

T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



**THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON TURKISH AND IRANIAN
FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASES OF IRAQ & SYRIA**

(2000- 2016)

THESIS

Mojtaba BARGHANDAN

(Y1412.110034)

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Political Science and International Relations Program

Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin UZUN

March 2017





T.C.
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

Yüksek Lisans Tez Onay Belgesi

Enstitümüz Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı **Y1412.110034** numaralı öğrencisi **Mojtaba BARGHANDAN**'ın "THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON TURKISH AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASES OF IRAQ & SYRIA (2000-2016)" adlı tez çalışması Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 13.03.2017 tarih ve 2017/05 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından *oybirliği* ile Tezli Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak *kabul* edilmiştir.

Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı

İmzası

Tez Savunma Tarihi :28/03/2017

1)Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özüm Sezin UZUN

2) Jüri Üyesi : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Muharrem EKŞİ

3) Jüri Üyesi : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Gökhan DUMAN

Özüm Sezin Uzun
.....
Muharrem Ekşi
.....
Gökhan Duman
.....

Not: Öğrencinin Tez savunmasında **Başarılı** olması halinde bu form **imzalanacaktır**. Aksi halde geçersizdir.



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original to this thesis. (05/03/2017).

Mojtaba BARGHANDAN







To my wife and children
To my dedicated professors ,



FOREWORD

This thesis is written as completion to the master degree in Political Science and International Relations, at the Istanbul Aydin University. As with the master program, the subject of the present contribution, “ The impact of public diplomacy on Turkish and Iranian foreign policy: the cases of Iraq and Syria (2000- 2016)” discusses the issues of foreign policy and diplomacy in IR and world politics. In term of IR theory, this contribution considers the nature of the policies of Iran and Turkey in the context of Constructivism, as it is able to explain these two countries behavioral patterns.

The subject of study is selected based on the observation in the latest political and diplomatic havocs in the Middle East with the centrality of developments in Iraq and Syria and with the focus on the way Iran and Turkey have behaved and reacted to each other’s policies. The public diplomacy and foreign policy are variables and the aim is to understand the impact of public diplomacy on the foreign policy of Iran and Turkey in the cases of Iraq and Syria. Since March 2015, I have been conducting research on the topic. It was so interesting and instructive and I have been able to end up with a conclusion.

I would like to thank my supervisor from the university Assist. Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin Uzun .Her valuable and constructive insights and directions, besides, necessary critiques has always been a great help and gave me plenty of guidance to complete the research and to write this contribution.

March, 2017

Mojtaba BARGHANDAN



TABLE OF CONTENT

	<u>Pages</u>
FOREWORD	ix
TABLE OF CONTENT	xi
ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
ÖZET	xv
ABSTRACT	xvii
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Statement of the Problem	2
1.2 Significance of the Study, Questions & Hypothesis	3
1.3 Methodology.....	5
1.4 Literature Review	5
2 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY RELATONS	17
2.1 What is public diplomacy?	17
2.2 The impact of the concept of power (Hard and Soft) on public diplomacy	27
2.3 To what extent public opinion is important for public diplomacy and foreign policy decision – makers	37
2.4 How public diplomacy and foreign policy are related to each other?	49
3 TURKEY	57
3.1 Public Diplomacy	57
3.2 Turkish public diplomacy in Iraq and Syria	70
3.3 Turkey’s Foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq.....	76
4 IRAN	93
4.1 Public Diplomacy	93
4.2 Public diplomacy of Iran in Syria and Iraq	107
4.3 How Iran Foreign Policy operates? The case of Syria and Iraq	114
5 CONCLUSION	129
REFERANCES	137
RESUME	143



ABBREVIATIONS

IR	: International Relations
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
NGO	: NON-Governmental Organization
EU	: European Union
PAITME	: Public Administration Institute Turkish and Middle East
FETO	: Fethullah Gülen Movement
PKK	: Kurdistan Worker's Party
UN	: United Nations
KRG	: Kurdistan Regional Government
NATO	: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CHP	: Republican People's Party
UNESCO	: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
ECO	: Economic Cooperation Organization
NAM	: Non-Aligned Movement
OIC	: Organization of the Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
IRNA	: The Islamic Republic News Agency
IRIB	: The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
JCPOA	: Joint Comprehensive plan of Action
D8	: The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation



TÜRKİYE VE İRAN DIŞ POLİTİKASI ÜZERİNDE KAMU DİPLOMASİSİNİN ETKİSİ : IRAK & SURİYE ÖRNEKLERİ (2000 – 2016)

ÖZET

İşbu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin kamu diplomasisininin 2000 yılından bu yana olan dış politika yaklaşımları üzerindeki rolüne odaklanacaktır; örnek olay çalışması temelde Irak ve Suriye'deki gelişmelere dayanmaktadır. Türkiye için, esas başlangıç noktası Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin 2002 genel seçimlerini kazandığı zamandır. İran için ise, bu husus 8., 9., 10. ve 11. hükümetlerin, yani Seyyid Muhammed Hatemi (2. Görev süresi; 2001-2005), Mahmud Ahmedinejad (2005-2013) ve 11. hükümet olarak da 2013 yılından bu yana Hasan Ruhani hükümetleri ele alınarak incelenecektir.

Türkiye ve İran, birbirlerine karşı ve diğer Devletler ile ilgili dış politika yaklaşımlarının, hem bölgesel istikrar hem de daha kapsamlı küresel barış için kritik öneme haiz olması bakımından bölgede etkin, etkili ve güçlü ülkelerdir. Buna bağlı olarak amaç, kamu diplomasisi yaklaşımlarının Suriye ve Irak'taki dış politika yaklaşımlarını ne derece belirlediği, bu kamu diplomasisi parametrelerinin ve araçlarının neler olduğu ve sonucun ne olduğu ya da olabileceği sorularının cevabını bulmaktır. Bahsi geçen amacı gerçekleştirmeye yardımcı olabilecek araç, Suriye ve Irak'taki gelişmeler düşünüldüğünde, bölgesel menfaatler ile ilgili kararlarının ve seçiminin arkasındaki mantık ve politikanın ne olduğunu anlamaktır. Kamu diplomasisininin farklı araçlarının uygulamasında kullandıkları yolları ve yaklaşımları, mukayese ve açıklama yoluyla analiz etmeye gayret ettim.

Bu amaçla, bu çalışmada Türkiye ve İran'ın, Irak ve Suriye'deki gelişmeler ile ilgili kamu diplomasisi ve dış politikası, bu ülkelerin politik kültürlerinin, politik yapılarının, tarihlerinin, coğrafi konumlarının, ideolojik eğilimlerinin ve jeo-politik konumlarının etkileri göz önünde bulundurularak, etkinlik ve proaktiflik bakımından ortaya konmuştur. Çeşitli alanlardaki duruşlarını doğrudan etkileyen bu birçok faktör arasında, çağlar boyunca mezhepsel ya da dini ittifaklar ve ihtilaflar gibi birçok zorluklara sebep olan, İslam'ın iki farklı dini mezhebini temsil etme özelliği bulunmaktadır. Bu temel özellik, Suriye krizinin patlak vermesi ile 2011 yılından bu yana çok daha dikkat çekici hale gelmiştir. 9/11, Irak'ın 2003'de ABD tarafından işgali ve 2010 Arap Baharı gibi diğer global ve bölgesel olayların her birinin de, Suriye ve Irak hakkındaki dış politika yaklaşımları ile ilgili duruşları üzerinde ayrı ayrı kendi payı bulunmaktadır.

Rekabetçi ilişkiler, bu ülkelerin nispi olarak benzer kamu diplomasisi araçlarını kullanmalarına sebep olmuştur; ancak, 9/11, Irak'ın 2003'de ABD tarafından işgali ve 2010 Arap Baharı ve 2011'de Suriye krizinin başlaması gibi bölgesel ve global gelişmelerin dallanıp budaklanması sebebiyle birbirine temas

etmemelik söz konusu olamamıştır. Bu gelişmelerin ve ideolojik ve stratejik önceliklerinin etkisi altında, kamu diplomasisi inisiyatifleri, bölgenin nihai menfaatine olacak şekilde dış politikalarını yönetmek için uygun olmamıştır. Daha doğrusu, ya kendi iç ve dış politikalarının başarısı adına ya da belki, Suriye ve Irak'ta sürdürülebilir barış için kamu diplomasisinde mevcut normlarını destekleyecek şekilde yeni yapıyı tasarlamak hususunda her ne kadar kendilerini sorumlu hissetseler de, Suriye ve Irak ile ilgili olarak pek de fazla “ciddi işbirliği isteği” söz konusu olmamıştır; hatta İran ve Türkiye sürekli birbirlerini eleştirmişlerdir.

Madalyonun öteki yüzü ise, bahsi geçen bölgesel gelişmelerin Türkiye ve İran için Irak ve Suriye'deki iktidar boşluğundan veya iç otorite yokluğundan yararlanmak amacıyla ya uygun politikalardan ziyade optimal politik sistemlerini desteklemek için ya da bölgesel hegemonya arayışı olarak da değerlendirilebilecek olan bölgesel güç dengesindeki herhangi bir zararlı kaymayı engelleme teşebbüsü için yeni bir iklim ve fırsat yaratmasıdır.

“Konstrüktivizm”in değerlere, normlara ve kimliğe önem verdiği ve interaktif şekilde ve karşılıklı olarak teşkil edildiği şekilde yapı ile broker ve/veya temsilci arasındaki ilişkiye baktığı gerçeği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda (Wendt, 2000), Suriye ve Irak'taki gelişmeler ile ilgili olarak, Türkiye ve İran'ın dış politikasını analiz etmek hususunda çok daha fazla potansiyele ve kapasiteye sahiptir. Bu teori sadece hem materyalistik hem de materyalistik olmayan boyutlara dikkat etmekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda dinamik ve durağan olmayan prosesteki mikro ve makroları da göz önünde bulundurur. Yani, bölgesel yapı ile ilgili normlar ve gerçekler hakkındaki konulara dikkat eder.

Diplomasilerinde, kaçınılmaz olarak hem bölgesel hem de küresel alanlardaki işbirliği ve ortaklık seçimlerini ve önceliklerini etkileyen farklı yaklaşımlar izlemelerine sebep olan bölgesel ve uluslararası menfaatler, tarihi arka plan, coğrafik ve jeo-politik konum, bölgesel ve uluslararası örgütlere üyelik gibi çeşitli hususlar bulunmaktadır. Bu açıdan, doğru, sağlam cevaplar elde edebilmek için sorulacak bazı temel sorular bulunmaktadır;

- 1- Türkiye ve İran'ın, Suriye ve Irak'taki kamu diplomasisi araçları nelerdir?
- 2- Kamu diplomasisi Irak ve Suriye'de barış ve istikrarın gerçekleştirilmesi için dış politikaya nasıl bir katkıda bulunmuştur?

Kamu diplomasisinin, tanım olarak, medya ve iletişim gibi araçlar yardımıyla hareket etmesi; bu araçların uygulamasının bu ülkelerde anayasa hukukunun, siyasi kültürün, siyasi sistemin, coğrafyanın ve tarihi arka planın talimatlarına dayalı olarak değişmesi; buna ilaveten, iktidardaki siyasi partilerin öncelikleri sebebiyle, bu ülkelerde iktidarda bulunan siyasi partiler ve bu partilerin siyasi yapıları, kamu diplomasisinin paradigmasını etkilemiştir.

Türkiye ve İran'ın dış politikalarının, bu ülkelerin kamu diplomasi yaklaşımlarını ciddi anlamda olumsuz bir şekilde etkilediği sonucunu çıkarıyorum. Bu ise, bunların, hem küresel hem bölgesel yeni gelişmelerin hem de bunların iç politika ihtiyaçlarının etkisi altında proaktif olsa da tutarsız hale gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Daha doğru bir ifade ile, direkt ya da dolaylı bir cevap olarak, mevcut durum şüphesiz bu ülkeleri karşılıklı politikaları ve duruşları ile ilgili olarak, daha meraklı, daha ilgili ve daha farkında bir hale getirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *dış politika, İran, Türkiye, Konstrüktivizm*

**THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON TURKISH AND IRANIAN
FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASES OF IRAQ & SYRIA (2000- 2016)**

ABSTRACT

This thesis shall focus on the role of public diplomacy of the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran to their foreign policy approaches since 2000; a case study largely dwells on the developments in Iraq and Syria. For Turkey, the focal starting point is since the time the Justice and Development Party won the 2002 general election. In case of Iran, this issue will be contemplated by considering the 8th - , 9th- 10th and 11th governments; that is, the government of Seyed Mohammad Khatami (2nd term in office; 2001-2005), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005 - 2013) and the government of Hassan Rouhani since 2013 as the 11th government.

Turkey and Iran are effective, influential and powerful countries in the region in the sense that their foreign policy approaches toward each other and with respect to other States is of crucial importance both for the regional stability and for the wider global peace. Seeing that, the aim is to find the answer that to what extent their public diplomacy determines their foreign policy approaches in Syria and Iraq, what are the parameters and the tools of their public diplomacy and what has been or would be the outcome. The objectives that might help to reach the aforementioned aim is to understand what is/are the logic and policy behind their decision and selection of their regional interests considering the developments in Syria and Iraq. I have tried to analyze the paths and approaches they adopted in the application of different tools of public diplomacy by comparison and description.

To this aim, in this study, the public diplomacy and foreign policy of Turkey and Iran towards developments in Iraq and Syria illustrated in terms of effectiveness and pro-activism, considering the impacts of their political culture, political structures, historical background, geographical location, ideological intentions and geopolitical position. Among many of these factors that directly affects their stances in various fields, is the characteristic of representing two different sects of religion of Islam, which, by itself, has caused many challenges such as sectarian or religious oriented alliances and conflicts during the ages. This fundamental nature, specially, becomes more subtly evident particularly since 2011 with the start of Syrian crisis. Other global and regional incidents like 9/11, the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. in 2003 and 2010 Arab Spring, each has also distinctly had its own share of its impacts on their stances towards their foreign policy approaches in Syria and Iraq.

In the same manner, factors such as their lobbying power and the status of their engagement in the region based on their memberships in regional and international organizations have also relatively affected the framework of the strategic planning for their public diplomacy and foreign policy approaches.

Under such circumstances, their political stances revealed and uncovered out of the emergence of new religious based coalitions and alliances and, as a consequence, has aggravated the ongoing crisis in the region. Such a climate became a dangerous

incentive for these countries to set out a serious provocative show of power, albeit, not addressing directly to each other. Even if their foreign policy approaches may not be a direct reflection of this characteristic; it has become the root and cause of, at least, many misunderstandings and, as the result, many challenges.

Competitive relations made them to utilize relatively similar instruments of public diplomacy; however, they could not stay untouched by the ramifications of the regional and global developments such as 9/11, the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, Arab Spring in 2010 and the start of Syria crisis in 2011. Under the effect of these developments and their ideological and strategic preferences, their public diplomacy initiatives have not been proper for directing their foreign policies for the ultimate benefits of the region. More accurately, although they felt responsible to design new structure to promote their existing norms in public diplomacy either for the sake of success of their own domestic and foreign policy or, perhaps, establishment of sustainable peace in Syria and Iraq, there has not been much "serious will for cooperation" over Syria and Iraq; moreover, Iran and Turkey have been continuously criticizing each other.

However, apart from these parameters, Turkey and Iran have been historically as bridges in terms of culture and economy; a characteristics which has not only given their ties a unique status in the region but also determine how these countries relate to each other in the regional developments.

On the other side of the coin, the said regional developments provided new climate and opportunity for Turkey and Iran to benefit the power vacuum or lack of domestic authority in Iraq and Syria to promote either their optimal political system, rather than appropriate policies, or in an attempt to prevent any harmful shift of the regional balance of power, which can also be evaluated as their quest for the regional hegemony.

So, theories that determined to explore the nature of foreign policy and public diplomacy of Turkey and Iran in Iraq and Syria, should consider the issue of regional hegemony, too. Accordingly, in the process of power employment by these countries in Syria and Iraq, soft instruments such as norms, values and identities are applied. That is, soft power applied besides hard power since the theoretical framework should consider both the hard and soft dimensions of power.

Considering the fact that the "Constructivism" regards important places for values, norms and identity and looks at the relationship between the structure and broker and/or agent with interactive manner and as mutually constituted (Wendt 2000), it has more potential and capacity in analyzing the foreign policy of Turkey and Iran with regard to developments in Syria and Iraq. This theory pays attention not only to both materialistic and non-materialistic dimensions but also to micro and macro in a dynamic and non-stationary process. That is, it pays attention to those matters related to norms and realities regarding regional structure.

In the social science, Structure is the intermittent patterned arrangements, which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available. On the other hand, Agency is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Barker (2005, p.448). The structure versus agency debate may be understood as an issue of socialization against autonomy in determining whether an individual acts as a free agent or in a manner dictated by social structure.

In such manner, in term of IR theory, this contribution considers the nature of their policies in the context of Constructivism, as it is able to explicate and analyze these two countries behavioral patterns.

On the other hand, their relations has been always experiencing ups and downs but at the same time when economic factors and cooperation attain prominence vis-à-vis politics, along with cultural cooperation, it has worked as a core and motor of maintaining warm mutual relations. However, the fact is that this has not been able to help for regional peace because furthering trade and economic cooperation has only eased the path for furthering mutual political willingness.

There are various aspects, such as regional and International interests, historical backgrounds, geographical and geopolitical location, memberships in regional and International organizations, which has made them pursuing different approaches in their diplomacies that inescapably affected their selection and preferences of coalition and corporation both in regional and global spheres. In this regard, there are some preliminary questions to ask in order to arrive at proper solid responses. These questions constitute the macro-level part of the present study;

- 1- What are the public diplomacy tools of Turkey and Iran in Syria and Iraq?
- 2- How their public diplomacy has managed to a contributive foreign policy for the achievement of peace and stability in Iraq and Syria?

The Justice and Development Party has been on power in Turkey since 2002 .In the case of Iran, been different parties have been in power since 2002. That is, during 1997-2005 the reformists (Eslah-talaban) were in power in the 7th and 8th governments. Then Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the candidate from conservative party (Osool-garayan) won the elections in two consecutive terms as the sixth and seventh President in 9th and 10th governments from 2005 to 2013. Dr.Hassan Rouhani mostly influenced by reformist (Eslah-talaban) and much less affected by the "Moderates" (Eetedal-garayan), won the election in 2013 as the eighth President in the 11th government.

The governing political parties in these countries and their political structures have affected the paradigms of their public diplomacy since, by definition, public diplomacy acts with the help of tools such as media and communication; considering that, the application of these tools varies in these countries based on the instructions of constitution law, political culture, political system, geography and historical background; moreover, the preferences of the governing political parties.

I will conclude that the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran have been seriously influenced by their public diplomacy approaches in negative manner. This has caused them to become inconsistent albeit proactive under the effect of new developments, both global, regional and the needs of their domestic policies. More accurately, the existing situation has naturally made them more curious, concerned and beware of with regard to their mutual policies and stances as a kind of direct or indirect response.

Keywords: *foreign policy, public diplomacy, Iran, Turkey, Constructivism*



1 INTRODUCTION

Notions such as interaction, counteraction, confrontation, cooperation, challenges, friendship and enmity are commonly used when talking about intergovernmental and intra-governmental relations. The power of public diplomacy in determining the limits or capacities, success and failure of these concepts is worth to be attended. This aspect is also applicable to the policies of Turkey and Iran in Syria and Iraq.

For quite a long time, both sides have believed cooperation in economy through neo-liberal understanding as the only alternative to bring blessing for all. They have also considered this co-operation more geopolitically, geographically and historically oriented. This has always been clear through the messages by the officials from both sides and their stances towards each other. However, neo-liberal understanding has found no chance of mutual cooperation toward bringing peace to Syria and Iraq but just helped political systems in Turkey and Iran to produce politics through economic and trade ties. Their approaches towards their mutual stances on Syria and Iraq, particularly, recently in Aleppo and Mosul, in spite of their efforts to promote relations, might be a proof of this claim.

In fact, a dramatic change in the Turkish foreign policy and strategy in its regional and international stances and relations in the first decade of the 21st century stands in sharp contrast with that of its immediate past because of the initiatives like the ‘Strategic Depth ‘ and ‘Zero-Problem’. In other hand, shift in Turkish foreign policy mindset emerged by the change in the mindset of benefiting its soft power capacities, esp. during 2002-2011. This, in fact, has brought with itself a new public diplomacy approach. On the other hand, politically, in the last fifteen years, Turkey has had a stable single party government with a sweeping reform agenda. Starting the accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, Turkey's reform process gained impetus transforming the country's legal and institutional setting which has indispensably affected the

country's public diplomacy needs. So that, the Justice and Development Party has been carrying out a multi-dimensional and proactive foreign policy.

Iran's public diplomacy up until 2013 was not proactive as expected and not much capable of constructively intervening in, controlling or shifting the path of an occurrence or situation in the region, except during 1997-2005 when the reformists (Eslah-talaban) were in power. The non-diplomatic lexicon that the governments adopted between 2005- 2013 and its coincidence with some regional developments has created an opportunity for the West and some Arab regional actors to challenge Iran's policies. However, the new diplomacy approaches adopted by Iran since 2013, in fact, transformed its status from different aspects in domestic, regional and International scopes. Although this breakthrough has been assessed and discussed in terms of both as a blessing and what some of the Persian Gulf Arab countries called it as making Iran a more powerful and eminent threat, Turkey's official and non-official stances have been so much different, mixed with reservation and optimism.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The 21st century has marked with growing worldwide security crisis; among of which, aggravation of situation in Middle East, in particular, in Syria and Iraq, has brought with itself the worst consequences. The reports and documents could have been warned the regional countries that new waves of conflicts and civil war have been on the way and severe security climate has been eminent and; nevertheless, the growing necessity to employ diplomatic means to end the continuing enmities and disputes, has not been heard. Among those countries mostly inflicted, are Iran and Turkey, which their role in changing the fate of the region has always been strategically high, though, their public diplomacy has acted relatively inadequate and weak, inconsistent and also incoherent towards their attitudes in foreign policy. Thus, in order to find the answer to the issue of "the Impact of the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey on their foreign policy approaches in Syria and Iraq ", a lot of tasks should be attended, which have not been done yet. The most important of all is that both sides should avoid assessing each other's regional intentions based on their daily domestic

politics. On the other hand, regional disputes affected by their insisting on "optimal purposes", but not "appropriate aims" for collective interests.

1.2 Significance of the Study, Questions & Hypothesis

As argued in the following chapters, public diplomacy, " as an instrument of promoting and enhancing soft power, deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies and encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications." (Gullion, 1965)

Thus, it plays an outstanding role in bringing up shifts in the traditional and/or historical relations between two or more States and also in the improvement or deterioration of situation in a certain country or region through its influence on foreign policy decisions. By the start of Syrian crisis and aggravation of crisis in Iraq, we have been witnessing the impact of public diplomacy on the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran in these crisis-hit countries. Thus, the present study has the potential to be a step towards much broader research and studies. However, this study is important since their public diplomacy instruments in Syria and Iraq have not been similar or, at least, not similarly applied.

The U.S. interests and engagement in the region has a subtle effect, if not directly, on the success or failure of Turkey's public diplomacy approaches in the region since they are both the members of some important international organizations such as NATO and have similar and common commitment.

A major problem here is the fact that, to this day, almost no significant academic work has managed to delve into this aspect of the engagement of Turkey and Iran in the region based on the capacity of their public diplomacy. That is, there is a major vacancy of an academic study on the aspects of the engagement of Turkey and Iran in the region based on their public diplomacy capacities. The significance of understanding this issue is that it would help

both the officials and the NGOs from both sides to consider a certain framework, which may emerge by the impact of their public diplomacy on their foreign policy. To put this into a historiographer's words, the very primary task of this study is hence to answer the immediate question of "what is the major connecting factor between public diplomacy and foreign policy" or "what really happens in this context in the cases of Syria and Iraq.

On the other hand, the effect of public diplomacy approaches of Turkey and Iran on their foreign policies in Iraq and Syria is studied based on Constructivism, since, it would be quite imprudent to carry analysis and interpretation phenomena without first getting knowledge and becoming aware of the roots and structures of the public diplomacy and foreign policy preferences of these countries.

The first and most important contribution of this study is that it introduces new ideas or platform for new general research on the impact of public diplomacy on foreign policy and also specifically in the cases of the involvement of Turkey and Iran in Syria and Iraq. Turkey and Iran have been utilizing quite similar instruments but with different purposes. There are some factors that are so basic and historically- oriented which has not let grounds for their public diplomacy to bear positive impact on the process of making decision in their foreign policies.

Based on this approach, two hypothesis, general one and main one, are introduced:

The general one is: "Public diplomacy affects foreign policies of Iran and Turkey."

The main hypothesis is: "Public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey has not had positive impact on their foreign policy on the cases of Syria and Iraq because of their geopolitical and geostrategic positions which has brought about the differences in their political and security preferences."

Moreover, I have tried first to tackle, as necessary as possible, some major questions, which constitute the micro-level part of the present study. These questions are answered through the chapters by defining the main concepts, assessment and analysis of the regional and major global developments, which

are directly or indirectly relate or concern the policies of Turkey and Iran in Syria and Iraq:

- 1- What is the historical nature of Turkish – Iranian relations and how does they mutually position themselves in such a discourse?
- 2- How the post-9/11 environment did brought up new incentives for Turkey and Iran to re-shape or overview their public diplomacy approaches and how it changed the structure of their public diplomacy?
- 3- If typical constituents of the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey is what are observed, then, what are, if any, the particular set of public diplomacy instruments were implemented by these two countries to target each other's interests directly or indirectly through regional developments, specially, in Syria and Iraq?
- 4- How have the government, the public and NGOs in Iran and Turkey responded or interacted with each other's pubic diplomacy and how the responses affected their foreign policy decision-makings?
- 5- What are the sources of power for Turkey and Iran in Syria and Iraq that have become the cause of motivation and incentive to these countries foreign policy to act as it is manifested today?

Having convincing answers to these questions, one can understand how complex is the effect of public diplomacy approaches on the foreign policy decision making of Turkey and Iran in Iraq and Syria.

1.3 Methodology

In drafting this work, I have used reports, data, surveys; newspaper achieves, officials' statements, interviews and my personal accounts and knowledge of the regional developments besides the two countries public diplomacy and foreign policy approaches, in particular, on Syria and Iraq. In this study, Turkish, Persian and English language sources have been used.

1.4 Literature Review

"The best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be

truthful. It is as simple as that.” Edward R. Murrow (an American broadcast journalist 1908-1965)

There is an increasing trend to produce literature on the issue of Public Diplomacy both in general and specifically on the public diplomacy of Turkey and Iran. There are also relatively prevailing tendency to produce literature on Turkish- Iranian relations with the focus on the application of diplomacy tools by these countries since last two or three decades. Roughly saying, there are not many exclusive or comprehensive studies regarding the effect of public diplomacy of Turkey and Iran on their foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq. There are articles; papers, thesis and reports along with books have been published so far discussing these two countries soft power, public diplomacy and foreign policy in general and also regarding the developments in Iraq and Syria.

The availability and framework of literature on the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey differs based on their political system, social acceptance and inclinations, geostrategic location, history and culture. To this effect, literature on Iran’s public diplomacy when it comes to the impact of its public diplomacy on its foreign policy towards the regional developments, in particular, Syria and Iraq, it is quite difficult to find comprehensive academic studies. In case of Turkey, it seems that the literature on public diplomacy is quite rich and there is the possibility to understand it through the plenty of reports articles and books. The book “Turkey’s public diplomacy and Turkish foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party”, comprised of comprehensive information in this regard. (Ekşi, 2014). In the third chapter of this book, the author defined the basics of Turkey’s public diplomacy and the role of Yunus Emre Institution and other cultural projects in abroad as the most important source of soft power. The author discussed how Turkey and the Justice and Development Party have been successful in coordinating the various institutions and Ministries for the unique purpose of a proactive diplomacy and multi-dimensional foreign policy. However, the author has not mentioned how Turkey’s public diplomacy affected its foreign policy with regard to regional developments or at least, in Syria and Iraq.

- **Understanding Public Diplomacy: Defining the Term**

Because of the nature of this contribution, it is beneficial to begin this section by addressing the question regarding the meaning of “public Diplomacy”. Thus, I have elaborated on a general definition of the term and its historical background along with tools that are often associate with it. A short assessment of public diplomacy and foreign policy of Turkey and Iran are also parts of this section.

The understanding of the importance and role of public diplomacy dates back to the time of the Administration of Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) during World War 1, “who finally decided that it worth pursuing systematically, at least for the duration of the conflict, but as the war ended, there was the perception that the U.S. needed to explain itself to the rest of humanity” (Waller, 2007). This was the time when this concept assumed a more prominent role in IR and International discipline. President Wilson’s use of the term in 1918 in the sense of the open, and not behind-door conduct of diplomacy gave the phrase of “open diplomacy” a further impetus. More, in his *fourteen points*, he emphasized on the “open covenants of peace”, which is a clear proof of this claim. (Cull, 2009)

This would give a misleadingly wrong perception that every political move and decision, especially in foreign relations, be made public and leaders speak more directly to the public rather than among themselves. This is, of course, would be true only if we accept that the leaders use the noble or strategic lies in world politics and in their diplomatic relations such as in treaties like Triple Alliance that the members secretly agreed to mutually support each others when in danger or under threat.

However, the concept of “Public Diplomacy” is said to be first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion. According to Nicholas J. Cull, Gullion was the first who used the term “ Public Diplomacy” in its modern meaning.(Cull,2006) Nicolas, also discovered in his study of *The Evolution of a Phrase*, the British were the ones who used the term in an 1856 article in London’s *The Times*. (Cull, 2009)

During this time, the politicians used this phrase so that a certain amount of impression on the public can be expected.

As an inference from Gullion's conception, public diplomacy received a brand new meaning, which is still a stimulating issue among academics and politicians:

“Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.”(Cull, 2006)

From this conception, it is possible to conclude that public diplomacy became about governments influencing foreign public's attitudes. Although, quite a young term inside the political vocabulary, it has stimulated different understandings and conceptual implications during its evolution. However, there is still a growing need to clarify the essence and uniqueness of public diplomacy in a country's diplomatic affairs.

- **Public Diplomacy Tools**

The history behind the beginning of public diplomacy campaign by a country might differs with that of others in terms of timing, necessities and capacities. In other words, public diplomacy instruments in every country might vary in depth but on the surface, it consists of programs with recurrent constituents that help further and encourage a good understanding of its politics, society and culture.

To put it in brief, the popular elements or, better to say, the known tools of a public diplomacy campaign which affect both the public diplomacy and foreign policy are like: publications, pamphlets and documentaries, traditional and digital domestic and international media, networks of NGO partnership, providing support for favorable groups and factions, educational and cultural exchanges, libraries and multi-media centers, exhibitions, language/literature teaching and training, computer-mediated games, aid projects.

These are elements, which are known to everybody; however, in order to expand the topic to understand and compare the capacities and effect of public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey on their foreign policies, I have set force further clarification in order to give the readers a small projection of some of these terms.

Publications, pamphlets and documentaries;

Publications, pamphlets and documentaries are common tools within the public diplomacy of Turkey and Iran through old and newest hard and soft forms. It includes production and distribution of hard-copy print materials, motion picture films, CDs and DVDs. Both sides have tried to limit their activities and operations in these fields under the framework of cultural co-operations. That is, both sides have tried to convince or persuade each other for promotion of cultural exchange and cooperation but at the same time have mutually used this as a strategy to limit each others' soft power tools in public diplomacy. In other words, there are both flexibility and conservatism against values and structures from both sides. In Turkey, various works of Late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Imam Khomeini and also other intellectuals have been translated into Turkish and published throughout Turkey, mostly by the help and efforts of NGOs affiliated to the Shia minority in Turkey. This issue also applies to the translation and publication of Turkish literature works in Iran. The quality and quantity of publishing these works, firstly influenced the publics in the destination country, Iran and Turkey, and secondly mutually affects their foreign policies.

Traditional and digital broadcasting;

The challenges in broadcasting industry are not new. However, it has moderately made its way to the 21st century and become more favored by countries in post 9/11. Hence, the challenges for the commencement of these broadcasting mechanisms have not been the same for Iran and Turkey.

The concept of digital broadcasting and the relevant studies in Turkey commenced in 1998 .In 1999, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television began the countdown for digital broadcasting and sent its decision for the gradual transition to the Supreme Board of Communication and it finally started

in 2015. Its traditional broadcasting first becomes active in 1968 by government – based media provider TRT. However, the use of traditional broadcasting such as radio or audio content and TV channels through analog broadcasting are still common in parts of Turkey.

For Iran, the application of traditional broadcasting goes back to 1958, when the “Television Iran” was established. Iran National Television Network established in 1966. But structurally became nationalized in 1969 and, thus, became government monopoly. On the other hand, NITV merged with Radio Iran in 1972 and then formed the National Iran Radio and Television (NIRT). After the Revolution it changed as to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). (Shahidi, Hossein (2007)

Iran also commenced broadcasting digital TV in 2009, using the DVB-T MPEG-4 standard, with 40% of population having access to digital TV by mid-2011. (IRIB 2013)

The effect that the government based and private Turkish broadcasting have had on Iranian public is incomparable with that of Iran’s on the public in Turkey.

Networks of NGO partnership;

Networks of NGO partnership are an element which both is sensitive and considerable in terms of the connection among NGOs. In the past, NGOs established with the aim to cooperate with the objective of compensating the government's weaknesses in the specific areas; that is, they have had complementary role alongside the government. Unlike the past, today, the purpose of the establishment of a non-governmental organization may deal with a specific governmental policy, or even supervision and provide advice to the government. That is, today, the activities of NGOs coalesce into the government plans and policies. This shift in the nature of activity of NGOs becomes a potent stimulus, which brought up new climate of interaction between NGOs. This feature also applies to Turkey and Iran. There are various institutions, research centers that hold round tables, exhibitions, and seminars. They believe that they can help their respective governments for finding solutions to regional crisis. At the same time, both sides’ feel concerned about the activities of some of the NGOs in their respective countries.

Language /literature teaching and training;

Language /literature teaching and training is also a valuable program that countries use for different purposes in the target country/ies. This is, in fact, a most prevalent form of exchange project which would satisfy both ends and would enhance other joint relevant projects such as cultural. In case of Turkey and Iran, there has always been high motivation and inclination to learn Farsi in Turkey by researchers, university students and those who are seeking for job in companies, which are jointly running business with Iran. The annual rise in the number of students seeking for learning Farsi in some universities such as Istanbul University and also Center for Teaching and training Farsi literature and language of the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul and Iranian Embassy in Ankara are proofs to this claim. (IRNA 2016). A similar reports published by Saadi Foundation (Saadi Foundation 2016) and Javan Online. (Javan Online 2016).

Today, more than 110 institutions, centers, universities and schools from around the world are teaching Farsi language and literature. Among this number, at least 14 are in Turkey. (MIU 2016)

Since the Justice and Development Party in power, this inclination got better responses both by the Iranian residing in Turkey and also by Iranian Consular and Diplomatic Missions in Turkey through the activities of Cultural Departments. On Turkey's initiatives in Iran, Younus Emre Foundation in Tehran provides the most powerful and active Turkish training course along with different cultural activities, which has inaugurated newly and has a comprehensive teaching facilities. The potential mutual effects of these elements and tools on the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey are outstandingly considerable.

Turkish Parliament also recently passed the law regarding to add "Farsi "to the list of languages which can be taught in the schools in Turkey. (habarturk 2017)

Providing support for favorable groups and factions;

Providing support for favorable groups and factions is the most aggressive constituent of public diplomacy designed for operation in target nation/s. This, of course, is not a new issue in the International Relations and world politics,

since countries resort to such methods for infiltration in war times. But as the component of public diplomacy, governments often try to nurture certain native groups and their viewpoints in a particular society in order to perform their plans in that society, as its target nation. In case of Turkey and Iran, historically, there has been some point of concerns and distrusts in this regard, in which minorities in two countries have become the materials to fulfill their ambitions.

Turkey and Iran have also supported their proxies or, perhaps better to say, their allies in the region. Their support of different proxies or allies created a kind of fragmented vision, too. At the same time, both sides accused each other's of such support.

A short assessment of Turkish public diplomacy and foreign policy

Considering the rise in the complexity of International Relations in the recent two centuries, Turkey began to notice the concept of 'public diplomacy' as one of the most important tools of influencing the public opinion. The primary outcome has, likewise, motivated the government to promote further its public diplomacy.

Thus, as a rising middle power and the Muslim-majority nation with a secular democratic government and a vibrant Islamic culture, Turkey became more and more concerned as to how to keeping up and maintaining its national interests, regional strength, and global responsibility. For this reason, issues such as efficiency in the areas of strategic communication and public diplomacy have been felt absolutely necessary elements to this aim. However, this trend is important with respect to both the legitimacy and the scope of effectiveness of the policies adopted by Turkey. As a consequence, Turkey benefited its structural background and rich cultural heritage and managed its increasing effect on regional and global politics in recent years toward the aims of its new public diplomacy initiatives. Soon, these initiatives become the most important tools of Turkish foreign policy and soft power capacity, which has rendered Turkey to increase its effectiveness in international public opinion to enhance its credibility.

In this regard and concerning its geostrategic position and geographic location, its domestic and foreign policy needs and necessities, Turkish Republic started new projects and activities in 2001. Turkey's effort for EU membership, its new initiatives with regard to the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus developments provoked by the insatiable expansionist measures and policies of the Cold War rivals, its ties with the U.S and with the neighboring countries, each have motivated Turkey to redefine and rebuild its organizational and institutional structure with the help of NGOs in a bid to maintain and promote the sub-structures and elements of the country's public diplomacy. However, various players in Turkey, which are active in the field of public diplomacy, are pursuing their own interests and communicating their own vision of the country independently of others and this resulted in some non-orchestrated efforts. In consequence, the public diplomacy projects could not yield the expected sustainable effects. The advocates of public diplomacy projects and initiatives in Turkey likewise faced several serious challenges brought with the divergent interpretations of this concept by various public and private institutions. The Justice and Development Party government felt the need for closer co-ordination of country's public diplomacy through a certain institution; that is, Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with Prime Ministry.

The developments in 21st century mostly have shifted the interest and involvement of great powers in the affairs of Syria and Iraq. It has, undoubtedly, raised the concerns of Turkey for its own interests. By a more subtle description, the Turkey's concern of Iran's policy has its unique root from ideological and power supremacy, taken its effect from the historical background. Under such condition, and for the sake of avoiding conflict, which will bring one side as loser and the other as winner, these two countries resorted to the soft power tools, though, differently in terms of quality, scale and manner of performance. Although, this approach has not yet helped them in whether maintaining the regional stability or fulfilling their own interests.

A short assessment of Iran's public diplomacy and foreign policy

Iran's geographical location, geostrategic position, its political and historical background, ideals of the Revolution of 1979 along with the consequences of developments in the recent decades are some of the most important determinant

factors, which have had the potential to limit, enhance or encourage Iran for bringing a shift to the structure of its public diplomacy.

Additionally, Iran with its unique location on the map of the region bordered with crisis –hit neighbors, has always been faced with the risks of multiple security threats ,so that , it employed its public diplomacy as it fit its needs and necessities according to the system, domestic policies and foreign policy requirements.

The study of Iran public diplomacy inevitably requires us to consider three main periods: “With 1979 Revolution”, “the start of Iraq imposed war on Iran” and “Post-war era”. The post – war era itself should be divided into at least two parts; pre- 2013 and post-2013. Of course, through these years, the public diplomacy of Iran has been tested by various challenges with the West and the regional challenges.

The reason for such classification lays in the necessity of considering the political system in pre and post Revolution, the lack of belief in the necessity of systematic application of public diplomacy in the first years of the revolution and during the years of imposed war (Sep 22, 1980 – Aug 20, 1988), the impossibilities as the result of war climate, as well as, the lack of adequate operational capacity and efficiency to employ the new structure for public diplomacy and the most important of all, the necessity to understand the impact and role of the Revolution in shaping the over all structure of public diplomacy. In the post -war era (1988 - 2016), there was some improvement in the administrative and executive layers of the system of governments from 1988 to 2005 during which the reformists were in power. From 3 August 2005 – 3 August 2013 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in power as the 6th and 7th President, the policies during these periods adopted plus the pressures from the West for the varieties of claims or alleged accusations, have had different effects on the domestic climate of Iran ,as well as, its regional and International status . It was only in 2013 when Iran has started new policies with new initiatives in public diplomacy during President Rouhani’s administration. It was the most daunting hurdle for Iran’s public diplomacy to revitalize its soft power and reach out to the International community through a more moderate,

tolerant, and open dialogue policy. This approach could help Iran to harmonize and reconcile inconsistencies between its foreign policy and public diplomacy.

Embracing digital diplomacy has been key in these efforts. It is clear that since assuming office, President Rouhani with the help of his cabinet ministers has committed to change the status of Iran in the international community. Iran, as part of a new statecraft initiative, has begun to benefit the social Medias and the relevant media technologies to engage in “digital conversations” with the West and the East to better convey its message of peace and solidarity as the sole answer to the world’s problems. Since, Rouhani’s administration believed that Iran should raise its words and not its voices; same strategy adopted by the West. The West’s “whiz-kids” have taken to heart the notion that “it is not whose Army wins but whose story wins.”(Hallams, 2011). Rouhani’s digital (Digi) diplomats- a metaphoric phrase to refer the way diplomats in the new administrations has been using social media -, on the other hand, recognize digital diplomacy as a great chance to focus efforts on crafting a message that will appeal to stabilizing peace and security both for the region and Iran.

Iran’s public diplomacy with regard to the developments in the region including Syria and Iraq has been influenced, to some extent, by its “official (governmental) diplomacy” or “track-one diplomacy” - a formal negotiations between States conducted by professional diplomats. Other forms of diplomacy such as “Track-two diplomacy” - the conflict resolution efforts by non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners - and “Multi -track diplomacy” - a contributive effort among private and civil sector actors that is intended to facilitate direct negotiations among public sector actors and conflict participants – (Diamond & McDonald 1996) have also been in the center of attention of Iran’s diplomacy and foreign policy affairs. That is, Iran has tried direct and indirect strategies and maximized the application of soft power. This approach have had ups and downs, intensity, fragility and strength in the past two decades since it influenced by the effect of the regional and international developments; though, the effect of direct order from the top of the system should not be undermined. On the other hand, Iran has found its preferences in Syria and Iraq and generally regarding regional developments through its official diplomacy

and this has been one of the cause of this intensity and fragility or the lack of consistency and sustainability in the form and scale.



2 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY RELATIONS

“Raise your words, not voice. It is rain that grows flowers, not thunder.”

Persian Poet, Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi

13th – century

2.1 What is public diplomacy?

Before jumping to the history and definition of “public diplomacy”, it is perhaps helpful to direct the reader’s attention briefly to the meaning of the relevant concepts such as Diplomacy and Traditional Diplomacy. The main reason is firstly to get the readers to distinguish the relevancy of these items with “public diplomacy” and thus to have a more systematic attention to public diplomacy and secondly it will provide the background to understand the various definitions of public diplomacy set forth by some scholars. On the other hand, it will give us, at least, a hint of what public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey looks like and how it has worked in recent decades.

Then, it will be followed by a short assessment on the role of media and culture and the effect of their relevant tools on the efficiency of public diplomacy.

From the early period of establishment of city – state, “diplomacy” has been applied because of the very nature of human for finding a solution to problem without resorting to force, even if, the lexicon itself was not in use like its modern application. More accurately, people decided to manage or adjust the International Relations and world politics through negotiations in order to achieve the maximum objectives, range from national interests to collective ones, if any, with a minimum costs in the political system in which the notion of “war” remains on the table as a possibility. In this negotiation, there are two or more States so that the diplomacy can be bilateral or multilateral. In the former, the two States engage in treaties such as economic or consular treaties and/or MOUs. Through the latter, some global and regional organizations emerged

such as World Trade Organization and UN. As Jan Melissen put it, "... the existing definitions of diplomacy have either stressed its main purpose (the art of resolving international difficulties peacefully), its principle agent; (the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of accredited representatives) or its chief function as (the management of international relations by negotiations). (Melissen 2005)

Jan Melissen has a more inclusive view of this concept, as: "the mechanism of representation, communication and negotiation through which States and other international actors conduct their business. Melissen (1999, p. xvi-xvii.) This definition suggests an international environment where a range of identifiable players exists.

In the postmodern transnational relations, there are various actors involved in diplomatic and non-diplomatic activities and most actor's range from State or non State are not as much as in control as they have been wanted to be. In such a world, the requirements of diplomacy faced transformation. In this shift, the inevitability and indispensability of public diplomacy as the ingredient for such a collaborative model of diplomacy or "multi-track diplomacy", has been felt, particularly since the beginning of 21st century.

Prior to this shift, there was traditional diplomacy, which the relationships between the representatives of States were secretive, and only the limited number of cadre involved rather than a broad diplomatic activity. It does not indicate that the traditional form of diplomacy does no longer exist but rather, because of the nature of some negotiations, even today, we observe this form of diplomacy.

Some Scholars have emphasized the importance of understanding the Traditional Diplomacy vs. Public Diplomacy. Public diplomacy should distinguish itself from the traditional diplomacy in the fact that it includes interaction not only with the governments, but especially with nongovernmental individuals and organizations (Murrow, 1963 in Leonard, 2002). So, public diplomacy presupposes an open communication process, which is based on the principle of publicity. It is trying to speak to the public, as opposed to the

traditional diplomacy, the characteristics of which are secrecy and exclusivity. (Tuch, 1990)

Public diplomacy, for this matter, is taking its roots from diplomacy as it targets the general public in the target communities and societies or specifically non-official groups, organizations and individuals. More accurately, the factor of “direct contact “of governments with the publics in the host countries is one of the core components of public diplomacy, since States have seen public diplomacy as a strategy to employ their plans and fulfill their interests through continuous negotiations with those bodies within a certain society which are of significant importance in terms of providing the opportunity for their influence on public opinion. The lobbying by governments within a certain community in the target country such as a minority group and a certain class of society or the use of media and cultural instruments are some of the instances in this regard.

However, as an academic discipline, public diplomacy has an assured history behind itself, and it has been universally acknowledged that the concept of ‘public diplomacy’ is said to have been first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion. (Cull, 2006)

According to an early summary of Gullion's concept published by Murrow Center mentioned in PDAA (public diplomacy organization):

"Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications."

In fact, the understanding of the importance and role of public diplomacy dates back to the time of Woodrow Wilson Administration (1913-1921) during World War 1 when the U.S. was the first among other countries which took the citizens of other countries as the materials and target for its goals. This was in part due to the global political climate when the U.S. understood that in order to exert proper influence on the relations between the nations, the process of persuading

the peoples of the host or opposite nations along with the inter-governmental diplomatic negotiations, was so significant. This concept, comparing with the time it coined, has experienced some changes in terms of methods, goals, and constituencies.

'Diplomacy' like Public Diplomacy is a mean with series of sub-tools employed for the sake of advancement of the interest of one country through interactions and negotiations. It is not conducted in a much broader area than public diplomacy does, though, the same spirit exists in both in the sense that they might be conducted openly and also being traditional oriented or emerging, based on the conductors' nature and historical background. Public diplomacy is much broader and extensive in terms of application, time, place and tools. It is, in fact, more extensive in scope.

Diplomacy is both a primary instrument by which States try to realize their foreign policy agenda and usual means of communication and other professional activities in international relations. As defined by Olson: "It is a lubricant for the machinery of foreign politics." (Olson, 1991). That is, diplomacy in one way or another is responsible for managing the relations between countries and countries with non-State actors through advice, design and realization of foreign politics, coordinating and ensuring specific and wide interests (Barston, 1988). In this regard, Smith believes that "a diplomatic activity is meant for advancement of national interests with practices of persuasion" (Smith, 1999).

Public diplomacy is a concept, which is commonly used by States as an instrument for political communications. It is a tool to provide necessary fields for starting dialogue and confer with others and mostly planned either to convey information or to influence and affect a certain community. This destination can either be a certain society or State.

Many scholars have discussed concept of public diplomacy but no clear consensus exists on the definition. However, some of the most contemporary usage of public diplomacy is mentioned in this section.

In the two most commonly used definitions of public diplomacy, Signitzer and Coombs (1992) understand the public diplomacy as:

"... A way, with which the government and the private individuals and groups can directly or indirectly influence those public opinions and positions, which directly influence the foreign politics decisions of another government."

Based on this understanding, the public diplomacy is more than ever broadening its field of traditional diplomatic activities. As emphasized by these Scholars, it is expanding its field from the sphere of "high politics" towards the diverse issues and aspects of daily life and from the "closed" sphere of governments and diplomats towards new actors and target groups, i.e. different individuals, groups and institutions, which are joining international and intercultural communication activities and have influence on the political relations between countries (Signitzer and Coombs 1992). In a similar definition, (Manheim 1994) concludes that the purpose of public diplomacy is explanation and speaking in favor of governmental policy and representing a nation to foreign publics. He defines the strategic public diplomacy as "government to people" (government – public) diplomatic activity, which includes government efforts to influence the public and elite opinion in another country and through this also the foreign policy activities of a target country. (Manheim 1994)

John Lee, an American writer concedes that we are living in an era of public diplomacy and that people-to-people communications are more important than dialogues between governments. Lee asserts that hence (democratic) governments often abide/rely on public opinion; consequently, public/international opinion holds incredible power. (John Lee, 1968). On the contrary, Hoffman contends that the revolution of mass communication gave rise to public diplomacy whereby government; individuals and groups have a direct/indirect influence on public opinions/attitudes, which bear directly on other states' foreign policy-making. (Hoffman, 1968).

Diplomacy Scholar "Paul Sharpe "also defines public diplomacy as "the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented" (Sharpe mentioned in Melissen 2007:106). According to Cooper, successful diplomacy means "openness and transnational cooperation" (Cooper, 2003:78).

Thus, considering that public diplomacy is an indispensable requirement for a collaborative model of diplomacy, openness and multi-level cooperation is crucial for a successful diplomatic relations.

Gilboa , describes the public diplomacy in the sense of content as activities in the field of informing, education and culture, which are directed to foreign countries with a purpose of influencing foreign governments through influencing their citizens.(Gilboa,2001) Most of the authors in this field (in Leonard, 2002) agree upon the desired effects of diverse activities of public diplomacy. First, to make the conveyed messages being heard, recognized and understood. Second, to create and strengthen a positive relation towards the communicated policies within the target public in order to solidify its positive image, reputation and the international position of the host country.

In sum, public diplomacy can be simply defined as a form of communication with the publics of target countries aim at persuasion and fulfilling the foreign policy goals. This is what governments, basically, trying to manage through necessary tools to influence the opinion, hearts and minds and positions of the public in foreign countries, in order to create a proper pressure on the policy makers.

One of the most important aspects of public diplomacy is the level and extent of knowledge of the operator country about the history, culture and geographical - geopolitical importance of the host country or society. This will result in more effective application of public diplomacy and steady foreign policy through more careful evaluation in the application of the components such as listening, advocacy elements; naming, press conferences, establishing information center in the Embassies and Consulates, cultural diplomacy, exchanges of any assets mutually to and from by which both sides benefiting, best use of State – sponsored and funded news and media .These factors will make the success of public diplomacy in a host society more convincible. However, the function of these elements and factors are mutually exclusive.

As a short introduction to the role of media and culture and their effects on the efficiency of public diplomacy, it would be helpful to refer to the needs of States in the information age, the onset of which is associated with digital

revolution, mostly, in 19th and 20th centuries; the era that the world has been witnessing the rise of digital industry ,as well as, emergence of communication tools, which inevitably affected the information industry.

This characteristic brought up with itself a common practice by the diplomats whose appetite for collecting information, reporting and sharing with their respective governments, increased. Through these information, States attempted to impose political and cultural transformation or at least a small extent of change in the destination countries and geographies. This transformation can be interpreted as negative and/or positive. That is, the advance of communication technology both turned to be a headache and promising phenomenon in the sense that it could cause a quick shift in the atmosphere of a community within a country. For instances, the negative impact of social medias on the formation of some movements such as Arab Spring is undeniable, since, it has turned to be a platform for superpowers and actors to misuse the situation which is still going on in Syria. Thus, in the opposite sense, communication technology can be a favorable mean when a Tweet or a video message by an official or a Foreign Minister can change a potential threat of war on his country. For instance, video messages in English with Persian and Hebrew subtitles published by Javad zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran since 2013 telling the world what is the reality behind Iran Nuclear activity or what is Iran's unchangeable policy toward any threat to its sovereignty. The impact of these video messages and his direct contacts with peoples around the world via Twitter and Facebook has been astonishingly beneficial for bringing the U.S. on the negotiation table.

By the same token, internet and mainstream social media, have offered an opportunity to the governments and non-government actors to connect with their audiences worldwide but at the same time has blurred the distinction between diplomacy and public diplomacy.

Culture as the core aspect and the key element of solidarity and unity among all structures of every country and also an element for attracting the minds and hearts of peoples of other nations, has been described as a notoriously difficult term to define. Meanwhile, scholars provided a historical perspective regarding the various interpretation of the term. As Avruch 1998:6-7 puts it, much of the

difficulty of understanding the concept of culture stems from the different usages of the term in anthropology and sociology. (Avruch 1998:6-7 mentioned in Helen Spencer-Oatey 2012) The most broadly and generally used definition since 19th century is the definition given by Matsumoto 1996:16 as: “ the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people ,but may be different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next.” Thus, any policies adopted by a country to target another country through interaction with peoples, language exchange, religion, arts and various societal structures, will truly affect or even modify the culture of the destination country. Matsumoto (1996, p.16)

Moreover, cultural diplomacy in International Relations and world politics is the means of soft power in information age. It is a factor, which overpasses the national and cultural boundaries by help of which a country would apply to form bridges and interactions through identifying power domains in the target country or community. As Joseph Nye puts it, soft power grows out of culture, domestic values and policies and also foreign policy. (Nye, 2004) If this is the case, culture and cultural diplomacy has significant role for the success of public diplomacy application.

On the other hand, this new trend with information age has created a new environment in which new parameters and components began playing role and the traditional form of diplomacy came to its end or become weakened and public diplomacy showed up ostentatiously. In other words, this situation began, particularly, in post Cold War period when the countries’ security preferences and attention to economic issues in the global market and international politics increased more than ever and it paved ways for the emergence of new actors in the form of peoples, groups and NGOs. In the similar way, the States as main actors in International arena resorted to public diplomacy as new tool to meet their national interests.

The strategies of each country for operating its public diplomacy and its sub-tools such as soft power may differ. In this regard, concepts such as culture, charismatic characteristic, legitimacy and moral authority showed up as some determinant factors, which might shape the ‘soft power’ strategy of each country towards the country of destination. This will also shape the structure of

countries' public diplomacy since the later benefits the facilities and resources of the former - soft power- such as culture, basic values and politics. Thus, culture and cultural tools – technical tools such as books, media and social software and psychological tools such as language, signs, writing and symbols- have determinant role on the effectiveness of public diplomacy application.

As already mentioned, culture is a set of values and practices. In this regard, when the culture of a country is based on the universal values and its policies promote the values and interests, which shared by others, it systematically creates attraction. Thus, the likelihood of achieving the desired results for that country will be provided. On the other hand, cultures with limited minor values are less able to produce soft power and thus would not be able to create a proper public diplomacy. By values, I mean the cultures which based on realities of the society and that do not change according to the needs and tastes of people and society. In contrast, there are cultures, which their values are based on social contract; that is, recognizes morality and values as relative and changeable according to human desires. Thus, in this regard, in those countries which their culture has stronger values, are more able to produce soft power and, as the result, more powerful public diplomacy. However, when we think about the concept of “threat” in today's international environment, cultural threat considerations comes in the same line of importance and sensitivity as other sort of threats such as military and economic threats. Because, in the modern globalization era and emergence of new communication technologies, the increasing number of cultural products and instruments are easily crossing the borders and penetrate in the life of peoples, in the forms of hard and soft materials. These products are interpreted as the dominance of other countries' culture or soft power on national identity of the target countries. By the same token, cultures with stronger values are less affected by those cultural threats.

Joseph Nye has referred to the effectiveness of culture. According to him, the impact of culture as a source of soft power depends on the context that this power is being applied. For instances, Tank is not known as important military resources or tool in the forest or swamp. For the same reason, American movies might be interesting and attractive in China or Latin America but might have

backfire in Pakistan or Afghanistan and decrease the impacts of the U.S soft power. (Nye, 1990)

In general, the impact and effectiveness of any form of power depends on the existing context and that who with whom in what circumstances are connected. However, soft power relies on the will of the recipients and readers more than what hard power does.

On the issue of the significance of Media and its role in the success of public diplomacy, it would be helpful to refer the preferences of the leaders in the process of State-to-State and even State -to- People interaction. Since, today, State officials send necessary messages of peace, threat and expectations to other States through media and statement rather than diplomatic notes. The most probable reason is that media, became one of the most obvious levers of governments for more concessions in different areas, particularly, public diplomacy and foreign policy. This trend causes a lot of misunderstanding among States, however, the more efficient is the application of media, the more successful is the State in the field of public diplomacy and, as the result, it will present itself with more sustainable power in regional and international politics. This will bring for the country sustainable relations with others, persuade public opinion and help the country to successfully maneuver in its bilateral and multilateral relations with the target countries. This approach may also attract the attentions of intellectuals in the host country or it may create a repulse. Otherwise, it will be out of the circle of international developments and international politics. That is, it will not be able to create a successful interaction between its public diplomacy and foreign policy.

This nature also indicates how public diplomacy and foreign policy relates to each other.

In other words, any negligence by a government in broadcasting the country's ideas and comments via media might lead to the decline in the country's regional and trans-regional roles in different areas. This will decrease the country's influence and, as the result, make the public diplomacy inefficient and so do the foreign policy. Since, the first and most important characteristics of

public diplomacy are that it directly addresses the peoples, NGOs and different layers of society in the host country.

This, indeed, proves that how both media and cultural institutions are significant for a country to gain the satisfactory outcomes of public diplomacy.

2.2 The IMPACT OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER (HARD AND SOFT) ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

“There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind.

In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.”

– Napoleon Bonaparte

In this section, the definition of concept of power and its different forms will be illustrated. I will also focus on the structural impact of these concepts on public diplomacy both in general and with respect to the regional policies of Iran and Turkey.

Power, defined by Oxford dictionary as the ability to do something or act in a particular way. Or, the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events.

It is possible to trace the concept of power back to ancient time; from Plato and Aristotle to the time of Machiavelli and Hobbes, for instances. But the systematic study of power is very recent and new. What is our major concern is not to prove the existence of 'power' as it is not tangible and can only be felt by action, but to understand it by comparing the nature of power in terms of its soft and hard utilization in public diplomacy approaches.

In theoretical perspective, Neo-realism and Liberal institutionalism convey different understanding of power. Liberal institutionalism approaches stressed on various aspects of soft power including cultural attractions, ideology and international institutions as the main sources. On the other hand, Neo-realism emphasizes the capacity they can impose and apply force on others in order to act as they wish to while liberal institutionalism aims at providing conditions according which others follow your wishes and orders; do as you want to. More accurately, hard power emphasizes the neo realistic approaches on the States'

capabilities and the application of its relevant means such as military might and economic growth.

More simply, the concepts of hard power and soft power can be considered as two poles of a continuum; that is, one single power chain. These concepts also imply ideas, interactions and different institutions for foreign policy in the areas of politics, security and economy. Ideally, hard power oriented strategies focused on military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions to advance and promote the national interests which naturally leads to adopt confrontation policies with neighboring countries. In contrast, soft power oriented strategies stress on common political values and peaceful means to reach at common solutions in order to managing the conflicts and promotion of economic cooperation.

As Joseph Nye put it, ‘...there are several ways to affect the behavior of others, by coerce with threat, inducing with payments or by attracting and coopt them to want what we want.’ Nye (2004, p. 2) He also mentioned in the same book that: “when we measure power in terms of the changed behavior of others, we have first to know their preferences. Otherwise we may be as mistaken about our power as a rooster who thinks his crowing makes the sunrise. Nye (2004, p. 2)

So, an approach based on respect and legitimate objectives without commands and only by affecting the behavior in the destination, will help to get the outcome without using threats. Here, the success to persuade others and raise their motivation plays very important role.

This short introduction indicates that each country might use the power and capacity of its power differently in terms of quality and quantity based on its goals with regard to the host country; it can be used both for the peace and waging war so its important role in the proper utilization of public diplomacy and its effect on the prevention of military confrontation or fixing misunderstanding among States should not be underestimated.

The term 'soft power' is an important concept added to the family of ‘public diplomacy’ in 90th by “Joseph Nye” in his book ‘Bound to Lead: The Changing

Nature of American Power.’ He described this concept as “the second face of power”. Nye (2004, p. 5)

Before arriving at the main discussion, an overview of the overall nature of soft power would help the better comprehension of the subject.

- a) Being traditional: As a deepest source of cultural power, soft power comes to reality after passing a long way of historical evolution. In other words, ideology, way of thinking, cultural traditions, habits, social systems, economic system, lifestyle and other issues of a society are, in fact, a cumulative result of the evolution of different forms of social production. In this process, each element of soft power has always influenced by cultural traditions and development of each culture finds its own distinctive trajectory.
- b) Being up to date: "soft power" is intangible in nature but is not fantasy or illusion. Its form and evolution and also change in its strength are related with its time period, background and international and domestic communities. Particularly, in the modern societies, soft power has close relations with scientific and technological progress, information society and knowledge –based economy. In other words, soft power strengthens and promotes with invention of endless instruments in international society. Development of information technology, changes the mass media to become dynamic and influential tools. As the mass media developed their way to the international community, its effect on International Relations dramatically increases and becomes an important power shifter.
- c) Being inclusive: soft power itself has a large capacity for expansion and competition. Along with the increasing flow of information technology and the development of Internet culture, soft power expands beyond the limits of geographic borders, national ethnicity, the time and space. This phenomenon strengthens community development and amazingly effects on lifestyle and standards of human behavior. In the international community, at a time when a variety of soft power is in interaction with other forms of power, competition becomes inevitable, so this process

will lead to conflict. Of course, soft powers attract and strengthen each other, and normally after interactions, adaption, learning and emulating from each other, become or form a “collective identity”.

- d) Being dynamic: Soft power is the mechanism of a dynamic process with a changeable nature in different period of time based on various contexts.
- e) Being interrelated with national will: If development of soft power neglected by a government, it would be difficult for that government to maintain its sustainable progress. To be effective, soft power needs to establish and manage a national strategy and also mobilize and unify national will. Hence, a strong national leadership is indispensable and essential to stimulate people's enthusiasm and to benefit people's zeal and passion to create and enhance the comprehensive national strength in the country's big jumps ahead.

The governing climate in the world has caused the emergence of new social and political groups and movements. This trend, naturally, affected the structure of States’ soft and hard power approaches. The reason is that It altered the existing public diplomacy strategies in the sense that it created new articulation which have provided a deeper understanding of various aspects of this concept in terms of its connotations. This has, in fact, awakened every class of society in the region as they understood deeper as to how the great powers such as the US and the UK, for instances, could win the hearts and minds of peoples and those of their leaders in the middle East and how they are continuing to be more effective by promoting new public diplomacy initiatives through their media coverage, reports and mass media .The outcome of the governing climate, ultimately, influenced the regional countries foreign policy, since the public diplomacy has become considerably politicized. This, in fact, is the situation, which has ended the traditional articulation and structure of public diplomacy.

The initiative by Joseph Nye who was first to introduce the concept of “soft power” in 1980s which emphasizes the link between ‘power’ with public diplomacy, is a best example that proves how the necessity for shift in the structure of public diplomacy been felt even before incidents like 9/11.

However, as already mentioned, in order to a country obtain the outcomes it wishes in world politics, it pursues soft power because it believes that through the instruments of soft power, it would get the other to want the outcome that it wants. This approach denies resorting to any kind of pressure or coercion.

Joseph Nye considers three main resources for soft power: (Nye, 2004)

- Culture (the parts of culture which are attractive for others);
- Political values (when meet expectations from inside and outside) and,
- Foreign policy (when deemed legitimate and moral)

These three main resources might help a State to attain the outcomes it seeks in world politics and in its ties with other States, in condition that they would pave the ground for that country to be admired and, as the result, followed by other countries so that it co-opts the country/ies of destination instead of coercing them since this country does not militarily threaten others or does not resort to the sanction policy. The best example in this regard is the U.S. power policy in a short period after the Cold War and before entering in 21st century.

Putting it differently, any State's domestic and foreign policies, are considered as potential sources of soft power. For example, racism in the U.S. in 1950s had bad impacts on the U.S. soft power in Africa. The same bad impact has been again for the U.S. because of its 2003 occupation of Iraq. Or the lack of freedom of speech, for instance, in Turkey and Iran is a serious blow to their soft power and public diplomacy and so does to their foreign policy.

Foreign policy also has decisive impacts on soft power because if a country designs its foreign or domestic policies based on hypocrisy, arrogances, indifferent to the opinions of others or parochial-based approach towards its national interests, it might contribute to the weakening of its soft power. It can be argued, the values that a government supports in its internal behavior, in international institutions (such as cooperation with others) and foreign policy (such as promotion of peace), strongly affects the priorities of others. That is, governments can present themselves as exemplary and influence on other countries, which can either attract or repel them.

Furthermore, political system along with historical heritage, determines the form, scope and structure of soft power of each country.

In order to find any track of these three main resources in public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey, the resources should be assessed in terms of meaning and structure with regard to the foreign policy preferences.

1) Culture:

Culture can produce power; however, this characteristic cannot be generalized as the attributed might for every culture. In other words, all countries in the world are not able to apply power to each other depending on their culture. Joseph Nye emphasized the notion of “attractiveness of culture” as the backbone of the successful application of soft power in the host societies. (Nye, 2002). Regarding Nye’s opinion, it is important to note that the attractiveness of cultural resources is not an acquired, but rather, an intrinsic characteristic. In other words, a culture is or is not attractive and I believe that it would not be possible to alter or transform cultural resources simply by some public diplomacy activities and/or to add some new elements to the existing resources. On the other hand, the attractiveness of a culture in the target community is not always absolute and depends on the interpretation and comprehension of the audiences or addresses. Thus, there is this possibility that the culture resources of a certain country may be attractive and pleasant in one target community but may not be attractive in another society. That’s why the extent that the cultural soft power can influence should be assessed based on the target community. It should not be generalized.

In this sense, Turkey as the heir of a great and powerful empire with unique geostrategic position has had to maintain its public diplomacy in a much broader geographies where once have been the lands of Ottoman Empire or under its control. To say, from Balkans to Central Asia and Caucasus as Turkey’s natural hinterlands where this country’s cultural and historical values and heritage are amazingly deep rooted. Its belongings from Europe to Asia must not be misinterpreted or limited as only militarily because of the military power of the Ottoman. This is the reason behind the power potential that Turkey represents in these regions, which triggers the dynamics of the regions on one hand and allows for the emergence of new areas of interaction on the other. Besides Turkey's political structure, which tends to be democratic, having a vibrant civil society helped this country to have a more efficient and operational

soft power. Although, the interpretation of its soft power application varies based on different periods and geographies.

Keyman, discusses the tenants of Turkey's soft power, and points out that the faith of a foreign policy vision depends on the state's capacity to contribute to state-building, nation-building, and economic development efforts around the globe. (Keyman, 2013)

Vedat Demir, explores Turkish public diplomacy as actively engaged to exercise soft power in order to improve relations with neighboring countries. Demir, sees a greater involvement of civil society as an indispensable factor for successful employment of public diplomacy. (Demir, 2012)

In case of Iran, its power potential and power operation capacity seems much more limited when compared to Turkey, despite, being the heir to several emperors and a rich history and culture. This is mainly because the quality and quantity of works carried out by Iran in the target countries, which has had negative contribution towards the interpretation of its cultural resources by peoples in the target communities. However, because of the specific nature of strategies laid behind the basis of the Islamic Revolution, and inflicting 8 years-long imposed war, the whole structure and the purpose behind the power operation by Iran faced serious shift. That is, Iran began to revise its policies and hard power infrastructure despite insisting in application of its soft power capacity.

2) Political values:

Every country has its own Fundamental values, which are accepted as the base of its policymaking. These fundamental values may emerge as the resources for producing soft power if they could only attract attentions domestically and internationally. Nye pointed to this issue giving the U.S. example. Nye believes that some of American fundamental values such as democracy and freedom have such characteristic. He believes that these power producing values emerge out of freedom, democracy, performance in international circles and foreign policy. (Nye, 2002)

Accordingly, political values should meet expectations from inside and outside. Thus, to understand political values of Turkey and Iran concerning

developments in Syria and Iraq, it is necessary to consider their political system, geographical and geopolitical position, historical background and cultural resources.

Major General Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of Iran Expediency Discernment Council has recently classified fundamental values of the Islamic Republic in two major sections: Internal and External values. In the external values, he places three principles: First, Respect to the sovereignty of other countries since every country should recognize all international borders and avoid occupation. That's why Iran is opposed to Saudi's attack of Yemen and its support of terrorism because this is the absolute violation of the rights of people in Yemen and the region. Second, Respect to the people's choice and vote. Iran accepts and values the democracy but, at the same time, does not accept Coup in Turkey. For instance, Iran does not intervene the domestic affairs of Bahrain but at the same time disrespect to its own people is unacceptable for us, why each Bahrain citizen does not have right to vote, Iran does not support religious discrimination in Bahrain.

Third, independency of countries. For instance, Syria and Iraq have independency and countries have to respect it. Iran is helping and supporting them upon the request of the governments there. ..”

In the internal values, he added three factor: First, religious supervision. Second, religious democracy and Third, Justice (fight against injustice, poverty and corruption). Each of them is the basic value.

For the Islamic Republic, the order of Velayat-e Faqih is the basis of any action. Rezaei , in this regard, said : “Velayat-e Faqih is also our value and this is the Velayat-e Faqih maintains these values and that Sepah – e – Pasdaran is the cane and the arm of the Iranian leadership in the defense of the values from Syria to Yemen and even within Iran....”. (ISNA, 2016)

These views embody that, for the Islamic Republic, elements such as “Respect to sovereignty”, “Respect to the people's vote” and “Respect to the independency” are the external values. “Velayat-e Faqih”, “Religious Democracy” and “Justice “are respected as internal values.

In case of Turkey, Political values and principles encompass elements such as “Kemalism”, “Secularism” and the motto of " Peace at home, Peace at abroad". Most mainstream political parties are also built on values such as “Nationalism, “Islamism” and “Kemalism”. Thus, existence of such a variety in the system of the State would naturally cause a different form of social forces with different wishes. Western form of democracy, Justice, respect to the sovereignty of other countries are also some other elements in Turkey’s political values.

Consequently, if we define political values as “views resulting out of socio-political practices of the social forces of a society”, we should consider the status of social forces which is the typical basic drives or motives that lead to the fundamental types of association and group relationship, in the country/ies of discussion. Also, what is more important is whether the requirements of social progress and of the development of human personality on the social scale exists in the country/ies of discussion.

In other words, if political values should meet expectations from inside and outside, in case of Turkey and Iran, this expectation has relatively been seen as "unachieved" or achieved with some major weaknesses or problem. This characteristic has, undoubtedly, affected these countries’ soft power, and consequently, public diplomacy. Since, it caused the domestic and foreign forces to question the legitimacy and credibility of the policies adopted by the said countries and has been accused for the lack of moral authority. Nevertheless, in case of both countries, soft power resources are the assets that, to some extent, have produced attraction, which often has led to acquiescence among the different social forces or the governing parties in Syria and Iraq.

‘Soft power’ is, in fact, better understood when compared by ‘hard power’. The concept of "Hard power" implies coercive action with force by various means, either militarily or non-military instruments such as economic might or policies such as imposing sanction. It is used when a country decides to occupy any other lands in the neighborhood country or in another continent or force it to surrender to its demands. That is, “hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)”. Nye (1990, p.164)

There are perhaps millions of documents that show how hard power applied through history. The world has witnessed two devastating world war and one Cold War. “Hard Power” is the legacy of the misery of September 11 attacks in the U.S. Even if it might not exactly or directly be exemplified or classified as "hard power", despite it has been coercive in nature, but it has not only shifted the balance of power in the Middle East and the Muslim lands but also caused the emergence of new extended coalitions and new non-State actors with Wahhabism and Salafism backgrounds.

This process has, naturally, endangered the diplomatic and security interests of Iran and Turkey since it, more than ever, provoked unprecedented resentment in the region. (Pew, 2007). It has brought with itself a harmful shift in the status quo of the Middle East and as the result ignored the interests of the regional countries, among of them, Turkey and Iran, and negatively affected their foreign policy decision-making towards Syria and Iraq.

Hard power also makes countries to revive their public diplomacy and bring themselves back on track, perhaps, both to better explain their country to the world and to dominate and control those who support violence. This in one way means that they feel the needs to empower their military or hard power instrument and at the same time the need to resort to public diplomacy which can reflect today's audiences and media in order to convey their policies to the other parts of the world in a more accurate and effective manner. This means that these countries also concentrate on their soft power, as well as, hard power. Shift in the USA's policies towards the Islamic Republic in 2013 is an example in this regard.

Neither the U.S. nor any single countries in the world, naming, Turkey and Iran has the same goals as in 70s or 80s. Now that the forms of vulnerability changed and increased, countries in the world, particularly, the main actors approach to the concept of security with new criteria, as the effect of which, changes occur in the instruments of power and their application. At the same time, the world could not prevent various threats by traditional tools and means and the new instruments such as communications and promotion of organizational and institutional skills needed. When the strategy of balancing of power does not work and the big powers do not able to limit the relative power of other

countries, it means that a kind of traditionalist account of world politics exists and no choice will remain but to resort to diplomacy and negotiation. Nye, in this regard, emphasizes the role of culture. That is, as the nature of international politics changes, the intangible forms of power such as culture become more important. Nye (1990, p.164).

2.3 To What Extent Public Opinion Is Important For Public Diplomacy And Foreign Policy Decision – Makers

In the previous section, the structural impact of hard and soft power on public diplomacy discussed and illustrated. We understood that the utilization of soft power and hard power describes the capability of a political structure or system to influence and affect the behavior, opinion or interests of other political structures, systems and the nation of host country through either ideological, cultural, economic and military means. These means determine the policies of a country towards a certain community or target country/ies. These are, in the meantime, are the elements which in one way or another have their roots in the opinions of the public and; in consequent, they would have impacts on public diplomacy and foreign policy approaches.

To better understand the significance of this term for foreign policy decision makers and the reciprocal impacts, first of all it is necessary to understand the decision maker's belief of the needs, the roles of the public opinion and preferences in the formulation of the foreign policy and also the decision context where the foreign policy choice must be made. Secondly, a short review of the history behind the 'public opinion' seems advantageous. It is also necessary to assess and study the relations between the concept and its influence in foreign policy making according to the different schools of thought.

Thus, in this section, I will share the definition of public opinion, its importance and role for public diplomacy and foreign policy decision -making mechanism.

“Public opinion” is a compound term, which has been used in daily life of all class of society and on various issues of politics, economy, social life and environmental issues.

This term is comprised of “Public “and “Opinion”, thus, can be generalized for public opinion of every country in various situation; for instances, in time of war and elections in developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. It is the perception and outlook which affects domestic policy and as the result foreign policy decision making since it is only through the approval of the public that a government gains the authority to function. Of course, the latter does not work for non-democratic systems. It is an element, which increasingly undertakes a more central role in determining the national and global policies.

There is this assumption that public views might act as a reliable guide to decision making in foreign policy. Public views/opinions is able to assess the wishes and liking but does not reflect the costs and-or threats associated with the policy. So, as the social understanding of today’s world condition increases, governments inevitably paid serious attention to the public opinions and decide on their policies accordingly or at least try not to counteract with public views.

Having such nature, there is no boundaries for the term “public opinion ”in terms of time and space but it has been experiencing structural transformations. So, it has not emerged or brought up in 21st century, but rather, has been mentioned directly or indirectly by philosophers and politicians of the previous centuries. It was derived from the French word l’opinion, and was first used in 1588 by Michel de Montaigne which mentioned in the work of John Locke in 17th Century, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding “ that define the significance of ‘public opinion’ in the ordering of politics.(Locke,1588 mentioned in Adelaide,2016).

The oldest application of this term related to the time of Aristotle and Plato in ancient Greece and Rome, specifically, in dialogues and public discussions in the cities of Athena and Sparta which these philosophers or their students were, in one way or another, mentioning and emphasizing the role and effect of public opinion as the supporter of governing power or a factor for the collapse of the governing power. That is, this term was used as both having positive and negative connotations or understandings. In other words, the history of this term goes back to the time when it was being used as “The right to effective participation of the people in the Government”.

For instances, Aristotle in his book “Politics” pointed out the importance of paying attention to the public opinion. He called any carelessness to the opinion of people as “dangerous” act. On the other hand, Aristotle suggested people’s active participation and respect to their opinions, besides elections and voting, as the best way to avoid this danger. Some parts of Aristotle's exact words is as follow: “...*but for certain people to have certain functions. In fact these different distributions of functions are the cause of the difference between constitutions: democracies are states in which all the people participate in all the functions* ”

And continued:

“ The citizens must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best State be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue 3 and for active participation in politics)... ”

(Politics, VII, viii. 1-3 , 573- 575)

In post – Aristotle and Plato, some steps taken for the evolution of the concept of public opinion and that was the formation of “peoples’ voice”. In this period, peoples began to transfer news by simple means. However, with the development of communication process, the concept of “the public opinion” got particular shape and coherence. This process, mainly, started in the Middle Ages, when the counteraction between Church as “religious domination” and the King as “worldly or material domination”, became as introduction and start of the emergence of ‘pubic diplomacy’. In this period, the new terms such as “people’s voice is the voice of God” emerged. Since the Middle Ages, the concept of “public opinion” became more under the attention of thinkers. Accordingly, John of Salisbury described this term as the supporter and backing of Parliament and Government. (Salisbury, 1933).

On the other hand, Machiavelli in his book ‘The Prince’, specifically, advises rulers to cultivate favorable public opinion, secure the support of the people, and achieve specific goals. Machiavelli does not counsel rulers to be arbitrary and cruel for the purpose of personal gain. He was highly critical of King Ferdinand of Spain for his needless brutality toward his people. He also argues

that loyalty; trust and obedience cannot be fostered if rulers mistreat their subjects over a long period of time. (Machiavelli, 1513)

After the transition from the middle ages, the world observed French Revolution (1789-99) as one of the biggest global developments, which has had direct effect on the promotion and significance of public opinion. The institutionalization of citizens' active participation in the affairs of the government is one of the remarkable outcomes of the French Revolution which by itself positively affected the meaning and understanding of "Public Opinion" as the thoughts and understandings of citizens and their political and intellectual representatives on various issues. Because, with the institutionalization of peoples participation, the existing distances between peoples or, better to say, the citizens and government declined and the public intellectual and theoretical interactions with politicians or government officials occurred systematically and the issue of "public opinion" inevitably became the focal point of the governments in power. With the advancement of science and technology, the significance and status of public opinion has also seriously added. To the extent that the current world public opinion to be accepted as a real power-blast in such a way that the authoritarian governments are also inevitably pay serious attention to this effective engine of force.

There has been diversity of views on the application and role of public opinion in policy forming. Winston Churchill took the view that there was "no such thing as public opinion. There is only published opinion". (Brainy Quote, Winston Churchill) While Abraham Lincoln was simply believed that: "Public opinion in this country is everything". (The Lehrman Institute)

However, in my own view, the simplest definition for the purpose of understanding its effect on foreign policy is as follow:

"Public opinion is an anonymous power and force enforced by all class of society who are well aware of the policies of the government in power on various fields, namely, political, social and cultural."

This definition helps us to better understand the relations between foreign policy makings with the people's opinion in a certain country. More simply,

public opinion is internal anonymous power and national political force, which has not been predicted in any Constitution.

The specific nature of public opinion is that it is not limited or specified for a certain group, but rather, is a platform for all class of society to participate and engage. More accurately, a consensus on an issue between some social groups cannot be defined as 'public opinion' since the engagement and participation of all class of society; that is, men, women, workers, students and intellectuals is necessary and is the precondition for the public opinion to have its ultimate effect on policy making. That is, public opinion is not just the opinion of a certain minority or majority who are aware of the country's situation. Otherwise we would have called it "public beliefs" which exist everywhere. That's why public opinions are more than specific beliefs in the society. This is one of many reasons that public opinion in democratic countries emerges easier and with more democratic congruence with the government policy than in other form of governments. Comparison between the significance of public opinion and its democratic congruence with the policymaking in Western countries and that of the third world, for example, is an indication of this claim. Because in democratic governments, "people's opinion" is respected and this caused more dynamism and motivation among the society. Through this dynamism and mobility, exchange of thoughts and opinions occur among the people and cause their promotion in political and intellectual fields.

On the other hand, the world has always been observing an environment of dissatisfaction among the general public towards their governments unresponsiveness and that their governments do not represent their interests while formulating policies. In this regard, the quality of this dissatisfaction differs in countries where democracy is the basis and that of non-democratic countries. That is, political representation in developed democracies is as important as public responsiveness to the policy to be operated. Peoples' dissatisfaction and, sometimes, extensive cries for transparency and public discussion towards the governments' domestic and foreign policies and the role of medias to create motivation and to persuade public opinions about the governments' policies is a clear example. The general climate in the Muslim world where democracy has not promoted yet, is clear example since; peoples

are not operationally accepted as important parts in policy formulation process despite in many of these countries the election system exists.

On the other hand, it is the external demands of public views that influence policy-making decisions and not the widely known formal apparatus of government. In the same manner, the power of the public opinion does not essentially underrate the power of the government officials and institutions since, naturally, governments are responsive to the views of the public but the quality and capacity of this responsiveness is different based on the system of government in terms of being whether authoritative, totalitarian and democratic. It is also important to understand the reciprocal relations between public opinion and the policy making. Public opinion at the same time tend to have a steady effect across policy areas while the governments tend to be operating in a representative manner, with policy principally acts according to the wills of its citizens. In this regard, what we have been observing in the recent decades in some Middle Eastern countries is the initiative of their respective governments in injecting the feeling of epic and passion to the hearts and minds of public opinion. That is, by creating an environment of epic in the country, these governments have had successfully tried to fill the vacuum in the fulfillment of their promises and also to lead the public opinion towards the fulfillment of determined interests. This way of leading and controlling the public opinion seems to be the last alternative and a sort of covered authoritative form of governing when the real dictatorship system would not work out.

Public opinion in some countries is the outcome of political system but in some other case, it forms the basis of political system, too. That's why there are still conflicting discussions about the relations between public opinions and the political systems, and so, the final effects on foreign policy decision making. As mentioned earlier, the role and impact of public opinion on foreign policy decision-makings vary in democratic and non- democratic governments. In democratic, particularly, Liberal democratic systems, in which "the people" are the central factor, the peoples' thoughts, interests, wishes and demands are important and has a determining role. In these systems, the views of the public respected and become functional through MPs, political parties and media. In addition, the sensitivities and orientation of public opinions has influence on the

policies and decisions of the governments because people and concern about the outcome of the next election elect them. That's why the people's satisfaction and securing their interests is seriously important for the governments. That is, in these systems, the voice of people, the voice of social groups and transparency are so important factors.

In other words, in a democratic state, foreign policy decisions are expected to be made by the people and for the people. According to Kant, "governments are responsible to the people and the public would not go to war since they are who finally pay the price and suffer the most..... "(Kant, 1795)

In non-democratic systems, pressures imposed on people. In such system, people are seen as apparatus. Demagogue and populism are common in such systems. For example, media and government-based institutions see themselves superior in term of understandings and ideas, and believe that people should be led and public opinions need engineering. These non democratic, or better to say, authoritative systems come to dead-ends because we are in modern era and social developments has serious effects on the society. Despite, governments would like to have public opinions but do not wish their voices to be heard and there is no transparency so that public opinion can be manipulated with various tools. This will lead to the further alienation of society, deprivation of the State and its diplomacy.

There is no doubt that public opinion in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes is not as much respected as in democratic ones.

Public opinion in many occasions does influence foreign policy decision making and has the potential to cause difficulties for the policy makers. In this regard and, in theoretical perspective, the realists insist on the role of elites either in leading the public to support their policies or ignore their preferences, "Even they believe that they should lead and not follow the public..." Foyle (1999, p.4)

Lippmann, pointed out how the public opinion is sensitive and how government should behave and should be responsive. According to his realistic argumentation, "the public is a dangerous and irrational force."

He also argues that:

“The public can elect the government and can remove it, they can remove it, approve or disapprove its performance, but the public can not administer the government...A mass can not govern.” Lippmann (1955, p.20)

In theoretical perspective, realists find public opinion volatile, based on emotion, lacking coherence and structure and that it has no or little influence on foreign policy making. (Holsti, 2012) On the other side, liberalists see the public opinion stable, structured and its relations with foreign policy making process is reciprocal. However, in general, based on what has been commonly believed, public opinion is significantly important. However, some others ignore its importance and influence in foreign policy.

As already mentioned, according to the liberalists, public opinion has coherence and structure .Its influences on foreign policy making is reciprocal. The supporters of Wilsonian ideology, for example, believe that public opinion affects foreign policy making by discouraging the decision maker from taking risky actions from fears that the government might loose public support and therefore persuade them to select policies preferred by the public. Foyle (1999, p.6)

The debate between realists and liberals outlines the importance of public opinion in foreign policy making. However, its impact remains limited. Realists disregard assertions that foreign policy making is affected by public opinion, arguing that leaders either ignore public opinion or lead the mass to support their position. In contrast, liberals consider that public opinion plays a constructive role in constraining decision makers, believing that mass support is a necessary factor for successful foreign policy. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the influence of public opinion on foreign affairs varies from case to case.

Considering these issues, there is a kind of reciprocal relations between public opinion and policymaking process. In the process of studying and assessing this relation, the governing system in the countries of study should inevitably be taken into account. When a government does not succeed to undertake any change in the quality of life of its people, it will certainly lose the supportive opinions of its people or “public opinions”. This inevitably affects the

government foreign policy decision-making in different ways because people will in no way trust the government.

In term of the relation between internal and external politics, in contemporary era, analyst's emphasis the existence of such a relationship. But this is not always the case because the officials sometimes ignore public opinion when it comes to strategic issues such as defense initiatives. This nature of relation is clearly performed both by Iran and Turkey regarding their policies in Syria and Iraq. Since, the leaders or policy makers in these countries preferred not to rely on the capability of opinion polls in dictating or designing their foreign policy, nevertheless, both benefited public support for their sustained endeavors with regard to Syria and Iraq.

In the case of Turkey, Turkish Parliament passed the law on the cross – border military operations in Syria and Iraq despite oppositions from Turkish citizens, members of Parliaments from main opposition parties such as CHP and HDP.

The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) via TNS has conducted a public opinion poll on the same issue among 500 peoples in more than 16 cities. According to this opinion poll, 15.9% voted for the continuation of diplomatic efforts by Turkey while 56.2% opposed to direct military presence and confrontation in Syria. At the same time, 15.4% voted for establishment of security zone for the safeguard of Turkish military while, 7.9% were in favor of armed support to the opposition groups to Bashar al-Assad's regime. As we see this is the smallest percent but the Justice and Development Party has done what has been necessary according to its own strategic plans. (ehlibeytalimleri, 2013) and also mentioned in Eurasianet organization (eurasianet,2012)

The latest opinion poll conducted by Metropol from 14 to 19 September 2016, 76% of 3000 respondents opposed going to war with Syria unilaterally although the figure fell to 58 percent if such an intervention was supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Turkey is a member. (Dorian Jones, 2012)

Based on the result of another survey published on Oct. 7 by the German Marshall Fund, Turkish citizens are gloomy about Turkey's economic prospects, suspicious of international partners, and opposed to military involvement in

neighboring Syria. “Turkish people overwhelmingly think the government should focus on domestic problems”, according to the survey carried out between July 4 and July 13 through face-to-face interviews with 1,018 respondents. “Seventy percent of respondents said Turkey should deal first with its internal problems. Only 20 percent said Turkey should play a more active role in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia”. Regarding to the survey conducted with financial support from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, slightly more than half of respondents, about 51 percent, disapproved of Turkey’s current foreign policy, while 41 percent approved of it. (hurriyetdailynews, 2017)

In case of Iran, unfortunately, it is not possible to find any conducted surveys or reports on the same issue within Iran, similar to that in Turkey. However, there are reports and analysis mostly published in the web sites such as “seratnews” and “diyaruna”, belongs to the groups and organizations opposed to the policies of the Islamic Republic in Syria and Iraq but their reports are not exactly reflecting the status of public opinion in Iran.

Without a stable and coherent support of the public opinion, it is not possible to formulate or implement a policy in the fields of economy, foreign affairs, energy or environment. However, as we see in the case of Iran and Turkey, this is not always the case.

On the structural impact of public opinion, some scholars such as Richard C. Eichenberg, challenged the nature of this impact by questioning the stability or volatility, plausibility, rationality, measurability and universality of public opinion. (Eichenberg, 2016)

These notions can be extracted from four sets of main questions concerning the impact or relationship between public opinion with foreign policy that governments and scholars are interested more than ever.

1. What do public opinion polls measure? How do citizens, who are generally uninformed about foreign policy and world affairs, form opinions on these matters? Quite simply, how can we measure “public opinion”?

2. How “rational” is public opinion? Is it stable or volatile? Are opinions coherent? Do opinions plausibly reflect the flow of world events?

Does public opinion respond to what governments do? Precisely what is the form of that response?

3. What factors influence the formation of citizen opinions? Specifically, what is the impact of fundamental attitudes toward war and military force? How important are partisanship, ideology, and gender?

4. How universal are the determinants of citizen opinion, especially on crucial issues of war and peace?

In fact, rational, persuasive, and justifiable policies are the elements of the only recipe for a successful public diplomacy. In case of Turkey, its public diplomacy has benefited the impetus of public opinion among many other factors such as economic recovering, a highly-motivated hard-working cadres, the mistakes by the opponent parties and good governance which led much of the landslide victories of the Justice and Development Party. Public opinion in Turkey has been much attracted by some persuasive slogans or catchphrases such as “serving the nation”, “2023 targets”, “new Turkey”, “democratization”, and “modernization” which reverberated with the huge class of Turkish society. The answer to the question of how these strategies and approaches played role in the success of public diplomacy in Turkey, lays in the nature of public opinion, as there is a common aspect everywhere and that is, “politicians and diplomatic bodies are considerably dependent on ordinary citizens”. (Melissen, 2005) Although differs in different countries in terms of quality, capacity and the extent, the ideas of the citizens could promote public diplomacy. For Turkey, These approaches and strategies, in fact, in one way, helped the Justice and Development Party to consolidate its power and gave it an executive supremacy and in another way, led the empowerment of national unity for unified support to governing political party. Both have, specially, helped the Justice and Development Party to run for more than one and half decade.

In case of Iran, public opinion is a seriously hard issue to define in term of its understanding and operation in the framework of public diplomacy and as the result for the foreign policy decision making mechanism. This is mostly related to the political culture, social acceptance and the structure of the hierarchy in the system of government, which decides on the issues of foreign policy. That

is, It does not mean that there is no respect for public opinion, but the form of approaches to the opinion of the public is different in the sense that the system accepts no pressures or imposition of any ideas which might probably harm the country's sovereignty or national security or oppose the ideals of the Founder of the Islamic Revolution. For instance, Ayatollah Imam Khomeini sees the government as a tool for Justice and prosperity of the people. He also sees the legitimacy of political regime depending on the views and ideas of the public and that the peoples' vote is the base in this regard. He considers people's all-round participation both in the formation and establishment of the system and its administration (Jamshidi, 2016)

As a matter of fact, in Iran, the social capital or confidence index has been decreased in recent years because the State is comprised of few parts with serious conflict of interests and with no or less inboard interaction; that is, a kind of antagonism governs. Thus, in the absence of social cohesion, no or less coalition and consensus, no or less tolerance, the acceptance of peoples' final arbitration is loose and poor; that is, the people are not superior to constitution and the legislatures are superior to constitution. In these circumstances the process of globalization shifts to threats instead of opportunity. Because, public opinion in such circumstances, has taken or forced to take the sources of identity from outside so, as the result, the views of the public would not affect the foreign policy decision making since, the people/ the public would have different readings and interpretation of their national and Islamic identity and consequently will be so mixed up in the process of assessing these issues, rather than, participating in political discussions. Of course the differences and variety is good but the situation is so disruptive that has been troublesome for the soul of national solidarity. The same situation also applies to Turkey but with a much less intensity or perhaps less pressure. This is mostly because of this country's comprehensive improvement plan for EU membership and also it's Constitution. However, the simple question is that whether in such situation, people are able to have much influence on foreign policy decision-makings. This characteristic differs in various societies because in some societies people with different ideologies and thoughts are social oriented before being or wanting to be politically oriented because they accepted to compete as long as their

competition is not in conflict with the interest of society or against national interest. However, this does not apply in Iran, for instances, because the social tissue is disrupted; that is, there are groups loyal and supporter of the government policy but at the same time the youngsters are seriously excluded. The exclusion of this class of society, not only in the Iran but also in every government with various system will damage the capacity and affect of public opinion on foreign policy decision makings. This situation can also be assessed in other way. That is, there is no or little public reaction to the developments and events and this cause the officials and policy makers to collect less information and outputs and, as the result, their response would be too late or not functional. This is mostly because the opinion of the public in this case deals with a situation, which no longer exists.

In sum, this analysis indicates the limitations of public opinion in influencing foreign policy, using recent references and examples. Further study on how public opinion is expressed, such as in media, polls, and focus groups may yield more detailed information. On the other hand, If we take the public opinion as the recapitulation of individual attitudes, sentiments or views held by people which can be fluctuated by factors such as public associations and medias, it would be necessary to define the role and effect of these factors which uses advertising techniques to get their message out and change the peoples' opinions. Depending on the overall general public view on the policy of the government, public opinions affect that policy in both positive and negative ways. On the other hand, governments often devise the use of public opinions to guide their public information and help in the deciding government policies. Consequently, its effect on foreign policy is inevitable.

2.4 How Public Diplomacy And Foreign Policy Are Related To Each Other?

We are living in an era when the nature and structure of International system and International relations is continuously transforming. This in one way affected by the rapid development of information and communication technologies. Influenced by the availability and easy access to these technologies, the international situation has also changed accordingly. This structural transformation has provided 'public diplomacy' for States as an

instrument to better achieve their national ambitions towards other countries in international arena. Because 'public diplomacy' is capable of influencing the hearts and minds of peoples through coordination among various areas, namely, public opinion, Medias, NGOs, cultural exchange, easy interactions among think-thanks and intellects and involvement of civil society in political affairs. These factors work as impetus for public diplomacy to affect foreign policy; however, the quality and level that foreign policies of countries are affected vary.

This characteristic has brought with itself a relevant and necessary change in the policies of a certain State towards other actors in world politics in order to better achieve its national goals. Under such condition, public diplomacy has emerged as a more important and sensitive apparatus for application of foreign policy.

In this section, the aim is to understand the relation between public diplomacy and foreign policy in general and based on new regional and global challenges beside the role of public diplomacy tools. Then, I will try to find a relevancy between this discussion to the question of how public diplomacy of Turkey and Iran affects their foreign policy in Syria and Iraq and what are the tools of their public diplomacy.

In the study of International relations, the concept of “foreign policy” means the analysis and assessment of a certain country’s actions and performances towards foreign destinations and also its domestic affairs, which affect the road map to determine those performances. This concept has a connection with “International politics “which is the study of these actions as a model for that country’s actions and responses by others.

On the other hand,” Diplomacy” is one of many tools for performing foreign policy in order to produce goals and purposes.

Among other tools for foreign policy are economy, propaganda, military force, culture and ideology. However, the fact is that “public diplomacy “supports the aims and ambitions of “foreign policy” and is a central element of broader diplomatic activity.

Both of these concepts are sensitive and important in the field of foreign affairs, in particular, in the globalized world where countries do not intend to remain idleness towards the developments in the world and feel the need to the assistance of others for both their survival and development. Thus, countries use different instruments in order to tackle other countries in international context. This is the point where, foreign policy and diplomacy are the only two strategies used by countries.

Countries fulfill their national interest through the decisions they make on the framework of foreign policy. In other words, for their national interest to promote and fulfill, countries adopt a number of strategies; naming, diplomacy, foreign aid, and military force. However, unlike the past, countries do not seek their national interest through exploitation of others and extreme measures, at least by hard power, but prefer to go through other measures such as “diplomacy” by which a state deals with other countries to promote its national interests, usually, through negotiation and discourse as the major substitute for force. This has given a new meaning to the relation between public diplomacy and foreign policy.

More accurately, until the beginning of 2nd world war, diplomacy, basically, was defined or thought to be the relations between States or State – to –State relations. But in the post war period, with the arrival of new countries in the global power scene, promotion of relations between States, the establishment of International organizations and emergence of new other governmental and non-governmental actors, “diplomacy” has become an important part of the international communication. As this situation continued, particularly, since the beginning of 21st century, and with the effect of globalization phenomenon, the State – to –State relations has experienced a deeper and wider impact and thus affected the diplomacy with new challenges.

These challenges gave new dimensions to diplomacy and Public diplomacy, and as the result, determined the relations between public diplomacy with foreign policy. For this reason, I have classified the new dimensions as below:

- A) Rise in the number and variety of actors and activities on the scene of international relations as the result of development of information and

communication technologies and social networks beyond the existing traditional institutions which is in fact one of the phenomenon of globalization in international system.

- B) The concept of “ security” expanded to new domains; that is, the meaning of “ security” in International relations in addition to the national security preferences such as threats, national goals and interests, expanded to new domains such as human security, environment, human rights and Contagious diseases. These concepts has made the domain of diplomacy wider and made the career of diplomats more sophisticated and complex.
- C) The re-emergence of tribal, religious and minority based movements and the responses by the political forces, brought up with it more complexities in the regional and global scenes.
- D) Foreign policy affairs and diplomacy decision -making organs, not like the past, have the monopoly of administering and performing the affairs of foreign policy; however, other governmental organs and institutions began to seek their goals, preferences and policies beyond the national borders. That is, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of countries now has domestic partners. Thus, under such condition, different organs take action on similar issues in parallel, That is, the diplomacy making organ has been given new role of coordinating the activities of these partners in coherent with national goals and interests. The problem is that these domestic partners only seek their partial interests through foreign relations and the micro or national interests is not considered. This nature of involvement in foreign affairs has, in fact, made the duties and responsibilities of diplomacy making organ, more difficult and challenging.
- E) Rise in the number of non-governmental institutions and actors: In the near past, diplomacy organ was just obliged and accountable to report the government. This trend has shifted and today, Medias, cultural institutions, universities, religious centers, NGOs, civil society actors, companies expect the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be responsive about its foreign policies performances. This nature of engagement in one way might imply how a country is democratic but its most harming nature is

that it causes mismanagement in foreign and domestic political decision-makings.

- F) Polarization of activities of diplomacy organs: The emergence of new domains and variety in the issues of international relations has resulted in the polarization of the activities of foreign ministry. In one hand, various traditional issues such as exchange of delegations, managing and solving the crisis, conflicts and counteractions are some of daily agenda of diplomacy organ. Beside these issues, matters regarding human rights and refuges, minorities and environmental issues have become parts of duties of diplomacy organ. The rise of variety of domains of activity and responsibility necessitates new specialized departments within the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- G) The emergent nature and unexpectedness of diplomatic activities: developments and occurrences in International scene transmitted to other areas and sections with such a fast speed, which necessitates urgent reactions of diplomacy organ. This means that the diplomacy organ must stay awaken and conscious all the time. This emergent nature has spilled out to the Consular activities more than ever. On the other words, issues such as terrorism, emergence of urgent situations and natural incidents has caused the Consular departments react and perform quicker than any time.
- H) The focus of activities of diplomacy shifted from macro to micro goals, which has caused the role of "public diplomacy" becoming featured: this is one of the most important dimensions of change in the field of diplomacy. The main activities of diplomacy in the near past was the fulfillment of goals of country's macro politics and the necessary follow-ups based on national security framework. Today, other governmental institutions and NGOs such as culture and art institutions, which are active beyond national borders, become responsible in performing parts of these activities. Although these institutions trying to fulfill their group goals and interests, their activities and performances are also based on the public diplomacy framework and planned to achieve foreign policy goals. In fact, by designing and defining foreign policies, the States are

looking to provide facilities and coordination of this kind of entities in order to achieve their political goals.

These dimensions imply at least two following issues:

- 1- The extent that non-governmental factors and/or non-State actors might affect and enforce those goals and purposes, which are considered by public diplomacy.
- 2- The extent that public diplomacy and foreign policy are related to each other.

Thus, the most serious links between public diplomacy and foreign policy is seen in the developments at the beginning of 21st century. For instances, in post-11 September 2001, the concept of “the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy of governments” on the framework of “ public diplomacy” has been considered by different countries in various ways. Through this trend, the U.S. officials began the initiative of telling the story of the U.S.A. just three weeks after 9/11 aimed at promotion and dissemination of the U.S. visions.

In this regard, public diplomacy affairs department of the U.S. State department performed various programs to reconstruct the status of the U.S. Other big powers did the same. Among the regional countries, Turkey and Iran adopted new measures or empowered the existing relevant structures since the necessities of the situation has been concerned. They tried their best in order to keep the balance between the mutual effect of public diplomacy and foreign policy.

In other words, on the eve of the 21st century, countries understood that because of the new security reasons or even economic, social, cultural challenges, they would need a more collaborative approach between their foreign policy and public diplomacy and also a new dialogue – based paradigm for public diplomacy.

The collaboration and interaction among countries esp. in Muslim world to fight regional terrorism or among all countries in the world to fight international terrorism are some examples for better and further understanding the bind between foreign policy and public diplomacy. These examples will help us to understand how and why public diplomacy is a central element of more vast diplomatic activity.

As it is clear, in case of terrorism, the objective for collaboration is confrontation with terror networks, dismantling and reducing their capacity of recruiting or financing or marginalization within Islamic society. For this collaboration to perform or operate, public diplomacy has a certain role to play. That is, the cooperation of all countries in this regard might clarify the centrality of public diplomacy to a broader policy making process which can be able to draw the nature of foreign policy.

If the governments are coerced rather than convinced, the collaboration would not give result since the governments would not have the chance of a successful management and would not be able to get the public to the center of this process. On the other hand, such collaboration can only be effective, resilient and stable if it extended beyond the governments and with the cooperation of NGOs. Of course the level of collaboration by the governments perceived differently based upon the system of governments and their foreign policy preferences. That's why there would be some challenges for the positive performance of this collaboration.

Being central to broader policy, "public diplomacy" has also some shortcomings in term of its ability to manage challenges with regard to various parameters within the society of a certain country. For instance, in the collaboration between Muslim countries with the West in the process of war against terror acts and terrorism, in general, the governments in both sides have inevitably had to find a way out of the possible oppositions their people; that is, elites, military and security organs, might exhibit. In the same manner, the government in one side should, at least, balance its collaboration with the certain other governments or coalition. Because there is this concern that whether this collaboration serves their government's interest or that of other country engaged in the process. This implies that public diplomacy itself is the most important central element in order to win the support for an effective long-term collaboration against terrorism.

On the issue of the collaboration between the Muslim countries and the West in combat against terrorism, the notions such as "Islamic Terrorists" and "the West" have challenged the foreign policies of those countries involved in the process and put them away from their main objective in terms of the norms

defined by public diplomacy; since both the West and Muslim world tended or forced to start a broader discussion of changing the mutual perceptions of Muslim society vis –a- vis Western society and their governments tried to convince each others. For instances, governments in the West have had tried to convince the Muslim world that the West is not the enemy of Islam and constructive co-existence with the West is possible and that the form of its market economy is also not incompatible with Islam. In this process, also, “the public” is the central factor. For the West this kind of engagement with Muslim societies would not be easy because the West would need to design a new form of interaction and strategy. For “interaction and strategy” to be fulfilled, public diplomacy plays the central role. On the other hand, any expectation of peaceful interaction or compatibility of Western and Islamic values is naive unless a successful engagement builds on a genuine dialogue emerges.

The defective quality and nature of “ the public” factor either in the interactions and counteractions between Turkey and Iran or in exerting power on the decision making mechanism of two countries has become more transparent , in particular, by the start of Syrian crisis in 2011. In other words, officials and policymakers in both sides have had different views or even clash of ideas on major issues regarding Syria crisis and developments in Iraq. Although there has been the will to manage the clash of ideas through various means of public diplomacy, this nature of their relations embodies that the elements of “the public “and “NGOs” have not been a great help on the two sides’ decision making process.

Thus, considering various issues discussed in this section, it is not possible to find much or no impact of public diplomacy on the foreign policy of Iran and Turkey towards the issues in Syria and Iraq.

3 TURKEY

3.1 Public Diplomacy

In the previous chapters, a lot has been discussed about the role and significance of public diplomacy, its tools, its definition, its relations and effect on foreign policy. In this chapter, I will share comprehensive information on how Turkish new public diplomacy initiatives began, the structure of its public diplomacy and its foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria.

The main aim of public diplomacy is either to revive and rebuild the country's damaged reputation and/or, as the result, to promote its position globally or within a certain community. To this end, a certain country's geostrategic position and geographic location would not only affect the extent that its public diplomacy can be beneficial for its global and regional image but also would affect other countries stances. This would create new opportunities and/or possible risks for public diplomacy and foreign policy decision-making process.

Having the youth population, developing economy, modern military power and as the fast growing country in the Middle East, Central Asia and Balkan triangle, gave rise to Turkey's confidence with new status in the new global arrangement. (Sezin Uzun, 2003). Inheriting such a confidence and as a rising middle power and the Muslim-majority nation with a secular government and a vibrant Islamic culture, Turkey became more and more concerned as how to keep up and maintain its national interests, regional strength, and global responsibility concerning the international and regional developments, particularly, in Syria and Iraq.

Turkish policy makers well understood that with the age of globalization when public diplomacy runs at the global level and people around the world are in contact to each other with no or less boundaries in this sense, it should consider proper strategies to be able to convince both domestic and foreign publics aim at utilizing the tools of its public diplomacy. This approach has helped Turkey

to differentiate the importance of public diplomacy with traditional one. It has also helped the Turkish Republic trying to stay consistent in maintaining the three strategies in employing its public diplomacy; namely, advocacy strategies, profile raising strategies and relationship building strategies (people – to – people and government – to – people.). However, this trend is important with respect to both the legitimacy and the scope of effectiveness of the policies adopted by Turkey. This characteristics, on the other hands, helped the Turkish policy makers to utilize the tools of public diplomacy in their foreign policy decision making process, particularly, concerning the Middle East, Central Asia, Balkans and EU.

Thus, issues such as efficiency in the areas of strategic communication and public diplomacy have been felt absolutely necessary elements to this aim. For this very reason, Turkey benefited its structural background and rich cultural heritage and managed its increasing effect on regional and global politics in recent years toward the aims of its new public diplomacy initiatives. The Public Diplomacy Office within Prime Ministry has taken this initiative to define new approaches through establishing communication with different segments, and carrying out activities on a multilateral communication basis.

For this purpose, Turkey has considered enriching the main components of its soft power and began to promote and develop the elements of social - cultural, economic, and political and security as four main categories. Under each of these categories there may lay sub-components that necessitated the relevant institutes and organizations, whether public or private, undertake huge efforts.

Based on the first category, the relevant Ministries and organizations in the government of the Justice and Development Party selected at least five sub-fields. First, through “culture and art “including adoption of new actions to promote Turkish literature, music and handicrafts. Devran, (mentioned in Abdullah ÖZKAN 2012) defined how the best use of ' culture ' might simply helps one country to influence the target country and argues that public diplomacy practitioners are capable to revive constructive memories in history as well as ethnic and cultural affinities in order to build an emotional link with the foreign publics. (Devran, 2012) Turkey in that sense has untapped potentials

in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia in particular, and a great web of diaspora connections around the world in general.

Second, through media including news agencies, newspapers, and multiple TV channels. Third, through creation of new incentives in science and education by which Turkey has relatively been successful in attracting thousands of international students from Central Asia, Caucuses, Balkans m Middle East and North Africa, in multiple active universities with high capacities and potentials. Fourth, through sport and sportive activities such as Football and Wrestling. Fifth, through Tourism industry and tourist attraction programs Nearly in all of these five sub-fields, the Justice and Development Party has been challenged a lot; in the sense that , the Justice and Development Party has been under huge criticisms for its policies regarding the activities of the elements in these categories.

Under the main category of economy, the government of the Justice and Development Party has begun vast economic interaction by the improvement of trade ties with regional and non-regional countries. In this regard, Syria and Iraq have always been two most important countries for Turkey. It was not that long ago that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his speech during the 23.World Energy Congress in 10 October 2016, reminded that Turkey is a country which is largely depends on foreign energy and continued:

“..... Turkey, especially in the last 14 years has had a growth performance above the average in the world. In this case, our energy demand increases between 6 percent and 8 percent per year. We meet this demand to ensure our security and we're working hard to diversify our energy supplies. ”

He added: “There is a serious potential for Turkey investment in all aspects of the energy, thus we invite companies to invest in our country and. Those who rely Turkey in Energy investment will never be regret...” (Anadolu Agency, 2016)

Interaction with International Organizations, efforts to reform the domestic political situation, participation in humanitarian activities, promotion of cultural relations and exchanges with the world and in particular with regional countries are examples of the third category, that is, political.

The category of security, in fact, attracted the attention of the experts since security for Turkey, considering its geographic location and geostrategic position, and its historical background has always been a matter of concern for itself, the neighbors and for the region. In this regard, Coşkun, take the examples of Turkey's engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan and concludes that what Turkey have done in the region is the best example of how public diplomacy capable of playing role in resolving inter-state conflicts through effective engagement both during and after peace periods. (Coşkun, 2012). This may also be true for Turkey's efforts in inviting Bashar Al Assad to stop killing its own citizen, since Turkey well knew that the continuation of such actions would soon bring other regional and international actors to the field in the heart of the region and that would naturally mean new threats for Turkey. Turkey's then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit of Damascus in 9 August 2012 and nearly 6 hours of talk with Bashar Al Assad to convey Turkey's serious concern for the future of Syria and the region is an example in this regard. (Akyol, 2011).

Recep Tayyeb Erdogan in another of his statement during an interview with Anadolu Agency was warning Syria against second Hama massacre. (Anadolu Agency, 2011)

At the same time, the aim to engage in Syria militarily in 24 August 2016 for the first time since the start of Syrian war in 2011, as Turkish President Recep Tayyeb Erdogan said was “ to end the tyranny of al –Assad who terrorizes with state terror...we did not enter for any other reason. We do not have an eye on Syrian soil...we are there for the establishment of justice...” (Hurriyetdailynew, 2017)

Concerning the origin of public diplomacy in Turkey, it is commonly believed that the concept of public diplomacy first entered into the language of policy makers in Turkey with an initiative by the Turkish National Security Council by adding this notion to the syllabus of short term training courses for public officials who serve in the police, judiciary and administrative bodies; although, there is no clear information in this regard. This initiative later on has been taken over and maintained by the Turkish and Middle East Public Administration Institute (PAITME).

Moreover, since 2002 Turkey started to increase its engagement in regional and International affairs aimed at seeking for a new image through the mediation and facilitator diplomacy (Ekşi, 2014). To this aim, designing new structure for already existing public diplomacy was necessary. So the Justice and Development Party first discovered the deficits through the evaluation of the three main categories social - cultural, economic and politics. One of that was profound lack of misinformation in abroad about Turkey as the main deficits which the Justice and Development Party and NGOs close to it tried to revive this deficiency and then recognized the potential and identified, with the help of elites and scholars, elements such as history, geographic position, and culture as the basis of soft power of Turkey's public diplomacy. Hence, Turkey has started to move forward for application of its public diplomacy with its new structure in 2003. The new structure then became officially operated with the cooperation of Yunus Emre Foundation in 2009. Subsequently, the institutionalization process started in 2010 with the establishment of Public Diplomacy Department at the Prime Ministry followed by the Department of Public Diplomacy and the Department of Public Relations in 2011 and 2012 respectively at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, Turkey's public diplomacy structure became fully equipped by the end of 2011 and became operative in foreign policy.

Among the scholars and officials who played important role in advancement of application and utilization of public diplomacy in Turkey, is "Ibrahim Kalın" who in addition to his elaboration of the place of public diplomacy in Turkey's foreign policy defined what soft power means in the Turkish context. He believed elements such as history, geography and culture empowered the nature of soft power and, as the result, Turkey's public diplomacy. (Kalın, 2011)

In the works of some Turkish commentators and elites including Ibrahim Kalın, the terms " identity" and " national image" introduced to propose ' new national image' comprised of both Western as well as Eastern elements based on the principles of a democratic state. The aim was to enter into a new phase of employing public diplomacy and soft power which would be able to compete with the Western and Eastern pattern. In this regard Willard sees the question of Turkey's identity as a core to Turkey's public diplomacy. (Willard, 2012)

On the other hand, public diplomacy as one of the most important tools of Turkish foreign policy and soft power capacity, has tried to increase its effectiveness in international public opinion to enhance its credibility. To this aim, the relevant office within Prime Ministry became responsible for providing the coordination between the public agencies and civil organizations for the accurate and efficient promotion and presentation of Turkey with the collaboration of relevant departments within Turkish Foreign Ministry. The secret behind this coordinated action is that the relevant bodies in the system broadened Turkish public diplomacy in diverse areas taken from foreign aids to countries in the Middle East and Africa, science and technology, economy, higher education, tourism, culture, arts and media aim at facilitating the recognition of Turkey's new potentials by the world public opinion. That is, the fulfillment of the accurate recognition of Turkey at different segments of the world necessitated medium and long-term systematic efforts, which the relevant office in the Prime Ministry - Office of Public Diplomacy-along with the relevant departments with Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributes, to such efforts by coordinating the different activity items mentioned.

Turkey has been of no exception with regard to being affected to risks or the timing use of opportunities because of its preferences determined by its unique geographic location and geostrategic sensitivities. However, with the rise of external and internal dynamics in various fields of economy, foreign policy, science, technology and arts naturally posed Turkey to some new areas of risk and opportunity. On the other hand, Turkey as a middle power in the unique geography has embarked on an ambitious peace and reconciliation approach with her own history and geography and has given factors such as time and space a strategic value in order to leave behind the reductionist classifications of the cold war era. There is big differentiation between the governments in power in Turkey, in particularly, the time period of 2000-2016 with those in the past. The current government has been seeking a more engagement both in regional and international sphere, taken from economy to foreign policy, and not as a mere spectator of the developments. Although this approach defined and described as Turkey's new Ottomanism by many countries, it might be described as Turkey's new initiatives to shift its position from center-periphery

to a more pro-democratic and fairer structure in term of its relations with the world.

These transformations along with the significant domestic, regional and global shifts and its reflections on foreign policy, has led to the emergence of the concept of 'New Turkey' (Akyol, 2014) which has become a key concept and on top of the agenda in Turkey's political lexicon and the President-elect Recep Tayyip Erdogan has hailed this concept in every occasion. This concept soon has become widespread as a new discourse in different regions and various fields of study to introduce and define Turkey's new initiatives in an emphatic way and has given new meanings and dimensions to Turkey's traditional ties with the world. This, in fact, convinced or motivated Turkey to adopt more accurate and diligent measures for its public diplomacy.

There are some reasons for this claim and the criticisms from in and out of Turkey in the sense that this approach is an opt for conservative hegemony and as the replacement for Secularist, i.e., Kemalist, seems has added strength to this motivation; that is, to employ public diplomacy with more diligent proactive measures.

Every country might start a new project or projects for development. For these projects to be fulfilled and maintained, they resort to create new story about the country as a whole and its future with regard to those projects by using its background and historical heritage through public diplomacy. In Turkey, projects such as 'New Turkey 'and 'Turkey 2023 vision' are some of these stories. In other words, Turkey, for instance, began this new story with its public diplomacy initiative and by the help of public opinion succeeds to converse these projects into a strategic value by the help of its rich heritages, which led its strategies gain depth and foreign policy becomes more proactive, as the result.

The real answer behind the emergence of the" New Turkey" initiative is perhaps " Turkey, Vision of 2023 " and its different categories; that is, economy, energy ,health care, transport, tourism and foreign policy . The later is the core part of this vision and also the main parameter of the New Turkey initiative since according to Ahmet Davoutoglu, in order to achieve its foreign policy

ambitions, Turkey has decided to make progress in all directions and fields such as regional integration, economy, EU membership and contribution to regional and global peace and stability. (Davutoglu, 2010)

Considering the fact that a country's historical background and heritage has indispensable effect on its public diplomacy structure, and accordingly, on its foreign policy decision making approaches, its political system also has its comprehensive share of effects on its public diplomacy in the sense that the latter can limit or develop the former. So, the political system can be taken as important determinant factor of the soft power capacity of a country. On the other hand, there is a difference between non-democratic and democratic, participative and non-participative, fair and unfair, transparent and non-transparent political system in term of the extent that each element in every section might limit or promote soft power likewise public diplomacy. In this sense, Turkey as a country which accepted the basis of Western values for democracy, is some steps further comparing with other regional countries, namely, Iran in term of its public diplomacy structure, even if with minor differences, and, in effect, its foreign policy decision making process. That is, the role of geographic location, historical background and political system should also be cogitated. Democracy in Turkey, despite its historical ups-and-downs, seems becoming more institutionalized in day by day. This will render Turkey for more prosperous public diplomacy initiatives and consequently enables it to become a regional and a would-be or emerging global actor.

The issues discussed in this section are the elements that form the basis of Turkey's public diplomacy concept and practice. The success of Turkish foreign policy and public diplomacy entails its ability to propagate these elements in a consistent and effective manner. The most important step here is to absorb the potential actors' contributions in this process in order to gain the main goals and the projects into practice. These actors can be from different class of society, government or non-governmental organizations, artists, business society, members of the media and press, scientists, intellectuals, academicians, humanitarian relief and human rights organizations.

That is, concerning its geostrategic position and geographic location, its domestic and foreign policy needs and necessities, Turkish Republic started new

projects and activities in the years to the end of 20th and in 21st centuries. Turkey's effort for EU membership, its new initiatives with regard to the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus developments provoked by the insatiable expansionist measures and policies of the Cold War rivals, its ties with the U.S. and with the neighboring countries, each have motivated Turkey to redefine and rebuild its organizational and institutional structure with the help of NGOs to maintain and promote the sub-structures and elements of the country's public diplomacy. However, like in Iran, various players in Turkey, active in the field of public diplomacy, are pursuing their own interests and communicating their own vision of the country independently of others and this resulted in some non-orchestrated efforts so that the public diplomacy projects could not yield any sustainable effects. The advocates of public diplomacy projects and initiatives in Turkey, likewise, faced several serious challenges brought with the divergent interpretations of this concept by various public and private institutions. The Justice and Development Party government felt the need for closer co-ordination of country's public diplomacy through a certain institution; that is, Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with Prime Ministry.

A question may arise whether public diplomacy for Turkey is a mere public opinion oriented sensitive instrument or a world view and more comprehensive relationship building and globally engagement element or even as an academic discipline in International Relations. This is mostly concern the understanding of the nature of 'public diplomacy' in Turkey aims at understanding where Turkey's public diplomacy stands.

In this regard, it might be more understandable through the performance of its foreign policy with regard to different geographies. Moreover, to find the relevant answer, I have shared an assessment based on the various categories of definition of this concept given by different scholars; a short review of literature of public diplomacy, which is specifically collected to define where Turkey's public diplomacy stands. This is not a separate general literature review.

In addition, Public diplomacy of each country can be possibly classified and defined based on certain strategies which are in one way or another depends on various domestic, regional and international developments. For Turkey, it is

possible to classify its public diplomacy based on three strategies: advocacy strategies, profile raising strategies and relationship building strategies.

For this reason, the ideas mentioned by Cull 2009, Glassgold 2004, Willard 2013 and Melissen 2005 are discussed in three main categories to assess the various functions of public diplomacy in the structure of Turkish foreign policy.

More accurately, these categories of definitions have been taken as a reference by the Turkish policy makers although there have been many misinterpretations, mostly, because of the changeable nature of these strategies due to huge unexpected shift in world politics.

In the first category, Cull, considers public diplomacy as an instrument with public opinion sensitivity used by Foreign Service officials to support traditional diplomacy in achieving their objectives via informing and influencing the target societies. (Cull, 2009) That is, he sees public diplomacy just as a government sponsored program intended to inform or influence public opinions in other countries. The same definition gave by Glassgold. He saw public diplomacy as the efforts undertaken by a government to influence different class of society of the target nation/s which is the strategy of turning the foreign policy of the target government to its own advantages. (Glassgold, 2004)

Fouts in Taylor (2006, p.47) defines it as a policy adopted by a government to reach out to the citizen or a polity to introduce and explain its cultural values, policies, and beliefs: this is a strategy of improving its relationship, image and reputation with that country. (Taylor, 2006)

Willard concludes the public diplomacy as a tactic used by diplomats to utilize soft power. He emphasized the importance of relations between public diplomacy and soft power as the former an active process and the latter a fluid substance of good will. (Willard, 2012).

Similarly, Melissen, concedes that public diplomacy is a key instrument of soft power. (Melissen, 2005)

The foreign policy makers often use this definition because it offers practical guidelines to identify policies towards the target community. It also contributes to the rationalization process of policy choice in order to solve competing

foreign policy problems under time pressure. Further, policy makers and politicians often prefer a concept designed to operate within the realist framework.

In the second category, the definition of public diplomacy given by scholars such as (Huijgh, 2011) and (Fisher, 2008) implies a multi-dimensional concept with the involvement of more actors. First, the main focus of this category of definition is “relationship building and engaging in foreign policies. Second, such definition is emerged out of lessons learned from the individual experiences of states. Third, public diplomacy in this category is taken as a worldview rather than a technical foreign policy instrument.

Huijgh pays attention to the role and effect of domestic audience in public diplomacy. (Huijgh, 2011). This is, in fact, has been neglected in the literature for long time.

Some other scholars emphasize the effect of social networks in the foreign policy decision-making process. In this regard, Melissen points out the replacement of a network centric environment with the hierarchical state centric model of IR as a transformed nature of International Relations. Melissen (2005, p.12).

In this category of definition of public diplomacy, new perspectives introduced which mostly underline the shift in the nature of public diplomacy from dominating the target community to a building and maintaining a relations that mutually beneficial. In other word, this category promotes social networking and emphasizes the increasing effect and influence of institutional and social networks in the foreign policy processes.

The third group of scholars introduces the third category of public diplomacy, which refers to this concept as an academic discipline in International Relations. This group of scholars such as Gilboa, refers to the public diplomacy as a discipline which is in the making. Gilboa (2008, pp.56-75) .

Despite the concept of public diplomacy is accepted, as one of the most interdisciplinary fields, which engage with at least thirteen other disciplines; such as, history, technology, psychology, sociology and international relations,

the relevant scholars could not succeed to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework.

Considering the above-mentioned categories, it might be possible to classify Turkish public diplomacy based on three strategies: advocacy strategies, profile raising strategies and relationship building strategies. Of course, these strategies have had a changeable nature in scale and quality at short and long term basis in the sense that from its first application in 2003 and then officially with the cooperation of Yunus Emre Foundation in 2009, Turkish public diplomacy went through these three main strategies. There are some early researches by Turkish scholars recommending Turkish decision makers to consider the new approach in their foreign policy process influenced by the rising necessity of integrating the concept of public diplomacy into Turkish foreign policy decision-makings. These scholars have played important role in generating a sort of awareness among officials and civil societies, as well.

As it has been discussed so far, the application of public diplomacy and its various instruments is not the same in every country in the sense that it might depend on factors such as geographic location, geostrategic position, historical background and the form and extend of its regional and global interactions and counteractions. In the sense of Turkey, issues like EU bid, fight with internal and external terrorism and its involvement in regional development; Syria and Iraq as the latest examples, are the most important ones. Turkey's efforts to mend its relations with the opponents of cold war, namely, Romania and Bulgaria, multilateral negotiation process with Greece since 1990, developing its relations with Russia since 1990, its arduous efforts to mend relations with Armenia with which Turkey signed two important protocols in 2009, Cyprus issue and its relations with Iran. Each of these issues has the potential to change the nature of Turkey's public diplomacy in terms of approaches and goals. This particular nature is capable to change the nature and flow of public opinion, as well. In this regard, Turkey has had difficult task to keep the mainstream on track to support the government's initiatives.

If how one might ask, we can argue that its geostrategic position both brought with itself opportunities and risks. There is this fact that the inability to take advantage of opportunities will lead to the supremacy of potential threats and

risks. This reality also applies to Turkey's public diplomacy which has not been fully administered its ambitions, Firstly because of its location on the world map, as this country is not limited in regional map. Secondly, the effect of this location on the extent that Turkey's public diplomacy could be applied.

In fact, this is not due to its infrastructure. That is, Turkey's public diplomacy would have been applied better if it could assess opportunities and risks better. To this end, Turkey adopted the policy of 'zero problem' with neighbors in 2004 as central theme of Davutoglu's and Turkey's foreign policy doctrine.

The Justice and Development Party has done quite well in term of maintaining the public opinion for its own sake because this Party has seen itself as the only Party that is eligible and has enough power to bring Turkey to its good and happy end. This is obvious in what this Party has done so far in terms of development and reconstructions of main infrastructures, which brought with itself economic boom.

Turkey has been seriously involved in fight with terrorism since 1978 with PKK. Although with ups and downs, it has got momentum, particularly, with the start of Syrian crisis and emergence of new terror group recently, namely, FETO. In this context, Turkey has benefited the public diplomacy and its instruments in order to both save its status in domestic politics and foil the supportive approaches towards PKK by the West and EU. That is, fighting terrorism while the world, mostly the West and some EU countries, are supportive of PKK and FETO. It has naturally needed the employment of both hard and soft power; that is, the smart power. Turkey has used public diplomacy mostly through the power of its medias to remind those supporters of PKK that, this community of terrorist group is different from the Kurds who have the same right as the Turks do since the establishment of Turkish Republic as a natural reflection of the 'Peace at Home, Peace in the World' policy laid down by great leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of Turkey.

3.2 Turkish Public Diplomacy In Iraq And Syria

We have already discussed the basics of Turkey's public diplomacy its structure and its influence on its foreign policy. We understood that Turkish public diplomacy based on three strategies: advocacy strategies, profile raising strategies and relationship building strategies. A specific literature review given with the aim of defining and illustrating where Turkey's public diplomacy stands with respect to its foreign policy in Iraq and Syria and its relations with Iran through discussing the causes and effects behind their counteractions and/or interactions in by comparing their public diplomacy tools.

Turkey has embarked a new different scope in its public diplomacy with regard to Middle East, especially, in Iraq and Syria soon after the Justice and Development Party came to power. This was, in fact, a strategy as precondition for promotion of its foreign policy in the region. Revival of historical and cultural ties with countries of region has been a focal point and central element of this approach in order to increase its strategic values by the help of soft power. Turkish public institutes and organizations have not been alone in this process, but rather received great support from private institutes. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Tourism Ministry, International Cooperation and Development Agency of Turkey, Red Cross, department of press and media within Prime Ministry, Public diplomacy agency and National television are among other active in this process.

Turkey's public diplomacy is more a subordinate to its official diplomacy or "track-one diplomacy" and foreign policy rather than a complementary to them. The main reason is that Turkey has engaged in many occasions as third party in bilateral or multilateral negotiations playing a mediator role. It has used psychological intimidation, in particular, towards Greece, whenever Greece violated Turkey's sea border and airspace; The Kardak crisis, which has been aggravated in 2017, is the latest clear example of its kind in this regard. Or in its relations with Iran, Turkey has had both mediator roles, the most recent one is Turkey's joint bid with Brazil in 2010 to seal nuclear swap deal. Turkey has also applied psychological intimidation, whenever it has been necessary, as a way of utilizing smart power or by sending a message of dissatisfaction to the

target country through media. Sometimes it has applied persuasive, coercive and argumentative language in its regional and international affairs. It has also imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions such as its step – by step sanctions on Syria began in 2011.

Turkey's latest policies with regard to Syria and Iraq, particularly, since 2011, which, to some extent, prevented the development of Turkey's soft power and public diplomacy, is also an example of its official diplomacy. For this reason it might be more proper to define a Turkish Middle Eastern public diplomacy with regard to Iraq and Syria to avoid any one-way and one-sided judgment about its public diplomacy as a whole.

Turkey's public diplomacy received huge support from TV programs, TV series and movies. These elements have had indispensably significant role in helping Turkish public diplomacy to resolve communication problems and obstacles and to influence on public opinion in the target countries of the region, and as the result, to improve its image among the publics of the regional countries. Turkish policy makers from cultural, political and media affairs have comprehended the importance of this tool and the incomparable rise in the volume of TV soap opera production in terms of quality and quantity is a proof to this. The Arab countries affected more by some of these TV soaps, to name: 'Years gone past' and 'Noor'. (Anas, 2010). As acknowledged in the same article, 22 countries since 2010 were importing popular Turkish television soaps and some of them were made record sales in the Arab world and some of them were earned \$3m annual sale. The 'Noor' was all time hit in Arab streets during 2008, which attracted over 85 million Arab viewer's mainly young women. 'Years gone past' was the name of another TV series, which received nearly 67 million viewers, and more than 50% were reported women. This is also interesting to know that there were only 18 national films released in 2005, 43 in 2007 and 51 in 2008, and 173 in 2015.

Since 2006, Turkish soaps have been the most favorable films within Iran, Arabs, Europeans and South American countries. According to a report, each family from these geographies watched at least one Turkish movie or soap per night. (noluyo. tv ,2015)

Films and movies in any countries commonly reflect their culture and social environment. Countries also are determined to utilize soap productions to this aim. Turkish soaps, in this sense, have played role in the advancement of Turkish public diplomacy. Even a simple TV series has been used as an instrument for an effective social change and snatch the hearts and minds of millions in the region. Besides these efforts , the Justice and Development Party has employed its public diplomacy on the frameworks of ‘People - to - People’ and ‘Government- to - People’ relations strategies as essential keys.

Understanding the role of Turkish public diplomacy in Iraq and Syria and its relations with Iran through discussing the causes and effects behind their counteractions and/or interactions in Syria and Iraq by comparing their public diplomacy tools seems fairer. The reason is that, the developments in Syria and Iraq, concerns Turkey and Iran more than any other countries and we observe regional polarization with the centrality of these two countries.

Iran and Turkey have special strategic position in the region and they owe this for the geography they are placed in, as both are ‘East to West ‘Connection Bridge. Iran is a country with ancient culture and civilization, a huge human power and a strategically important geography and economy. Turkey is also an important country in Eurasia with developing economy and on the way to integrate with global economy and serious cooperation with EU in various fields. Although having multiple commonalities, Iran and Turkey are acting as two opposing poles. That’s why we observe regional polarization with the centrality of Iran and Turkey.

The most determinant difference between Iran and Turkey is, perhaps, the way they are supporting non-state actors or their proxies in the region. This means a difference in their public diplomacy approaches is indispensably expected. When diplomacy loses its role and effectiveness, power struggle, or better said, the role of power and, as the result, violence rises. This is the trend, which happened, in recent decades in the regional policymaking of both Iran and Turkey. More Turkey approached to Saudis and Qataris, closer it becomes to the opponents of governments in Iraq and Syria. This process is the reverse for the Iranian case. This situation is, actually, the cause for emergence of conflicting approaches between Tehran and Ankara. On the other hand, the aggravation of

tension in Iraq and Syria has brought the foreign policy and public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey face to face in a racing field of the region so that beyond the regional competition, they faced with strategic counteraction and discourse conflict in Iraq and Syria. Iran supports intifada and the “axis of resistance” as Iran’s main ideological and strategic project but Turkey, otherwise, is said to be following Neo – Ottomonism model and the policy of increasing its power in the region. What ever is the goal, their foreign policy agendas seriously affected their public diplomacy approaches with the centrality of the regional crisis and, in particular, in Syria and Iraq.

That is, the existing differences between public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey towards Iraq and Syria is mostly related to the differences between theoretical approaches, resources, principles and the goals of the their foreign policies. They are also different in terms of discourses, instruments and public diplomacy agenda and structure.

On the other hand, Iran, in recent decades, has shown its intention to solve regional problems with the cooperation and collaboration of regional actors and, in fact, supports the regional equations to be set by the regional countries. However, Turkey, most probably, because of its situation in the world map and its geopolitical position has been supporter of bonds among countries of region but with an arrangement going beyond the region and a closeness to Western countries, especially, the US, and in some cases to Israel. That is, Turkey seems tend to provide the grounds for the Western countries to be present in regional equations and calculations through the expansion of its relations with Western countries. This conflictual political strategy between Turkey and Iran towards the relations and convergence with the West is more related to their political-ideological structures and the way they believe in the West or the extent they are correlated and connected to the West through International Organizations. Iran’s relations with the West is mostly follows anti-Western motto and has deep conflict with the U.S and some of its strategic allies such as Israel but at the same time has had continuous tensions with Western European countries while Turkey has been following the Western oriented approach and an effort for Europe membership.

Iran's public diplomacy in Iraq and Syria has been based on saving the status quo and support to the standing governments while Turkey decided to impose a shift to existing situation. Based on these factors, Iran looks at Iraq and Syria as 'neighbors of the concurrent, accordant with same interest, while, Turkey 's stance towards these two southern neighbors changed to become counteractive and conflictual. Iran represents as ally and, to some extent, intermediary role in Iraq and Syria to stabilize the internal regional situation but Turkey is believed to seek for regional hegemony and leadership. If the later is true, then Turkey's public diplomacy seeks to change or revise the existing structure and behavior in Iraq and Syria according to its own foreign policy preferences. Adoption of different approaches by Turkish officials with regard to developments in Iraq and Syria also has not only challenged its public diplomacy approaches but also caused numerous challenges in its domestic and foreign policy.

To put it differently, Turkey and Iran both have applied the two dimensions of power; that is, soft and hard power in many occasions along with some conventional armaments through their proxies or even military forces. But, the contrariety is that the convergence of Iran with political, social and cultural elements in Syria and Iraq, besides, the inherent geographical and historical characteristics of both Iraq and Syria in the region provided more opportunities for Iran to maneuver. However, it should be reminded that there are some elements like the problems of Kurdish minority, its comprehensive relations with Israel, cultural –historical gap; that is, counteraction between tradition and modernism, which have challenged Turkish public diplomacy and foreign policy both in the region and globally. These elements, in one hand, prevented Turkey in the application of its public diplomacy in Syria and Iraq. They, in other hand, deprived Turkey of its opportunities in these countries.

At the same time, the problem is that, while the security matters in the contemporary world becomes an affirmative issue; both Turkey and Iran are still following a non- affirmative approach towards developments in Iraq and Syria. Turkey's public diplomacy towards Syria and Iraq, in particular, since the start of Syrian crisis in 2011 has been vulnerable because of serious contrast of ideas and policies between Turkey and these countries. The outbreak of war, by itself, is the failure of diplomacy and/or public diplomacy. Another problem is that the

regional developments has caused the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey to be, more than any time, under the control of military and politicians, of course, with different intensity and acuity.

On the other hand, if Turkey insists on the same approach, it will not only inflict huge expenses but would also probably have not much chance to benefit the situation in terms of preserving its own national security, maintaining supports to its proxies, to help re-establishment of the regional stability. That is, public diplomacy of Turkey, concerning current foreign policy approaches, is a long way off its real public diplomacy and foreign policy capacities, capabilities and ambitions.

To sum up, the start of Arab Spring, which caused major instability in the region fueled, by the start of Syrian crisis, has made Turkey forefront of regional opposition to the Bashar Assad and has criticized Iran in various occasion for supporting the Assad regime. The root of these differences is that Iran saw Syria crisis as a new plot by the West, rather than the Syrian freedom movement. That is, Syria was viewed as a front – line State against Israel. However, Turkey saw the crisis as the continuation of Arab Spring and the people's reaction against Bashar al- Assad's regime. On the other hand, Turkey has come to this belief that an Iran-led shite axis is forming, extending from Iraq to Syria. This has triggered Turkey to look for allies including the KRG and Iraq's Sunni Arab population to counter this axis.

Turkey's geopolitical and geo-economic interests in Iraq and Syria now stretch some 729 miles from its border with Iran, across Iraq (219 miles) and Syria (510 miles). From 100 to 150 miles on each side of these borders live approximately 20-25 million people depending on where the borders are drawn. It includes the large cities of Diyarbakir, Erbil, Selamani (Sulaymaniaya) Gaziantep, Aleppo, Adana, and Iskenderun. Thus, the collapse of state institutions in Iraq and Syria makes it clear that in the emerging vacuum only Turkey is poised to take the great advantage of its position. In Iraq, Turkey will have to share a condominium of power with Iran, especially with regard to the KRG.

The 20 million Kurds of Turkey and 9 million Kurds of Iran will demand close management by Ankara and Tehran. Both countries realize this. With the

current situation and Turkey's position and influence in the North of Syria and also in KRG of Iraq, Turkey will be economically a major player in future. Other major powers and actors, namely, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia would have no or less share, economically and in the rehabilitation of Syria. On the other hand, Russia, considering its global challenges would probably mostly focus on maintaining its military capabilities in the Black, Aegean, and, Eastern Mediterranean Seas as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, Iran, because of its several domestic problems would not be able of being a major economic factor and would mostly focus on Alawites and those groups, which have sensitive importance for Iran such as Hezbollah in order to contain the threats of Israel. Saudi Arabia would be the most loser actor in Syria and Iraq as a result of various domestic, regional and international challenges and as the ISIS becoming weaker or its military power is diminishing, along with the shift in the situation within Syria, the rejuvenation of secularism and Sunni nationalism would lesson Saudi influence. Among the major actors, the U.S. has so far showed lesser or no interest in the future of Syria and Iraq in term of economic development.

3.3 Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards Syria And Iraq

Any issues and developments regarding Syria and Iraq have always been the subject of concern for Turkey. The developments in 21st century mostly has added other regional and non-regional actors to this list because of the shift in the types of their interests in the region, particularly, with the effect of developments in Syria and Iraq. The shift of interests and involvement of great powers in the affairs of Syria and Iraq, undoubtedly, has in one hand become a matter of concern and on the other hand, created an atmosphere of conscious rivalry, to some extent, among those countries which have similar interests and/or security concerns. This rivalry or, by a more subtle description, the competition has its unique root from ideological and power supremacy, and with some effects from the historical background. Thus, many factors such as the stances and positions by other regional and non-regional actors ,either governmental or non- governmental , have had huge effect on Turkey's foreign policy approaches .

Turkey's sensitivity towards developments in its Southern neighbors; Syria and Iraq, has not been new and has, in fact, its root from grand strategic objectives and interests and a deep root from history. There are some reasons behind this sensitivity:

First of all, these countries both have a long border with Turkey and are the most influential Arab countries. Secondly, Syria and Iraq are also the gateways for Turkey to Middle East and Arab countries. Thirdly, historically, Turkey has a share of the northern parts of Iraq and Syria, which has explicitly and/or implicitly been reiterated by senior Turkish officials in various occasions. The latter is one of the most important driving motors of Turkey's economic bids and vast trade investments in these countries.

Of course, Turkey has experienced border and land disputes, historical ethnic and religious problems with her neighbors. These conflicts can be defined as geopolitical and geographical oriented disputes and, in fact, Turkey's hard power diplomacy in her relations with its southern neighbors.

On the other hand, Turkey's interests in its southern neighbors are not limited with the components mentioned above, but rather, deals also with the "Turkmen" factor in the north of Iraq and parts of Syria; the issue which has engaged Turkish public diplomacy and foreign policy in recent years. In other words, Turkey has pursued a policy of promoting Turkish Ethnicity and Nationality by support to Turkmen minorities in Syria and Iraq aimed at opening a window for its influence and monitoring on political trends in these countries. That is, Turkey has tried to fill its power vacancy in these countries and, the region as the whole, by using 'Turkmen' factor. This is also considered as part of Turkish public diplomacy initiatives even if a self-interest approach might seem overweight the real good intention. According to a report by ORSAM, more than 3.5 Million Turkish speaking and Turkmens are living in Syria. (Öztürkmen, Ali; Duman, Bilgay; Orhan, Oytun , 2015) . In Iraq, there is this claim that the population of Turkmen minorities ranges between 500000 and 3 million. Iraqi Turkmens are considered to be the third largest ethnic group in Iraq. (Bill, 2005)

Among the main components of Turkey's attention to Iraq and Syria are:

- a) Oil reserves in Northern Iraq and North East Syria
- b) Kurdish areas on both sides of the borders of these countries
- c) A small minority of Turkmen in Northern Iraq and Syria
- d) Support for some political groups and figures loyal to Turkey

There are some factors, which have made the status of Turkish foreign policy in Iraq and Syria fragile. Despite the efforts undertaken by the Justice and Development Party from the beginning, its policies with regard to Middle East has always been under criticism of opposition parties, namely, the People Republican Party and the Nationalist Movement Party and different civil society groups from in and out of Turkey. In fact, the opposition parties along with some civil societies have found the situation proper to increase their criticism towards the policies adopted by the Justice and Development Party in Iraq and Syria. Their main arguments for criticism is that the Justice and Development Party's policies put the country's credibility, security and interests at risk. One of the biggest challenges the Justice and Development Party has been facing regarding its foreign policy has been its alleged support of terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq which caused serious doubts and mistrust among the public and intellectuals within the country and through the region about the real nature of Turkey's foreign policy goals. According to many in Iran and some Muslim countries in the region, the problems began when Turkey arrived in dilemma of collaborating with terrorists and at the same time accompanying the anti-ISIS coalition. From the surface of development, it is perhaps understandable that Turkey in one hand had no choice but to support the military coalition against ISIS and Al Nusra and on the other hand to provide the necessary grounds for the collapse of governments in Iraq and Syria by means of support to non-state actors. In the study of Turkey's foreign policy approach during the Justice and Development Party we observe inconsistencies in Turkey's goals and interests with regard to its commonalities with its Western allies, which is one source of challenges between the two sides. In the same vein, these policies have challenged the Turkey's public diplomacy approaches regarding Iraq and Syria, which in many ways has damaged this country's regional credibility and

interests. This, in fact, has foreclosed Ankara from its opportunities in the region and also put Turkey at many risks.

Some of the obstacles that are parts of long term policies that Turkey, at least for the time being, would not be able to ignore, at least, in short period of time:

- 1) The alleged human right violations, particularly, with regard to the Kurdish minorities, the Armenian and the Alevi.
- 2) Historical, cultural, political and ethnic problems with its neighbors such as Iraq and Syria.
- 3) Its military, political and economic ties with Israel.
- 4) The cultural and historical gap in terms of counteraction between tradition and modernism in Turkey.

Iraq and Syria are countries with vulnerable geography, particular geopolitics and geostrategic situation, political instability, challenging and stressful ties with their neighbors. These characteristics have given them a strategic importance and significance for neighboring countries, like Turkey. Moreover, the Kurdish factor and the effective presence of the Kurds in the northern parts of Iraq and Syria and also the historical land claim by Turkey, has increased the importance of these countries for Turkey.

In the same manner, the said Kurdish region has become, simply, a dragging and drifting spheres on culture and civilization between the Persian, the Turk and the Arab, as this specialty determines the strategic importance of power dispute among Iran and Turkey in Iraq and Syria.

To understand Turkish policies toward Syria on the framework of the subject of this study, a short chronology of Turkish-Syria relations since 1998 (years prior to the victory of the Justice and Development Party) seems necessary.

Turkey has one of its longest common borders with Syria along with historical and geographical links, which has given a special place to their neighborhood ties.

Up until 2001, there has been a traditional tenseness in Turkey – Syria relations. This was mainly due to disputes such as:

- Self-annexation of the Hatay Province to Turkey in 1993

- Water disputes due to the Southern Anatolia Project
- Support to PKK by Syria (no cooperation with Turkey in Fight with terrorism)

With the Bashar Assad assuming the power in 17 July 2000, a series of official and diplomatic visits from both sides began. These visits, in fact, encouraged by two primary events:

- 1- Expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey by Syrian authorities in 1998.
- 2- The time President Ahmad Necdet Sezer's visit of Syria in 2000 to participate in the funeral ceremony of Hafez Al Assad, Syrian President.

These two events, in fact, laid the foundation of good - will relations between Turkey and Syria and it continued with the series of high-ranking official visits, which created a healthy dialogue environment and caused signing of agreements on different fields such as security and economy. (Oran, 2001-2012) In less than a year, the ties promoted on three major fields: Security, Water and Economy. Among these fields, "Water Issue" and "Fight with Terrorism ", not very long before, were the major points of serious disputes between Turkey and Syria. However, these sensitive issues became the basis of their ties in the new era. Since 25 July 2001, Turkey increased the level of water flow to Syria as a show of good will. Until the end of 2002, the two sides consolidated and strengthened their cooperation in the common fields. The improvement of relation was so speedily moving forward that both sides held two consecutive meetings of the Economic Cooperation Council in 2000 and 2001. This Council was not held since 1988. Some important protocols signed for promotion of economic relations. It is also worth reminding that the Turkey-Syria railroad began its operation again in 2001. It was out of service since 1993.

With the beginning of Syrian civil war, their relations strained again. The consequences of Syria crisis started in March 2011, proves the extent that a certain country or certain countries foreign policy can change rapidly, sometimes with no concern for regional peace and stability. It also proves the extent that regional alliances, for instances, Iran –Turkish co–operations for bringing peace and stability to the region are fragile. This has caused an atmosphere of mutually affected resistance against each other's proactive

policies in Iraq and Syria, which in part has misguided regional countries public diplomacy approach and actually has reduced the flexibility of public diplomacy and their foreign policy. This situation, for example, shows how developments in Syria and Iraq interconnected when Iran and Turkey are the countries of discussion.

Since the start of the Syrian crisis, the Justice and Development Party inspired to have more active role and determined to balance its global expectations and regional objectives and thus decided to revise its regional policies as a possible response to emerging risks. This is one of the reasons that Turkey adopted different stances and policies till now. Turkey's first step was to peacefully persuade Bashar al –Assad for constitutional reform, which was rejected by Assad, and this caused Turkey for imposing pressures. In the second step, Turkey began to council with main neighboring countries, including Iran. In this regard, in the statement made by the time Prime Minister Receb Teyyeb Erdogan after his visit of Iran in 2012 is, in fact, one of the most important suggestion or assumption made by Turkey; Erdogan was saying that a democratic election in Syria will decrease the tensions and would provide the necessary grounds to solve the crisis before more escalation of tensions. (Mashreghnews, 2012)

However, this suggestion was not something that Iran would turn green light since Turkey's policies with regard to election in Syria for Iran was not a sincere move because officials in Iran were, undoubtedly, afraid of Sunnis' control of the government. This maneuver by Iran has made Turkish policy makers to seek for new road map with regard to their policies in Syria. In the Third step, Turkey approached to the UN and asked for UN -backed solution, which called “the Annan Plan”. However, this plan failed to ensure its main objective, which was a cease-fire. In the forth step, Turkey has changed its rhetoric and has become a serious critic of Bashar al – Assad; specially, in the words of Prime Minister Receb Teyyip Erdogan who once said, " Syria is not a foreign affairs but a domestic affairs to us " and that " the Annan Plan is a good chance for Syrian crisis to be resolved." (AK Parti, 2011)

But what are the core reasons behind these approaches and policies?

After the Arab Spring in 17 December 2010, Turkey has gained leverage in the Middle East and has been relying more than ever on its influence and strength in the streets of Arab countries and since then its policy makers understood the necessity to review the country's ties with regional actors, especially with Iran, in order to test the status and limits of its regional power and its capacity to lead the demand for revolution in the whole region.

At the beginning, the Syrian crisis was taken as a revolt of the Sunni majority but despite the undergoing efforts and Turkey's support, the opposition groups have not been able to engage all Sunnis, especially in urban areas. This, in fact, misled Turkey in her next steps.

On the other hand, active involvement of other elements such as Saudi Arabia in Syria crisis playing with the Salafism factor, caused a serious rift and gap among the opposition groups and, in consequent, influenced the stances of the State actors behind them. There are some reasons behind this rift, which caused Turkey to revise its policies on regime change or anti-regime protests and consequently has changed its stances towards the role of Iran in Syria domestic affairs.

a) Saudis' involvement, aggravated the existing rivalry between Tehran-Riyadh which has caused both sides to start new strategies.

b) Sheikh Adnan Arur, Syrian salafi cleric living in Saudi Arabia and a critic of non-Salafi Islamic majorities fighting with the Syrian government and also the non-official face of the anti-government movement in Syria, issued new Fatwa and declared Salafist Jihad against the Shiite – Nusayri in Syria .His Fatwa has been important, firstly in the sense that it has been issued by a Syrian national living in Riyadh. Secondly, it has had the potentiality to affect the opinions of the groups within Syria and thirdly, it has had the potentiality of aggravation the tension and war of words between Turkey and Iran.

c) Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah, the Grand Mufti, called for destruction of all churches in Arab Peninsula which, in fact, exterminated the outlook for any possible rapprochement between Islamist groups and Christians in Syria.

These factors have sent a clear message to Turkey that there would be no consensus among the opposition groups and that they are not capable to take

over the command and control of the country. Beside these issues, the summits of The Friends of Syria in Istanbul, Tunisia and France beard no outcome.

With the escalation and continuation of conflicts among opposition fronts and central government in Syria, Turkey has decided to support and take the side of the opposition and has been insisting it as part of her regional policy agenda. Although since the adoption of this policy, there has been no feasible outlook for the success of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis and is still volatile.

However, three possible scenarios can be suggested to understand Turkey's goals behind these approaches.

1) Strengthening the role of being a main playmaker country in the Middle East, which has been defined as "Neo- Ottomanism" approach.

2) Promotion of Turkey's democratic initiatives.

3) Turkey's support of the oppositions in Syria on the angle of support for democracy

A) Based on the first scenario, the Justice and Development Party has decided to revive the glories of the Ottoman Empire or what has been called as the " New Ottomanism " in order to take the leadership of the Muslim world, particularly, the Sunnis and to create a kind of balance in her relations with the West specially aspiration to join the European Union. A shift in Turkey's policies towards Middle East and her direct involvement in the developments, support for the abolition of the siege of Gaza and also serious rift with Israel are some other evidences which strengthen the probability of this scenario.

On the framework of this scenario, the purpose of the Justice and Development Party in supporting the opposition groups and fronts in Syria and finally, the collapse of Syrian regime has been to form a new government comprised of the prominent population of Syria, that is, the Sunni population as they beholding the most important security and political positions in this country. The significance of this issue becomes double when we focus on the Justice and Development Party's Sunni Islamism or perhaps fundamentalism for the sole aim of fall of Syrian regime. This is meant to be the presence of the country's majority Sunni, which constitutes 70 percent of the population, on political sovereignty.

At the same time, sudden shifts in Turkish foreign policy is not a surprise .To remind, Turkey neutralized and prevented the establishment or creation of "Sunni Block" against Iran. This was the plan started by Georg Bush in January 2002 by introducing the "Axis of evil" which included Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

B) Based on the second scenario, the government of the Justice and Development Party has become a major supporter of political change and reform in Syria. This effort could in the long run have privileges for the Turkish Government. Firstly, Turkish government hopes to achieve a considerable level of popularity among the opposition groups in Syria after the fall of Bashar al - Assad. The close contact between Turkey and opposition groups in Syria will provide Turkey more role-playing. On the other hand, the similarities between the current situations in Syria with that of Iraq in term of existing social gaps will trigger the emergence of Federal system in Syria like that in Iraq. This approach, firstly, will help Turkey to manage potential threats of Syrian Kurds towards her national security and sovereignty. Secondly, Turkey might be hopeful of more economic engagement in Syria after fall of Bashar Al Assad since Syria's infrastructures damaged by years of war and need monumental task for rebuilding.

However, for at least four reasons, Turkey's first scenario seems not successful:

Firstly, there is no clear outlook about the collapse of political regime in Syria. Secondly, Turkey's zero problem policy with its neighbors faced with huge challenges, which has limited Turkey's political maneuvers in Syria. Thirdly, Turkey's support of the opposition groups or fronts in Syria has put her in front of other countries which have separated into two uncompromising and irreconcilable fronts; The Sunni – Salafist along with pro-western axis including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar which united to change the Ba'ath regime in Syria and Shite along with anti –western axis including Iran, Russia, Iraq. Thus, this situation has brought some new crisis with the countries in second axis.

And finally, the growth of fundamentalist Salafism within the opposition groups and the control of Kurdish regions by the Kurds shows that in case of the

collapse of Syrian regime, the future of this country after Bashar Assad is seriously ambiguous and volatile. As well as, rise in the number of displaced persons and refugees on the borders of Turkey, would inflict more expenses on this country and as the result would add fuel to fire.

C) Based on the third scenario, Turkey has considered herself as a democratic country or at least trying to reach the ideal level of democracy and the government has come to this belief that establishment of democracy in Syria similar to what happened in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, would bring security back in the common borders with Syria. This scenario seems also not successful because Turkey's predictions and policies toward Syria has not came true, at least till now ,since she never predicted the effectiveness of other State and non-State actors and also the structure of the dissidents and opposition groups.

The JDP government has been left alone in a very critical juncture in her support of the revolution in Syria and its ties with neighbors, especially, Iran. Turkey's dissatisfaction of Iran's Syrian policy has strained relations to some extent especially because of difference in their interpretation of the outcomes of Assad's resignation and regime change which by no means is a huge danger to Iran's security, as mentioned repeatedly by the officials in Iran. Thus, since the start of Syria crisis, the term "peaceful competition" shifted to a "rivalry" to some extent when it comes to Turkish-Iranian relations concerning their regional policies. Because this crisis has had a relatively huge impact on their relations. Although the officials' rhetoric was expected to be based on the former, the media, especially from the Arab world and the West have focused on the later more willingly.

Turkey and, Receb Teyyep Erdogan, personally, were known hero throughout Arab regions especially after the 2011 Egyptian revolution known as Tahrir Demonstration and the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. However, the failure of Turkey's policies toward Syria, at least till now, both because of the capacity of her policies and the lobbies and forces that Iran has on the Syrian government, and also the effect of policies adopted by Russia caused Turkey, to some extent, to enter to the eve of losing the once accepted perception of being a model for Islamic countries, since it has been widely believed that Turkey has

not been able to be consistent in her policies toward supporting the opposition groups and that she was zig zagging in her foreign policy preferences.

However, with the beginning of “Astana Peace Talks” - the Syrian settlement meetings- in Kazakhstan on 23rd January 2017 by the joint efforts of Turkey and Russia, it seems that Turkey has started new diplomatic effort to reconstruct its regional role and image and to represent Turkey’s capability in the application of public diplomacy and foreign policy.

At the same time, in my view, this process has also affirmed the extent of Turkey’s moral responsibility towards the Syrian people comparing other actors. Meanwhile Turkey’s role in Astana peace talks does not deny the content of the scenarios discussed in this section. Accordingly, based on a report published by Sputnik news, “the Turks did huge futile efforts to exclude Iran from Astana Peace Talks”. (ir.sputniknews, 2017)

The worst consequence is that, Syria crisis has become an apparatus for power show or a show of force for Turkey and other actors. This "show of power" has maximized the potential to aggravate the already crisis – prone region such as Iraq.

Turkey’s Iraq policies during the Justice and Development Party administration focused on the fields of economy, politics and security. Each of them are evaluated based on the necessities and the developments in Iraq and, generally, in the region.

The 2003 occupation of Iraq by the Coalition Forces, spearheaded by the U.S. and Britain with the support of 49 countries was one of the most important factor, which have changed the balances in Middle East. The occupation seriously affected Turkish foreign policy and its international status in at least three tangible levels:

- 1- Concerning the issue of Northern Iraq, it affected Turkish – U.S. relations
- 2- Negatively affected Turkey’s Middle East status and its relations with other Arab States
- 3- It negatively affected Turkey’s influence in Iraq internal politics.

Tensions between wide spectrum of politicians in Iraq domestic policy and, in parallel to it, Turkey’s intervention through supporting political groups imply

that the political equations in Iraq are highly important and sensitive for Turkey. Adoption of policy of changing the government in Iraq has become a top agenda in Turkey's foreign policy. Its stances towards Nuri el- Maliki are a clear example. This is not to criticize Turkey or whatsoever but the fact is that Turkey is mostly worried about its strategic interests along with security concerns. On the other hand, based on the historical documents, Turkey has particular rights in northern parts of Iraq.

In other words, Turkey's policies towards political systems in Iraq influenced by her regional interests and preferences. Thus in order to analyze the Justice and Development Party current policies toward political developments in Iraq, it is necessary to remind ourselves that there is a mutual relations between domestic developments and foreign policy of a certain government and both of them can be cause of change in the political stances and attitudes of that governing political system. Turkey has not been an exception in this regard and influenced by her geopolitical and strategic interests in the two layers of domestic and regional spheres. Based on the necessities of time and regional dynamics, these two layers have formed and led Turkish foreign policy in different directions. For instances, since 2007 the rapprochement between Turkey and KRG initiated by the Kurds both balanced the influence of Iran in Iraq and countered Baghdad's centralizing tendencies. Turkey, on the other hand, benefited economically since KRG offered her to start some major construction projects such as Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports by Turkish companies. In the post-U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey well knew that in order to control and manage Kurdish nationalist movement within her territories, she would need the help and support of KRG from within Iraq. Turkey could manage her relations with KRG in short period as the result of uneasy relations between Erbil and Baghdad after 2003, particularly, over the distribution of oil revenues. Another factor to this achievement was Nouri al-Maliki's strong Shia leaning and inclination, which played as an incentive for both KRG and Sunnis in Iraq to become closer to each other and this, obviously was a benefit for Turkey.

In term of security, factors such as PKK, non- state actors, terrorism and the Kurds should be considered. These issues caused more headaches for Turkey

after the fall of Saddam Hossein with the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003. The establishment of parliamentarian and federal democracy in this country has led the Kurdish minority in Iraq to reach their political, cultural, social and economic rights, but at the same time, has caused Turkey's foreign policy to experience new challenges. Northern Iraq became an autonomous Kurdish region, which could have helped Kurdish minority in this part of Iraq facing similar demands and a safe haven for P.K.K terrorist group.

In term of facing or compromising by mutual concessions with the PKK, Turkey has always tried to find a way out of crisis with P.K.K and has doubled her peaceful attempts in recent decade but with the start of Syrian crisis, this approach has lost its momentum and full scale military conflict began. On the other hand, the European Union's emphasis on granting more cultural and political freedoms to the Kurdish minority in Turkey implies that Turkey has decided to minimize the Kurd's trend towards the center through dialogue and other peaceful means.

It seems that Turkish foreign policy could have transform the security threats by the Kurds in the northern Iraq to an effective strategic factor and as an opportunity both for herself and for the Kurdistan region of Iraq. By signing trade and economic contract, specially, in the field of Hydrocarbon reserves and facilitating investment by Turkish companies in the Northern Iraq, which sometimes has ignored the central government in Iraq, Turkey has successfully made good relation and connection with Kurdistan region of Iraq. Thus, by tying the economic bonds with the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Turkey has also been successful in converting the threats to opportunities.

Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq stepped in new domain because it did not trust the U.S. promises about the unification of Iraq. Thus, by the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey already consolidated its control of the KRG economy. The project of oil pipeline from KRG to Turkey's port of Ceyhan completed in 2013 by passing the Baghdad –controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. This project has further tied the two economies and on the other hand, has made the KRG more dependent on Turkey in order to survive the crisis. It at least ensured the KRG not left alone in Turkey's war against the PKK.

Turkey also successfully reached her foremost objectives; that is, to ensure that the KRG would become economically independent on Turkey. Today, Turkey with more than \$12 Billion trade exchange, is by far the most important economic and political partner of the KRG. In 2015, at least 1350 Turkish companies were active in that region. Despite these companies inflicted huge financial losses and trade risks due to escalation of crisis, it has been estimated that as of 2016, about 2000 Turkish companies operated in the KRG. These companies have had important share of building major infrastructures in KRG. Perhaps, Turkey, ironically, has regained its strong position in the KRG as a result of the U.S. war in Iraq. (Washington Institute, 2015)

In term of economic relations, Turkey – Iraq have had very comprehensive economic relations since 1980s. However, affected negatively between 1990-1991 with start of Gulf War, their economic relation got momentum with the serious will of the two sides in 2000s despite UN sanctions on Iraq. With the Justice and Development Party in power in 2002, Turkey's comprehensive plan of action on economic policies in Iraq was, somewhat, a sort of opposing to the occupation of Iraq. It seems it was not just the JDP's policy but also supported by the State. Because the time Economic Minister, Kurşat Tüzmen, visited Iraq in January 2003, 2 month before the occupation of Iraq. Even when coalition forces were engaged in Iraq, Turkish officials and relevant trade and economic institutions were talking about Turkey's serious intention and wish in economic re- infrastructure of Iraq. According to statistics published by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, Turkey's export to Iraq in 2003 was 828.000.000 \$ which rose to 8.314 Billion dollar in 2011. The total trade volume of 942.000.000 \$ with Iraq in 2003 increased to 10,8 Billion Dollars in 2011. In fact, Iraq is a very strategic country in terms of Turkey's foreign trade balance and export rate. In foreign trade, Turkey's has gained more than 10.6 billion dollars in trade with Iraq while obtained 4 billion dollars in its foreign trade with the United Kingdom and \$2.6 billion with Azerbaijan. Turkey's export rate to Iraq in 2013 was 11.9 Billion dollar – 7.9% share of foreign trade- but decreased to 10.9 billion dollar in 2014 – 6.9% share of foreign trade. (TOBB)

Thus, there are two basic interconnected elements which have had affected Turkey's policies towards Iraq in post-occupation era. Firstly, security policies and concerns toward Northern Iraq, and, Secondly, policies regarding the reconstruction of Iraq in the fields of politics and economy.

In sum, there are two main factors affecting Turkish foreign policy in Iraq:

A) Internal factors

Besides Turkey's security interests and concerns, the energy resources and economic interests are also other geostrategic reasons behind Turkey's undeniable historical interests in Iraq. In International politics and in ties among political actors, political and economic co-operations should not be separated. That is, economic co-operations sometimes result in promotion of political relations; the later also sometimes leads to development of economic and trade relations. That's why Turkey has always hoped the political party loyal to her would win the power in Iraq. This is the reason Turkey has always adopted policies regarding Iraq's domestic politics.

B) Regional factors

B1. Trying to prevent its regional and political isolation:

Advancement of the government's policies, establishing friendly relations with neighbors, increasing soft power and elimination of tension. Are the most important and influential components for the increase of the government's popularity. Recep Teyyeb Erdogan in 2002 emphasized on the promotion of relations with the neighbors and then began to operate the strategy of "looking at the East, rather the West" and "elimination of tension with the neighbors" which were among the main element behind the victory of The Justice and Development Party in 2002. These strategies and policies facilitated the advancement of Turkish foreign policy. The Justice and Development Party regional status weakened by various situations such as Turkey's agreement to the deployment of NATO Missile Shield Defense System in her territory which caused tensions between Turkey's with neighboring states that later on led to Turkey's political isolation. This triggered Ankara to afresh her policies towards Iraq's internal developments.

B2. Turkey's concerns over Iraq increased:

Since the outbreak of Syria crisis in 2011, the focus of Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq has increased. Turkey, in fact, began to worry about the rise of Iran's geopolitical influence in the region, particularly, in Syria and Iraq. The JDP has left no stone unturned through public diplomacy and diplomatic instruments to change the status quo and power balance in the region. For Turkey, Baghdad is the rout for Iran to influence in Syria so the situation in Iraq has always been seriously sensitive for Turkey in term of assessing and preventing Iran's regional policies to be fulfilled.





4 IRAN

4.1 Public Diplomacy

Each country may possess some variables solely and specifically fit for it. Because of the strategic importance of these variables, they cause a scale of distinction among countries and their mutual and multilateral stances. Geography, population, history, geopolitical position and culture are some of these variables. However, there are also variables such as political stances that change due to the effect of some internal and external elements. These characteristics also apply to Iran. Iran as a major regional middle power State, located at the heart of the Middle East and a sovereign state in Western Asia, has been affecting by its neighbors, population, and economic power, energy resources and has been disposed to various threats. It is a key player at the heart of the most pressing questions of today's Middle East, including Syria, Iraq.

These characteristics along with its central location in Eurasia and Western Asia and its proximity to the Hormuz Strait, has made it known for its great strategic importance and has always made it the center of attentions of the regional and International State and non-State actors and, at the same time, has the potential to limit or enhance or encourage the application of its public diplomacy.

Iran has also the power to exert considerable influence in Global Energy Security, energy supply and the world economy. Since, this country has the largest fossil fuels reserves, comprised of the largest natural gas supply in the world and the 4th largest proven oil reserves. These characteristics have determined the level and quality of its engagement in the regional international affairs. Iran is the founding member of the United Nations, ECO, NAM, OIC, and OPEC. Therefore, these blessings have brought with itself opportunities together with risks for Iran.

Considering its civilization and history, Iran has a rich cultural legacy which in part is reflected by the number of heritage sites – more than 19, recorded by UNESCO World Heritage Sites which ranks 4th largest in Asia and 12th largest in the world.

In terms of political system, the governing system is based on the outcome and ideals of the 1979 Revolution and new Constitution. The system is unique in many aspects since it combines elements of a parliamentary democracy with a theocracy governed by Islamic Jurists and on the top is placed the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei who is the successor of late Ayatollah Khomeini, the Founder of the Islamic Republic. It is diverse and rich in culture and also in the number of Ethnic groups. Shia Muslims are the dominant inhabitants. Other ethnic groups live in peace in Iran, at least, comparing with some other Middle Eastern and even European countries where the Muslims do not have same rights as the Christians do.

Regarding the unique feature of each country in terms of the effect of some past and contemporary developments and the chain relationship of these developments on the structure and understanding of public diplomacy, I would have to bring the attention of the readers briefly to the historical background of Iran public diplomacy, at least some points from the revolutions and then quickly jumping to the duration that focused in this contribution.

The public diplomacy of every country has its own origin and resources. It is possible to trace the application of public diplomacy of Iran and its relevant instruments far back in the Persian Emperors. There are documents showing that 2,500 years ago, the Persian Empire invented Chapar (courier), the most developed communication system for its time. (The Classics.us, 2013) Although Chapar may seem quite simple, Iran's Emperors (Briant, 2002) expanded their control of and influence over different parts of the world using this system. (University of Chicago Press, 1988). In other words, Iran historically proven to be capable of applying diplomacy for divers reasons taking from security and military to attracting the attention of peoples in different lands.

For Iran, the concept of “public diplomacy”, has been comprehended uniquely in terms of its origin and operation in the country, besides its general understanding which has already been discussed in the previous chapters.

As already mentioned, Iran with its unique location on the map of the region bordered with troubled neighbors with the risks of multiple security threats, employed its public diplomacy as it fits its needs and necessities according to the system, domestic policies and foreign policy requirements. Its public diplomacy, the tools and structures, renovated after the 1979 Revolution.

The 1979 Revolution, itself was the outcome of public diplomacy, since soft power instruments, mainly, brochures and pamphlets and speeches given mostly by clergymen and those loyal to the Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, distributed around the country and even into some neighboring countries. There was no media coverage at the beginning in support of the process. The application of media to fulfill and promote Revolutionary goals occurred right after Imam's arrival to Tehran by the revolutionaries taking the control of the state –owned newspaper Keyhan and also Radio and TV. This was, in fact, the period when public diplomacy has got momentum, even if, this concept by itself was not a matter of concern.

The Islamic Republic as the new established system in Iran faced huge challenges in various fields and fronts both from inside and outside. Soon after the Revolution, the Iraq imposed war on Iran has been both a great scourge because of a huge loss of life and huge infrastructure damages and also a historic opportunity to gain experience in the area of public diplomacy and the application of its power resources. It has also helped Iran in the sense that being imposed by an unfair war has doubled the acceptability and jurisdiction of Iran in the eyes of those still opposed to the Revolution in Iran and in the broader geographies in the region like in Iraq and Syria. In other words, attractiveness of the ideals of the Revolution for the Muslims around the world doubled. Soon, cultural invasion alongside political pressures and economic sanctions started one after another by the West, since Iran has been seen by the Westerners as an undefeatable barrier for them to fulfill their ambitions in the region and generally in the broader Islamic world.

The New established Islamic Republic in its first decade started to merge its experience of the past and the contemporary developments with the ideal of the Islamic Republic in order to ink a new road map and instruction for its public diplomacy and foreign policy. In other words, besides the general understanding of the term “public diplomacy”, for the Islamic Republic, it has been necessitated to design a unique structure for its public diplomacy in the sense that the system has seriously and firmly remained loyal and consistent to the ideal of the Revolution and new Constitution Law. If we only understand that the system in Iran could not avoid to fulfill one of the most important case in the Constitution, that is, the export of Revolution, it would be easy to understand that how Iran’s public diplomacy in its real capacity started.

According to Articles 152 to 155 of the Islamic Constitution as the Principles of foreign policy, the teaching of Islam is necessary by Islamic Revolution. Article 154 clearly refers entirely to the issue of teaching of Islam based on Islamic Revolution. The message which can be extracted from these Articles can be summarized as: ‘The foreign policy of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to the hegemonies superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.’

This Article challenged the governing system in the region and even the world and as the result made the super powers and actors in international system to react and counteract to it. This is the reason why most of the researchers of Islamic world and also some Western sociologists believe that Iran's Islamic Revolution has been the biggest driver of Islamic political movements in the globe. Article 154 clearly states the purpose of the Constitution in publishing and releasing the Islamic Revolutionary ideals and its serious will and determination to realize this end. This Article also made the Islamic system in Iran committed to support and defend the poor and the oppressed nations to free their lands from the oppressors; yet, with no eye on their lands and sovereignty in exchange of giving support. The most important concepts emphasized in this Article are: happiness, independency and freedom.

In the meantime, people in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Palestine, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Egypt were quite impressed by the Islamic Revolution and even the 'Arab Spring', is regarded as 'Islamic Movements' by think tanks and scholars in Iran to express that today, after three decades, the world is witnessing the fulfillment of revolutionary values as considered and planned by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the regional countries against the oppressors.

That is, it seems that in the process of writing the Constitution, in addition to the emphasize on its 100% Islamic nature, aspects of public diplomacy were also being considered in a bid to really prove its Islamic peaceful nature and as a model which will bring peace and happiness and freedom for all Muslims, with the centrality of people, although, the system has yet a lot to do for placing 'the people' in the center in its real meaning.

Accordingly, Theda Skocpol puts it, Iranian Revolution had all the characteristics of a great revolution, and it is, in fact, a 'social revolutions'. (Skocpol, 1982). In this case, Iranian Revolution has been placed in the center of International attentions and with its Islamic model caused a start of a new practical efforts for understanding religion and reevaluation of various political and social dimension of religion, particular, the Shiite. Theda writes, "The revolution of Iran must also be comprehended from a large perspective view and a structure based on history; a society, and organized diplomacy in Iran.... and would place Iran in the internationally evolving political and economic path. (Skocpol(1982,p.286) Iran's Islamic Revolution emphasizes on ethical discourse and in this case, soft power has had the ability of attracting others attention and can determine and change people's behavior.

This short evaluation on historical background clearly illustrates how the structure of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the threats by the West are closely related with the nature of Iran's public diplomacy and as the result, foreign policy. It also gives us a hint of the origin of the new wave of Iran public diplomacy.

The start of new pressures on Iran since 2001 by the West, predominantly, since the administration of President George W. Bush, who approached Iran with

what is called as a “two clock strategy”, became a powerful provocative factor which incited and encouraged the relevant bodies within the system to move forward for this new wave of public diplomacy.

In other words, the US government directed its policies at fulfilling two coercive objectives: changing both Iran’s behavior and its regime through instruments of hard and soft power. The change in behavior was geared at curbing Iran’s nuclear program, which was described as “non-peaceful.”

The West also has benefited the “Israel” factor as a leverage to push Iran into corner .It has also manipulated the Terror issue in the Middle East to its strategic advantage.

In light of the White House’s detrimental policies, traditional diplomacy tools such as traditional mottos like “Down with America “- which has changed in 2017 as “Down with the U.S. Government” -, along with common broadcasting through IRIB have not been helpful. Iran began to believe that in order to win the diplomacy war, it should resort to public diplomacy programs that attract, inform, persuade, and influence – that is, the necessity of new public diplomacy became almost impossible to ignore.

In 1997, reformists won the election and Seyed Mohammad Khatami - the reformist politician - 5th President of the Islamic Republic (3 August 1997 to 3 August 2005), and an outspoken critic of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government, had run on a platform of liberalization and reform. During his two terms as president, Khatami advocated freedom of expression, tolerance and civil society, constructive diplomatic relations with other states including those in Asia and the EU, and an economic policy that supported a free market and foreign investment. During his Presidency, the system was highly concentrated on the application of public diplomacy. Khatami is known for his proposal of Dialogue among Civilizations. The United Nations proclaimed the year 2001 as the United Nations' *Year of Dialogue among Civilizations*, on Khatami's suggestion. That was the most significant public diplomacy and foreign policy achievement of Iran both in regional and global sphere.

However, the application of power during the Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the 9th and 10th Administrations in the Islamic Republic (2005-

2013) has had a much more different nature which was not, in fact, pleasant for the West and some of its regional puppets. This tense situation fueled by the rhetoric from inside Iran and huge pressures from outside which had given a kind of hard power nature to the officials in that period, most importantly, the periods which coincided with the emergence of new policies in the Middle East in post - 9/11, along with various crisis such as the Arab Spring and Syrian crisis. As the result, it has had backfires on Iran in various aspects. However, Iran could not stay neutral to other country's new policies and their engagements in the region.

Iran entered into a new era of public diplomacy following Hassan Rouhani's victory in the June 2013 presidential election. Iran began both to revitalize its soft power tools and reach out to the international community through a more moderate, tolerant, and open dialogue policy. Digital diplomacy and social media have become increasingly important to this end. The new administration's social-media friendly approach set for fulfilling its foreign policy goals.

To that effect, in 2013, after at least one decade of hard work on identifying its deficiencies and the country's need for infrastructural changes in soft diplomacy tools, Iran stepped in a new era in terms of the application of new instruments for its public diplomacy and digital diplomacy.

Further, in the Digital Age of the 21st century, in which States have to compete in "net wars" and against "networks," the coming to power of President Hassan Rouhani and his 11th administration heralded a much-needed reinvigoration of Iran's public and digital diplomacy. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001).

To insist on practicing diplomacy as usual without effective public diplomacy is like trying to run a car without an engine. Rouhani's administration realized that the Internet and social media should be at the forefront of efforts to craft an alternative narrative to long-propagated narratives on Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and also promote the much-maligned status of Iran. Regional countries such Turkey's views in this regard comparing some Arab States, was different in nature and intentions.

The US, as the forefront of taking the nuclear issue as leverage for imposing pressures on Iran, on the other hand, reached the same level of understanding of the necessity of transformation through its coercive and sanction-oriented policies on Iran to a negotiation and soft diplomacy-based policy beginning in 2013. As US President Barack Obama stated in an interview published in Huffington Post, “We have done the same thing over and over again and there hasn’t been any change – [we] should try something different...”(Luers and Pickering, 2015) President Obama has taken charge of “trying something different” with Cuba and Iran by initiating discrete and patient diplomatic approaches. (Luers and Pickering, 2015) A New Start: New Strategies, New Discourse News production and information-processing techniques and strategies adopted by global media giants are a clear indication of huge efforts undertaken by countries to utilize media as leverage in protecting and consolidating the superiority of their ideologies; achieving their policy goals in economic, cultural, and political issues; and shaping public opinion to be in line with their interests. This trend is indicative of the role and influence of media on public opinion, and these strategies represent the most effective instruments in current world politics – the symbol of a new era providing grounds for diplomacy and a “must” for foreign policy. Despite the national security-related closure of some press and publishing agencies in Iran in the run-up to the 2013 election and, further, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s eight-year Presidency, the current administration has adopted supportive measures toward the press, of course not much in accordance with international standard. The Rouhani administration has provided support to strengthen the relevant infrastructures based on the necessities for promotion of its media diplomacy through the collaboration of its official news agency, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). Working together, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Press TV, Fars News Agency and some other media agencies have paved the way for close interactions of media diplomacy and foreign policy, though such efforts are not yet completely constructive or comprehensive. The common understanding in Iran has been that public diplomacy should be explained in the same frame as official and state diplomacy.

However, the rhetoric of Iranian officials during specific periods for the sake of defending the country's national security was either harshly inverted or misinterpreted as the "warmongering nature of Iran or has left the field of public diplomacy in favor of the opponents. This not only put the nuclear negotiations at risk, but also provided opportunities for the West to use such language as leverage in making the dossier more security-oriented rather than peaceful, as well as making sanctions harsher. This provided legitimate grounds for Iran's opponents to use their own public diplomacy methods to limit or neutralize the narrative and prevented the world-view and self-view of Iran from being well settled and harmonized both internally and with the international community. Faced with this challenging misinterpretation, the 11th administration began its attempts to resolve this via resorting to new diplomacy tools based on maximum engagement, as well as employing a new rhetoric based on patience which I believe is a common element of diplomacy. That is, the new administration in contrast to the previous era, has adopted "patience-oriented diplomacy. "In understanding this challenge, Iran had begun to implement new strategies since 2013 by determining its goals and setting a new agenda that included the consideration of factors such as infrastructure improvements. Thus, the public diplomacy department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became active and involved. Furthermore, other related organs and entities became more organized and collaborative through cooperation with the IRNA, IRIB, Press TV, and other relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations. Previously, the works and activities of these media organs proved relatively inconsequential in terms of cooperation that could lead to achieving a certain common goal.

However, with the 2013 government, the professional public diplomacy approach was ushered in, which focused on the power of soft diplomacy to confront both propaganda and international pressures blocking Iran from fulfilling its foreign policy goals. Iran wielded media-based strategies such as the distribution of books and pamphlets, production of motion pictures, and promotion of radio, television and Internet as well as other diplomacy tools such as cultural exchanges, negotiations, and an emphasis on cultural and civilizations values. In addition, Iran stepped forward to begin direct talks with

other countries in an international diplomacy framework for its foreign policy initiatives.

Iran believes that strengthening the model prescribed by Islam regarding defending the legitimate rights of Muslims and rejecting the dominance policies of expansionists will make States play an active role and restore their rightful status in achieving an Islamic model of democracy, such as in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Bahrain, and lately Yemen. Unlike some regional countries which has either been meddling and/or interfering in the internal affairs of these war-torn countries, Iran has been saying that it applied more reasonable soft power-oriented policies. With its efforts, the current government has created a supranational psychological operation to either confront international media hegemony or to implement dynamic diplomacy in order to connect with and/or meet the will of public opinion. In one way, this approach helped the government to neutralize psychological warfare employed by some main actors through diplomacy. In another way, it was used to convince the influential States, especially on issues like the legitimate and inalienable right of Iran to employ nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes that had placed it under constant pressure, including four decades of sanctions on accusations of so-called “non-peaceful use of nuclear technologies.” This approach has emerged to be more tangible and effective with Iran’s nuclear negotiations being handed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the new administration. Today, despite the politically challenging aspects of the Syrian crisis coupled with other issues such as the aggravation of situation in Iraq, beginning of the Yemeni war, and fear of new U.S. regional policies with the Donald Trump in power, Iran’s new diplomacy still proves to follow the same rout.

As mentioned already, the foreign policy approach of Iran’s pre-2013 administration seems to have made the gaps with the West more prominent and caused the securitization of the nuclear dossier. Some key international actors misused this trend as a bargaining chip against Iran. Accordingly, any attempts by Tehran at emphasizing the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities were ineffective in such a tense political atmosphere and gained no success in de-securitizing its peaceful nuclear activities or repairing its image. Given this falsely harsh and violent image of Iran based on rhetoric, the establishment or

improvement of constructive ties and communication with the international community, as well as the promotion of exports and foreign investment became undoubtedly arduous. This is, in fact, a clear indicator of the significance of public diplomacy or people's diplomacy to promote a positive image of Iran in the international arena. To move Iran forward, there has been an inevitable need to promote public diplomacy with the capabilities of digital diplomacy, which centers on the use of the Internet and new information technologies to help achieve diplomatic objectives, whether it is to promote Iran's international reputation or combat foreign media propaganda.

Given the challenges that Iran has been facing, recommendations to re-create a separate institution dedicated to public diplomacy, in addition to the relevant bodies established previously, have been taken seriously by President Rouhani since the beginning of his presidential campaign. His election strategies sought to coordinate the myriad of information operations being carried out along with particular emphasis on the use of the Internet and social media technologies charged with monitoring, analysis, exposure, and countering of adversary propaganda and disinformation activities on a sustained basis. In the course of Rouhani's campaign, Iran started to experience the real power of digital diplomacy.

The active involvement of Iran's diplomatic body, especially the great efforts by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's first "Digital Minister," increased the enthusiasm and hopes of the Iranian public towards the country's foreign policy. At the same time, Dr. Zarif's highly sophisticated application of new social media in presenting a reasonable and rational image of Iran was in fact an attempt at the de-securitization of Iran's peaceful nuclear activities. From its rise to power in 2013, the current administration and its cabinet have concentrated on social media and social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This, in particular, indicates the vast capacity that helped Iran to recover its public diplomacy strength at home and beyond its borders. President Rouhani explained this in a tweet proclaiming: "All my efforts are for Iranians to benefit information from around the world, as this is their right." President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif's embrace of social networking has helped cast the new administration in a moderate light while also distancing it from the

manner of diplomacy of the 9th and 10th administrations under Ahmadinejad. For example, in a Twitter exchange with Nancy Pelosi's daughter, Zarif effectively declared that Holocaust denial was not Iran's national stance. (Zarif, 2013). Another example is Zarif's Twitter response to a carpenter from Texas who challenged Zarif's tweet regarding the use of chemical weapons and militarism. When the carpenter asked: "Does that include nuking Israel," Zarif replied: "We do not have nukes, they do." (Zarif, 2013). Zarif's YouTube video under the rubric of "Iran's Message: There is a Way Forward" also contributed to efforts to gain support for the country during the nuclear negotiations. The nearly six-minute clip in English, released in November 2013 just before the interim nuclear agreement was signed, shows Zarif defending Tehran's nuclear program based on the principles of "dignity and respect." Without access to such a message, Western journalists and interpreters would have had to translate and analyze the words of Iranian officials and could have conveyed it in their own frame. Social media has helped Iranian officials shape the narrative around their nuclear ambitions. The relatively considerable shift in perceptions toward Iran since 2013, especially the perceptions in the US and Europe, could be due in part to the public relations campaign that is being conducted by Iran through both social media and public diplomacy initiatives. Rouhani's administration has used social media in an effort to garner international support and as a medium to convey its position to the outside world.

The most daunting hurdle for Iran's public diplomacy has been how to best utilize the relevant instruments and capacities to reach out to the world, as well as harmonizing and reconciling inconsistencies between its foreign policy and public diplomacy. Embracing digital diplomacy has been key in these efforts. Iran, as part of a new statecraft initiative, has begun to use new media technologies to engage in "digital conversations" with the West and the East to better convey its message of peace and solidarity as the sole answer to the world's problems. The West's "whiz-kids" have taken to heart the notion that "it is not whose Army wins but whose story wins."(Hallams, 2011)

Rouhani's digital (Digi) diplomats, on the other hand, recognize digital diplomacy as a great chance to focus efforts on crafting a message that will appeal to stabilizing peace and security both for the region and Iran. The way

President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif used Twitter to wish Jews around the world a happy Rosh Hashanah in September 2013, commanded world attention and seemed to herald a new era of social media diplomacy and public exchange. This stunning exchange of direct Twitter diplomacy from Tehran represented a fundamental change for a nation that for years seemingly cared little about its capabilities in the application of soft diplomacy. Iran has thus initiated a new discourse based on soft diplomacy, but is being challenged by the hawkish stances of some key international actors that have demonstrated a considerable shift from their soft diplomacy in recent years by maximizing the application of their massive hard diplomacy tools. The defeat of their hard power and aggressive stances, and the success of Iran's win-win diplomacy in recent months in the framework of nuclear negotiations with P5+1, proved to be a prime example of how diplomacy can resolve crises. This success has once more proved Iran's historical capability to take advantage of soft power diplomacy, rather than aggressive one, either for interaction or for confronting the regional or international counteraction exhibited by others.

With the nuclear negotiations came to end, albeit with ups and downs, paying attention to some of the basic strategic goals and priorities of Iran's foreign policy – the de-securitization of its international position, revival of its political and cultural behavior, recovering its global status, and the constructive and effective interaction with the international community – gives us the idea that Iran has optimistically embarked upon a long and challenging path of engagement with the world. The overall affect of Iran's new engagement in International arena has been obvious on its public diplomacy approaches towards the regional issue, it has both given Iran an extent of dare with confident to step with new face in the region and interact or counteract with the powers engaged in the region. There is this question that what if, however, the outcome of nuclear talks and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action bear an unexpected result with the new U.S. administration in power? Would this affect Iran's newly restructured public diplomacy?

It is ultimately the strength and seriousness of the will of the government and the nation – rather than the sheer volume of tweets, blogs, and texts – that would shape success of Iran's public diplomacy and the sustainability of its

approaches. At the same time, the entirety of Iran's domestic and international issues will influence the condition and future of its public diplomacy and as the result on its foreign policy.

Whatever the effects may be, Iran will insist that current approaches be upheld in condition that the crucial support given by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, as well as popular support would continue. Iran is well aware that any inconsistency in this regard will once again provide the opportunity for other regional, international actors or opponents to exploit these inconsistencies and generate new fronts for attack against Iran's interests. Because the outcome of the Talks is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Whatever the merits of this outcome, the negotiation itself has opened the long-closed door to Iran.

In sum, 8 years of imposed war was the most important reason that caused Iran lagging behind in its application of public diplomacy and soft power because national defense became its main priority.

The test of Iran public diplomacy has not been limited to these issues. The U.S military presence in the region has been accepted differently by different countries in the region. The Islamic Republic has seems never accepted the U.S presence and its involvement in regional issues but at the same time has also been conveying this message to the regional countries through public diplomacy tools and has been consistent in this regard. As, Ambassador Mousavian in one of his speeches emphasized, Iran repeatedly announced that the U.S. is the first and the most dangerous threat to Iran's national security and there are as many as 20 reasons why Iran does not trust the U.S. (Mousavian, 2015). However, Turkey's stances and policies on the same issue has not been consistent and has got interval in terms of quality and speed according to the necessities of time and situations. This is because of the difference between Iran and Turkey's regional and international status and role, which influenced by their place on the world map and their historical background.

Besides the difference in their stances and policies with regard to the U.S. regional policies, they have been following in many occasions on different approaches with regard to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region

in particular, regarding crisis in Syria and Iraq. This characteristic has, in fact, put them in opposite sides but except some war of words, both have avoided adoption of aggressive public diplomacy.

Regarding the role of Turkey's public diplomacy it can be said that its public diplomacy towards Iran peaceful nuclear activities has been both supportive and critical. Turkey's most transparent support was her participation in joint declaration of Iran nuclear deal with 10 articles brokered in 17 May 2010; a deal which the U.S. has rejected promptly. Although Turkey's motivation behind this approach can be evaluated as Turkey's bid to have more active engagement in regional and international affairs and, besides, as a counteraction move against Western pressures in various fronts.

In the following section, I have comparatively analyzed the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey in Syria and Iraq while the center of focus is on Iran and its public diplomacy. The aim is to have a supplementary debate on the operation of Iranian diplomacy in Syria and Iraq on the context of Turkey's stances and attitudes.

4.2 Public Diplomacy Of Iran In Syria And Iraq

Rise in the benefit of applying soft power against hard power and the politics of thought against the politics of power of non –State actors comparing with that of State actors, is one of the phenomenon which emphasizes more on the role and effect of public diplomacy. More accurately, the cultural values and political decision of a country are, in fact, the resources for soft power to emerge. Through public diplomacy, these power sources serve to the country's strategy and diplomacy to achieve national interests. Despite the differences between public diplomacy and official diplomacy, government is the major responsible for public diplomacy. Moreover, States employ some tools such as the media, academic institutions, tourism industry and NGOs through public diplomacy for advancement of foreign policy goals. These tools help the States to shape the public opinions and influencing politicians in the target country. As mentioned so far, Iran has embarked on the new and long way to these aims. Although, Iran's attempts in order to make some regional States to understand its real intentions in Syria and Iraq has had no outcome so far and it seems that

the climate of mistrust still exists, even, from Turkey towards Iran. The recent statements of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs accusing Iran of sectarianism and the reactions by his Iranian counterpart and the continuation of war of words between their speakers is the proof of this claim.

(ir.sputniknews, 2017), (milatgazetesi, 2017)

In this regard, a report published in Hurriyet, in which it is said Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in his speech at the Munich security conference accused Iran of its policies towards Syria and Iraq and that Iran is going to transform Syria and Iraq into Shia. "(hurriyet ,2017)

As the response, the war of words began since then. The content of the statements by both sides implies that both sides are, in one way or another, eradicating the small amount of hopes on finding permanent solutions in Syria and Iraq.

As mentioned earlier, Iran and Turkey are two middle power States. Both have their own exclusive plans and policies, besides, coalition or proxy forces with regard to the regional developments, and most importantly, towards Iraq and Syria. However, it seems they intend to administer stable peace in the region. Considering such a nature and the various aspects of their policies discussed so far, finding their public diplomacy criterion is considerably important to understand how they their public diplomacy operation affects their foreign policy approaches in Syria and Iraq.

Iran and Turkey both employ their public diplomacy capacities in different ways to promote and consolidate their power and interest, and perhaps, hegemony in the region. Or, at least, trying to keep the balance with regard to each other's regional power. Meanwhile, both have different opportunities in employing these capacities and instruments. At the same time, their relative success depends on their motives and strategies. Meanwhile, the Syria crisis and intensification of tensions in Iraq has shifted the parameters of the regional actors' relationship and the nature of their interaction and counteraction, and as the result, changed the nature of phenomenon and approaches within international community. Both of them calculated to achieve their goals with less cost but best outcome in this process.

On the other hand, Iran's public diplomacy with regard to the region has always been influenced by its official diplomacy. That is, although, Iran tried its best to maximize the use of soft power strategies, particularly, with the end of Iraq's invasion of Iran, this trend has had ups and downs, intensity and weaknesses or fragility in the past two decades, in the sense that, Iran has emphasized more on developments in some regional countries like Iraq and Syria since its official diplomacy followed the same path. Despite, its hard power variables also focused on the countries of the "axis of resistance" against the American-Israeli axis. Unlike Iran, Turkey had its focus and emphasizes on the balancing mechanism and mediator role in the region. This nature of policy is not consistent with before the Justice and Development Party era. Because Turkey was believed and known more as a country with hard power as the focal point of its foreign policy. The main reason behind this, perhaps, was its military power besides its economic power. With the Justice and Development Party coming to power, soft power considered more seriously along with hard power. The Justice and Development Party has successfully achieved this goal in order to promote its regional status and credibility through some internal economic, political and social reforms in politics and economy.

Turkey first came up with serious will to manage the currents of the regional developments and conflicts. Its mediatory role in Israeli-Syria conflict and Israel –Palestine disputes are some of the examples in this regard. In his second half, Turkey under the Justice and Development Party has begun interfering and hegemonic approaches in the region. In general, after the collapse of Saddam Regime, both Iran and Turkey looked for new opportunities in Iraq, mostly, ideological oriented, rather than mere economic. Of course, later on shifted to security and power struggle oriented preferences. In Syria, also, these countries have been looking for different opportunities and this made them engaged in proxy war.

That is, Syria and Iraq became a field which the world has seen the most extensive competition of their soft and hard power and it seems they employed all their capacities such as publications, films, cultural exchange, radio and television and social medias in supporting one or more non-state actor/s and

opposing the others. In this process, both countries have employed two basic factors:

Firstly, strategic communication in the sense that they focused closely to various elements involved in Iraq and Syria in order to identify the government policy, and **Secondly**, promotion of extensive relations with the key peoples in the target countries through holding conferences, seminars, identifying main corridors and communication channels, granting scholarships and also cultural exchanges.

Both of them understood that public diplomacy is not propaganda, psychological war or a mere cultural activity, but rather, the combination of all at once.

On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, there are some factors with paramount importance, which promote or weaken the operation of public diplomacy of a country in the target country. Language, literature, art, ideals and values, ideology, diplomatic ties, cultural ties, elevating the historical negative understanding, healthy economy, the power to influence and reshape public opinion and influence among international media are some of the main potential elements in this regard.

Cultural, historical and religious commonalities, being geographically close to Iraq and Syria, the Iranian and Shiite living or residing in Iraq and Syria, the cultural capacities and capabilities of the Iranian are the most important public diplomacy opportunities for Iran in Iraq and Syria. Iran has been able to promote the status of its international position and maximize its attraction within these target countries through these elements.

On the other hand, unlike Turkey, Iran could not promote civil societies, so has been under continues pressure by international communities and, still, there are some potential harms, threatening Iran in this regard.

- **Opportunities for Iran in Iraq and Syria**

Iran and Iraq are two neighboring countries; share the longest common border by far besides an ancient cultural and religious heritage. Their disputes began mainly after the collapse of the Hashemite Monarchy, which resulted in the country withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact in 1958. With the Saddam Hossein

of Baath Party gained power in 1960s, it took a more aggressive stance on border disputes with its neighbor, specially, in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Iraq launched an aggressive invasion over border disputes and a design to gain control of oil-rich areas in Iran's territory. The conflict lasted for eight years and ended in a stalemate, and involved the use of chemical weapons and ethnic violence against Iraqi Shia Arabs, who were accused of colluding with Shia Iran. With the fall of Saddam Hossein's regime in 2003, their relations normalized and as of 2010 they have signed more than 100 economic and cooperation agreements. (Press TV, 2010) and besides promotion of economic relations, the cultural and religious tourism started between the two countries especially from Iran to Iraq. This nature of relations could create some opportunities for Iran in Iraq.

Opportunities in Iraq:

Some of these opportunities can be listed as bellow:

- Shiites are the majority in Iraq.
- The historical, cultural and civilizational relations background with the Kurds.
- 16% of Iraq population are Persian and with Iranian origin.
- There are the holy sites and Najaf Seminary, which is the cradle of the emergence of a Shiite religious leaders such as Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Ayatollah Khomeini
- Iran's assistance of Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hossein
- Iran's efforts in reconstruction of Iraq
- Solidarity with the Iraqi people against Saddam, the US attacks and acts of terrorism by ISIS
- Iran's permission to huge number of refugees from Iraq to Iran under Saddam and also huge number of Iraqis residing in Iran. They are a serious potential local human force for Iran.
- The official request of Iraqi government from Ghasem Suleimani, the commander of Qudus Army of Iran to lead major operation in Iraq against ISIS and other terror groups, which, by it, implies how deep is Iran's influence in Iraq.

Opportunities in Syria:

Iran's opportunities in Syria are different with that in Iraq. The most obvious background of ties between Tehran- Damascus goes back to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Syria's cooperation with Iran continued during Iraq imposed war on Iran and also Iran's support and assistance to Syrians during post war period, in particular, since the beginning of recent crisis in 2011. This nature of relations, has provided the Islamic Republic with some unique opportunities to promote its public diplomacy strategies; some of major ones are as bellow:

- Support to the Resistance movement in Syria
- Investment in Syria, construction of power plants and cement plants;
- Iranian pilgrims travelling in huge number to Syria
- Cooperation in the scientific- academic fields and holding cultural weeks;
- The Alawites and the Shiites living in Syria and their influence is huge in various aspects.

- **Obstacles in Iraq and Syria:**

In spite of these opportunities, there are also serious challenges and obstacles from in and outside Iran for the fulfillment of public diplomacy strategies in Iraq and Syria:

- *Weakness or fragility in approach:*

There has been no or less attention to long-term approaches and not enough attention made to identity and image building. The focus has been spent on the daily situations and disputes; this has caused the function of Iran's public diplomacy in Iraq and Syria inefficient.

- *Problems in employing the instruments:*

Despite being relatively rich in culture and arts; especially, cinema, Iran has benefited its advantages much less in Iraq and Syria (Shokri ,2013).

- *Mistrust of some religions and groups to Iran:*

The sense of mistrust, miscalculation and suspicion between Iran and Arabs has long historical background. This mistrust in Iraq and Syria is limited to some of

opposition groups and Sunni figures. Some of Iran's strategies with regard to internal conflicts in these countries seems helped to reduce misunderstandings, but could not success to deescalate the conflicts. Moreover, Turkey's public diplomacy in Syria and Iraq has been more successful in this respect.

- *Iran's culture became politicized and securitized:*

With the effects of developments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, Iran's culture and Shiites identity politicized and securitized in the sense that Iran-phobia and Shiite-phobia have become two challenging issues for Iran .The role of Western and Arab media should not be underestimated in this regard.

- *The revival of Arab Nationalism as a tool to confront Iran:*

Iran's rivals in the region began to encourage the revival of Arab Nationalism, Pan Arab and Salafism movements to confront Iran's policies in the region, particularly, in Iraq. According to Owen, this mechanism and strategy has been used to deal with Iran's ideological and cultural influence and conceded that: "It could just as easily have stimulated opposition, either from the local Shi'as, who tended to see Arabism as a way of bolstering Sunni supremacy, or by the leaders of other Arab States like Saudi Arabia who resisted anything they saw as an Iraqi bid for leadership over the rest of the Arab world. " (Owen, 2004)

- *Wahhabism and Salafism:*

Radical Salafism and politicized Wahhabism, motivated and encouraged a wave of a religious ideology to confront the Iranian culture and the Islamic Revolution. The empowerment of Shiites, on the other hand, activities of Wahhabi groups and movements in the region have increased.

- *Soft power and the U.S. public diplomacy:*

The U.S. has been actively challenging Iran's cultural and Islamic teachings in Iraq with the centrality of Islamic Revolution and by employing its public diplomacy tools.

The public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey in Iraq and Syria has been both to save the status quo and support to the standing governments whenever it has been necessary. However, Iran often looks at Iraq and Syria as 'neighbors of the concurrent, accordant with same interest, while, Turkey's stance towards these

two southern neighbors has been counteractive and conflictual. Iran represents as ally and, to some extent, intermediary role in Iraq and Syria to stabilize the internal regional situation but Turkey is believed to seek for regional hegemony and leadership. If the latter is true, then Turkey's public diplomacy seeks to change or revise the existing structure and behavior in Iraq and Syria according to its own foreign policy preferences.

4.3 How Iran Foreign Policy Operates? The Case Of Syria And Iraq

Through the history, great statesmen have always created balance and compliance between the realities within the border and the developments overseas. This nature of behavior brought with itself some new aspects in IR and world politics. That is, during the history of human political and social life, different governments have followed various ideologies and worldviews, defined different goals for themselves and looked for strategies to fulfill their aims on the framework of those realities. More accurately, the stances and political approaches of each government and State are comprehensible through the goals and ambitions that it follows.

Thus, paying attention to the aspirations of each country via understanding the policies of the other side of the national border plays highly significant role in the understanding and the analysis of that country foreign policy. This trend has become one of the most important principles of statesmanship.

In the same manner, Iran, indispensably, has adopted different approaches in its foreign policy approaches at different period in time, however, with keeping up its loyalty to the ideal of the Revolution. As a matter of fact, such a nature can give us the idea of existence of two possible dimensions of foreign policy for Iran: "Fixed and Variable" dimensions.

The "*fixed dimension*" refers to the ideals and basic principles of the foreign policy of Ayatollah Imam Khomeini (RA), such as no return from mistrust to the U.S. intentions and policies towards the Middle East and Muslim World. Also, de-realization of Israel, which is called by Iran as "Occupier Regime" which are not alterable.

Considering Ayatollah Khomeini's policies and ideals and the effect of these ideals on the foreign policy of Iran will help to better understand the roots, origins and role of Iran's public diplomacy. Ayatollah Imam Khomeini's views, even if in its modest form, essentially break the structure of the existing international policy and that, accordingly, the structure of the existing world is deemed unfair. So that in the wake of the creation of new poles and power relations, his policies and ideals is seen as apostolic and sacred. This approach has made the think tanks and experts in the field of Iran foreign policy from outside the country and even from inside to answer a general response, simply as 'Yes' or 'No' or to make simple and explicit judgments. This trend has created different imagination and understanding of Iran public diplomacy. However, if the said experts do not pay attention to these ideals, their strategies and solutions will be taken as irrelevant, illogical and invalid for Iran's foreign policy so that the topics raised may seem unreasonable and radical, that is, less based on the actual structure of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Accordingly, the nature of its public diplomacy can be a reflection of this nature of its foreign policy. This approach has had two important aspects. First, its ability to save the Islamic Republic of any serious political challenges and domestic chaos, and second, it has guaranteed the Islamic Republic's independency and a sense of confidence in various fields.

On the other hand, foreign policy of Iran since the Islamic Revolution has been based on Ayatollah Imam Khomeini's ideals and principles and his speeches because his words has been based on religious, intellect and true wisdom of a serious global uprising against the United States and Israel. That is, the Islamic Republic has been consistent in the instruction of its foreign policy; however, there has sometimes been some shifts whenever necessary.

This nature in foreign policy is still continuing in the depth but seems a little bit different on the surface because of the necessities of shifts in regional and international political atmosphere. That's why Iran's foreign policy and domestic policy are completely separate fields. It followed 'variety principle' in its domestic policy. That is, the "*variable dimension*" refers to its domestic policy. There has always a different selection existed right in front of a particular government or political activists. This variety has had the potential

power to alter the public diplomacy approaches. For instances, in the first decade of the revolution, the followers of centralized State with central planning approaches were well able to act as they wish. In the second decade of the Revolution also the supporters of individual freedoms and a State with weak or limited power had more opportunity for maneuvering. This nature has been continuing during different governments till the 9th, 10th and 11th governments. But in the foreign policy there has been obstacles for governments in power or political activist and this obstacle is very basic. That is, if the government or political activist does not accept and follow Ayatollah Imam Khomeini's philosophy and centralized States' ideals in the foreign policy approaches, the government or the activist is believed to be incapable and is only limited in simple analysis and assessments. This characteristic of the structure and the system clearly indicates how would or should the public diplomacy be like.

The still existing believe is that if a government, a political activist or an intellectual detests or abominates his philosophy or words, that means they inevitably waste their power of mind and information for a simply wrong judgment. This nature of foreign policy and public diplomacy has its root from the sacred philosophy of 'unity against the Western hegemony', which is still valid and accepted. This is, perhaps, the reason that, what is important is the government or relevant bodies working or commenting on foreign policy mechanism, should make their stance clear whether they are either with or against, whether they are ardent supporters or fully opposed in order to let them keeping on or stop move forward. The system has never accepted or let the middle or duality in foreign policy approaches. Inasmuch as 'a big word, because of its big outcome, does not give space to others', it would bring two outcomes, both of them would harm the system in the long run:

First, it would unconsciously propel or push them towards the enemy. Second, it would decrease them to 'marginal' force.

How it comes? Because the system acts in such a way that makes the opponents having neither internal motivation, force or opportunity to act against nor to be counted active within domestic disputes; that is, weaken them or limit their activities. On the other hand, when the cause of their presence in the scene becomes weak, they are operationally weakened to nothing. That means,

according to the system, any refusal or denial of Ayatollah Imam Khomeini's ideal and words means having no ideal or words in the foreign policy decision-making process. There should be no reaction to any action in foreign policy decision-making and this is to be accepted by anybody within the government. This does mean a centralized system of government being so much rational, selective and cautious in the process of foreign policy decision-making.

This short summary of the nature of foreign policy decision-making gives us a hint of what the public diplomacy is like. Operationally, it is a public diplomacy, which, in fact, becomes the magic behind the success of Iran in the most of its regional and global policies comparing other regional countries.

Considering the direct and indirect effects of some regional and International developments such as 9/11, countries began to adopt public diplomacy approaches both in coherent with their geostrategic, geopolitical situation and national security preferences and also the general nature of public diplomacy as accepted and believed by the International system. Iran has not been an exception. The political and security consequences of 9/11 has made Iran to alter its public diplomacy approaches rapidly to a security oriented one and as a matter of fact, a shift occurred in its foreign policy approaches, no matter how its public diplomacy harms others because others have applied their public diplomacy in the same manner. This, in fact, implies the supremacy of "self-interest" on "collective - interest" in the regional and world politics.

In general, this nature of public diplomacy has been empowered by two important characteristics of the foreign policy decision makers in Iran;

- 1- Understanding 'the urgency' and 'seriousness of the situation'.
- 2- Having less looked at the "Region" in its physical and objective aspect but more based on cultural and historical commonalities with countries in the region. That is, Iran has taken the performances of governments and States in the region as the dominant factor of analysis and assessment of its regional public diplomacy and, as the result, foreign policy. The importance of "region" for the foreign policy of Iran is analytical and abstraction and not tangible and urgency oriented so does its public diplomacy approaches. The benefit is that the foreign policy decision makers in the Islamic Republic

target the performance of each State and the government separately and in conjunction with others and by means of real assessments and factsheets, they easily control and manage both the region physically and in its other aspects. This is, in fact, telling us that how much Iran public diplomacy has been active in the region since the revolution and specially in conjunction with foreign policy since two past decades.

- 3- Another important characteristic of Iran foreign policy decision making process which directly or indirectly is the reflection of its public diplomacy, is that the assessments, analysis and scenarios provided by intellectuals and analysts within or outside Iran about issues which directly or indirectly concerns it, are not always seriously taken as the base of action. The base, in the first place, is the ideals and teachings of Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, the Constitution Law.

The problem is that with the Islamic Revolution, Iranian diplomacy formed within the context of the climates which are emerged out of an environment of action and reaction and, at the same time, the space for activity of this diplomacy is provided by its enemies since they are still the governing global power and still able to indirectly create opportunities for Iranian foreign policy to act and operate. The policies adopted by Georg Bush administration against Iran are the unique example. In other words, while the Islamic Revolution is actively dynamic, Iran and its foreign policy is inevitably operates on “action” and "reaction basis”. With such situation, there is this belief within the system that the Iranian diplomacy and as the result foreign policy does not need much macro design and great strategies and that the primary will of the nation and the fulfillment of the ideal of the Revolution is taken as equal to fulfillment of a great strategy. This might seem naïve and ingenuous but is something, which accepted and respected within the system and has moved forward successfully. The system would like to keep itself in its historical context by the help of ‘cultural factor’ and the potential of the Islamic Revolution for introducing Iran to the region and the world. This is an approach, which the West, in particular, Great Britain and then the U.S. has been following in order to prevent the rise of Iran’s historical and cultural capacities, regionally and globally. Iran public diplomacy and foreign policy have been shifting the country’s interest from

national to regional scope since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution. The reality is that the basic challenge of Iran foreign policy since last decade is less because of conspiracy and external containment, but rather, more because of neglecting the cultural and mental capacities of Iranian society; better to say, its soft power which especially emerged after Revolution.

With such a structure, there is no expectation for the rise of a powerful and real democracy as the spirit of the Revolution does not accept and permit Western democracy.

Despite all these pros and cons in Iran foreign policy structure and public diplomacy approach, the system often introduces two main objectives of “National Objectives” and “Transnational Objectives”, for its foreign policy, which are relevantly, affected Iran’s diplomacy in Syria and Iraq and in its relations with Turkey.

The consolidation and development of the national power, preserving the independency of the country, supplying security and promotion of the system’s regional and international status are some of the main "national objectives" in Iran foreign policy. "Transnational objectives" encompass Islamization of the world which has been introduced and defined by Late Supreme Leader as “Exporting the Revolution”, the expansion and spread of human and divine values, fighting with dominant powers and support to the oppressed, the formation of the single Islamic Ummah which Imam Khomeini (RA) re-emphasized on this issue in his “Political divine Wills “ which is described as “Timeless Message” addressing Muslim around the world. These characteristics, clearly, implies the domains and basis of Iran foreign policy. (farsnews, 2016)

The study of Iran's public diplomacy structure and foreign policy approaches, gives us at least 16 parameters for its foreign policy strategy. Each of which has a direct or an indirect effect on how its public diplomacy operates in Iraq and Syria, which at the same time determine its relations with regional countries, like Turkey.

- **Iran's Foreign Policy Strategies**

- 1. A strategy of “a regional major power “.**

Solutions:

- 1-1 Comprehensive development in all areas
- 1-2 Powerful presence in regional and international organizations
- 1-3 Targeting and finding new allies and partners in strategically important places in the world .
- 1-4 To challenge International Imperialism
- 1-5 A purposeful show of power through different military, scientific and political means. Iran’s proliferation of new military equipment has been done under the framework of the International norms and the relevant regulations of the U.N. Security Council and just aimed at defending Iran’s sovereignty and national security.
- 1-6 Extensive networking in regional countries and sensitive places in the world.

- 2 Exporting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution:**

Solutions:

- 2-1 Investment in the fields of art and media such as film production aimed at the dissemination of revolutionary culture and the ideals of the revolution.
- 2-2 Targeting and attracting the public opinion worldwide.
- 2-3 Promotion of the level of interaction with intellectuals in the world, esp. with supporting countries
- 2-4 Facilitate the process of foreign students entrance to Iran and investment in this respect
- 2-5 Bringing up the ideals of the Revolution in International community and during diplomatic visits.
- 2-6 Expansion of the areas of activity of the Consular and diplomatic Missions and cultural attaché

- 3 Unified Islamic Ummah.**

Solutions:

- 3-1 The organization of Islamic Conference should become more active in order to solve problems of the Muslim world

- 3-2 Formation of political, security and economic Union among Islamic countries.
- 3-3 Managing ideological disputes among Muslim countries
- 3-4 Formation of the strategy of managing public opinion in Islamic world
- 3-5 Increasing the current level of consultations through Iranian Missions abroad to produce or collect relative consensus among Muslim countries about different regional and international issues
- 3-6 Dealing with Iran - phobia project
- 3-7 Investing attempts in managing and solving disputes and misunderstandings among Muslim countries considering their national and transnational interests
- 3-8 Cooperation with more moderate and more independent Islamic countries in order to manage and control radical independent countries such as Saudi Arabia
- 3-9 Active presence in all Muslim countries
- 3-10 Expansion of economic and technological interactions with Muslim countries
- 3-11 Emphasize on the commonalities in interaction with Islamic countries
- 3-12 Investment on designing a detailed and comprehensive program to push public opinion, nations and governments toward the idea of the unified Islamic Ummah
- 3-13 Expansion of the level of activities of the Islamic Development Bank with the aim of rendering help to solve the internal problems of Muslim countries.

4-Islamic Awakening.

Solutions:

- 4-1 Bringing up fundamental and dynamic Islamic ideas in different regional and international occasion with the emphasize on commonalities
- 4-2 To facilitate conditions for attracting Muslim elites to the country's higher education centers
- 4-3 To hold various efficient meetings on regional and international issues with the participation of Muslim elites
- 4-4 Expansion of Radio and TV programs on the area of regional Islamic issues

4-5 To use the best of social media and cyber atmosphere to have more interaction with Muslim public opinion

4-6 To provide effective pattern of Islamic country through relentless fight with dominate powers and defense of the oppressed.

5-Supporting the Intifada.

Solutions:

5-1 Reminding the Palestine Intifada continuously to International community

5-2 To make OIC more active in this regard

5-3 Allocation of financial, political and intellectual support to Intifada

5-4 To create coordination among Palestinian groups and to resolve disputes

5-5 To stimulate and guiding the public opinion and intellectuals in Muslim countries to support Intifada

6-Applying preventive measures.

Solutions:

6-1 Growth in the military capabilities, economic and political power

6-2 To increase the cost of any attack to Iran's interest in the world

6-3 Military and political power show by launching new short and long-range rockets

6-4 Determining new partners and allies around the world

6-5 To guide the lines of conflicts to the outside of boundaries of geography of Iran

6-6 To create a network of people loyal and supporter to Iran around the world

6-7 Powerful presences in International organization

7-Development of regional co-operations.

Solutions:

7-1 An effort to expand the activities of the enterprises such as ECO BANK and D8

7-2 Establishment of economic, political, etc. union which could encompass all
or

Some regional countries

7-3 To prevent and to resolve disputes among regional countries

7-4 Identify and capture regional markets

7-5 Expansion of cooperation with regional country in tourism industry

7-6 Creating coordination among regional countries to fight regional terrorism

7-7 Expansion of technological interactions with regional countries in the field
of

Nano technology

7-8 Improvement in the level of consultation with regional countries on
International issues

7-9 Targeting and investing on the intellectuals and public opinions in regional

Countries

8-Unity and coalition with supporting countries.

Solutions:

8-1 Finding new partners and friends

8-2 Being actively present in sensitive places in the world (Latin America, South
East Asia and, etc.)

8-3 Increasing the level of cultural, economic, political interactions with
friendly countries

8-4 Establishment of a union comprising friendly and supporting governments
from different places of the world

8-5 Increasing diplomatic consultations

9-Presence in the world sensitive regions.

Solutions:

9-1 Identifying strategic regions and the regions, which would be effective on
the future outlook of the world.

9-2 Expansion of economic interaction

10- To help creating new power bloc: by interfering in the governing international order and the creation of new international system and new power blocs by the Islamic Republic.

Solutions:

10-1 Expansion of political and economic cooperation with supporting and independent countries

10-2 Establishment of a universal Union comprising powerful and supporting countries in Latin America, South East Asia, Africa.

10-3 To advertise and boost the idea of creating new power bloc among friendly and supporting countries

10-4 To get supporting countries involved in the concerning international issues

10-5 To support independent countries against the dominant system

11- The protection of the freedom of movement and the oppressed nation.

Solutions:

11-1 To support humanitarian and freedom movements in International organizations

11-2 Political, economic and intellectual support to the oppressed nations and freedom movements

11-3 Investment through social media and mass media aimed at supporting to the poor nations and the freedom movements

11-4 Expansion of interactions with the oppressed nations and defending them against the oppressors.

12- ‘Non-alignment ‘ as a third pattern in the International system: This is the result of the” No East, No West” motto according to the principle 152 of the Constitution.

Solutions:

12-1 To help the emergence of new power blocs

12-2 Increasing the national power

12-3 Adherence to the principles of Imam Khomeini (RA)

12-4 powerful and continuous presence in International community to bring up the country's views

12-5 To benefit the capacities of OIC, Non-Allied Movement and others to confront the politics of imperialism

13- Fight with dominant powers: this is the direct outcome of foreign policy principles to show that the Islamic Republic will never compromise with the dominant powers.

Solutions:

13-1 Expansion of national power in every aspect

13-2 Intellectually confront with ideology of dominant powers

13-3 Widespread investment on media to fight dominate policies

13-4 Making efforts to prevent the realization of the imperialistic plans in Int. Organizations.

13-5 Establishing new Anti-Imperialism blocs.

13-6 Benefiting the capacities of OIC and NAM to confront imperialistic policies.

14- Managing the public opinions in the world: Iran has been able to shift the regional and international public opinion on some issues and to fix them as a norm, such as opposition to the unilateral policies of the U.S.A, opposition to the rise of violence and terror in the occupied land.

Solutions:

14-1 Expansion of the area of media activity to all over the world

14-2 Designing a new project to manage public opinion based on the characteristics of each region in the world

14-3 Production of movies specially designed to guide the public opinion to a certain destination

14-4 Make the world public opinion involve in Iran disputes and conflicts with dominant powers

14-5 Promotion of tourism industry with a perfect strategy

14-6 The maximum use of the capacities of diplomatic and cultural Missions overseas with different purposes

15- Managing International conflicts and disputes: this is the strategy, which helps the Islamic Republic to prevent political, and security in its disputes with other members of International society.

Solutions:

15-1 Expansion of national power

15-2 Creation of a counteraction climate in the ties between big powers to prevent their consensus

15-3 Paying more concentration on diplomatic consultations

15-4 Coordination between diplomatic activities and advertisements

15-5 To present the hostile country in fait accompli

16- Dialogue instead of conflict: Iran insistently has tried to pursue its goals through dialogue and communication based on the Islamic system components.

Solutions:

16-1 Paying more attention to diplomatic activities

16-2 Finding new partners in the world

16-3 The best use of capacities of groups and organizations such as NAM and OIC

Despite all these strategies and suggested solutions, there are realities about the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. These realities are either the realization of the Supreme Leader's final command or based on the necessities and requirements of time or within its fix criterion. That is, there are many occasions that the first and last decisions are made by the decree of the Supreme Leader with regard to the system's foreign policy in the region or in domestic policy even decisions with regard to the scope of public diplomacy activities.

However, there are at least four major factors, which, in one way or another, affect public diplomacy approaches of Iran and Turkey:

- 1- Historical background,
- 2- Differences and commonalities in their regional policy ambitions,
- 3- Differences in the level and capacity of their engagement in International affairs
- 4- Their memberships in Intentional organizations.

Considering the pros and cons, the potential threats to Iran's national interests and the above-mentioned factors along with foreign policy strategies and the suggested solutions applied to dispose and remove the threats and promote its public diplomacy both in general and with regard to Syria and Iraq, it would be possible to presume Turkey's possible reaction or stances and, in the meantime, helps us to understand the nature of interactions and counteractions between Iran- Turkey.

That is, the differences between theoretical approaches, resources, principles and the goals of the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey imply that they are really different in discourses, instruments and public diplomacy agenda and structure. For instances, Iran has shown its intention to resolve regional crisis within the regional territories through the cooperation and collaboration of regional actors and, in fact, supports the regional equations to be set by the regional countries. On the other hand, Turkey has been supporter of bonds among countries of region but with an outbound arrangement going beyond the region and closeness to Western countries, especially, the U.S. This is one of the reason that Turkey's return to the Middle East and its effect on the region has been completely different with that of Iran's already presence in the region. Iran has been seen as a rising threats, especially, after 9/11 while Turkey has been believed to have stepped in the region with new wave of soft power, economic power, democratic system and positive constructive approaches aiming at bringing peace and stability to the region, except the situation in post-Syria crisis. Within such framework, Iran has seen Turkey as the neighbor with NATO – level military power and historical roots in the region , so that has been the only neighboring country which would have been a preventive or balancing power against Iran's policies in Iraq and Syria. This understanding was one of many factors worked as an incentive for Iran to step into the region, particularly, in Iraq and Syria, with new approaches in public diplomacy. As an

example, Iran has always emerged as a country opposed to the presence of the West in the region. In contrast, Turkey seems always tend to provide the grounds for the Western countries to be present in regional equations and calculations through the expansion of its relations with Western countries.

This conflictual political strategy between Turkey and Iran towards the relations with the West is more related to their political-ideological structures and the way they believe in the West. Iran's relations with the West is mostly follows anti-Western motto and has deep conflict with the U.S and some of its strategic allies such as Israel but at the same time has had continuous tensions with Western European countries while Turkey has been following the Western oriented approach and an effort for Europe membership.

Thus, paying attention to these comparative and analytical assessment of public diplomacy and foreign policy of Iran and Turkey, gives us the hint that how much their understanding of issues in Syria and Iraq is delicate and fragile. In the conclusion, I share with you more transparent reasons to prove this fragility.

5 CONCLUSION

This contribution is a case study on the impact of public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey on their foreign policy with respect to the developments in Syria and Iraq. To understand the extent and nature of their efforts, through the three chapters of the present study, I have tried to examine the structural and behavioral impacts of public diplomacy on their foreign policy approaches, considering that they have utilized relatively similar means but in different ways. To this aim, a mixed method of comparison, analysis, and description is used.

In the first chapter, the public diplomacy was defined; the impact of the concepts of hard and soft power was discussed and lastly the relations between public diplomacy and foreign policy were analyzed. The second and third chapters examined the public diplomacy and foreign policy of Turkey and Iran towards Iraq and Syria, regarding the geopolitical position, geographical location and cultural characteristics.

I have followed the path of "Constructivists" account to define the behavioral patterns of Iran and Turkey towards each other's policies developments in Syria and Iraq. Considering the fact that the 'Constructivism' puts important places for values, norms and identity and looks at the relationship between the structure and broker with interactive manner, it has more potential and capacity in elaborating and analyzing the role and effect of their public diplomacy and, as the result, their foreign policy towards Middle East developments; esp. towards Syria and Iraq. This theory pays attention not only to both materialistic and non-materialistic dimensions but also to micro and macro in a dynamic and non-stationary process. That is, it pays attention to those matters related to norms and realities regarding regional structure. On the other hand, the variables of interests to scholars- for instances military power, trade relations, international institutions or domestic preferences- are not important because

they are objective facts about the world, but rather because they have certain social meanings.

(Wendt 2000)

Turkey is a nation straddling Eastern Europe and Western Asia with cultural connections to ancient Greek, Persian, Roman, and Byzantine and Ottoman empires. It is bordered by eight countries: Greece to the west; Bulgaria to the northwest; Georgia to the northeast; Armenia, the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan and Iran to the East; and Iraq and Syria to the South. Each of which have both positive and negative effects on this country's domestic, regional and International diplomacy and policymaking. The Aegean Sea is to the west, the Black Sea to the north, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south. The Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, which together form the Turkish Straits, divide Thrace and Anatolia; they also separate Europe and Asia.

As it is clear, Turkey's location between Europe and Asia has retained its geopolitical and strategic importance throughout history. Being a bridge between the East and the West, Turkey has always played significant valuable role for bringing peace and stability at home and in abroad. The role of its public diplomacy is undeniably serious and has affected its relations with other countries in positive and negative manners.

Heir to one of the world's oldest civilizations, Iran is bordered to the northwest by Armenia, the de facto Nagorno –Karabakh Republic, and Azerbaijan; to the northeast by Turkmenistan; to the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan; to the south by the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman; to the north by the Caspian Sea; and to the west by Turkey and Iraq. It is the second-largest country in the Middle East and the 18th-largest in the world. With 78.4 million inhabitants, Iran is the world's 17th-most-populous country. It is the only country with both a Caspian Sea and an Indian Ocean coastline. The country's central location in Eurasia and Western Asia, and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, make it of great geostrategic importance.

Due to their geopolitical position, geographical location and cultural characteristics, both of these countries are known for their effectiveness, means

of power and the employment of these means in the Middle East. They in one hand representing two different sects of religion of Islam; a characteristic that by itself has caused many challenges such as sectorial or religious oriented alliances. They are not the direct root and cause of these challenges; however, their stances has determined or, better to say, uncovered their political and strategic goals by means of emergence of new religious based coalitions and alliances, which has deepened the existing crisis in the Middle East. This climate has naturally become a forceful incentive that made them to arrive at the doorstep of a quite ill rivalry in the regional issues but at the same time, they exhibited different interactive approaches with convergence towards any pressure they faced by International communities.

The political turmoil in the most parts of Middle East besides civil war in Iraq and Syria destabilized the security in the region. It, as the effect, diminished the chance of sustaining democratic principle. The most important and sensitive of them are democracy, economic stability and security. Under such environment, the involvement of foreign factors in the affairs of the Middle East has posed many questions for the future of the region and fueled the fire. Affected with these violence and crisis, Turkey and Iran, while started to change their attitude for seeking more power, sometimes with reservation, arrived at very sensitive result; that is, both sides believed to depend on public diplomacy as it conveys a message of materiality comparing security oriented attitude. The latter provoked worries among neighbors in the crisis hit region, which is always fraught with tensions. By this approach each side tried to promote this perception that they can play as a broker among opposing or conflicting parties. So that they can win the hearts and minds of people and countries in the region and also use this for improvement of their status within International community. To this aim, both sides benefited various tools of public diplomacy within their capacities.

Thus, their public diplomacy and foreign policy have always been affected unexpectedly by regional and International factors, non-State actors, transnational actors like NGOs or transnational corporations, which could alter or affect their State beliefs about concerned issues. Both of these countries have also had to keep the balance regarding the power and influence of the opposite side in the region, particularly, in Iraq and Syria and their engagement in

International affairs. Their attempts to extend the capacities of their soft power in the Middle East has been different and through the use of variety of ways; naming, media broadcast, movies, satellite, cultural initiatives such as attracting students, mutually opening the language teaching-learning opportunities. They also have been trying to compete in attracting students from different Muslim countries. The least not the last benefit of this approach is to have a larger number of supporters among the future generation and increase their popularity in the region. In another different aspect, they have also managed to influence the minority groups within their countries.

As it is mentioned through the chapters, every country is the target of specific threat/s. Iran has been mostly under the threat of the West and some regional dependent countries loyal to the West. In this regard, back to 2002, just to remind, U.S. President Georg W.Bush in his State of the Union address On January 29, 2002, has called Iran along with Iraq and North Korea as “Axis of Evil”. Less than 6 years after his remarks, Iran has involved in the regional affairs more than ever that both Turkey and the Arab countries became so afraid of its power and influence. Of course, extraordinary strategic location, deep-rooted State tradition, cultural depth and oil wealth, are some of the factors that has given Iran to win a new place in the balance of power in the region. On the other hand, when looking at the developments in the region, it seems that the U.S. regional policies and actions, by empowering Taliban terror group in Afghanistan, occupation of Iraq and even by having double standard policy on Syria crisis, has provided the Islamic Republic an unexpected new opportunity or perhaps a serious security vacuum, as a jumping platform, to involve in the region with new initiatives. This new political wave began by Ahmadinejad’s government since 2005, during which many have known Iran the both Muslim and non- Muslim, as the only country, which was standing against the oppressor. However, since 2013, With President Rouhani in power, Iran stepped in new era in terms of its regional and international interactions and counteractions. Designing new public diplomacy initiatives besides its traditional diplomacy, Iran begins to take the benefit out of this opportunity. Turkey on the other side has had different messages and reactions, sometimes with reservation, towards Iran’s new public diplomacy initiatives and foreign

policy approaches. This is partly due the lessons from the history of their mutual relations and mostly because of the securitization of the climate in the region because of verity of crisis. In nearly all situations, both sides have tried to approach towards the policies of other side with reservation and special attention mixed with concern. For instances, the Hezbollah –Israeli war in Lebanon at the beginning of 2007, which began with the joint initiative of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan including some Sunni States, empowered the feeling of a threat of Shiite – Sunni bloc. Turkey has been invited but opposed to this initiative and even took a historic step forward and managed the historic meeting between President Ahmadinejad and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to prevent the establishment of such a bloc. Turkey participated in the “meeting of the 7 countries” including Pakistan, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. But with so different goal and has closely conferred with the Iranian officials and Shiite groups within Lebanon. The outcome was as follow: Turkey did not join in Sunni bloc against Shiite Iran. It also did not join the Western bloc against Iran in the process started by George. W. Bush and ended with the signing of the Joint comprehensive plan of action but it took a position according to accepted principles and not according to the name, power and positions of the countries in the Western bloc.

With the beginning of Syria crisis, Turkey and Iran seems unwantedly arrived at a new phase of mutual confrontation in the form of rhetoric and war of words. They, better said, began a level of counteraction towards each other's policies. However, extraordinary will of finding peaceful solution for the crisis has been clearly transparent in their public diplomacy approaches although they showed their efforts in contextualizing their foreign policies through their public diplomacy means and by engaging with the peoples, NGOs, opposition parties and political leaders in Iraq and Syria.

The two countries public diplomacy effectiveness, proactivity and their orientation towards developments in Iraq and Syria, caused them to adopt different policies both towards each other and developments in their mutual target countries. These aspects has made them pursuing different kind and level of diplomacies depending on their historical backgrounds, geographical and geopolitical position and also regional and International developments either

directly or indirectly affecting their interests, bilateral relations and their selection and preferences of coalition and corporation in regional and international developments.

This study explicitly demonstrates how Iran and Turkey are mutually important countries. Each of them would be both a potential threat and /or blessing for each other – a sort of frenemies- by the effect of criterion and factors discussed in this contribution.

In terms of the structure of political system, in general, the more determined and stable the structure of the system of government or the hierarchy of the decision making mechanism in a State is, the more mature is its foreign policy decisions structure, knowing that the decision making structures of the most countries is in the form of official and/or non- official. For Iran and Turkey both of these features apply in one place or cross each other in somewhere, which mainly related to the complexity of its political systems that are not classifiable through commonly accepted global standard. That is, having both official and unofficial nature of foreign policy decision-making is often the characteristic of a country with a complex system of political, economic and social structures. In such context, it is far to expect a free effective social grouping, political parties and public opinion. Such a nature of political system increases the vulnerability of the policies of these two countries.

As the last but not the least, I would say while the Syrian Peace Talks held in Astana and a ceasefire enforced, even if fragile, the only chance of fulfilling a sustainable peace in Syria is closer cooperation and collaboration of Iran and Turkey. However, the situation is not promising because the war of words started between them since 17 February 2017. Of course the role of other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and non-regional actor like Russia along with their proxies active in the field, should not be undermined.

What kind of Syria and Iraq we would picture and presuppose for near future is so much obvious through the policies adopted. Each region or the same region in Syria and Iraq became a turning point of the behavior and preferences of Turkey and Iran. While both countries expressing relatively the same concern, they apply un-identical approaches. Each of these two countries is going to be

raw materials for the global actors or some regional Arab countries new strategic plans regarding Syria and Iraq.

The study of the relations and interactions between Iran and Turkey shows that a strategic relations has never been formed between them and even since 2002, not only there has been no progress in this regard but also both sides have accused each other in charge of being the cause of many problems in the region. Both have utilized such stances for their domestic, regional and global policies. However, at the same time, each of them may be in right path in their own right. That is why the mutual desire to maintain warm relations is high on paper. However, "Self Interest" seems becomes or has been their most important interest towards development in Syria and Iraq. The recent statement by Ibrahim Kalin during a press conference in Presidential Palace, as saying that ". In finding solution for any regional issues, Turkey has always supported dialogue, but this does not mean that Turkey is taking blind eyes on Iran's efforts to increase its power and influence in the region and thus we will be present in Syria and Iraq..." (kalin, 2017) By this statement in 22 February 2017, he gave a message that Turkey applies his soft power but if necessary it will focus on self –interest for the sake of its national security. At the same time, on the other side of the line of this war of words, has been Ali Akbar Velayeti Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's Advisor who in a statement said: "Those who entered in Syria and Iraq without any permission, should leave those lands ... if not, they will be pulled out by the people of Iraq and Syria..." (halkweb, 2017 , irna,2017)

This study proves that the public diplomacy of Iran and Turkey has made their foreign policy approaches towards Syria and Iraq so much delicate and fragile. More accurately, it has naturally made them more curious, concerned and beware of with regard to their policies and stances as a kind of direct or indirect response which emerged in the form of harsh rhetoric in particular since 2011. This has caused them to become inconsistent, lacking serious will for cooperation and the rise in the sense of distrust. Such condition, naturally, gave birth to new attitudes in their foreign policies in Syria and Iraq.



REFERENCES

- A Wendt Social Theory of International Politics** (CUP Cambridge 2000)
- Abraham Lincoln** and public opinion; the Lehrman Institute;
<<http://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincoln-in-depth/abraham-lincoln-and-public-opinion/>>
- Adelaide**,2016, Lock.J(1588)An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ,
<<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/181u/>>
- Ak Parti** 2011; ,Suriye meselesi bizim iç meselemizdir
- Akyol, Kürşat** (9 Ağustos 2011). "Şam'da kritik görüşme". bbc.co.uk. Erişim tarihi: 29 Ağustos 2012.
- Akyol,M.**(2014) .“ what exactly is the New Turkey?” Al- Monitor plus
- Anadolu Agency,2016** : Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Türkiye'nin Suriye ve Irak'taki mücadelesi hayati bir zorunluluktur :
<http://aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiyenin-suriye-ve-iraktaki-mucadelesi-hayati-bir-zorunluluktur/662058>
- Anadolu Ajansı.** worldbulletin.net,2011;"Turkish PM warns Syria against second Hama massacre" . 2 Mayıs 2011.
<http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/73220/turkish-pm-warns-syria-against-second-hama-massacre>
- Aristotle** , Politics,VII, viii. 1-3 , 573- 575
- Arquilla,J. and Ronfeldt,D.**(2001) .“Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy,” 5 November 2001
- Avruch** (1998,pp.6-7) mentioned in Helen Spencer-Oatey (2012) ; What is culture? A compilation of quotations. GlobalPAD Core Concepts. Available at GlobalPAD Open House <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/globalpadintercultural>
- Balamir Coşkun,B.** (2012) , Institute of Public Diplomacy Security ,Challenges and Public diplomacy< <http://www.kamudiplomasisi.org/>>
- Barston, R.P.** (1988): Modern Diplomacy. London, New York: Longman.
- C. Eichenberg Richard, 2016**
<http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-78>
- C.Foyle, D.**(1999,p.4).Counting the Public In: Presidents , Public Opinion ,and Foreign policy
- C.Foyle, D.**(1999,p.6).Counting the Public In: Presidents , Public Opinion ,and Foreign policy
- Chris. B.**(2005); Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. London: Sage. ISBN 0-7619-4156-8 p448
- Cooper, R.**(2003) The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. Atlantic Books, 2003
- Cull, N.** (2006). "'Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase". USC Public Diplomacy. University of Southern California. Retrieved September 26, 2014.

- Cull, N.** (2006). "Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase". USC Public Diplomacy. University of Southern California. Retrieved September 26, 2014.
- Cull, N.**(2009,p.19); "Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase", in Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, (ed.), Routledge, 2009, p.19.
- Cull, N.**,(2009,p.19); "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase", in Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, (ed.), Routledge, 2009, p.19.
- Cull, Nicholas J.** (2009): Public diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press
- Davoutoglu, A.**(2010). A New Vision
- Demir, V.**(2012); Institute of Public Diplomacy , Public Diplomacy And The Contributions Turkey Has Made in The Relationship Among Its' Neighboring Countries
- Devran, Y.** (2012): 'Türk Tarihi Perspektifinden Kamu Diplomasisi Olgusuna Bakış Ya da Tarihi Potansiyeli Yeniden Düşünmek (Looking at the Concept of Public Diplomacy from the Perspective of the Turkish History or Revisiting the Historical Potential)' in Abdullah Özkan and Tuğçe Ersoy Öztürk ed., Kamu Diplomasisi (Public Diplomacy), Istanbul: Tasarım, Kamu Diplomasisi Enstitüsü Serisi (Public Diplomacy Institute Series)
- Diamond , Louise and McDonald John** (1996) Kumarian Press, 1996 - Political Science
- Ekşi , M.**(2014) .Kamu diplomasisi ve Ak parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası ,3.Bölüm, Türk Kamu Diplomasisi: Siyasal kitabevei
- Fars News**(2016); The discourse of the export of revolution ,
- G. Wilson, F.**(1933).John of Salisbury, Concepts of Public Opinion ,The American Political Science Review Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jun., 1933), pp. 371-391) ..
- Gilboa, Eytan** (2001) Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects. Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (2), 1-28.
- Gilboa, Eytan.** 1998. Media diplomacy: Conceptual divergence and applications . Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 3 (3): 56-75.
- Glassgold, Stacy, M.** (2004): Public diplomacy: The Evolution of Literature, Institute of Public Diplomacy, <http://www.kamudiplomasisi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=50>
- Gullion, E.**(1965); dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and retired foreign service officer and founder of an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy.
- Hallams, E.**(2011). "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America's Soft Power," Journal of American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2011).
- Hallams, E.**(2011). "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America's Soft Power," Journal of American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2011).
- Herodotus, Herodotus:** The History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
- Hoffman, Arthur** (1968) International Communication and the New Diplomacy 'Indiana University Press; 1St Edition
- Huijgh, E** (2011): Changing Tune for Public diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension, The Hague: Netherland Institute of International Relations,

- Humphrey, T.** (2006): 'The Practice of Public diplomacy' in Joshua S. Fouts ed., Public diplomacy: Practitioners, Policy Makers and Public Opinion, A Report of the Public diplomacy and World Public Opinion Forum, Washington D.C.: April 9-11
- Ibid ,Nye** (2004,p.2) Soft Power ;The Means to Success in World Politics
- Ibid ,T.**2006
- Ibid,** Cull, Public Diplomacy before Gullion, p.20.
- Ibid,**2015
- Ibid,**p.286
- Ibid. Huijgh ,** 2011
- Iran, Iraq have signed 100 economic agreements
<<http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/117500.html>> , Sun Jan 31, 2010
- Kalm, İ.**(2011): 'Soft Power and Public diplomacy in Turkey', Perceptions, SAM: Autumn, <<http://sam.gov.tr/soft-power-and-public-diplomacy-in-turkey/>>
- Kant,I.**(1795☒).Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
<Sketchhttps://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>
- Keshavarz Shokri ,A.**(2013. p17)Tehran ,Imam Sadegh University: Cultural opportunities and challenges for Iran in Middle East.
- Keyman, F.** (2013): 'Rethinking Turkish Foreign Policy', The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 27 May, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3758/rethinking-turkish-foreign-policy.html>
- Lee, John** (1968): The Diplomatic Persuaders: New Role of the Mass Media in International Relations' Krieger Pub Co; 1st edition (June 1968) Edited by John Lee
- Leonard, Mark** (2002) Public Diplomacy. London: Foreign Policy Center.
- Lippmann,W.**(1955,p.20). Essays in the Public Philosophy
- Luers,W. and Pickering,T.**(2015). "Cuba and Iran: A New Era for American Diplomacy?" Huffington Post Blog Series "90 Miles: Rethinking the Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations," 20 January 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-luers/cuba-and-iran-a-new-era-f_b_6508150.html
- Manheim, Jarol B.** (1994) Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence. New York in Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Matsumoto** (1996,p.16) mentioned in Helen Spencer-Oatey (2012) ; What is culture? A compilation of quotations. GlobalPAD Core Concepts. Available at GlobalPAD Open House <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/globalpadintercultural>
- Melissen(ed.)**Jan(1999);Innovation in Diplomatic Practice(Basingstoke: Macmillan,(1999)PP.xvi-xvii.
- Melissen, Jan** (2005);The New Public Diplomacy ,soft power in IR , Plgrave Macmillan ,2005.
- Melissen, Jan ed.** (2005), The New Public diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Melissen, Jan ed.** (2005), The New Public diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Melissen, Jan ed.** (2005), The New Public diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

- Michael, J Waller**(2007,p.35); The public diplomacy reader, the Institute of World Politics Press Washington 2007 ,p.35
- Mousavian , Seyed H.** (2015), "Iran & the US: The Way Forward," The US Army War College, June 18, 2015.< <https://hosseinmousavian.com/iran-the-us-the-way-forward/>>
- Muharrem,E.**(2014);Turkey's public diplomacy and Turkish foreign policy during the JDP.Ankara:Siyasal Kitabevi
- Murrow quoted in Leonard** (2002) ,p.150; Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader edited by Anandam P. Kavoori, Todd Fraley
- Niccolò Machiavelli.** 1513 The Prince
- Nye,J.**(1990) Soft Power , p.164
- Nye,J.**(1990) Soft Power , P.164
- Nye,J.**(2004,p.2) Soft Power ; The Means to Success in World Politics
- Nye,J.**(2004,p.5) Soft Power ; The Means to Success in World Politics
- Nye.J** (2004) ;Soft Power: The Means to success in world politics ,New York: Public Affairs,2004
- Nye.J**(2002);The Paradox of American Power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone. Oxford University Press, Mar 7, 2002 - Political Science
- Nye.J**(2002);The Paradox of American Power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone. Oxford University Press, Mar 7, 2002 - Political Science
- O Anas** ,2011:Turkey's Soft Power Challenges in the Arab World , dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/akademikincelemeler/article/download/.../5000047072
- Olson, William C.** (1991/1960): The Theory and Practice of International Relations. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Oran.B.** (2001-2012).Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 3
- Öztürkmen, Ali; Duman, Bilgay; Orhan, Oytun** (2015), "Suriye'de Değişimin Ortaya Çıkardığı Toplum: Suriye Türkmenleri" (PDF), Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi,Rapor 83ORSAM; <http://suriyeturkmenmeclisi.org/files/file1.pdf>
- Park, Bill** (2005), Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq: problems and perspectives, **Taylor & Francis**, ISBN 0-415-38297-1
- Paul Sharpe** mentioned in Melissen 2007:106
- R.Holsti,O.** (2012).Public Opinion on Human Rights in American Foreign Policy, by: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/Holsti_I.html >
- S. Nye , Joseph**(1990); Soft Power, Foreign Policy Journal No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary Autumn, 1990
- S.Nye, Joseph** (2004);Soft Power and American Foreign Policy ,Political Science Quarterly ,Academy of Political Science , 2004
- Sezin Uzun, Ö**(2003), Türk Dış Politikasında İmaj, <<http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/arkaplan/haziran03/tr/aykonu.htm#6>>
- Shahidi ,Hossein** (2007,p.95); Journalism in Iran: From Mission to Profession. Routledge. p. 95. ISBN 978-1-134-09391-5
- Signitzer, Benno H. & Coombs, Timothy** 1992, Public Relations and Public Diplomacy. Conceptual Convergences. Public Relations Review 18 (2), 137-147.
- Skocpol, T.**(1982). "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." Theory and Society 11.3 (1982): 265-83. Web.

- Smith, Gordon S.** (1999) *Reinventing Diplomacy: A Virtual Necessity*. Virtual Diplomacy Series. Washington: United States Institute of Peace
- The Classics.us**, 12 September 2013. "Chapar Khaneh" or "Chapar-Khaneh" ,
- Tuch**, 1990 quoted in Derina Holtzhausen, Ansgar Zerfass .ed.(2015) ;The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication. Taylor & Francis
- Washington Institute**(2015)
- Wendt ,A.**(2000); *Social Theory of International Politics* ,CUP Cambridge 2000
- Willard, J.** (2012): 'An Outsider's Perspective on Turkish Public diplomacy', Center for Strategic Research (SAM), 24 February,< <http://sam.gov.tr/an-outsiders-perspective-on-turkish-public-diplomacy/>>
- Willard, J.** (2012): 'An Outsider's Perspective on Turkish Public diplomacy', Center for Strategic Research (SAM), 24 February,< <http://sam.gov.tr/an-outsiders-perspective-on-turkish-public-diplomacy/>>
- Zarif,J.**(2013). personal Twitter page, [@JZarif](http://www.twitter.com) 8:38 AM – 5 September 2013
- Zarif,J.**(2013). personal Twitter page, [@JZarif](http://www.twitter.com) 9:54 AM – 5 September 2013.

WWW REFERANCES

- <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krp-an-undeclared-economic-commonwealth>
- <https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/suriye-meselesi-bizim-ic-meselemizdir/11521#1> August 2011
- http://portal.irib.ir/web/digitaltv/main/-/asset_publisher/TY7v/content
- http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/228673/350814_de.html
- http://www.ehlibeytalimleri.com/-turk-halki-suriye-ye-mudahaleye-karsi_d3528.html and also mentioned in: <http://m.eurasianet.org/node/66033> Turkey: Public Support Low for Possible Fight Against Syria
- <http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940128000738>
- <http://www.habersitesi.com/ibrahim-kalin-irani-uyardi-38104h.htm>
- <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1399947-meb-acikladi-okullarda-artik-yeni-diller-ogretilecek>
- [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/irandan-turkiyeye-sert-tepki-40371412\)](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/irandan-turkiyeye-sert-tepki-40371412)
- <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=89554> : Turks oppose military intervention in Syria, gloomy on economy: Survey
- <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-entered-syria-to-end-al-assads-rule-president-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nid=106709> , 2017
- <http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n28303/> **عمومی افکار و مردم/جامعه/رسانی اطلاع های سرویس**
دکتر محمد حسین جمشیدی مردم و افکار عمومی در اندیشه **س_خمینی_امام_اندیشه_در_امام_خمینی**
- <http://www.isna.ir/news/95050100630/> **جمهوری-نظام-دستاوردهای-و-ها-ارزش-رضایی**
(خارج-و-داخل-در-اسلامی 2016)
- <http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/107760/> **خبری-گفتگوی-در-اردوغان-اظهارات-کامل-متن**
- <http://www.milatgazetesi.com/iran-dan-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-uyarisina-kustah-cevap-haber-102415>
- <http://www.miu.ac.ir>
- <http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/muslims-and-islam/2007/>

<http://www.seratnews.ir/> , diyaruna.com
<http://www8.irna.ir/fa/News/81481782/>
<https://halkweb.com/cumhurbaskanligi-sozcusu-ibrahim-kalindan-irana-flas-yanit/> ,
<http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/82439620/>
<https://ir.sputniknews.com/iran/201702212247107/>
<https://ir.sputniknews.com/opinion/201702202244455>
<https://noluyo.tv/haber/1756/dunyada-en-cok-izlenen-turk-dizileri>
<https://www.tobb.org.tr/IktisadiRaporlama/Sayfalar/Eng/EconomicReports.php>



RESUME

Name and Surname : Mojtaba BARGHANDAN
Date of Birth: 27.05.1973
Place of Birth: Iran – Amol
Father’s name: Reza



Education:

From Primary to High School: Amol City
Bachelor degree: Tonekaboon Private University
Subject: English Literature and Translation
City: Tonekaboon city, North of Iran
MBA: Iran Payam-e- Noor University (Unfinished)
MA: Istanbul Aydin University (2014-2016)
Subject: Political Science and International Relations

Publications, Articles, Op-eds, Speeches, etc.

In English:

- Iran New Social Media –Friendly Approach, Spring 2015, Turkish Policy Quarterly
- A Public Diplomacy Lesson from Iran, July 2015, Hurriyet Daily
- Security seems irretrievable, December 2015, Center for Geopolitical Analyses (International Crisis Monitoring Unit), New York College
- The same Op-ed article published by Hurriyet daily in November 2015.
- The challenges for the JCPOA as a model of regional cooperation, Hurriyet daily, February 2016.

Turkish Language:

CNN Turk: Şiddet ekiyor anlaşmazlık biçiyorlar April 2016
The same Op-ed has been used by many news sites throughout turkey with modified title such as “ Güç ekiyor uyuşmazlık biçiyorlar”

In Frsi :

More than 20 articles published by Iran News Agency (IRNA) , Iran Student News Agency (ISNA) , Iran Newspaper , Diplomatic Monthly of “ Hamshahri Diplomatic”, Tahlileiran, irdiplomacy , iikss, ankara embassy , etedaal.ir ,etc.

Speeches :

- 3rd Turkey –MENA Nuclear Industry Congress 2015 SZ&W Group 15-16 April 2015
- Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Region: Opportunities and Challenges, International Conference, Istanbul Aydin University, 7 April 2017

Note: Participation in more than 300 international and regional conferences and 10 round-tables.

Contact information:

Email: mbar.istanbul@gmail.com

