

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**THE IMPACT OF TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS ON TURKEY'S
RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES**

**MASTER THESIS
Natig SAMADOV**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Gokhan DUMAN

October, 2017

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T.C.
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Natig SAMADOV



FOREWORD

The aim of the thesis is to analyze how a non-Arab Muslim country, Turkey, which has historical roots, borders and normal political and economic relations with Arabs and Arab countries in the region, cooperate with single non-Muslim Jewish Israel in the region which has religious and political conflicts with Arabs and Muslims. The dissertation mainly analyses how the relations of Turkey – Israel impact to the relations of Turkey with Arab states in the Middle East. Also in the dissertation I will find answers to the questions that how Arab States reacted to the Turkish – Israeli's political, economical and strategic partnerships and what were the benefits of Turkey from getting cooperate with Israel despite of Arabs.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assist.Prof. Dr. Gokhan Duman, for his excellent teaching skills and indulgent comments. I would like to thank to my advisor Assist. Prof. Dr Ozum Sezin Uzun for overall unforgettable support throughout my enrollment in the program of M.A in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. I also would like to thank to all other instructors and professors who taught me at the Institute of Social Sciences at Istanbul Aydin University.

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------------|--|
| PKK | : The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan) |
| ISIS | : Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| JDP | : Justice and Development Party |
| CHP | : Republic People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) |
| MIG | : Mikoyan-Gurevich |
| ASALA | : The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia |
| MOSSAD | : Ha-Mossad le-modi'in u-le-tafkidim meyuhadim meaning "Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations" |
| CENTO | : The Central Treaty Organization |
| ADL | : Anti-Defamation League |
| CBQ | : Commercial Bank of Qatar |
| CIA | : The Central Intelligence Agency |
| UNSC | : United Nations Security Council |
| MDW | : Mass Destruction Weapon |
| GNAT | : Grand National Assembly of Turkey |
| AQAP | : Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula |

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THE IMPACT OF TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS ON TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

ABSTRACT

The dissertation analysis the historical aspects of Turkish – Israeli relations and how the Turkish – Israeli relations affected to Turkey's relations with Arab states. The main important point is that how these two of non-Arab states of the Middle East region build strategic relations despite of Arab States. Using comparative historical approach, I will analyze in detail the ideological and political problems of contemporary bilateral relations, as well as to consider the impact of Turkish-Israeli relations to the Turkish-Arab relations. Turkey and Israel have tried filling lack of balance of power in the Middle East which emerged after Cold War era as becoming regional powers amongst Arabs. In the thesis it has been analyzed how these rival states need strong strategic partnership with each other despite of Arabs in the region.

Keywords: *Turkey, Israel, Turkish-Israeli relations, Turkish-Arab relations, Middle East*

TÜRK – İSRAİL İLİŞKİSİNİN TÜRKİYENİN ARAP DEVLETLERİ İLE İLİŞKİSİNE ETKİSİ

ÖZET

Tez, tarihi görünüm ve günümüz Türk – İsrail ilişkisinin Arap devletleri üzerinde nasıl etki ettiğini incelemektedir. Önemli nokta, Ortadoğu bölgesinin iki Arap olmayan devletinin bölgedeki Arap devletlere rağmen nasıl strateji ilişki kurduğudur. Kıyaslamalı tarihsel yaklaşımı kullanarak, detaylı şekilde ikili ilişkilerdeki ideolojik ve siyasi sorunların Türk – İsrail ilişkisinin Türk – Arap ilişkilerine etkisi açısından analiz edeceğiz. Türkiye ve İsrail Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Ortadoğu bölgesinde boşalan güc dengesini Arapların arasında bölgesel güc olarak doldurmaya çalıştılar. Bu tezde bu iki hasım devletlerin Araplara rağmen neden bir-birleri ile güçlü strateji ortaklığına ihtiyaç duydukları da analiz edildi.

Anathar Kelimeler: *Türkiye, İsrail, Türkiye – İsrail ilişkisi, Türkiye – Arap ilişkisi, Ortadoğu*

1. INTRODUCTION

Here is Middle East. If you do not know the history of these lands, you will be a “useful idiot” (Yalcin, 2014). Energy sources, shorter and low-price transportations for transports of goods and services have increased the importance of the Middle East. Additionally, the region has hosted to homelands of three main religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) and also diversified nations, colorful cultures, ancient historic backgrounds of states, strategic states, having direct borderline with Asia, Europe and Africa and etc. factors are specifying significance of the region. Majority in the region is Arabs and Arab States. Turks, Persians, Kurds and Jewish people are four non-Arab nations and Turkey, Iran and Israel is three non-Arab states in the region. Correlation between Arabs and non-Arabs are playing key role for regional states. Iran, despite of being Muslim state, is accepted as an enemy by Arab states and Israel is a Jewish country and identified as an enemy by Muslims and Turkey is a Muslim country, has rooted connections with Arabs but not identified as an enemy by Israel. That’s why the relations between Turkey and Israel are crucial for Arab States. After First World War, with the collapse of Ottoman Empire, several Arab states occurred but possible relations between Turkey and Arabs were impossible because of British and French’s colonial attitudes toward Arab region. After Second World War with the end of decolonization policy of the Great Britain and France, Arab states got independence in the Middle East and the region would be changed to be like a boiler in following years.

The main purpose of the thesis is to analyze how the regional developments have affected the relations between Turkey and Israel and how the Arab States have been affected from this Turkish-Israeli relation. After the Cold War, regional instability forced Turkey to get closer relation with Israel. However, the relations between Turkey and Israel was not temporary, it has been based on the national interests for both states. This strategic partnership between Turkey and Israel has played one of the most important roles in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. I have

tried to analyze how a non-Arab Muslim country, Turkey, which has historical roots, borders and normal political and economic relations with Arabs and Arab States (Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq) in the region, cooperate with single non-Muslim Jewish Israel in the region which has religious and political conflicts with Arabs and Muslims. The dissertation mainly analyses how the relations of Turkey – Israel impact to the relations of Turkey with Arab States (Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq) in the Middle East. In the dissertation I try to answer to the questions that how Arabs reacted to the Turkish – Israeli's political, economic and strategic partnerships and what were the benefits of Turkey from getting cooperated with Israel despite of Arabs. One of the most important issue that what I have tried to analyze, the developments in the region affected only to the relations between Turkey and Israel or the relations between Turkey and Arab States (Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq) also have been also affected at the same time. This topic is important because it deals with religious, governmental and ethnical situations that cause serious regional conflicts; the topic studies how the governments of countries balance their relations with each other despite of other regional powers, shows how the ethnical situation and religion play important role in the Middle East and answers the question of why non-Arab powers of the regions need each other despite of Arabs.

The subject of this dissertation is the relations of Turkey and Israel, Turkey – Arab States relations during the years 1945-2016. The subject deals with economic, political and military relations of Turkey and Israel in the Middle East and effects of these relations to Arab states (Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq). The content features how Muslim but non-Arab country, Turkey, and Jewish Israel conduct bilateral relations despite of Arabs in Middle East. Chronologically speaking, the content is divided into three periods, first period starts from 1948 (the year of Israel's establishment) until 1990 (Cold War Years), second begins from 1990 till 2002 and last chapter contains 2002 till 2016.

The dissertation limited the years between 1948 (the year of establishment of Israel State) and 2016. First chapter starts with establishment of Israeli State and relations with Turkey during the Cold War as a state and contains 1948 – 1990 years. At the end of 1940s and beginning of 1950s, the establishment of Israel state in Arab lands, being first Muslim country of Turkey which recognized Israel as a state (28 March

1949), Turkey's pro-western attitude during Suez Crisis, creation of Baghdad Pact and at the end of 1950s ascending of crisis with Syria brought Turkey face-to-face with Arab world and resulted break of relations among Arabs and Turkey. As a result, Arabs saw Turkey as a strategic partner of imperialist west during these years (Vurmay, 2009). In 1960s new government in Turkey led by Prime Minister Suat Hayri Uygulu who supported that Turkey would not only abide by west, also would evolve relations with Arabs and Soviet Union (Karpat, 1975). Prime Minister Uygulu had taken more attention to Palestine issue to gain political and economic support from Arabs. At that term the next war between Arabs and Israel was emerged and Turkey had supported Arabs clearly during the war. Turkey also closed its US bases, cause of these bases had been using for logistic support to Israel. Al-Nasser, leader of Egypt, had lost out and new guidance for Arabs had passed to Saudi Arabia. During Cyprus conflict, in 1974, Turkey requested backing from Arab states and demanded to recognize Northern Cyprus as a state, but as an answer to Turkey, Arabs postulated from Turkey to interrupt all connections with Israel (Sleiman, 2002:40). The relations were based on intelligence and security issues between Turkey and Israel in 1960 and 1970s. Jerusalem was declared as permanent capital by Israel government on 30th July 1980. The decision was condemned by Turkey and requested for cancellation. Turkish consulate was closed in Jerusalem. The coup d'état was realized by Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren in Turkey on 12nd September 1980. The relations were dropped off to the lowest level almost broken totally. At the beginning of 1980s Turkey returned to balancing relations between Arabs and Israel (Sleiman, 2002:45-67).

Second chapter talks the strategic partnership relations' between Turkey and Israel. After Cold War, strategic partnership was started with Israel. Military issues were the most important tools in foreign policy of both countries with each other. Palestine issue was getting more effective in relations. Changes in governments in both Turkey and Israel defined the arguments of relations. Yitzhak Rabin, Simon Peres and Ehud Olmert terms in Israel, Suleyman Demirel, Tansu Ciller, Necmeddin Erbakan, Mesut Yilmaz and Bulent Ecevit terms in Turkey changed main concepts of relations between Israel – Arab – Turkey relations in the region. Gulf War, Oslo Agreements, Common Sham Battle and important military agreements was followed during these

terms. During the strategic partnership period, military relations were improved, mutual military trainings were organized.

The last chapter contains the relations during Justice and Development Party period. It's so critical terms for both parts. It has been an important period in terms of either improving the relations or occurring new conflicts. The new era was started with Justice and Development Party period for the relations Turkey and Israel. The main issue in the relations with Israel was intelligence and military issues. The braches of relations were spread to the other civil sectors in the second period of JDP. The Arab Spring, new defined policies, energy issues, territory conflicts, terror issues, importance of strategic situation of the region and new governments are getting key factor for regional and global powers. The main crisis between the states was occurred in 2008 with the occupation of Gaza Strip. Low chair crisis in Tel Aviv, Mavi Marmara tragedy in international waters in 2010, "one minute" crisis in Davos were crisis headlines in relations. Civil deaths in Gaza till the end of 2010 exceed thousand and Israel's all policies against Palestine were condemned by Turkish political leaders in domestic and international arenas.

Turkey and Israel assimilated importance of strategic side of the relations. In terms of Israel, main purpose of the foreign policy is "surroundings strategy". The goal of Israel, to surround Arabs with non-Arab community by follows this strategy/policy (Melman, 1990:29). Israel needs faithful non-Arab but Muslim partners in the region against Arabs. Before 1979, Islamic Revolution, Iran had been one of the most important partner for Israel in the region. However, with the revolution Iran was pushed out and isolated. That's why Turkey's importance for strategic partnership came to the agenda. Improve relations with non Arabic countries are called as Frog Policy by Israel (Sozcu, 16.07.2014). Israel develops connections with non-Arab societies in the region and Israel's target is to recovery from Arabs' surroundings by the Frog policy. Israel has aimed to be accomplished with non-Arab States by jumping over Arabs' surroundings like a frog (Eshed, 1988). In terms of Turkey, Turkey's relations with Arab States are not as well as the period before Arab Spring. The relations with Syria, Egypt and Iraq got into dangerous impasse. The crisis in Syria, coup in Egypt and arresting Mursi and his supporters by General Sisi, supports of Arabs to Sisi, ISIS's capture of Mosul and crisis with Iraq government, spread of ISIS terrorist attacks to the frontier of Turkey, are obligated Turkey to think deeply

about its policy towards Middle East. One of the most crucial points for Turkey's foreign policy is to achieve to the target of being greatest regional power. It is known well that it would not be easy without Israel's support. The most important tool of Israel is power of Jewish lobby in the United States legislative and executive branches. It is clear that Jewish lobby plays important role in the voting process in the House of Representative and Senate of the US. In the terms of Turkey, any negative bill or regulations might be obstructed by vetoes of Jewish representatives of the Senate and House of Representatives. Each year in April, so called Armenian Genocide bill has not accepted in the Senate cause of Jewish lobbies' vetoes.

Methodologies conducted in this thesis are of qualitative nature. Content analysis of both primary sources and secondary sources will be conducted. The primary recourses of the thesis are officially statements, multimedia products and agreements. For the secondary resources, books, journal articles and newspaper articles have been used.

Within the context of first part of the thesis, the works of Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa's *The Formation of RCD; Regional Cooperation for Development*, Daniel Wagner's and Giorgio Cofiero's *Is the Turkish – Israeli Rapprochement for Real?*, Daniel Raviv's and Yossi Melman's *Every Spy a Prince; the Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Ahmet Davudoglu's *Strategic Depth*, Edward Sheenan's *The Real Sadat and Demythologized Nasser*, Fahir Armaoglu's *Palestine Issue and Arab – Israel Wars 1948-1988*, Javid Ali's *Chemical Weapons and the Iran – Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance*, Kemal Karpat's *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, Mustafa Albayrak's *Turkey's Middle East Policy from Baghdad Pact until Iraq Revolution (1954-1958)* were used. Within the context of the second part of the thesis, the works of Ali Balci's *Turkish Foreign Policy and Israel; Compare the Years of 1990s and 2000s*, Dore Gold's *The End of the Post-Gulf War Era*, Lewis Bernard's *The Shaping of Modern Middle East*, Meliha Benli Altunisik's *Worldview and Turkish Foreign Policyin the Middle East*, Miral Vurmay's *From Past to Today Arab – Turkish Relations*, Ahmet Davudoglu's *Strategic Depth* were used and within the context of the third part of the thesis, the works of Kemal Kirisci's *The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for Arab World*, *The Future of Turkey's Middle East Policy*, Lewis Bernard's *The End of Modern History in the Middle East*, Martin Kalb's and Carol Saivetz's *The Israeli – Hezbollah War of*

2006; The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, Matt J. Martin's Predator: The Remote – Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilot's Story, Oguz Celikkol's From One Minute to Mavi Marmara; Conflict of Israel and Turkey were used.

2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: TURKISH – ISRAELI RELATIONS AND REACTIONS OF ARAB STATES IN COLD WAR YEARS

2.1 Background

In 2006 Palestinian legislative council elections resulted with the victory of Islamic Palestinian organization Hamas, lead by Khalid Mashal. After victory, Khalid Mashal visited to Turkey and met with Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul. During meetings Abdullah Gul used an important sentence in his speech; “The title deed register of Israel, Palestine and Jerusalem belong to me so I have to take care about Palestine” (Sabah, 20.02.2006).

Almost all Middle East, included lands where Israel was established, was under rule of Ottoman Empire from XVI century till the First World War. During the First World War on 16th May 1916, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement or officially named as Asian Minor Agreement was signed between Great Britain and France (Encyclopedia Britannica) and assented by Russian Empire. The agreement was due to defeat of Ottoman Empire and share out of its lands in Middle East by Triple Entente. The policy on region and present-day conflicts carry steps of this agreement (Guardian, 30.12.2015). According to the agreement, Great Britain would take the control of Jordon, River of Jordon, Southern Iraq, and the coastal strip between the Mediterranean Sea, France would dominate southern Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and Russia would take Armenia, Istanbul and Turkish Straits (Barr,

2011:18-33) but there was not shown in any article of the agreement for domination over Palestine lands. After First World War Great Britain made more effort for Palestine. As result, in San Remo Conference in April 1920, the question over Palestine was solved and Sykes – Picot was changed; France would dominate Syria and Lebanon, Great Britain would control Palestine, Jordon and Iraq. One of most important document for Palestine in 1917 was Balfour declaration. It was a letter from Great Britain foreign secretary Arthur Balfour to Walter Rothschild, leader of the Great Britain Jewish Society. In the letter was offered a national home for Jewish people in Palestine (Martin, 2010:65-87). From the declaration numbers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine increased under the control of British Mandate; from 1919 till 1923 35,000-40,000 Jews came to Palestine, from 1924 till 1932 75,000-80,000 Jews family moved, from 1933 till 1936 200,000 – 250,000 Jews came to Palestine (Peel Commission Reports, 1947). Increasing of Jews minority caused many conflicts between Arabs and Jews people in Palestine. In 1936 Arab leaders created High Arab Commission and organized revolt to protest Jewish immigration policy. British government created a commission, led by Lord Robert Peel, to solve the conflict (Peel Commission Reports, 1947). On July 1937, Peel published its report on conflict as White Paper. According to Peel Commission Report, the root of conflict was coming from deep so Arabs and Jews people could not live within a state. The report was foreseeing the division of Palestine into three parts: Arab Region, Jews region and Mandate Governance on Tel-Aviv, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Either Jews or Arabs were opposite to this report. For Arabs, they never accept Jews society neighborhood and for Jews, they never accept a state less area than Arabs and without Jerusalem. Jews claimed that pledges of “national home” were included with all Palestine and Jordon, so White Paper betrayed ‘national home” (Peel Commission Reports, 1947). League of Nations also was opposite to this report and British government created new commission, led by Sir John Woodhead, for a new research for solution of the conflict but with the beginning of Second World War the quests for the conflict was stopped.

2.2 Relations from 1948 until 1964

After Second World War, United Kingdom and France decided for withdraw from the Middle East. This withdrawal caused to establishments of independent Arab

States in the Middle East. The withdrawal from Palestine had been started by UK in May 1948. The establishment of Israel was declared by Jewish National Council at the date of 14th May 1948 in Tel Aviv. Voting day in the United Nations on establishment of Israel state, according to the result the state of Israel was officially established; 33 countries with lead of the USA (72% of voting) voted for in favor, 13 countries mainly Arabs and Turkey voted for against (28% of voting) and 10 countries with lead of the UK were the abstentions (Friedman, 2006:34). The first declaration of recognition had come from the USA at the same day and Israel was recognized by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the next day. Few hours later of announcement of Israel's establishment, the declaration of war on Israel had come by Arab nations (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan). After declaration of war by Arab States on Israel, the Palestine Commission was created by UN General Assembly to define the future of Palestine. As normally Arabs were opposite to the newly created commission. The constituent members of the commission were the US, France and Turkey. The first crisis between Turkey and Arabs was occurred with the creation of the commission. On 28th March 1949, Israel was recognized by Turkey and Turkey had been the first Muslim state with the recognition of Israel. After that the connection between Turkey and Arabs were strained.

The first step in the relations at the political level between Turkey and Israel was begun in March 1950. At that period The Republican People's Party lead by Ismet Inonu was in power in Turkey and the relations were improved during Democrat Party led by Adnan Menderes. The first relations were based on intelligence issues (Korucu, 2005). In 1950, the single party system in Turkey was ended with the Democrat Party, led by Adnan Menderes, victory in the elections and Menderes became Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey. On September 1951, Turkey and Greece were invited the Ottawa Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for negotiation for full membership to NATO. In 16th February 1952, Turkey was officially invited to NATO and on 25th February Turkey became NATO member in Lisbon Summit of NATO (Yesilbursa, 2010:43-49). After a year, in October 1953, Turkey was elected to United Nation Security Council (Yesilbursa, 2010:43-49). This election was the second biggest victory for Turkey's foreign affairs during Democrat Party term. In following years, trade and air transport agreements were signed with Israel. All relations with West were going well but with Arabs it was worse because Arabs thought that Turkey had done something behind their back

(Yesilbursa, 2010:43-49). In 1955-1956 years, two happenings were reason to begin cold era between Turkey and Israel. First was Baghdad Pact, second was Suez Crisis. In 1955 Baghdad Pact was formed by Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, UK and Turkey. Turkey expected that Arabs would not be against to the Baghdad Pact because joining of Arabs to this Pact would make easier economic aids from west to Arab world but Arabs would support Pan-Arabism (Sonmez, 2009:84). For Israel, Turkey would encourage Arab world against Israel (Kurkcuoglu, 1972:66-68). Israel mentioned this discomfort via ultimatum (Erhan, 2016:73-75). Response of Israel to Turkey's Baghdad Pact membership was not delay: decreased export from Turkey and demanded immediately five million credit loans from Turkey. (Erhan, 2016:73-75) Iraq wanted to become regional leader with creation of Baghdad Pact and support of west. Great powers aimed different expectations with creation of Baghdad Pact. For Turkey Baghdad Pact meant to prevent communism spread in Middle East, for Britain to cling in Middle East (Sanjian, 1997:97-112). Iraq and Britain took more effort to attract Jordan and Lebanon because Britain thought that if Jordan become a member of Pact, other Arab states would follow her, but it would never happened (Sanjian, 1997:97-112). Jordan and Lebanon followed "wait and see" policy. Government of Jordan sympathized to west but public was against it. In Jordan people reacted sharp to Baghdad Pact and Egypt media supported all these protests so King Hussein gave up the decision for joining the Pact (Sanjian, 1997:97-112). Turkey aimed more western aids to the region and remove Soviet influence from the region with creation of the Pact. Egypt led by Nasser, tried to rescue Egypt being addicted to the west, Menderes tried making strong relations with the west by supporting pro-western policies in the region (Cakmak, 2008:434-551). Turkey never expected Arabs negative reactions against the Pact. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes visited Jordan and Lebanon to convince Arabs but was welcomed with protests (Sanjian, 1997:97-112). All despite of Iraq, Britain and Turkey's struggles, none of Arab states joined to Baghdad Pact.

In 1954 Egypt demanded British troops to withdraw from Suez Canal. Egypt's troops also were busy in intermitted battles with Israel along the border of Egypt and Israel. For building Aswan Dam on the Nile River, Egypt leader Jamal Abdel Nasser declared nationalization of Suez Canal (Armaoglu, 1989:64-75). This was the victory of Arab nationalism over western imperialism in Arab world and Nasser became a leader of Arab world. The Arab League supported Nasser. Turkey saw the situation

in the atmosphere created by Baghdad Pact (Sanjian, 1997:97-112). Iraq thought that it was an opportunity for tilt over of Nasser. In 1956 Suez Crisis was happened. First Israel attacked to Egypt on 26th October 1956. Turkey condemned Israel for this attack (Artuc, 2008:210-215). After 2 days Britain's and France's joined to the war. The duty of France and Britain troops were to took the control the around of Suez Canal during the war (Armaoglu, 1989:64-75). The USA was unannounced from all these military activities. That's why the US was opposite to the war as the Soviets. Turkey had never used any policies which the US was opposite. That's reason which Turkey was also against to the military activities of Israel in Egypt over Suez. Turkey's ambassador in Tel Aviv, Sevkati Istinyeli was called back to Turkey. The US warned Britain, France and Israel with applying economic sanctions if they continued the war. As a result, France and Britain withdrew from Egypt in December and Israel followed them by March 1957. When the Baghdad Pact established, Iraq was the biggest nominee for leadership of Arab world but, nevertheless Nasser lost, Egypt became the leader of Arab world after Suez war. As a result of Suez pro-western regional powers included Turkey lost their prestige in Arab world.

1958 Iraq revolution by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, Soviet influence in Syria and close economic and military relations of Egypt led by Nasser with USSR and others developments were enforced non – Arab regional powers (Iran-Israel-Turkey) to built strong links among each other. Israel perceived threatening with the revolution in Iraq like Turkey because pro-western government was fallen by pan – Arabism supporter (Albayrak, 2013). The coup d'état was supported by Nasser and the USSR. During the putsch King Second Faisal and his Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were killed by Qasim's supporters (Albayrak, 2013). Israel decided to get close strategic cooperation with non-Arab regional states and signed security agreement with non-Arab Iran and Ethiopia (Troen, 2002:130). Founder and first Prime Minister of Israel David Ben Gurion wanted Turkey to join this security partnership because in his mind, Israel would balance the hostility of regional Arabs with friendship of Turkey (Koni, 1994). For ensuring participation of Turkey to phantom pact, Ben Gurion, with his foreign affairs minister Golda Meir, organized hidden voyage to Turkey and this voyage was announced compulsory landing for trouble of the airplane (Zohar, 1979:76). Ben Gurion met with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Foreign Affairs Minister Fatih Rustu Zorlu and agreed on participation of Turkey to Israel's security

pact with Iran and Ethiopia. Main part of phantom pact was sharing of intelligence information among members (Tavlas, 1994:30).

During 1950s, rising Arab nationalism in Arab world, Ottoman heritage, Turkey's pro-western policy and Turkey's close relations with Israel caused Turkey's exclusion from Middle East. There was a wrath among Arab nations to West for its mandate policy toward Arab states and in addition to this, western support on establishment of Israel on Palestine territories. This fact also increased Arabs' fury against west. For that reason, none of Arab states except Iraq, joined Baghdad Pact. Capturing governance first in Egypt then in Syria by Arab nationalists, Syria's claim over Hatay and close relations of Arab states with Soviet Union caused stretched relations between Arab states and Turkey. After Iraq revolution by Arab nationalists, Turkey was deprived of active policy toward Middle East.

2.3 Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy; Turkey's tilt towards the Arab states and economic relations during 1980s

In 1960s, Turkey's interest of foreign policy was different with the west and Israel. Especially during Cyprus conflict, there was lack of Western partners' support to Turkey. Also a letter was written by US president Lyndon Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu on 5th June 1964; it was written that the US was against Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and if any military conflict with Soviet Union happened, NATO allies would not go help for Turkey (Michael, 2009:65-72). Due to west's attitude about Cyprus issue, Turkey decided to apply multi-dimensional policy for its foreign policy and Turkey had not been stick only to the west, but also the relations with Soviets and Arabs would be developed (Karpas, 1975:18). In 1965, Justice Party in Turkey came to the power with led by Suleyman Demirel (Demirci, 2016:54). His most important duty for foreign affairs was to review the relations with West and Arabs. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel had taken more attention to Arab neighbors because before 1960s Turkey had followed pro-western policy, that's why Turkey was forced to leave alone in the Middle East by Arab States. After switching to multi-party system in Turkey, religious factors, therefore, Islamic values came into prominence (Kurkcuoglu, 2010:66-68). During Demirel's visit to Moscow in 1967, he gave a speech to press; "West never wanted industrialization of Turkey or it had seen as impossible. They advised us agricultural

and light industry. Heavy industry never looked with favor on us. We cooperated with Soviets and started to build these issues. West worried by this. Before coming here, US ambassador came to the Prime Ministry building and visited me, opened my room door, before sitting he asked that "Are you changing axis?". They did not like our relations with Soviets and Middle East."(Neziroglu, 2003) The Middle East and Islamic regions were changed to one of the most important target of Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's diversify foreign policy was seen itself in the relations with Israel during Six Days War in 1967. On May 1967, the balance of power in the Middle East was in favor of Arabs. The most important partner of Israel, the USA, was busy in Vietnam. Also arms support from Britain and France was difficult when international conditions were considered (Kurkcuoglu, 2010:66-68). Israel was in danger as geopolitically any possible attack by Arabs from east over West Bank by Jordan, from north over Golan Heights by Syria, from west over Gaza and from south over Najaf desert by Egypt. The Soviet Union had been stayed beside of Arabs since 1955. From the beginning of 1967, the relations between Israel and Syria were stretched. Israel claimed that Palestinian guerrillas pass over from Syria to Israel. Israel informed UN that he could not stand idle with hands tied and the tension changed to a war on 7th April 1967 (Olgun, 2015).

During 1966 one third of Egyptian troops were in Yemen to support Arab Nationalists in civil war. Egyptian air defense system was so weak; "a Jewish peace activist with his single motor airplane entered to Egypt airspace, landed to Fayed airport and wanted to meet with President Nasser (Al Jazeera, 02.07.2017). It was a big question that how this activist departed from Israel with his primitive airplane crossed over Sinai Peninsula and landed an airport near to the Suez Canal without any notice. On 16th August 1966, an Iraqi pilot escaped from army with Soviet produced MIG 21 and landed to Israel. Israeli army took an opportunity for exploration of advantage and disadvantage sides of Arabs' Air Forces' aircrafts with dissect of MIG 21. Dany Shabira who was the head teats pilot of Israeli Air Forces flied with MIG 21 and ascertained all Achilles heel of MIG 21 in enemy's hand (Ginor, Remez, 2007:133-152). Israel used all information of MIG 21 during the real war. Israel did shoot down 6 Egyptian MIGs on frontier between Syria and Israel by aerial attack in 7th April, 1967. On 30th May, Jordon and Egypt signed a defense pact and 4th June Iraq joined it (Ginor, Remez, 2007:133-152).. Israel aircrafts bombed Egypt, Syria and Jordan airports and Egypt lost its 320 aircrafts, it was 80

percent of Egypt's aircrafts and all bombard planes in the first day of the war in 5th June 1967 (Armaoglu, 1989:46). Within three days, Israel occupied half of Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, West Bank, Golan Heights and Jerusalem. In sixth day of the war Israel had won. As a result of the war; Israel expanded its lands as 6 times with occupied territories and map of Middle East changed, refugee problem was raised in occupied lands by Israel, Egypt lost its leadership in Arab world and leadership passed to Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, which supported Arabs during the war, began to lost its influence in Arab world after the war (Duran, 2013). During the struggle the bases in Turkey was closed to the US military operations. The reason was shown as the logistic supports from the US to Israel had been realized over Turkey via these bases. Turkish Prime Minister declared when the war began that Turkey would be at the side of Arabs and would be help them for victory (Kurkcuoglu, 2010:66-68). It was clear that Turkey would support Arabs despite of the west.

In 1967, Egypt made a military alliance with Syria and Jordan against Israel. On June, Israel destroyed air forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and occupied Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem, West Bank and Golan Heights. The USA supported Israel; the USSR broke the relations with Israel. The confidence of Arabs for the USSR arms was shattered with the war. The US played in active role in the peace processes with the victory of Israel and stated the conditions of the war. According to the conditions; recognition of the sovereignty rights of all states in the region would, equitable treat for Arab refugees, allow for peace passing from Suez Canal, limitation of armament and guarantee for territorial integrity of each states. Almost all condition would serve for existence of Israel in the region. Arabs demanded for withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories. The conflict would continue till 1973. At that term Soviets would make amends to Arabs for excuses of 1967 and increased economic and military aids to the Arabs.

At the beginning of 1970s almost all states in Middle East nationalized oil companies in their countries. During the nationalization process, Iraq faced overreaction by oil companies and Turkey supported Iraq for nationalization process. (Tiryakioglu, 1979:101).

In 1973 another war occurred in the Middle East. It was the last war which Arab states jointly attacked Israel. As shortly 1973 was a year that Arabs despaired of front

line war against Israel. Arabs named the war as Ramadan war, for Jews Yom Kippur war and for west it was October war. It was different from previous ones. Israel had been taken unawares by Arabs for first time. It was Ramadan month in Islamic world and first day of Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism. On 6 October Israel found itself at the war with Egypt and Syria. Israel was in advance. It had confidence that the victory of 1967 brought. At the end of the war, Israel took the control of Golan Heights and used as shield against Syria in north, West Bank territory was conquered and used as shield against Jordan in east and Sinai was occupied in south and used as shield against Egypt and also there was the US factor behind of Israel. Arabs lost at behind of table since 1967 war because with discussions none of lands taken back which occupied by Israel during 1967 war. However, Arabs patience was exhausted. Arabs preferred war and joint against common enemy. Egypt forces passed Suez Canal and Syria troops took control back on Golan Heights and attacked from east at the same day. Israel counter-attacked over Golan Heights against Syria but Egypt to relieve Syria began new attack toward inside of Israel at the third day of the war.

The US had looked the region from the Cold War prism and the way to keep Soviet away from the Middle East was to strengthen Israel (Caglayan, 2004:56). Israel was not only an ally, but also strategic partner of the US. For that reason, the US bat for Israel with the Operation Nickel Grass by dispatching weapons and munitions starting on 13rd October 1973. (Shlaim, 1995:32-41) After two days, on 15th October 1973, the balance of the war changed. Israel forces, with the US air forces support repelled Syria troops from Golan Heights and broke the connection between Egypt 2nd and 3rd armies. (Shlaim, 1995:32-41). The Arab States applied oil embargos on the states which supported Israel during the war on 16th October. The US was top of the embargo list. Oil embargos whacked the US up to terminate the war. Foreign Minister of the US Henry Kissinger fled to Moscow on 21st October. The USSR was one of the most important supporters of Arabs during the war. The Soviets dispatched weapons for Arabs but not as much as the US for Israel.(Griffith, 2008:53-56) Israel was not fight against only Egypt and Syria, also nine Arab states (Iraq, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tunis) sent 50,000 troops to Syria and Egypt, 30,000 of 50,000 was from only Iraq. (Griffith, 2008:53-56) Negotiation in Moscow gave its result immediately; with the No:338 decision of UN security council ceasefire was declared in the Middle East. All three

states (Egypt, Syria and Israel) declared “victory”; Anwar al Sadat was called “hero of Suez” and Hafez al-Assad was called as “Lion of October”. (Ezzat, 2012)

After the war of 1973, Arabs said to the West especially to the US; “You love our oil, but we don’t love your friend Israel. Furthermore our oil is not so much. You adjusted our oil prices as you want for a long time, from today we will do price adjustment” (Yanki, 1980). During the war of 1973, Arabs used the oils as a weapon against the West and aimed the US argue out of supporting Israel and it resulted rising the price of oil as 320% within 3 months (Abir, 2006:62-66).

In 1970s, Turkey was forced to apply Middle East initiative because of economic crisis. Export quotas which applied by European Economic Community and standstill in world economic markets in second half of 1970s were limited export possibility to European markets. For that reason is the most efficient market was Middle East. (Dagi, 2002:16). Other political triggers for Turkey’s shift to Middle East were negative decision of UN on Cyprus issue and President Johnson’s letter on Turkey military operation in Cyprus and also coldness relations between Israel and Turkey was advantage for getting close relations with Arabs in 1970s. Starting of 1970s, Turkey started multi-dimensional policy on economically predominant (Irbec, 1990:115) and avoided relationship with Israel. On 23rd November 1970, in Grand National Assembly of Turkey, during the discussion of issues on agenda, member of Turkish Parliament, Necmettin Erbakan stated that Turkey needed Common Market with Muslim countries in the Middle East (Kocer, 2003:86). Economic relations between Middle East and Turkey were improved and caused for increasing rates of trade between the region and Turkey with the rising of oil prices and occurring rich-oil based products (Acar, 1993). In 1970, Turkey’s export to Middle East increased as 38% with comparing previous year (Irbec, 1990:115-117). During 1960s, Turkey owned half of coal and oil transportation sector but in 1971, Turkey supplied 40 percent of oil needs by native resources and 60 percent was imported from the Middle East (Ozturk, 2006:94-97). In 1973, total export rate to Arabs states was 3.3 percent but it was increased by 12.8 percent (Irbec, 1990:115-117). Arabs share rates in Turkey’s import products was only 6.1 percent in 1973 but was increased by 16.8 percent in 1974 (Simsek, 2005:89). On 27th August 1973, Turkey signed Crude Oil Pipelines Agreement with Iraq in Ankara. Two pipelines which passed over Turkey were important for Turkey. Turkey needed oil and the cheapest way to provide oil

was from Iraq. Oil transport from Iraq to Europe over Turkey would bring in income to Turkish economy.

The years, between 1950 and 1970, were the hottest years of Cold War. Communism as a regime was getting more threat for the world which had ruled by capitalist regimes. Turkey as location formed a border line between the socialist regimes and capitalist regimes. Turkey had had straight borderlines socialist regimes from eastern border, capitalist regimes from the western border. For the both regimes Turkey's importance was the highest. Turkey was the single state between the both regimes and Middle East. Turkish governments had preferred applying pro-western policies by achieving aids from Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan and being a member of NATO and all these were targeted to protect Turkey against Soviets threats (Ozer, 2014:34). Turkey was aimed to use a protection shield against Soviets. Turkish governments had sympathized to the west block which had protected by the US and built close connections with Israel which had supported by the West. At the same time, Pan-Arabism was dominated in Middle East and Turkey was isolated from Middle East by Arabs because of its pro-western policy as a Muslim country. For that reason, it succeed to got relations only with single Arab state Iraq. After revolution in Iraq, non-Arab states of Middle East, (Iran-Israel-Turkey) got close with each-other. After defeating of pan-Arabism in Middle East, oil crisis in the world and economic crisis in Turkey changed Turkey's face to Middle East during 1970s. Turkey's foreign policy was based on political factors between 1950 and 1970 but after 1970s the predominant tools were economic factors. After applying multi-dimensional policy, Israel's regional policy was condemned and Arabs supported by Turkey but with Ozal term, Turkey started balanced policy between Arabs and the West. Turgut Ozal played active role among Arabs. At the same time cared not breaking relations with Israel between till the end of Cold War.

In 1970s the world and Middle East were entered new eras with changes in governments and agreements. The SALT I was signed between the US and the USSR. In the Middle East, King Hussein of Jordan excluded Palestinian guerrillas from Jordan, Anwar Sadat took the power in Egypt after death of Nasser and Ba'ath supported Hafez Assad was on the head of Syria. On 6th October 1973, in the holly day for Jewish; Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria bombed Suez canal and Golan Heights which were in the control of Israel at that days. At the beginning Arabs were near to

victory but later Israel could take the control in her hands. Anwar Sadat was agreed on peace and declared ceasefire. After the war, Arabs agreed with Iraq's offer on applying oil embargos on pro-Israel countries and five percents in price would be raised for each month. Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq applied full embargos on the US. Oil prices rose from 5,4 dollars to 22,6 dollars. Greatest oil markets, Japan, the US and Europe, faced with some difficulties. A year later the embargo would be removed. Egypt and Syria built new diplomatic relations with Washington. Egypt closed military base of the USSR and it showed the loose of political prestige of Moscow in Arabs eye. On 19th November 1977, Anwar Sadat visited Israel and at the same year Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin visited Egypt. On 5-7 September 1978, Camp David Agreement was signed between these leaders. According to the Agreement; Israel would give self-determination for Palestinians in Gaza Strip and West Bank, then Israel would withdraw from Sinai Peninsula within 3 months. On 18th September Israel withdrawn from Sinai Peninsula and Egypt recognized Israel. Arabs were opposite to the agreement and Egypt was got out from membership of Arab League. The centre of the organization was moved from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt's new strategy was welcomed with economical aids from the US and faced some conflicts inside of the country. Assassination of Anwar Sadat was a result of this conflict in 1981. After death of Sadat, pro-Western Hosni Mubarak came to the power in Egypt.

The determinative parameters for next 10 years were; Islamic Revolution in Iran, Soviets invasion of Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq war. In 1979 Khomeini created Iran Islamic Republic with the Revolution. During the term of Revolution, the price in oil rose from 13 dollars to 34 dollars and this arisen caused an oil crisis in the US for a little time period. Iran Islamic Republic left CENTO and applied embargo on Israel. In 1979 Iranian students crowd the US embassy in Tehran and hostage crisis was happened between Iran and the US. In 1979 Saddam Hussein regime was in Iraq. From this year the several conflicts between Iran – Iraq was emerged and these conflicts were changed to a war in 1980. On 22nd September Iraq attacked Iran. There was no any victor at the end of 8 years. The US supported Iraq during the war. The war made heavy blow for Iran. Iran lost more than 20 times of all oil produced incomes in war expenses during the war. The situation for Iraq was not different

from Iran's; between 1982-1985 years Iraq bought arms from the US and the UK as 42,8 billion dollars (Eye, 2012).

In 1981, Israel's share rate on Turkey's total export was not 0.4 percent, but share of Middle East countries was reached to 40.3 percent (Irbec, 1990:115-117). In that period Libya, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia were the most important economic partner of Turkey. In 1979, it was allowed for open a representation of Palestine Liberation Organization in Ankara. Turkey also supported and voted in favor of Palestine in UN General Assembly. After the coup d'état, Turkey did not change its political axis in 1980 and banned participation of Israel in Izmir Industry Fair in 1981.

During 1980s, Middle East was so complicated; Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan, Iran Islamic Revolution, Iran – Iraq War, declaration of Jerusalem as capital city by Israel, Israel invasion of Lebanon, coup d'état in Turkey but first three were most important factor that increased Turkey's interest on Middle East. All these three run upside down all policy in the Middle East. Soviet occupation meant that Soviet influence in Middle East, especially in oil-rich region Persian Gulf was increased and opened the way for expanding of Soviet towards South-Eastern Asia. The relations between Israel and Turkey kept up its coldness as 1970s but Israel's activities in the region were so salient in those years. Israel began to tighten up the region and declared Jerusalem as capital city on 30th July 1980. Turkey and Arabs condemned Israel for this reason. The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren realized coup d'état in Turkey on 12nd September 1980. The relations between Israel and Turkey had been decreased to lower level and only common activity with Israel was Israel's Lebanon operation. Lebanon was invaded by Israeli military forces with the excuses of detecting terror camps of ASALA, an Armenian militant organization, (The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), and destroying them, so Israel proposed for cooperation for the operation. Turkey went to elections and Motherland Party led by Turgut Ozal came to the power in 1983. During Ozal's term, Turkey's intent was keep close relations with Arabs because of economic reasons. For that reason Turkey stayed as neutral during Iran – Iraq war which started on 22nd September 1980. Turkey's most export share to Middle East was shared between Iran and Iraq. Iraq and Turkey got an agreement on increasing capacity of Kirkuk – Ceyhan Oil Pipeline and trade amount with Iran reached to 2 billion dollars (Turkmen, 2010:55). Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared its independence

in 1983 and Turkey demanded Arab States to recognize the independence but no react had been come by Arab States. Ozal observed Arabs' political view on these issues and preferred mainly pro-western policy, even though in 1988, Turkey became the first country that recognized Palestine as an independence state (Kurkcuoglu, 2006:99).

In 1989, with assassination of Lebanon president a civil war occurred in Lebanon. The conflicts were increased in south part of Lebanon which was under control of Israel. Israel intelligence service kidnapped religious leader of Lebanon Sheikh Abdulkarim Ubeyd, in answer to this, American hostage was hanged. So the US interfered to the Lebanon crisis and tried to solve the conflicts with diplomatic ways. As a result military government in east Beirut, led by Michel Aoun, was dissolved by the US. At the same time, the political activities of Palestinian Liberation Organization were increased and first Intifada was begun for freedom of Arab lands, which was under occupation of Israel, and Gaza.

2.4 Balance Of Power in the Middle East

After the Second World War, British and French colonies got their independence and these newly independent countries created geopolitics, geo-economics and geo-cultural discrepancies. Doubtless, the main reason of these discrepancies was creation of Israel State. By establishment of Israel State, anti-Semitism¹ thought had moved from Europe to the Middle East. More interesting fact, in the region, which had been influenced by both two Super Powers, the US and the USSR, contradictory structures was emerged as politically. Socialist-nationalist Nasser and Baas administrations had exhibited anti-Israeli approaches. The US had effort to transform the present revolutionary powers to traditional Arab regimes (Sandikli, Dagci, 2006:105-107). However, the US had always strived to protect Israel when applying policy to toward the Middle East (Sandikli, Dagci, 2006:105-107). Balances inside of the region and effects of outside powers to inside balances were the result of Middle East's own sixty seven percent proven oil reserves of the world (Sen, 2003:102). For the west, the most important issues are delivery of gulf oils to the world markets as

¹ Discrimination against Jews. Before establishment of Israel, discrimination against Jews in Europe was its highest point. Hitler's policies against Jewish society was the best example for this Anti-Semitism.

unconfined and continuously and ensuring the security of Persian Gulf by Israel. The USSR pursued the conflict with the US in the region over Egypt Yemen and Syria. On 20th October 1955, Syria and Egypt signed Mutual Defense Pact, in answer to the pact Israel signed security pact with the US for reason Egypt's buying arms from USSR over Czechoslovakia (Uslu, 2003: 124-126). On 30th October 1955, Israel demanded from the USSR to stop selling of arms to Egypt, in answer, ambassadors of seven Arab countries warned the foreign affairs minister of the US about disadvantages of relations with Israel (Sandikli, Dagci, 2006:105-107).

Jamal Abdul-Nasser in Egypt followed the policies which aimed to defend the Pan-Arabism and to eliminate of Israel. Suez Canal which was built by support of France and England in 1869, was nationalized by Nasser. Suez Canal was taken advantages in transportation of Oils from Persian Gulf to Europe. Transportation from around of Africa results 20,900 km for 24 day, but via Suez Canal the shortcut reduces the distance by 43 percent, 12,000 km for 14 days (Lesseps, 2011:271-275). For this reason, the US tried to solve the problem with notification, but France and Britain which directly affected from the nationalization, got together for resort to force and to occupy the Suez Canal got an agreement with Israel. After occupation of Suez Canal, the USSR protested France and Britain with sending diplomatic correspondence. Saudi Arabia and the US applied embargos on France, but during oil crisis the decision about embargo was suspended. On 25th January 1957, Eisenhower Doctrine was declared. According to the Doctrine; the US would be stand against all communist activities in the Middle East. On 7th March 1957, Israel withdrew from Egypt with demand of the US. Egypt and Syria were against the Doctrine, Iraq, Iran and Turkey accepted, Lebanon and Libya reluctantly accepted (Dedeoglu, 2002:53). On 13rd April 1957, Syria attacked Jordan and the US sent military help to Jordan. Egypt and Syria read this situation as involvement of the US in Arabs' domestic affairs. Upon this Jordan and Iraq declared creation of Arab Federation, in answer to the federation, Egypt and Syria joint and declared United Arab Republic (Sandikli, Dagci, 2006:105-107). The US lost its prestige in eyes of Arabs with its policy towards the Middle East. On 14th July 1958, there was coup-d'état in Iraq and King Regime was got down. It was reason for collapse of Baghdad Pact.

The year of 1959 was a complicated year for the Middle East. The US, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan signed Defense Pact. Nasser faced some disagreements with the USSR and Syria accused Iraq as a communist spy (Ro'i, 1974:26-39). The US got an

agreement with Britain, Italy and Turkey for place medium-range missiles in these countries with under control of the US. In Turkey the base was built in Izmir (Sisav, 1992:147). During the term of Kennedy, the US tried warm relations with Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Egypt and Syria were close to the USSR. The USSR had more reputation than the US in eyes of Arabs which united against existence of Israel. In 1960, Iraq declared that it created “Palestine Republic Army” and would fight against Israel. Nevertheless, Iran recognized Israel. So Egypt applied economic embargo on Iran. Saudi Arabia declared that it would not extend the agreement on Air Base with the US because its support to Israel.

On 19th July 1961, Britain gave the independence to Kuwait. Iraq objected to the decision and claimed that this land was belonging to Iraq. Few days later, the US demanded to appoint ambassador from Kuwait, for this Iraq recalled its ambassador from the US and stated to freeze of relations with the US (Alazemi, 2013:87-94). Nasser supported Kuwait against Iraq and Britain sent troops to Persian Gulf for response of threat by Iraq. In 1963 Nasser supporter colonel Abdul Salam Arif came to the power by coup d'état in Iraq. The government was on the control of Ba'ath Party in Syria. On February 1965, Israel bought arms from German Federal Republic, comparable to this, Egypt recognized East Germany. Government of East Germany visited Egypt and signed with Egypt hundred million economic aid packs with the efforts of the USSR (Chicago Tribune Newspaper, 22.02.1965).

The most basic geographical and political balance mechanism of the Middle East geopolitics should be seen on the sensitive balance of Egypt – Turkey – Iran (Davutoglu, 2012:353-360). This regional balancing factor has formed central triangle which intersects of water ways of the main world continent with basic sea joined ways.



Figure 2.1: The Geographical and Political Balance Mechanism of the Middle East
 (<http://politikaakademisi.org/2014/04/26/egypt-turkey-and-iran-exchanging-roles-in-a-tumultuous-middle-east/>)

This is one of the basic strategic triangles which international actors have had to take attention when they making policy toward the region. If the developments are followed inside of the triangle, it might be kept pulse of the new regulations about the region.

In 1950s years, when Nasser had been excluded with Suez Canal crisis, Turkey and Iran got closer within the Baghdad Pact and made strategic relations (Davutoglu, 2012:353-360). The result of this relation has might be take course about the today's regional balancing system of the Middle East. Till 1970s years, Turkey – Iran partnerships (Pakistan and Iraq for a little time) against Egypt of Nasser, which made threats for interests of the systematic powers, was very important in terms of balance of regional powers and international determinative actors of this balancing. After revolution in Iran, the relations between Egypt and Turkey was cold but kept a good lookout for each other (Davutoglu, 2012:353-360). This balance system shows that in the terms of outside of regional powers, exclusion two of these three countries would be incubus for the region. It seems as great threat for any formed ally of any two of these three countries in out of the system. For that reason, if one these countries excluded to outside of the system, other two would be forced to closer with each other inside of the system (Davutoglu, 2012:353-360). In the both exclusion (Egypt during Suez Crisis, Iran after Revolution), Turkey had tried to make balanced policy between excluded power from the system and the power inside. The most important

thing was in both exclusions, excluded powers were defined as threat for Israel². According to Ahmed Davudoglu's Strategic Depth, Middle East contains three main triangle balancing system.

The greatest triangle has related with smaller triangle in relations. The smallest triangle is also important because these countries have had direct borders with Israel and two of them (Palestine and Lebanon) are in hot conflict with Israel. In general, in the balancing among triangles, greatest triangle never allows to all members of smaller triangles in making ally with each other in the opposite side. At this situation, 2+1 balances with 1+2 (Davudoglu 2012:356). In Baghdad Pact, two members of greatest triangle Iran and Turkey made an ally with a member of smaller triangle Iraq against other member greatest triangle Egypt with other two members of smaller triangle Syria and Saudi Arabia. After military coup in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia made an ally against Egypt, Syria and Iraq. During civil war in Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Iraq built a partnership against Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. After 1980s, the ally of Iran and Syria was against to Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. During first Gulf War, Iran and Jordan were against to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. At the middle of 1990s, Turkey, Egypt and Israel were an ally against Iran, Iraq and Syria (Davudoglu, 2012:356-360).

After the Second World War, there were two main affected factors for Middle East; The US attempts for fill the lack of balance of power in the Middle East with the withdrawal of Germany, UK and France from the region and establishment of Israel. In January 1979, Khomeini came to the power in Iran with revolution and in June Saddam was in office in Iraq. A year later, Iran – Iraq war was started and ended after 8 years. Before the war, in April 1969, Iran wanted to occupy Shatt al-Arab River but never succeed. Sunni Saddam always worried about Iran's influence on Iraqi Shiite majority. Iraq attempted to take the control of Khuzestan. During the war, the US had sold arms to both sides; Iran and Iraq (Los Angeles Times, 20.01.1988). Israel also had sold arms to Iran as over a billion dollars (Shahdadi, 1990:237-238). Till the revolution in Iran, the balances were building on Iran. The Middle East had been taken shape on Iran. However, with the revolution the system

² In Suez Crisis Egypt was declared as an enemy for Israel and after Revolution Iran was seen as an enemy for Israel and the all West.

was broken. The First War was happened for four years, Second was for 5 years but Iran – Iraq war resulted in eight years. At the final there was no looser or victor. Both countries' economies were based on oil. Iraq bombed Iranian oil tankers, as answer Iran bombed Iraqi oil plants. Both countries fell down as economically. The aim of West was to supply Iranian oil without monopoly of Iran itself. The US, UK and Japan had supported Iraq but Iraq was supported by France, Russia and Israel. The US saw clearly that who had had what they have and which kind of arms were used. In 1986, UN General Assembly had decided that Iraq was using Mass Destructive Weapons against Iran (Hughes, 2002:436). But the decision was vetoed by the US and UK in UN Security Council. Israel supported Iran to crush Arabs and used the theory of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Arabs, except Syria, supported Iraq during the war. Turkey was neutral. Iraq could not pay its debts which had borrowed during the war and this caused to the attack of Iraq to Kuwait in 1990. The main aim of the US was to change the regime in Iran and to drive Iranian oil to the world market without monopoly of Iran itself. At the war, the US observed strong and weak sides of the parts and how the neighbors and other regional powers reacted.

3. RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

3.1 The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s

After the Cold War, the international system changed from bipolarity³ to unipolarity⁴ led by the USA. Uncertainty, instability and multifaceted threats was brought with unipolar system itself and the US's expansionist policy toward the Middle East caused recharge of balancing power in the region during the Post-Cold War period. After Cold War situation was so permitting that the USA may spread western liberal democratic values to the world. Collapse of USSR weakened Turkey's strategic importance for security of the West because there was no any threat from the east (Bal, 2006:19). Fearing of possible isolated from the West, Turkey aimed to build strategic partnership with the USA and its allies. Gulf War is the most important war for forming of new Middle East and balancing the power in Middle East after the Cold war and Turkey supported the Western coalition with Arab states in the war (Gozen, 1998:24). Gulf War started with Kuwait occupation by Iraq and resulted separation of Iraq into three parts; northern no-fly zone (to protect Kurds in north part of Iraq), southern no-fly zone (to protect Shiite Muslims in south part of Iraq) and centre with capital of Baghdad. The war was also strengthening the US' link with the region. Gulf War was the most important war for forming of new Middle East and balancing the power on Middle East after the Cold War. The US actually interfered to crisis first time in the Middle East with the war. The developments after the Cold War, forced Turkey to draw new foreign policy toward Middle East. The war affected to Turkey's policy toward Middle East with the end of Cold War. Supporting of Turkey to the Gulf War did not get expected results for Turkey. After the war economic sanctions enforced on Iraq in a reaction Iraq closed down the Kirkuk – Ceyhan Oil pipeline and Turkey-Iraq economic

³ Bipolarity is a world order system in which predominance of global military, cultural and economic influence is shared between 2 states.

⁴ Unipolarity is a world order system in which predominance of global military, cultural and economic influence is held by 1 state.

relations reciprocally were ceased. Damages of these negative developments to Turkey were about between twenty five billion and hundred and fifty billion dollars (Akbay, 2013:87). Divisions of Iraq after the war increase the importance of the region in the term of security of Turkish borderline along with Arab states; Iraq and Syria. In this situation, which the Soviets no longer exist, main threats came from in Middle East for security of Turkey. Turkish Army played so important role in the foreign policy toward Middle East with National Security Policy. Importance of National Security Policy made military power more powerful than political power in Turkey (Ozcan, 2000:132). One of the main reasons for more power given to military was military's seeing itself as a "protector of the state". The duties of military were to protect the state in terms of territorial integrity, national unity and secularism (Karaosmanoglu, 2011:53). After Post – Cold War era, Turkey draw a strategic policy which aimed to balance the threat from Middle East by playing more active policy role in the Middle East (Altunisik, 2000:42). One side of this strategy was built on toughen politics against the states where the threats came from, other side was predicted on the development of relations with Israel (Altunisik 1999:93). Close relations with Israel meant to gain the support of either the US and it's Congress or Jewish lobby in the all around the world (Volfova, 2014:82-97).

Starting of Peace Process with Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 between Arab States and Israel prepared the floor for the affinity between Turkey and Israel. In 1991 Suleyman Demirel in Turkey came to the power as the Prime Minister. The first attempt for rebuild relations with Israel was signing Toursim Cooperation Agreement in 1991 between Turkey and Israel and upgrades the diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level. Yitzhak Rabin came to the power as prime minister of Israel in 1992. He had differed from previous Israeli leaders. He took warm look to the relations with Iran and Arabs. Prime Minister Rabin had begun peaceful talks with Yasser Arafat, leader of Palestine Liberation Organization. At the final of the meeting, both parts had recognized each other state and organizations as an interlocutor; Arafat recognized Israel, Rabin recognized Palestine Liberation Organization. The talks had resulted with singing of Oslo agreement in 1993 (Makovsky, 1996:65-79). Based on the agreement, Gaza Strip and West Bank would be taken partial powers from Israel. But being different was biggest obstacle for Rabin, that's why he had been assassinated in 1995. The most interesting fact, after Rabin's death Shimon Peres who had served as the Defense Minister during Suez

Crisis, Six-Days War, took the control of the power as a new prime minister. At the same year Suleyman Demirel was the president of Turkey and Tansu Ciller had served as prime minister. Ciller's visit was the turning point in the relations. During the meeting Ciller's used phrase summarized the importance of the visit; "I can assure that you will have your promised lands" (Ertur, 2015:47). Tansu Ciller was the first Prime Minister of Turkey who visited Israel in 1994 and she signed Air Forces Training Agreement (Aydigan, 2011:33). The main discussed topic was bilateral security cooperation and strategic relation or cooperation against Syrian sponsored terror (Makovsky, 1996:83-87). At the same year Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Shimon Peres visited Turkey. In 1996 Suleyman Demirel visited to Israel as a first official visit of president of Turkey who visited Turkey and following the visit Israeli president Weizman came to Turkey. Visits between Turkey and Israel followed by visits Head of Chief Turkish Army Ismail Hakki Karadayi to Israel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Israel David Levy and Minister of Defense Israel Yitzhak Mordechai in 1997, Chairman of General Assembly of Israel Dan Tichon and Minister of Industry and Trade Natan Sharansky to Turkey in 1998. Lastly Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barack organized one day visit to Turkey in 2000. In answer to Turkish – Israeli affinity, in the Arabs line there were counter-spurt; Syria – Iran and Syria – Iraq economic relations were raised, Syria – Greece and Egypt – Greece military corporations were happened at that years.

3.2 Common security concerns with Israel and reactions of Arabs

During Perez's visit to Turkey as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, the main talked issue was about modernization project of F-4 and F-4 Phantom II Aircrafts (Yilmaz, 2001:73). Israel had aspired for modernization of the Aircrafts and wished evolve the military relation between Turkey and Israel. In 1994 Mutual Defense Cooperation and Security/Intelligence Agreements were signed. One of the most important agreement was signed in 1995; Combating with Terrorism and Other crimes agreement (Freedman, 1998:176-192). According to this agreement, Special Forces in the General Directorate of Security would be trained by Israel, weapons and necessary equipments would buy from Israel and Police staffs who work in the Intelligence Bureau of General Directorate of Security would be train by agencies of MOSSAD (Freedman, 1998:176-192). In 1995 Modernization of F-4 Phantom

aircrafts tender would give to Israel Aerospace Industries to eleven million seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars per aircraft, totally six hundred and fifty million dollars for 54 F-4 Phantom Aircrafts, without any open bid (Akgul, 2015).

1996 would be strange year for Turkey both inside and outside. The year started with Military Cooperation Agreement between Israel and Turkey in 23rd February, 1996. According to researcher and journalist Mehmet Ali Birand's writing "the agreement was the dream of Turkish, American and Israeli General-staffs" (Turkish News, 02.08.2011). Turkish and Israeli Chief of General Staffs met, got idea of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and there was no objection. Details was discussed by Military Staffs of both countries and signed without asking anyone. If Minister of Defense of Turkey did not babble mistakenly, no one would know about the agreement. During the visitation General Bir, Second Chief General Staff of Turkish Army, to the US, main talked topic was about the dealing and agreement to attract the Jewish lobby (Kazan, 2009). Presented agreement by a General-Staff of Turkey was attracted attention of Arabs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministry of Turkey kept silence, Chief of General – Staff was talking and giving statements. Furthermore, during the elections period, Israeli and U.S press talked and wrote more about the agreement. All these developments put the worries of Arabs to the highest point. Arabs mentioned that the agreement was a union against Arabs in the region and it threatens the peace of the region (Liel, 2001:210-216). Arabs interpreted the agreement that Turkey gave base to Israel and in the base Israeli pilots were trained against Arabs. It was given surveillance possibility to Syria and Iran as electronically and in return Turkish soldiers with duties throughout frontier of Syria and Iran were trained and donated by Israel (Yilmaz, 2001:73). On 22nd June 1996, The League of Arab States Summit was held in Cairo and main discussed issue was Turkish-Israeli military cooperation. At the end of the summit, The League of Arab States declared a statement as a result of the Summit; it was demanded to review the agreement and to avoid any behavior against infraction of Arab nations. The agreement was named as a step to redesign the map of Middle East and the worry of Arabs attracted to the attention of Ankara (Ebrahim, 2001:243). During Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Tehran in 1996, Turkey was condemned on all types of military corporations (Maddy, 1997:97). At that time Israel and Syria started peace talks on Golan Heights and the most interesting fact was on negotiable topic between Syria and Israel. Both countries discussed the problem on Turkish water sources.

According to the plan, Turkey would give more water to Syria and in exchange for Syria would give up from the demands on Golan Heights. The question is how Israel could attempt solve its problem between Syria with Turkish waters without assent of Turkey.

In mid of 1996 the new election was happened in Turkey. The victory was expected by Welfare Party. Before election, in the radio program of Voice of Israel, possibility of Welfare Party victory was asked to Israeli president. He answered that; "I know Mr Demirel, and also don't believe that the Army will stand-by. It is meaningless to evaluate the situation on fear" (Dursunoglu, 2009:83). During his visit to Turkey he was asked about the military agreements by media groups. He answered that; "the agreement between two countries, was built on economic and security cooperation. Arabs say that with this agreement Turkey and Israel will attack to Syria together. It is a great stupidity" (Dursunoglu, 2009:83). In the election as expected, new government, Welfare Party in Turkey came to the power led by Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan. At that period Turkey was governed by Islamist coalition-government led by Prime Minister Erbakan and pro-western Army. One of the most important projects was Tank Proje which aimed to build 3627 Tanks. Erbakan had stand up for national produced tanks but Army was defending to buy finished tanks from Israel (Nachmani, 2003:10-16). Producing national tanks was useful to the economy because it would be cheaper and the unemployment rate would get down. For Erbakan's model; only two million dollars would pay per a tank and it would be totally 7.5 billion dollars (Nachmani, 2003:10-16). Buying finished tanks from Israel might be more costly and also would be reason for hooked from Israel in the military sector. For Cevik Bir's model; three million dollars would pay per a tank and totally would be eleven billion dollars would be paid to Israel with additional logistic service as three billion dollars, total rate would be fourteen billion dollars (Nachmani, 2003:10-16). At that time Second Chief of General Staff General Cevik Bir had organized visit to Israel without asking to the government and signed military agreements which aimed cooperation in military training, improving defense technology and sharing information of intelligence (Kogan, 2005).

After Military agreement between Turkey-Israel, during the elections in Israel in April 1996, Israel invaded to Lebanon. The powerful party for the election was Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu. The reason for the invasion was water sources in Lebanon; Zahrani river, Awali River and Litani River. Israel would aim to take the

control of these rivers by depopulation policy and weaken Hezbollah's power in Lebanon (Oktar, 2010:55). At these days, Israeli bomber aircrafts sortie in Konya. In Iranian Press was written that "Israel became our border neighbor by courtesy of Turkey" (Calabrese, 2015:609-612) and Turkish journalists were welcomed in Southern Lebanon with antipathy of Hezbollah because of Turkey's partnership with Israel. Israeli ambassador Zvi Elpeleg gave a message to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to stand strict against Arabs and Minister gave diplomatic statements such as "Turkey's relations with Israel did not concern anyone" (Hallahmi. 1997). Erbakan draw Developing-8 Project which aimed to build economic cooperation within eight economically developed Islamic countries; Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Egypt. Erbakan organized his first foreign visit as Prime Minister to Iran and the visit was followed by to other Muslim countries such as Tunis, Egypt, Nigeria and Libya.

The most important visit to Israel from Turkey was realized by Chief of General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi in 24th February 1997. After three days the meeting was organized with Prime Minister Netanyahu. The interesting fact is that a day later from the meeting, the members of Turkish National Security Council were gathered in 28th February. At the final of the meeting, Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan was forced to resign. Erbakan's party had been closed and Erbakan himself was prohibited from the politics. New Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz mentioned the situation in the region show Turkey the need of strategic relations with Israel (Bir, Sherman, 2002:23-31). During his visit to the US, he repeated the support of Turkey for Israel one more time. In mid of 1997, new bilateral military meeting was organized between Turkey and Israel, Turkey was represented by Second Chief of General Staff General Karadayi and deal on modernization of M-60 Tank project, which aimed to upgrade 170 US-built M-60 Tanks. The project was given to Israeli company, Israel Military Industries (IMI), which was on the verge of bankruptcy at that time, for 4.5 million dollars per a tank and totally to 765 million dollars (Kogan, 2005:93).

In 1999, the governments changed in both countries; Bulent Ecevit was Prime Minister in Turkey and Ehud Barak in Israel was in the power as Prime Minister. During that time, so-called Armenian Genocide was discussed in Israeli Assembly and was put on academic books (Auron, 2009:215-217). After that, President

Demirel visited Israel to discuss the situation but Israel mentioned for no need to worry.

3.3 Effects of political developments to the economic relations of Turkey and Middle East states

Political developments in the region also affected the relations on economic relations among countries in the region. The most long-life and cheapest oil reserves are located in Middle East. It is the reason that interests of non-regional powers on region have been risen up. Iran-Iraq war damaged Iraq's economy, its substructure and social texture. Decreasing of globally oil prices and arriving deadline of due date of debts from other Arab states forced Iraq to occupy Kuwait because of its oil reserves. Before the Gulf War, Iraq was the second greatest economic partner of Turkey after Germany (Gulec, Oguz 2003:165). Applying embargos on Iraq and closing of Kirkuk – Ceyhan Oil pipeline reduced oil imports of Turkey and took away incomes from oil transportation. Turkey's economic lost was about 200 million dollars and 250 million dollars yearly because of the war. The embargoes forbid import and export of Iraqi products for all countries (Schacter, 1991:142). Iraq was permitted to sell oil till 2 billion dollars in each 6 months during 1996 year and all incomes would be paid for humanitarian purposes under the UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 (Direzinci, 2005:28). In 1990 Turkey's export to Iraq to was about 215 million dollars, but after the war it was decreased to 212 million dollars in 1991, 160 million dollars in 1992 (Tekisen, 1999:67-71). The same situation was occurred in import rates. In 1990 import from Iraq was about 1,047 million dollars but after the war numbers changed; in 1991 there was no any import from Iraq, in 1992 only 1 million dollars import from Iraq was actualized. The main import product was oil from Iraq. Turkey was received 57,5 percent of oil needs from Iraq but in 1991 the import was stopped (Tekinsen, 1999:67-71). So Turkey turned its face to the oil-imported countries; Iran and Saudi Arabia. Import from these countries was more expensive for Turkey because of oil's transportation fees; transportation fee from Iran was 9 dollars per a tone, from Saudi Arabia was 6 dollars per a tone (Incekara, 1990:154). After the Gulf War, rising of oil prices from 18 dollars to 26 dollars increased Turkey expenses of oil imports. For all these negative economic damages forced Turkey to review Middle East policy and needed

to revise it. As politically, Arab neighbors, Iraq and Syria, were not safe because of their support to terror groups and Turkey needed new non-Arab but regional economic and strategic partner to balance the power in the region. Turkey-Israel got close military and economically at that period.

Table 3.1: Export Shares of Middle East Countries in Turkey's Total Export (%) between 1990 and 2002 (<http://www.tek.org.tr/dosyalar/gap2.pdf>)

| Countries | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | Average |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| UAE | 0,58 | 0,56 | 0,66 | 0,84 | 1,02 | 0,87 | 0,91 | 1,01 | 0,89 | 1,47 | 1,14 | 1,21 | 1,27 | 0,96 |
| Iran | 3,82 | 3,58 | 3,09 | 1,89 | 1,38 | 1,24 | 1,28 | 1,17 | 0,72 | 0,59 | 0,85 | 1,15 | 0,86 | 1,66 |
| Israel | 0,36 | 0,58 | 0,61 | 0,52 | 0,98 | 1,11 | 1,10 | 1,49 | 1,78 | 2,20 | 2,34 | 2,57 | 2,38 | 1,39 |
| Qatar | 0,05 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,05 | 0,08 | 0,05 | 0,04 | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,04 |
| Kuwait | 0,71 | 0,12 | 0,45 | 0,68 | 0,71 | 0,55 | 0,46 | 0,48 | 0,33 | 0,31 | 0,26 | 0,33 | 0,38 | 0,44 |
| Lebanon | 0,39 | 0,67 | 0,67 | 0,65 | 0,89 | 0,74 | 0,79 | 0,76 | 0,58 | 0,61 | 0,47 | 0,59 | 0,52 | 0,64 |
| Egypt | 1,24 | 1,24 | 1,18 | 1,25 | 1,07 | 1,14 | 1,36 | 1,16 | 1,76 | 1,76 | 1,35 | 1,35 | 0,91 | 1,29 |
| S. Arabia | 2,61 | 3,56 | 3,30 | 4,25 | 3,37 | 2,17 | 1,85 | 2,04 | 1,76 | 1,38 | 1,39 | 1,60 | 1,53 | 2,37 |
| Syria | 1,50 | 1,94 | 1,47 | 1,56 | 1,40 | 1,26 | 1,33 | 1,02 | 1,15 | 0,87 | 0,66 | 0,90 | 0,74 | 1,21 |
| Oman | 0,04 | 0,01 | 0,04 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,09 | 0,07 | 0,08 | 0,11 | 0,09 | 0,10 | 0,09 | 0,07 |
| Jordan | 0,62 | 1,17 | 1,12 | 0,68 | 0,62 | 0,78 | 0,65 | 0,41 | 0,52 | 0,33 | 0,36 | 0,38 | 0,32 | 0,61 |
| Yemen | 0,21 | 0,46 | 0,42 | 0,66 | 0,32 | 0,38 | 0,31 | 0,33 | 0,23 | 0,33 | 0,25 | 0,32 | 0,33 | 0,35 |
| Total share | 12,13 | 13,92 | 13,06 | 13,07 | 11,87 | 10,37 | 10,18 | 9,97 | 9,83 | 10,00 | 9,20 | 10,52 | 9,36 | 11,04 |

Table 3.2: Import Shares of Middle East Countries in Turkey's Total Import (%) between 1990-2002 (<http://www.tek.org.tr/dosyalar/gap2.pdf>)

| Countries | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | Average |
|--------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| UAE | 0,86 | 1,74 | 1,55 | 1,07 | 1,46 | 0,12 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,16 | 0,24 | 0,58 |
| Iran | 2,21 | 0,43 | 1,60 | 2,27 | 2,98 | 1,93 | 1,85 | 1,33 | 0,94 | 1,56 | 1,50 | 2,03 | 2,17 | 1,75 |
| Israel | 0,28 | 0,37 | 0,42 | 0,41 | 0,54 | 0,47 | 0,44 | 0,48 | 0,62 | 0,73 | 0,93 | 1,28 | 1,28 | 0,63 |
| Qatar | 0,00 | 0,01 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,03 | 0,14 | 0,03 | 0,02 | 0,01 | 0,03 | 0,02 |
| Kuwait | 0,24 | 0,00 | 0,30 | 0,29 | 0,33 | 0,27 | 0,24 | 0,35 | 0,18 | 0,21 | 0,30 | 0,30 | 0,06 | 0,24 |
| Lebanon | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,02 | 0,02 | 0,03 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,07 | 0,06 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,06 | 0,10 | 0,05 |
| Egypt | 0,17 | 0,23 | 0,26 | 0,36 | 0,53 | 0,59 | 0,62 | 0,82 | 0,86 | 0,27 | 0,26 | 0,22 | 0,28 | 0,42 |
| S. Arabia | 3,24 | 8,69 | 7,28 | 5,10 | 5,28 | 3,88 | 3,91 | 2,10 | 1,46 | 1,42 | 1,76 | 1,76 | 1,86 | 3,67 |
| Syria | 0,38 | 0,32 | 0,23 | 0,23 | 0,19 | 0,72 | 0,71 | 0,94 | 0,67 | 0,75 | 1,00 | 1,12 | 1,19 | 0,65 |
| Oman | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 |
| Jordan | 0,15 | 0,14 | 0,11 | 0,08 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,07 | 0,06 | 0,02 | 0,04 | 0,05 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,07 |
| Yemen | 0,00 | 0,04 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 |
| Total share | 7,57 | 12,00 | 11,77 | 9,83 | 11,40 | 8,10 | 7,97 | 6,24 | 5,01 | 5,12 | 5,93 | 6,98 | 7,24 | 8,09 |

In table 1, shares in total Turkey's export rates were 11,04 percent as an average between 1990-2002 and highest point was 13,92 percent in 1991. The highest share average countries were Saudi Arabia (2,37%), Iran (1,66%), Israel (1,39%), Egypt (1,23%) and Syria (1,21%). From the list, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria

accommodated to the general average, Egypt had constant share till 1997 and in 1998 was seen a bounce but then the rates were declining. Only Israel's share was improving substantial measure so that in 1998 Israel was the first country for most shares had in Turkey's total export in the Middle East. In Table 2, Turkey's import shares list from Middle East countries was drawn. Shares in total Turkey's import rates were 8,09 percent as an average between 1990-2002 and highest point was 12,00 percent in 1991. The highest share average countries were S. Arabia (3,.67%) and Iran (1,75%) because of applying embargos on Iraqi oil forced Turkey imported oil from these countries more expensive with additional transportation fees. Syria (0.65%) and Israel (0.63%) followed Iran and Saudi Arabia. In last two years, non-Arab regional countries passed Arabs; Israel's share did exceed Syria and Iran did exceed Saudi Arabia.

4. RELATIONS DURING THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY ERA

4.1 Major Tenets of Justice and Development Party's (AKP) Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

Turkey could not be irrelevant to the Middle East after Iran-Iraq war and the US occupation of Iraq in the post-Cold War Era. Policy of neutrality toward Middle East, which started with Iran-Iraq war, changed to active policy with military operations in North Iraq, conflict with Syria for PKK, improvement of strategic relations with Israel (Davudoglu, 2009:397).

In 2002, single party government term started in Turkey. A new political party Justice and Development Party (JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the elections and came to the power. It was the historical victory that Turkey would be governed by single party. Firstly, at the beginning of JDP era, Abdullah Gul became Prime Minister because chairman of Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was banned from deputy cause of his six monthly prison term. A month later Grand National Assembly of Turkey started to discuss and accepted new regulations on articles in constitution about conditions of deputies (Hurriyet, 13.12.2002). According to new regulations in constitution, Erdogan could be deputy of Turkish Parliament and Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey.

In Justice and Development Party term, the relations with Israel, new page was opened. Like previous governments, in Justice and Development Party's first term, relations with Israel mainly were focused on intelligence and military issues. However, after second term of Justice and Development Party, the relations had got enlarged with some civil sectors like tourism and trade.

In 2008, Turkey became mediator between Israel and Syria. There were 5th rounds of talks in December 2008 (Sokullu, 2013:146). Before visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to Turkey, bad news came from the US. One of the most important

Jewish lobbies in the US, Anti-Defamation League (ADL), gave a statement about so-called Armenian Genocide as “Genocide was happened by Turks” (Saygun, 2012). That was the beginning of the break of relations between Israel and Turkey. On 22nd December 2008 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came to Turkey to meet with his counter-part Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Result of this visit, Israel promised not attack to Gaza Strip (Bolme, 2009:23-31). But after 5 days later on 27th December Israel attacked to Gaza.

Ex-Chief of General Staff of Turkey General Ergin Saygun wrote in his book that the breaking of relations was planned by Israel and the US themselves. “After the statement of ADL, Israeli jet-planes entered to Turkey air space from south part to assault Syria. To show this openly, jet-planes put down their fuel depots (Tip-Tank) to Turkey’s lands. We demanded apologize from Israel for this violation. Americans said that “When Israel explains the reason you would give truth to them”” (Saygun, 2012:68). With this explanation, the US gave a signal that it had possessed information about the violation before. As a result, Israel did not apologize and did not give any explanation for the violation. For next Anatolian Eagle Trainings Israel was not invited. Upon this the US left Anatolian Eagle Training and joined associate training with Israel after 3 days (Atilla Ilhan, Coming to One Minute, Hurriyet 22.09.2012).

Israel went into 2009 with new government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Benjamin Netanyahu who joined to one of the most important Israeli special forces, Sayeret Matkal, during Six Days War in 1967. After the war he got captain rank. His elder brother Yonatan Netanyahu was in the same Special Forces but he was killed when he was directing Uganda-Entebbe Airport Operation (Reich, Goldberg, 2008:348-350). Benjamin Netanyahu was attacking to Gaza and became minister during the term of Ariel Sharon who was Netanyahu’s soldier-mate from Sayeret Matkal. Sharon was following the withdrawal from Gaza policy. Upon this policy Netanyahu left from Sharon’s government. (Soner Yalcin, Welcome Israel, 16.07.2014) He became the chief of Likud Party, which aims to establish Great Israel on Promised Lands which was mentioned in Old Testament. Finally, he was elected as Prime Minister of Israel.

In January 2009 World Economic Forum was organized in Davos. In the panel named as “Gaza; Peace Model in Middle East”, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, Israeli President Peres, General Secretary of UN Moon and General Secretary of

Arab League Moussa participated at the panel as speeches. Turkey blamed Israel for operations in Gaza with famous phrases of Erdogan “We know well how you kill” which was addressed to killed children in Gaza during Israel bombing (The New York Times, 29.01.2009). Israel defended itself with saying “Israel has protected its territorial integrity and used self-defense right against any possible attack from Hamas against Israel” (The Guardian, 30.01.2009). Erdogan left the panel and World Economic Forum 2010 was remembered with Erdogan’s historical word One Minute. After the Forum, Turkey opened new page in its foreign policy and Israel relations. Erdogan became a hero in Arab world (The Guardian, 30.01.2009). This meeting was so important for Erdogan. Erdogan was going to the elections after a while and Turkish people’s sensibility about Palestine people was known. Erdogan had to play the game with rules of people. (Wagner, Cafiero, 2009:22).

In January 2010 another crisis between Turkey and Israel, low chair crisis, was happened. Turkey ambassador Oguz Celikkol was invited to Israel Parliament by Dany Ayalon, assistance of Israel Foreign Affairs Minister. He called press members to the room. Oguz Celikkol offered that before starting talks let the press members out. Dany Ayalon turned to press members and said in Hebrew (native language of Israel) “We are sitting on higher chair, but he on lower chair. There is only Israel flag on the table and we are not smiling” (Haaretz, 13.01.2010). The meeting’s details were published in newspapers a day later. Turkey got information about the meeting from news programs and newspapers. After the lower chair crisis, Israeli ambassador in Turkey was called to the building of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs and warned over the

On 31st May 2010 Mavi Marmara or “Flotilla” incident was happened. Turkish ship named Mavi Marmara decided to carry humanitarian aid to Gaza and break Israel blockade on Gaza Strip. When the ship was on international waters, Israel Naval Forces attacked to the ship. Result of this attack nine Turkish citizens were killed by Israel Naval Forces in international waters. Turkey demanded a formal apology from Israel for killing the 9 civilians, paying compensation to relatives of the victims and abolish blockade on Gaza Strip. With this crime Turkey was supported by international community and Israel was forced to be alone (BBC News, 27.06.2016). Turkey-Israel relations were frozen and diplomatic relations were shifted to its lowest level. All agreements and relations were stopped. There were some interesting facts about this tragedy. Period of that time’s ambassador Oguz Celikkol claimed that

there was Egypt's finger in this tragedy. "Israel attacked to the ship cause of wrong information by Egypt intelligence service. Egypt warned Israel that the ship is carrying weapons" (Celikkol, 2014:38). Celikkol supports his claim with a fact about passengers. He focuses on passengers list of the ship. There was an Egyptian passenger who cease from get on to the ship at the last minute. Then the fact about this passenger's being a personal of the Egypt intelligence service was arose. He added that one week before the tragedy Chief of Egypt Intelligence Service Omer Suleyman visited to Israel and possibly talked about the Mavi Marmara (Celikkol, 2014:43).

The year 2013 was started with interesting facts for the region. From the end of February the telephone traffic between Turkey and the US was started (Time, 25.03.2013). Drafts of peace agreement were sending and receiving between Israel and Turkey (Radikal, 23.03.2013). There was an important issue inside of Turkey. Talks with PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, were going faster. On 19th March Obama called Erdogan and talked for 2 hours (The Times of Israel, 22.03.2013). On 21st March, in Nowruz Holiday, Ocalan's letter to Kurdish people was read both in Turkish and Kurdish in Diyarbakir. In the letter it was called a cease fire that included disarmament and withdrawal from Turkish soil and calling end to armed struggle. On 22nd March Obama called Erdogan, but this time he was not in White House, he called from Israel. He talked with Erdogan for a short while then gave the phone to Netanyahu. Netanyahu apologized for Mavi Marmara tragedy and accepted for compensation to relatives of victims. Netanyahu gave a statement from his official Facebook page: "Syria issue and other developments in the regions forced us to get close relations with Turkey. We are worrying about Syria crisis. Threats from Syrian's groups in Golan Heights are increased. Both Turkey and Israel have direct borders with Syria, so we decided to remote relations with Turkey and to call Mr. Erdogan for apologize" (The Times of Israel, 23.03.2013). After this statement, Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Dany Ayalon, who was seat Turkey Ambassador Oguz Celikkol to low chair in 2010, joined a news program on TV in Israel and talked about normalizing relations with Turkey. He said that "President Obama demanded us to cooperate with Turkey against Syria. New page is being opened and amazing developments are waiting for us" (Ilhan, 2013:15). The Turkish court decided to arrest period of that time's Chief of General Staff of Israel General Rau Aluf Gabiel Ashkenazi, Commander of Marine Eliezer of Israel Alfred Marom,

Chief of Military Intelligence Department of Israel Amos Yadlin, Commander of Air Force of Israel Avishay Levi (Sabah, 19.05.2013). Two weeks before this court decision in Jerusalem Post newspaper was written that Israel and Turkey were getting to an agreement and Israel's accepted to pay 21 million dollars to relatives of victims of Mavi Marmara (Jerusalem Post, 03.05.2013). In this situation there was an interesting thing. During press conference a question was addressed to Yigar Palmor, Israel Foreign Affairs Ministry press speaker. It was questioned that "Are we a country that will change the policy about Gaza with the demand of Erdogan? The answer was so simply "there was no anything change. Blockade is going on. We will not change our policies with wishes of Erdogan" (Al Monitor, 20.10.2013). At the same day Turkey Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davudoglu was in front of press. He said that "Israel and Turkey are the closest to normalization" (Yeni Akit, 11.05.2014). Both statements were so different, almost were opposite. However, this normalization did not go for a long time. On 8th July 2014 Israel attacked Gaza and relations again turned to previous situation and were frozen and diplomatic relations was shifted to its lowest level.

These were things what it was seen and politicians said or mentioned. As we know in politics, the things what it was seen is not the same with what's going on in the behind of curtain. It's difficult to imagine frozen Turkey-Israel relations or the relations with its lowest level because it was seen in 1980s. When the relations got frozen after coup d'état, a warning letter came from the USA to both countries. In the letter was written that negative relations between Turkey-Israel were affected to US's policy in the region. Although that times' Middle East was not more important than today's, the US was worried about it. Now Middle East is the center of the world political crisis. Terror issues, energy resources, Arab Spring, new governments, territory conflicts, new defined policies and importance of strategic situation of the region are getting key factor for regional and global powers.

After second term of Justice and Development Party relations with Israel were enlarged with tourism and trade. As economically trade is the most important for both parts. Trade with Israel is not a simple trade. Political relations were frozen but economic relations were not. The political relations were broken with Gaza occupation in 2008. One minute crisis in Davos in 2009, low chair crisis in Tel Aviv in 2010, Mavi Marmara tragedy in international waters in 2010 were crisis topics in relations. Till the end of 2010, civil costs in Gaza were over thousand and political

leaders of Turkey condemned Israel's all policies toward Palestine in domestic and international levels. But if it is looked at economic rates it will be seen different things. On the contrary it is known, the relations were not frozen all.




Figure 4.1: The Trade Results between Turkey and Israel from 2007 till 2014 (<http://itrade.gov.il/turkey/israil-ve-turkiye-arasindaki-ticaret-2014-yilinda-da-yukseliste/#sthash.BqUUaEUq.dpuf>)

According to Israel Central Statistic Department, in 2010 total of export and import rate of both countries were increased for 26% comparing with 2009 and increased from 2.47 billion dollars to 3.12 billion dollars. This number increased 4.9 billion dollars in 2013. For half of 2014, the rate was over 2.5 billion dollars. A year later from Mavi Marmara tragedy, the trade rate between both countries increased for 29% and became highest rate of last five years. The number was 4 billion dollars. Export rate from Turkey to Israel was 1.8 billion dollars in 2010. It was increased for 20% and was 2.17 billion dollars in 2011. Israel's export rate to Turkey was 1.31 billion dollars but it was increased for 40% and was 1.85 billion dollars in 2011. In 2013 export rate from Turkey to Israel was 2.3 billion dollars. Main products for exporting were foods, automotive, machines, iron, steel, textiles and etc. On the other hand, export rate from Israel to Turkey was 2.5 billion dollars. Exporting products from Israel were foods, refinery products, plastic, chemical elements, textiles and etc. Turkey's investment rate to Israel was 1.3 billion dollars and Israel's investment rate

to Turkey was almost 4 billion dollars (Salom, 04.06.2014). Turkey in Israel signed 147 projects in the rate of 1.3 billion dollars. For today trade rate between two countries is nearly 5 billion dollars. Turkey is in the 9th place among the most Israel's import countries (Salom, 04.06.2014). In the first quarter of 2017, the export from Turkey to Israel was increased by 20 percent and the export from Israel to Turkey was raised by 45 percent (Jerusalem Post, 16.05.2017). The trade rate between Turkey and Israel was 3.9 billion dollars in 2016. In 2016, exports of Israel to Turkey were 1.3 billion dollars and imports of Turkey to Israel were 2.6 billion dollars (Jerusalem Post, 16.05.2017). From the relations Israel gained more as economically and politically. Turkey tries to rid of less scathe. When we look to the region, all enemies of Israel have faced difficulties. Iran is on blockade and is isolated from the world. Esad's Syria and Taliban are at the war, Morsi's Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood was overturned.

From Turkey's perspective, Turkey lost some partners after Arab spring such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq's central government. Growth of crisis in Syria, Muhammad Mursi and Muslim Brotherhoods' overturned by Army led by General Sisi, Arab world supported General Sisi, political crisis with central Iraq government, ISIS operations in the borders of Turkey forced Turkish government to change some policies. Turkey knows it well that without Israel's support, it will not be easy.

Syria was one of the most reactive countries against Turkish – Israeli military cooperation. However, Syria did not have enough information about content of Turkish – Israeli military cooperation so Syria stayed distant to Turkey in its policy. The second most reaction came from Libya. Qaddafi would accept any possible attack against Syria as himself. Qaddafi mentioned that, all Turkish companies would be closed and replaced by Greek companies in his country (Ceylan, 1999; 221). Iraq was in among most reacted countries for Turkish-Israeli partnership but Saddam thought that the partnership was against to Syria and Iran, so Iraq used “wait and see” policy against Turkey. For this policy, Iraq's gotten weak of economy, because of the Gulf war, played so much important role. Other used “wait and see” policy countries were Egypt and Jordan. At the beginning of the declaration of strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Amr Moousa came to Turkey and was informed about the details of the military partnership by Turkish authorities. However, minister stated that he had some doubts

about strategic partnership aimed not aggressor but only training sides and not satisfied for given information by Turkish authorities (Yilmaz, 2003:70).

The relations between Turkey and Arabic Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar) have revitalized during JDP term, starting from 2002. The relations are being increased up on two main concepts. First is to take benefits from investment toward these states and attract Arabic investors for Turkish markets. Second concept is built based on energy and military technological sectors. Turkish businessmen realized 12 projects for two billion dollars in Qatar during 2007 (Turk, 2009:22).

The amount of foreign trade between 2002 and 2008 was raised with Middle East and Gulf initiative policy of JDP. Foreign trade rate between Turkey and Saudi Arabia was 8,3 billion dollars between 1996-2001 years, but started with JDP term the rate raised as 20,3 billion dollars between the years of 2002-2008 (See Table 3). The most raised percent occurred in the rates of trade with Qatar during JDP term. After JDP term the trade rate was raised to 2,5 billion dollars from 130 thousand dollars. Trade between Turkey and Arabic Gulf states were raised sustained during JDP term.

Table 4.1: Amount of Foreign Trade between Turkey and Arab Gulf States (.000 USD) (http://tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4)

| Amount of Foreign Trade between Turkey and Arabic Gulf States (.000 USD) | | | | |
|---|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Countries | Years | Import | Export | Trade rate |
| Saudi Arabia | 1996 – 1997* | 2,725,276 | 965,641 | 3,690,917 |
| | 1998 – 2001 | 2.940.438 | 1.728.248 | 4.668.686 |
| | 2002 – 2008 | 12.786.163 | 7.557.917 | 20.344.080 |
| | Total | 18.451.877 | 10.251.806 | 28.703.683 |
| Kuwait | 1996 – 1997* | 275.514 | 232.685 | 508.199 |
| | 1998 – 2001 | 449.346 | 350.282 | 799.628 |
| | 2002 – 2008 | 333.900 | 1.689.982 | 2.023.882 |
| | Total | 1.058.760 | 2.272.949 | 3.331.709 |
| Qatar | 1996 – 1997* | 16.227 | 20.871 | 37.098 |
| | 1998 – 2001 | 94.668 | 36.163 | 130.831 |
| | 2002 – 2008 | 341.566 | 2.002.958 | 2.344.524 |
| | Total | 452.461 | 2.059.992 | 2.512.453 |

* These years were the term of Welfare Party term led by Erbakan. During this term Erbakan preferred for Muslim countries in the international relations and the trade between Turkey and Arabic Gulf states was stated to rise within Erbakan Government term.

In 2008, when the relations had broken between Israel and Turkey, rate of trade between Arab States and Turkey was increased. On 6th February 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Qatar with a lot businessmen groups (Yeni Safak, 05.02.2008). Following Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan came to Qatar. After important visits from Turkey, Qatar companies have begun to be interested in Turkey. A Qatar company Al Wasaeel International Media Co bought some stock certificates of Sabah Newspaper (Turk, 2009:27). According to first results of 2017, Qatar was the third biggest got tenders by Turkish building contractors. Thirty six Turkish contractors accepted 119 projects with 18 billion dollars till February 2017 (Hurriyet, 16.02.2017). In answer to Turkey, Qatar companies bought some Turkish banks. In 2013, Commercial Bank of Qatar (CQB) bought 71 percents of AkBank with 460 million dollars. In 2016 the CBQ paid 222,5 million dollars and bought last 29 percents and owned all AkBank. Second greatest of Middle East and Northern Africa QNB, bought Finansbank from National Bank of Greece with 2,7 billion Euros. At last, global networks of sport channels owned and operated by beIN Media Group, a spinoff of Aljazeera network, beIN Sports bought Digiturk for 1 billion dollars (Hurriyet, 16.02.2017). Qatar bought bank-companies for 5 billion dollars with 3 years in Turkey.

Turkey – Kuwait economic relations was improved during JDP term. Kuwait's investment in Turkey was over 5 billion dollars between 2002-2008 years. In answer to this Turkish companies had owned over 30 various construction projects in architecture and oil/gas sectors in Kuwait (Turk, 2009:28). Till 2016 bilateral corporation rate was reached to 17.5 billion dollars, at the same time Turkish companies' construction projects was over 51 billion dollars (Dogan News Agency, 09.05.2017). Also bilateral trade amounts were over 1.3 billion dollars and rate in contracting sector of Turkish companies in Kuwait was reached 6.5 billion dollars in 2016 (Dogan News Agency, 09.05.2017).

The relation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is different from other two Arabic Gulf states. The foreign trade rate was raised to 5.5 billion dollars from 1.3 billion dollars between 2003-2008 (Turk, 2009:29). Turkey exported agricultural products to

Saudi Arabia for 230 million dollars for a year till 2008. Turkey's aim in the relations was based on economy, but for Arab States, Turkey was the balance element against rising Iran influence in the Middle East (Munyar, 2009:7). Iran's influence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon forced Saudi Arabia to cooperate with Turkey. In 2006 King Abdullah visited Turkey after 40 years. Development of politic and economic relations was discussed. Additionally, security issues were among of talked topics (Khan, 2006). According to Turkey Economy Ministry's data for 2016, Turkey's export to Saudi Arabia was about 2,6 billion dollars and import from Saudi Arabia was 1.5 billion dollars (Ozturkler, 2017).

4.2 War on Iraq

International siege had not been ended against Iraq, despite of Iraqi forces withdrawal from Kuwait by Operation Desert Storm in 1990. The regime's sovereignty was restrained by UN Security Council's sanctions and the USA went on with its allies to strike Iraq's infrastructure and strategic facilities. The Republic Party came to the power in the USA in 2000. The numbers of Mass Destruction Weapons were shown as a threat for the US and regional countries (Hughes, 2002:430-438). Terror attacks on World Business Center in New York on 11th September 2001 were related to Iraq by the US. UN Security Council did not allow for the attack to Iraq, but the US was determined for the war. The most important factors which had dragged the US to the Gulf Wars were Jewish members of Senate and House of Representatives of the US, Israeli and Jewish lobbies and Israel itself. Israel aimed to escape from its biggest enemy in the region by the US.

The reasons and results of Gulf wars have been discussed today and most of conflicts, which emerged after collapse of Saddam regime, have not been solved yet. The war brought demolition, losses and disasters to the region. During 1990s, the strategy of the US for taking control over Iraq was covered with disarmament of the country and restrain of sovereignty rights (Jabbar, 2004:3). The strategy went out in same level till Republican Party governance in 2000. Attacks to World Trade Center and Pentagon in 9/11, prepared suitable floor for some who wait for tilt over of Saddam regime. However, the US blamed Al-Qaida for the attacks and Al-Qaida was shown as a responsible for the victims of 9/11. For that reason the US preferred to attack Afghanistan Firstly,. The US and its allies overthrew Taliban in Afghanistan.

During the war in Afghanistan, the US tried to look for any possible connection between Iraq regime and activists in 9/11 (Aljazeera News Agency, 07.09.2011). However, there was not any real connection between Al-Qaida and Iraqi regime was detected (The Guardian, 13.03.2008).

On 17th March, the US declared the war against Iraq by the reason of Iraq's not obeying decisions of UN Security Council. The official reason for attempt of tilt over Saddam regime was having Mass Destructive Weapons and these were threat for regional countries and the US. The US and its allies succeed to overthrow Saddam regime but never stabilized in Iraq. The situation was an advantage for Israel because she breathed comfortable with disqualified of eastern enemy and got rid of threats from Iraq. After all Israel was escaped from pressure over solution of Palestine issue. The conflicts inside of Iraq after the war pushed the plans of Israel about Palestine into second plan. However, the Gulf War was known as "American war", it mainly had served to Israel's interests, so it was expected attitude for Israel to support the war.




Figure 4.2: Invasion Map of Iraq
 (<http://libguides.memphis.edu/c.php?g=131493&p=899585>)

There are two main reasons of great powers, such as the US, the UK, France and Germany, interested in Israel's security; first is a mutual interest in Arabic world, and second is importance role of Jewish lobby in powerful countries' domestic policy in the US, the UK, France and Germany (Ahmad, 2000:31-32). On account of the US's Middle East policy, security and interest of Israel are coming forward (Karakoc, 2003:101). Washington applied Greater Strategy for blockade Iran and Iraq, to provide security of Gulf oil, to guarantee Israel's security and to provide peace in

Middle East (Walker, 2004:21). During the Cold War, the US tried to preclude influence of Soviets in the Middle East, so got hot relations with friendly regional countries. Israel was seen as shield against improvement of Soviet influence in the region, Israel was a potential platform for military operations of the US and a strategic partner (Walker, 2004:21). Israel took position against strengthened Islamist movements in the region and Syria's increased influence in Lebanon by support of Soviets. In 1980s, President Regan defined Israel as strategic value in the US's foreign policy (Karakoc, 2003:112). The US government, see Israel as the closest partner for fighting against terrorism after 9/11. Deputy of Defense Minister Paul Wolfowitz mentioned to Ariel Sharon that Israel was inseparable ally of the US in fighting against terrorism and Palestinians' movement was defined as piece of international terrorism complot against democratic societies (Zunes, 2002).

Former CIA director R. James Woolsey related 9/11 attacks with unsuccessful politics of the US toward Middle East in 1990s and criticized Washington with the pretext of mere stability to get close to the oil supplied regimes of Middle East (Woolsey, 2004:29). When George W. Bush was elected as the President of the United States of America with victory of Republican Party in 2000, he changed priorities of the US policy toward Middle East. For Republicans, Clinton did not enough benefit from Camp David Summit and they thought that government was concentrate on peace in the summit, but never focused on threats from the Middle East against the US, so Bush was determined to terminate Saddam's power in the Middle East. At the first months of Bush term was focused on Iraq (Walker, 2004:23).

Invasion of the US to Iraq, was so important for either take control of extracting oil in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, or stabilizes oil supply (Woolsey, 2004:29). President Bush called members of the House of Representatives to the meeting on 19th September and mentioned that US Army is fighting against Al-Qaida successfully but the main threat comes from Saddam Hussein. Bagdad government has had enough MDW to destroy Israel and possible attack from Iraq may cause to international cause and conflict (Woodward, 2004:193-194). On 10th October, House of Representatives accepted the decision which giving the right to the President for using the USA Armed Forces against Iraq when he approve it (Woodward, 2004:211). Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld stated to the President on 10th January 2003 that "military dispatching and CIA operations are going well but risks

for Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other neighbors were increased. It must be done something immediately otherwise either the US or other regional countries would be remained under dangerous” (Woodward, 2004:268). On 13rd January President Bush met with General Secretary Colin Powell and decided for trip to Europe for convince to war (Woodward, 2004:277-278). Washington blamed Saddam Hussein with hiding banned weapons since 1990 Gulf war (Woodward, 2004:185).

Iraq and Israel was enemy to each other since establishment of Israel, 1948. Iraq, like other Arabs, was never willing to peace with Israel. Iraq had sent its army to Israel in 1948 and 1967, and send army to defense Damascus against Israel in October 1967. Additionally, Iraq’s support to Intifada and giving aids to family of Palestinian activists and suicide bombers were asserted (Cooley, 2003).

Israel aimed to internal confusion by weakening of governance in Iraq. For that reason, Israel has established close relations with Kurdish groups in Iraq since 1960s (Kasim, 2003:141). Defeat of Yom Kippur War forced Israel to go rooted changes in security policy of country. After a year later from First Intifada in 1988 Iraq’s missile attack to Iran formed new threat perception. Israel was in face to face with possible missile attack from Iraq (Ozcan, 2002:237-242). Israel’s special attention to Iraq had started in mid of 1970s with France acceptance giving nuclear reactor to Iraq. In 1981 Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor was destructed by Israel. Since that date Iraq sustained its nuclear programs in far and hidden places, it was one of the big reason for Israel support of Gulf war in 1991 (Walt, 2007:233). Israel put forward Iraq as a threat after because of its weapon capacity the Gulf war and qualified Iraq, which locates between Syria and Iran, as a bridge of logistic and military support to Palestinians (Mearsheimer, 2007). Israel followed the policy that manipulated internal conflicts in the region for increasing capability of maneuver and form a security circle around her and got close relations with powers from outside of the region (Aras, 1998). Israel defined the regional countries as source of instability and states – sponsored terrorism. Iraq and Iran were on the list because of their huge amount of capacity for MDW. So Israel wanted the US invasion Iraq and following the plans for occupying Iran were on the agenda (Kasim, 2003:139-140)

Second Gulf War knocked over Saddam regime, increased influence of the US in country and strengthen division of Iraq what had been started since 1991. Israel gained strategic, political, economic and military earnings. Israel got rid of one greatest enemy and the negative views from Islamic and Arabic worlds toward Israel

changed toward the US. Islamic and Arabic worlds understood the importance of the break of the US support to Israel policy against Palestine. The US plays so important role for the Israel as foreign supporter, creator of free trade zone, military supplier being one of permanent members of UNSC. After knocked down of Saddam, Israel pressure over Lebanon and Syria increased. Bashar al-Assad was isolated and understood that there is no longer any the product transportation line without Iraq (Canikoglu, 2013:198-202).

Changing the regime by force in Iraq had been on agenda since first Gulf war. Jewish origin political members of Ronald Reagan and George Herbert W. Bush terms were not pleased during Clinton policy toward Middle East (Yenicag, 29.12.2016). These groups demanded change of Iraqi regime and changes in the Middle East (Ahmad, 2014:40-55). All these topics were moved to the agenda with victory of George W. Bush in 2000.

During these terms Turkey was busy with its internal economic and political problems. Turkey had been seen opposite to the US operation to Iraq but kept quiet till the election on 3rd November 2002. The crypto-message from Turkey's ambassador in Washington was sent to Turkey about the US operation in Iraq in June 2002. It was stated four most important topics (Ulutas, 2006: 143-145);

1. The US unconditionally will hit Iraq
2. The US will hit whether UN decision or not
3. The US will want Turkey nearby
4. But the US will hit even if Turkey is not nearby

After the message received to Turkey, US Deputy Minister of Defense Paul Wolfowitz came to Turkey with US Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mark Grossmanile and Commander of NATO Forces and US Air Forces Joseph Ralston to discuss the situation about Iraq and requested support from Turkey for a possible Iraq occupation (Voice of America, 30.11.2002). US Deputy Minister of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized on these topics; (Bila, 2003:146-147)

1. The US sees the regime in Iraq as a threat because of its support to terrorism, activities in MDW areas and this regime has to be changed. The exact operation date has not organized yet.

2. In the region it is aimed an Iraq as democratic, multi-ethnic, non-MDW, supported territorial integrity and getting peaceful relations with the US and Turkey.

3. It is well known that it will be effects of any possible operation to Turkey. This operation may also be realized without Turkey. But it will be harder. This situation will limit the interests of Turkey in the shape of new Iraq.

4. The US have being aware of Turkey's interest. But participation of Turkey from the beginning of operation is desired by the US government.

Wolfowitz delivered valuable promises of President Bush to Turkey as report; (Bila, 2003:152)

1. Military Operation will not be incompletely, the US will complete the duty.

2. After knock down of Saddam regime, the US with Turkey and international community will provide the democratic regime which will be respectful to the minorities included Turkmens. All Turkmens rights will be protected.

3. There will not be established any Kurdish state and there will not be any agreement with Kurds about it. There will not be allowed to realize any goals of Kurds against Mosul and Kirkuk.

4. There will be cooperation with Kurdish groups only inside of territorial integrity of Iraq.

5. Military Operation will be organized and performed which will not cause to any refugee problem for Turkey.

6. The US will try to compensate all damages of Operation to Turkey. In the First Gulf War it had not be done enough. Turkey will be one of the most taken benefit countries from changing of regime in Iraq.

7. The US will ready to exchange the valuable information about MDW.

8. The US is ready to deployment of Patriot missiles to Turkey to protect from Iraq missiles.

Wolfowitz, during his visit to Turkey, seriously focused on Iraq issue and the US openly stated to Turkey she will attack to Iraq. Furthermore, the US had reassurance to Turkey about Mosul, Kirkuk, PKK/KADEK and independence claim of Kurds. In the following days, requests of the US increased. These requests were recorded in 15th October 2002 dated hidden report of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry (Milliyet, 18.09.2003). Amongst these requests the US would send 80,000 troops, 250 aircrafts would be deployed in Turkey and for all these the US demanded to use 15 airports and 5 seaports (Ulutas, 2004:144-146). On 2nd, 10th and 24th July, 2002 Turkish Chief of Army Staff, Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defense Ministry

organized three meeting in the topic of Iraqi war and at the end of the meeting Turkey's redlines in Iraqi war were specified in the final report (Sahin, Tastekin, 2006:262-263):

1. Declaration of independence Kurdish state in north part of Iraq
2. Giving governance of Mosul and Kirkuk under the control of Kurds
3. Creation of any federative structure which would open the way for independence of Kurdish state
4. Not being substantive nation of Iraqi Turkmens in the new created structure
5. Being a part of any international intervention without legitimacy ground

In the report, Turkey aimed to minimize the things to do and maximize assets during a possible intervention and stated importance of maintain influence in north part of Iraq.

3rd November elections in Turkey were resulted (Haberturk, 03.11.2002). JDP led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, won the election and became the first political party that has won an outright majority since 1991. Erdogan was banned according to the Turkish constitutional law for being a Member of Parliament, so Abdullah Gul from JDP became Prime Minister of Turkey. The most important crisis which Gul Government had taken over was Iraq issue. The US was waiting for new government to meet her demands. Wolfowitz and Grossman met with Prime Minister Gul on 3rd December (Vatan, 18.03.2011). American representatives promised for support Turkey on International Monetary Fund, European Union, Cyprus issue and economic problems if Turkey opened bases for American aircrafts and troops. After the meeting Minister of Foreign Affairs Yasar Yakis summarized the meeting with a sentence; "We will never participate in military operations in Iraq, but in any inevitable situation we will open our air bases and military plants to the US Military troops", but like first Gulf War, in Iraqi war there would not be opened bases to UK Military troops (Ulutas, 2006:148). Turkey's decision on the US policy and demands was not clear. The US wanted to use Turkish possibilities and geographical advantages, also demanded airports, seaports logistic supports, and wished to enter Iraq over Turkey. However, the US did not want Turkish army in Iraq, demands support from Turkey but did not want Turkey's military power in Iraq, wanted to give shape Iraq as she wishes but never wanted interfere for Turkey to this policy. In answer to the US demands,

Turkey never wanted the war but also never wishes to break relations with the US. Turkey did not want to place thousands US soldiers in homeland but also never wish to be deactivate in the new shaping policy of Iraq after the war. Turkey worried that if Turkey rejects the demands of the US, the region would be shaped as US wishes and after the war, the US would follow the policy against Turkey in the region (Pehlivanoglu, 2007:337). Prime Minister Gul started to attempts for peaceful solution in Iraq and organized visits to Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran (Hurriyet, 05.01.2003). During the visits Gul stated that “any possible war in the region would not give benefits to the region. All countries have had responsibilities on the issue. All we would try to preclude the war till the end” (Hurriyet, 05.01.2003).

British Minister of Defense Geoffrey Hoon visited Turkey on 8th January (Ergan, Demir, Hurriyet, 05.01.2003). Minister Hoon wanted to clarify Turkey’s decision as soon as possible and stated that Turkey had to decide the decision before 27th January on front line from north part (Ulutas, 2006:148). Because of approach for the war, Ministry of Defense of Republic of Turkey warned governorships of 25 cities, which were under the target of Iraqi missiles, to precautions (Milliyet, 29.01.2003). Leader of Iraqi Democratic Party of Kurdistan Masoud Barzani visited Turkey on 9-10th January to discuss and get idea of Turkey about Iraqi intervention plan of the US (Cumhuriyet, 10.01.2003).

The redlines of Turkey was discussed in Ankara with special representative of Bush administration, Zalmay Khalilzad and signed the notification at the end of the meeting (Ulutas, 2004:149);

1. Iraq’s territorial integrity had not to be divided.
2. There would not to be allowed any Kurdish state in Iraq.
3. Natural resources of Iraq would be under control of central government and shared equally among Iraqi people.
4. It had to be basis that Iraq would be a unitary state.

On 6th February 2003, Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) accepted the missive which would open the bases to American soldiers for 3 months (Milliyet, 07.02.2003) but second missive had not been accepted on 1st March 2003 (Takvim, 03.03.2013). On 9th March Erdogan was elected to Turkish Parliament and became the Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey (Takvim, 03.03.2013). On 20th March when the US started operations in Iraq, GNAT accepted third missive which allowed

to the American aircrafts using Turkish airspace and letting the Turkish Army enter to North Iraq for 6 months (Hurriyet, 05.04.2013). Kurdish leader Barzani reacted strongly and stated that if Turkish army entered to North Iraq, we would fight with them (Ulutas, 2004:155). American Army had faced with some difficulties to take the control of security in Iraq after occupation. That's why the US demanded reinforcement army from Turkey (Hurriyet, 16.04.2003). New massive was prepared and sent to GNAT for voting. The importance of forth massive were; to send humanitarian aids to Iraqi people, to limit the undesirable behaviors of Kurdish groups, to prevent the pressure over Turkmens, to clear north part of Iraq from PKK (Voice of America, 10.07.2003).

In the Iraq war, Turkey had acted process toward the Middle East. Turkey tried to get close relations with Syria and Iran because of showing these countries that any possible US military intervention to them would seriously damage to the all region. Turkey warned Syria and Iran about making compatible policy toward international community to prevent future US intervention (Ulutas, 2004:158). At the beginning of millennium, Iraq crisis was the most serious problem which Turkey government had faced. The war had affected to Turkey's economy. Before the war oil process was followed around 20 dollars but in March the price raised to 35 dollars (Fujikawa, 2006). Between 1996-2002 years 191 million 121 thousands crude oil transported to Turkey by Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (Botas yearly report, 2003). As yearly, in 2002, 23 million 763 thousands crude oil was transported and in previous year the number was like 31 million 280 thousands (Botas yearly report, 2003). In 2002 the petrol prices was calculated 23.4 dollars per barrel, 26.9 dollars per barrel for 2003 and 32.3 dollars per barrel in following 2004 years (Botas yearly report, 2003).

4.3 Lebanon Crisis

2006 Lebanon war had carried Lebanon to the foreground in the Middle East policy. The developments in Lebanon were bear on Turkey in some levels. Primarily, GNAT accepted on Turkish Army joining to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon as peace-keeping force (Murphy, 2008), so the developments in Lebanon and future stability possibilities have interested for Turkey. However, Turkish interest on Lebanon was not limited with joining to the peacekeeping force. Firstly, any possible instability in Lebanon might be cause for general instability in the all Middle East.

More importantly, Lebanon is a part of struggle for the future of Middle East. In the terms of the issues such as position of EU and the US in the region, futures of Iran and Syria, Lebanon war and its results were so important for Turkey and the region. Lebanon makes exceptions in some cases in the region. Lebanon, which had been established under the mandate of French after the 1st World War and declared independence in 1943, is created on political structure which based on religious identities. In terms of this situation, in the Constitution of Lebanon, eighteen sects officially are known and all political system is divided for the majority rates of the sects (Harris, 1997). The organs of the state and bureaucracy are arranged for this principle. Lebanon is different from other regional powers with its relatively liberal economy and politic understanding (Altunisik, 2007:11). On the other hand, Lebanon has strategic importance for its location. Its location on the seaside of Mediterranean Sea and being the buffer-zone between Israel and Syria have made Lebanon in the center of regional and non-regional powers' interests. It could be reason that some states and regional politic movements might be active in Lebanon by using its internal structure.

The civil war of 1975 was emerged by coming together of related internal and external dynamics. Political system could not satisfy new demographic realities developed political dynamics. The politic system was destroyed completely with come up of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the scene of Lebanon as an important actor after taken out from Jordan by force of PLO. The main reason of the civil war which was emerged between the years 1975-1990 was the conflict between powers which had wanted to change the status-quo and supporters of remaining status quo in Lebanon, also the states from outside had participated in the war. The states had settle up with each-other on Lebanon by supporting the different parts.. Today the developments in Lebanon are taken shape with telescope of the conflicts between power distributions and identify struggle of internal and regional.

In 1989, the new period was started with end of civil war at the result of Taef agreement. The most important peculiarity of this period was tutelage of new regime was given to Syria⁵. By Taef agreement, some regulations were applied for internal structure of Lebanon. As example, the number of members of parliament was increased and shared equally between Muslim and Christians, the rights of Sunni

⁵ See the Taef Agreement text -

<http://www.presidency.gov.lb/Arabic/LebaneseSystem/Documents/TaefAgreementEn.pdf>

Prime Minister was increased against to Maroni (Christian) President and the term of head of Parliament was increased.⁶ However, the Taef arrangement had been continued as Sunni-Maroni system like previous years and Shiites were excluded. By implication, the Taef brought peace and stability to Lebanon under the tutelage of Syria but never solved the basic problems. As a result, the politic arrangement in Lebanon had been gone on with the structure which based on religious identities, excluded Shiites and great inequality of social-economic system and influence of outside powers was never decreased.

After Taef regulation, Syria increased influence on Lebanon and tried to get close relations with West and Gulf countries after the Gulf War. The regulation accepted that there had been a privileged relationship between Syria and Lebanon and recognized the influence of Syria in Lebanon (Noun, 2008) so, the agreement was big success for Syria. However, the problem was defining and applying of quality of this “privileged relationship”. The problem for applying Security Plan on Taef Regulations was solved by taking control of Syrian Army in Lebanon. After defeating Iraq in Gulf war, Syria intensified its influence in Lebanon with new agreement of Brotherhood, coordination and friendship with Lebanon’s government in 1991 (Noun, 2008). After Taef Regulation Shiites society in Lebanon had grown stronger. As representative of Shiites, Hezbollah began to politicize. Hezbollah became the representative of Shiites in Lebanon on politic system. As a result, Hezbollah participated in Parliament election of Lebanon in 1992 and won 8 of 128 seats, 10 seats in 1996, 8 seats in 2000 and 14 seats in 2006 in the Parliament of Lebanon (Byman, Gwertzman, 2008). However, Hezbollah never gave up the weapon. Syria had seen Hezbollah as an instrument which might be used against Israel. Hezbollah has been domain with the border areas of Syria and Israel in Lebanon.

The cooperation with Hezbollah was very important in terms of Syria. In 1990s Syria had applied balancing policy between two partners; Lebanon regime and Hezbollah (Alfoneh, 2017). The dimension of Hezbollah – Syria cooperation was formed by Iran. Close relation between Syria – Iran began in 1980s. Their common factors for close relation were; seeing antagonist Israel and Iraq as an enemy, feeling of worry against the hegemony policy of the US and European power and limiting the

⁶ In Lebanon, Prime Minister has to be Sunni Muslim, President has to be Maroni Christian and Head of Parliament has to be Shiite Muslim.

influence of Turkey in the region. The reasons for Iran in the close relation with Syria were; wishing to get out of desolation, aiming to be effective in the Arabic region, support Syria against its policy against the US and Israel and protecting interests in Lebanon (Altunisik, 2007:8). Hezbollah had formed triangulation point in the relation between Syria and Iran. Iran had played very important role in the creation of Hezbollah. The relation with Hezbollah gained Iran to provide an orbit in conflict between Arab – Israel and in the policy toward Arabs (Shaikh, 2017). Likewise Iran would be opened to Mediterranean Sea region (Culov, The Guardian, 08.10.2016). So Iran needed Syria to achieve Lebanon and Mediterranean Sea. Syria had used Hezbollah against Israel, the US and its allies in Lebanon. Hezbollah – Syria – Iran axis was useful for these powers to achieve their interests.

Lebanon also has had importance in terms of Israel. Importance of Lebanon for Israel was influence of outside powers in Lebanon and these powers use of Lebanon's lands as base in wars against Israel. During civil war, the activities of Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon caused conflicts with Israel and resulted occupation of Lebanon two times by Israel in 1978 and 1982 (Reilly, 2004). Unlike 1978, the occupation in 1982 was not limited with southern part of Lebanon, also Beirut was occupied by Israel's army and the occupation was continued until 1985. In 1985, when Israel withdraw from Lebanon, formed a Security Belt in southern part of Lebanon and these belt was secured and controlled by Southern Lebanon Army which created, trained by Israel and formed by Lebanese soldiers (Franks, New York Times, 25.05.1985). This situation was continued until 2000 year when Israel Army withdrawal from Lebanon.

2000s were a period that some changes emerged in Lebanon and regional politics. Firstly, one of the most important outside power, Syria had lost its position in the region. In 2000, meeting of Clinton – Assad in the scope of Peace Process was ended unsuccessfully and resulted with end of Peace Process (Gold, 2000). New governments in the US and Israel, also death of Hafez Assad and success of his second son, Bashar Al Assad, in Syria weakened Syria's position in the region especially in Lebanon. George W. Bush's government in the US indicated Syria as a target and mentioned openly the regime had to be change in Syria. The effects of all these developments which happened in the outside of Lebanon had been felt in Lebanon. After Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, attempts of withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon was increased and Syria was forced to withdrawal from Lebanon by

international community. On 27th April 2005, Syria withdrew its army and intelligence agencies from Lebanon and in May 2005, the first parliament elections were carried out (Ciezdlo, Washington Post, 22.05.2005). In the election anti-Syrian coalition group led by Saad Hariri gained victory. (Kifner, New York Times, 20.06.2005)

All these developments had some effects on Hezbollah. Withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon was interpreted as a success of Hezbollah in Lebanon and all Arab regions. Hezbollah used this perception for increasing its popularity in Lebanon (Bergman, Ynetnews, 10.03.2016). As a result, Hezbollah had sent two ministers to the government in the 2005 elections (Norton, 2007:483). Hezbollah applied binary strategic policy. Firstly, Hezbollah increased its role in domestic policy by improving its politicization process. It was the better way for increasing activities of Shiites in Lebanon's domestic policy. Secondly, for helping its politicization process, Hezbollah sustained its military struggle against Israel (Kalb, Saivetz, 2007).

The reasons of the war which happened in 12th July till 14th August 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel were Hezbollah's attack to Israel with missiles and mortars and kidnapping two Israeli soldiers (Erlanger, Opper, New York Times, 07.08.2006). Israel lost five soldiers during its attempt to rescue its kidnapped soldiers. Israel answered to Hezbollah with declaring war and occupying southern part of Lebanon (Knickmeyer, Washington Post, 31.01.2008). In terms of Israel, Hezbollah's aggressive policy in Lebanon was perceived as a part of great struggle in the Middle East. For Israel, the main actors of this struggle were Iran and Syria. Israel thought that Hezbollah's attack to Israel was kind of message from Iran and Syria that they had had a weapon which may use against Israel, it was Hezbollah (The Times of Israel, 11.11.2016). Israel defined its attacks to Lebanon and Hezbollah it was also an answer against Iran and Syria. Briefly, Israel's target was not only Hezbollah but also Iran and Syria (Altunisik, 2007:13). However, in terms of Hezbollah the situation was completely different. Hezbollah believed that the policy of US and West aimed to captivity all the region and Islamic territories. For Hezbollah, developments in Lebanon were a part hegemony policy of the US (The Jerusalem Post, 03.11.2014). Forcing Syria out of Lebanon and supports from inside of Lebanon to withdrawal of Syria was commented as earnings of the US policy toward the region (Hourani, 2012). The target for Hezbollah was not only Israel, but also the US and its policy toward the Middle East.




Figure 2.3: Lebanon Crisis Map
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/5184828.stm

The result of the war was not clear for both parts. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah achieved their plans for success. Israel could not defeat Hezbollah and Hezbollah showed to the world that it had capacity to shoot Israel (Kalb, Saivetz, 2007:27-29) Also Israel's Army plan to rescue their kidnapped soldiers was unsuccessful (Isracast, 17.01.2007). Hezbollah declared itself as the victor of the war because of Hezbollah resisted powerful Israel and did not be defeated. The war increased Hezbollah's popularity in the region and Arab world. However, the effects of the war to Lebanese were hard. Lebanon lost 1191 civilians and 4410 injured in the war (Human Rights Council Report for the war, 23.11.2006). Almost a million people became homeless. Economic damages of the war to Lebanon were valued as 12 billion dollars (International Crisis Group, Middle East Report №59, 01.11.2006).

During the war, Turkey supported Lebanon and mentioned that stability had to be established in Lebanon. Turkey sent humanitarian aids as 20 million dollars to Lebanon in the war (Atlioglu, 2009). In August Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited Lebanon and Israel to talk about to participate in Peace Keeping Forces in Lebanon after the war. On 5th September 2006, GNAT accepted the decision to send army to Lebanon and 261 Turkish soldiers had been sent to Lebanon in October 2006 (Milliyet, 08.07.2015). Generally Turkey stayed distant to Lebanon because of Lebanese policy toward Turkey. Turkey faced with two biggest problems from Lebanon. First happened in 2000; Lebanon Parliament accepted resolution about so called Armenian Genocide by force of Armenian minority in Lebanon (Horizon, 11.04.2017). Second problem by Lebanon was in 2007. Lebanon signed an agreement on defining Exclusive Economic Zone with Greek part of Cyprus (Meier, 2013). The agreement ignored Turkish part of Cyprus and went to cooperation on

extract energy resources in Mediterranean Sea with Greek part of Cyprus (Meier, 2013).

For Turkey applying any policy toward Lebanon would be never achieve to any success. Lebanon is a country that policy is made on slippery ground and has had potential for making crisis easily because of its having many sectarian differences. Lebanon locates in one of the most important strategic location in the region, in the terms of setting balance of policy for the region, so it serves to crisis based on conflicts and instability. External intervention toward internal policy of Lebanon is a part of its real politics. Western powers such as the US, Great Britain and France, and regional powers such as Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel would always play important role in the Lebanese politics. Turkey might compete with some of these powers and might cooperate with others of these powers. It is clear that Turkey might more compete with France and might more cooperate with Syria and Iran. Any Lebanese policy without Syria and Iran would not be success. Turkey would never apply a policy toward Lebanon with ignoring Iran and Syria. Turkey had to take attention to Armenian minorities in Lebanon. Any coalition group led by Hezbollah would go the parliament with Armenian Tashnag Party. In election in 2009, Tashnag Party gained 2 seats in the Lebanese Parliament and participated in domestic policy of Lebanon (Sanjian, 2009). For the future, Tasnag Party may cause for Lebanon to break relations with Turkey. Hezbollah's near future politics and military position have to be read carefully. Hezbollah plays more active role in domestic policy field in Lebanon and its military activities also have been proven with struggle against Israel in the war of 2006. Hezbollah's activity in Syrian civil war welcomed negatively from Sunni Muslims of Lebanon. For Sunni Muslims, Hezbollah have had right to use its weapon only against Israel not against to Sunni Muslims in Syria. This situation caused for seen of Hezbollah as a threat by Lebanese Sunni Muslims and Christian society in Lebanon

4.4 Arab Spring and reactions of Turkey and Israel

The world understanding of dictators never be advanced. Ruling of states by strong men for life have been formed as a rule in Arab World for almost half of century. On 6th October 1981, the assassination of Egypt president Anwar Sadat was happened. Egypt lost the dictator who had ruled the country for a decade and then met with the

next dictator who would conquer the power for three decades. Mubarak came to the power accidentally and brilliantly survived as the longest accidental ruler of Egypt, it was an accident of the history (Slakman, New York Times, 11.02.2011). For one thing, Sadat appointed him as Vice President in 1975 (Taha, Daily News Egypt, 11.02.2013). However, there were other eligible candidates for the position and probably more disserving than Mubarak, but it was the choice of Sadat himself. A candidate had been usually selected from military in Arabs. Mubarak had so many experiences in military; he was appointed as chief the commander of the Egyptian Air Forces during Yom Kippur war in 1973 by President Anwar Sadat (Times of Israel, 18.09.2013). Muammar Gaddafi of Libya had graduated from military academy in 1965 and seized control of the government in a military coup that deposed King Idris (New York Times, 26.05.1983). Hafez al-Assad of Syria also was commander of the Air Forces and former Minister of Defense in Syria (New York Times, 11.06.200). These people had known well the power and had capability to use the weapons well and had potential to seize power with using the military power. When they were in junior offices, there were waiting for little opportunity for seizing the power. By the time, the principle of the dictators was being patient before becoming dictator. Saddam Hussein was so patient, while he organized a meeting and stated that he took the control of the power, he had been loyal to his predecessors. Gaddafi came to the power with military conspiracy. Gaddafi, when was serving in Libya's Army in 1969, concerted with some General Staffs and took the supports of them for revolution (Cildir, 2016:56-57) . Saddam was working hard for his political party and realized military coup against military regime and conquered the power in Iraq (CNN News Agency, 27.04.2017). In the case of Abdul Nasser had been plotting for a long time, Anwar Sadat had spied for Germans (Sheehan, New York Times, 18.07.1971). Briefly, they involved to the dark side of the world but they were not stupid. They played the game very carefully; waited, waited and waited. They had patience. They were not deeply intellectuals. This is one common problem for all dictators. Most of them did not have university degree. Arab Spring had started with Mohammad Bouzzazi set himself on fire on 18th December 2010 in Tunisia (Addala, The Telegraph, 17.12.2015). It was not supposed that any suicide may cause great changes in the region. The term Arab Spring was inspired from Prague Spring which there was a revolution in Czechoslovakia against Soviet Union in 1968 (Masaad, Aljazeera, 29.08.2012). It started the domino effect

and caused biggest changes in Egypt, Libya, Syria and smaller changes in Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon and Algeria and still continues.




Figure 4.4: Arab Spring Map

(<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-8>)

When protests had begun in Tunisia, President Ben Ali fled and temporary government took the control. First elections after Arab Spring was done in October 2011 and Islamist Ennahda Party had won majority seats in parliament (BBC, 27.10.2011). After assassination of opposition leader in February, a political crisis emerged again and Nahda government forced to resign (Frosini, Biagi, 2015:24-28). In 2014 the political crisis resolved and parliament approved constitution. As a result, Centric and Secular Nida Tounes party had won the elections; its leader Beji Caid Essebsi has been elected as president of Tunisia (Gall, New York Times, 27.10.2014). Uprisings against Qaddafi in Libya began in February 2011. NATO had imposed no-fly zone in Libya and destroyed Qaddafi's Air Forces in March (Traynor, Watt, The Guardian, 25.03.2011). Rebels had captured Tripoli and killed leader of Libya Qaddafi in October (Gatehouse, BBC, 31.10.2011). In first democratic elections after death of Qaddafi, independents had won majority in National Congress and control of Libya was given to General National Congress in Libya (Pack, Pack, Aljazeera, 06.07.2012). However, the chaos had not been over. During that term the US Ambassador John Christopher Stevens was killed by Islamist militants on September 2012, in Benghazi, Libya (BBC, 12.09.2012). From that date Islamist activists was spread to all Libya. They had declared occupy of Derna and ruled under Islamist rule in 2013 January (Moore, Newsweek, 04.08.2016). In 2014, General National Congress was forced to call off and new General Elections were set but only 18 percent of population had participated in voting (Aljazeera, 26.06.2014). The House of Representative which centered in

Tobruk was elected and recognized as government of Libya by international organizations but the results was rejected by Supreme Court of Libya as illegal and unconstitutional (Eljarh, 2014). In May 2014, Second Civilian War in Libya has been begun and still continues. Islamist Militants took control over Tripoli and port city of Sirte which was home town of Qaddafi (Al Arabia, 21.12.2016). In December 2015, the Political Agreement was signed between parts and the powers shared into three within Libya as three governments into one country; Presidential Council, Government of National Accord and House of Representatives (Reuters, 17.12.2015). Political powers have been shared between opponent governments in Tripoli and Tobruk.

Uprisings in Egypt against Mubarak started at the same dates with previous ones. After brutal crackdown in Tahrir Square, Mubarak had turned over the power to military council. In March 2011, referendum it was showed strong support to new parliamentary and presidential elections. Democratic Alliance led by Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won the Parliamentary elections in November 2011. In June 2012, Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Mohammad Morsi was elected as the president of Egypt in the first democratic presidential elections after Mubarak down (Piconne, Alinikoff, 2012). After Morsi's radical decisions, he was overthrown by military coup and the constitutional court of Egypt banned Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi was arrested with his supporters. In 2014 new constitution was agreed on by referendum and General Sisi became new president of new Egypt. At the end of the 2016 pro – Sisi independents won the majority in parliamentary elections.

Protests had begun and 72 people were killed by security forces in Syria on March 2011. Assad regime started to bomb Homs. Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as branch of Al-Qaida in Syria, was founded in 2012 (Lister, 2016:8-22). Rebels had attempted to take Aleppo, Syria's second city and Aleppo was divided. Government Forces bombed rebels and forced population to exodus. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was founded and captured Raqqa (Anjarini, Al-Monitor, 01.11.2013). ISIS had consolidated territory between Syria and Iraq and abolished former border. US-led coalition forces intervened to Syria and fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2015. Government forces lost most of Idlib province in 2015 (Khodr, Aljazeera, 15.05.2016). Russia launched airstrikes against ISIS in Homs and Raqqa (Sanchez, The Telegraph, 15.05.2016). Also British forces joined air strikes against ISIS at the

end of 2015. Today in Syria, regime forces, ISIS, coalition forces, Kurdish forces, Turkish and etc groups are fighting.

Uprisings in Yemen had begun in January 2011. Protestors demanded re-election for presidency but President Ali Abdullah Saleh rejected it. Regime forces had killed 45 protestors in Sana'a, the capital city. Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) occupied most of Abyan province. At the end of the year President Saleh left country and ceded power to his deputy Mansour Hadi (Ghobari, Reuters, 22.01.2012). New presidential election was held with single candidate Mansour Hadi. For showing the objection to the results of election, AQAP attacked to Presidential Palace and killed over 30 civilians. Rise of oil price had provoked anti-government demonstrations. As a result, President Hadi sacked the cabinet. In 2014 Houthi rebels were emerged led by Zaydi Houthi forces. Saudi Arabia– led coalition started to bomb Houthi controlled territories in 2015. On 28 July, 2016 former president Saleh and the Houthi rebels declared that they formed an alliance to fight against Saudi – Arabia led military coalition (Fox News, 28.07.2016).

One of the most important points during Arab Spring was situation in Jordan. Uprising and revolutions had crossed away Jordan. There are wars almost in all neighbours of Jordan, but Jordan has kept as a state of stability. King II Abdullah has ruled Jordan since 1999. Neither uprising nor attempts for revolution had occurred for knock down the King. For the reason of it the history of Jordan should be reviewed.

Jordan was designed as a buffer country between UK and France in 1921 by UK (Robins, 2004:142). Churchill had gave Abdullah jurisdiction over Jordan as a present because of his leadership in uprisings against Ottoman. After the First World War, brother in law of Abdullah, Faisal had started the bilateral connections with Zionist leader C. Weizmann and it was the first attempt for starting of relations with Jewish and Hashemite family (Goldfoot, Jewish Bubba, 28.12.2014). The period between 1917 and 1948 was a period that many severe conflicts between Arabs and Jewish were occurred in Palestine. In that time, Amir Abdullah, had tried to prevent the spread of conflict to his country border and kept contact with UK and Israel. In 1947, before the voting of the plan in UN on separation on Palestine between Arabs and Jewish people, Amir Abdullah and Golda Meir met in Amman to talk about the plan of division of Palestine (Horowitz, The Times of Israel, 03.03.2017). Abdullah mentioned that he might recognize Israel with the condition of annexation of

Palestine lands to Jordan. The meeting ended without any deal but opened new relation page for Jordan and Israel. During first Arab – Israel war after the establishment of Israel State, King Abdullah stayed neutral and did not joined to the ‘holy war’ with Arabs. After the war, new independent state in the Middle East, Israel, declared its victory over Arabs and had proved its existence in the region. The first aim of King Abdullah was live and long-life of his Kingdom. He adopted the single way for achieve the aim was the close cooperation with Israel. King Abdullah saw Israel as an actor in the Middle East within the scope in equation of cooperation – compete. It was seen as a betrayal by other Arabs. King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian in Jerusalem in 1951 at the entrance of El Aqsa Mosque (The Guardian, 21.07.1951). The reason of the assassination was the policy of Abdullah toward Israel (Aljazeera, 20.02.2008). Five days earlier, Lebanese former Prime Minister Riad al Solh was assassinated in Amman (Kechician, Solh, Gulf News of Lebanon, 11.05.2016). He was there to discuss the possibilities of Lebanon and Jordan peace with Israel (Aljazeera, 20.02.2008). The assassination of King Abdullah was the first great political assassination in the center of Jerusalem after the establishment of Israel. The critical assassinations in the Middle East followed by King Faisal bin Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 1975, Muhammad Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981 and Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. The reasons of all assassinations were based on their Jerusalem Policy (Kilic, Yeni Akit, 01.03.2017). These assassinations were caused to changes in the policies of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel toward Palestine.

Turkey affected from the revolutions because of its geographical location and historical background. The revolutions in the Middle East caused to the term of “Turkish Model” come into the question for Arab States with new governments (Kirisci, 2013). There was one of the most important questions; could the new Islamic rooted governments rule their countries without detriment to the pro-Western policy? Morsi in Egypt lost his chance for ruling the country. For other leaders the answer of the question will have been answered by the time and flow of the history. Turkey’s claim for being regional / global power has been damaged with the Arab Spring. Syria has been changed to one of the most important struggle place for new global geopolitics competition with entering non-regional powers such as the US, Iran and Russia to Syria. At that moment, although Turkey has had geographical advantages, stayed far away for being single determinative actor in the region. Even

Turkey strained relations with Iran and Russia over Syria issue. The regional power struggle with multi-player means that to narrow the applying policy toward the region in terms of Turkey. As normally Turkey has supported dissident groups in the countries which have faced with Arab Spring. The policy of supporting rebels might be return to Turkey as leader for the region. In reality Turkey would be pleased on more democratic Middle East (Oguzlu, 2001:39). Throughout the process Turkey have to take attention in the relations with Russia, Iran and Syria despite of the US and the EU. Otherwise any conflicts with these powers might be cause for more complicated region. Also Turkey knows well that its oil and gas needs might be supplied from the more peaceful and secured markets.

Arab Spring has positive side like as changing the regimes based on dictatorships and forming new regimes by democratic elections, but also during this process these positives might be changed to most dangerous tools by pressure of outside powers. Because in the new regime changed countries, a new civil war based on sects during form of new government process today's Syria, may be occurred. That's why, new regime leader has to be pleased all parts of his country to prevent any possible conflict or civil war. Sharing, controlling and security of transports of oil reserves are so important for the US and European powers as much as oil supplied countries. To control Arab Spring by the US and European powers is important to strengthen the position against Russia, Iran and China, to guarantee the security of supplying energy resources and to provide the security for Israel in the region. At the end of the process, the region with democratic governance and governor, preferring democracy and human rights in the region, wishing peace despite of war, realizing share of knowledge and technology despite of weapon trade, acceleration of social-economic development in the region would not be favor of Israel. In this situation, Middle East is meant for Israel, a region which cannot controlled as Israel wishes (Benn, 2011:54).

New peace talks between Turkey and Israel was so important at the term of changed balances in Syria. On 22nd March 2013 Benjamin Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister to accept the demands of Turkey for Mavi Marmara crisis by the force of the US President Barack Obama (Abdulfettah, Aljazeera, 19.04.2013). The date was not coincidence. The US had wished two strategic partners of the US, Israel and Turkey, had to be at the same side against Iran-Russia-China bloc toward the Middle East. The US and Israel was worrying about coming of radical Islamist regimes in

the Arab region. The attack to US embassy in Egypt and Libya and spread out of Al-Qaida in Tunis, Libya and Yemen forced the US to check the balances and accounts in the region. The maintaining of balance without Turkey in the region had been impossible. Israel was unsuccessful to make amends of strategic advantages from Turkey with Greece. Additionally, Israel has been worrying about any possible partnership between Turkey and Iran. Israel sees democratization process of Arab States as a threat. At that time Israel would lose the claim of being “single” democratic country in the region. Interests on energy reserves in Mediterranean Sea had played important role for Israel-Turkey to a new cooperation. According to Israeli politicians, energy reserves in the sea which many powers compete for may prepare useful cooperation occasion for Turkey and Israel. Israel and Turkey might deal on natural gas resources in Mediterranean Sea to supply to Europe via Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, 02.05.2017). This would be cheaper with compare any dealing with Cyprus and Greek for transportation. Another worrying issue for Israel is in new Islamist governments in Arab states may trigger any possible intifada in Palestine.

The results of Arab Spring for the region are clear. The storm has over passed from Gulf region and Arab States. Bahrain had applied harsh methods against activists. Qatar increased the wages of workers in public sectors at the beginning of revolutions. There is serious deport customs in Gulf Kingdoms. Only migrants have worked in low-value waged works. If any objection or expostulation has occurred, they would be deported to their countries immediately. Arab Spring was not well for the US as expected at the beginning. The US aimed a region with its strong partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The election of Mohammad Morsi and its overthrown by army was not be expected. The US likes elections but not liked the results of elections in Egypt which resulted with victory of Muslim Brotherhoods led by Morsi. The US does not like coups but if any military governments have agreed on cooperation with Israel it would be acceptable. The US is still the super power but could not dictate the developments in the Middle East as freely and the US has not been single in this unsuccessful policy. Also Turkey could not choose the winning side in Egypt and has had serious problems with rebels in Syria. The armed protests against to regime in Syria have become to the sectarian civil war, it has been so staggering thing to all parts. In some countries there are bloody Sunni – Shiite conflicts. Shiite Iran, Sunni Turkey and Wahabi Salafi Saudi Arabia have been fighting at the war in Syria. The conflict between Shiite and Sunni are in its highest

point in Iraq. Nobody has thought that Iran might gain advantages from the Arab Spring. The applied economic embargos on Iran had distorted its waist. However, now it's impossible taking any decision without Iran in Syria. The Ruhani government in Iran has taken negotiation on nuclear program with strongest countries. The reality is that, it is hard to imagine the victor or loser parts in the Middle East after Arab Spring. Muslim Brotherhood had been seen as a victor at the beginning but now the party was banned and members of the part are in jail, many of them were executed by new Sisi's regime. It affected negatively to Qatar because Qatar had supported Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The only victor might be Kurds in Iraq. They used successfully the chaos ambient in Iraq and oil-rich North Iraq Kurdish Governance has applying independent economic policy with its strongest neighbor Turkey and has sent military support to Syria as independently. They have their own flag, military forces and anthem. They are so near for an independent country. The drawn Middle East map by Great Britain and France at the end of First World War almost failed. For next five years it is hard to see the same Iraq and Syria as today.

5. CONCLUSION

The dynamic relations between greater actors from outside of the region and regional balances form the intersection area of the relations between global factors and regional conjuncture. UK's colonial background of Iraq, France historic influence over Syria, Germany's policy toward the Middle East based on the Berlin – Bagdad railway project, Russian's Middle East facts of Eurasian strategy and the most important the US's hegemonic policy toward the Middle East are important parameters of Turkey in regional policy. Turkey's neutral policy which had started with Iran – Iraq war changed to playing active role in the region within the scope of Northern Iraq inventions, conflicts with Syria and strategic partnership with Israel. Now it's not the time of applying independent regional policy, it is the time that interregional interaction strategies which affected and determined each other have been taken over.

After the establishment of Israel, the main policies for the west toward the Middle East was focused on guarantee of Israel's security and provide the security of Gulf oil reserves. In terms of this policy the US will have stand against to all threats for Israel in the region. Israel needs non-Arab but Muslim partners in the region. There are two other non-Arab states in the region; Iran and Turkey but three non-Arab nations; Turkish, Persian and Kurdish. As state Turkey is single potential non-Arab partner. Turkey is single NATO member in the region and locates in strategic location. It is neighbor with Iran, Iraq and Syria which are most hated states by Israel. For struggle with these enemies, Israel needs Turkey's partnership. In terms of Turkey, Israel is also important and needs the partnership of Israel. Confidence to Arabs is not strong. The Arabs have never been in a unity in the region from the end of Second World War till today. Arabs always see themselves as potential antagonists. They have common enemies; Israel and Iran but never stand against them as unity ally, so for Turkey, making policy toward the Middle East with trust to

only Arabs would not wrong. Turkey needs an ally to balance Arabs in the region. Also some Arabs balancing Turkey with Turkey's rivals such as Syria had made a partnership with Greece and Kurdish groups like in Iraq.

Until 1960s, Turkey had not had evident Middle East policy. From the collapse of Ottoman Empire till the end of Second World War, Turkey's foreign policy mainly were based on the agreements which define borderlines of the Republic of Turkey. At the end of 1940s, when Israel established, Turkey recognized Israel and started close political relations with this new state. However, as a result of recognition Israel by Turkey, the relations with Arab States were broken. After the Cyprus issue occurred, Turkey had stayed alone in the United Nations. It was forced Turkey, to define evident policy toward the Middle East. After 1960s, Turkey's target for the partnership in foreign policy shifted toward Arab States. In 1963, Turkey had made relations with Arab States; in 1970s Turkey had taken warm look to Union of Islam and attended to Rabat Summit of Arab League in 1974. Turkey and Arab States had developed economic relations in the years 1974-1990. In 1990s, Turkey followed pro-western policy during Gulf War. The aids from Iraq and Syria to PKK, Syria's strategic relations with Greece, water crisis between Turkey, Syria and Iraq were resulted that Turkey had become distant with Arab States. The situation has been changed during JDP period. The economic relations with Arab States had developed to its highest point in the history. The same result was same with Israel. The economic relations between Israel and Turkey were lived its golden era during JDP period despite of all political crisis.

The last Qatar crisis in the Middle East was caused to new establishment of balance of powers in the region. Amir of Qatar had criticized the increased tension in the relations between Iran and Gulf states and he rejected the President Trump's invitation to White House for resolving the problems (The Reuters, 08.06.2017). Also he stated to be more understanding toward Hamas and Hezbollah is more important. The US, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates commented supports of Qatar to Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood as an aid to terror. Isolation policy toward Qatar had reminded Israel which had been isolated by region states since its establishment. Qatar crisis is concerning Israel in terms of many issues. Firstly, Israel has formed a coalition against Iran in the region. The coalition contains the countries

which had wished to exterminate Israel in 1948. The coalition led by Israel against Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas had started with Egypt. Then it spread to Gulf region and Saudi Arabia cause of threat from Iran. Arab States was forced to make close relations with Israel had organized by the US against threats toward Israel. During Arab Spring period, the term of 'common enemy Israel', which associate Arabs, had threw to the second plan. The Arabs in the region are busy with threats of Iran and Qatar. The pressure over Israel has decreased. However, Israel is aware dangers of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah and ISIS in Golan Heights and Sinai. At that situation Qatar opened its doors for Hamas leader. In 2012, Amir of Qatar visited Palestine and provided million dollars to Hamas. Qatar has played a precious mediator role in the region between Hamas and Israel. Israel and Qatar have worked closer on Gaza conflict. Isolation of Qatar might be dangerous for the region. In the Sunni bloc, which had been created against Iran in the region, isolated Qatar would shift to the Iran side. This is also same for Hamas. If Hamas isolate in the region, a serious bloody war might occur between Israel and Hamas or Hamas would shift to Shiite bloc led by Iran in the region. Although, wars and instabilities in around, Israel lives most powerful period in the history. The most interesting point all these developments happened in 50th anniversary of Six Days War 1967.

In the Middle East all political situation has been formed on balancing strategy. Israel has been balanced by Turkey with cooperation with Arabs and Iran. As an answer for this policy, Israel has made partnership with Greece and Greek part of Cyprus and also has had some hidden cooperation with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria. Turkey uses Israel against Arabs and Israel needs Turkey against Arabs. Arabs always demanded from Turkey to break relations with Israel. Turkey needs Arabs' economic partnership but also has to protect its interests toward the region. Arabs always have had conflicts with each other. Saudi Arabia – Yemen, Iraq – Kuwait, Iraq – Saudi Arabia, Syria – Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia – Egypt, Egypt – Iraq and etc. these all are some the conflicted couples among Arabs in the region, so in term of Turkey, trusting Arabs would not benefit for Turkey. In the region, Israel never wishes powerful and greater Turkey or Iran. There is a clear subject that in the terms of Arabs being unite is impossible against Israel. It has been proved by historic aspects. Amongst Arabs, Iraq and Syria are seen as more serious enemy than other Arab states for Israel. For that reason, during the Iran – Iraq War, Israel had

supported Iran against Iraq. In this situation being partner with Iran against Iraq is more beneficial than being enemy with Iran during the war. The phrase of Chanakya⁷ has got more valuable: *“There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self interest. This is a bitter Truth”* (Siddiqui, 2010:40).

Turkey – Israel relations have not affected as same level for all Arabs. The most affected states were Iraq and Syria. These countries have direct frontier with Turkey and Kurdish based terror groups’ camps locate in these countries. Saddam was one of the biggest threats for Israel. Syria has been at the war with Israel in Golan Heights. For Israel, partnership with Turkey would give effective politic results against Syria and Iraq. For Turkey, in the struggle with Iraq and Syria in the terms of terrorism, strategic partnership with Israel has increased its importance. For Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, the relation between Israel and Turkey have not welcomed aggressively like Iraq and Syria. It is impossible to forget US factor in the region. The US is the one of the most important strategic and economic partner with Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. For the US one of the most important aims in the region is to secure supplying of Gulf energy resources to the West markets. Turkey is the single NATO member in the region. The main break between Turkey and Arabs such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt emerged with arresting members of Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Egypt. During the election in Egypt after revolution, Turkey government had supported Morsi and condemned the decision of arresting Morsi and prevention of Muslim Brotherhood’s activities. After coup of Sisi in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Egypt declared Muslim Brotherhood organization as a terror organization. So two greatest supporter of Muslim Brotherhood organization in the region, Qatar and Turkey, have become as a target. Declaration of Islamist Muslim Brotherhood Organization as a terror organization is the favor of Israel so Israel has stayed at the same side with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The most interested thing for Saudi Arabia and Egypt is not the strategic partnership of Turkey and Israel, but Turkey’s supports of Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and relations with Iran. Arabs also never want powerful Turkey which might play important key role in policy making of the region. As a result, the relations between Israel and Turkey and also Arab States and Turkey have affected reciprocal from the developments of regional. That’s why the

⁷ A famous Indian philosopher, jurist, economist and royal advisor. Known as founder of the Maurya Empire. Had lived 4th BCE.

lines of the relations between Turkey – Israel and Turkey – Arab States are wavy. It could be affected positively/negatively based on the current political situation in the region between the powers; Turkey, Israel and Arab States (Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq).

Breaking off the relations with Israel would be much more cost for Turkey. Turkey might lose benefit of its partnerships with Israel and might harm its position in the United States. The Jewish lobby's active role in Washington might be benefit for Turkey in terms of counterbalance to Armenian and Greek lobbies. In the region being enemy with Israel will not benefit to that state(s). Turkey needs Israel in economic, politic and military levels. For the region states, partnership with Israel is important for being effective policy maker in the region and support of any adversaries of Israel in the region would be resulted negatively for the future. Iraq and Syria examples are so important proofs of this. Turkey despite of Arabs and Arabs despite of their historical aspects need close or open partnership with Israel in the region for future.

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