

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**SOMALILAND-SOMALIA TALKS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, PROCESS
AND PROSPECTS**

THESIS

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Department of Political Science and International Relations

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Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER

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İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

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Not: Öğrencinin Tez savunmasında **Başarılı** olması halinde bu form **imzalanacaktır**. Aksi halde geçersizdir.

To my beloved parents: my mother Halimo Ahmed Jama and my father Mohamed

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FOREWORD

Self-determination and secession are not new phenomena but gained popularity in international politics soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secession is the withdrawal of a territory, with its population, from a previously existing state and creating a new state on the same territory while self-determination is based on the notion that every people or nation has a right (legal and political) to decide their destiny. One way to accomplish successful secession by the seceding state is to hold talks with the parent state. The aim of the negotiations like this is always to decide the future of these territories, whether to stay together and be united or to separate and become different states. Negotiations are also a vital part in the process of recognizing new states. In the 2012 London Conference on Somalia, the international community proposed a plan for Somaliland and Somalia to hold talks in order to clarify their future relations and thus promised to provide a negotiation platform. The former Somaliland British Protectorate and the former Italian Somaliland united on 1 July 1960, after gaining their independence from Britain and Italy (Italian Somaliland being under UN Mandated Italian Trusteeship) on 26 June and 1 July 1960, respectively, and thus forming the Somali Republic. After a 30-year long union, the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991 when armed rebel groups ousted the late military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. On 18 May 1991, the people of the former British Somaliland announced that they restored their independence and broke away from the rest of the country, and hence, declared the Republic of Somaliland. Ever since, the two states took two different pathways and became separated geographically and politically, among others. Above all, Somaliland could not manage to acquire an official recognition from a single nation. Following the London Conference Communiqué, Somaliland and Somalia held their first dialogue in Chevening House, London on 20-21 June 2012. This was followed by talks held in Dubai, Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and Djibouti. The dialogue process collapsed in early 2015 in Istanbul. This study examines this dialogue process that started in London and collapsed in Istanbul.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
ÖZET	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of the Study.....	1
1.2 Problem Statement.....	3
1.3 Research Objectives.....	4
1.4 Research Methodology.....	4
1.5 Significance of the Study.....	5
1.6 Organization of the Study.....	5
2. CONCEPTUALISING SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION	7
2.1 Self-determination and Secession.....	7
2.1.1 Secession and Self-Determination Theories.....	8
2.1.2 Several Secession Cases.....	11
2.2 Secession and Peace Talks.....	13
2.2.1 A Five-Stage Process of Sustainable Peace Talks.....	13
2.2.2 Several Cases of Peace Talks.....	15
3. SOMALILAND AND SOMALIA: A BRIEF HISTORY	20
3.1 Somaliland and Somalia in the Colonial Era.....	20
3.2 Somaliland and Somalia as One: The Union Period (1960-1991).....	22
3.3 Taking Two Different Pathways: Somaliland and Somalia since 1991.....	25
4. THE DIALOGUE PROCESS: FROM LONDON TO DJIBOUTI	30
4.1 London Conference: The Genesis of the Talks.....	30
4.2 Chevening House Round, London.....	32
4.3 Dubai Round.....	33
4.4 Ankara Round.....	33
4.5 Istanbul I Round.....	34
4.6 Istanbul II Round.....	35
4.7 Djibouti Round.....	36
5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE DIALOGUE PROCESS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES	39

5.1 The Failure of Istanbul III	39
5.2 Why are the Somaliland-Somalia Talks Unsuccessful?.....	42
5.2.1 Distant Political Positions.....	42
5.2.2 Domestic Pressure.....	44
5.2.3 External Influence.....	46
5.2.4 Lack of Implementation.....	49
5.2.5 Unaddressed Grievances.....	50
5.3 Attempts to Resume the Talks.....	51
5.4 The Possible Future Scenarios of the Talks	52
5.5 Theoretical Assessment of the Collapse of the Talks.....	54
6. CONCLUSION.....	56
REFERENCES.....	59
APPENDICES	63
NOTES	64
RESUME.....	68

ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
CPA	: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EU	: European Union
FIR	: Flight Information Region
FVP	: First Vice President
GoNU	: Government of National Unity
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPA	: International Peace Institute
MP	: Member of Parliament
NFD	: Northern Frontier District
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
SAF	: Sudanese Armed Forces
SNL	: Somali National League
SNM	: Somali National Movement
SPLA	: Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	: Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TNG	: Transitional National Government
TRT	: Turkish Radio and Television
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
UCID	: Ururka Cadaaladda Iyo Daryeelka
UIC	: Union of Islamic Courts
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNISFA	: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNSOM	: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
US	: United States
USC	: United Somali Congress
VOA	: Voice of America

SOMALILAND-SOMALIA GÖRÜŞMELERİ: TARİHİ GEÇMİŞ, SÜRECİ VE ÖNGÖRÜLER

ÖZET

Devletler ve devlet dışı aktörler arasındaki görüşmeler çoğunlukla ayrılma görüşmeleri veya barış görüşmeleridir (çatışma çözümü). İki devlet ister birleşmiş ister ki ayrı olsun ayrılma görüşmelerinin amacı iki bölgenin gelecekteki ilişkilerini belirlemektir. Üstelik Müzakereler, yeni devletleri tanıma sürecinde çok önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Yeni seçilen ve sonra uluslararası alanda tanınan devletlerin çoğu bu konumu diyalog yoluyla gerçekleştirir. Bu tez, Somalil Hükümeti ile Somali Federal Hükümeti arasında 2012'deki Londra'da başlayan ve 2015'te İstanbul'da çöken diyalog sürecini inceliyor. Eski Somaliland İngiliz Himaye ve eski İtalyan Somaliland (İtalyan Somaliland, BM Mandalı İtalyan Vesayetçiliği altında) Somali Cumhuriyeti'ni oluşturan böylece sırasıyla Temmuz 1960 26 Haziran ve 1 günü İngiltere ve İtalya'dan bağımsızlıklarını kazanan ve sonrasında 1 Temmuz 1960 tarihinde birleşmiş. 30 yıllık bir birlikten sonra 1991'de Somali merkezi hükümeti çöktü silahlı isyancı gruplar, acımasız bir iç savaş sonrasında, eski askeri diktatör Mohamed Siad Barre'yi devirdi. Sonuç olarak, Somaliland 18 Mayıs 1991'de Somali'den ayrılacağını açıkladı ve o zamandan beri iki ülke ayrı. 2012 Londra Somali Konferansı'ndan bu yana Londra, Dubai, Ankara, İstanbul (iki kez) ve Cibuti'de altı tur görüşme gerçekleşti. Ancak, yedinci tur (İstanbul III) Ocak 2015'te başarısız oldu ve ardından tüm diyalog sürecinin çökmesi izlendi. Müzakerelerin çökmesine yol açan etkenler, uzak siyasi konular, iç ve dış baskılar, önceki anlaşmaların uygulanamamış olması ve başvurulmamış şikayet ve adaletsizlikleri içermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Müzakereler, görüşmeler, diyalog, ayrılma görüşmeleri, Somaliland, Somali.*

SOMALILAND-SOMALIA TALKS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, PROCESS AND PROSPECTS

ABSTRACT

Talks among states or among states and non-state actors are mainly secession talks or peace talks (conflict resolution). The purpose of the secession talks is to determine the future relations of two territories – whether they will stay united or separate into two states. Moreover, Negotiations are a crucial part in the process of recognizing new states. Most of the newly seceded, and then, internationally recognized states achieved this position through dialogue. This thesis examines the dialogue process between the Government of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia that started in London in 2012 and collapsed in Istanbul in 2015. The former Somaliland British Protectorate and the former Italian Somaliland united on 1 July 1960, after gaining their independence from Britain and Italy (Italian Somaliland being under UN Mandated Italian Trusteeship) on 26 June and 1 July 1960, respectively, and thus forming the Somali Republic. After a 30-year long union, the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, when armed rebel groups, after a brutal civil war, ousted the late military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Consequently, Somaliland announced its secession from Somalia on 18 May 1991, and the two countries were separate ever since. Since the 2012 London Conference on Somalia, six round talks took place in London, Dubai, Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and Djibouti. However, the seventh round (Istanbul III) failed in January 2015 and then, the collapse of the entire dialogue process followed. The factors that led to the collapse of the talks include distant political positions, domestic and external pressure, lack of implementation of the previous agreements and unaddressed grievances and injustices.

Keywords: *talks, negotiations, dialogue, secession talks, Somaliland, Somalia.*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Self-determination and secession are not new phenomena but gained popularity in international politics soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The greater Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) dissolved and disintegrated into numerous states. The former Yugoslav Republic alone faced various recurrent secessions and broke down into seven states (Pavkovic 2000). There are more states in the world today than before 1990. Secession is the withdrawal of a territory, with its population, from a previously existing state and creating a new state on the same territory while self-determination is based on the notion that every people or nation has a right (legal and political) to decide their destiny. Whereas self-determination can either be internal – some form of autonomy within the state – or external – independence –, secession often aims at sovereignty change and thus, it is commonly perceived as negative (Baer 2000; Bereketeab 2012). Moreover, self-determination requires the recognition of third states and the United Nations (Baer 2000).

As Beran (1998) emphasizes, secession is not the only way that new states are formed, but it can be differentiated from “partition (the dissolution of a state into two or more new states) and from expulsion (the excision of people and their territory, against their wishes, from an existing state which maintains its legal identity)”. Some secessions are peaceful, like those of Latvia (1991), Estonia (1991), Macedonia (1991) and Slovakia (1993) (Pavkovic & Radan 2007), while others are characterized by conflict or violence such as Eritrea and South Sudan. While newly seceded states aim to achieve self-determination and recognition, parent states often prefer to protect their territorial integrity and favor unity. The state community, who are those expected to grant recognition to the newly formed states, prefer territorial integrity over the secession claims when considered from legal principle perspective (Oeter 2015).

One way to accomplish successful secession by the seceding state is to hold talks with the parent state. The aim of the negotiations like this is always to decide the future of these territories, whether to stay together and be united or to separate and become different states. Negotiations are also a vital part in the process of recognizing new states. In the negotiation process, there is either a third party playing a mediating role, or just the two negotiating parties hold the talks.

Several cases can be revisited to underscore the role of negotiations in the process of forming and recognizing new states. In Kosovo, after the United Nations established a transitional administration which let the Kosovars govern themselves, the future and legal status of this territory was left to the two respective parties – Serbia and Kosovo – to decide through talks (Oeter 2015). South Sudan is another successful case to acknowledge the significance of negotiations in these processes. After a long struggle for self-determination, South Sudan managed to claim self-determination and convince the North (Sudan) to accept their right to self-determination under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Kenya in January 2005. Ultimately, South Sudan achieved independence through a self-determination referendum in 2011 (Malwal 2015). Cyprus has been divided for decades and the two sides, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, failed to determine their future relations due to both internal and external factors. Nonetheless, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan initiated a strategy to hold negotiations and bring the two sides of Cyprus to the table. Unfortunately, the Annan Plan which began in November 2002 eventually failed in 2004 due to geopolitical, political, cultural and historical factors, among others (Michael 2007).

In the 2012 London Conference on Somalia, the international community proposed a plan for Somaliland and Somalia to hold talks in order to clarify their future relations and thus promised to provide a negotiation platform. Paragraph 6 of the London Conference Communiqué indicated that “The Conference recognized the need for the international community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG [Transitional Federal Government of Somalia] or its replacement may agree to establish in order to clarify their future relations”¹. The former Somaliland British Protectorate and the former Italian Somaliland united on 1 July 1960, after gaining their independence from Britain and Italy (Italian Somaliland being under UN Mandated Italian Trusteeship) on 26 June and 1 July

1960, respectively, and thus forming the Somali Republic. After a 30-year long union, the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, when armed rebel groups, after a brutal civil war, ousted the late military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre (Lewis 1988; Bulhan 2008; Ingiriis 2016a).

On 18 May 1991, the people of the former British Somaliland announced that they restored their independence and broke away from the rest of the country, and hence, declared the Republic of Somaliland (Farah and Lewis 1997; Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003; Eubank 2010; Ministry of National Planning and Development 2014). Ever since, the two states took two different pathways and became separated geographically and politically, among others. Above all, Somaliland could not manage to acquire an official recognition from a single nation. Following the London Conference Communiqué, Somaliland and Somalia held their first dialogue in Chevening House, London on 20-21 June 2012. This was followed by talks held in Dubai, Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and Djibouti. The dialogue process collapsed in early 2015 in Istanbul. This study examines this dialogue process that started in London and collapsed in Istanbul in a detailed manner.

1.2 Problem Statement

Several countries separated through negotiations (South Sudan and Sudan for instance). In this case, the international community lets the respective states agree on their future relations. Somaliland declared its secession from Somalia in 1991 but could not acquire an official recognition from a single country since then. Thus, in the 2012 London Conference on Somalia, the international community proposed the two sides to clarify their future relations through talks. Consequently, the dialogue process started in London in 2012 and collapsed in Istanbul in 2015. Unfortunately, this issue has been completely neglected by the researchers of Somali Studies, Somali politics in particular. This thesis, therefore, attempts to fill this gap and thoroughly examine this process. In fact, it is the first of its kind to be conducted on this issue.

1.3 Research Objectives

This study aims to investigate the dialogue process between the Government of Somaliland and the initially Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the later Federal Government of Somalia, that started in 2012 in London and collapsed in 2015 in Istanbul, after six successfully held rounds. Since the intention of this process was for the two sides to clarify their future relations (to stay united, to separate or otherwise), the study firstly portrays historical background of the two sides, as many widely argue that historical factors will mainly determine the future of these talks. It also revisits similar negotiation processes, both successful and unsuccessful, that previously took place to widen the argument and draw lessons from them. It then probes and assesses each of the six rounds which took place successfully. Additionally, it examines the factors led to the collapse of the dialogue process and finally attempts to present the possible future scenarios of the talks.

Among the specific objectives of the study:

- I. To thoroughly explore each round, its communiqué and agreements.
- II. To probe the factors that led to the collapse of the process and appraise the aftermath of the process collapse.
- III. To figure out the ramifications of the historical factors on the dialogue process.
- IV. To present the possible future scenarios of the talks.

1.4 Research Methodology

The study employs a qualitative research approach. As Kothari (2004) puts it “[s]uch an approach to research generates results either in non-quantitative form or in the form which are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis. Generally, the techniques of focus group interviews, projective techniques and depth interviews are used” (p. 5). The thesis relies on both primary and secondary data. The primary data is collected through personal interviews and focus group discussions conducted by the author between March and June 2017. The secondary data is generated from diverse sources such as academic publications, news outlets and YouTube videos. As far as the literature review and history is concerned, books, journal articles, conference proceedings, published personal

reminiscences and the like were consulted. Considering the dialogue process, specific sources provided the communiqués and related details of the successful talks. Among these, Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (Hargeisa Office); YouTube videos and other news outlets; unpublished theses and policy documents.

The study has a number of limitations. The researcher, though traveled to Somaliland, could not reach some targeted politicians, academicians and others involved in the negotiation process. Many did not even reply emails. Had all these people participated in the research process, the study would have been more complete, rich and informative. Furthermore, the researcher lacked necessary funds and other resources to travel to different areas and reach as many people needed to contribute to the study. Specifically, it was not possible for the researcher to reach politicians and academics in Somalia, Mogadishu in particular, due to unavoidable circumstances, mainly security issues.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This is, by far, the first detailed research conducted on the Somaliland-Somalia talks, a process that began in 2012 and collapsed in 2015. Many ordinary people, politicians, and academicians of both sides, as well as those who closely follow Somali Studies, would all appreciate to have an academic piece on this issue. Many would also argue that an in-depth research on this issue has been neglected for the last five years. Being the first of its kind, this study arrives the right time and elucidates the talks in a broad way. This study will thus be beneficial to governments of Somaliland and Somalia, researchers and academicians, and all institutions, be it international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations (both international and local) and non-state actors who are interested in the political developments of the region.

1.6 Organization of the Study

Chapter 1 introduces the study while Chapter 2 presents and reviews the relevant literature. Chapter 3 provides a brief history of the two negotiating parties – Somaliland and Somalia. Chapter 4 demonstrates the dialogue process and elaborates each of the six

rounds held between 2012 and 2015. Chapter 5 examines the causes and consequences of the collapse of the dialogue process while chapter 6 concludes the study.



2. CONCEPTUALISING SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION

Talks among states or among states and non-state actors are mainly secession talks, peace talks (conflict resolution) or otherwise. The purpose of the secession talks is to determine the future relations of two territories – whether they will stay united or separate into two states. In contrast, peace talks aim to bring peace and reconciliation between two or more warring groups, or to some extent take negotiating parties towards a union. However, the talks may sometimes aim to achieve both secession and conflict resolution. For instance, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005 in Kenya intended to terminate the conflict between the two sides and also decide their future relations and as result of this agreement, South Sudan became an independent state in 2011 (Malwal, 2015). The purpose of Somaliland and Somalia talks, according to the 2012 London Conference on Somalia Communiqué, was the two sides to determine their future relations. Somaliland and Somalia have been separate countries since 1991 and there is currently no armed conflict between them. This chapter, thus, examines negotiations and secessions and provides several cases for both. Section one of the chapter probes the concept of secession, secession and self-determination theories and eventually presents various secession cases. Section two of the chapter demonstrates the significance of negotiations in accomplishing successful secession and recognition, offers a process of achieving sustainable talks and presents several secession talks.

2.1 Self-determination and Secession

In this section, the concepts of self-determination, secession, and recognition are defined and elaborated. Various theories of secession and self-determination are then examined. Among these theories are national self-determination theories, choice theories, Just-cause or remedial-right theories, primary right theories, democratic theory of political self-

determination, and declaratory theory. Later, a number of secession cases are incorporated into the study to comprehend how these theories are linked to the real world if they could justify these secessions and so on.

Debates on self-determination and secession became popular and took prominence in international relations, international law and related fields throughout the recent decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union could be a remarkable time and landmark as it triggered the largest secessionist movements in recent history. Secession is defined as the withdrawal of specific territory, with its population, from an existing state and also creating a new state in that territory. Successful secession is followed by the parent state (previous state) to lose sovereignty and jurisdiction over the seceded territory as the new state takes its position (Pavkovic and Radan 2007). Self-determination is based on the notion that every people or nation has a right (legal and political) to decide their destiny. Whereas self-determination can either be internal – some form of autonomy within the state – or external – independence –, secession often aims at sovereignty change and thus, it is commonly perceived as negative (Baer 2000; Bereketiab 2012). Moreover, self-determination requires the recognition of third states and the United Nations (Baer 2000). Secession is not the only way that the territory of an existing state can be altered. Other forms, in spite of secession, are partition (the dissolution of an existing state into a number of new states) and expulsion (the elimination of a particular group of people with their territory from the state, always against their will) (Beran 1998).

2.1.1 Secession and Self-Determination Theories

The meaning and interpretation of the concept of self-determination evolved since the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. Among the most popular interpretations of the concept is that of the former president of the United States of America Woodrow Wilson. Whilst he did not explicitly mention self-determination in his famous Fourteen Points in his address to the congress in 1918, he mentioned the term in other speeches. In 1916, Wilson affirmed this statement in public: “We believe ... that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live” (Zaric 2013: 23). In his “peace without victory” speech to the US senate in 1917, Wilson declared:

The American people ... believe that peace should be rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments – the rights of peoples great and small, weak or powerful – their equal rights to freedom and security and self-government (Zaric 2013:23).

Woodrow Wilson perceived self-determination as a universal principle appropriate for all nations and people around the world. However, the ultimate goal of self-determination, for him, was the security of human beings through the protection of minorities and ethnic groups (Zaric 2013).

Costa (2003) classifies three types of secession and self-determination theories. National self-determination theories underscore the significance and the likelihood of nations to secede. It argues that nations have the right to self-determination and also the right to have their own independent state. In choice theories, secession is justified by the willingness and the choice of the population in a particular territory. Majority of the population need to support the secession, they should not necessarily be a distinct nationality, and they need not be victims of atrocities or injustices. Here, secession is justified by the mere choice of the people, and in this case, the theory is named choice theory. Just-cause or remedial-right theories maintain that secession arises as a result of (mainly) two just-causes. The first one comes into existence when the seceding group faces massive human rights violations and systematic discrimination or abuse. The second one arises when the seceding territory has been annexed or the group and their territory have been illegally integrated into the state (Costa 2003). Just-cause or remedial-right here mean that secession is resulted by or aimed to be a remedy for certain atrocities or injustices faced by the seceding group. Secession is thus assumed to medicine or to some extent panacea. Nonetheless, this theory is criticized to ignore the significance of national identity and nationalism in secessions, to confront democratic principles, that is to say, the majority vote for secession can be rejected because of an unjustified cause, and finally that justice claims or causes are highly disputed (Costa 2003).

In his theory, Buchanan highlights several damages and injustices that provide the right to self-determination and secession. These include ‘unjust conquest, exploitation, the threat of extermination and the threat of cultural extinction’. (Lehning 1998: 2). Discussing secession theories, Buchanan mentions two types of normative theories of secession. These theories, according to him, consider the right to secede as a remedial

right only or as a primary right. Remedial right only theories, as mentioned earlier, maintain that the right to secede arises as a result of certain injustices, for which secession is believed to be the perfect remedy. On the contrary, primary right theories, like choice theories, assert the significance of the right to secede regardless of any other factors such as injustices. These theories, however, propose certain conditions to be satisfied in order to enjoy the right to secede (Buchanan 1997). Primary right here means general right that a group of people needs to exercise under certain conditions. Primary right, like the right to vote, is necessary for every citizen. But citizens still need to satisfy certain conditions including being a citizen, mature and mentally fit. Similarly, primary right is general right. Democratic theory of political self-determination recognizes the right to self-determination as a human right that every adult must exercise. It asserts that 'political unity must be voluntary, and its democratically self-defined territorial groups that have this right' (Beran 1998: 33). In accordance with this theory, the right to self-determination is not a claim right, but a liberty right, which means that 'in virtue of the right, other entities have a correlative obligation not to interfere with the exercise of the right, but do not have an obligation to assist its exercise' (Beran 1998; 35). Democratic here means that people have the right to decide. In doing so, they have freedom of association and determination. They don't rely on other people or institutions to decide for them.

According to Baer (2000), the legitimacy of secession, as well as state formation, is linked to the principle of state sovereignty with its three elements (governmental rule, territory, and nation). These three elements elucidate and consider the legitimacy of who rules the state, why the sovereignty of the state has to change, and how, in which process, the sovereignty changes? This implies that a secession to be legitimate, there should be a form of authority, specific territory and defined population in the new state.

Majority of the secessionist movements and the newly seceded territories and states aim at recognition from other states as well as the international community as a whole. Numerous international relations scholars and political theorists realize that the denial of recognition likely leads to undesirable consequences and further conflict. Nonetheless, others also maintain that recognition itself may result in unfavorable ends and ironies. Geis et. al. (2015) state two types of recognition between two conflicting parties. 'Thin'

recognition refers to ‘[the] recognition of each other as agents, as autonomous entities that have the right to exist and continue to exist as an autonomous agent’ (p.13). On the other hand, ‘thick’ recognition means much more than that; ‘each party needs to understand the other in terms of essential elements composing its identity’ (p.13).

As far as legitimacy is concerned, recognition of new states is considered as constitutive. This implies that the qualification of a particular territory and its authority to a state requires the recognition of the other members of state community. In contrast, the declaratory theory argues that recognition is not necessary as ‘a political entity with a defined territory, a people, and an effective state authority constitutes a state...and the act of recognition only clarifies such underlying legal quality’ (Oeter 2015: 127). In this theory, the legality of a statehood is conceived as a mere fact. The term declaratory reveals that secession is justified by the declaration of the seceding group. The legitimacy of the Kosovo recognition is highly controversial in the European Union, while Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and North Ossetia were retaliatory actions following the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. Despite these cases, there are traditional policies of non-recognition in other cases like Somaliland, Transnistria, and Northern Cyprus (Oeter 2015).

The legal recognition of a state as a player in the international system could be considered as the most basic form of recognition, as it provides some sort of respect to the state (Iser 2015). However, there is a debate on whether secession and recognition of new states should be considered as a legal issue or normative issue. According to Oeter (2015), ‘[an] old saying of public international law treaties [states that] ‘secession is a matter of fact, not a matter of law’’ (p.129). Apart from this, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, in international law, states that a new state qualifies to be recognized by other states if it has ‘a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states’ (Pavkovic and Radan 2007).

2.1.2 Several Secession Cases

In this section, a number of secession examples are probed – three in East Africa and the rest in Eastern Europe. Eritrea and South Sudan cases are of particular interest, as they happened in the same region as Somaliland. Eritrea had similar features with Somaliland;

they both have distinct colonial heritage compared to their parent states, and that both have regained their independence by military means against their parent states, Somaliland with Somalia and Eritrea with Ethiopia, respectively. Furthermore, Eritrea seceded the same time as Somaliland announced its secession (1991), but achieved recognition in a short period of time. South Sudan is relevant because of its negotiations with Sudan to determine its future. Somaliland and Somalia are now in that position, and the Sudan-South Sudan case has a lot of experience to offer. The recurrent secessions in the former Yugoslav Republic are considered to enable us to comprehend the greater debate of secession and their causes, justifications, and processes. We need to acknowledge which secessions were successful as a result of talks and which through other approaches.

There were at least three secession cases in East Africa, namely Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland, since 1991. Eritrea and South Sudan achieved international recognition but Somaliland still struggles to achieve recognition. After a 30-year long armed struggle with Ethiopia, Eritrea seceded in 1991, and achieved international recognition after two years (in 1993), when Eritreans voted for independence in the referendum (Adam 1994; Gilkes 2003). On the contrary, following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 in Kenya, facilitated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization for East African Countries, South Sudanese voted for independence in the 2011 referendum (Malwal 2015). Details of the South Sudan peace talks were presented in the previous section.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia experienced recurrent secessions. All secessionist movements employed as a source of legitimacy for their secessions and as a justification, by national self-determination as well as referenda held to seek support for the people's wishes. Slovenia seceded, and declared independence, on 24 June 1991 after 88.4 percent of the Slovenians voted for independence in a referendum conducted in December 1990. On 25 June 1991, Croatia proclaimed independence following a plebiscite held in May of that year, in which 93 percent of the Croatians voted for independence. On 18 October 1991, soon after the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovo announced its independence from Yugoslavia, following a referendum in which 99.4 percent of Kosovars voted for independence. After a plebiscite conducted in February

1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. In April of the same year, Serb Republic proclaimed independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pavkovic 2000).

2.2 Secession and Peace Talks

Negotiations are a crucial part in the process of recognizing new states. Most of the newly seceded, and then, internationally recognized states achieved this position through dialogue and negotiations. Negotiations of this kind usually take place between the parent state and the seceded state, often in the presence of international organizations (like United Nations) and/or other states. Some examples of negotiations include those concerning the cases of South Sudan (Malwal 2015), Kosovo (Oeter 2015), Israel-Palestine (Pruit 1997; Migdalovitz 2004), Cyprus (Michael 2007) and that of Somaliland which this study examines. In the recognition of new states, the final resolution should be accomplished through negotiations rather than by use of force. Negotiations, nevertheless, necessitate the existence of incentives which may motivate both sides coming into a compromise (Oeter 2015).

2.2.1 A Five-Stage Process of Sustainable Peace Talks

Peace talks may not always be associated with secession or recognition. Some deal with local reconciliation, bringing several conflicting political or military factions together, to achieve peace and stability. However, numerous negotiations which were, in one way or another, involved in secession and recognition of certain territories, were referred to as peace talks. Among them are South Sudan, Israel-Palestine and Cyprus peace talks and peace processes. Saunders (1999) developed a five-stage process of sustainable peace talks:

Stage 1. Deciding to engage: It is always unlikely for two hostile groups or seemingly enemies to negotiate, or it might be seen as a waste of time. However, they possibly acknowledge, at some point in time, that it is necessary to change the current situation, although who moves first or sacrifices something brings trouble. Therefore, in this stage, the parties decide to negotiate. Several questions need to be answered at this stage. Among them, who will take the initiative? Under what conditions (the compact, place purpose and agenda, group size) will the talks be held? And who will the participants be (who are the

individuals qualified to be members of each side)? The first initiative to engage in talks can generate from either side or from a third group. In Somaliland-Somalia talks, the international community proposed for the two states to talk, and promised to provide a platform and other possible necessary facilities in the 2012 London Conference on Somalia.

Stage 2. Mapping and naming problems and relationships: In this stage, which starts with the first meeting of the process, aims to define the key problems and prioritize them in accordance with the comprehensive attention they require. Naming the problems enables to evaluate their magnitude and decide which one to deal with first, second and so on.

Stage 3. Probing problems and relationships to choose a direction: In this stage, the group describes the principal problem(s) to deal with and expresses the confronting relationships that cause them. They then outline the possible methods to alter these relationships, weigh available choices and set a direction. They finally demonstrate their will to change those relationships.

Stage 4. Scenario-building – experiencing a changing relationship: The aim, at this stage, is the dialogue group to accomplish a new way of thinking together to realize the desired change, and to design a scenario for that change. The tasks to perform include listing the barriers to the desired change, listing all necessary steps to eliminate them, deciding who takes which step, and carrying out these steps in sequence while considering their interactions.

Stage 5. Acting together to make change happen: In this last stage, the group decides to perform all necessary activities to fulfill the previously designed scenario. Changing the relationship goes beyond the negotiation groups, and extends to the civil society of the two sides. Doing so requires using the existing public, political or educational institutions, influencing their instructions or establishing new institutions to perform the desired activities. The members of the two participating groups collaborate, aiming to change the perceptions or to some extent, relationships of their citizens. They must, therefore, employ a bottom-up approach, that is to say, instead of directing their actions at governments, they must persuade citizens what to do and how to change (Saunders 1999: 97-145).

This model could also be applied to secession and recognition talks, and some of them likely went through these stages (not necessarily in this sequence), to decide the future of a particular territory. If you take any of the previously held talks as an example, the two sides – parent state and seceding state – firstly agree to discuss their future and initiate talks. They decide their relationships (as equal parties, state, and autonomous territory, *de jure* state and *de facto* state, so on and so forth), and highlight the problems. They also agree on which issues go first and how to proceed with the principle matters. After all, they need to cooperate for possible changes and what leads to these changes. These changes include holding referendum and likes, and these types of activities need the commitment of both sides. Practical examples of this kind of negotiations are presented in the following sections.

2.2.2 Several Cases of Peace Talks

As can be seen in the literature here or elsewhere, one way that new states come to being is negotiations between the parent state and the seceding state. This is when the two sides agree to come to the table and thus, discuss and decide their future relations. The Somaliland-Somalia case is a good example. Being two separate states since 1991, the aim of the current negotiations is to decide the future of the two states. To understand more of these talks and their processes, learn from the past experience, and comparatively study their similarities and differences with our case of interest, selected cases are examined in this section. I selected South Sudan, Israel-Palestine and Cyprus talks. Whilst only the first case (South Sudan) was successful, while the other two failed, we have to even consider the failed cases as the talks process started at least and achieved some developments. Keeping in mind that the Somaliland-Somalia talks can be either success or failure, there is no reason to consider the successful talks only. We are mainly interested in the process. Moreover, the elaboration of the main reasons that led to the failure of those two talks (Israel-Palestine and Cyprus) will be attempted. The case of Sudan-SPLM is selected because it took place in the same region as my study, East Africa while the Israel-Palestine and Cyprus cases are selected since they are among the most well-known peace talks in recent history.

2.2.2.1 Sudan-SPLM Peace Talks

Soon after the British Empire withdrew from the country in 1956, the conflict between the northern and southern Sudan commenced. The conflict in Sudan is labeled as a multidimensional one that originated from as diverse sources as religion, geographic distinctions, race, and resources (Sriram 2008). In March 1972, through the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, South Sudan was granted regional autonomy. Unfortunately, the Nimeiri regime revoked the peace agreement in 1983, which resulted in the beginning of a 21-year-long civil war between the two sides. Finally, South Sudan managed to claim self-determination and convince the North to accept their right to self-determination under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 in Kenya. This peace negotiation was facilitated and organized by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization for East African Countries. In this agreement, South Sudan was awarded a six-year transitional period (from July 2005 to January 2011) before a referendum was held. South Sudan eventually achieved independence through a self-determination referendum on 1 January 2011, in which the Southern Sudanese voted in an overwhelming majority of 98 percent for independence (Malwal 2015).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is considered as the ultimate result of the Machakos Peace Process which started in 2002. The CPA concluded the prolonged civil war between the two sides and also led to the independence of South Sudan. Borsché (2007) summarizes the agreement as follows:

The CPA is composed of six partial agreements that have been signed by the parties. CPA is indeed a comprehensive agreement and some important stipulations in the CPA are: The South is given the opportunity to become independent through a referendum in 2011; until the referendum the South will have autonomy; the leader of the SPLM shall be FVP [First Vice President] of Sudan, 28 percent of the seats in the GoNU [Government of National Unity] should be given to the SPLM; revenues from the oil in the South are to be shared 50-50 between the North and the South; Sharia law is to be applied only in the North and only to Muslims; the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) should be the only legal armed groups in the country; they should remain separate, but some integrated units are to be formed; the government will withdraw 91 000 troops from the South in two and a half years and the SPLA has eight months to withdraw its troops from the North;

furthermore the North and the South shall have separate banking systems and currencies (Borsché 2007).

However, the CPA has its limitations. One of them is its failure of deciding the status of the Abyei area; its status was instead decided through the Protocol on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict. Unfortunately, the oil-rich area of Abyei is caught between Sudan and South Sudan geographically, politically and ethnically since the secession of South Sudan. There is no government in charge of this contested area but a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission (the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei also known as UNISFA) has been in charge of observing the situation since 2011 (Al Jazeera 2015).

2.2.2.2 Israel-Palestine Peace Talks (The Oslo Process)

After a prolonged conflict between Israel and Palestine, and Israel and several Arab countries, Israel and Palestine ultimately reached an agreement in Oslo, Norway in 1993. Oslo agreements, signed on 9 September 1993 led to the mutual recognition between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, whereby, PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's existence as a state, while the Palestinian Self-Government Authority was created. The two sides also demonstrated their commitment to further talks (Pruitt 1997; Migdalovitz 2004). PLO leaders also refrained from all acts of violence and vowed to maintain peace, stability, and coexistence. The Oslo II transitional agreement (also known as Taba Accords), signed on 28 September 1995, covered beyond peace and mutual recognition. It addressed the cooperation of the two sides, civic issues and elections, economic relations, legal affairs and Palestinian prisoners' release (Migdalovitz 2004). Unfortunately, the Oslo peace process collapsed for various reasons. Although international, geopolitical and regional factors likely played a role, there were specific reasons attributed to the failure. As several researchers argued, the failure was principally due to implementation failure. Israel's never-stopping settlement constructions, Arafat's inability to strongly deal with attacks and strikes from his side, and the negotiation styles of participants from both sides all damaged the trust between the two parties. Not to mention the United States' biased role in the peace process, and its tendency towards Israel. In spite of the implementation failure, the collapse of the process partially stemmed from the nature of the 1993 mutual recognition between Israel and PLO. Ironically, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinians but never recognized

Palestine's right to statehood. Likewise, PLO recognized Israel's existence as a state, but did not recognize Zionism as a legitimate national movement (Rynhold 2008).

2.2.2.3 Cyprus Peace Talks (The Annan Plan)

Although Cyprus was divided since the 1960s, the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the partition that followed took the separation into another level, generating geographic and demographic aspects. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan initiated a strategy to hold negotiations and bring the two sides of Cyprus together. Unfortunately, the Annan Plan – that lasted from November 2002 to April 2004 – eventually failed in 2004 due to various factors including geopolitical, political, cultural and historical ones. Strong distrust and uncertainty between the two parties and insecurity primarily resulted in disagreements and differences. Notably, negotiations failed to determine the future of the two sides (Michael 2007). However, there were particular factors attributed to the failure of the Annan Plan. The mediators (the Secretary-General and other UN convoys) miscalculated the Greek-Cypriot public opinion; failed to comprehend or recall Greek-Cypriot's historical position on a federal solution; overrated the capability of bi-communal (composed of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots) citizen groups to alter the attitude of the Greek-Cypriots, and the mistake to presume that the same strategy that worked with Turkish-Cypriots will apply to the Greek-Cypriots. Other regional and geopolitical factors were repeated regime changes in Greece, the shift of Turkey's regional attention to the Iraq war, and the European Union's incapacity to formulate and stick to a consistent Cyprus policy (Michael 2007).

The concepts of secession and self-determination have been examined in the chapter, followed by theories on secession and self-determination, and several secession cases. All the selected secession cases are in line with the secession theories we have probed. Secession, according to these examples, is assumed to be national self-determination right, just-cause/ remedial right or mere primary right. Nations like Slovenians, Croatians, Kosovars, Bosnians, and Serbians were all in a quest for their specific nation-states, where states like South Sudan and Eritrea needed to be separate states because of injustices they experienced, or just because of their choice and willingness. The case of Eritrea has particular importance as it has more similarities with the case of Somaliland. These

similarities mentioned in the previous sections include their distinct colonial heritage, regaining their independence by military means and being in the same location (Horn of Africa). The successful talks between Sudan and South Sudan and the later referendum which resulted in an independent South Sudan also give Somaliland a hope, and it may follow the footprints of South Sudan. The purpose of reviewing secessions of the former Yugoslavia was to know more about secession and comprehend how secessions are justified in different parts of the world.

Since the aim of Somaliland-Somalia talks was to decide the future of the two sides, this chapter revisited the literature on negotiations and secession. Negotiations play a vital role in achieving successful secession and recognition. Although the Oslo Process of Israel-Palestine and the Annan Plan of Cyprus collapsed, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Sudan-South Sudan was successful and led to the end of the armed conflict between the two sides, and also, resulted in an independent South Sudan. In previous sections, some of the numerous factors which led to the collapse of the other two talks are examined.

3. SOMALILAND AND SOMALIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

As Confucius once said “study the past if you would define the future”¹. To understand the current talks and their future trends, one should necessarily review the historical factors and events that may directly, or indirectly, significantly or trivially affect the outcome of the talks. This chapter sketches the modern history of the two states. Somaliland and Somalia had separate colonial history and origin; achieved immediate unification after the independence, and again separated when the catastrophic civil war led to state-collapse. Hence, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the colonial era (before 1960). The second section explores the period of the union of the two states which lasted around thirty years (1960-1991). And finally, the third section investigates after the collapse of the Somali state, the secession of Somaliland, and Somalia’s degeneration into war-torn and failed state (since 1991). The aim is to highlight various crucial, historical events in order to grasp or reveal their likely implications on the development and future of talks.

3.1 Somaliland and Somalia in the Colonial Era

The Somali nation, mainly pastoralists, lived in the Horn of Africa. Colonial powers were interested in this territory for different reasons. Three European powers, namely Britain, France, and Italy, and at least two African states, Egypt and Abyssinia, were all involved in the competition to occupy the land of Somalis in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire transferred several Red Sea ports to the government of the Khedive Ismail (of Egypt and Sudan) in 1866, and Ismail’s government later claimed that the Somali Coast was part of this jurisdiction. Present in Aden since 1839, Britain’s aim to land in the Somali area was to supply fresh meat to its garrison in Aden, since it used Aden as a station on the short route to India (Lewis 1988). France’s interest in Djibouti was mainly

strategic, while Italy's aim in Somalia could be both strategic and economic as they later extensively benefited from the banana sector.

Ultimately, the greater Somali territory was partitioned into five territories: British Somaliland occupied by Britain, Italian Somaliland occupied by Italy, French Somaliland occupied by France, Ogaden and Reserved Areas consolidated to Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and Northern Frontier District (NFD) merged to Kenya. After signing formal treaties with the local clans and clan leaders, Britain finally established the Somaliland Protectorate in 1887. Given France's attempt to extend its area and Britain's response, the two sides finally signed the Anglo-French Treaty in 1888, which defined the boundaries of the two protectorates. After deals with the local clans as well as the Sultan of Zanzibar, Italy established the Italian Somaliland. After negotiations, the Anglo-Italian protocol was signed in March 1891, in which, the boundaries between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were defined. It is worthwhile mentioning that Italy participated in these negotiations with Britain as a protector of Abyssinia. Hence, in 1897 the boundaries of British Somaliland and Abyssinia were defined, but this did not come to light until 1934 when an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission tried to demarcate the boundary. This resulted in the uprising of the Somalis under British protection, leading to the death of one commissioner. This 1897 agreement is considered to be the root of the longtime hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia (Lewis 1988).

During the Second World War, Italy captured British Somaliland in August 1940, and after only seven months, Britain recaptured the territory. Italian Somaliland and Ogaden were also captured by the Allies during the East African campaign to liberate Ethiopia from Italy. Consequently, all Somali territories except French Somaliland remained under the British administration for nearly a decade. However, a United Nations Assembly decision put Somalia under a ten-year UN mandated Italian Trusteeship on 21 November 1949. To implement the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements, Britain transferred the Ogaden territory to Ethiopia in September 1948 (Lewis 1988).

After an independence struggle accompanied by pan-Somalism movements – an effort to unite all the five Somali territories under one state – which lasted for some time, British Somaliland achieved full independence on 26 June 1960, while Italian Somaliland became

independent four days later, on 1 July. The two states then united on the same day, 1 July 1960, to form the Somali Republic. French Somaliland (Djibouti) remained a French colony until 1977, while Ogaden and NFD remained to be parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. Since our aim is to comprehend the historical relationship between Somaliland and Somalia, and how they get their present-day positions, we will attempt to further clarify the union and its aftermath.

3.2 Somaliland and Somalia as One: The Union Period (1960-1991)

Two important points to highlight here are that Somaliland (former British Somaliland) and Somalia (former Italian Somaliland) had separate colonial origins and that Somaliland, before voluntarily uniting with Somalia, had five days of independence. The people of Somaliland sacrificed more to the unification than Somalis did (Lewis 1988), but they faced different realities when they arrived in Mogadishu, and their expectations and dreams vanished. They perceived that they sacrificed their sovereignty and newly acquired independence for unity, in order to clear the way and set a good example for the other Somalis (in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti) to follow.

According to Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the premier of Somaliland during the independence, the parliament of Somaliland discussed the components of the act of union to be ratified together and approved an act of union draft with 23 articles. However, when they traveled to Mogadishu, the joint session of the national assembly (33 MPs from Somaliland and 90 MPs from Somalia) did not consider their proposal. As the south had a clear majority, they approved an act of union with only two articles – the two governments were amalgamated and the two parliaments were merged². In that proposal, the leadership of the country should be shared equally. That is to say, if the president of the republic is from one side, the prime minister should come from the other side. Furthermore, both sides must obtain equal seats in the parliament as well as in the cabinet. If one side takes the capital of the republic, the other capital should host foreign consulates. Nevertheless, all these conditions were rejected by the MPs and delegates of Somalia and they maintained instant and unconditional unification of the two states (Odowa 2013).

Mogadishu, the capital of Italian Somaliland, became the capital of the new Somali Republic. All crucial positions, the president, the prime minister, key cabinet positions and army commanders went to the south. As soon as the new Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, announced his new government, only four of the fourteen ministerial positions were granted to the northern (Somaliland) politicians. As Bulhan (2008) puts it “unity without condition turned out to be unity on unequal terms” (p.59).

The skepticism and disappointment of Somalilanders towards the union instantly came to light. Several events reveal the level of anger of Somalilanders. To approve the constitution under which the two states united, a referendum was held on 20 June 1961. The Somali National League (SNL), the most powerful party from the north, boycotted the referendum. Consequently, the majority (over 50 percent) of those who voted in Somaliland rejected the constitution. Another significant event was the foiled military coup carried out by military officials from Somaliland in December 1961. Though their attempt failed, they wanted to withdraw the union as they conducted their coup inside the territory of the former Somaliland British Protectorate. It was also widely believed that SNL members were part of the plan and sympathized the military officials (Lewis 1988).

Major general Mohamed Siad Barre, the longtime serving military leader of Somalia, took power in a military coup successfully staged on 21 October 1969. The military acted only five days after the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, and seized the opportunity, while the civilian government was struggling to replace the departed president (Lewis 1988; Bulhan 2008; Odowa 2013; Ingiriis 2016a; Ingiriis 2016b). The military regime is believed to have committed crimes against humanity in Somalia during its reign.

There is an argument that the crimes against humanity as well as atrocities committed by the Siad Barre regime in Somaliland, in late 1980s, can be referred to as a genocide. Although this genocide is not recognized internationally, I will briefly discuss it.

According to Ingiriis (2016b), Barre used the clan as a weapon to serve his interests, oppressed rival clans and conducted genocidal campaigns across Somalia in the 1980s. The most notable and costly state-sponsored genocide was carried out in Somaliland in

the late 1980s against the people of Somaliland, the Isaaq clan-family in particular. He writes:

The year 1988 was the turning point. The Siad Barre regime involved the Somali air forces in the genocidal campaigns to conduct aerial bombardments on Hargeisa, the center of the Isaaq region. The bombardment was done with mercenary pilots transported from South Africa and Zimbabwe (Ingiriis 2016b:243).

He adds that the decision of Somaliland secession and the overwhelming support of the secession is widely determined by the legacy of the genocidal campaign carried out in Somaliland. As far as the people of Somaliland are concerned, accumulated grievances led to their position. In 1988, the Isaaq civilians were particularly targeted because of their clan affiliation, and moreover, there were plans to exterminate them and replace them by the Ogaden refugees of the 1977 war between Somalia and Ethiopia. As a result, around 100,000 people are believed to have been killed, while over 500,000 were forced to flee from their homes (Ingiriis 2016b). Pretending to fight against SNM, the Siad Barre regime targeted innocent civilians because of their political positions or clan affiliations. Thus, cruel counter-insurgency led to the indiscriminate massacre of civilians, total destruction of cities and towns, killing livestock, destroying water pools, wells and dams, and numerous harsh and cruel activities (Africa Watch Committee 1990).

Dr. Hussein A. Bulhan, a Somali academic and psychiatrist, discovered a tape belonged to the Siad Barre military regime taped in Hargeisa in the late 1980s. In the tape which was featured in Al Jazeera documentary aired in 2016, the generals were recorded clearly revealing what they were doing and here is what they said:

Attack and eliminate them. Kill even the wounded. Destroy water sources and reservoirs. Burn down villages. Pillage and kill their residents. Everything...whoever submits, tell him his medicine is in the ground and bury him there. You must eliminate all. Allow no activity, no life. Kill all but the crows (Al Jazeera, 2016).

The discovery of new mass graves still prevails in Somaliland and most of them are exhumed in the presence of international observers and human rights organizations. According to the proponents of this argument, these and many other pieces of evidence prove that what happened in Somaliland could be referred to as a genocide. In accordance with Merriam-Webster Dictionary, genocide can be defined as “the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political or cultural group”. Furthermore, genocide is

legally defined in Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, N/A).

Somalilanders, the Isaacs in particular, are not a separate ethnic, racial or religious group, but they were targeted due to their clan identity and political beliefs. Proponents of this argument, therefore, maintain that there is enough evidence to support the case of genocide in Somaliland; what the military officials said on that tape is a first-hand proof of what they have committed.

3.3 Taking Two Different Pathways: Somaliland and Somalia since 1991

The destructive and persistent civil war of Somalia, which was limited to the northern side in the mid and late 1980s, spread to south-central Somalia in 1990 and onwards. As a result, Siad Barre was defeated and forced to flee from his palace in January 1991. Mogadishu, the capital of the republic, fell to the hands of clan militias, whereby, two warlords – Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aidid, who both belonged to the same clan-family (Hawiye) as well as the same political organization (United Somali Congress or USC), fought over the control of the city. This power struggle led to the division of the city into two parts, the northern side under the control of Ali Mahdi and the southern side under Aidid's control (Farah & Lewis 1997).

The defeat of Siad Barre and his loyal forces, followed by power competition among rebel groups and clan militias, resulted in total state collapse, and the state's monopolization of the use of force came to an end. In South-Central Somalia, the social cost of the civil war and political turmoil was very high. A severe famine occurred in 1992-1993, a large number of the population fled to the neighboring countries, Middle East, Asia, Europe, and North America. Many were also internally displaced. Furthermore, the social capital, infrastructure, and public services were demolished (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003). The international community made several attempts to save Somalia from upheavals since

1991. As early as 1992, during the famine, US-led forces (the Operation Restore Hope, US-led United Nations mission) invaded Somalia to defeat the warlords and let the food aid reach those affected by the civil war and the famine (Wheeler & Roberts 2012). Other attempts by the international community aimed to create a central authority for the country. According to Pijovic (2013), there were at least 13 international conferences on Somalia between 1993 and 2003 intended to establish a central government for Somalia, or develop its prerequisites and necessary requirements. Among them, the Djibouti conference held in Arta in 2000 was the most successful one as it generated the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia. All the followed governments in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2017 were all came to being as a result of international efforts. None of them was the outcome of popular votes.

Due to the absence of effective central government which monopolizes the use of violence, has sovereignty over its territory, maintains the security and carries out all national duties, Somalia became a safe haven for warlords, terrorist groups, pirates and numerous rebel groups and militias belonging to different affiliations. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2005 and their triumph over the warlords in 2006 (Pijovic 2013), led to the Ethiopian invasion to assist the transitional government. After the Union of Islamic Courts were defeated in more vicious and costly battles, the rise of the worst of all evils followed. Al-Shabab, an extremist, terrorist organization having links with Al-Qaeda, became the most powerful and brutal organization, controlling the largest area since the collapse of the state. Efforts to cope with Al-Shabab's threat to the neighboring countries, the region and to the international community bring about the African peacekeeping mission in Somalia known as AMISOM from several African nations. Among these nations, Uganda, Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya, where Ethiopia and Kenya initially invaded Somalia separately and later claimed to have joined the peacekeeping mission. The rise of the Somali piracy in North-Eastern Somali coast became a threat to maritime trade and other sea voyages through the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, efforts by the international community created sea forces to patrol water channels near Somali coasts to avoid and handle threats from the pirates.

On the other hand, in the Grand Conference of the Northern People held in Burao, whereby the clan leaders, elders, and leaders of the Somali National Movement (SNM) met, the 1960 Act of Union was annulled and the independence of the former British Protectorate was restored. On 18 May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland was founded, consisting of five regions of the Somali Republic and covering the former British Protectorate territory. Bordered by Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, the boundaries of Somaliland were colonial legacy, similar to those of other African nations, created by international treaties signed between 1888 and 1897 (Farah & Lewis 1997; Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003; Eubank 2010; Ministry of National Planning and Development 2014).

Over the years, Somaliland enjoyed relative peace and stability, tangible reconstruction, effective economy, democracy and working institutions. Although there were droughts and internal clan wars in the early 1990s, Somaliland did not experience massive war and catastrophic famine (Forti 2011; Pijovic 2013). There were no terrorist and piracy-related movements in the country as well. One important factor for this is the homegrown, bottom-up approach initiated by the clan leaders in Somaliland. The elders along with clan leaders and political figures endeavored and accomplished full reconciliation among the clans in Somaliland (Farah & Lewis 1997). The elimination of clan hostilities and conflicting political views resulted in the consolidation of people's power, who later wholly participated in the peace-building and state-building efforts. Another factor which facilitated the success of the homegrown approach was the absence of foreign intervention. Reconciliation, peace-building and state-building processes were all local efforts and solely carried out by the local population. Moreover, political and traditional actors in Somaliland never acquired formal development assistance or significant financial aid (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003; Eubank 2010).

Considering the state-building efforts, being the second face after peace-building, Somaliland reconstructed the infrastructure, restored education, health and other public services. Additionally, the state created its own constitution, flag, currency, passport, license plates for vehicles and other statehood symbols. There is also a functioning parliament, executive institutions, judiciary, army and police force (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003; Forti 2011). As far as democracy is concerned, Somaliland adopted a multi-

party, democratic system with three political parties. The referendum for the constitution as well as the decision to restore its independence was approved by 97 percent of the popular vote in 2001. Since the secession in 1991, Somaliland conducted five elections peacefully; two local municipal elections in 2002 and 2012, a parliamentary election in 2005, and two presidential elections in 2003 and 2010 (Ministry of National Planning and Development 2014).

Economically, Somaliland is a poor, underdeveloped country. The World Bank and the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Development estimated the 2012 Gross Domestic Product and Per Capita Income of Somaliland to be \$1.4 billion and \$347, respectively, which makes it among the five poorest countries in the world (Muhumed 2016). The country's economy heavily depends on the livestock production and around 16.3 million heads were exported to the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia, between 2010 and 2014 (Muhumed 2016). Given that everything has been started from the bottom in 1991, after the destructive civil war, achievements in the social sector are substantial. Ten years after the secession (2001), the country had 294 primary schools, 15 secondary schools, and two universities. However, in 2015 there were 1083 primary schools, 146 secondary schools, and 19 universities. Furthermore, the enrollment of primary schools increased from 35,997 students in 1999 to 234,128 students in 2015 (Ministry of National Planning and Development 2016). Although health sector received significant foreign assistance from international organizations, it is not as successful as the education sector. In 2015, there were 36 hospitals, 101 health centers and 164 health posts in Somaliland (Ministry of National Planning and Development 2016).

The population of Somaliland was estimated to be 4.8 million in 2015, with annual population growth rate of 3.14 per cent and life expectancy of 51.8 years (Ministry of National Planning and Development 2016). Literacy rate was 59 per cent in urban areas and 47 per cent in rural areas in 2012 (World Bank and Ministry of National Planning and Development 2014).

Nevertheless, Somaliland somewhat suffered from the absence of formal political recognition from the international community. No single country recognized Somaliland since its secession. Consequently, Somaliland did not obtain bilateral donor aid or

financial and technical support from the international financial institutions for peace-building and reconstruction efforts. Lack of recognition also retarded foreign investment, economic growth and international trade (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003). In this age of globalization whereby nations are highly interdependent economically, politically and culturally, among others, it is not easy for a poor, underdeveloped country like Somaliland to achieve a lot by itself. Despite the substantial achievements of Somaliland in different areas, it is somehow in a political and economic isolation given its absence from a number of international and regional organizations. Among them are the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

These historical events discussed above may have a number of ramifications on the Somaliland-Somalia talks. The two sides are in two extreme positions. While Somaliland maintains that its independence is unnegotiable and the final outcome of the talks must be two parallel states, Somalia insists that the union is unnegotiable and there has to be only one state. Somalia, being the parent state, safeguards its territorial integrity, avoids any change to its territories and escapes further disintegration that may follow the successful secession of Somaliland. On the contrary, Somaliland proposes strong justifications for its case. Somaliland was a separate colonial territory and therefore had different colonial origin; obtained its independence from Britain in separate date and existed five days as an independent state; voluntarily united with Somalia, and thus, can voluntarily withdraw from the union; the union failed it and brought political grievances as well as atrocities and genocide against it; regained its independence by military means; and existed as an independent, *de facto* state over 25 years. The rise of new generations and the possible formation of different identities may also have a profound effect.

4. THE DIALOGUE PROCESS: FROM LONDON TO DJIBOUTI

For the first time since its secession in 1991, Somaliland attended a conference on Somalia in 2012. The 2012 London Conference on Somalia initiated the idea of Somaliland and Somalia to hold talks in order to clarify their future relations. This chapter examines the dialogue process, proposed in paragraph 6 of the London Conference Communiqué, which the international community promised to provide any necessary assistance needed by the negotiating parties – Government of Somaliland and Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (or its replacement). The first meeting took place at Chevening House, London, where two technical committees from the two sides designed the framework for the future talks. This was followed by a presidential-level meeting in Dubai, whereby, the two presidents formally endorsed the dialogue process. After that, talks took place in Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and Djibouti. The chapter will be limited to the rounds that successfully took place so far, their communiqués and agreements.

4.1 London Conference: The Genesis of the Talks

Since Somaliland announced its secession on 18 May 1991, it has been a separate state politically, economically and geographically. Having managed to achieve relative peace and stability in the early 1990s, Somaliland has never been part of the international community's efforts to stabilize Somalia. International efforts and interventions were limited to the conflict-ridden South-Central Somalia. These interventions ranged from humanitarian to military to political. During the 1992-93 famine, both humanitarian and military interventions took place in Somalia (Wheeler & Roberts 2012). Furthermore, as far as political intervention is concerned, there were at least 13 international conferences on Somalia between 1993 and 2003 intended to establish a central government for Somalia, or develop its prerequisites (Pijovic 2013). Several more conferences also took

place since 2003. On the contrary, while Somalia has been subject to international interventions, Somaliland has accomplished homegrown reconciliation, peace-building, state-building, reconstruction, and democracy – conducting five democratic elections peacefully (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf 2003; Forti 2011; Ministry of National Planning and Development 2014).

Since the separation of the two entities, Somaliland never attended any conference on Somalia until the London Conference in 2012. The new administration from Kulmiye Party, who won the 2010 general elections in Somaliland, came up with a new policy towards the quest on recognition and decided to negotiate with Somalia (the parent state according to secession theories). Over the years, negotiating with administrations of Somalia, or participating in their politics has been prohibited, and sometimes considered as a crime in Somaliland. Thus, the government had to seek permission, approval and public support for its new foreign policy from the parliament, opposition parties and civil society. After several efforts, the new regime managed to acquire public support and announced that they will attend the London conference for the first time. With their conditions fulfilled, Somaliland attended the conference as an independent state equal to Somalia and other attending states. The British Government also made an exorbitant effort to bring Somaliland to the Conference. The London Conference on Somalia took place on 23 February 2012 at Lancaster House, London. The conference was attended by 55 delegations from Somalia (including the Somaliland delegation) and the international community¹.

Taking the presence of Somaliland as a vital accomplishment, the British Government, as well as the international community, incorporated Somaliland into the conference's agenda. Ultimately, paragraph six of the London Conference Communiqué stated that “The Conference recognized the need for the international community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG [Transitional Federal Government of Somalia] or its replacement may agree to establish in order to clarify their future relations”².

4.2 Chevening House Round, London

As the London and Istanbul conferences' communiqués stated, the international community promised to support talks between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (or its replacement) and Somaliland to clarify and decide their future relations. Consequently, two technical committees from the two sides – Somaliland and Somalia – met on 20-21 June 2012 at Chevening House, London. Hosted by the UK and co-hosted by Norway and the EU as per request of the two sides, this preparatory dialogue aimed to pave the way, and establish an outline and agenda for the future talks.

Firstly, the participants agreed that the talks will take place between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (or its replacement) and Somaliland, as emphasized in paragraph 6 of the London Conference Communiqué and paragraph 10 of the Istanbul II Conference Communiqué³. Defining the two talking sides was particularly beneficial and significant for Somaliland, to avoid certain political ambiguities. On one hand, mentioning TFG or its replacement removes any possibility that Somaliland could deal with regional states of Somalia, which were interested in participating in the dialogue process initially. On the other hand, asserting its side as Somaliland avoided to be referred as other names like the Northern Regions of Somalia, or as regional state of Somalia. These are among a number of names used by certain people from Somalia who are against the secessionist agenda of Somaliland.

The two sides highlighted the necessity of adopting a common method to avoid anything that would undermine, or to some extent put at risk, the continuation of the talks. Moreover, they expressed their commitment to the continuation of the talks and called the two presidents an urgent meeting to review the progress. The two sides also called the international community to keep supporting and facilitating the talks and providing, among other assistance, legal, economic and security experts. Furthermore, they emphasized their commitment and agreed to share experience on working with the international community on the use of development and humanitarian assistance for the benefit of people in both Somaliland and Somalia, and at the same time, requested the international community to increase that aid. On local issues and far from talks, the two parties agreed to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, extremism, and serious crimes,

and also, in the fight against piracy (both at sea and on land), maritime crime, illegal fishing and toxic dumping. Finally, they repeated their support for ending the transition in Somalia⁴.

4.3 Dubai Round

As the Chevening House meeting of technical committees called for the two presidents to meet and review progress, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and the President of Somaliland Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo met on 28 June 2012 in Dubai. The aim of this meeting, hosted by the government of the United Arab Emirates, was the two presidents to officially endorse the process of talks between the two sides started at Chevening on 20 June 2012. The two sides also agreed to the continuation of talks, and to let the two committees from the two sides and their presidents continue the dialogue. The two presidents jointly signed a statement with the above agreements⁵.

4.4 Ankara Round

The Turkish Government hosted a presidential-level meeting between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland held on 13 April 2013 in Ankara. One purpose of this meeting was resuming the dialogue process after regime change in Somalia. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud replaced the previous president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, while the transitional period in Somalia came to an end. With the presence of the Turkish prime minister and foreign minister, the two sides agreed upon and jointly produced a communiqué with seven articles⁶.

(1) The two sides committed to the continuation of the dialogue; (2) agreed to accept and act in accordance with the London and Dubai agreements; (3) stated that the Dialogue is between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland, and the international community that is supporting this process will only provide facilitation when needed; (4) agreed to share the aid received from the international community, and to encourage and facilitate aid provided to Somaliland; (5) agreed to cooperate in security sector and share related intelligence, training and scholarships for security sector

professionals in order to become more effective in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, toxic dumping, maritime crime and serious crimes; (6) the two parties agreed to meet in Turkey within 90 days; and finally, (7) the two sides agreed to avoid any inflammatory words and actions that would undermine, or put at risk, the continuation of talks. The communiqué was signed by Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Interior Minister of Somalia and Mohamed Abdilahi Omer, Foreign Minister of Somaliland in the presence of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud of Somalia, President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo of Somaliland, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, and Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey⁷.

4.5 Istanbul I Round

Shortly after the Ankara dialogue, the two sides met between 7 and 9 July 2013 in Istanbul. The dialogue, hosted by the Turkish Government, was an extension and followed the Ankara agreements. It also focused on the issues that came into existence after the Ankara meeting, to address any barriers or activities that would damage the continuation of the talks or the process as a whole. In this meeting, the two parties discussed a crucial issue and finally came to an agreement on it. Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia, the Somali aviation and air traffic management was assumed by the United Nations and established their base in Nairobi, Kenya. In this meeting, the two sides agreed to return the air traffic management from the United Nations and decided to establish a joint control body based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. The base is supposed to lead the air traffic control of both Somalia and Somaliland and will propose a mechanism for equitable revenue-sharing. Additionally, the two parties expressed their commitment to the process of talks and its continuation, and also agreed to meet again in Turkey within 120 days. This communiqué was signed by Abdikarim Hussein Guled, interior affairs and national security minister of the Federal Government of Somalia, and Mohamed Abdilahi Omer, foreign affairs minister of Somaliland⁸.

4.6 Istanbul II Round

Following the talks and agreements in Chevening, Dubai, Ankara, and Istanbul I, delegations from the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland met in Istanbul between 16 and 19 January 2014 with the assistance of the Turkish Government. In this meeting, the negotiating parties made further clarifications on the dialogue process design in the communiqué before declaring the principles of agreement. The two parties expressed their appreciation on the Turkish Government's role in the dialogue; highlighted that the two negotiating teams reach decisions by consensus; emphasized that the focus of the agenda will be the nature of future relations of the two parties, and other issues of mutual importance and necessity will be discussed as the need arises; agreed to establish a regular schedule of meetings (every 90 days); and there will be jointly agreed agendas set prior to the dialogue session⁹.

In this meeting, the two sides agreed on nine principles declared in the communiqué¹⁰:

1. The parties will pursue dialogue towards agreed outcomes and approved the contents of previous agreements which are in the best interests of both parties.
2. The parties enter into the dialogue firmly committed to resolving issues and finding mutually acceptable outcomes.
3. The parties agree to act in accordance with the Code of Conduct and other agreements.
4. The parties will fully facilitate and jointly define areas of cooperation which can meet practical needs of both parties.
5. The parties make a firm commitment to the resolution of differences through exclusively peaceful means and dialogue.
6. The parties agree with Turkish Government to provide regular briefing to the international communities.

7. Referring to the Communiqué of the two parties Dialogue in Istanbul, Turkey on 7-9/July 2013. The parties agreed to nominate Air Traffic Control Board to establish within 45 days.

8. The parties agreed to appoint an ad-hoc technical committee composed of 4 members, (two from each party) to prepare the terms of reference of the Air Traffic Control Board. The Technical Committee work will be supervised by the respective two Ministers.

9. We share the pain inflicted upon the Somali people by the military regime in Somalia before the year 1991. We condemn all the atrocities committed by that regime throughout all Somali people particularly the people of Somaliland.

Article 9 of this communiqué has a particular importance here, as a government of Somalia officially acknowledged the state-sponsored crimes against humanity conducted in Somaliland in the late 1980s for the first time. However, they rejected to consider those crimes as genocide and employed the term ‘atrocities’. This issue and others of importance like that of the air traffic management will be further discussed in the next chapter.

4.7 Djibouti Round

The president of the Federal Government of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and his counterpart, the president of Somaliland Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo met on 21 December 2014 in Djibouti. Djibouti became the fourth nation to host this dialogue after the UK, the UAE and Turkey. The two sides agreed¹¹:

1. To accelerate the pace of the dialogue between the two parties while setting defined time limits for the talks.
2. The two parties agreed to take bold steps on future political relations, at the same time implementing the previous agreements including: A) Avoiding whatever undermines ongoing dialogue. B) Not only avoid the politicization of humanitarian and development programs but instead

encourage their advancement. C) Implementing the previous agreement reached on civil aviation on technical grounds.

3. Both parties agreed to engage the Government of Djibouti in the dialogue whenever needed.

4. Both parties agreed to protect human rights, cooperate on security concerns, and work in collaboration against terrorism, piracy, and organized crime.

5. Both parties agreed that the next meeting between Somalia and Somaliland shall take place in Istanbul, Turkey on 26 and 27 February 2015.

6. The two presidents of Somalia and Somaliland express their gratitude to the president of the Republic of Djibouti, His Excellency Ismail Omer Guelle, for hosting the dialogue following request by the two parties.

In this chapter, the dialogue process as a whole and successful rounds, in particular, that have taken place since the beginning of the talks have been probed. The 2012 London Conference on Somalia was the origin of the idea of holding talks between Somaliland and Somalia. Technical committee-level, presidential-level and ministerial-level talks then followed, taking place in London, Dubai, Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and finally Djibouti.

According to the agreements of the above six rounds, the two sides could not dare to discuss their future political relations although the Djibouti round called them to do so. This was due to distant political positions, unaddressed historical issues and domestic pressure, among other factors elaborated in the next chapter. Although holding six rounds could be interpreted as a success, the reality is that none of the agreements has been implemented, be it the air traffic management, sharing aid or cooperating in the security sector. Much of this lack of implementation has to do with the weakness of the Federal Government of Somalia in terms of legitimacy and power as will be elaborated in the next chapter.

The next chapter will elaborate the failure of Istanbul III and the collapse of the dialogue process as a whole; the factors that led to the collapse of the talks and the aftermath of the process collapse; later attempts to restart the process and will finally demonstrate the possible future scenarios of the talks.



5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE DIALOGUE PROCESS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

The 7th round of the process, planned to take place in January 2015 in Istanbul failed when the two sides disputed the list of the delegates selected by Somalia. This led to the collapse of the entire dialogue process. This chapter examines the reasons behind the failure of Istanbul III. It then investigates the factors that caused the process to collapse including distant political positions, domestic pressure, external pressure, lack of implementation and unaddressed grievances. Finally, it elaborates the later attempts to resume the process and then attempts to demonstrate the possible future scenarios of the dialogue process.

5.1 The Failure of Istanbul III

According to Istanbul II communiqué, which took place in Istanbul between 16 and 19 January 2014, the two sides agreed to establish a regular schedule and meet every 90 days. Unfortunately, the next planned round (Istanbul III) could not be arranged until January 2015. Although Djibouti round was held in December 2014, some politicians claim that this round was unofficial and aimed to give the two sides a chance to set a date for their next meeting that should have taken place in Turkey¹. The two delegations ultimately came to Istanbul in January 2015 for the long awaited Istanbul III round. Unfortunately, this round led to the collapse of the entire dialogue process.

When the two delegations from Somaliland and Somalia came to Istanbul, they could not directly commence discussing the issues in the agenda due to certain barriers. The two delegations, however, explained these barriers differently and each side blamed the other for being responsible for the failure of the meeting. The former foreign minister of Somaliland Mohamed Behi Yonis, who led the Somaliland delegation argued that a number of people who are originally from Somaliland were deliberately added to the

representatives of Somalia in this meeting. This, he said, was against the previous agreements. The minister added that when they received the list, they informed the foreign minister and the prime minister of Somalia as well as the government of Turkey that they will not attend if those people are not removed from the list. The government of Somalia initially promised that they will reconsider the list, but they did not change anything (Yonis 2015). As a result, Yonis (2015) maintained, the meeting could not be held as the constitution of Somaliland does not allow them to talk to people who are originally from Somaliland and those previous agreements between the two sides supported this notion. He concluded that their delegation was not willing to talk to the delegation from Somalia about the aviation and political issues since, he stressed, they violated the regular 90 days schedule, aviation agreements and also uttered many inflammatory words against Somaliland. The delegation of Somalia, according to Yonis (2015), therefore should take the full responsibility for the failure of Istanbul III.

On the contrary, the former information minister of Somalia Mohamed Abdi Hayir, who was a member of the delegation of Somalia argued that the delegation of Somaliland were responsible for the failure of the meeting. Hayir (2015) who himself is originally from Somaliland, stated that any side cannot influence the list of representatives of the other side and the conditions that Somaliland put on the table were inappropriate and unacceptable. The minister added that the two delegates agreed to return to their homes, consult with their presidents and then figure out how the next rounds can be held. Hayir (2015) promised the Somali people that the dialogue will continue and that they will not give up until the ultimate goal of the process, which is according to him, the unity of Somaliland and Somalia, is achieved. Unfortunately, the two sides could not figure out a way to resume the process and a single round was not held ever since.

Given the arguments of the two sides, what are the real factors behind the failure of Istanbul III and the collapse of the entire process? In 2012, two members from the Puntland State of Somalia, a regional state of the Federal Government of Somalia, were added to the delegation of Somalia, however, Somaliland argued that those members were originally from Somaliland and therefore rejected to attend the talks unless the two members were removed from the list of delegates (VOA 2012). As the Somali society is organized into clans, and each clan lives in a defined territory (though some areas are

shared), originally from Somaliland here refers to anyone who hails from the five major clans living in Somaliland namely Isaaq, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, and Isse. Somalia, back then, accepted the request of Somaliland and removed those members from its delegation. This incident reveals that there was an understanding between the two sides (Somalia should not add a politician originally from Somaliland to its delegation) which may support Somaliland's claim that Somalia is responsible for the process collapse. That understanding states that Somaliland will not talk to people who are originally from Somaliland representing Somalia, and Somalia will not select delegates who are originally from Somaliland. However, evidence exposes that Somaliland was not later serious about this rule. In Dubai round, the former defense minister of Somalia Hussein Arab Isse, who is originally from Somaliland, attended the meeting with the president of Somalia. Moreover, the former foreign minister and the current finance minister of Somalia Abdirahman Duale Bayle, who is also originally from Somaliland, attended the Djibouti round. Some politicians from Somaliland argued that Djibouti round does not count as it was not an official round². Nonetheless, since Somaliland did not express any concern on the presence of these two ministers in Dubai and Djibouti rounds, Somaliland should not have made the issue a big deal in Istanbul III³. Some people argue that even if this understanding – Somalia to not add a politician who is originally from Somaliland to its delegation – has existed, it was not right for the government of Somalia to consider it. Sed (2015) argued that politicians from Somaliland are in all levels of the state administration such as the parliament and the cabinet, and therefore, must be part of the national policies and decisions. The national decisions belong to the nation as a whole and specific people cannot take them; a particular group of people (here referring to the politicians of Somalia who are originally from Somaliland) cannot be barred from that right (Sed 2015).

Prior to Istanbul III, there was another failed sideline meeting. Two technical committees from the two sides met in April 2014 in Istanbul to further discuss the Istanbul I and Istanbul II agreements on the aviation and air traffic management. In Istanbul I, the two sides agreed to establish a joint control body based in Hargeisa that will repossess the air traffic management from the United Nations. In Istanbul II, the two sides agreed to appoint an ad-hoc technical committee to prepare the terms of reference of the Air Traffic Control Board. In this technical meeting, hence, the terms of reference that the joint-committee

will operate was supposed to be discussed. However, it became futile as the two sides could not agree on the terms of reference⁴. The former aviation minister of Somaliland Mohamoud Hashi Abdi blamed the technical committee of Somalia that they came up with a different understanding of Istanbul I aviation agreements. They proposed the establishment of a steering committee and defining their terms of reference, however, they argued that moving the Flight Information Region (FIR) from Nairobi and placing it in Hargeisa was not part of the deal⁵. As the minister added, the meeting failed since the delegation of Somalia contravened the agreement. Emphasizing their position, the minister maintained that they assume this project as one package that must be managed by one board. The board should administer the daily operations, revenue sharing strategy and the other policies that they will operate⁶.

Planning to solely regain the air traffic management of the former Somali Republic, Somalia was not apparently willing to move the air traffic management base to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. Paradoxically, they signed this agreement of establishing air traffic management joint committee based in Hargeisa, and they, at the same time, began reclaiming the air traffic management from the United Nations and had talks with the respective institutions solely. The Minister of Aviation of Somalia, Mohamed Abdilahi Salad confirmed to the VOA Somali that the Air Traffic Management of Somalia will be moved from Nairobi to Mogadishu late October (Salad 2017).

5.2 Why are the Somaliland-Somalia Talks Unsuccessful?

The Somaliland-Somalia dialogue process which originated from the 2012 London Conference on Somalia collapsed in January 2015 with very little achievements. Numerous factors contributed to the collapse of the process. Some of these factors were political and historical; other factors arose during the process. Although these factors were mainly domestic, external factors also played a role. In this section, factors that led to the collapse of Somaliland-Somalia Talks are examined.

5.2.1 Distant Political Positions

Somaliland's quest for recognition took over two decades, and in this period, it failed to achieve recognition from a single country. The recognition-seeking efforts of Somaliland

targeted the neighboring countries, African countries, Middle Eastern countries, the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and others. However, after failing to convince any of these nations or organizations with their case, they finally accepted to talk to Somalia and discuss with them their future relations. Although Somaliland accepted to hold talks with Somalia, it nevertheless underscored that it will never compromise its secession and that its independence and sovereignty are sacred and unnegotiable. On the contrary, Somalia saw the proposed talks as an opportunity to convince Somaliland to reunite with it. It always stressed that the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia are sacred and unnegotiable. As a result, many people maintained that the talks were not going anywhere and that the process was likely to collapse as soon as they start discussing the main issues such as whether there will be one or two countries in the future (Aideed 2015). In the Djibouti round, the two sides agreed to take bold steps on the future political relations. Even though both sides did not demonstrate the courage of discussing the principal issues, Djibouti round unveiled that the time to decide on the principal issues has arrived. Distant political positions, therefore, jeopardized and hindered the process as there were no visible signs that any part was willing to show compromise. The position of the politicians of Somaliland is very clear. President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud once stressed that they will not give up their quest for recognition even if it takes one hundred years⁷. Likewise, the presidents of Somalia often stress that the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia are sacred. Among these presidents are Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and Mohamed Abdi Farah Jama⁸. These political positions determine what each side wants to achieve in the process, and what politicians from both sides tell their people. The current government of Somaliland, for instance, engaged in the talks on the basis of public support, in which the promise was that it was seen as a means of achieving recognition. On the other hand, Somalia sees the process as a chance to bring Somaliland back to the union. Apparently, the two sides were poles apart, and therefore, little could be expected from the talks to achieve. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile mentioning that the pressure from the international community, in the London Conference, in particular, played a major role for the two sides to participate the process.

5.2.2 Domestic Pressure

Somaliland and Somalia have been separate states since 1991 when Somaliland announced its secession in Burao. Since then, in spite of Somalia's over two-decades-long civil wars and political upheavals, the two countries had different constitutions, state structures and institutions. Taking these distinctions and distant political positions into account, delegates of the two sides in the talks were always trapped. That is why, as many believe, the principal issues could not be dared. Constitutions of both countries (Somaliland and Somalia) underline that the territorial integrity of their countries is unnegotiable. Mohamed Hashi Elmi, the former finance minister of Somaliland, who is a prominent critic of Somaliland-Somalia talks, opposed the Istanbul I agreements on the joint air traffic management. He argued that, in accordance with article 42, section 3 of the Somaliland constitution, the management of Somaliland's land, sea and air cannot be shared with any other part and the government of Somaliland has the sole mandate⁹. Additionally, Elmi interpreted Somaliland's participation in the dialogue process as evidence that the secession and recognition-seeking have been compromised and given up. He accused the delegates of signing the agreements as the Government of Somaliland instead of the Republic of Somaliland. Discussing with Somalia on the sovereignty of Somaliland, according to him, was wrong as the government of Somalia was weaker and that the case of Somaliland has a strong justification. Being the finance minister of Somaliland back then, Elmi emphasized that he, together with the former health deputy minister of Somaliland Nimco Hussein Qowdhan, strongly opposed Somaliland's participation in the 2012 London Conference at the cabinet meeting¹⁰. In the cabinet meeting, several ministers attempted to justify attending the conference that there are financial gains for Somaliland but Elmi argued that the financial gains resulted from that conference or the dialogue process are insignificant¹¹. The current government of Somaliland has been highly castigated on the grounds that the immediate goal of the talks is financial benefit, and in this case, the most suitable delegates have never been selected for attending the talk rounds, and serious preparations have never been done prior to the talks¹².

How the dialogue process is considered by the two sides also matter. Dahir M. Dahir, a political officer at United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), believes that

Somalilanders saw the talks as a national issue while the government of Somalia saw it as just a (local) process¹³. This notion is supported by the fact that representatives of Somaliland always consisted of members from the cabinet, parliament and political parties. Moreover, Somaliland considered the talks as an external issue; mandated the talks to the ministry of foreign affairs, and delegations were always led by the foreign affairs minister of Somaliland. On the contrary, Somalia considered it as an internal issue; the ministry of interior affairs represented the government of Somalia and the minister of interior affairs always led its delegations. Given that there are no active political parties in Somalia, only ministers and MPs attended the round talks. In short, all the previous agreements were signed by the foreign minister of Somaliland and the interior minister of Somalia, except the presidential level agreements signed by the presidents. Even though Somaliland regarded the talks as a national issue, the current government has been criticized that it did not take them seriously when the selected representatives, as well as prior preparations, are taken into consideration. Some even go further to lambaste them that they used it as a project to gain financially, and few members limited the talks to themselves¹⁴. And according to Elmi's argument that I mentioned earlier, the initial justification of the ministers to attend the London Conference (for financial gains) supports this argument.

Changing political situations in both Somaliland and Somalia challenged the talks. In 2012, the transitional period came to an end in Somalia, and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was replaced by the Federal Government of Somalia. In late 2016 and early 2017, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Somalia respectively, while certain structural changes were made. The main structural change was establishing the upper house along with the previously existing parliament. New legislative and executive councils were placed by the election. Although the new president of Somalia, Mohamed Abdi Farah, praised the talks and promised to continue them during his campaign as well as in his inaugural speech¹⁵, any progress has not been made ever since he came to power. On the other hand, the presidential elections planned to take place in 2015 were postponed at least twice, and they are planned to be held in November 2017. In the last two years, Somaliland has been struggling with making nationwide civil and voter registrations prior to the elections. Several politicians argued that Somaliland

has no mandate to continue the talks since its tenure ended in 2015. Others maintained that the government should not sign major agreements or take important decisions in this transitional period. Saed Mohamed Elmi, Somaliland MP, called the Parliament to suspend the talks until the election is held and new government comes to power¹⁶; Bobe Yusuf Duale, a then member of Waddani Party, called on the President of Somaliland to suspend the talks which are a threat (in his words) to the existence of Somaliland, until effective Parliament is elected¹⁷. Mohamed Hashi Elmi also argued that the government has no mandate to make major decisions before the election¹⁸.

The weakness of the Federal Government of Somalia and the mandate conflict between the federal government and the regional states also hindered the process. The recently adopted, clan-based federal system in Somalia is not yet mature; some regional states like Puntland existed before the system, others are recently formed while some are still to come. The Constitution is also under construction. This problem undermines the ability of the federal government to sign vital agreements with Somaliland and make major decisions. The Puntland state of Somalia, for example, rejected the agreement to move the air traffic management base to Somaliland¹⁹.

5.2.3 External Influence

Somaliland and Somalia did not engage in the talks based on their willingness. Given the fact that serious reconciliation was never conducted in Somalia, their politicians always claimed they were willing to talk to Somaliland. On the other hand, Somaliland, when confronted by this issue often highlighted that they would talk to Somalia when there is an effective and powerful government which manages to monopolize the use of force and acts as the sole legal authority. Thus, this dialogue process was imposed on the two sides by the international community in the 2012 London Conference on Somalia²⁰. Since both sides were in need of the international community's assistance, not to mention that Somalia's fate already lies in their hands, they had no choice but to accept the proposed talks. To emphasize, the international community financed and still finances all efforts – maintaining peace, peace building and state building, among others – of restoring peace and stability in Somalia²¹. Initially, the responsibility of the process was assumed by the

United Kingdom, which hosted that same conference; the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Djibouti hosted it later.

The UK's involvement in Somali affairs endured since the colonial era. They are among the supreme foreign players in the Somali affairs. Their policies are not limited to the Federal Government, but they also directly deal with Somaliland, though they did not recognize it officially. The UK not only praises Somaliland for its achievements in democracy, specifically holding multiple free and fair elections, but it directly supports and finances the democratization process. Likewise, it extends both humanitarian and development assistance, being among the few states which directly contribute to the Somaliland Development Fund²². Thus, although they are more deeply involved in Somalia (being part of the efforts of the international community to restore peace and stability), they have a decent relations with Somaliland as well.

Turkey, being the principal host and organizer of the talks, became deeply involved in the Somali affairs lately. Turkey's involvement dates back to 2011 when the former Prime Minister and the current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu during the severe famine. Turkey's presence in Somalia has been growing ever since. However, Turkish policies towards Somalis are highly criticized for their partiality. Turkey heavily invested in Mogadishu for the last five years, rebuilding the infrastructure such as airports, ports, and roads. They have, as well, built hospitals and schools. Moreover, Turkey heavily invested in the security sector of Somalia, providing training to the security forces and eventually establishing its largest military base (or military training camp, as they call it) in Mogadishu (Financial Times 2016; TRT World 2017). On the contrary, Somaliland receives no significant assistance from Turkey, except a relatively small number of government scholarships. Back in 2013, the former Turkish Ambassador to Somalia Cemalettin Kani Torun highlighted that their efforts, which began in 2011, aimed to support the Southern Somalis, but their future plans, he underlined, were not supposed to be limited to the Southern Somalis²³. Unfortunately, that was not the case and all their efforts are still limited to Somalia. Above all, the government of Turkey is in favor of the Unity of Somalia, as revealed by their policies and actions (see Financial Times 2016 and section 5.3). Apparently, the government of Turkey may not be expected to support a secession case, like that of Somaliland, when they are confronted by the Kurdish case. In

that case, many Somalilanders, including the critics of the dialogue process, often question Turkey's impartiality to host the talks despite Ambassador Torun's claim that they treat both parties equally as their brothers. He added that the decision on their future relations lies in their hands and Turkey's role is just offering the necessary assistance²⁴. Turkey has not shown any partiality during the talk rounds in Istanbul and Ankara. However, its plans towards resuming the dialogue process, as will be examined in section 5.3, may reveal its partiality in the dialogue process in general.

The United Nation's role in the talks is completely absent. Nicholas Kay, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Somalia, who was asked to give updates on the talks while speaking at the International Peace Institute (IPI) in June 2015 said "[A]t the moment, it is not going anywhere. The last round of talks broke up in Turkey, without the two sides meeting, and I haven't seen a date set for any further resumption of that. Obviously, we are keen to encourage a process, but this is a process that the government of Turkey has been hosting and organizing" (Kay 2015). Despite the fact that the government of Turkey solely runs the dialogue process as the special representative clarified, some politicians called the international community to intervene in the process after its collapse. Among them, Abdifatah Saed Ahmed, Somaliland Ambassador to Djibouti who called the international community including the European Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to interfere in the talks²⁵. Sed (2015) argues that the talks would have been more successful if hosted by neighboring countries like Djibouti which is already involved in Somalia; previously hosted several reconciliation conferences for Somalia; has close ties with both Somalia and Somaliland and also shares a lot with both sides. In short, as could be expected according to the realist theory in international relations, conflicting, interest-based roles of foreign states challenged the process.

It is worthwhile underscoring that classical realist theory of international relations best explains the current situation in the Horn of Africa. In pursuit of their national interests, numerous countries are competing in the region. Turkey established a military base in Somalia; the UAE established military bases in Somaliland and Eritrea; France, China and the United States all have military bases in Djibouti. Even the countries in the region are

part of the game given the fact that both Ethiopia and Kenya invaded Somalia not to mention Ethiopia's political and economic intervention in both Somaliland and Somalia.

5.2.4 Lack of Implementation

Since the talks were proposed in the 2012 London Conference, six rounds were held in London, Dubai, Ankara, Istanbul (twice) and Djibouti. The meetings were either presidential level, ministerial level or technical level meetings. These rounds and the process as a whole achieved very little as the signed agreements were never implemented. Somaliland often blames Somalia for not being willing to implement these agreements as they are not serious about the talks. In the failed Istanbul III, foreign minister Yonis blamed Somalia of violating the regular 90 days schedule, aviation agreements and their politicians' using of many provocative words that could undermine the talks²⁶. The air traffic management agreement, which is considered as one of the most crucial achievements of the dialogue process, was never implemented. In Istanbul I, the two sides agreed to repossess the air traffic management and establish a joint committee based in Hargeisa. In Istanbul II, the parties agreed to establish an air traffic control board within 45 days and the appointment of an ad-hoc technical committee to prepare the terms of reference of the air traffic management control board. However, the following technical level meeting on the issue held in Istanbul failed as the two sides could not agree on the terms of reference²⁷. After all, cooperation in the security sector did not take place; inflammatory words were not avoided; aid was not shared decently; air traffic management board was not established, and the future relations were never discussed.

The weakness of the Federal Government of Somalia massively contributed to the absence of implementation. Apart from its mandate conflict with the regional states, the government runs a small area; it is very weak to reach its boundaries. Thousands of peacekeeping troops are present in Somalia, attempting to restore the peace and stability of the country. Militant groups such as Al Shabab are still powerful and govern large areas. The government is not a result of popular vote; it rather came as a result of a process organized and financed by the international community.

5.2.5 Unaddressed Grievances

During the colonial era, the two sides were under two different colonial powers and received their independence in two different dates. Somaliland received its independence on 26 June 1960 from the British Empire, while Somalia received its independence on 1 July 1960 from Italy (being under UN Mandated Italian Trusteeship). Four days after its independence, Somaliland voluntarily united with Somalia and gave up its sovereignty in the hope of realizing the dream of the Greater Somalia, in which five Somali territories (namely British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Northern Frontier District of Kenya, French Somaliland and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia) were expected to unite (Lewis, 1988). Unfortunately, the other three territories could not join them. As elaborated in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the people of Somaliland were marginalized politically, economically and socially after the union, which led to the skepticism and disappointment of Somalilanders towards the union.

Many Somalilanders argue today that another union will result in the same outcome, whereby, Somalilanders will be subject to another marginalization. Ironically, Somalians often show their desire for another union but never acknowledge these grievances. The current reality in Somalia makes another union based on fair power-sharing impossible. Apart from conflicts and distrust among the clans, clan-based federalism led to the highest level of clan competition in Somalia, and has profound negative implications on the security and political stability in Somalia (Ulusio, 2014).

Moreover, what added insult to injury was the well-documented crimes against humanity and atrocities (and even the genocide claim that I addressed in Chapter 3) committed by the military regime of Somalia in the late 1980s in Somaliland, in which, the Isaaq clan-family was targeted.

In Istanbul II, the two sides affirmed that they "...share the pain inflicted upon the Somali people by the military regime in Somalia before the year 1991...[and] condemn all the atrocities committed by that regime throughout all Somali people particularly the people of Somaliland". This issue resulted in an outrage in Somaliland and the representatives of Somaliland in this round were criticized for accepting the use of the term "atrocities" instead of genocide in the communiqué. In addition, the article generalizes the crimes

committed by the military regime against all Somalis but what happened in Somaliland was completely different and incomparable according to many²⁸. To sum up, the Somaliland-Somalia talks cannot be fruitful unless these grievances are dealt with acquiescently and openly.

5.3 Attempts to Resume the Talks

Since the collapse of the dialogue process, politicians from both Somaliland and Somalia recounted their willingness to resume the process as soon as the elections are held on both sides, and other barriers are addressed. However, there are no serious efforts by the two parties. Turkey, nonetheless, seemed the most concerned party. Following the failure of the talk rounds between the politicians of the respective sides, the government of Turkey attempted to switch the talks to different actors. They targeted the traditional (clan) leaders in 2015 and then independent intellectuals in 2016.

The plan of bringing the traditional leaders together was executed by the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu and its Consulate in Hargeisa (Horn Cable TV 2015). The issue came to light when certain clan leaders confirmed to the press that they were approached to be part of that plan by the Turkish Consulate in Hargeisa. This has blown up the plan and press conferences by the opposition parties, namely *Ururka Cadaaladda iyo Daryeelka* (UCID) and Waddani, as well as other independent politicians, followed, who stressed that only the government of Somaliland has the mandate to talk to Somalia²⁹. They argued that attempts of Turkey to deal with actors other than the elected government is a way of sabotaging the sovereignty of Somaliland. Elmi (2015) stressed that letting the clan leaders attend the talks by the government of Somaliland, connotes that Somaliland gave up its quest for recognition, and raises doubts about the seriousness of the secession. After the complete non-fulfillment of the plan, the Turkish Consul General in Hargeisa later denied the existence of such a plan in the first place³⁰.

Turkey then switched to the intellectuals, but unlike that of the traditional leaders, the plan worked initially and the first meeting took place successfully. In April 2016, a meeting of six intellectuals – three from each side – was held in Ankara, hosted by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation. In the meeting,

Somaliland was represented by Dr. Hussein A. Bulhan, Mohamoud Abdi Hamud and Hassan Khalif; Somalia was represented by Dr. Hussein Warsame, Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali and Yusuf Garad Omer (who later became the foreign affairs minister of Somalia). Turkish intellectuals were as well present in the meeting including the Ambassador Ahmet Riza Derer, the Special Representative of Turkey for Somaliland-Somalia Talks. The intellectuals discussed the history of the political differences of Somaliland and Somalia and the current situation. Moreover, they exchanged views on how intellectuals can cooperate and what role can they play in the current political stalemate of the two countries (Omer 2016).

The meeting of the intellectuals was again opposed by the opposition parties of Somaliland. Bobe Yusuf Duale, a then member of the Waddani Party, accentuated that this meeting was an act of damaging the sovereignty of Somaliland by the government³¹. He recalled that the 2012 decision of the Parliament (to attend the London Conference and, in turn, the following talks) only gave the mandate to the government, and he lambasted the Parliament for their weakness to act on this issue. Duale argued that if the meeting of the intellectuals is accepted it will be followed by meetings of the chambers of commerce, clan chiefs and religious leaders which is unlawful³². Furthermore, the local media later reported that the government of Somaliland held clandestine meetings with Somalia in Turkey, as the foreign affairs minister of Somaliland Sacad Ali Shire, the presidency minister of Somaliland Mohamoud Hashi Abdi and the interior affairs minister of Somalia Abdirahman Odowa were reportedly in Turkey at the same time³³. Officials of Waddani Party criticized the government on the basis of these rumors, but the foreign affairs ministry later denied and refuted the existence of a secret meeting³⁴.

5.4 The Possible Future Scenarios of the Talks

Since the beginning of the Somaliland- Somalia Talks in 2012, six rounds took place in the UK, the UAE, Turkey, and Djibouti. All these meetings have had very little success to show as none of the agreements has been implemented. Above all, all expectations vanished when the dialogue process collapsed in early 2015. In spite of the mutual blames, Somaliland decided not to show any compromise on sitting at the table with politicians of Somaliland origin from the other side. This gives the responsibility of the process collapse

to Somaliland since they gave no concerns on the politicians originally from Somaliland who attended previous rounds (Dubai and Djibouti) representing Somalia. However, Somalia could have avoided the process collapse had they replaced the members who have Somaliland origins, and that would only be possible if they had considered the talks as a highly crucial process. The two parties used the list of delegates to support their blame-games, but the real factors that led to the failure of the process are deeper and long-standing. Among them: domestic and external pressures, an absence of implementation, the feeling of mistrust resulting from the atrocities of 1980s and distant political positions.

The study projects that this dialogue process may resume sometime in the future (near or distant). This is because of two reasons. First, politicians of both sides have promises to keep. Politicians of Somaliland need to show their people that they are working on all means to achieve recognition including talking to Somalia. They may argue, as they already did, that there are no other opportunities and numerous doors closed when the talks were commenced. The seceding state (Somaliland) and the parent state (Somalia) are expected to decide their future relations similar to the cases of Sudan-South Sudan and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Second, a foreign pressure is likely and both parties can be influenced and pushed to resume the talks.

Nonetheless, these talks will never be able to offer a platform that the two parties can determine their future relations as per the current stalemate, whether recommenced or not. It is already a quarter century that the two countries are poles apart and there are no signs of compromise, attachment or changing positions. Politicians of both sides emphasize that their political positions are unnegotiable, and their constitutions support this notion. Grievances such as political and social marginalization, genocide and other crimes against humanity, which are among the justifications of the Somaliland secession case, are to be addressed, and Somalia, over the last quarter century, showed no willingness to deal with these issues. Faysal Ali Warabe, the chairman of the *Ururka Cadaaladda iyo Daryeelka* (UCID) of Somaliland, several times argued that Somalia, if they have respect for Somalilanders and have sympathy for what they have gone through in the late 1980s, would have changed the flag, in which, those crimes were committed in its name³⁵. The disconnection of Somaliland and Somalia is almost 30 years old, a long enough period that those who were born at the time are old enough to be involved in the politics of both

sides. These new generations have very little in common, in terms of the history and politics of the last three or four decades. In short, the detachment of the hearts and minds of Somalilanders and Somalians challenges the agreements and likely crucial decisions in the future. Additionally, I argue that foreign arbitration will not be effective unless very powerful authorities, who can make difficult decision (even against their will), come to power on both sides. Due to weak governments and ineffective state institutions on both sides, non-state actors such as religious leaders, traditional leaders and militant groups (widely present in Somalia) enjoy a certain level of power to act on and reject vital decisions resulting from arbitration.

5.5 Theoretical Assessment of the Collapse of the Talks

In chapter two, we have seen a five-stage process of sustainable peace talks developed by Saunders (1999). I have also argued that this process can be applied not only to peace talks but also to secession talks. Thus, let me discuss the Somaliland-Somalia talks in light of the Saunders's five-stage process. The talks have gone through some of the stages but not (success) fully in sequence. In stage 1, the two sides decided to engage in the London Conference followed by six other rounds. In stage 2, they mapped and named problems and relationships. They agreed to share the development and humanitarian assistance from the international community; to cooperate in the security; and they emphasized that the talks will take place between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (or its replacement – the later Federal Government of Somalia) and the government of Somaliland. In stage 3, they probed the principle problems and relationships, but they did not take bold steps to address the principle issues – their future relations. In stage 4, they failed to build a new scenario and experience a changing relationship, while in stage 5 they did not act together to make change happen – either to unite, separate or establish another form of political system.

A number of secession theories has been presented in Chapter 2 as well. In this section, I will attempt to explain why the Somaliland-Somalia talks are not going anywhere in light of the secession theories. Remedial Right Theory seems the only relevant theory here. One of the main factors that led to the collapse of the talks was the unaddressed atrocities committed against the people of Somaliland in 1980s, and the mistrust that resulted from

them. Although these injustices are not the main justification of the Somaliland secession, they vehemently contributed to the position of Somaliland. According to the theory, secession is perceived to be a remedy for these injustices. Thus, the Somaliland-Somalia talks are in vain due to the mistrust resulting from these injustices.



6. CONCLUSION

Somaliland and Somalia had a separate colonial history and origin and they achieved immediate unification after the independence in 1960. However, the union lasted 30 years only. After a decade-long civil war which led to the total collapse of the government, the people of the former British Somaliland announced that they restored their independence and broke away from the rest of the country, and hence, declared the Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991. Ever since, the two states took two different pathways and became separated geographically and politically, among others. Above all, Somaliland could not manage to acquire official recognition from a single nation. After a 21 year-long absence from the conferences on the affairs of Somalia, Somaliland eventually attended the 2012 London Conference on Somalia. Paragraph 6 of the London Conference Communiqué called on Somaliland and Somalia to hold talks in order to determine their future relations and the international community promised to provide the necessary assistance.

In Chapter 1, I have introduced the study and presented the background of the study, problem statement, research objectives, research methodology and significance of the study. The main purpose of the study was to examine the talks between the Government of Somaliland and the initially Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the later Federal Government of Somalia that started in 2012 in London and collapsed in 2012 in Istanbul. The study employed a qualitative research approach and used both primary and secondary data.

In Chapter 2, I have reviewed the literature of secession talks, peace talks, and secession theories and cases. The purpose of the Somaliland-Somalia talks was the two sides to determine their future relations, and therefore, the talks were secession talks. I have reviewed three selected cases of talks namely Sudan-SPLM, Israel-Palestine and Cyprus

talks. Among the theories of secession reviewed in the chapter were national self-determination theories, choice theories, just-cause or remedial right theories, primary right theories, and democratic theory of self-determination. Finally, I have reviewed a number of secession cases such as Eritrea, South Sudan and the recurrent secessions of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serb Republic). All these secession are in consistent with the secession theories we have presented in the chapter; they were justified as either national self-determination right, remedial right or primary right.

In Chapter 3, I have presented the history of both Somaliland and Somalia briefly. The history was divided into three parts: the colonial era whereby the two territories were under different colonial powers (Somaliland under British Protectorate and Somalia under Italian Trusteeship); the union period (1960-1991) in which the two territories united and were single country; and the post-1991, a period in which the two countries remained separated since the secession of Somaliland in 1991.

In Chapter 4, I have examined the beginning of the dialogue process and its six successful rounds. The first meeting was held in Chevening House, London on 20-21 June 2012. This was a technical level meeting between committees from the two sides, and it aimed to establish an outline and agenda for the future talks. Dubai round held on 28 June 2012 soon followed, whereby, President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud of Somaliland and his counterpart, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed of Somalia met and officially endorsed the dialogue process. The third round took place on 13 April 2013 in Ankara, Turkey. The fourth round and the fifth round took place in Istanbul between 7 and 9 July 2013, and 16 and 19 January 2014 respectively. Finally, the last successful round was held in Djibouti on 21 December 2014.

In Chapter 5, I have investigated the failure of the seventh round and the causes and consequences of the process collapse. The seventh round which was planned to take place in January 2015 in Istanbul failed when the delegation of Somaliland argued that members who are originally from Somaliland were added to the delegates of Somalia and that they were not willing to talk to them. The failure of Istanbul III led to the collapse of the entire dialogue process. The process collapsed due to various factors. The fact that the two sides

are in distant political positions jeopardized any chances that would lead the two sides to come closer. Domestic pressure originating from the constitutions, institutions, nationals and political/social organizations of the two countries also limited the power of the governments and their representatives. Additionally, external pressure from the stakeholder foreign states and organizations also played a role. Finally, the process could not proceed or succeed due to the fact that none of the agreements of the previous rounds were implemented.

In this study, I also attempted to demonstrate the future possible scenarios of the Somaliland-Somalia talks. The thesis projects that the talks can restart anytime in the future but will never be able to determine the future of the two countries, which was the intention. This will be the case because of uncompromising, distant political positions, unaddressed grievances and the rise of new, disconnected, generations on both sides. Moreover, the study argues that foreign arbitration will not be effective due to the absence of very powerful authorities, who can make difficult decision (even against their will), on both sides.

Interpreting the collapse of the Somaliland-Somalia talks in light of the Saunders's five-stage process, the study finds that the talks have gone through some of the stages – stage 1, 2 and partially 3 – but not (success) fully in sequence. Furthermore, Remedial Right Theory (of secession) has some implications on the collapse of the process.

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APPENDICES



Figure A.1: The Map of Somaliland and Somalia

Source: Thinkstockphotos.com

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. London Conference on Somalia: Communiqué (2012) from Foreign and Commonwealth of UK. Retrieved 8 June, 2017 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200312londonconference/_sede200312londonconference_en.pdf

Chapter 3

1. Quotes about history by Goodreads.com, Confucius. Can be accessed through <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/history>

2. Horn Cable TV covered their program *Dib u Xusuuso Taariikhda* (remember the history) in 2015 president Egal's proposed resignation as the president of Somaliland, which the parliament of Somaliland disapproved. In his speech before the parliament, after they rejected his resignation, to elaborate the reason he wanted to resign, he addressed several historical events including the union of 1960, since he was the prime minister of British Somaliland back then. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cTwCnFeRC4>

Chapter 4

1. London Conference on Somalia: Communiqué (2012) from Foreign and Commonwealth of UK. Retrieved 8 June, 2017 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200312londonconference/_sede200312londonconference_en.pdf

2. *ibid.*

3. Chevening House Declaration (20-21 June, 2012). Received a copy of the declaration from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

4. *ibid.*

5. Dubai Statement (28 June, 2012). Received a copy of the statement with the signatures of the two presidents of Somaliland and Somalia from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

6. A copy of the Ankara Communiqué from the Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was received from United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Hargeisa Office. Additionally, Former foreign minister of Somaliland Mohamed Abdilahi Omer, announced the seven articles agreed in the Ankara meeting in this clip. Retrieved 10 June, 2017 from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfuytoBYKIs>

7. *ibid.*

8. Istanbul I Communiqué (7-9 July, 2013). A copy of the communiqué of the Istanbul Dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia was received from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Hargeisa Office. The communiqué is signed by Abdikarim Hussein Guled (interior minister of Somalia) and Mohamed Abdilahi Omer (foreign minister of Somaliland).

9. Istanbul II Communiqué (18 January, 2014). A copy of the communiqué was received from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Hargeisa Office. This communiqué was an extended one with a number of sub-headings including dialogue process design, code of conduct and declaration of principles. The nine principles agreed in this meeting are written in the last section (declaration of principles). The nine principles are directly quoted in this study. The communiqué is signed by Abdikarim Hussein Guled (interior minister of Somalia) and Mohamed Behi Yonis (foreign minister of Somaliland). It is worthy here to mention that Mohamed Abdilahi Omer lost his position of foreign minister through cabinet reshuffle, and he was moved to the ministry of commerce. Mohamed Behi Yonis became the new foreign minister.

10. *ibid.*

11. Djibouti Agreement (21 December, 2014). A copy of Somaliland-Somalia Agreement in Djibouti was acquired from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Hargeisa Office. In this presidential level meeting, the agreement was jointly signed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud of Somalia, and President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo of Somaliland. The English translation of the six agreed articles are directly quoted from the copy. However, the presidents signed a copy written in Somali language.

Chapter 5

1. In a debate hosted by Horn Cable TV, the former advisor of the President of Somaliland on the elections and the current minister of the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Development, Mohamed Ibrahim Adan, argued that the Djibouti round was unofficial. The full debate can be accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-n3midkBg0>

2. *ibid.*

3. From a focus group discussion with several youth activists, journalists and intellectuals (their names unrecorded) held in Hargeisa in April by the Author. Others, like Dahir M. Dahir, political officer at UNSOM also argue the same.

4. The former Somaliland Minister of Aviation, Mohamoud Hashi Abdi accompanied by the aviation experts from his side, held a press conference when he returned to Hargeisa, after the failure of the technical aviation meeting in Istanbul. The press conference can be accessed here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivs2ZBEq4YE>

5. *ibid.*

6. *ibid.*

7. The president said this during his annual speech to the nation in the parliament (both the House of Representatives and the House of Elders ‘*Guurti*’) in 2013. This specific

statement of the president can be accessed from this clip:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLnQaxlW25U>

8. The leaders of Somalia always say statements like this when addressing to the people particularly in their speeches of the national days (26 June and 1 July).

9. Mohamed Hashi Elmi talks to Horn Cable TV in February 2015. The full interview can be accessed: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tgi9_8pCZns

10. *ibid.*

11. *ibid.*

12. Numerous politicians, intellectuals and professionals hold on to this argument. This argument was recorded in a focus group discussion carried out by the author in Hargeisa in May 2017.

13. An interview with Dahir M. Dahir by the author on 13 June 2017 in Hargeisa.

14. From a focus group discussion with several youth activists, journalists and intellectuals (their names unrecorded) held in Hargeisa in April by the Author.

15. President Farmajo mentioned the Somaliland-Somalia talks in his inaugural speech. Here is a clip of the speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhSpymrkMk>

16. The MP called the suspension of the talks in a press conference: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7-oAOIMmGU>

17. Bobe Yusuf Duale called the president to suspend the talks in a press conference: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V16OifNUk9c>

18. Mohamed Hashi Elmi called the suspension of the talks in a press conference: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fXsSaJ9VzM>

19. The President of the Puntland State of Somalia showed their concerns in 2014 on the air traffic management agreements between Somaliland and Somalia. The news can be accessed: <http://goobjoog.com/madaxweynaha-puntland-hadii-maamulka-hawada-xamar-laga-rarayo-garoowe-hala-keeno-dhageyso/>

20. Somaliland accepted the invitation of the UK and attended the 2012 London Conference alongside Somalia, but both sides did not expect the article on the talks. That is why many argue that the process was imposed on the two sides.

21. Nicholas Kay (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia) and Maman Sambo Sidikou (Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia) explained the role of the UN and the African Union in Somalia's peace building and state building efforts at the International Peace Institute in June 2016: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=644&v=an9f3npPkbI>

22. The UK, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are among the contributors of SDF. Extra information is available on the SDF website: <http://www.somalilanddevelopmentfund.org/>

23. The Ambassador talked to Horn Cable TV: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdkmX7nIVQY>

24. *ibid.*

25. Ambassador Saed said this in a debate hosted by Horn Cable TV. The full debate can be accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-n3midkBg0>

26. Minister Yonis held a press conference after the failure of the planned meeting in Istanbul. It can be accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7-EoUKtyM8>

27. *ibid.*

28. Dahir M. Dahir and Mohamed Hashi Elmi are among those who argue this.

29. Yusuf Hirey (clan leader), Mohamed Abdillahi Ur-Adde (member of Waddani Party) and Jamal Ali Hussein (former presidential candidate of UCID) talked to Horn Cable TV: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcM8pyXV8zs>

30. The consul-general disseminated a press release: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y80jhRBrkTI>

31. *ibid.*

32. *ibid.*

33. This is reported by Somali Cable in April 2016: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DL-d7RMzHHU>

34. *ibid.*

35. Warabe, among other times, said this in an interview he gave to Universal Somali TV in March, 2017 in London. The Interview can be accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyLba8giMbg>

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Muhumed, M. M., & Gaas, S. A. (2016). The World Bank and IMF in Developing Countries: Helping or Hindering? *International Journal of African and Asian Studies*, 28, 39-49.

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