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**TERRITORIAL CONFLICT: CASE STUDY OF CAMEROON AND
NIGERIA OVER THE BAKASSI PENINSULA**

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IBUE NANJE CLARIS





To my parents

FOREWORD

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	: Abyei Boundary Commission
AU	: African Union
BFF	: Bakassi Freedom fighters
CEMAC	: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CNMC	: Cameroon Nigeria Mix Commission
EEBC	: Ethiopia and Eritrean Boundary Commission
ECOMOG	: Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
EPZ	: Export Processing Zone
FDS	: Federal Director of Survey
GGC	: Gulf of Guinea Commission
GOS	: Government of Sudan
HOA	: Horn of Africa
HRDG	: Human Rights Defense Group
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
ICR	: International Conflict resolution
IGAD	: International Governmental Organization for Development
NM	: Nautical Miles
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
PCIJ	: Permanent Court of International Justice
SCNC	: Southern Cameroon National Council
SPLM	: Sudan People Liberation Movement
TPLF	: Tigrayan People Liberation Front
UN	: United Nations
WWI	: World War One
WWII	: World War 2

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YASAL ÇATIŞMA: BAKASSI YARIMADASI ÜZERİNDEKİ KAMEREN VE NİJERYA'NIN ÖRNEK ÇALIŞMASI

ÖZET

Afrika bağlamında bölgesel çatışma tekrar eden bir durumdur. Bu çatışmaların tarihi Afrika kıtasının neredeyse her köşesine ulaştı. Nijerya ve Kamerun arasındaki Bakassi yarımadasında yaşanan anlaşmazlık, kıtadaki diğer vakalarla ilişkilidir. Bu tür anlaşmazlıkların ortak bir olgusu olarak, konular kolayca uzun savaflara dönüştürülür. Bununla birlikte, Bakassi davasında, bu devletlerin sayısız agresif çatışmalara bakılmaksızın savaşı önlediği için anlaşmazlığın değerlendirilmesi gerekiyor. Afrika'daki bölgesel çatışmalar genellikle kıtaların sömürge tarihi nedeniyle kalıtsaldır. Bakassi, Afrika'da birçok farklı toprak çatışması vakası gibi durumun benzer kaynaklı olduğunu gösteriyor. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışma, devletler arasındaki bölgesel uyuşmazlıkların tipik durumlar olduğu gözlemleniyor. Bu çalışmada, Bakassi anlaşmazlığını Afrika'daki diğer toprak anlaşmazlığı vakalarından farklı kılan şeyleri göreceğiz.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Konuşma Anlaşmazlık, Sınırlar, Çatışma Çözümü, Diplomasi, Kolonicilik,*

TERRITORIAL CONFLICT: CASE STUDY OF CAMEROON AND NIGERIA OVER THE BAKASSI PENINSULA

ABSTRACT

Territorial conflict within the context of Africa is a re-occurring situation. The history of these conflicts has struck almost every corner of the African continent. In the case of the Bakassi peninsula between Cameroon and Nigeria, it seem relative to other cases within the continent. As a common phenomenon of these kinds of dispute, the issues are easilly transformed to long wars. However, in the case of Bakassi, it is necessary to appraise the dispute in view of its perculiariaty as these states avoided war regarless of the numerous aggressive confrontations. Territorial conflicts in Africa generally are hereditary in nature due to the continents colonial history. The case of Bakassi like many different cases of territorial conflict in Africa comes from a similar position. Notwithstanding, this study has its variations to typical cases of territorial disputes between states. In this study we will get to see just what makes the Bakassi dispute perculiar from other cases of territorial disputes in Africa.

Keywords: *Territoial Dispute, Boundaries, Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Colonialism.*

1 INTRODUCTION

Territorial conflicts can be framed as a categorical expression of differences between states over the position of their common borders or colonial borders or the ownership of territories. This could still be one country questioning the legitimacy of other countries rights to exercise control or sovereignty on some of its homeland or part of the territory. Territorial conflict could emerge from varied perspective, it could be in a case where one government of a state does not agree to the stipulations of where the boundary of its border lies with another state meanwhile the other state takes the boundary line as its legitimate border with the former state based on ancient documents signed. On another note in cases where there are no historical documents or any agreement previewing where the borderline is, so both bordering states suggest areas of definition of where they think the boundary is or be drawn.

To continue in another preview, territorial conflicts could emanate from cases where this is a generally in approximate demarcations of former border agreements and as such when the challenging state and target states try to re-delimit their border, the new terms arrived at are not specified well enough to eliminate conflicting claims. For instance, in the Persian Gulf, most of the disputes involving Saudi Arabia and its neighbors are mostly linked to the fact that historical boundary documents of border locations were not vivid enough. In addition, where there is no antecedent agreement to serve as a reference point of the boundary line; however, the conflicting states present their separate claims of where the border should be to conditions in their favor. Notwithstanding in all of this cases from where a border dispute could stem from, none of the states involve in the allegations and claims of the boundary puts to question the existence of a border but simply the exact location of the border line. Following the end of the Second World War (WWII), there has been a surge in territorial disputes and they have been very challenging.

According to Huth as Choi presents 129 territorial disputes identified, 59 of these were because of these forms of disagreements highlighted above. Most of these conflicts are ongoing and remain unsettled over 280 of these forms of states disputes identified from 1946-1988 with territorial quarrels being the direct cause. This played a major role in the disintegration in inter states relationship and in over the 20 wars fought from the post WWII era, fourteen of these wars fought were because of territorial disputes Huth(1996,P. 21). However, territorial disputes could be intra state or Inter states, Intra state territorial disputes are those territorial contestations that take place within the confines of a territory. This could be in any form domestic regions within the same state could lay contested claims over a piece of territory, or group seeking autonomy in terms of its self-management and resources within the same territorial space. For example, in the terms of Bagdad and Erbil which Capital of Kurdistan region in Iraq. Even though intra-state territorial disputes are equally as important, my focus here is on interstate territorial dispute.

In their turn, Interstate territorial dispute are classified in two categories, disputes over the border, piece of land territory or dispute over the entire state. In the latter category, dispute over the entire state is one where there is a disagreement on the possession/control of territory entirely. In these cases, one state or government does not identify another as a sovereign entity and alleges it is a part of it. In most of these cases, it usually leads to war for instance Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is an example to this category. Iraq claimed Kuwait was a part of it, nonetheless the invasion was illegal and Kuwait with the help of her allies (USA) fought back and compelled Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In addition, Morocco refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Mauritania and proceeded to claim the entire territory in 1960.

In the former category of dispute over border on disagreements over part/piece of territory, this is usually a very common area of territorial disputes in international relations. It could also be in situations where one state refuses to recognize the sovereignty of another state over some parts of its territory. Examples within this category in the first segment are the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Case of Libya and Chad over the Aouzou strip and Our point of focus in this work as well Cameroon-Nigeria over the Bakassi

peninsula. In the second segment, one government does not admit the sovereignty of another state over portions of territory within the other is territorial space.

However, the government does push to make any irredentist claims over that portion of the territory within another state. Nonetheless, it may support separatist movement within the other states that claim that part of the territory should become autonomous. An example to support this is Pakistan whom since gaining independence in 1948, has disputed with Afghanistan over the areas inhabited by the people of the Pathan tribe. This has led the Afghan government to call for the creation of an independent Pakhtoonistan state. Like i said above in this category, these contending states do not reject the existence of a boundary between them but contest on the limit of it. These are therefore conventional border disputes in the view that it is a disagreement between two states, which is classical situations of delimitation. The terms delimitation and demarcation should be paid attention, as they may seem very similar, they both in territorial dispute terms will signify different aspect therefore, i will give detailed explanation of both terms below when looking at the different concepts. To continue, before going in to the conflict itself it would be important to look at certain aspects of peculiarity within territorial conflicts. When states contest over a territory, there are usually two aspects as to why they can dispute over the territory. These are the tangible and intangible perceptions.

Tangible are the material aspects behind why they state involve have a rivalry over a territory. This material features are important to the states as they provide economic and strategic benefits to the states in quest for it in case of it is disposition. Strategic benefits can give states a boost in its security in terms of its position of its military in relation to a neighbor or rival state. A country that has inadequate resources is likely to engage in territorial disputes for this tangible material values. These cases of territorial dispute usually emerge in situations where there is unequal distribution of resources among states in a region. Moreover, it is common for this kind of disputes to lead to war if the territory in dispute has valuable resources like oil, gold and diamonds. Consequently, the significance of this resources to the states power dynamics in relation to other states, there is a high probability that this form of dispute takes

a very long time to settle except in cases where one of the disputing states possess an absolute force advantage over the other.

Furthermore, the value of the territory does not depend solely on strategic and material components yes, they are very salient but intangible perceptive values are also other forms of attraction that states sort after. Intangible values are those components of attachment to a state that are feasible. It could be attachment in the form of sentimental reason, historical reasons or cultural aspects. This seems to be not so strong links comparatively to the tangible values but this equally tends to influence states in territorial disputes. A territory could be regarded as part of another state even beyond geographical proximity due to the identity of the people that occupy the territory. Cultural ties existing between the state and the territory also present a strong linking challenge that can influence territorial dispute. As we will discuss below cultural and ethnic ties being one of the major reasons for territorial disputes among states in Africa, a state may also consider a territory as its sanctuary for its norms. A symbol for its identity and could be a very powerful pull aspect for territorial disputes.

A territory could contain both tangible attractions and intangible values; the kind of dispute that erupts from this situation is actually very difficult to settle. States tend to persist in these disputes with the level of stakes that are involved in it. This makes it almost impossible to resolve and to find mutually acceptable ground for settlement. States are more unlikely to accept sharing of the resources especially oil, more are likely to accept share or joint exploitation of the resources.

In the case study of Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, it will be important to first to give a preview of the location of Bakassi. Bakassi peninsula is located at the Gulf of Guinea located on latitudes $4^{\circ}25'$ and $5^{\circ}10'N$ and longitudes $8^{\circ}20'$ and $9^{\circ}08'E$ some 1000km of Mangrove swamp that extends from the Lake Chad basin. Bordered on the west by the Estuary of the cross river, on the north by the Akpayafe (also known as the Akpalkang) on the East by the Rio-del Rey Estuary and on the south by the Gulf of Guinea half submerged Island mostly occupied by fishermen settlers Annene (1970). With population of more than 250.000 of mostly Ibibio, Ijaw and Efik-speaking

people of Nigeria. It is located between the cross river and the rio-del Rey estuary at the point where the warm flowing east currents meet the north flowing current leading to the formation of foamy breakers and endless thunder ashore. The importance of Bakassi needs not to be further explain, as it is obvious besides being rich in maritime resources; the peninsula contains about 10% of the world's petroleum and gas reserves Oluda (2011). Being as well a strategic military location at the core of the Gulf of Guinea, it also has direct link to two seaports of Calabar and Douala. The figure I below shows the location of our area of our focus.

1.1 Aim of Study

The objective of this study is to search for reasons why the Bakassi dispute did not turn into a war. The Bakassi peninsula dispute is very peculiar in nature comparative to other territorial conflicts. Generally, many African states after independence have witnessed an increase in territorial disputes.

In most cases, these disputes turn to wars accounting for huge casualties and massive displacement of people. In territorial conflict between Sudan and South Sudan alone, more than 2.5 million people were displaced from it. One of the largest refugee camps (Dadaab Dadaab) is in Africa. Even though not linked to a point of focus here but most of this fighting is result from similar perspective.

I will consider the cause of the Bakassi dispute even though it is being dueled upon by other writers, I will equally add my views into the existing motives already advanced. Nevertheless, it will be equally essential for me to talk about the actors involved in this dispute and the different roles the played in either escalating or resolving the Bakassi dispute. In addition, it will be important to look at a comparative approach of the Bakassi dispute with other territorial disputes within Africa,

Many authors have written on the Bakassi dispute however, striking enough, there has been very little attention on the why the dispute between these states did not result to war. This aspect of the conflict will be the point of interest in this study.

1.2 Importance of Study

Although significant amount of research has been conducted in this field, however in this case of territorial conflict, not so much time has been taken to view the subject from this perspective of why the Bakassi dispute did not resort to war. My study will bring give an appraisal why these states were able to resolve this issue without going to war.

My study will add to the already existing data in the case study of the Bakassi dispute and territorial conflicts in general. It will also be contributive in the framework of research and theory.

The research will help to guide diplomats and statesmen/women in ways of identifying areas of influence in trying to bring peace between states involve in territorial rivalry. Identifying features which attention should be given to peacefully resolve territorial disputes between states

1.3 Research Methodology

In this research, I will be using qualitative research methodology. I will be exploring and gathering data of existence works in this subject from interviews books, journals, articles and other online source of available data for analysis.

Since there has been many data written in this field of study, my interest will be at looking almost all the available data in this field of study. As I go through the data, I will explore in depth the different views and perspective of other writers through the available data.

In addition, I will be conducting an empirical analysis of the available data, making interviews and from the analysis, relevant data sampled to support the findings from this thesis. The analysis of the data, which I have gathered, will be done with an iterative interpretation to come to concise findings.

1.4 An Outline of Presentations

Considering the study, I will begin with introducing the concept of territorial conflict with the other forms of territorial dispute in brief. I will proceed to identify the area of focus then locate the area of the dispute (Bakassi). Continue

with a brief history of the Bakassi Conflict from the origin until the settlement from the International court of Justice.

The next chapter will focus on the review of relevant literature from other writers within the topic area. Like I said before and I reiterated again, there has been a lot of research carried out in the subject of the “Bakassi dispute, so as we go through the literature of this topic we will see the different views presented by other writers.

To continue, I analyze and application of relevant theories of international relations to explain the Bakassi dispute. However, before looking at the theoretic view of the topic, I will shed some light on some concepts that re-occur throughout the study. This is to give the reader an understanding of these concepts in their application.

However, as it is a topic in within the framework of international relations, I will look at the actors involve in the dispute. In going through each actor, I will assess the level of their commitment to the dispute and their roles played in the Bakassi conflict. In addition, I will bring in the views of residents in Bakassi on the causes of the issues through interviews I conducted.

In the fifth chapter, I will present reasons to support the argument why the Bakassi dispute did not lead to war. In this area, I will be bringing in data to support my argument for why these states did not turn to war to handle their differences over the Bakassi peninsula.

Finally, in the last chapter I will make conclusions based on the analysis of what I have presented and Recommendations on how to improve resolving this form of states dispute.

1.5 Research Questions

In light to better understand and approach this topic in a different perspective and give contributive views for research with this field, I will poise the following research questions.

In the Bakassi dispute whom are the actors involved in the dispute and what roles did they play in either escalating or de-escalating the Bakassi conflict?

Africa has/is witnessing many territorial conflicts over the continent. In view of the Bakassi dispute, what are the causes of the Bakassi dispute?

As uncommon as it is for territorial disputes with almost every “ingredient” necessary to push the conflicting parties to war, why did the disputing parties in the Bakassi dispute not resort to war?

From the resolution of the Bakassi dispute, what lessons can be drawn in intervention and settlement of territorial disputes between States?



Figure 1.1: Source: Rigzone

Source: (<http://resumestat.com/news-map-and-image-library-rigzone>)



Figure 1.2: Map of Bakassi showing boundaries.

Source: United Nations peacekeeping operations (<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/bakassi.pdf>)

Map of Bakassi showing boundaries

However, before going any further it is important that we consider historical background of the Bakassi dispute.

1.6 Historical Background

Like most territorial conflicts, the Bakassi peninsula conflict did not just occur. Although the Bakassi conflict seems to have just caught the attention of a clear majority recently, the origin of this dispute falls back before there were territories like Nigeria and Cameroon, as we know then and prior to the independence of Nigerian and Cameroon on 1 October and 1 January 1960 respectively. The conflict stems from a long time ago when the Obong¹ of Calabar signed a “Treaty of Protection” with the British (Nowa). In this treaty, the Obong gave his authority to the British to guarantee the British protection of his lands. At the time, there were a lot of inter-tribal battles and the best way he thought to protect his kingdom was to submit to British authority who had better weapons and could defend his lands from imminent threat from other tribes. On the 10 September 1884, the British agreed to extend their protection over the territory under the Jurisdiction of the Obong of Calabar and his chiefs. The Obong assured the British of not engaging in signing other treaties with other European powers in return for British protection. By signing this treaty, he ceded his authority and control of his lands. It should be noted that during this era this kind of ploy in gaining territorial control was very common. It should be marked that contrary to accord between two states these protectorates did not have any precise boundaries.

As the Berlin West African, conference² of 1884-85 laid down modalities for the partition for Africa, Britain and Germany who had colonized and occupied Nigeria and Cameroon respectively at the time, preceded to define their various spheres of influence in Africa. On 15 November 1893, the two powers (Germany & Britain) delimited their spheres of influence in Africa and in what is today referred to as Bakassi. In this agreement, the colonial powers (Britain and France) gave away portions of territory to each other in ways to ease trade and navigation in their respective territories. Without consulting the Obong of Calabar, the British and German had no idea about what part of the land they gave each other belong. They put in place their own boundaries to suit their

¹ Paramount traditional ruler in native Calabar region who control vast area with many subordinate chiefs under his jurisdiction.

² Conference that set pace for the scramble and partition of African among European Nations.

interest not knowing they were destabilizing and dividing people from common ethnic origins and disrupting ancient boundaries. This was later fortified by another agreement between the both powers in 19 March 1906 to cover Britain and German colonies that span from Yola right up to Lake Chad. Because of these agreements and other key declarations, in 1900, 1903 and 1906 that also brought military enforcement saw the creation of Northern, Southern Nigeria (the colony of Lagos included) as British colonies and Kamerun³ as German colony these protectorates became colonies. It should be noted that while these accords the area referred to as Bakassi peninsula had been submitted in German control in Kamerun.

To further clarify according to Nowa, their boundaries and establish clear-cut navigation from Yola to the area between Kamerun, and Nigeria to the sea, they both signed “The Frontier settlement between Nigeria and Kamerun from Yola to the sea” in London on the 11 March 1913 later Nowa (2006). “The regulation of Navigation on the cross river” signed in Obokum April 12, 1913 by Hans Detzner representing Germany and W V Nugent representing Britain. This addressed a concise boundary between Britain and German Kamerun from Yola to the cross river. This agreement was followed with eight maps Chiahemen (2002) Britain was more interested in securing a continuous land access to the Calabar sea port since the Germans already had access to the Douala sea port they relinquished a considerable navigable fragment(portion) of the coast to the British. In return, the British handed over Bakassi and its environs to the Germans who were more interested in in Shrimps and in British assurance of not continuing further expansion eastwards. These agreements were done without consent of the local traditional rulers who governed these regions that bordered the two countries. These actions met no resistance from the local authorities about these arrangements made by their colonial powers without their permission because they posed no threats to the indigenous people. It should be recalled that during this moment Nigeria did not exist as it is now today but as separated territories known as the northern and southern Nigeria it was later in

³ Former appellation to present day Cameroon by the Germans during the German era of colonization.

the early stages of the ninetieth century that these two colonial factions were amalgamated to form the Nigerian protectorate. During this merger of the northern and southern colonies of Nigeria none of the traditional rulers the emirs, Obong or any other local chiefs were consulted about these boundaries. The colonialist to serve their economic interest and facilitate their exploitation of the resources mostly did this.

From 1913, the maps produced by British and German of both Nigeria and Kamerun vividly showed Bakassi in Kamerun when the First World War (WWI) broke out in 1914 became another turning point in the history of this region. Britain and France (Allied powers) attacked German colonies in Africa. After the defeat of Germany and the end of the WWI, Former German colonies were divided between Britain and France as stipulated in the treaty of Versailles⁴ under the supervision of the League of Nations as mandate territories⁵. “Cameroon” was divided into two parts the British and the French mandates. The British however claimed there was inadequate personal to administer their part of Cameroon as a separate colony. They decided to jointly administer Cameroon as an integral part of Nigeria, which was her colony because they shared a common terrestrial and maritime boundary. The area, which is known as Bakassi today, was in the British section of Cameroon. It should be noted that this was not a merger of the colonies but rather limited to an administrative fuse of the colonies. The British and French went further ahead to define their boundaries in Cameroon. They signed the Franco-British accord on the 10 of July 1919. Viscount Milner then Britain secretary of colonies represented the British and Henry Simon who was French minister of colonies represented France. The old boundaries in the 1913 Anglo-German accord were maintained and Bakassi was in the British Cameroons section administered as an integral part of Nigeria Ayim (2008).

To ascertain this, accord another treaty was signed on December 29, 1929 and 31 January 1930 between Paul Marchand commissaire de la repulique

⁴ Treaty which gave territories of former defeated nations of the first world war to the Allied powers

⁵ A system of control of former territories of defeated axis powers of WWI which gave authority to the allied nations

Cameroun⁶ and Sir Graeme Thomson who was the governor of Nigeria Nowa (2006). This declaration was in turn ratified by both parties the British and French in a swap of notes between the French Ambassador in London and the British Foreign minister on January 9, 1931. Again, during this declaration the maps still shows Bakassi peninsula in British Cameroons. The development did not encounter any disapproval or protest by the people of Calabar or their ruler (obong). However, it should be noted that the local indigenes were not concerned about this allocations at the time because it did not affect their day-to-day lifestyle. The communal relation and activities remained uninterrupted. The sense of being a national to either state did not really depend on their local boundaries to the local people at the time. Equally, whoever affected by these decisions of the borderline did not really seem as a challenge at the time as identity

With the outbreak of the Second World War and the imminent failures of the League of Nations to maintain world peace and order, the United Nations organizations took over. The mandate system of the League of Nations was taken over by the United Nations trusteeship system that was approved by the general assembly of the United Nations with the intention of preparing the colonies for immediate independence. The trusteeship system however replaced the mandates system in British and French Cameroons. As a result, Nowa Britain divided her section of Cameroon into two parts the British northern and Southern Cameroons on the 2 of August 1946 Nowa (2006). There was a provisional order in the council of the United Nations that made transitional details of the boundary between these regions now to be administered as separate integral parts of Nigeria (not part of it). The northern section of British Cameroons was attached to Northern Nigeria while the Southern part of British Cameroon, which contained Bakassi, was administered as part of the Eastern region of Nigeria. In 1954, the secretary for colonies in Nigeria issued a declaration defining the boundary of Eastern Nigeria and Southern Cameroons with Bakassi in Southern Cameroons distinctly from Calabar on the maps at the time. It should be noted also that the transition from the League of Nations to the United Nations, the UN ratified former League of Nations treaties and

⁶ Commissioner in French Cameroon

boundary agreements. This was in accordance with the former Anglo-German agreements and Franco- British treaties on the 13 of December 1946 without any antecedent changes to the previous boundaries.

Based on the analysis and survey conducted by the United Nations trusteeship council,⁷ (The UN trusteeship council was created by the UN to supervise the level of developments made by former German colonies under British and French rule). The UN in March 1959, Nowa (2006) asked Britain and France to stipulate their plans for the people living in “Cameroons” and “Cameroun”. On the 1of January 1960 French Cameroun (Cameroun) gained independence from France. Based on the new statute of Cameroun there was need to reiterate the boundary between Cameroun and Cameroon based on the previous colonial agreements. On 1 October 1960 Nigeria gained independence from Britain and there was as well need to restate the boundaries based on the colonial agreements maps were produced to this effect and in 1960 these maps clearly showed Bakassi in Southern Cameroon.

The United Nations Trusteeship council mounted pressure on the British to clarify their wishes for the people of Northern and Southern Cameroon. From Ayim, on the 11th and 12th of February 1961 a plebiscite was organized to this effect for the people to determine where they wish to belong. Two separate plebiscites organized for the people in the North and they chose to become independent by joining the federal republic of Nigeria while the people of Southern Cameroon chose to join the La Republique du Cameroun (Independent French Cameroun) Ayim (2008).

After independence, Cameroon and Nigeria started having differences on the delimitation of the boundary. Many small skirmishes occurred but these confrontations were not violent in nature at the time. However, in May 16, 1981, Cameroon ambushed and killed Nigerian soldiers in three canoes. Nigerian reports on this incident said it took place in Akpa-Yefe (figure II) along the 1913 border while Cameroonian reports said the incident took place right in the Rio-del Rey area on the other side of the peninsula. Nigeria

⁷ A council created by the United Nations to survey the level of progress made by the territories under the United Nations trusteeship program.

demanded an apology from Cameroun but the later was hesitant insisting the incident took place in Rio-del Rey (Figure II). Eventually Cameroun issued an apology to Nigeria and she did not press the case any further as the Shagaria's government did not much care about if the incident took place in Rio-del Rey but that Cameroun should simply apologize for it.

Moreover, conflict took a different turn with hostilities in the early 1990's and the official introduction of a third party and other effort from regional organization (OAU) with the UN and ICJ occupying center stage. Following the clashes of 1994, Cameroon realized bilateral negotiation with Nigeria would not entirely settle the dispute even though it laid fundamental basis on which the ICJ could build its arguments. During the 1995 31st OAU head of states meeting in Addis Ababa, some African heads of state tried to get Paul Biya and Sani Abacha to dialogue since they had confidence in their authority to help resolve the dispute. Unfortunately, this was not successful. Due to this failure, it prompted the OAU to designate Eyadema, president of Togo to pursuit peace talks. On March 29, 1994, Nowa (2006) Cameroon tabled the issues of the Bakassi Peninsula to the ICJ for arbitration. As a result, Cameroun's external minister Ferdinand Leopold Oyono and Nigeria's Foreign Minister Chief Tom Ikimi from February 16-17, 1996 met in Kara, Togo to agree on ending hostilities in the peninsula and that both parties recognize the dispute was in the hands of the ICJ.

Furthermore, with the dispute in the International court of justice, after a series of long deliberations and study of facts, the ICJ in October 10, 2002 come to a resolution and it decided based on colonial archives in favor of Cameroun. The decision of the ICJ on the boundaries of the Bakassi region was ruled on the 1913 Anglo-German agreement. Based on this settlement, Nigeria was supposed to withdraw and transfer its administration in Bakassi peninsula to Cameroun's jurisdiction. Cameroun on her part was supposed to remove its citizens from anywhere close to the new border between both states and the land boundary from the Lake Chad in the North and Bakassi in the South was delimited and signed by both states. To affect this ruling by the ICJ, then UN secretary general Kofi Annan used his good office, requested both heads of states to sign an agreement to commit to pursuit of peaceful transfer. In this

regard, the heads of state signed the Green Tree Accord and as accept to form a mix commission to take charge of the delimitation of the border and transition.



2 CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

From Sango (2002), The rift over the Bakassi peninsula located in the Gulf of Guinea, is a heritage from imperialist, neocolonial and colonial rule in Africa. For colonialist like France, Britain, German, Spain and Portugal, it was all about their respective interest and benefit from the African colonies. With this mindset, they proceeded to partition the continent in the 19th century among themselves to suite their interests respectively. However, during the partition of the continent, they did not take into consideration the people who lived there, their own boundaries, cultural beliefs and identities. As common as it is in Africa due to the partition, most people of similar ethnic groups found themselves separated into different countries. Neither showed expressed any concern nor formulate any initiatives to better the standards of living. Nonetheless, skirmishes over the rightful ownership of the peninsula started as soon it was discovered that the peninsula was sitting around massive reserves of crude oil and gas. With this discovery, it was only then that either state started making allegations and counter allegations over ownership of the territory. Nigeria has its claims link to this peninsula attached to historic and colonial rule while Cameroon with the 1913 Anglo-German treaty.

Ibekwe (2012) recounts origin of the Bakassi dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria emerges from the greed of the colonial powers, which they transferred to the two independent countries. The Bakassi peninsula was not a topic of territorial or economic controversy before or during the colonial era between these two Africans as they lived peacefully and together in a common local environment. He equally aligns the growth in population in both states after independence; the need for exploitation of resources was imminent. The governments of both states are highly dependent on natural resource for sustainable livelihood. With discovery of oil deposits by European multinationals it is from this that, the Bakassi disputes sprout. Due to the higher ration of the population of Africa that is dependent on natural resources, the roots of civil war hinges around this aspect throughout the continent. The

multinational companies who explore these resources have shown they are more interested in their profits and not stabilization or development of the continent.

Jadesola (2012) Information accessible at the Federal Directorate of Survey (FDS) in Lagos displayed Bakassi peninsula as a part of Southern Cameroon, which was no longer a part of Nigeria as of 1961. With this, the minister for foreign affairs premised to forward a diplomatic note to the Embassy of Cameroon in Lagos slated No 570 of 27 1962, along with a map attached to it Jadesola (2012). This was to recognize the fact that the Bakassi peninsula was part of Cameroon. Notwithstanding, by 1965 Cameroon came up with territorial allegations on parts of the borderland of Danare and Boudan, a mixed technical commission was organized to trace the boundary. In the presidential era of Ahidjo in Cameroon, the Nigerian administration under military rule led by General Gowon came into peaceful engagement to establish a boundary commission to look for solutions to the boundary differences.

In allusion to Asobie (1998), international disputes are struggles among or across nation states. The rivalry might be between two or more governments to monopolize the exploitation of resources in disputed territories. This could happen if one state attempts to prevent another from accessing those resources that are necessary for its survival. To him, international disputes are struggles between or among social groups or more precisely social classes, clashing cross state boundaries. These social classes sometimes mobilize and utilize the different structures of the state-coercive and non-coercive to secure their ends. Moreover, these contests are invariably, for the control of some productive forces; materials of labor (land, minerals, raw materials); mechanism of labor, technology, finance capital, and labor power (trained or specialized human resources).

According to Anene (1970), she gives a detailed and interesting recount of the international borders of Nigeria. The work was not only concerned with the foreign acts of partition, but with the impact of colonial boundaries on the peoples in whose history the acts of portion were major intervention. This necessitated a multi-disciplinary inquiry into the ethnicity at the time the boundaries were made, the history of the different peoples, particularly the question of the history of political and economic inter group relationships, the

knowledge of these available to the treaty makers, and the consequences of their decisions. Though he recognized that the boundary zones of Nigeria and her neighbors were potential sources of boundary disputes, it did not put forward dispositions that may afford the best guide to a settlement of a miserable colonial heritage.

In another perspective, Rouke (2007) assessed at length the heritage of colonialism in Africa. He points out that the industrialization of the north was one factor that caused the colonization of the south in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He illustrates that Africa largely controlled by its indigenous peoples in 1878. However, by 1914 become almost totally subjected and divided into colonies by the European powers. The colonial boundaries had little relationship to the territories occupied by the various indigenous people, grouping nations together in some cases and dividing them in others. He further points out that within seven decades, virtually all the colonies recognized their independence, but many of the new countries (such as Rwanda) troubled by the legacy of trying to get two or more states to live peacefully in a single state. Though he did not particularly highlight the Bakassi Peninsula, he however showed the general trend of European colonial imposed boundaries on Africa.

To continue in another angle, Akanmode (2000) printed out that a population of Nigerians occupies the Peninsula that covers a marshy area of about 1000 kilometers' squares, located in Cross River State. He further points out that if a judgment delivered by the ICJ on Thursday October 10, 2002, Akanmode (2000) was anything to go by, the inhabitants of the Peninsula may well be on their way to changing their nationalities from Nigerians the Cameroonians. In addition, his emphasis was on the paradox of the Peninsula. He maintained that the Peninsula is a community that subsists amid plenty-plenty of fish and oil deposits but ravaged by poverty. He further traced the dispute in the oil rich area between Nigeria and Cameroon form 1993, leading to loss of lives from military aggressions that Cameroon instigated. Although, this work deals extensively on the ICJ judgment, it fails to trace the origin of the dispute to colonial rule.

Odje (2002) in his own contribution offers a collection of documents on the creation of boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon. He remarks that the

judgment of ICJ is binding but unenforceable in international law and at best is advisory, that the court has no enforcement powers, lacks the power of compulsion and it can only assume jurisdiction by consent of the parties. He further noted that for Cameroon to enforce the judgment of the ICJ, it must get the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations and that the United Nations does not allow the use of force for the enforcement of international law. He recommended that Nigeria should employ diplomacy and appeal for review of the judgment to protect the interest of the people of Bakassi, Cross Rivers state and Nigeria at large. His discussion of the problems of ICJ in enforcing its judgment and the weakened nature of its structure is of great importance, but he fails to trace ICJ ruling to the nature of its structure. However, his observations only centered on the validity of the judgment of the ICJ.

Oluda (2011) views also touch the outcome of the ruling by the ICJ citing the importance of the role and involvement of Kofi Annan in the deliberations for a peaceful transition of Bakassi from Nigeria to Cameroon. The green tree Accord and the transition process of Nigeria from the region and the establishment of administrative presence by Cameroon on the peninsula. Adding to this he also touched on the outcome of the ICJ ruling and significance to Nigeria. Oluda asserts the indigenes of Bakassi were disgruntled by the ruling and felt abandoned by their home government. Most people in the region claimed the former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo who was involved in the transfer of power to Cameroon did not have Nigeria at heart. In his own views, the implications of Bakassi's transfers to Cameroon had other underlying consequences. The fear of losing the peninsula to Cameroon is equally a loss to an entrance to the Calabar port. This is because the Calabar port lies along the Calabar channel and in terms of the 1913 agreement used by the ICJ, this area belong to Cameroon. The consequence of this will be the loss of the multimillion Naira Export Processing Zone (EPZ). Since Calabar largely depends on this EPZ it will mean an even great loss to the region not to mention the millions of barrels of oil deposits found in area.

Moreover, in the mindset of Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006), their own contribution sees colonialism as the source of boundary dispute among many African countries. They postulate that the Exchange of Notes of October 1, 1960

between Nigeria and the United Kingdom on treaty obligations and Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 1962 from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of Cameroon show that Nigeria acknowledged that Bakassi peninsula belong to Cameroon. They Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006), also add that according to the definitions of boundaries by the Northern, Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria, on the proclamation L. N126 of 1954, Bakassi peninsula was not part of Nigeria. Instead, it was part of the former Southern Cameroon. They also added that the reason for increased military presence in the region had nothing to do with the indigenes of Bakassi but due to the discovery of Oil reserves in the peninsular.

Similarly, according to Berridge (2002) in his mindset of underscoring the significance of bilateralism says that bilateral diplomacy is relevant in the contemporary world in that usually when negotiations take place; it is much easier on a face-to-face basis whereby leaders do come together and discuss issues of importance. On these terms, it is easier to identify pertinent issues, which can help in understanding the difference expressed by each side. In effect, it will be easier to get to a compromise during negotiations. He further adds that heads of government may come into agreements but they might not always be with the national interest of the states involved.

In the same vein Allee and Huth in explaining the merits of bilateralism in dispute resolution offers that the two sides to a dispute have the flexibility to fashion out their desired terms of settlement, and at the same time exercise considerable control over the settlement outcome, by negotiating directly. They add further that in direct negotiations, both sides can also control, at least in part, the information concerning the bargaining process, and the timing of final settlement. They also added that domestic political aspects usually add significant pressure on government behavior in interstate dispute Allee and Huth (2006).

Furthermore, Mbuh (2004) also brings in another view for the reason why Cameroun and Nigeria were slowly moving to war is that both governments utilize the Bakassi border conflict as a means of switching concerns away from their poor human rights records. In both states, it is common to spell out many cases of severe human rights violation, resulting from the desperate aspirations

of the masses for genuine democracy and good neighborliness. This mindset backed by the works of Albert Mukong (1985), and as Executive Director of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG) in Cameroun, and Africa Confidential all shade light on the human records of both nations Cameroun and Nigeria Mbuh (2004). In the both countries, there has been a gross abuse of basic human rights and fundamental values. The irony of this is the constitution of both states clearly states the need for people to exercise their rights. However, like many less developed countries, these aspects are mostly on paper and their applicability is nonexistent. In Mbuh's view, the Bakassi issue provided a major opportunity to divert the high attention from international organizations on these states.

However, in Kah's (2014) perspective he brings in the role of the military of both countries and how it fuelled the conflict or aided in the implementation of peace. In different phases of his analysis he views the level of military involvement however like Mbuh, he adds that this intensity and focus on the Bakassi was driven by other factors. Aligning with Mbuh he also asserts that the military involvement in the Bakassi dispute was a means to divert attention from the current deplorable governing in the respective countries. In both countries, there were almost semi authoritarian rule Cameroon had for close to 5 decades been rule by Two heads of states while Nigerian even though had changes in its government but was usually in radical forms by military coups. Therefore, the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula helped the governments to direct home attentions from deplorable government rule to need for gaining additional territorial space.

Fowler and Fanso look at the whole history of Cameroon right from encounter of the Europeans and the Cameroonian tribes to the creations of boundaries of todays Cameroon. The history of joint administration between parts of Cameroon and Nigeria and the demarcation of the boundaries of Cameroon, unravels background history between Cameroon and Bakassi and Nigeria , it helps in the construction of a background history of the disputed Bakassi peninsular. Fowler and Fanso(2009).

Tarlebba and Baroni (2010) in the view presented the dispute and how the ICJ handled it to arrive at a peaceful solution and equally some aspects they add as

motives for the territorial conflict. The Cameroon government after failures of several attempts for a bilateral diplomatic solution decided to forward the dispute to the ICJ in 1994. Under the supervision of the UN secretary general Kofi Annan, he invited representatives of the respective states to be part of the negotiation process. It is intriguing that it took eight years of serious negotiation to arrive at a settlement for the ICJ. The representatives of the respective states took part in intensive review of facts, historical documents in a quest to arrive at a solution. In light with the proceedings, Nigeria alleged to the ICJ that the most effective way to determine the location of the Bakassi peninsula was through a democratic referendum. As she asserted that her claim for sovereignty was not based on the resource, location or attractions disposed in the peninsula but rather on the wellbeing of the Nigerians settlers in the region. On the 10 October 2002, the ICJ declared judgment on the fate of the peninsula in favor of Cameroon. The judgment of the ICJ was based on former colonial documents. The determined the boundary according to Tarlebba and Baroni (2010), with the Thomson- Marchand and the Anglo-German declarations of 1929-1930 and 1913, respectively.

Bening looks at base of the Ghana-Togo border issues, France and Britain's occupation of Togo its imminent partition after the first world war, drawing similarities with Cameroon and Nigeria and why the Ewe tribe eventually was more affected. Western Togoland was controlled as an integral part of the Gold Coast and became incorporated later in to the new independent Gold Coast, on the other hand Eastern Togoland later became the Republic of Togo. His intent was to portray how the partition cut across the land of the Ewe people who had been in interaction with their Ewe brothers on the other side for a long time. Eventually the future boundary dispute between Ghana and Togo Bening(1983)

As seen from the assessments of different writers within the study of the Bakassi issue, significant contributions have been made to explain the issue. In different perspective analyzed by different authors, they established the possible causes of the issue on natural resources. The discovery of natural resources in the Bakassi peninsula cannot be ignored when looking at the causes of this territorial dispute. It is until the discovery of huge deposits of oil in the late

1960's and early 70's by European multinationals that this country openly alleged ownership of this area. Prior to this discovery, the Bakassi region was at its mercy of itself ignored and cut off from the rest of the world by both Nigeria and Cameroon. Considered remote, uninhabitable and marshy the region left less developed and seen equally as non-consequential to either Cameroon or Nigeria. Therefore, before this finding by the European multinationals, the 1913 Anglo-German agreement did not even occur or seem to have taken place. In another perspective, the role of colonial heritage from the scramble and partition of Africa has been the fundamental basis for the conflict over the Bakassi peninsular. In this perspective, the lack of regards for the African boundaries by the colonial powers and equally the non-consideration of their presence and involvement in the Berlin West African conference. These showed how severely they did not care about the locals when they decided their boundaries. Many as the main origin of this issue see the dispositions of the conference, transferring to the Cameroon and Nigeria boundaries. Most African boundaries even though arbitrarily arrived at have remained the juridical boundaries of these countries. This explains the next perspective of ethnic issues and differences as an important aspect when talking about the Bakassi dispute. As we will see subsequently in this study, African boundaries that existed before colonial rule were not drawn based on positions. Rivers, mountains or any other natural features did not determine boundaries instead they were based on spiritual and traditional believes and as they vary from one area to another. As it is in the Bakassi region and its environs, the people of this areas share common ethnic values. The basis of these shared ethnic similarities we will look further in this study and its effects on the Bakassi issue. A lot of concern already given in the role of the UN and its judicial organ the ICJ, and other aspects such as the steps taken to arrive at peaceful resolution. The aim of this thesis will attempt to establish a link and understanding in why Cameroon and Nigeria did not go to war over Bakassi. Although very unlikely for a peaceful solution as many other cases of territorial dispute between states within Africa suggest, this thesis will try to provide facts to support this argument in a very vivid manner to give a better understanding of why Cameroon and Nigeria choose peace with all the stakes involved.

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The subject of international politics is an empirical science in which the most significant manner to appraise the value of any theory depends on how appropriately it describes states behavior. However, within the scope of the Bakassi issue and the arguments which I attempt to present in this thesis to support my views why the Bakassi dispute did not turn to war, I will be using the Liberal perspective of international politics better explains this perspective. In using this approach, our focus will be on the liberal paradigm. This theory will attempt an explanation of the behavior of these states and ultimately why the Bakassi dispute did not lead to war.

3.1 Liberal Paradigm

Under the liberal lens of international politics, states are viewed as important actors but equally, non-state actors like institutions, individuals and other organizations play a major role in providing room for states to conduct their affairs Voitti and Kauppi (2012). In view of the Bakassi dispute not going to war, the liberal perspective in this issue does not eliminate the possibility of it happening. However, several dispositions were available to these states to look for a solution that will not just be peaceful but mutual to all the actors involved. I will attempt an explanation from the liberal perspective on the role of institutions in bringing about peace on this issue. In addition, liberal view of economic interdependence, how it explained under this framework why these states did not fight over Bakassi.

For liberal theorist of international relations, States are important in the conduct of international politics however, they are not the main actors in some cases. One of the fundamental principles of the liberal views as Yurdusev (2006) presents is that special institutions may exist that may control states on how they conduct their relations with other states. In the Bakassi dispute and events leading to its resolution, we see how evidently this is. Both Cameroon and

Nigeria submitted their authority to this institution as it became the main actor within the dispute and instrumental in bringing about peaceful resolution of the Bakassi issue. Before going to a wide aspect of the involvement of international organization, it is important to highlight the role of the African Union and its intervention even though to a limited extent. The African Union called both states to order and insisted both states had to continue to dialogue to pursue a peaceful solution.

In the same context, the presence and role of the UN in the Bakassi dispute, its intervention to bring about resolution of the conflict. This in line with the liberal perspective of global politics as the liberals coined the term. However still in the liberal context of other actors involving in global politics, it's still challenging to describe under what circumstances and extent these other actors influence states behavior in interstate relations. The example of the Bakassi dispute somehow shows that level in liberal framework of this other actors (non-state actors) impact in global politics. The submission of both states to the authority of the UN in eliminating the possibility of war over the Bakassi peninsular. This actions and influence of the UN is directly in correlation to the liberal idea of existence of special institutions regulating states behavior in the international scene.

The role of the UN summarized under the following to understand fully how the liberal paradigm explains the Bakassi issue.

The UN through its main judicial organ the ICJ arbitrated in the Bakassi issue between Cameroon and Nigeria. In the arbitration provided by the ICJ, she listened to both sides of the argument from the Cameroon and Nigerian perspectives. However, within the confines of the ICJ the both parties also had provisions to negotiate almost every aspect of the arbitration process. The ICJ acted as a neutral party serving as a judge responsible for the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi dispute.

In addition, the ICJ man acting juridical organ of the ICJ in further supporting the liberal argument provided mediation to disputing parties. Allowing Cameroon and Nigeria, the opportunities to vent out the feelings regarding the Bakassi issue and explore their grievances. The role of the UN did not just stop

there; they continued working with Cameroon and Nigeria together or separately sometimes to bring about peaceful solution. In a more intensive extent, the UN implored the services of the former Secretary General Kofi Annan who worked with the conflicting sides. His efforts in this area working with both Cameroon and Nigeria to explore their underlying interest in their varied positions paid off enormously. This is in line with the Paris agreement when he persuaded them to commit to the judgment of the ICJ before it made it public to both parties as they accepted to come to a consensus.

Furthermore, the Role of the UN also in the Good office it provided in the Bakassi issue. Article 98 of the charter of the UN provides that the secretary General in addition to acting in his capacity in all meetings of the general assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and social Council and the Trusteeship council shall perform such functions as entrusted to him by these organs. These in most cases include functions in the areas of prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, article 99 of the charter states that the Secretary General may bring to the notice of the general assembly or Security Council cases that he feels can threaten international peace and security. Consequently, the role of the secretary General has included good offices. Acting in view of these dispositions, Kofi Annan provided Good office in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the Bakassi dispute. After the ICJ had already passed judgment on the Peninsular, the secretary General (Kofi Annan) summoned both disputing parties to New York. This was so to formulate a system of implementation of the judgment by the ICJ While this, Cameroon and Nigeria signed the Green Tree Accord to lay down modalities of peaceful transfer of authority over the peninsula. These views are just to support the arguments from the liberal perspective why the Bakassi dispute did not turn to war.

Moreover, in their view, states behavior is influences also if not modified by economic links or other forms of inter states connections. As John et al (2013) reiterates in Kant's view, the three independent effects of Kantian elements understate believes of his prescription for peace since, interdependence, democracy, or the presence in inter-governmental organizations doesn't really increase while the others remain constant. These connections can be in social,

cultural and a political as well between states. The connections could moderate states relations and influence their actions towards another. As we will see later, the interconnections between Cameroon and Nigeria in the economic and other aspects had significant advantage in their behavior. One can possibly put into context that the economic interdependence between the two states was important in the resolution of the Bakassi dispute. With the increasing nature of globalized structures, in liberal views, states and intergovernmental organizations, multinationals, non-governmental organizations will only continue to exist in a capacity of cross connection. This will only instill networks of common strategy and goals, expansion of sovereignty free actors and framing the term global society. To continue, in Immanuel Kant's intuition, in building of a classical liberal idea, modern economy supports that under an international framework characterized by division of labor, free trade and comparative advantage, each state national economy is better off. In this sense, states enjoy a friendly competition in production and have a high incentive to seek peaceful solution to all their differences. Hence avoiding policies that will lead to break the mutual advantages that they benefit from their union. This is exactly true for the relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria, as we will see in further details in table 1 below. Their mutual benefits trades to each party from their economic interdependence prevented them from breaking the perpetual peace, which they created through commerce. Hence explaining why, they did not risk all of this to turn to war in the Bakassi issue.

However even though liberal rhetoric strongly criticizes the use of violence in the conduct of international politics, it does not eliminate the possibility of its existence. The view of this school of thought explains the behavior of Nigeria and Cameroon in their skirmishes over the peninsula. Although there were records of deaths on both sides, the actions in this regard were coordinated and there was no open confrontation to push the states to war. The use of violence in this conflict is more passive and casually organized. When Nigeria extended its military into some areas within Bakassi, Cameroon did not retaliate in the same fashion. We can see how anarchy in this dispute was managed and harmonized to eliminate any war. This correlates with Schumpeter's view in liberal pacifisms, as Doyle (1986) presents a sense of non-aggressiveness that characterizes liberal

societies. Schumpeter further postulates the fact that with the death of imperialism and the wake of democratic capitalism there is an increase in the opposition, which against the expansion of war cabinet. In this view, liberal capitalism in the contemporary era have constructed an institutional structure to prevent war. In this case, he refers to the example of the international criminal court at The Hague that arbitrates states disputes. The influence of this institution in the Bakassi dispute is almost self-explanatory.

Furthermore, in the context of liberal ideal, the factors or attributes present to a state society can influence peaceful relations with other states. Domestic political structure, values and political culture can direct states decision and influence leadership Doyle (1986). In Nigeria during struggle over Bakassi, its perceptions in relation to its role within the African political structure managed its decision in context with peaceful resolutions in the Bakassi conflict. Nigerian domestic politics favored its role as an emerging power in African and equally the growth of African states, it considered itself a leader in the continent. However, this was in line with its ambitions of becoming a member of the Security Council, so to speak this domestic political plight had direct consequences on its decision and one of the reasons for the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi dispute. This is in line with Kant's analogy of perpetual peace in one of his definitive articles of peace. He states that wars have a direct charge on the on the individual's welfare in a state. In a liberal state, the people's welfare restraints the government in its engagement in wars. Thus, if a liberal state is going to war, then it is a representative aspect of popular will rather than the will of the monarch. Within the confines of the Bakassi dispute, popular will configured in liberal terms favored mutual dependence rather than war.

The state and human nature have continually improved and increased enhancing the growth of freedom. In Doyle's view, peace among liberal nations cannot be ignored or merely seen as a product of their strategic alliance. He alludes that the stable democratic patterns among liberal states is because of the common values which the share not simply due to the alliances Badie et al (2011). The common values and deep ethnic similarities shared between these states was one of the main reasons why they did not resort to war with each other over their difference in the Bakassi peninsula. As opposed to many different territorial

disputes within the African continent, the Example of Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula is a very rare situation where a territorial dispute of the magnitude managed even at the brink of war. The states viewed much more similarities between themselves irrespective of the high stakes involve in their potential quest. The similarities in their traditions, the shared cultural beliefs and customary rules influenced the choice of action between these states. As Moravcsik (2001) frames it, societal groups with differentiated individual interest determine the material and ideational interest that is advance through political views. In Cross River region in Nigeria, Bakassi and the Manyu Division in South West region of Cameroon, all these people share the same traditional values. Equally, conforming to Kant's domestic publicity in perpetual peace where states with similar aspects benefit from presumed amity in the liberal perspective, while non-liberals encounter presumed enmity Doyle (1986). The people of these two countries share an underlying historical link rooted in cultural ideologies, and values they share. Inhabitants of the above regions in both states share the same traditional believes and see themselves as people of the same family genealogy though, in different states. Consequently, their similarities translated into their approaches of how both states handled their difference in Bakassi.

Furthermore, another perspective as presented by the liberals to explain why these countries chose to settle their difference amicably is interdependence. Liberal ideals as Moravcsik (2001) suggests that the configuration of preferences within a state shapes its behavior. Liberals argue that the interaction and distribution of preferences between states has a decisive influence on the state's behavior. Liberal ideal presents a relation between alternating state preferences and interstate behavior. A link which is explained by the policy of interdependence, the policy of interdependence here directly translates into cost and benefits created by prominent groups with in state societies to achieve their preferences in the international scene. Each country needs an objective, which is a stake in a case to either influence cooperation or provoke conflict in its foreign policy. This results from a configuration of interdependent preferences that dictate binding constraints on states behavior.

However, this does not directly translate to a harmony of preferences between states or an ideal. Each state seeks to achieve the preference that it's been constrained to by the dominant societal groups or the combination of the preferences distinctive of other states. The direction or pattern of the interdependent policy reflects underlying societal purpose. In the case of Cameroon and Nigeria, there is a strong compatibility of state preferences influencing incentives of cooperation and low conflict. There is the direct link to the reason why these states put their differences aside to pursue coordination in view of the Bakassi issue. This I will explain further in subsequent chapters.

The liberal paradigm more than any other theory within international politics is better disposed to explain the behavior of both Cameroon and Nigeria in the Bakassi issue. Even though the UN has been severely criticized of being ineffective which is fair, it's involvement in the Bakassi issue can be affirmed upon as if not the main reason behind the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi issue and a few areas in which it has succeeded as a peace keeping organization

4 ACTORS AND CAUSES OF THE BAKASSI CONFLICT

There is usually no universal definition of Actors in international politics. However, some scholars have used some characteristics to coin the meaning of an actor in international relations. According to Ryo Osiba, he defined them as entities that possess the following characteristics. a) Have an autonomous ability to determine their own interest; (b) The capacity to mobilize human and as well material resources to accomplish their interest and purpose, (c) Their actions should be significant to the point of being able to influence the state-to-state relation or actions of non-state actors in a global system Sekiguchi (2010 Pp 243,244). It is no news however, the fact that states have always been considered the main actors in international politics. However even though that is not the case today in contemporary times as there is an increasing number of non-state actor in international relations. In this section of this thesis, I will be analysis the role of all the actors present in the Bakassi dispute state and non-state actors alike who were either active or passive in the Bakassi dispute and their level of involvement in the dispute and how it influences it.

4.1 State Actors.

According to Mingst and Arreguin-Toft (2010), in international politics and law, for an entity to be called a state it most meets the following critical characteristics.

It must have a territorial base,

It must have a population as well

A government should be in place which the population acknowledges and pledges allegiance,

In addition, it should have the sovereignty, the supreme control and will to act/influence its affairs internally and externally.

Notwithstanding, this description of a state has been contended by different group of scholars. The realists generally hold the claim on a state centered view that a state is an autonomous actor restrained only by the structural anarchy of the international system. Moreover, that, as a sovereign body, a state has a persistent set of objectives, which is a national interest coined in terms of power and acts as a unitary and unanimous actor. On the other hand, the Liberals view a state from a different perspective. To them a state enjoys sovereignty but not an autonomous actor. To them the state is multiple stag with a function to maintain the status-quo of the game. They also think there is no definite national interest instead there are multiple and this interest change from time to time and contest each other in a pluralistic framework. To the constructivist, national interest is not substantial or given. They are abstract and constantly changing because of local factors and in reply to international norms. In addition, that states have multiple personalities with a mutual understanding for common interest, which evolves varying states preferences and eventual behavior

In the Bakassi conflict, there are states actors involve in the conflict directly and indirectly. I will classify the states actors into actively involved state actors and passive state actor's due to their level of involvement in the dispute. I will analyze the role of these actors in the conflict below.

4.2 Nigeria

It is no news that Nigeria was one of the belligerent states that was involved in Bakassi dispute. Nigeria has always held a perspective of the Bakassi conflict that has been evolving in due times as the administrative authority changed different aspects of how the Bakassi peninsula dispute was treated and looked at changed. Since there was no dispute over the Bakassi territory prior to independence, this analysis will start from the post independent era when the rich mineral resources discovered in the region that eventually fueled flames for this dispute. It should be recalled that this region was abandoned by both states due to its remote nature and because of the residents being considered less "consequential" to the homeland territory. The reason the inhabitants of this region are considered less consequential was due to the absence in significant

administrative positions in their territory. The inhabitants of this region enjoy a peaceful co-habital relationship and a common cultural and ancestral origin irrespective of the fact that they were a blend of two entirely different states. After the discovery of oil and other marine resources in the area, it created an alarming surge of interest by both states over the area. After Nigeria became independent in the 1960's, there was still issue over the ownership of the Bakassi peninsula. It was in the first phase of the 1970's where the issue began to surface when the now independent states (Cameroon and Nigeria) sought to delimit their maritime border as the 1913 Anglo- German treaty left it quite vague. However, though this was not an issue at the time the ancient colonial maps of this era showed the Bakassi region in Cameroon's territory. This did not bother the Nigeria head of state at the time (General Gowon) even though he received advice from other government officials to pursue the delimitation of clear boundaries between Nigerian and Cameroon. Moreover, in response, the president met with his Cameroonian counterpart and the Coker-Ngo line was drawn in 1971 clearly establishing the navigable and defining limits to three nautical miles. For some critics Ayim (2008) and a vast opinion in Nigeria, the background role and position taken by Gowon in the Bakassi dispute is because of the relationship he had with Cameroonian head of state at the time Ahmadou Ahidjo. Many Nigerians alleged his support during the civil war as the reason why Gowon was quick to come into agreement with Ahidjo over the Bakassi settlement. In addition, he acknowledges the faulty Ngo-Coker line that will later bring about complexity over the border issue in the future and will be a point of capitalization by his detractors and predecessors.

From the view point of the first three Nigerian heads of state when Tafawa Balewa, who was the country's first prime minister after they gained independence in 1960 from England. General Ironsi and General Gowon, there was no issue of discussion about Bakassi and not even a course for concern as what was more important at the time was to delimit a clear boundary. To this leaders and as well public opinion, they enjoyed a much peaceful and cordial relationship with Cameroon which the sort to keep it that way. Keep in mind that two of the leaders were military rulers and even in their unscrupulous strategies, there was no aggression between both states but this was short-lived.

When General Murtala Muhammed overthrew General Gowon from power, and became the next Nigerian head of state, he took a completely different approach and in his view, he rejected every form of negotiation and treaty his predecessors had signed with Cameroon. In a way to slander and discredit the reputation of the former head of state he overthrew in his words, he publicly criticized the Coker-Ngo line saying, “Gowon should be held accountable for giving Bakassi away” Nowa (2006). He began to question every domestic or foreign policy his predecessor had made. In a way to reverse the actions of his predecessor, he awoken the desires of some of the people who had voted in the 1961 plebiscite in Bakassi to gain independence by joining the Republic of Cameroon but wanted to be with Nigeria.

In hope of going away from the colonial commitment which had been made in 1913 and reinforced by the 1961 plebiscite. This will be the basis of a rise in public opinion seeking to defer the 1961 plebiscite confirming the fate of Bakassi as part of Cameroon, and the subsequent occurrences in 1981, 1994 and 1996. The role of the subsequent head of state General Sani Abacha who came in power in 1993 cannot be overlooked even though it was shortened. In his perspective, he struggled to establish a military base in Bakassi going against all previous agreements. This was very much welcomed home in Nigeria as many of the people still looked at Bakassi for being a part of Nigeria. Eventually this led to a series of confrontation between both states as it ignited both states to make their presence and authority felt in the region not just in the presence of armed forces but also through taxes on the indigenes. This was the basis of what later mounted to course the attacks and counter attacks in 1994 and 1996, which eventually influenced the republic of Cameroon to take the dispute to the International court of justice.

To continue, another significant era in Nigerian political evolution in the Bakassi dispute has been when President Olusegun Obasanjo came back to power. Obasanjo had served as Nigerian head of state under a military regime from 1976 to 1979. During his term of office, the Bakassi issue was not an issue in his presidential mandate as it was in his second term of office. In his second mandate, which stated in May 1999 to 2007 his actions, policies, and ways of dealing with the Bakassi dispute are classified as being one of the most

significant since the independence of the country in 1960. His presence in office during the settlement of the case and his role in bringing about the end to the dispute is very significant. In fact, many in different ways have viewed his role. Some have suggested that the reason why Obasanjo did not reject the ICJ ruling is a result of Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy. Part of this Afrocentric policy is against intervention in an independent state's affairs. In addition, Nigerian aspirations of gaining a membership into the Security Council was one of the reasons put forward to why they did not challenge the court's decision. For some critics in Nigeria, Obasanjo decision to support the handing over of Bakassi and signing of the Green Tree Accord was personal. In the delight, it was put forward that Obasanjo was interested in winning a noble peace award that is why he accepted in almost a non-contradictory many the settlement agreement that was arranged by the ICJ.

Public opinion about the handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon by Nigeria has been very aggressively against the decision by the Nigerian heads of government to concede a strategic part of their territory as most people opposing to this decision have portrayed. Most of the anger expressed by Nigerians to the decision by their head of state is also because the head of state did not consult the state senate when he handed over Bakassi to Cameroon. Some members of the senate and other high public office heads have publicly expressed their views about the handing over of Bakassi. Senator Chukwumerije Uche of the Progressive Peoples party from Itiat, labeled the handing over of Bakassi as a pricey mistake in Nigeria's history since independence that will soon backfire to Nigeria. In his opinion, he called out a high rate of corruption among those legislated to represent Nigeria in the ICJ. In his word, "I believe Nigeria will suffer reparations for this costly mistake" Itiat (2012). Other members on government condemned this move by former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo. Government officials like the chief of defense general Azazi criticize the handing over of Bakassi and said the transfer of the territory will pose security risk to Nigeria. The former minister of Justice and attorney general of the republic Mr Aondokaa also decried the legal procedure and said the Green Tree Accord is not really a treaty. In addition, he said it is not binding since it is a product of the ICJ judgment Itiat(2012). The masses denounce the

idea and from several publications, Nigerians have expressed their concern about the transfer of a territory, which they believed formed a part of the Nigerian Nation. In the daily Sun Newspaper and article by a Nigerian writer Eric Osagie published on 22 of August 2008 titled “Weep not for Bakassi”, the writer criticizes their home government for abandoning its people and accuses them of greed and selfishness. He also questions the possibility of the Bakassi people resettling to join another culture and religion. Equally, he labeled the nation of Nigeria as a giant with dwarf feet and said it is they should cry for ceding Bakassi. Itiat (2012). Furthermore, other Nigerians express their dissatisfaction in the handing over of Bakassi. In the Guardian Newspaper 3 November 2003 issue, Levi Obijiofor denounces the handing over by President Obasanjo saying he did not realize the long-term effect of his actions. He reiterated that even in peace or wartime no country gives up its part to a fellow belligerent state Itiat (2012). This and many more complains from different Nigerians have been expressed about the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon. Nigerians also criticized the International court of Justice for being unfair and biased to Nigeria in the Bakassi case. The criticism stems from the fact that the ICJ president Gilbert Guillaume who was French and somehow favored Cameroon because it was a French colony.

However, irrespective of this large number of Nigeria condemning the actions by their leaders in giving Bakassi to Cameroon, some Nigerians support the point of view of their head of state. Senators Yisa Braimor, Barigha Amange of the People’s Democratic Party even though expressing regrets said Nigeria was bound by international obligations to respect the decision of the court. Chinua Asuzu a lawyer from Assizes law firm noted that even if the President consulted the senate or not, Nigeria is bind by the Green Tree Accord in ceding Bakassi over to Cameroon Itiat (2012). In relation with the perspective of the last two Nigerian Heads of state Goodluck Jonathan and Muhamed Buhari respectively, they have almost the same views but with different retrospect. According to former head of state President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria will not challenge the judgment of the ICJ in 2002. To him the reason behind this decision is the concern he has for the Nigerian settlers in the Bakassi region. He was not ready to resettle the population that already has a home and he further re-iterated that

Bakassi being in Cameroon does not affect Nigerian oil productivity. Current head of state president Buhari faced with the question of challenging the decision of the ICJ ruling over Bakassi in 2002 when he visited Cameroon in May 2015. In response to this he said since Nigeria let the case get to the world court, and lost then they will abide by the decision of the court (Buhari: no plan to challenge Cameroons' ownership of Bakassi peninsula 2015).

Also, Nigeria had as of October 2012 completely ceded Bakassi to Cameroon based on the 2002 ICJ verdict. Also from advice of the Attorney general and Minister of Justice Mohamed Adoke they both said in a statement if Nigeria made an application to review the 2002 ICJ ruling it is bound to fail and this failure will automatically affect the Nigerian diplomatic image (Buhari: no plan to challenge Cameroons' ownership of Bakassi peninsula 2015).

4.3 Cameroon

Contrarily to Nigeria, Cameroon has had a very brief political history and evolution with respects to the Bakassi dispute. Since independence in 1960, Cameroon unlike Nigeria has had just two heads of states. Government view and Public opinion over the Bakassi dispute has not varied very much except for the most significant steps taken in 1996 by the current administration in reporting the issue to the ICJ. In Cameroon, When Bakassi is mentioned one of the first ideas that comes to mind from a Cameroonian point of view is remoteness. Since Cameroon got custody of the region, she left it in ruins irrespective of the wealth present in the area. Through the short political history of Cameroon and since independence, there has been no significant evolution in Bakassi. If Perceptions have changed about the ownership but what about the residents in the abandoned region? During former president Ahidjo's term of Office, it was at his era that the need to delimit the maritime and terrestrial frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria from Lake Chad in the north right down to south. It was during the delimitation of the maritime boundary that differences were established as to the exact location of where the borderline should be drawn. However, this was not because of the wealth of the region but of the difference if the both parties in choosing the right position. Notwithstanding, they put the difference aside as President Ahidjo and his Nigerian counterpart Gowon signed

the Coker-Ngo line and the Maroua treaty as explain previously in the historical background. When Ahidjo left office, this marked the turning point for the Bakassi dispute. When the current President Paul Biya came to Power in 1982, things changed dramatically with the aggressive actions taken by both Nigeria and Cameroon in their approach to the Bakassi issue. As already explained in the historical background, it was during the reign of current Cameroonian head of state that the dispute was reported to the ICJ. The role president Paul biya performed in this dispute cannot be undermined. His diplomatic and peaceful approach with former President Obasanjo of Nigeria at the same time maintaining the relationship between both states has earned him an admirable role among his compatriots. However, there has been a very different view of Bakassi dispute from the people who live in the region and those in the former Southern Cameroon. As I have vividly described in the historical background, Paul Biya championed the Cause on the Cameroonian side in pursuing mediation and diplomatic methods to bring about a peaceful resolution of the dispute. After the dispute was settled, Southern Cameroonian people and people in Bakassi peninsula have a different view towards the Bakassi issue from the actions of the home government.

With Nigeria, fully redrawn from the region and ceded completely to Cameroon, the Cameroonian central government has pretty much abandoned this region to its self. It should be noted that this was the same region that was fought over by Cameroon when Nigeria laid claims of the area. As of today, the area remains inaccessible from Cameroon except through the creeks. On the other hand, it is more accessible to from Nigeria as most Cameroonians venturing to the area go to it via Nigeria. Being under Cameroonian jurisdiction, one will wonder that it should be felt in the area but it is no news that the Nigerian Naira is the most widely recognized legal tender in the region even though the franc CFA is used to a lesser extent. The region still practices some form of the ancient trade by barter and lacks a considerable amount of basics facilities to support life. These above circumstances have driven the people in the region and the people of former southern Cameroon to express their disgust of being under the administration of former La Republic du Cameroun. It has been referred to in many cases as re colonization by the former La republic du Cameroun. The

opinions of people living in Bakasssi has not been anything short of the fact that they wished they had been reunited with Nigeria or become an independent entity. The people of the former southern Cameroon wished they as well were offered an opportunity to independence during the 1962 plebiscite. From Ebai's view, this has led to the birth of secessionist movements the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) as the claim is that the nation state movement after unification and independence has instead pushed them to francophone domination Ebai (2009). The Cameroonian views of the Bakassi issue has been that of complete despair but despite this fact, the idea that its part of Cameroon is an extent is making some Cameroonian proud of their countries rhetoric's in times of conflict. This also instills to a certain degree of trust by the people to the diplomatic and negotiation policies of the Central government.

4.4 Britain And France.

Britain and France are passive state actors in the Bakassi dispute due to the role they played in the conflict. As already seen above, Britain and France were the former colonial powers who occupied Cameroon and Nigeria. Britain colonized Nigeria on the other hand France gained access to Cameroon after the defeat of the Germans in the First World War and their colonies given to the victorious powers of the First World War. Before French presence in Cameroon as already seen in the historical background, the Germans annexed Cameroon. It is during the German era in Cameroon and British reign in Nigeria where Bakassi was transferred to Cameroon in the 1913 Anglo-German treaty (as mentioned in chapter 1). With the abrupt end of the German control over Cameroon because of the First World War, the Bakassi peninsula did not present any major concern during the British and French governance of Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. However, in this era, the two colonial powers made an exchange of notes defining frontiers between their both colonies. France and Britain who occupied Cameroon and Nigeria are passive actors in this dispute over a territory, which they govern due to their background position they took while the belligerent state went at each other. Diverse opinion would have thought that since these colonial powers were the ones who laid foundation for the conflict over the Bakassi peninsula, expectations would be that they would intervene as it became violent between the both states concern. On the contrary,

this was not the case as the both states had been granted independence and hence it would be against international law for former colonial masters to intervene into the interior affairs of independent states. However, this was not always the case in the Bakassi dispute. France and Britain intervened in this dispute in a silent way to influence both states resolving it amicably. The role of these two powers can be seen in their good office tactics, which they employed. They however persuaded the both heads of states after the settlement by the ICJ in New York in the presence of the United Nations secretary general and a representative from the United States. Their presence cannot be taken for granted in bringing about the peaceful settlement in the conflict and implementation of the green tree accord.

4.5 Non-State Actors

In this category, we will look at the involvements of other actors besides the above already analyzed state actors. Here we will look at the roles of the League of Nations, the United Nations organization and the African Union.

4.6 The League of Nations

After the end of the First World War in 1919 and following the defeat of the German and ottomans, The League of Nations in a way of administering sanctions to the defeated powers of WWI seized territories from the former powers. The League of Nations seized their Asian and African possession and the colonies, which the league considered unfit for self-administration. The latter were handed over to the victorious powers of WWI. Kamerun a former German colony was given to Britain and France who emerged as conquerors in WWI to continue governing the colony. Under the League of Nations mandate system, Cameroon however following the handover was divided between the British and French, placed under Category B for colonies that needed a little grooming before granting independence. The French govern most Cameroon as a single entity while the British on the other hand who got the part of Cameroon with Bakassi governed it as an integral part of Nigeria.

Notwithstanding, it should be noted that during this period, Bakassi was not an issue or a cause for concerns about it ownership and It will be after this period

that's the sad territory will change hands and decisions made at this post WWI moments that will forever change the landscape or relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria.

4.7 The United Nations Organization

Under the League of Nations, no significant changes that we can examine, and link as the role-played by the League of Nations in this dispute. However, it cannot be compromised as the decisions taken by the League of Nations laid parts to later quarrels over the peninsular. On the other hand, the United Nations Organization role in the dispute cannot shortlisted. Under the United Nations Organization, the role it played can be broken down in to smaller factions to ease the understanding. The role of the UN can be seen in the involvement of the International Court of Justice and the role performed by the secretary General of the UN.

4.8 The International Court of Justice

The international court of justice, which is the main judicial organ of the UN, established in 1945 to replace the former permanent court of International Justice (PCIJ) of the League of Nations. However, although the statute of the ICJ was almost a literal copy of its predecessor's, the ICJ had some major differences with the later. The ICJ established as an integral part of the UN, which was not the case with the PCIJ of the league. In its statute, the ICJ made provisions for the election of five judges by the general assembly and Security Council, which was not the cases with the former PCIJ. Lastly, the court structured in chambers to deal with different cases as oppose to the former court, which was based on provisions of article 26 and 27 of the permanent court of International Justice statute (<http://www.icj->). This difference and better equipped structure of the ICJ is set up to achieve the purpose prescribed to it by the United Nations which is, to settle disputes or occurrences that may disrupt peace among member states. One may be pushed to ask a question as to what extent the court has achieved the role it was created for, but in our case, we are interested in viewing the role of the court in territorial dispute with the case of the Bakassi peninsula being our center of attention.

The international court of Justice being the principal judicial organ of the UN might downplay its role in the resolution of the dispute. Its role in accepting, administering and providing a framework and platform for the both parties to resolve their difference cannot be overlooked. It is of course nothing new that the jurisdiction of the court is limited only to cases referred to it by member states. It deals with legal and political disputes referred to it on the other hand it has no jurisdiction in cases not referred to it. The ICJ was setup to be a last resort in cases where all procedures of resolution of a conflict have been employed and fail, as well as after regional courts or administering jurisdiction to a dispute or conflict have come short to providing a solution. For instance, in the Chad and Libyan dispute over the Aouzou strip, it was only after the failure of the diplomatic solution between both states and as well the failure of the African Union to peacefully resolve the dispute that the ICJ stepped in after it was referred to it. In the Bakassi case, the court did not only administer the dispute but equally provided binding precedence to both member states. This has help in preventing the occurrence of future conflict over the region between both member states. This now leads us to another role played by the court in the Bakassi dispute, which is enforcing of judgments.

For the ICJ to provide permanent solutions to cases referred to it be member state it must be able to enforce the decision from its precedents. Being the main judicial organ of the UN, the ICJ has a strong mechanism behind it to ensure that states respect and implement to the later decisions made by the ICJ in the disputes brought before it. If a party to a dispute fails to implement the obligations of the ruling, the counter party has the rights to refer these actions to the Security Council. The Security Council has special recommendation empowered it by the charter to take decisions in cases like this. However, this has brought criticism to the court to a certain degree for its inability to have a mechanism on its own to enforce its decision in case of violation by a state party. In another note, the court in its adjudication of the Bakassi dispute has been met by claims of bias in its decision. Nigeria accused the ICJ of colonial bias for basing its ruling in the dispute on the 1913 Anglo-German agreement that transferred Bakassi to Cameroon. In a statement regarding the 10 October ruling over the Peninsula by the Nigerian government, they said this area has

been historically governed by Nigeria and there is no record of any form of control or government administration by Cameroon in the region. The Nigerian government referred to those claims as being contrary to all conventions and laws. In a statement from a close associate of the former head of state President Obasanjo, (Pacific settlement of Border Disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi Affair and the Greentree Agreement 2008), he states that the ruling by the court is flawed. Therefore, because of this we are not saying yes to it neither are we saying no but we are simply highlighting our areas of disagreement with the decision of the court.

Notwithstanding it will be completely unrealistic not to applaud the role of the ICJ in the peaceful resolution of this dispute. It is understood that the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula will not have been resolved peacefully without the involvement of the ICJ. However, this leads to another aspect of analysis the role of Individuals in the dispute especially the former UN secretary general to Kofi Atta Annan.

4.9 Role of former UN Secretary General KOFI Atta ANNAN.

In assessing the role played by the former UN secretary general, we will look directly at his involvement in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. To begin, the former UN secretary general provided an atmosphere of trust for both parties express the differences. This goes a long way to stress the significance of good office in resolving disputes, which he engaged even before the judgment by the ICJ. This role he further applied to by making both parties agree on an amicable procedure to resolve the issue. After the judgment, the role of the secretary general became more salient to resolving the dispute peacefully. It should be noted that after the decision by the ICJ it did not just calm the tension between both states if anything it raised issues that brought disagreement between the parties involve. The involvement of Kofi Annan, his good office help ease tension between the sides and rekindle the spirit of reconciliation. Prior to the declaration of judgment by the ICJ, the Secretary General summoned the two heads of state in Paris on September 5, 2002 to agree that they will accept the decision from the ICJ and set up structure for the implementation of the court's decision. He further convinced both head of states

to settle for confidence building standards, eventual demilitarization of the region with a possibility of international observers to supervise the withdrawal of troops from the area with the UN support. This is in conjunction with Allee and Huth (2002) perspective of features common to legal dispute resolution organization. Their ability to coerce states leaders in advance to agree on the final decisions of the trial by the deliberating body Allee and Huth(2002, P.287)

Ensuing the decision from the ICJ, a series of meetings were organized under the supervision of the secretary general providing his good offices, which led to the signing of bilateral agreements for the creation of a joint commission to review the plausible outcomes from the court's ruling. The first agreement signed in Geneva on 15 November 2002 where both parties agreed to the creation of a mix commission and modalities to follow up the implementation of the court judgment (International Peace Institute 2008). The creation of the Cameroon and Nigeria mix commission (CNMC) was purely an idea from Kofi Annan in an effort for a peaceful transition and settlement of the border dispute after the ICJ ruling. In a mixed communique broadcasted after the meeting in Geneva, the secretary General and two heads of state adopted an extensive ideal until 2005 that entailed an effortless transfer of military, civilian administration and Police forces in the Lake Chad region. With this effort in place, it was noted in a report the transfer took place by December 2003 and the area has been calm since the transition.

He further continued by reaffirming to the international committee to help within the framework of preventive diplomacy to both states in their ongoing settlement and as well financial support in the demarcation procedure and as well rehabilitation of roads, bridges and other navigable channels within the region of settlement. To the heads of state, he advised them to agree on strengthening bilateral relationships open embassies and consulates with common border patrol security forces to ensure security and the safety of the people along the border regions. The both leaders later agreed on a treaty of friendship and non-aggression and reaffirmed to take appropriate steps to assure the security and continuation of livelihood of the people most affected by the court's decision. The secretary General reiterated that the success of the

precedence this far is prove that neighboring states with little UN assistance can work together to avert border conflict and settle their differences amicably.

The last agreement orchestrated by the UN secretary General Kofi Annan was the green tree accord, which was signed on the 12 of June 2006 (International Peace Institute 2008) with the heads of states of both states Paul Biya and Olegun Obasanjo from Cameroon and Nigeria respectively. This was with done in the presence of representative from Britain, France, Germany, and the United states in Long Island New York. Besides finalizing the transition and agreement measures as seen already in the Green Tree Accord, set details for the transition of power in the region. Nigeria agreed to remove its forces and government authority in the region within a period of sixty days and could be extended to an extra 30 days but not more. Cameroon on the other hand agreed to guarantee the respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Nigerian people living in the area. Cameroon also agreed to respect and retain the cultures of the Nigerians nationals living in the area, their customs and tradition, beliefs, way of life, their language and no infringement on their rights to fishing and respect and protect their property without any unfair taxing.

Furthermore, they also agreed according to article 6 of the accord to create a follow up committee to verify the implementation of the decisions taken in the accord. The role of the UN secretary general cannot be shortlisted when analyzing the actors in the Bakassi dispute. His contribution is imminent in the success and peaceful settlement of the dispute.

After looking at the actors of the Bakassi dispute, it is important to look at some of the cause of the dispute to understand the next part of the study.

4.10 Causes Of The Bakassi Dispute

In looking at a conflict, it is important to diagnose the causes of the conflict to get an understanding of why there is a conflict and how it can be resolved. The Bakassi dispute is a unique case of territorial dispute and considering the causes of the dispute will give us a direct view of why the dispute did not lead to war. There are no immediate causes but rather a compilation of motives that triggered the dispute to get to a point where it was referred to the ICJ. To analyze this perspective in logical terms it will be important to look at this as

factors that contributed to the dispute and bringing into perspective, the views of the Bakassi people on what caused the dispute.

4.11 Colonial Rule.

Colonialism has been one of the dominant concerns that brought about the Bakassi dispute between two traditionally close allies. When the colonial powers Portugal, Britain, France etc. came to Africa to create their spheres of influence, they did not put into consideration the indigenes. The decisions and activity was centered on their selfish economic, political and strategic interest. This laid the foundation for future problems in post-colonial Africa Posner and Mccauley, (2015). For the colonialist to better access and control their areas of jurisdiction they instituted varied policies. Divide and rule, partitioning of African states was one of the means used to achieve this aim. In this way, they laid boundaries to mark political, economic and social frontiers without taking into consideration the boundaries of the indigenous Africans and the effects it will have on their socio-political life, cultural relations and ancestral genealogy. From Horvath (1972), narcissistic behavior separated ethnic groups to territories governed by colonialist and this curb immensely the reign of peace within the region as divided clans and families fought for unity with their relatives. This response became very common throughout the continent in some cases there were revolts against the colonial rule as many clans and tribes fought back against this rules and policies that destroyed their culture. The behavior of the colonialist and their policies set of many conflicts within Africa the Bakassi dispute is a pertinent example of this case.

4.12 Natural Resources.

In pragmatic terms, the most significant reason behind the Bakassi dispute was the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the region. Before the discovery of these resources in the region of Bakassi it was practically considered non-consequential not just the region but also the people who lived in it. It should be recalled that Bakassi is almost in accessible to either Cameroon or Nigerian. The topic of its ownership was never a case prior to this finding. Bakassi as seen in Figure II an island surrounded by marshy creeks heavily infested with

mosquitoes it is only accessible through the navigable creeks. The indigenes of Bakassi are mostly considered uneducated and their main activity is fishing which is practically their most important source of livelihood. With little or no representation in neither government in the both countries, it is safe to say Bakassi was an abandoned region. However, since most of the indigenes who lived in this region have mostly been Nigerians, there has been no reason whatsoever for them to think of themselves as being without a state even though they were not represented within the ranks of the Nigerian government. However, things changed drastically with the discovery of huge oil reserves and gas deposits in the region. Although this is not the only riches this region has, its waters rich in fish and prawn deposits surround Bakassi. In addition, its strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea makes it a great access point into the Atlantic Ocean. The discovery of oil in this region incited attention from Cameroon and Nigeria and equally their colonial masters as it agitated tension, strained relationships between former close neighbors and in some cases, lead to deaths. Hypocritically, if oil were not discovered in the region it would have still been considered non-consequential as well as its inhabitants by both states. The discovery of oil in the region has been the main reason behind the Bakassi dispute. To the inhabitants of this region, Conflict over Bakassi is a lot more complex than finding of oil within the region. Notwithstanding, much more severe to the indigenes was the displacement and separation of families and tribes from their ancestral lands, religious spots, burial grounds not just due to the scramble and partition of African but also a result of internal conflicts generated from the discovery of oil deposits.

4.13 Demographic Motives.

Bakassi region and its environs, which extends on both sides of the border is home for the Efik people. This has been their home during pre-colonial and post-colonial Africa even before the area turned into a case for concern. The Efik people who are normally fisher-men and women have occupied these lands from the lower cross river basins to the Bakassi peninsula for a very long time. The issue with their identity has never been a concern until the discovery of oil in the Bakassi peninsular. However from Itiat, it should not be mistaken because this people are of Nigeria descent with their ancestral genealogy linking them

with the Oron, Baise, Uruan, Eket, Annang, Ibibio, and Igbo people Itiat (2012). Traditional accounts if the Efik people migrated from the Ibibio and Igbo territory to settle in their present location. There are people of Ibibio descent who are Cameroonians and equally settle along the borders of the Bakassi peninsular. The culture of the people from the Calabar in Cross River state further south east and all Bakassi right into Manyu division in Cameroon is almost identical with a common ancestral tree. Nigerian claim over Bakassi was also supported by the demographic composition in the region. As Itiat (2012) reiterates, for as long as it can be remembered, the Efik people have lived in this region, all along the signing of the Anglo-German treaty they still lived on these lands, and in no time in History were they ever force to depart from this area. Ascertain to the British claims over the Falklands from Argentina because its people lived in the area supported Nigerian claim. Britain even went to war with Argentina in 1982 over the ownership of the Falkland Islands in a case, which was later resolved as they accepted to share proceeds from the allege oil reserves, which the Island had. Nigerian rhetoric and a contributive motive that supported its claim and caused the conflict somehow was the presence, exclusive and continuous habitation of people of its demography in the Bakassi peninsular. However, this view although strong is no news to people who are aware of the expanding Nigerian population within its neighboring states. In Cameroon for instance there is a very large Nigerian population living in the territory there are many places within the core of Cameroon occupied by mostly Nigerians. If the above claims were to be considered then it will be very realistic that Nigeria could also claim those areas within the heart of Cameroon occupied by most its citizens.

4.14 Politico-Strategic Motives

The significance of the location of Bakassi cannot be stress any more than it already has been. The Gulf of Guinea the whole coastline right down to Angola has been an area of huge interest not just because its endowed with huge oil and gas deposit, it also boosts of a rich bionetwork which is made up of a very diverse flora and fauna. This contains a rainforest generating a high amount of global oxygen, with Navigable watercourses and Channels to the sea. Its location and disposition to its occupant gives an advantage to the state that possesses and

controls the movement. In 1966 during the Nigerian Biafra war, the strategic location of Bakassi peninsula was tested when Former head of state General Yakubo Gowon solicited the Ahidjo to combat the secessionist Biafran army that seek to succeed from the federal republic of Nigeria. Ahidjo used parts of the Peninsular, which were access ways for supplies during the war sent to the Biafran army and blocked the supplies from getting to the Biafran fighters. Because of this, the Nigerian army could advance and easily crush the opposition leading to the success of the civil army against the Biafrans. This role played by Cameroon during the Nigerian civil war revealed to Nigerian just how strategic Bakassi was and how important it was for her to maintain security in relation to any form of threat. Some analysts claim that Ahidjo's decision to support Nigeria during the Civil war came from the idea to restrain similar opposition in Cameroon in case it was necessary. Like the realist assert, the nature of the international organization and the real form of power forces state leaders to look at the world in comparative terms. Notwithstanding, Lukong (2011) irrespective of the Cameroonian assistance to Nigeria during the civil war, Nigeria still felt a significant amount of threat from Cameroon more than any of its regional Neighbors (Lukong, 2011: 21). This stems from Nigeria's expansionist views within the African milieu and the French position towards this perspective. Nigeria has an expansionist foreign policy within Africa. It exports its culture and tradition as well as other significant traits associated with the Nation on the other hand this position is met by a very strong French presence in the Continent, which stands in the way of Nigerian expansion policy. The French relationship with Cameroon even in post-colonial Africa somehow fuels this tension and is in a symbolic way responsible for the high threat level Nigeria feels towards one of its strongest neighbor and ally. It was in this light that Oscar Ede Lukong (2011) made a claim to affirm the level of threat Cameroon possess to Nigeria's security. In his view, "Cameroon is just a moderate French orb in Africa, and has no defense treaty with France. However, Cameroon is a neighbor Nigeria needs to have a rigorously well-defined foreign policy because in a case where Nigeria has a war with any of its neighbors there is a very high probability of that neighbor to be Cameroon". (Lukong, 2011: 21)

As supported by the theory of dilemma of security once, states feel the threat to their internal security because of a neighbor's action whether directly or indirectly, there is usually a domino effect and the state must fortify itself to be able to withstand the threat posed by its neighbor. In the light of this, Nigeria realized its security could be guaranteed only if it secured control of Bakassi peninsula and the surrounding cross-river estuary and Calabar channels. To Nigeria, the control they implied can be reached in two ways, Single handedly or through close cooperation with the Cameroon. In the first part of the 1990's, Nigerian political game of doing, this entailed of a complete review of the whole border query with her neighbor Cameroon. Hidden in this quest was its agenda to denounce all pre-colonial and post-colonial agreements, which tired the region to Cameroon. In the context of long historical, linguistic and cultural relations between the southern Cameroon and the eastern region of Nigeria, they were administered jointly during the UN mandate era. The republic of Cameroon always feared the existence of an imminent threat of secession of the southern Cameroon from the former La Republique du Cameroon. This was due to the marginalization of the southern Cameroon by the former La Republique du Cameroon and failures to implement the principles laid down by the unification treaty, which stipulated the creation of a federal states system. On the other hand, after unification of Southern Cameroons and the Eastern Cameroon the government implemented a unitary state system. These and many concerns of the Central government viewed Nigerian position in the Bakassi region as a threat that could possibly link to breakaway of southern Cameroon from the republic. This made it impossible for Cameroon government to bargain its position over the peninsula with Nigeria because it viewed that doing this will speed up secessionist motive of the Anglophone Cameroon. So, both states then viewed the region and its environs to promote their absolute national interest. This then fostered the disparity between both states instead of bringing them together as in most cases states borders bring unity and opportunity here it brought division and tension hence contributing to the conflict.

4.15 Geographical Dispositions

Geographically, Bakassi peninsula is an approximately 826.07 square kilometers neighboring to Akpabuyo Council of Cross River State and Mbo

Community in Akwa Ibom State, Nigerian universal boundary with Cameroun (<https://dawodu.com/un2.htm>). As figure II indicates, the peninsula is situated between latitudes 4.26/4.5 degrees North of the Equator and longitudes 8.30/9.08 degrees East of Green Which Meridian. Bakassi peninsula is made up of more than thirty-three villages. Even though it is a liable claim of controversy, the community of the peninsula ranges from one hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand settlers. The marshy peninsulas along with its correlate small islands are crucially situated at the controlling entry of Nigerian port of Calabar. The encircling waters are filled with many fish, oil and gas deposits. The conventional settlers are mostly Efik fishermen with links to Nigerian Calabar region. Bakassi is located at the eastern edge of the Gulf of Guinea, at the point where the warm eastward moving Guinea Current referred to as Aya Efiat in Efik joins with the cold northward moving Benguela Current also referred to as Aya Ubenekang in Efik Itiat (2012). These big ocean currents come in contact making big foamy breakers that continuously advance to the shore, and creating submarine reefs, which are affluent in shrimps, fishes, and a wide range of other aquatic creatures. This then causes Bakassi region to be a very productive space for fishing. Majority of the settlers are living off fishing. According to research conducted, the Bakassi peninsula undergoes coastal erosion, a common occurrence of groundwater, eradication of its biodiversity, oil discharge and equally contamination because of insufficient environmental conservation programs. However, irrespective of these surrounding threats, Bakassi peninsula in no ambiguity constitutes a national power because of its strategic position and economic probability. This there for explains the assertion ownership and counter claims and military contest over the authority and jurisdiction of the peninsula in the 70's 80's and 90's by Cameroon and Nigeria

4.16 Constitutional Disposition.

The Nigerian constitution of 1999 explicitly includes Bakassi as one of the local governments of the federal republic of Nigeria. In its section 12(1), the constitution states that Bakassi is one of the local government areas, which falls under the jurisdiction of the 18 local governments of the Cross-river state region in Nigeria. As written in the first section of the 1999 constitution, in section 3(1) it explains the existence of 36 states that make up the federal republic of

Nigeria. Furthermore, in the section 3 sub 6 it states that there shall be also 768 local government or administrative units. One of the local governments is Bakassi, this therefore makes Bakassi embedded in the Nigerian constitution as it was also one of its points raised to the ICJ to support its claims over the rightful ownership of the Bakassi peninsula and supports the governments of Nigeria deployment of a military and administrative authority to the region Ajaebili (2011). This disposition by the Nigerian constitution supported its fights and claims over the island and contributed to the conflict.

4.17 In application of Bilateral Border Agreements

In another dimension, the inability to apply agreements reached between the both states over their border difference contributed to the conflict in its own. Post-independence, both Cameroon and Nigeria embarked on delimitation of their common border. In between 1970 and 75 approximately five significant agreements had been signed between Cameroon and Nigeria about the precision of their border. In August 14, 1970, the Yaoundé agreement was reached which laid down modalities for the demarcation and delimitation of the border to be carried out in three phases, which included the maritime boundary via the land boundary and concluding with the Lake Chad frontier area. The second Yaoundé declaration in April 4 of 1971 saw both heads of states of Nigeria and Cameroon Yakubu Gowon and Ahmadou Ahidjo respectively agreed on a “compromise line” demarcating the maritime frontier on twelve points. This was ensued by the declaration of Lagos in June of 1971 Lukong(2011) which broadened the maritime delimitation to 17.7 (NM) Nautical miles from the 3 NM initially agreed upon in Yaounde second declaration. After this was the Kano declaration of 1 September 1974, where the heads of states of both countries created a safe ground and extension of 2 and 4km on either side of the frontier in which oil extraction was prohibited. Lastly, the exchange of letters between both heads of state on the one of June 1975, which was later, modified in July 1975, which was about the delimitation of the frontier on eight counted positions. (Lukong, 2011:21)

In slightly after a year when both states came up with the Second Declaration of Yaoundé, in a meeting in Garoua of the mixed boundary commission, the

Nigerian delegation questioned the declaration and said the Nigerian president had alleged that the declaration was not acceptable. The Nigerian head of state followed suit with this decision in a letter addressed to his Cameroonian correlative that that decision was unacceptable. This was just the beginning Of the Nigerian impulse in rejecting existing declarations she had fully taken parts in. From 1977, it had become a normal issue for Nigeria to reject former declaration in 1977 she equally rejected the Maroua declaration and even the Compromise line which was drawn by the Nigerian president Yakubu Gowon himself. In response to the rejection of the Maroua declaration, the Nigerian government said the president had taken into the declaration without the approval of the military council and hence the senate failed to ratify it (Lukong, 2011: 18). These inability to respect legal border declarations only raise the tension level between both states. In most cases of the rejection of the former declarations where situations where she envisages her national interest will be a threat. This therefore supports the assertion of national interest being a fundamental factor in international relations.

4.18 Change of Colonial Masters and Governments within the Belligerent States.

Conceivably, it can be stated that colonizers usually demarcated frontiers to guarantee their economic, political and strategic interest. As presented by Aghemelo. and Ibhasebhor (2006), the boundaries drawn by former colonial powers were solely to meet their own appeals and not to settle indigenous people where the rightly belong. In every case where this decision had to be made, there was always the same outcome. Colonial powers never took into consideration separation of ethnic groups, clans, tribes etc when they divided the areas of influence. Precolonial boundaries in Africa were not demarcated based on political or economic criterion. Delimitation was based off relationships, myths, spiritual antics, and identity and migration stories with the use of physical striking landscape features to indicate these differences. The boundaries existed for the ideal use for internal separations only and showed an African perspective of thought within space. The European cartography imposed on Africa was far complex and advanced in a sense to suit political power demarcate various regions of their tax schemes. In clear terms on can argue that

European cartography in Africa gave birth to the national identities. So, the conferences which were held in Europe to presumably solve boundaries issues among African countries was most effectively to ease tension between themselves and divide spheres for application of the European economic centric policies on their African colonies.

With changes in colonial masters came changes in the boundary structure to adjust to new interest. Cameroon was formerly a German colony, after the defeat of the former in WWI; it became French and British protectorate (www.postwatchmagazine.com/2005/05/bakassi). However, Nigeria remains a British territory but with the transition in Cameroon came changes in the boundary structure and need for renegotiation with Nigeria. The needs for these new changes to the already existing boundaries were mostly to suit the concern of the French and British. Some scholar's proposition suggests that this constant change in boundaries laid foundation for the existential territorial conflict, which is common within most African countries post-independence era. Bakassi dispute among many others is an example to substantiate this view. Colonial boundaries of course have imposed significant disadvantages in Africa. Even worse is the balkanization, which further divided these territories into smaller fragments. This is not only directly linked to the dispute over Bakassi as it is a typical example of Balkanization within the African continent to please the colonial needs of Britain and France, this has also created an outward orientation. Thus, African states look towards a relationship with their former colonizers due to the fragmented structure of infrastructure left by colonial powers rather than links within the continent with each state; they are tied to their relations out of the continent. This crisis in Bakassi and other African countries suggest that the colonial changes and maps laid was not stable for the formation of African states.

According to Jackson and Roseberg (1982) the structure of states left from colonialism is responsible for inter/intra state conflict. The ongoing crisis within African states context in many states in Africa reflects this. The boundaries of colonialism allowed for complete jurisdiction over each state territory but the European powers never exercised this form of control. This control then became mandatory for the states after independence. The boundaries of colonialism

created the unstable infrastructure of African states and hence directly linked the Bakassi conflict and the surge in the self-proclamation identity in contemporary Africa. The form of jurisdiction exerted over the territories by the African leader's post-independence had not been put into perspective of their respective territorial limits demarcated by the Europeans. However, this structure could not withstand this jurisdiction. Many scholars have contended that the present state boundaries in Africa are arbitrary that is the boundaries were realized juridical with agreements with foreign nation (colonial powers) instead of empirically with the occupants of the territories integrating under a common framework of community. With the disposition, it can be argued that very few African states are can be classified as stable in view of their juridical attained boundaries.

Equally, the rampant changes in government between these states especially Nigeria pushed this states to scuffle. In political terms, change in government is correlative to change in the power structure of a state. When a new government takes over power, there is a probability of change in administrative ideals and policy that represented the previous government. Sometimes this change can be very divergent from antecedent leadership to suit the ambitions of the current administration. The most compelling impact this has is not just within the state but also with its relations with other states. Its previous treaties agreements can be a subject of great disdain as in most cases within Africa this transition from one government to another is usually radical. From the administration of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa right down to Olusegun obasanjo, there has been stiff changes in the policy and approach and how it has influence the Bakassi dispute. This influence in most cases has not been towards a peaceful solution but rather towards diversion in common instances. On the other hand, Cameroon has not witnessed frequent change in government comparatively to Nigerian. The transition from the former head of state Ahmadou Ahidjo to Paul Biya was practically stable in terms of the foreign policy towards Nigerian and the Bakassi dispute. However, the level of commitment and diplomatic approaches differs with the both head of state. For Instance, during president Ahidjo's term of office, he enjoyed a cordial relation with Nigeria and the management of the Bakassi dispute during his presidency was strictly diplomatic. His efforts with

reaching the 1975 Maroua agreements with Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and the successes from the meetings in Kano, Maidugari and Yaoundé depict his commitment to achieving a peaceful solution. However, these attributes can be argued on not solely his commitment to a diplomatic solution but his relationship with Nigeria. His mother was Nigerian and he spent part of his childhood in Nigeria and went to the same school with Yakubu Gowon who later became president hence making it difficult for them to disagree considerably over the Bakassi issue.

Most government transitions in Nigeria were usually military coups. However, after independence in 1962 when Tafawa Balewa came to power in 1962, there was no issue with the ownership of Bakassi peninsular. In 1962, Ahidjo and Tafawa exchange notes as first's head of states for Cameroon and Nigeria respectively Nowa (2006). In this exchange of notes, Tafawa acknowledges that Bakassi is not part of the Nigerian territory. As governments change especially within Nigeria, each leader had his own view of the actual limit of the border with Cameroon. The most prominent deviations to the initial views of Tafawa came mostly from Military leaders who took over power with a coup. When General Murtala Mohammed overthrew Gowon from power in 1975, he objected every decision Yakabu Gowon had taken in view of Bakassi. In his point of view, Bakassi belong to Nigeria and the acknowledgment by Gowon's regime of Bakassi not being part of Nigeria to him was exorbitant (Lukong, 2011: 10). Some critics to his regime have laid claims he had an agenda, which was to tarnish his predecessors reign. His perspective put into question previous agreements as far back as the 1913 Anglo-German agreement hence laying the basis for the Bakassi dispute. Another regime change of note with an impact in the Bakassi dispute is the transition from Babangida to General Sani Abacha. In most instances, his accession to power has been deemed a coup (Lukong, 2011:10). However, his coming to power was unfavorable to the negotiations in the Bakassi peninsula he created an administrative base in Bakassi occupying villages of Jabane in the heart of negotiations. He equally marched his troops into the region where they encountered confrontations with the Cameroonian army. It was during his tenure that Cameroon after repeated failure attempts at negotiation between the both states resorted to report the dispute to the ICJ. In a

lesser extent, regime changes did not only bring major changes like we've seen above. It equally stalled negotiations and pushed back progress made in the course to arrive at an agreement in negotiations.

4.19 Opinions Of Bakassi People

For me to get an in-depth view of the Bakassi issue, I went to some Villages in Bakassi to get the views of the people of Bakassi. This was significantly important since they live in the region, their views and opinions would be more specific as to what the cause of the issue is. However, to do this, one of the major challenges was to get to Bakassi. Ironic how rich a place is yet it's inaccessible. The roads to Bakassi are virtually upkept so accessing this area by land is difficult; however I went through the sea from Limbe with the government survey group for population census. Notwithstanding, it's more dangerous to go to Bakassi by the sea because of the presence of pirates on the waters in this area.

Nonetheless, with the government survey group, we had security and better transportation systems to survive the harsh waters of this area and the pirates as well. Also after arriving there, the roads linking the villages in Bakassi are literally inaccessible as well so the major means of transportation here is with the use of motor bikes and canoes. The bikes easily connect the villages as they can better access the road tracks which link these villages. Some other areas I accessed using Canoes where it was necessary. My Interviews were very random and on certain cases with people who really wanted to talk, they asked to meet another time in private or in public. I talked to 30 people from the ages of 40 and above male and female, because I believed they will have an experienced inside on this issue. I had at least 5 interviews in each village from Isangele, Akwa, Idabato, Kombo Itindin and Kombo Abedimo. The people I interviewed are traders, fishermen, a teacher and a civil servant uneducated and educated respectively. The idea of my interviews was not met with the same reactions in every case it was very scary in most cases just breaking this conversation; I was almost beaten in Idabato. In most cases, people were afraid to talk to me, some feared I worked under cover for the government and I

wanted to get them arrested eventually based on their remarks. In most cases, this fear expressed by most people is because of the brutality the Cameroonian Gendarme forces have inflicted on the inhabitants of Bakassi especially those of Nigerian decent. So not everyone welcomed the idea of talking about the Bakassi issue as some were aggressive towards it that's why most people whom i interviewed did not want their names to be mentioned. On another note, most of the people in this region are uneducated as this region had been mostly neglected so there are very few schools there which were opened just recently.

Furthermore, regarding how i undertook my interviews as i said earlier we mostly random, but knowing how sensitive the issue is to the people i was advice to engage in conversations with persons I intended to interview. So, in most cases I would sit introduce myself to create an atmosphere of trust with the person I interviewed. The nature of the issue to the people of this region makes some people afraid to talk about it. So, some people did not talk to me on our first encounter instead the requested we met again in another location to talk and for them to further understand the intent of my questions. Even after explaining to them the intent of my questions, most of the people with views opposed to the actions of the Cameroonian Gendarmes still requested to stay anonymous for fear of backlash if I worked for the government.

In line with the fact that I used a qualitative research methodology, my questionnaire was very basic in its nature. The fact most settlers in the Bakassi region are mostly illiterate, our means of communication was in Pidgin English (broken English). Therefore, my questions to them were for them to tell me in their perspective what the cause of the Bakassi issue is. The views and their perspective varied on with visible links to their nationalities and individual aspects of what the main issue is. Below is summary representation of the interviews not all of them are represented here only the few with varied perspective. Some of the responses are reported in the same words of the people in Pidgin English, majority of the inhabitants here can't speak in English.

A Nigerian a fisher man who insists his identity by kept confidential told me in his perspective the issue mainly is held in lines of division between Nigerians and Cameroonians. In his view, Nigerians suffered from this difference and they (Nigerians) are targets to the Cameroonian Gendarme forces in the region.

Alluding to the fact that there are suspicions of them trying to take the place away from the Cameroonians due to its oil and fish resources. He points out the fact that the gendarmes brutalize Nigerians in the region with no justification of their actions.

In a similar view, in an interview with Ruth (December 2014) a Nigerian woman trader in Akwa says (Dem di vex with we them no like we because we di make market) Cameroonians in Bakassi do not like them since they operate businesses and get money from them. To her, it's because of jealousy by Cameroonians towards Nigerians in the region since Nigerians operate most businesses in the region. Hence, in her perspective she thinks it is an economic oriented issue with the settlers in Bakassi from Cameroonian and Nigerian decent.

Taking complete contrary view to Ruth's point of view is Pa Tom (December 2014) a Cameroonian primary school teacher in Isangele. According to him, the issue in the region is because of Nigerian settlers who do not respect the laws of the region. To him, it because of their actions that the Gendarmes were sent to the area to protect it from their criminal activities. He states from example that most of the Nigerian settlers in Bakassi are people who fled the 1966 Nigerian civil war. They came and settled in the region and started pirate activities and illegal fishing in the region. It is in retaliation of their actions by the gendarmes that the Nigerians think we do not like them as he adds. He goes further to state (No na only them dey for here other people too from Chad, Congo di stay for here too but why na only them di get problem with gendarmes) that there are nationals from Chad, Congo living in Bakassi but they are no occasions where they have experienced brutality from the gendarmes.

Also, a Nigerian Mr. Uche a fisher man (December 2014) from the Igbo tribe in Nigeria says it's a tribal issue between the Ifik,Ibiobio and Igbo people(We di fear we plenty as we dey here so, Gendarmes them di just see man for road hold am beat am). He says these tribes continue to leave with constant fear, as they are the targeted in Bakassi by the Cameroonian Gendarmes. He further explains that the problem in Bakassi is from the Europeans and that for him it is because the Europeans want to exploit the region from its resources.

Furthermore, in another view sort of unique in all is this was a Cameroonian woman a who did not have a lot to say as she simply puts it, (All man know say Nigeria their old president Gowon be don sell this place for Cameroon since) “Everyone knows Gowon sold Bakassi to Cameroon”. In her perspective, all the issues surrounding Bakassi had transpired between former presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon (Yakubu Gowon and Ahmadou Ahidjo). To her the issues here were mainly political and had nothing to do with the differences with either Cameroonians or Nigerians in the region.

Moreover, many people in the area tied the issue in Bakassi to be because of colonialism. On this view, many Nigerians and Cameroonians had the same perspective of what they thought to be the reason for the issues in Bakassi. Many of them referring to the past that they lived in peace without any major links with nationality just tribes in the Bakassi region. In their views, the coming of the Whiteman in the region brought a sense of division amongst them and the idea to have a side, which you belong. In addition, that even after the white man had left, they continue to show their difference and ideological belonging which only continues to bring them more trouble.

When interviewed on December 2014 Mr. Ben said explains, however, not everyone in the area sees in this perspective Mr. Ben a Cameroonian civil servant does not take any side in his opinion. He gives a brief history when Cameroon and Nigeria existed as one; many Nigerians entered Cameroon and operated businesses. He said (Wa only problem whe we be get with Nigeria na say them be di force we for buy market from them even if you no want buy) they were only hated by Cameroonians because of their dominant attitudes where they forced people to buy the things they sold. He said these differences had existed already in the past and now it was just transcending in to the new times and lines of independence. He says the major reasons why the governments want to draw lines of the border is so people will stop illegal fishing acts, which is very common here.

Mr. Peter a Nigeria local business man presented another very interesting perspective from Ifik tribe. In his perspective, the problems of the region are from non-respect for of the traditional values among the tribes in the region. In his view this is he said when they have a traditional festival going own the other

tribes in the region do not respect the rules they seek during this period. In his words, (If we move wa juju people for different tribes them no di follow the law them whe we di follow am when we move juju. So, this thing di make am we di get problems them because no man no di show respect for another man e juju) so, in his opinion this is the cause of the problem in Bakassi.

To a Nigerian man whose name I will keep confidential says the issue is just because of the discovery of petrol. He says the governments of either Cameroon or Nigeria do not really care about the people living in this area. To him if not for the petrol discovered in the region no one will know it exist. The fight between both states is just for who to control the petrol found in the region. He went further to say that even though they have discovered petrol there, there is still nothing being done by either government to improve their living conditions in Bakassi.

Through my time here and experience from talking to some of this people, I realized one significant issue. There exist very strict lines of division in the views of the people based on their nationalities. It's almost as if there is a confrontation waiting to be triggered by the slightest motive. Although the people of this area continue to carry on their daily activities without any worry, it's easy to tell there is a lot of grievances subjected beneath their faces. Some Nigerians still hold a strong perspective the region will be returned to their country. For the most part, they simply want to carry on with their daily activities of fishing and eliminated some of the taxes which they pay. From my time spent here, although this issue is resolve, it has issued a new sense of consciousness and an atmosphere which needs to be cleared so this people can continue to live their lives in harmony. However regardless of all this differences in lines of perspective, this people still share the same concerns about the wellbeing of this regardless of their nationalities. They still just want development, health care, schools, infrastructure and improved standards of living. This leads me to support more of the view that the local indigenes should have to be included in determining the outcome of their destiny. Cameroon and Nigeria who dispute over this region want it for its resources the people living in the area are of no consequence to the governments of this belligerent states.

5 WHY THE BAKASSI DISPUTE DIDN'T LEAD TO WAR

In this section, I will be making an analysis on the factors that contributed to hinder a possibility of the both belligerent states from going to war over the Bakassi peninsular. In my analysis, I will bring out to what extent the contributing factors influenced the peaceful settlement of the dispute without recourse to war and their limitations citing strong references to support my claim. Territorial disputes from ancient have been one of the main sources of intra state violence. They have been classified by some scholars with some characteristic that assesses the stakes involved in a territory that can influence the antagonistic states to go to war over it. War being an organized use of military force in this case to satisfy a minimal threshold of severity. Danilovic (2012) Clash over territory may be entrenched in three kinds of interest: security, economic and ethnic motives. Two states interest may clash over a territory if it contains valuable resources the most common being oil resources, minerals or rich agricultural soil potential. Security concerns can also arise when the portion of territory has a strategic position whose possession could prove to have strategic military advantage to the state it belongs. It could be a position that gives a state a better view in a situation to mount a defense from incoming threat Cashman (2000). This could be a hilltop or mountain pass which, could be the only possible invasion route. In addition, on the final ingredient that could push states strife over a territorial segment to war is if there are ethnic or religious ties between the people that live in the territory and the occupants of the state that wants to lay claims over the territory. Senese and Vasquez (2008)

In the Bakassi, dispute we sort of have all this different interest clamoring in the disputed area thus raising the stakes involve in the disputed region. According to theory of war, these different challenges will make states bargaining over a territory very unattainable. A territory with strategic military value might be very difficult to bargain since its possession gives critical advantage and averts the bargaining power prospects in the future. Every state involved in a dispute

over this kind of territorial faction will be reluctant to concede it to its adversary for fear they might use it against them to exploit continuous demands thus making it a commitment issue. Claims of territory with ethnic or religious ties can be difficult to give up since most governments are interested in reuniting with their kin rather than separating from them. Religious and ethnic ties make a territory difficult to divide or cede. Borman et al (2015). On the other hand, even though it seems like the most difficult to bargain, territory with economic interest does not present the same challenges except where the economic benefits are significantly extensive that retaining the territory will provide considerable advantage Lake et al (2010). With that said it is easier to accommodate economically valuable territories over the other two paradigms. The Bakassi dispute is an ideal case with all these elements involves but without the contentious states resulting to war which sort of an unforeseen situation is considering the stakes that were involved.

According to analysis and statistic gathered over the world on territorial disputes with military involvement and wars. In each case, they determined if the territory that was sought after by the two states contained economically important resources, a strategically valuable location and if it was home to people with common ethno-religious or linguistic ties. In each case from 1950 - 1990, they accumulated information on whether and when each dispute led to political or military conflict. In political frame, they summed their analysis to include hostile rhetoric's, diplomatic and economic sanctions and as well adversarial support by one state to overthrow another's government or destabilize it, while militarized conflict involved threat or use of force. Huth K, 1998, cited by Lake et al (2010). In the statistics gathered by Huth from over 129 countries, the evidence shows a steady pattern. On a medium, military and political was very likely to take place when there were linguistic and ethnic ties between those in the contested territory and the states making claims over it. The threat of conflict was likely lower for disputes with strategic territory and those involving economically valuable territory. The least likely to lead to political conflict was territory with economic interest. Thus, the type of interest at stake has a significant consequence on the negotiation interaction and of course, whether it leads to war or peace.

Furthermore, the reason why these states did not resort to war to settle the dispute over Bakassi, we need other paradigms to make an explanation. This leads us to the interdependence theory.

5.1 Interdependence Theory

It has been argued by many scholars for long that peace is a clear externality to world commerce. Significant research to affirm this liberal conviction that trade aids global peace. Thinkers like Immanuel Kant, Montesquieu have asserted this claim to a high degree. Nevertheless, in critical bases, the correlation between economic and politics is more complicated than a simple trade conflict correlation. The classical liberals hold that economic interdependence, democracy and international organization have capable and significant effect in reducing the prospect of state involvement in militarized conflict Mansfield et al (2004). In their views of the eightieth and ninetieth century, they perceived economic interdependence to have control that is more pacific. Thus, commercial interest brings states together in a web of common interest that inhibits them from the use of force. It is in the same perspective that Cordell Hull said, “if trade crossed borders, soldiers won’t” Mansfield et al (2004).

In the Kantian perspective of analysis, democracy is not the only incentive that causes peace in interstate state relations. They expanded their analysis to include belonging to international organization as another reason for peace. In their review of the cold war era, it is evident that trade and a chain of intergovernmental organization reduced in a great deal the number of militarized interstate dispute. It is important to reiterate that interdependence and conflict does not duel solely on reciprocal trade combinations but also interdependence by international capital that exceeds interchange of goods and services. Jackson (2014) Capital market relations contain aspects of local economies that have slight international exposure, movement of capital for trade items that serve the purpose of import and export of goods and services. With focus on economic links between states referred in other circumstances as globalization or integration, this leads us to pose a question if economic interdependence influences the political comportment of states, is there any

military constrain in their actions towards each other. This question has been the basis of several research paradigms for different scholars.

Most Scholars have argued in different directions Immanuel Kant argued that liberal trade among nations creates absolute peace and he further emphasized that free trade is a key element to global peace. In a contrasting view, Jean Jacque Rousseau contended that this form of integration would only bring about tumult and conflict. It is ambiguous to bring about a point of convergence in establishing what characterizes economic interdependence between states. I will present various views and evidence from different perspective to support this Kantian religion that economic interdependence inhibited Nigeria and Cameroon from going to war over the Bakassi peninsula. Before moving ahead, it is important not to mistake interdependence with interconnectedness. The outcome of negotiations on interdependence will depend on constraints associated to them, in situations where there is mutual costly outcome of transactions there is interdependence. If cooperation doesn't have compelling costly effects it's simply interconnectedness. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 1989, Quoted by Crescenzi (2005).

In the views of Baldwin, economic interdependence is an action of likely exit cost that states incur from breaking economic ties. Concealed inside economic interaction that is a simple transaction of good and services, interdependence contains an undertone of constraints which are tangled commitments that are valuable to break Crescenzi (2005). States tie their economies to influence their political behavior that is if economic markets are left alone to develop, they will automatically grow to tie states by trade thereby diminishing the political boundaries and conflict. This economic exchange will limit security interest, as there is absence of a treat but more interactions this in turn diverts national interest to be replaced by the search of wealth.

In relating the perspective of Cameroon and Nigerian per the views of Kant, the high level of interdependence between the both states strengthened the peaceful ties between then there by, creating more incentives to keep their cooperation and profitable trade environment and human mobility as it was despite the concerns provided by the strife they have over the peninsular. As the economic ties grew stronger, so did the incentives to keep a peaceful status-quo and

cooperative environment as such limiting the probability of war. In the same light as the argument presented by Beyene (2014) wealth increase within each state involve in an economic tie creates a domino effect on political conflict. The beneficiary from the increased wealth will mount pressure on their governments to preserve the status-quo through peace. This then makes diplomacy to become a conduct thus limiting security concerns. The governments become susceptible to their citizens as they seek to keep their new prosperity by pushing their governments to cooperate more with other states.

Furthermore, in the perspective of Solomon Polacheck, war and trade have an asymmetric relationship. If trade increase, there is a decrease in war or any form of strife that can affect the trade relations. Trade develops naturally through comparative advantage and resource allocation. As soon as trade connections are established and in place, states will do whatever is necessary to conserve their wellbeing improvements. In continuing with his arguments, He also argued that states involved in more trade in a balance would have a higher cost of conflicts so everything being equal, they will be involved in less conflict Crescenzi (2005). To support these claims not only with the contest of a territorial conflict, Figures produced by the Economist in 1997 show that world trade volume increase about sixteen folds after the end of World War II. Regional integration in Europe (EU) and Asia (ASPEC) Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation have been responsible for fueling the economies of this various regions and the globe at large. Crescenzi (2005). The table below represents Reported trade figures between Cameroon and Nigeria from 1996- 2010. It should be noted that there is a very high volume of illegitimate trade going on in the border between this two nations due to the high level of accessibility on the wide border. From Soule (2001), Nigeria's massive size makes up over 60% of the consumers in West Africa. With over 50% of industrial and manufacturing potential, most of its trade is with its neighbors however, the trade with its neighbors is always inaccurately perceived. The figures on the table are just a quota of the reported trade between these two countries. However, although it does not present data from the origin of struggles in Bakass, it is a strong indication of the progression prior to this date below. These details show how

economically interdependent both states had even at the peak of their altercation which inhibited the possibility for the discord over Bakassi to lead to a war.

Table 5.1: Trade Figures Between Cameroon And Nigeria From 1996 - 2010

Period	Reported Import value of Cameroon from Nigeria in US\$	Reported Export value from Cameroon to Nigeria in US\$	Reported Import Value of Nigeria from Cameroon in US\$	Reported Export Value from Nigeria to Cameroon in US\$
1996	116,534,304	17,723,788	453,622	158,890,708
1997	115,625,552	14,958,937	429,759	60,731,623
1998	125,851,065		746,985	100,345,536
1999	167,626,000		574,308	186,793,984
2000	285,250,202	13,872,905	873,531	246,215,117
2001	258,239,883	13,407,865	3,478,875	125,018,641
2002	200,625,425	15,169,308	31,769,292	112,712,122
2003	345,455/170,205,463	16,743,844	808,501	313,143,864
2004	7,543/292,792,590	24,751,659		
2005	605,463,891	15,772,249		
2006	57,661,141/735,421,893	21,328,143	8,394,956	1,068,709,140
2007	1,237,314,622	98,857,356	3,940.653	519,779,925
2008	13,515,742	32,081,012	1,393,444	477,627,046
2009	9,670,424	24,535,848	1,927,581	490,906,346
2010	18,655,351	28,275,416	1,927,581	500,923,965

Sources: Compiled from *Comtrade. UN.org*. A compilation of reported import and export trade figures between Cameroon and Nigeria from 1996-2010

According to the table above, trade volumes millions of USD increase progressively. However, most of the trade statistics between these states during the Bakassi issue is unaccounted. A large volume of the trade figures is missing in the above table. These figures are just to present a clear understanding to support the trade relation. Although not reported here this evidence is strong enough to show that prior to this period, these states were still involved in trade. However, it is insufficient to claim that the high level of economic interdependence between this two these states restricted them from going to war. This Kantian principle presents itself to be limited in many different levels of analysis as Rousseau noted economic interdependence only leads to more controversies and conflict. In the critic presented by Wagner, he challenges the hypothesis of bargaining power of Economic interdependence by Hirschman, Keohane and Nye saying their perspective is perceptive and has many flaws. Describing the flaws in the words of Harsanyi as “Blackmailer’s Fallacy”. They believe, if one state X could give in to the demands of another state Y rather than suffer from punishment, then it is possible for the state Y to take any demand from X by only threatening state Y without punishment. In Wagner’s argument, he states that the philosophy neglects the significance state Y attaches to the demand of state X and the cost of state Y to implement its threat. Crescenzi (2002). This leads us to next reason to support the argument why the conflict did not result to a war. I will look at ethnic ties and how the influence the peaceful settlement of the Bakassi conflict.

5.2 Ethnic Ties and Conflict Relation.

The Bakassi dispute evolved in different phases, escalated on several occasions, and came to the brink of war many times. However, for some reasons there was no actual militarized confrontation over the peninsular. In supporting this view as to why it did not lead to war, Ethnic ties are one of the reasons that restrained these belligerent states from going to war. In the perspectives presented by Papaioannou and Michalopoulos (2012), to quantify the effects of the scramble for Africa, it requires identifying the partitioned groups. For example, the Maasai have been split between Kenya (62%) and Tanzania (38%), the Anyi between Ghana (58%) and the Ivory Coast (42%), and the Chewa between

Mozambique (50%), Malawi (34%), and Zimbabwe (16%) but they still share similar beliefs though greatly affected by partition of Africa. If you look at the demographics of the people living in Bakassi, over 98% of the populations are comprised of Nigerians with Ancestral roots from the Cross-river state and Akwa Ibom states in Nigeria. Now from various studies which will be enumerated below, an analysis of the relationship/influence between ethnic ties and territorial dispute will be made and to what degree. In addition, this analysis will establish an understanding of the situations under which states are inclined to make or intensify a territorial claim based on ethnic ties. Nevertheless, in my presentation I will be analyzing these claims and showing how they inhibited the possibility of this states from going to war over the Bakassi peninsular. Alluding to Esman (1994), most states obtain their legitimacy from some form of shared existence of a common ethnic group, this could give states almost the moral empathy to make territorial claims where this links existed at whatever cost. However, despite these avenues for states to make such territorial claims, not all states have engaged to make such claims. There are certain characteristics that is common with states that are involved in any territorial claim the challenger and its target that are the major determinants whether a state engages in a territorial claim Allee and Huth (2006). In this analysis, the challenger state is Nigerian and the Target State is Cameroon, the most significant factor that could motivate territorial claim in a situation of shared ethnic group is the population demography of the challenger state. However, still in their view states are more likely to seek settlement by resolution when the dispute is significantly important to domestic groups Alle and Huth (2002, P 291). In this case, the role of this ethnic groups influenced their respective states to seek peaceful settlement.

In the first hypothesis, Huibregste (2010). if an ethnic group composes a majority in the challenger state, there is a high probability to institute a territorial claim over a territory with shared ethnic group. Ethnic fractionalization as a component of ethnic configuration has always had conflict-dampening effects in the international level. Huibregste (2010). Not every leader is guided by the ambition of bringing all their people under one rule and political banner. In most cases, it's a cost and effect benefit analysis

that will involve such and attempt of territorial claim in material terms and reputation. However, in the Bakassi case the Nigerian leaders considered other aspects that were granted to them based on the ICJ settlement and realized a claim will cost more than the benefits of simply re-uniting their people under one banner. In a statement by the Nigerian head of state Olusegun Obasanjo after the ICJ judgment in 2006, “As a great advocate of the observance of the rule of law nationally and internationally and a great believer in the settlement of disputes peacefully, we accepted the verdict notwithstanding our disappointment. However, as the ICJ itself recognized and, as we indicated after the verdict, human beings are involved and we are concerned about them and their plight rather than about land and water, the jurisdiction of which the ICJ judgment gave to Cameroun. We assured the Nigerians living in Bakassi and all Nigerians that their interest will be protected in the process of implementation of the ICJ judgment”. Dawodu (2015). Thus, this explains to a degree why there was no war over Bakassi.

Moreover, in applications of Hensel et al (2014) perspective in another hypothesis, A Challenger State in this case Nigeria is less likely to initiate territorial claim over a shared ethnic group when there is greater global backing to territorial integrity norm. As seen in previous analysis within this text, the Nigerian public was furious as to why the leaders had given up on the quest to get Bakassi. The population demographic of this region continued to play a significant role in inciting Nigerian to go ahead beyond the judgment of the ICJ to pursuit the claim. Notwithstanding the UN in its charter clearly stated for member states to respect the territorial integrity of another independent state and restrain from infringement into their sovereignty and independence. Nigeria being a member of the United Nations had no options but to respect the rules laid down by the charter of the UN which she had rectified.

Furthermore, if a shared ethnic group is within the target state is not represented with the government of the target state; there is less likelihood of the challenger state to make any claim Hensel et al (2014). In the population demographics of settlers in the Bakassi region, they are mostly from the Calabar and Akwa Iboom states. The central government of Nigerian contains a very few indigenes from these regions. As the voices of the people in the Bakassi region echoed to

their home government in Nigeria, there was no representation in the central administration to push forth their ideals and needs to be united with their fellow compatriots.

On the other hand, it will be absurd to take this analysis as being completely enough to support the claim of prohibiting these states from going to war. However, this leads us to make an analysis of the Nigerian foreign policy and Judge the contributions it had to support the previous claims analyzed.

5.3 Nigerian Foreign Policy and Its Role in Inhibiting a War.

In this part of the analysis, I will focus on Nigeria's foreign policy, its Afro-centric nature and role in preventing the Bakassi dispute from going to war. The goal of this analysis is to analyze Nigerian foreign policy towards Africa generally and simultaneously correlate it how it constrained them from going to war over Bakassi with Cameroon. The basis of every foreign policy is domestic policy. As an image of its domestic policy, Nigeria adopted a foreign policy that reflected its internal organization. The Section 19 of the 1979 Nigerian constitution outlined the Nigerian foreign policy as follows Wogu et al (2015).

- I) The Promotion and Protection of National interest
- II) Promotion of African Integration and support of African Unity
- III) Promotion of International cooperation for consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination in all its manifestation.
- IV) Respect for international law and treaty Obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and adjudication.
- V) Promotion of a just world economic order.

In its Afro-centric nature and manner of application of its foreign policy, that has had many critics referring to it as an Afro-centric foreign policy. Nigerian perspective of Africa is wrapped up in this saying, "I am because we are and since we are therefore I am" (Mbitti). After her independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted five policy principles that are centered around African views as follows.

- I) Acceptance of the sovereign equality of all African states
- II) Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African State.
- III) Non-Interference in the internal affairs of other African countries
- IV) Commitment to functional co-operation as a means of promoting African Unity.
- V) Total eradication of racism and colonialism in Africa. Nweke (2010)

The idea of Nigeria's foreign policy being Afro-centric is centered in Nigeria's view of the world through an African perspective. Nigeria considers itself in this regard Nigerian perspective of foreign policy is guided by its views on Africa. From its opinion, to lead Africa and make decisions with Africa at the center of its policy. Since its independence, Nigeria has taken it upon itself the role to be an emancipator in African affairs. This role can be seen in various activity of its involvement in the affairs of the continent. Under the framework, she has been heavily involved in the decolonization process in some African countries like Mozambique, Angola and Namibia. Moreover, she has been very strong participant in South African anti-apartheid clash. In addition, her role in the formation of ECOWAS and support to her members to foster regional development within West Africa cannot be overlooked. Nigeria has pushed the envelope even further being as she has been the main leader in donating both financial and material resources to enable the functions of the OAU peacekeeping forces. She also burst the leading military presence within the OAU peacekeeping forces and the ECOMOG forces. This role and presence of Nigeria in African politics has created an image that she tries to keep alive for other African Nations to follow suit. Because of this position, it has given her the appellation of Giant of Africa and pushed her to lobby for membership with the security council of the UN. Due to this position in African affairs, it made it difficult for Nigerian to challenge the decision of the court as this will be very contrary to her objectives and could hinder her quest within the UN. Hence, this explains why former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo was greatly criticized at home after he refused to challenge the decision of the ICJ. This position occupied by Nigeria and the role it's been performing within the African

context of international relations greatly limited the possibility of the Bakassi dispute with Cameroon from escalating.

5.4 Cameroon's Foreign Policy and Its Role in Preventing War with Nigeria

Cameroon's foreign policy in the wake of the Bakassi dispute even though not very clearly defined can still be framed in its role in the Bakassi issue. However, with the administration of Ahidjo from the early 1960's, Cameroon policy favored the maintenance of very cordial relations with its neighbors. In this era, Cameroon had one of its most friendly foreign policy with Nigeria. This is seen from the perspective of the relation the former president Ahidjo shared with Nigeria. It is alleged that his Mother hailed from the republic of Nigeria and even so, he had very close relationship with the Nigerian leaders. However, with the transition of power from Ahidjo to Paul Biya in 1982, when in his speech in 1983, he clearly asserts. "I am firmly determined to continue on this path of openness within the framework of our laws and regulations and with due respect for the fundamental interests of the nation: liberalization as concerns public freedoms, freedom of thought and of speech, a factor of creativity through the development and discussion of ideas, of fulfillment through participation." Ngolle (1996). The salient question that arises is to what extent and in what ways the process of democratization is likely to affect this pattern of foreign policy making in Cameroon.

In Ngolle's point of view, since attaining sovereign independence, Cameroon has opted for a foreign policy that has been described variously as status quo, conservative, pragmatic, cautious, non-confrontational, capitalist, pro-West, and moderate Ngolle (1996). However Achu establishes that even after independence, France still continued to exert some form of control over Cameroon Achu (2011) These characterizations of the external behavior since independence are for the most part reflective of not only the principles that both the first and current generation of political leadership endorsed as the philosophical foundation of Cameroon's foreign policy, they are also indices of Cameroon's desire to achieve certain objectives in our interactions with the external environment. The extent to which these principles and objectives have been upheld has been largely a function of the domestic situation, which under

the political atmosphere is ripening in terms of the ability to attain the maximum of Cameroon's foreign policy objectives.

Essentially, these foreign policy principles, which include international cooperation, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Pan Africanism, non-alignment, anti-colonialism/imperialism and respect for the territorial integrity of states coined at independence with a view to enabling the young state. To better articulate its position and define its place vis-a-vis others in the international system. These principles coined as a reflection of Cameroon's colonial heritage and legacy, which endowed her with certain national attributes. These objectives, which also happen to be the foreign policy goals characteristic of most African foreign policies in general, include the consolidation of national independence, the achievement of sustained economic development, decolonization, African unity, international peace and security, the achievement of national political stability, and the attainment of international respectability. This is seen in effect in the relationship with Nigeria, how Cameroon continuously seek alternative means to the Bakassi issue.

However, the extent to which they can sustain this international legitimacy would depend partly upon their ability to manage and organize their domestic environments particularly in political and economic terms. Political stability is an objective that has eluded post-independence Africa for much of her history, and under a scenario such as is being played in states such as Cameroon; there is reason to caution that efforts at democratization of domestic politics should not be allowed to eclipse the much-needed foreign policy goal of international respectability or legitimacy. Cameroon is particularly in a much favorable position to reconcile her effort at democratization with the goal of international respectability given her history of political stability, economic progress, and new political leadership. This has however made Cameroon more diplomatically engage in her relations with other state. As member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, (CEMAC) the regional organization has also been able to influence her foreign policy. To promote peace in the central African sub region and Africa at large. Notwithstanding, this organization in view of the Bakassi dispute has shown lack of effort in seeking settlement Achu

(2011). Although Nigeria is not of the organization, as a close neighbor, she benefits from these policies directly. The extent to which she can manage this situation remains one of the challenges of not only her efforts at democratization of domestic politics but also one of the challenges of her future foreign policy.

5.5 Bilateral Diplomacy And Its Role In Peaceful Settlement Of Bakassi Dispute

Bilateralism refers to the handling of activities by two sovereign states together. When states recognize each other as sovereign, they get together and recognize each other's sovereignty and rights of non-interference in their sovereign affairs. They accept to establish diplomatic relations and create embassies and intend exchange ambassadors to foresters this alliance. Most states involve in bilateral agreements usually have similarities in terms of their governments or the values which they live-by and uphold. Some countries have a long historical traditional relationship like India and Nepal. These two countries have had a long bilateral agreement way before the birth of Buddha, it was not until the 1950's when they signed an agreement protecting their bilateral relationship. This agreement helps both states politically and economically. Other example of bilateral agreements includes the relationship between Canada and Australia, where they share the similar form of governments with the queen of England occupying the same position in both states (nominal head of state). The united states and Japan, the united states and South Korea which saw the signing of two treaties the security treaty between US and Japan, the US South Korea status of forces treaty. Bilateralism can be associated to different motives involving the states who are a part of it.

Nigeria and Cameroon even prior to altercations in the 1980's, both states had set up many different agreements, support collaboration and peaceful relationship between the two countries. In this view, they had continuous talks, seminars and workshops on frontier issues to bring about new initiatives and ways to eliminate border disputes. In 1970, under the structure of the first Yaoundé declaration, the mix boundary commission of Cameroon and Nigeria was created in August of 1970. It was given the responsibility of demarcating the maritime border in compliance with the second declaration of April 1971.

The mixed boundary commission met in Lagos and Garoua from October 15-22 and May/August in Nigerian and Cameroon respectively from 1971-72 (Lukong, 2011: 38). However, the commission could not meet its goal to demarcate the maritime boundary due to the inability of Nigeria to confirm the second declaration of Yaoundé. This sent them backwards notwithstanding this did not make the parties stop pursuing their common objectives and continue associating to demarcate the frontier. The commission continued to meet subsequently in later years from right up to 1993 where it became dormant. In this, meetings held between Lagos and Yaoundé, the commission discussed vital border questions and means to promote trans-border relations, strengthen their bilateral relationship and peaceful co-existence.

5.6 Advocating Trans-Frontier Collaboration

In the mixed commission meetings, the meetings served as a symposium for both states to deliberate boundary concerns without any beliefs and emotion. In this objective and clear judgments, each delegation based their decision on facts rather than previous sentiments of attachment to a perspective. Alluding to Lukong (2011), the mixed commission was further significant in its way of appraisal on how the gas and oil fields along the border had to be exploited by both states (Lukong, 2011: 38). To this effect in the commission's meeting in Yaoundé in 1993, the concern of the exploitation of resources on the common border was projected a platform.

5.7 Advocating Sub-Regional Integration

On another note, the mixed commission also endeavored to enhance sub-regional integration and bilateral relations. The mixed boundary commission advocated for regional integration not just limited to both Cameroon and Nigeria but equally to other states with in the Gulf of Guinea sub region. In the meeting organized by the commission in 1991, according to Lukong, Cameroon was represented by a delegation of 53 led by the minister for external relations Roger Booh Booh. Their Nigerian counterpart led by Sandra Nwachukwo who was the Nigeria foreign minister and equally served as the head of the technical committee, accompanied by a contingent of 20 members along with major

general Ike Omar. In the meeting, themed discussions were centered on the encouraging bilateral cooperation. Any unresolved frontier questions or issues that continued to arise during delimiting the frontier and equally a project for the creation of a Gulf of Guinea commission (Lukong. 2011: 38). These meeting strengthened bonds of peaceful collaboration between the two states increasing Tran's frontier and bilateral relations between the both states. Subsequently as was discussed in the meeting the Gulf of Guinea commission (GGC) was later created in 1999 by both states. Its main objected was to establish collaboration between states and extend and preserver peace within the sub region. By the year 2010, it the GGC had grown and engulfed neighboring states with in the sub-region to involve countries like Angola, Democratic republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo and Gabon.

In intent to continue fostering bilateral cooperation between both states by using a different approach, they organized a seminar in 1992. Governors of the Border States attended this seminar with members of their various delimitation and research teams. Admiral Augustus the vice president and head of National frontiers commission led Nigeria. The Cameroonian group was led by the speaker of the house of Assembly Honorable Cavaye Yeguie Djibril the seminar was organized in Yola in the Adamawa region in Nigeria. According to Lukong, as objectives, the Seminar designated to bolster peaceful border relations between Cameroon and Nigeria via improved comprehension of their relations especially the border areas Lukong (2011, P.39). Such understanding is vital because there was genuine socio-economic association that influenced clashes between the people of the border regions. In addition, it was predetermined to build up security, friendship and collaboration among both states by recognizing barriers to this friendship and recommend different ways to build on it. These proposals were to improve the trans-border relations and security in the border region and the sub continental region of and Africa. In addition, it was equally intended to focus on economic and social links between the two countries at the same time working on ways to exploit these potentials for the benefit of both nations. By the end of the seminar both teams had come up with huge detail of varied themes, they had identified which ranged from trans-frontier languages, inter-ethnic relations, trans-border business, development on border sides and

environmental protection on the border and security. Because of this, the formed sub commissions to identify detailed problems and make recommendations on the basis pertaining to an issue.

5.8 Issues Identified and Recommendations Suggested.

The participants of the seminar presupposed that the major reasons for clashes along the frontier was due to the differences in infrastructural and development designs on both sides of the frontier. To counter this, according to (Lukong, 2011: 40), they requested that both states share a universal scheme of development along the border. They equally cited the absence of correlated economic movement between both nations, which in effect inspired unauthorized trade, and other criminal activities across the common border. As a solution to the participants proposed to create an administrative unit to follow up, supervise and authorize trans-border economic activity. The third issue had to do with the absence of deliberations in issues of control of trans-border resources leading to insecurity, under exploitation of the available resources and theft (Lukong, 2011: 40).

As one of the main uncertainties in the region, it was noted that insecurity led to deaths, conflicts and destruction of property. To remedy this, they proposed the creation of an administrative structure to manage the exploitation of universal resources on the common border. Equally, they identified incitation and provocation of violence by the media through it comments, which pushed further hostility and strained border issues on each side of either camp. To this it was requested there will be scrutiny on aggravate comments and broadcast from the media that will be directly or indirectly instigative to violent actions. Furthermore, the absence of collaboration between the forces of security in the fight of crime on both sides of the border was also diagnosed as a problem. In this case, it was proposed that there should be an illustration of applicable juridical mechanism on trans-border assistance in lending and sharing ideas and information from what the other country had applied on similar issues so it will be easier to tackle security exigencies. Equally, the non-application of existing treaties and agreements was also seen as a push back factors in bilateral relations between these states. As a solution, Lukong (2011) they proposed

rectification by respective government institutions with jurisdiction to ratify and apply treaties and accords to avoid further application issues (Lukong, 2011:45). On another note, there was also a noted issue of a universal language on the common frontier, which made it difficult for communication there by affecting many issues ranging from trade development and security. In this case, it was recommended that there should be a harmonize language to be used along the frontier.

However even though these delegates worked in collaboration at this seminar, it should be reckoned that there were enormous differences in the two camps. There were disagreements as to the validity of some previous treaties and agreements signed especially with the Nigerian camp doubting the authenticity of some of the treaties they had signed earlier on. Equally, there were differences in stance as to the level of demarcation that was already done on the frontier. To the Cameroonian delegation, they border was already delimit all that was needed was to intensify it in the form of pillars to show a clear cut. Meanwhile the Nigerian delegation was more concerned about the credibility of the Maroua agreement of 1975 if it should be considered as basis of this new decisions being taken to eliminate the border differences. These discrepancies did not stop this nations from continue discussions and continue finding peaceful solutions to the issues from the peninsular. It led to further efforts in even in situations where skirmishes occurred.

5.9 Diplomatic Mechanism Employed in the Brink of War after the 1981 Border Incident.

Tension continues to mount between the both states as tempers flare in the back and forth disagreement as to where exactly the demarcation of the frontier lied to support which state rightfully owned the Bakassi peninsular. In May 16 of 1981, a confrontation occurred between Cameroon and Nigerian coast guards in the Bakassi peninsula, which resulted to the death of 5 Nigerians (Lukong, 2011: 45). This situation heightened tension and strained the relationship between these states. It was one of the most significant moments in the peak of negotiations between states over the scrambled region that many analysts thought it will provoke a war. Nonetheless, after the incident that led to the death of Nigerian citizens, the government of the federal republic of Nigeria

reacted with an initiation of reconciliation rather than retaliation, which will be common respond in many cases. In international relations states have always put their interest first before their friendship Nigerian reaction to the 1981 incident showered a great deal of restraint and composure as the government instead demanded for an excuse from Cameroon a state with a smaller military and economic capacity relative to Nigeria. The Nigeria government requested punishment for the soldiers involved in this incident and equally compensation for the families of the victims.

To acknowledge Nigeria fairness and willingness for a peaceful settlement of their difference after the death of it citizens, the Cameroonian head of state Ahmadou Ahidjo responded with commitment to reconciliation in the face of the crisis and sent a delegation to Nigeria. The minister of foreign affairs who on meeting with their Nigerian counterpart in Lagos offered condolences to the affected families and proposed the creation of a mix commission to investigate the May 16 incident led the delegation (Lukong, 2011: 45). After the investigation by the mix commission made of Nigerians and Cameroonians, it was resolve that Cameroon should compensate the families of the victims while Nigeria had to pay reparations, as there were damages on the Cameroon embassy because of protest actions after the death of the five Nigerians in Bakassi. This settled the slight constrain in the relationship between the states and intensified border talks between them.

5.10 Exchange of Visit between Heads of State to Boost Bilateral Relations

With frontier talks back on and a stabilized relationship restored, the head of states of both states showed their commitment to diplomatic settlement of their differences as Paul Biya of Cameroon ascended to power he was invited by the Nigerian head of state president Shehu Shagari. This proposition by the Nigerian head of state to his Cameroonian colleague was not just due to the accession of power by president Biya but however to return the visit he had made to Cameroon in February of 1981 on the request of the former Cameroonian head of state Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Notwithstanding it is worth to note that prior to these events, that led to strained relationship between this two states Nigeria and Cameroon had a very cordial

relationship. The role president Ahmadou Ahidjo played during the Nigerian civil war of which started from July 1967 – 1970 cannot be underestimated in the defeat of the Biafran insurgence by the federal government of Nigeria (Lukong,2011: 45). Ahmadou Ahidjo was elementary in the derail of supplies meant for the Biafran mercenaries during the Nigerian civil war as the supplies we transported through the Bakassi region. Most pro Biafran supporters, fighters who were recruited to join the course of the civil war in one way or the other had to access Nigeria through Cameroon. The Douala international airport was one of the areas where most of the persons who had come under the radar of government surveillance in Nigeria use to illegally get to Nigeria. Ahidjo providing his support to General Yakubu Gowon then president of the republic of Nigeria to kill the political surge that was supposed to see the Biafrans break away from the Federal republic of Nigeria. This civil war and Biafrans aspiration for independence from the federal republic of Nigeria was in an extent impeded by Ahidjo's strategic contribution. This support was not just in obstructing supplies for Biafran soldiers but also in the form of arbitrary arrest of wanted civilians who had fled Nigeria to Cameroon. In addition, people wanted in Nigeria arrested as they tried to access Nigeria via Cameroon. This close partnership, friendly relation and assistance is being referenced to by some critics in Nigeria as the reason why the Nigerian government “sort of” to give Bakassi a way to Cameroon as compensation for its assistance during the 1967 civil war.

Responding to the requested visit by the Nigerian head of state, President Paul Biya was joint by a delegation of Governors. The governors Yakum Ntaw and Ousmane Mey of the former Southwest and Northwest provinces of Cameroun respectively (Lukong, 2011:45). In this brief visit of the Cameroonian president to Nigeria, they both resolve to guarantee their commitment to continue and intensify cooperation. In line with this decision, they signed a cooperation agreement to cover the fields of Scientific, economic and technical cooperation. Under the terms of the agreement, both parties intensified the necessity to continue relations in the areas of economic, scientific and technical cooperation. They equally emphasized the respect of the rule of law by foreigners of each nation in their host countries. In full commitment to a diplomatic solution of the

crisis in the border, both head of states publicly decried the rapid surge in interference and intervention in states affairs. Thus, advocating the UN values of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states and respect for boundaries inherited from colonialism. In conjunction to this meeting and engagement to seeking a peaceful solution to the looming crisis the agreement Cameroon ratified the agreement in 1985.

To show good faith in response to this pledge by Nigeria for peace, Paul Biya of Cameroon equally proposed a return Visit to his Nigerian colleague so they can build on the already achieved proposals based on the agreement that they reached during his visit to Nigeria.

5.11 Sustenance of Strained Relations in the Wake of Crisis.

With the wake of instability in Nigeria, there was a military coup (Lukong, 2011: 58), which inevitably led to the ousting of Shehu Shagari. In the face of this new government led by President Mohammed Buhari who took over power in December, the relationship between these states took a severe hit. Due to the overthrow of president Shagari he couldn't affect his return visit to Cameroon by Paul Biya. With a new president in Nigeria, this swayed the relationship with its neighbor (Cameroon) in the wake of the Bakassi dispute. President Buhari instituted one of his very first reforms after coming to office, which was rounding up of foreigners for potential expulsion to their countries of origin. In the plight of this action, over seven hundred thousand Cameroonians were huddled for repatriation.

However, the riff in the relations did not just end here, the military regime of president Buhari transferred into traits and deployment of trained armed mercenaries in the border regions. He equally built military bases in along the border regions and stationed forces in the Lake Chad basin area as well. As of a result of this tense relation and limited medium for discussion and mediation, Nigerian mercenaries attacked Cameroonian villages along the border destroying property, kidnapped and tortured three Cameroonians in February of 1987. Nonetheless the government of President Buhari even though very detrimental to the Cameroon Nigerian relationship, it was abruptly cut short as he was replaced by President Ibrahim Badamassi Babangida. With the current

status quo, there was need to re-establish the bilateral relations between both nations. Nonetheless, this was not the case as President Babangida continued in the same footsteps as his predecessor. Instead seeking mutual understanding and common terms for negotiation and settlement, He sent as envoy to Cameroon the head of his infantry battalion Sani Abacha. His visit was to restore the relations to where they were before the February 1987 incident (Lukong,2011: 58). Despite his visit and communion with Nigerians living in Cameroon at the time, Abacha's visit did not yield the fruits of negotiation as was intended to. In the depth of this weakened relationship, Nigeria invaded and occupied territories within the Cameroonian frontier. They occupied more than ten villages, small islands on the Lake Chad basin dismissed Cameroonian authorities and locals who refused to acknowledge the Nigerian rule. To stress their presence, the Nigerian hoisted its as they took away the Cameroon's deposed traditional rulers and local chiefs.

In the phase of these developments, there was need for rapprochement to dissolve this tense atmosphere. Still with all these altercations lingering on the border these states still held themselves back from a total confrontation. This level of prudence in dealing with an adversary is very exceptional in the Bakassi dispute. This does not just depict the unwillingness of these states in engaging into total war but also their high regard for a diplomatic solution to their differences. The understanding of this relationship will be seen in the next stage of analysis vis-a-vis other territorial related conflicts will be highlighted in the next level of my analysis. These continuous meetings with heads of states from Ahidjo to Paul Biya, Yakubu Gowon, Tarefa to Shagari etc. This back and forth détente by the presidents of both nations is a focal point of their pledge to a peaceful solution for the Bakassi dispute. The status-quo in the Cameroon-Nigeria relations required a bold step from the both nations. In effect, President Ibrahim Babangida visited the republic of Cameroon accompanied by a delegation of governors of all the states with a common boundary with Cameroon. In a meeting, which lasted for two days from December 8-10 in 1987, the Cameroonian head of state was joint by governors from Border States. In the brief visit, the head of states evaluated the nature of their bilateral relations and reassured on themselves of the underlying principles that formed

the basis of their relation. The ethics of respect of territorial integrity, independence, equality, non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states stressed as rhetoric's of their ideals. Acknowledging the need to reaffirm trust and restore the negotiations back to where they were before the wreck, the both head of state issued a communique agreeing to safeguard peace on their common frontier and the formation of a mixed patrol to guarantee this peace, which they sought. Despite these measures to preserve peace and maintain serene bilateral relations, the Cameroon-Nigerian relationship continued to degrade due to the persistence in border confrontations.

5.12 Recession in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations and Extent of Commitment to Fend Off a War

Due to constant confrontation along the mutual border and the inability to maintain peace along the frontier, Cameroon-Nigeria relations continue to deteriorate. In the wake of the 1990's the sub divisional office for the border division of Kombo Abedimo in the Bakassi region was kidnapped along with members of his team by forces of the Nigerian army. Still this antagonistic behavior did not end here Nigerian military proceed to occupy several Cameroonian villages along in some of the raids they put up Billboards to show the area is Nigerian. In one of this occupation missions, the Nigerian military set up an immigration post in Tipsan in the Adamawa province of Cameroon. Accessibility for Cameroon into this region continued to be a problem for its strategic vision. (Lukong, 2011: 59). However, the persistence of these acts did not stop the government's commitment to continue seeking peaceful solutions which they both conceived plausible. In response to this after the OAU, submit Biya paid a visit to Nigeria to meet with the Nigerian head of state. They both re-committed again to continue using dialog to achieve a lasting solution. To crown these efforts, they re-established the mixed commission from 1978 to lead investigations in the ongoing actions. To show obligation in the pacific settlement the Nigerian head of state sent his foreign minister to Cameroon to work and visit the disputed regions. However, these efforts got obstructed as stakes continued to increase and even further. The Nigerian government produced an administrative map demarcating the frontier with Cameroon at Rio Del Rey rather than the Akwayafe (see figure II) as antecedent maps presented.

In response to this Cameroon embarked on exploitation of oil in un-delimited areas of the frontier of the coast of Bakassi in the maritime frontier with Nigeria. This region exceeded the positions that were within the limits of exploitation in the 1975 declaration. However, Nigeria did not revert to this instead; they criticized the basis of the 1975 declaration in a reunion with the mix commission in 1993 (Lukong, 2011: 60). With the onset of power of General Sani Abacha the bilateral relations between this both countries hit rock bottom as he ordered the advance of Nigerian forces into the peninsula occupying the Jabane and Diamond Island. The advance of the Nigerian forces hit adversaries with Cameroon military as the advance halted. This led to scuffles between the both forces as the Nigerian military to continue its advance north. The brawl for position between these forces continued even though no severe casualties were reported, there was loss of lives and property as in some cases, the Nigerian military seized equipment from Cameroon construction workers

Distinguishing their cordial relationship even though the forces we face to face with each other the governments continued to seek non-aligned ways to resolve this issue without going to an open war. This makes the Bakassi conflict very different from other territorial disputes the approach and unwillingness by both states from engaging in to a war is striking. These confrontations prevailed until 2002 according to Lukong, when the Cameroon government device to involved multilateral actors in a quest for peaceful management and resolution of the frontier issue. Even though Cameroon involved the OAU, UN and ICJ to this dispute, that did not stop them from continue seeking a bilateral solution. In the heart of the clashes with their militaries, they continued to send envoys to meet and find mutual understanding on the issue at hand. Paul Biya sent Ferdinand Leopold then minister of external relations to Nigeria who met Baba Gana then Nigerian foreign minister of foreign affairs (Lukong, 2011: 58). They both agreed to form a mix commission solely for the areas of dispute, establish a phone connection between both presidents to get resolute perspectives as to their schemes for a solution. These attempts even though became normal they proved to be of no significant importance but even though the always failed they kept on engaging in them.

Unlike most cases in territorial conflicts between states, when the confrontation reaches the military involvement most states start withdrawal of their administrative personnel and civilians. In the peak of this standoff, the embassies and consulates of both states remained opened and functional. The large settlement and investments of huge capital moveable and immoveable in each of these states influenced this restraint from going to war. The Bakassi issue is unique from other territorial conflicts. However, it is in retrospect of the above analysis that this dispute was peacefully settled. It is unrealistic to select one of the above reasons as the major motive behind the settlement. It is view of ethnic ties, economic interdependence, bilateral diplomacy, and the foreign policies of both countries and the other reasons advanced to support this argument.

5.13 Resolution Modalities Implemented In The Bakassi Dispute.

In other to give an appraisal of why the dispute over Bakassi did not lead to war, it is necessary to look in to the modalities and aspects of conflict resolution implored to manage/resolve the dispute between these states. With a variety of African boundaries mixed with ethnic groups displaced into different locations due to arbitrary boundaries that were adopted by African states, this creates pressure for further demarcation and revision of African boundaries. There have been many cases of territorial conflict in Africa from Egypt/Sudan in 1958 when Egypt occupied a small area of Sudan, Libya/Chad over the Aouzou strip, Somalia/Ethiopia over ogaden, Mali/Burkinafaso, Sudan/South Sudan, to Eritrea/Ethiopia in 2000 etc. In each of these cases, there has been some form of intervention from either the AU, UN, ICJ or other international organization to arbitrate in these disputes. Like the other territorial disputes within Africa, the Bakassi dispute attracted similar concerns and different principles of conflict resolution applied to reach a settlement.

In the Bakassi dispute, we see a high degree of commitment by both parties to manage and resolve the differences from the Bakassi peninsular. According to Zartman, negotiation is the first line of conflict resolution (Zartman, 2007: 465). With the Bakassi dispute, Cameroon and Nigeria involved themselves into negotiation procedures to settle their differences over the territory. Still in

Zartman's views on negotiations, "sometimes, official efforts need informal assistance" (Zartman, 2007: 466). To create an atmosphere where both parties will be comfortable to pursue negotiations, Cameroon and Nigeria organized workshops and seminars to set pace for settlement of their differences. The Yola seminar of 1992 was organized by both states to create an atmosphere where representatives of both states can express their concerns before going forward (Lukong, 2011: 39). It created a relaxed atmosphere for the parties to continue expressing their concerns. However, with the inability for both parties to assess objective evidence towards achieving a peaceful solution, negotiation procedures failed.

Unlike most other conflict settlement procedures in international conflict resolution, (ICR) the case of Bakassi has a unique twist. Within the confines of ICR, when negotiations fail, mediation is usually the next procedure to involve settling a dispute in international relations. However, with the theory of ripeness in the views of Soto and Zartman (2010) ripeness of time is of essence in diplomacy. Timing is very significant in mediation and for mediation to succeed; it must be launched at the right time. The conflict must be ready (ripe enough) for the initiation of mediation, the disputing parties must have arrived at a stalemate. In props to Chester Crocker former vice US secretary of state for Africa from 1981-1989, said the Namibian dispute was ripe in the second half of 1987 Soto and Zartman (2010). In the Bakassi issue, mediation only started shortly after the ICJ's adjudication and Nigeria's noncompliance with the ruling. This moment was the stalemate of the Bakassi dispute, neither Cameroon could claim victory or Nigeria defeat since the later did not accept the judgment from the ICJ. Both parties found themselves in a deadlock situation with this issue without a relief but with projections of things to get even worse. This ruling by the ICJ gave birth to militant groups who declared impeccably to fight this decision. The Bakassi Freedom fighters (BFF) militia carried out terrorist activities in the region seizing vessels and kidnaping crewmembers.

The UN initiated mediation after the ICJ ruling, with former secretary General Kofi Annan. He organized a meeting between Cameroon and Nigeria heads of state in Geneva 15 November 2002. This meeting laid groundwork for the UN's mediation by creating a mix boundary commission directly overseen by the UN

office of West Africa. Projecting modalities for the implementation of the ruling by the ICJ and further plans for complete resolution with the Green Tree Accord in 2006. The mediation role by the UN in the Bakassi made it possible for it to be one of the complete comprehensive settlement of boundary disputes Africa. Among other territorial disputes within the continent like Ethiopia/Eritrea, Chad/Libya, Algeria/Morocco and Namibia/Bostwana to name a few, the Cameroon Nigeria settlement scored it the important role of leaders in peace processes (International Peace Institute 2008). Although the role of the UN in the mediation of this dispute is significant, however it will be unfair to eliminate the presence of Germany, France, UK and the US in the mediation process. The influence of this states especially France and Britain, in mounting pressure on these states to continue in the engagements of the settlement by the UN.

Notwithstanding, with very limited involvement from sub regional organizations ECOWAS and CEMAC, the UN faced some ordeals in implementing the decisions from its resolution. Even after both states had signed the Green Tree Accord in 2006, Yar'dua replaced Obasanjo as president. The new government of President Yar'dua questioned the legality of the Green Tree Accord and its provisions for the settlement of the dispute. On the other hand, there were significant resistance to Cameroonian authority in Bakassi as most inhabitants of this region didn't accept the change. This led to further confrontations between the people of Bakassi and the Cameroon Gendarme forces as several people reported brutality from the Gendarmes creating further issues in confidence building process. The UN mediation although interrupted did not cease from looking for further solutions. They convinced the disputing parties to further sign 3 other agreements from December 2003, 2004 and 2007 (International Peace Institute 2008) which was perceived as the most difficult as it sealed the complete handover of Bakassi.

It is without any doubt that the significance of the UN and its mediation in the Bakassi dispute cannot be ignore. Not to ignore the its adjudication in this issue, but its mediation and the above detailed analysis contribute to the reason why the dispute did not lead to war. Other African countries Chad/Libya fought over the Aouzou strip, Ethiopia and Somali fought a war over Ogaden, Sudan and

South Sudan fought over Abyei. The case of the Bakassi dispute is a commendable example of the UN's role in conflict resolution. However, there are other contributing aspects, which aided the mediation from the UN and as well points out the weakness of its involvement. Most writers within the part of the study have failed to acknowledge the fact that the UN in its mediation ignored the involvement of the locals in the determining process of their fate. Notwithstanding, not to discredit the UN for its services, because there would be no settlement of this dispute without its presence. The shortcomings of the UN in the Bakassi settlement will be seen in the subsequent chapter.



6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Border conflicts have always been a segment in the African, third world and developing countries political scene. In almost every single case, this originates from colonization, the irrational, forceful delimitation and divide of peoples and collectivities in to district territorial zones. In the first phase of independence cycle, advances by newly independent states for control over their internal and external jurisdiction intensified these disputes instilling a change within the norms contained in the OAU. The norms of non-intervention and territorial integrity contained in the charter of the OAU now AU and the principle of Uti possidetis adopted in the charter of the the AU did not settle the conflicts rather it enhanced them. African states in context of these principles defended their borders inherited from colonialism with every means necessary they were ready to go to war in most cases to defend these lines. However, the principles also created a mechanism for the settlement of these disputes. In conformity with the principles of the UN, the existence of sub-regional and regional organization, international institutions like the ICJ have been very pertinent in resolving these territorial conflicts and giving the concerned parties the ability to arbitrate their allegations. The existence of this international institution has been very significant for a peaceful resolution of these conflicts nonetheless; the involvement of this organization indicates disintegration within the sub-regional and regional structure to clear up these disputes.

Concerning territorial conflicts in general and Bakassi dispute, and as much as this phenomenon is on a surge in post independent Africa; diverse lessons can be drawn from it. In studying the Bakassi dispute, it is evident on many levels to site the role of colonialism in the conflict. The Bakassi dispute like many other territorial disputes within Africa were inherited from European mercantilist policies and practices throughout the Continent. Not only was the Bakassi dispute bound to happen its almost justifiable to alleged that it was orchestrated to from long ago. However, not consequentially but through the policies of the European powers who colonized Africa. Creating arbitrary boundaries to serve

short-term interest for a people, which will be permanent on these areas, was one of the most obvious and most impactful ordeals of colonial rule in Africa. The disregard for the anthropogenic homogeneity of ethnic groups within Africa was just the start of it. This conflict as it is with many other territorial conflicts within Africa, was framed and sized by the size of the compensation that would accrue from it.

However, the focus of this study has been to attempt to provide an explanation to justify why the Bakassi issue did not turn to a war between Cameroon and Nigeria. To support this argument, I will reiterate this perspective passively on some of the points, which I raised during the study. The role of diplomatic negotiations and commitment to a peaceful solution to the Bakassi dispute is another aspect of this conflict that draws a lot of attention. This does not just give life to diplomatic negotiations but equally portrays its significance in situations where there is mutual respect for the institutions of diplomacy. The level of commitment showed by Cameroon and Nigeria to a peaceful diplomatic settlement even in the face of confrontations from each side is no comparable within the African context of territorial dispute.

Furthermore, the role of the UN in this conflict cannot be ignored as much as Cameroon and Nigeria showed commitment to a diplomatic solution, the role of the UN could not be overlooked. The intervention of the ICJ in arbitration of this dispute and settlement of the dispute is one of the main reasons behind the success achieved in prohibiting the states from going to war. Moreover, the role of the UN secretary general in providing good office and mediating both parties towards a lasting solution after the ICJ ruling is a force to reckon with. This goes beyond and above to solidify the role of the UN as a peacekeeping body even although many will disagree about this but the Bakassi dispute proves this point.

Notwithstanding, it is equally necessary applaud the role of interdependence between Cameroon and Nigeria as another soft arm in bringing about peace in the Bakassi issue. Even though most scholars within this topic overlook this aspect, the level of economic interdependence between these states creates a subtle but strong bond of contention in reminding these two countries how connected they are than it seems to be. The trade figures in Table I support

these claims. Countries involved in trade do not go to war. The deep trade network established by both states, which only continues to grow even in the face of adversity is remarkable. At no point in time even at the peak of tension did these states stop or halt trade relations with each other. Based on Martin Jackson's findings from 1950-2000, situations of interstate wars have decreased from 1850 to 1949 while there has been an increase in trade networks. As Martin says when there is trade between nations, the network structure becomes dense. The deep economic link existing between Cameroon and Nigeria supports the actions taken by both states in the face of confrontation to continue to seek peace. There were many circumstances of deadly encounters between these two states over the Bakassi peninsula. However, they refused to be limited to the temporary skirmishes that frequently occurred between them. Not as if they were forced to but at every moment where a party used excessive force, the response from the countering state was never in a similar pattern. Instead, they seek dialogue and resolute means to bring peace between them.

In addition, bilateral dispositions pursued by Cameroon and Nigeria cannot be ignored in highlighting why the Bakassi issue was resolved peacefully. The commitment to continuously seek dialogue and look for solutions to the constantly emerging problems from the border delimitation with each other. These two states went back and forth in setting up commissions, workshops and new incentives to eliminate border disputes. The workshops and seminars organized in Yola attended by both representatives of these states is also another measure to show case their commitment to seeking a peaceful solution to the quarrel over Bakassi.

Moreover, ethnic ties as seen have a contradictory way of influencing states to make territorial claims. In an area like Bakassi with a greater proportion of the population being Nigerians, the leaders of the state overlooked the possibility of uniting the people under the same Umbrella of Nigeria. This can be because of cost and benefit relations where the costs of it uniting with a part of your ethnic group exceed the benefits from such unity. In this case, Nigeria viewed this as more likely to be catastrophic on her part if she went against the decision of the UN in still claiming Bakassi. The inability of Nigeria to make these claims worked on the other hand right into the favor of Cameroon who was given this

peninsula. However, the inherit and deeply rooted connections between both states in diverse areas customary norms and tradition between these states influenced in a degree the desire to seek a peaceful settlement of this issue

Equally, the role of the foreign policy perspective of both states influenced the peacefully resolution of the Bakassi dispute. Nigeria a member state of the Economic community of West Africa(ECOWAS) while Cameroon a member of Central African Economic and Monetary Community(CEMAC), being members of different sub regional organizations, directed their foreign policies differently. The goal of this regional organization is to strengthen the growth of their sub regional member states economically and politically. However, the sub regional organizations are also out to promote peace within their regions and Africa at large. Notwithstanding, the need for peace and cooperation between member states as stipulated by this regional organization have influence on a certain degree the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi dispute Although critics highlight their absence in major aspects of the settlement of the dispute. The basis of the formation of this regional organization that is promotion of economic integration, they moved towards another dimension although still primarily on economics. They adopted intergovernmental approach to governance based on national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states. In line with the foreign policy objectives of these states, it has been about the relevance is the element of respectability or legitimacy of position. Although the both have a short history of foreign policy, Cameroon and Nigeria have had to consider the attainment of international respectability or legitimacy as one of the prime goals of foreign policy. In this regard, the respect of international norms and principles of the UN charter have been held in high standards by these states. And in the same view, both states have succeeded in getting the international system to understand and react to their needs to a degree which makes their position on major world issues a factor to be reckoned with in international politics.

6.1 Recommendations

Alluding to my perspective in the previous chapter in all fairness to the UN and its role in the resolution of this dispute, there are certain aspects of how it

handled this dispute. The ICJ ruling has been contested and many loopholes depicted in its post judgment proceedings. Mediation by the UN settled the border dispute between these states however; it did not completely resolve the issues that it created. In addition, the involvement of the parties concerned in the mediation by the UN is equally another aspect I think is a cause for concern as I share more light on this below.

The settlement of the Bakassi dispute however phenomenal it was give created new evils within this region. After the ICJ ruling and proceedings by the UN for settlement, to some degree the UN knew its decisions would not settle well with at least a party of this dispute. Since the transfers of sovereignty to Cameroon in 2008 making an end to the dispute, there has been a surge in conflicts in this region. A rise in militant's groups resisting the transfer of the peninsula to Cameroon the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF). This group launch a series of attacks against Cameroonian authorities present in the region killing Cameroonian soldiers and kidnaping some. With more animosity growing in some parts of the Nigerian society, more people accused the government of selling Bakassi to Cameroon. The popular Niger Delta rebel group known for its terrorist activities in the oil rich Niger delta region, soon joined forces with the BFF in resisting and terrorizing people in this region and further its activities right in to Cameroon territory. They declared the regions would not have any peace under Cameroons rule swearing to render the economy of the region impoverished. These activities became existent post settlement era of this dispute and equally more reports of violence and brutality of the people of Bakassi from the Gendarmes.

Furthermore, from the mediation and settlement of the dispute, the UN left out the concerned parties in these parties from the mediation and negotiation processes. For mediation to be successful, its relies on the compliance of the disputing parties and equally the fairness of the mediator in the proceedings. However, in this dispute certain aspects of its resolution clauses shows that the parties were not involved in making vital decisions. For instance, the residence of the Peninsula was not aware of the fact that provisions from the Green Tree Accord. One of these provisions suggested Nigerian nationals in the peninsula to choose to either relocate to Nigeria or remain in Bakassi as Cameroonians.

This eventually brought resistance to these dispositions from the treaty during its implementation in Bakassi. In addition, the people of former southern Cameroon recount aspects of them left out in these proceedings. They felt that Bakassi belong to the former colony even before its integration with “Cameroun” the felt that their perspective should have been sought out as well in making these conclusions. Equally, the residents of Bakassi who have approached the UN for a referendum to determine their destiny equally opposed the views of the ICJ recounting that before Nigeria or Cameroon existed, there was Bakassi.

On another note, another aspect about these proceedings that has caused its criticism is the fact that the AU did not play much of a role in the adjudication and mediation process. The AU and UN have agreed on improving consultation, collaboration and sharing of information in proceedings of resolution. Despite the UN desire to strengthen regional organization and include them in shaping the future of their respective regions, it completely ignored involving the AU in the settlement of the Bakassi dispute. Although the UN achieved its objective to an extent the role of the AU in this dispute would have made some significant changes to the outcome.

It is from these above perspectives that I want to add some recommendations since territorial disputes are still arising within Africa. Inclusivity in the processes of conflict resolution is very important to achieving lasting solution to border dispute. Settlement of a dispute is great, also is achieving lasting peaceful relations and satisfaction to the parties. Learning from the Bakassi dispute shows it is important to include most significantly the people most likely affected from the decisions of the proceedings. This will assist in concluding on terms that will not just be mutually beneficial to the parties of the dispute, but as well the inhabitants of the disputed location.

Moreover, inclusivity of regional and sub-regional organization in these proceedings is very salient in getting better and trustworthy results. Sub-region and regional organizations respectively will obviously have better inside on this border disputes than international organizations. Not to despise the role of IO in any way but regional organizations will understand better how to resolve their boundary differences. Prior to colonialism, Africans existed as one without land

boundaries only separated by ideologies they will be able to set boundaries among themselves that will exist with limited differences. In props to (Vale and Sorbo, 1997: 13), they recount the “laissez-faire” attitude portrayed by the UN in Rwanda when the OAU urged the UN to send peacekeeping forces to replace the AU’s observers and get implementation of the 1993 Arusha Agreement. This instance to show how significant regional organizations can be in cases of disputes or conflicts within the region. These are some of the areas I feel can be improved upon in getting better and proficient results in not just interstate territorial disputes but conflicts generally.



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