded on the basis of their appearance and religious beliefs. Especially, the visible Muslim, or better said the woman with the headscarf or the man with the beard seems to be hit the most by those discriminative policies. For example, like the Jewish community who was banned to enter public places in the past, the woman wearing a face veil are by law denied entering hospitals, government buildings and public transportations. In a similar way, the man with a beard, or an Islamic outlook are watched or stopped by the policeman more often: *'You actually see the same scenario of the Second World War, for example now with the veil-ban in the Netherlands, or you will not be admitted to certain professions with a kippa or headscarf, that is simply exclusion, you simply exclude a certain group'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33). Although, the enforcement of this sort of restrictive legislation clearly shows that the oppression of people with an Islamic background has been brought into the mainstream and has even become institutionalized over time. In relation to this, some respondent has indicated, that this in turn has challenged the resilience of the democratic system ever since policymakers, who tend to drift away from rule of law can easily get away with it without being held accountable for the consequences: *'I had recently been to Auschwitz, and those people didn't realize they were going to be gassed. They thought they were going to shower, that's been kept a secret. I don't want to say that it will end like this with Muslims, but with Jews it started with not being allowed to enter certain places. At one point,*

*entrance to certain neighborhoods were banned, so it all went in stages. But it started with exclusion and that they were not allowed to enter certain stores. And what I see with Muslims, with the burqa ban the steps are still small, but if everyone can go their own way and the Dutch government does anything to stop this, then it may be that gradually larger steps can be taken' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman initiator of cultural projects, 33).* In a similar way, a great part of the respondent has even claimed that in the recent years the idea of the Netherlands as a peaceful and tolerant country has been faded away in the sense that the political decisions that are made with regard to Muslims and immigrants are most often in non-compliance with the Dutch legislation. On top of this, a great part of the respondents has expressed their concerns and have criticized the attitude of the Dutch state against Muslims. In doing so, they have said that at first glance the repressive policies taken by the government might be seen as necessary and harmless, but in consideration of the long-term consequences, they indicated that they are quite worried about it. For example, if the government continues to offer a platform for extreme right-wing parties that propagate anti-Islam ideas, these groups will grow stronger in the future. In case, they might even win victory and become the ruling party and may pass certain laws that might deprive more civic rights of people with an Islamic background. If it comes to that point, in the worst-case it can also translate into a comparable Hitler scenario in which, like in the Second World War it may have devastating consequences, or even worse it might even cost human life: *'If the Dutch government does nothing, I will make a link with the elections as the forum of democracy grows, then certain motions can be passed and legislative changes can simply be made, in which other things will soon be prohibited. Or even worse, it may be that gradually larger actions can be taken that will have dire consequences and may even cost human life' (Dutch-Moroccan Muslim woman economic teacher, 28).*

When it comes to the implications on societal level the increase of popular support for extreme far-right parties evidentiary shows that the aversion against Muslims is strongly present too within the society. According to the interviewees, this comes due to the fact that the security narratives are dictated by an anti-Islamic political discourse that gives a signal to the wider population



that a crackdown against Muslims is necessary, hence legit to be carried out. In this particular way, the people are either intentionally or unintentionally frightened and incited to take action against Islam and its people. This in turn provides a breeding ground for extreme right-wing radical groups. In spite of this, as a great part of the respondents indicates, the radicalization among right-wing extremists is often being overlooked or even kept out of the public eye. This is mainly due to the fact that terrorism is often portrayed as an Islamic problem, hence this biased view on terrorism has downplayed the existence of far-right extremisms and made people blind to radicalization within own group: *'It is white supremacy, you can see that it makes many people blind to radicalization from their own group. So, people are very focused on Muslims and other minorities and most incidents are magnified, but because of nationalism they don't see their own radicalization happening in their own area. So, in short, the Netherlands is so focused on Islam fundamentalism that the extreme right-wing ideology actually enters through the back door'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37). Subsequently, those groups sneaked into the society through the backdoor to exert a great influence on a large part of the population. In doing so, they have infused fear among the wider population by proclaiming that the Islam and Muslims are posing a danger to the society. As a great part of the respondents have claimed, this has activated the feeling of fear and anger among a great part of the population and incited people to assume extreme ideas about the Islam/Muslims, or in most extreme cases even inflamed people to engage in violent activities against Muslims. This in turn has affected the cohesion of the society and caused the Dutch nation to stray away from its reputation as a tolerant state. In relation to this, most of the interviewees have claimed that there is a dichotomy between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, in which both sides are in fear of each other. This has to do with the fact that both groups are leading separate lives and thus remained stranger to each other. Accordingly, as a respondent said, being unknown makes unloved, which means that the unknown is often seen as something scary, and for this reason feared and hated. So, are Muslims often irrationally feared as they have become victim for anti-Islam led hatred, hostility and violence: *'Unknown makes unloved and that is also the case. And I think people who are more in contact with Muslims are much less opposed to Islam than people who*

*did not qualify with Muslims. And in the Netherlands, you just have a very large group that has nothing to do with Muslims. For example, I live in Amsterdam-West it is a very segregated one and this is a negative situation where there is no contact at all with white people. And also, because there is no contact and if you grow up in such a neighborhood, it also leaves a certain impression. For example, the young vlogger in Zaandam who received hate messages that all has to do with segregation, so that people do not live together' (Dutch-Turkish Muslim man historian writer, 37).*

However, the division within the society has raged extremism on both sides as it has aggregated the threat of terrorism even further. For instance, on the one hand, you have the non-Muslim groups who have the feeling of fear, hatred, and anger towards Muslims. This has incited people to rely on self-defense and has created a sense of justification for attacking Muslim people. In this setting, there are many cases where religious places such as mosques and Islamic centers have been set on fire, or even worse covered with excrements. The practicing Muslims, or better said the visible Muslims wearing a headscarf or having a long beard are often insulted or threatened with death. Furthermore, Muslim groups have been stigmatized to such an extent that they are excluded from all areas of social life. For example, the respondents indicate that they are often discriminated in the labor market and therefore cannot easily find a job. This also applies to the housing market, people with an Islamic name are more difficult to find a rental home or buy a house. In worst cases, children with an Islamic background are often removed from home without any valid reasons and placed in indigenous families. After to have said this, it is valid to conclude that that the extreme right ideology has established itself in all aspects of life and has taken over to exert a strong influence on individuals to adopt the same line of thoughts to act accordingly. However, this has not only invited radicalization within own group, but it also has triggered the feeling of injustice and discontent within the Dutch Muslim community. In relation to this, almost half of the respondents have claimed that there are days that they experience the feeling of exclusion, and that they feel that they are not fully involved in the society. A few respondents have even said they are in most cases not treated equally as they have started losing faith in the Dutch government and its

democratic system. Although, almost all interviewees stated that, the sense of inequality and discontent may activate the feeling of isolation and makes people more likely to take in radical ideas. On the long term, this may lead to radicalization and even proceed to inspire the feeling of impotence, and anger, which in turn may invite people to rely on self-help. Consequently, this makes people more vulnerable for terrorist recruit, and thus makes them more willing to involve in terrorist engagement, with the aim to take revenge or change the status quo: *'So the moment someone is oppressed or injustice is done, they are very prone to take in radical ideas and engage in violence. If this happens in a systematic way and no compensation or compensation is ever given, the confidence in the democratic system and the Netherlands as a rule of law diminishes, which is making people more likely to resort to violence'* (Dutch-Turkish Muslim woman manager, 36). To round up, as things stand now, the respondents have claimed that the government's approach to anti-radicalization has crushed the togetherness of society, in which both groups have drifted apart from each other. As some respondents have stated, both groups have fallen into a war mentality as they have become more prone to act violently towards each other. However, this has formed the base for further radicalization on both sides with that it has led to a vicious circle of terrorism that feeds itself. Consequently, this, in turn, has brought the human security as well as the national security in further danger.



## 6. CONCLUSION

This research was based on a case study, with a particular focus on the Dutch context. The aim of the study was to examine to what extent the Dutch anti-terrorism policies have been dictated by an anti-Islam discourse on terrorism to figure out in whether those policies have led to human rights violations and with that endangered the overall national security. The research question that was central to this study is as followed: *How has the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism in the Netherlands, reproduced by mainstream Western Media, in the aftermath of 9/11 have had an impact on counter-terrorism policies, human rights of Dutch Muslims, and the national security?* To give an answer to this question interviews have been held among Dutch Muslims, non-Muslims and government officials.

According to this, the final results have evidentiary shown that the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism is strongly present in the Dutch society ever since terrorism is often equated with the Islam. In doing so, the Islam is portrayed as a backward religion and a source of violence and thus claimed to be incompatible with the Dutch society. However, the securitization of the Islam has led to false security narratives in which the Islam has been represented as an enemy to the Dutch society. In the same setting, the results have shown that the Dutch mainstream Media is seen as a culprit in reproducing and reinforcing the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism. So, is the media coverage about the Islam and Muslims all the time quite negative, as it is frequently related to terrorism. In particular, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 the link between terrorism and Islam has been further intensified. This in turn has had a great impact on the political decision-making processes, with regard to policies related to combating terrorism. This became evident after analyzing the developments of the Dutch framework on counter-terrorism from a historical context. In relation to this, the Netherlands is not new to terrorism, hence it has a long history of counter-terrorism that dates back to the 1970s, in

which Moluccan groups took prominent figures hostage to enforce the Indonesian and Dutch government to take seriously their ideal of an independent republic of South Moluccas. Back then the Dutch government response was quite mellow for the reason that it wanted to protect her reputation as a tolerant nation based on the principle of harmony. However, in wake of the 9/11 attacks, the political climate surrounding terrorism has drastically changed. Only after the murder of Dutch moviemaker, Theo van Gogh in 2004 the terrorism threat, especially the homegrown dimension has become more salient. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 has been a turning point in Dutch framework on counter-terrorism. In this setting, terrorism started to be seen as a domestic and Islamic problem, which has resulted in a rigorous change in thinking and acting against terrorism. In doing so, the Dutch government has made a shift to counter-radicalization and adopted a secular orientation in which radicalization has been seen as something that only occurs within Muslim communities. This, in turn, has opened door for the introduction of harsh and repressive measures, that are at odd with human rights. In consideration of the stories of the interviewees, it is rightful to conclude the Dutch Muslims seem to be hit the most as they have been fallen victim to human rights violations. However, the negative state behavior against Muslims has led to the normalization of inappropriate behavior against Muslims, in which anti-Islam led hatred, hostility, and violence have become socially accepted on societal level as well. In doing so, the anti-Islam sentiment in de society have grown stronger, which in turn have provided ground for the rise of far-right extremist groups. Those groups have been successful in gaining popular support through the exploitation of the feelings of aversion and fear for the Islam. In spite of this, they have been overlooked and thus remained out of the public eye. This has to do with the fact that the problem of radicalization has been reduced to Islam fundamentalism, hence other forms, or better said extreme right-wing radicalization has sneaked in from the back door as it has become the blind spot of counter-radicalization. As a consequence, the results have evidentiary shown that this has had negatives implications on political as well as societal level. In consideration of the political implications, the empowerment of the far-right extremism has provided a podium for those who want to propagate extreme views about the Islam as it has paved way for extreme anti-Islamic proposals

and with that given authorization for the enforcement of controversial law. In doing so, the democratic institutions have been challenged and the Netherlands have been drifted away from the principle of a liberal and tolerant state. When speaking about the implications on societal level, is evident to say that the anti-Islam sentiment is strongly present on societal level too, ever since the far-right populist parties have succeed in receiving the majority votes, nevertheless, their political programs have been based on radical anti-Islamic ideas. However, this is quite alarming, because this indicates that anti-Islam led hate speeches and hostility towards Muslims have been somehow brought into the mainstream. So, are many cases in which religious places such as mosques have been set on fire, or even worse covered with excrements. The visible Muslims, in particular the woman wearing a headscarf, or a man with a long beard are often insulted or threatened with the dead. On top of this, Muslim groups have been discriminated on the labor market and therefore face more difficulties to find a job. This also applies to the housing market since people with an Islamic name find it more difficult to rent or buy a house. After to have said this, it is valid to conclude that that the extreme right ideology has established itself in all aspects of life and has taken over to exert a strong influence on individuals to adopt the same line of thoughts to act accordingly. However, this has not only invited radicalization within own group, but it also has triggered the feeling of injustice and discontent within the Dutch Muslim community. This has led to a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims in which both sides have fallen into a war mentality. This, in turn, has crushed the togetherness of the society and formed the base for radicalization on both sides. This, in turn, has ended up in a vicious circle that feeds terrorism in itself and with that puts the national security in further danger. In consideration of all there is enough evidence to conclude that the anti-Islam discourse on terrorism is highly present in the Dutch society and with that exerts a great influence on the way Dutch counter-terrorism policies have taken form. The results of the research have proven that this in turn have led to human rights violations and put the Dutch national security in further danger.

In consideration of all, the current Dutch framework on terrorism seems to do more harm than good. Hence, this part gives some recommendations in the

utilization of a proper designation of the anti-terrorism policies in the Netherlands.

- First of all, the government should take a neutral stance on terrorism. This means that it needs to be break free from an anti-Islamic discourse on terrorism by adopting a broader vision on terrorism. Besides, it should put a re-focus on other forms of radicalization and recognize the existence of right-wing extremism.
- Secondly, the government should work closely with Islamic institutions and schools in order to understand what the main roots are of radicalization among Muslim youth. However, closing Islamic institutions and downsizing the financial aid will close this channel.
- Third, the government should set up a constitutional court to tests new counter-radicalization laws on the Dutch constitution. Besides this, the government should establish a research department that takes on the responsibility to conduct impact analysis in order to figure out what the side-effects and long-term consequences are of anti-terrorism policies.
- Fourth, the Dutch mainstream media should be taking up a more responsible and neutral role when reporting about the Islam and Muslims. In doing so, it should stop being an amplifier for those who want to propagate their extreme ideas about the Islam. In relation to this, the media landscape should the Muslim communities the opportunity to create their own TV and radio programs, or their own channels.
- Fifth, the existence of Islamophobia should be recognized and made measurable. In this setting, Islamophobia should be included as a separate "hate crime" category in the police registration system as new laws need to be passed to protect Muslims from anti-Islam hatred hostility and violence.
- Fifth and last, the government should initiate anti-discrimination projects to promote social cohesion and increase diversity in order to give a better reflection of the society. To support this, municipalities should initiate activities to bring the native population in contact with other groups.



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