

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PEACEBUILDING AND MEDIATION EFFORTS IN SOMALIA (1990-2021)**

MASTER'S THESIS

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

JULY, 2022

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APPROVAL PAGE

DECLARATION

I hereby declare with respect that the study “A Critical Analysis Of Previous Local And International Peacebuilding And Mediation Efforts In Somalia (1990-2021)”, which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the Project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (.../.../20...)

Mohamud Jama ABDI

FOREWORD

First and foremost, I would like to thank Allah for providing me with the strength, knowledge, capability, and chance to pursue and successfully complete this research study. This accomplishment would not have been achieved without his blessings. I want to thank everyone who helped with the work that was discussed in this thesis once again. First and foremost, I want to thank my academic adviser, Assist. Prof. Dr. MEHMET TURAN ÇAĞLAR, for taking me into his group and providing me with the chance to complete this excellent thesis. This thesis would not have been possible without his exceptional guidance, creative suggestions, patience, motivation, and support.

Secondly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my family especially my mother and my father who supported and encouraged me throughout my work, it would be impossible for me to be where I am right now without having their continuous support.

July 2022

Mohamud Jama ABDI

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the origins and primary causes of the Somalia war, as well as international efforts to find a long-term settlement to the dispute. Despite this, Somalia is considered to be a country with a population that is ethnically, religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous. Nonetheless, their similarity did not save them from becoming embroiled in one of the world's worst conflicts, which claimed the lives of thousands of Somalis. The overthrow of President Barre's administration in 1991 triggered the crisis, and no significant improvements have occurred since then. The research sought to comprehend the history of local peacebuilding in Somalia through mediation efforts. The research also sought to determine the importance of grassroots mediation in resolving continuing conflicts in Somalia. Additionally, the research aimed to explain why the majority of peace endeavors failed, despite the fact that the past three peace-building conferences ended in a meaningful resolution. This study also demonstrates the significance of local peace-building efforts whereby it shines a light on underappreciated local peace-building efforts, demonstrating that peace-building efforts are not limited to foreign, regional, and international entities. In this regard, the last chapter provides various recommendations and the very best method to create long-term peace and prosperity for the citizens of Somalia.

Key Words: Africa, Conflict, Peace-building, Mediation, Somalia.

SOMALİ'DE ÖNCEKİ YEREL VE ULUSLARARASI BARIŞ İNŞASI VE ARACILIK ÇABALARININ KRİTİK BİR ANALİZİ (1990-2021)

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Somali savaşı'nın temel ve birincil nedenleri ile anlaşmazlığa uzun vadeli bir çözüm bulmaya çalışan uluslararası girişimleri incelemektedir. Somali devleti; etnik, dini, kültürel ve dilsel olarak homojen bir nüfusa sahip bir ülke olarak kabul edilmektedir. Fakat bu homojenlikler, Somali toplumunu dünyanın en kötü çatışmalarının birinden kurtaramamış ve binlerce Somalili bu çatışmalarda hayatını kaybetmiştir. 1991'de Başkan Barre yönetiminin devrilmesi ülke içi krizi tetiklemiş ve o zamandan beri ülke içi krizin çözümü adımı yeterli gelişme olmamıştır. Bu araştırma, arabuluculuk çabalarıyla Somali'deki yerel barış inşasının tarihini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Araştırma ayrıca Somali'de devam eden çatışmaların çözümünde taban arabuluculuğunun önemini belirlemeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, araştırma, son üç barış inşası konferansının anlamlı çözümlerle sonuçlanmasına rağmen, barış çabalarının çoğunun neden başarısız olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Böylece yeterince takdir edilmeyen yerel barışı tesis etme çabalarının önemine ışık tutarak, barışı tesis etme çabalarının sadece yabancı, bölgesel ve uluslararası oluşumlarla sınırlı olmadığı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, son bölüm, Somali vatandaşlarının uzun vadeli barış ve refahı için çeşitli önerileri ve yöntemleri özetlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika, Çatışma, Barış İnşası, Arabuluculuk, Somali.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	: Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism
ARS	: Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia
AU	: African Union
CGWO	: Coalition for Government Women Organization
CPMR	: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
EU	: European Union
FGS	: Federal government of Somalia
FMS	: Federal member states
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
IDA	: International development association
IDP	: Internally displaced persons
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGASOM	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia
NFD	: Northern frontier district
NGOs	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NSC	: National Salvation Council
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PNG	: Provisional National Government
SNA	: Somalia National Alliance

SNL	: Somalia National League
SNM	: Somali National Movement
SRRC	: Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	: Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSWC	: Save Somalia Women and Children
SYL	: Somali Youth League
TFC	: Transitional Federal Constitution
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TFP	: Transitional federal parliament
TNC	: Transitional National Alliance
TNG	: The Transitional National Government
UIC	: Union of Islamic Courts
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for refugees
UNITAF	: Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	: United Nations Operations in Somalia
US	: United States
USC	: United Somali Congress
USCENTCOM	: United State Central Command
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background Information

The globe experienced prominence in the pursuit of peace in conflict-dominated states throughout the post-Cold War era. With the establishment of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, the reinvigorated push for peacebuilding got significant support. The implication was increased vitality in peacebuilding activities, the expansion of organizations entrusted with fostering peace, and growth in peacebuilding studies (Curtis, 2012).

Most peacebuilding interventions and involvement have been centered on ensuring liberal structures via their peacebuilding practices by international institutions and organizations. Most African crisis nations have received peacekeeping assistance from a variety of organizations using flexible techniques and processes. In the practice of peacebuilding, the neglect of local and grassroots peacebuilding efforts has damaged diverse diplomatic and negotiating frameworks in African states for the establishment of long-term peace (Hoffman, 2006). The result has been a breach of lasting peace in most African countries, which remain in a state of instability.

The local model of mediation and peacebuilding is built on an inclusive platform that attempts to expand peace research by "creating constructive reform mechanisms that reduce violence." (Lederach & Maiese, 2009). It identifies all possible strategies to overcome communication challenges and collisions of conceptions between foreign and governmental institutions and players, civil society, and regional competitors (Garwerc, 2006). It throws into doubt liberal and grassroots peacebuilding approaches, including peace treaties and people-to-people efforts, which have ruled many global security projects.

According to studies, a successful system for peacebuilding in Africa should be able to guide trust, rehabilitate conflict-ridden societies, promote reconciliation and social justice, and encourage communication and engagement among all players

involved in the conflict (Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Richmond et al., 2012). This argument supports participatory bargaining, education programs, people-to-people efforts, concepts, and activities involving "local communities, global, and regional participants" (Curtis, 2012; Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Based on this assumption, the current study advances the idea that all parties involved in the disagreement should have enough representation in the peacebuilding process to preserve complete representation towards national reconciliation. Given Africa's continuous wars, a localized peacebuilding approach may be more viable.

Governments have traditionally questioned the validity of people-to-people efforts and other community peacekeeping initiatives in conflict towns and communities. Despite local achievements, moving from local people-to-people peacebuilding programs to governmental levels has proven problematic. If there is no buy-in from a legitimate authority, state-level adaptability might well be prohibited. As a result, without government assistance, organizational support may stifle the growth of projects, which must be legitimized (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). As a result, nations and multilateral agencies must act as legitimate authorities in order to realize great achievements. For example, several people-to-people efforts launched by Palestinian authority and Israeli authorities lacked legitimacy, undermining the entire peacebuilding efforts (Maoz, 2004).

Somalia's conflict has been raging for over three decades, beginning with a deadly civil war that gradually evolved into a war on terrorism. Three generations have been affected by the devastation caused by the fighting that began in 1991. Despite various peace initiatives, it appears that there has been little headway in ending the ongoing conflict. That is, clan-based hostilities have caused the country to be classified as a failed state. Somalia has experienced eleven occurrences of serious human rights violations since 1979. Four of these eras occurred during the authoritarian rule, with the remaining six occurring following the state's demise in 1991. In Somalia, there are four types of wars. They are the rivalry between the new democracy and traditional society; the struggle for power and wealth between non-Islamist elites; the philosophical clash between non-Islamist and Islamist elites; and the strife among clans as a result of the civil war.

In general, Africa has also been marked by continuous disputes, which have been largely blamed on colonial legacies, authoritarian governments, poor

economic and political strategies, widespread disregard for human freedoms, entrenched bureaucracy, and ongoing civil wars (Chinenye, 2011). The total breakdown of law and order in Somalia is partly due to the economic and political challenges that plague most Sub-Saharan African countries. The outcome of Somalia's anarchy is mostly evident in rising crime rates, flagrant contempt for human rights, higher death tolls, catastrophic humanitarian situations, refugee problems, and security concerns in the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa.

Somalia has yet to have a stable government. Fragments such as Somaliland and Puntland, as well as the ongoing Al-Shabaab insurgency, have rendered the country unfit for long-term stability. Lake (2014) recalls that the fall of Barre's authoritarian leadership ushered in a clannism culture in Somalia. That is, clans were moved from egalitarian societies to hierarchical structures because public service delivery was based on clannism. This arrangement has made establishing a functional state nearly impossible, with private bodies serving as key suppliers of public services (Abdulle, 2008).

Mediation has been used as a means of achieving long-term peace in Somalia in recent years. The first stage of reconciliation is to resolve the state-society conflict, which necessitates discarding the monolithic notion of modernity in favor of one that embraces diverse modernities and departs from the two extreme models of state westernization or indigenization. The failure of both of these models may be seen in Somalia's postcolonial state system and the adoption of the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula (which is a power-sharing structure where the four major clans have dominance while minority clans get half of what the four major clans get). Nonetheless, Nathan (2005) blames the African Union (AU) for failing to prioritize mediation as a means of achieving peace. At the moment, there isn't a big crisis in Africa or elsewhere that hasn't been the focus of a slew of mediation efforts.

Menkhaus (2010) adds that over 20 years of international engagement in Somalia has failed to achieve peace. No administration formed as a result of a peace process has gained credibility among Somalis. However, in many places, Somalis have employed dispute resolution traditions to re-establish security. Since over a dozen national reconciliation conferences have been conducted in Somalia since 1991, the closer look reveals that just six of them were complete national peace conferences (Abraham, 2000). The first were the Djibouti Negotiations in June and

July 1991, during which Ali Mahdi was appointed interim President, a decision that General Mohamed Farah Aideed strongly opposed. This peacebuilding process, which brought together six factions, was really just a series of talks aimed at forming an interim administration. Second, between January and March 1993, the Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Talks was the cornerstone of the United Nations (UN) intervention in Somalia, and it was intended to serve as a model for the establishment of a two-year interim administration.

Third, in 1996–1997, neighboring Ethiopia organized the Sodere Conference, which tried to resurrect a disorganized, federal Somali state at the cost of anti-Ethiopian troops (Menkhaus, Sheikh, Joqombe, & Johnson, 2008). The ‘Cairo Conference’, a competing peace initiative in Egypt, weakened Sodere. Fourth, in 1997, Egypt, Ethiopia's regional adversary, held the Cairo Conference to establish a centralized Somali state and strengthen the dominance of Somali forces that boycotted the Sodere negotiations. The two broad alliances that developed from Sodere and Cairo became the foundation for the primary political divisions in Somalia in the years that followed. Fifth, Djibouti hosted the Arta Peace Conference in 2000. This invited civic leaders to the meetings rather than faction leaders, and the events were relayed back to Somalia via telecommunications technology. Finally, in 2002-2004, the Mbagathi conference was held in Kenya, sponsored by the regional organization of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to develop a successor to the failed Transitional National Government (TNG).

Previous efforts to stabilize and achieve permanent peace have relied heavily on liberal peace-making methods. This means establishing peace frameworks that bring together foreign players and high-ranking government, opposition, and militia group leaders while generally neglecting grassroots-based institutions. Over the last two or more decades, there have been several liberal/top-down/paternalistic peacebuilding initiatives in Africa's warring states, with little or no substantial progress toward peace. When grassroots leaders are participating in a peace-seeking endeavor, their opinions are rarely given much weight. As a result, the notion of local players in addressing conflict-underlying concerns in Somalia has been alienated, leaving the nation split and contentious along ethnic lines.

B. Purpose and importance

Research on effective peace processes for Somalia's disputes is vital if the violent conflict can be avoided and lasting peace can be established. This study looks at features of local actors' mediation for peace-building, both as a concept and as a successful technique, in order to lay the groundwork for long-term peace processes in Somalia. Many peace accords in Somalia have resulted in more negative peace than positive peace. As a result, the research focuses on encouraging local actors to achieve effective outcomes in peace-building activities. Repairing destroyed buildings and re-establishing governmental institutions are only part of the process of rebuilding a country after a conflict.

Essentially, it is about reconnecting people at all levels, rebuilding people's trust in good governance and the rule of law and giving people more hope for the future. Every one of these activities are essential for the establishment of stability and peace in post-conflict contexts. The possibility of conflict re-emerging is quite significant when it is ignored. In this way, state-building and peace-building might be seen as mutually exclusive processes, with the former necessitating the establishment of institutional authority and the latter requiring its tempering through negotiated settlement and common understanding. This dilemma for both international and domestic peacekeepers is to place reconciliation completely within the framework of state-building while also utilizing state-building as a foundation for mutual trust and long-term reconciliation. In the Somali regions, none of these processes can take place without the active engagement of the Somali people.

1. Research Questions

A. The main research question is

What were the previous international and local efforts for peacebuilding in Somalia and how effective were these efforts to bring security and instability to Somalia?

B. Research sub-questions are

- a. How can grassroots mediation and negotiations serve as a solution to ongoing conflicts in Somalia if the root causes of instability and insecurity in Somalia are ignored?

- b. Among the international, regional, and local peacebuilding efforts, which peacebuilding effort was the most successful? And why?

2. Main Argument

Any negotiation and mediation will not bring stability and prosperity to Somalia if there is no trust in the central government, the respect and the acknowledgment of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia.

C. Research methodology and techniques

In this study, a qualitative research approach using historical analysis, and case study will be used. The goal of the study is to learn about the many mediations that took place in Somalia and how they influenced the present situation in Somalia. This study will look at why conflicts in Somalia keep recurring after numerous rounds of mediation and talks. This study will employ a dual research approach that includes both an evaluation and a comparative investigation. The research will investigate how various mediations and negotiations that have taken place in Somalia since the civil war have influenced the Somali peace process. The evaluative study will be used to evaluate where foreign entities stand in the negotiations and mediations in Somalia and how their interests align with the Somali peace process.

The research will mainly be supported by secondary sources. This study will focus on document analysis. Document analysis will focus on secondary data from UN publications, newspapers, books and other academic publications since it's desktop research. The study will be based on peace and conflict studies and examine prior mediation efforts in Somalia. The study will use books, papers, and literature review references to learn more about the topic's origins.

D. Literature review

In the literature on negotiation and mediation, there are two methods that lead to a methodological dispute. To comprehend this distinction, the two ideas must first be defined. Mediation, according to Touval and Zartman (1985), is a third-party action intended to enable parties in disagreement to continue their talks. When participants in a negotiation reach an impasse or stalemate and are unable to continue discussions on their own, mediation is required. From this perspective, Mwagiru

(2000), Bercovitch (1996), Houston (1996), and Moore (1986) conclude that mediation is a special-case extension of bargaining. Two primary frameworks with separate methodological methods arise from the mediation literature. One strategy is built on power, whereas the other is not. For example, Burton (1972) describes non-power-based mediation as an integrative procedure that resolves conflict using an analytical approach. This indicates that the parties evaluate the situation together in order to reach an agreeable solution. The power-based strategy is the polar opposite. Furthermore, the non-power-based approach places a greater emphasis on human issues than institutional behavior. As a result, the goal of a non-power-based strategy is to strengthen relationships between enemies. Power-based mediation, on the other hand, is a directed procedure with a set framework of power relations. The fundamental goal of mediation is to achieve a certain result (Louis, 1996). As a result, the focus is on topics that are of current concern or relevance to the parties and the strategy overlooks the underlying, more basic issues at hand. Short-term advantages, such as rebuilding institutions like the government, are prioritized over digging deeper into the problem (Burton, 1987).

When it comes to the Somali dispute, contemporary literature proves Somalis' Cushitic ancestry on the one hand, while contending the group's purity on the other. According to the latter school of thought, pre-colonial Somali civilization was made up of several ethnic groups like the Afar, Oromos, Bantus, and Nilotes (Greenberg, 1950).

Despite this, the majority of Somali tribes may trace their ancestors back to two primary roots. They are Sab and Samaale (Clark, 1954). This argument debunks promises of Somali unity, and instead, a discourse arises that provides a window into the Somali conflict from an ethnic standpoint. Such a viewpoint underpins the idea that ethnicity is at the root of the Somali conflict (Brown, 1993). Touval, who writes about Somali nationalism, creates the image of a cohesive group and therefore promotes the concept of homogeneity, but he fails to see that any community would unify if faced with a shared adversary. In contrast, in studying the legacy of the colonial period, Samatar (1994) and Hess (1966) highlight the division of the Somali people into five state systems, each arising from a separate colony: Britain, Italy, France, and Ethiopia in various portions of Somalia. This gives a foundation for arguing against the concept of uniformity, despite the fact that the distinctions are a

result of colonialism.

A regional movement sponsored by Djibouti in 1991, with Egypt and Italy on board, was one of the first attempts at mediation. Although Ali Mahdi was declared interim president, it was challenged by General Aideed, the leader of the United Somali Congress (USC). Aideed saw this conclusion as separating him from Somalia's leadership. Aideed successfully denied Ali Mahdi's presidential campaign with the help of Ethiopia and Eritrea, despite Egypt and Italy's support. This result shattered the USC and sparked a fresh round of conflict. The United States (US) assisted the UN during the Addis Ababa summit. Ethiopia served as a mediator in both projects. Despite the fact that the Somali National Movement (SNM) boycotted the meeting, its conclusion resulted in a foundation for UN involvement through the UN Somalia Operation (UNOSOM II). It also established the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Somalia as a political and administrative body. The UN voted Resolution 814, which increased the UN's mission in Somalia based on the TNC. UNOSOM II was tasked with assisting local Somali populations in re-establishing administrative institutions at the district and regional levels, as well as re-establishing a police force and re-establishing judicial systems. The Addis framework, on the other hand, was unable to be implemented due to exclusion. The tensions that resulted culminated in a clash in 1993 between the UN and General Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia. In 1995, the UN was compelled to evacuate its soldiers due to the bloodshed (Menkhause, 2009).

Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt all launched projects in 1996. Daniel Arap Moi, Kenya's president at the time, was the first to do so in October. Despite the fact that Osman Ali Atto and Ali Mahdi reached an agreement to calm Mogadishu, the outcome was harmed by a similar meeting convened by Ethiopia in November of the same year (1996). The Sodere conference, as it is known, ensured Somali unity as well as a transitional and rotating president. Sodere, on the other hand, was a failure. Apart from Sodere and Moi's efforts, Egypt sponsored another meeting in Cairo in December 1997, with backing from the Arab League, Libya, and the Islamic Conference (Menkhause 2009). In 1993, Somalis took on many local projects such as Borama, Sanag, and Kismayu on their own. In 1994 and 1998, these two were followed by Bardera, Galkayo, and Gerowe. Internal meetings mainly reconciled various clans, allowing for the restitution of plundered property and the creation of a

conducive climate for normal business. The Hergaisa Declaration, on the other hand, is the most notable of these local initiatives. In this circumstance, the Assembly of Elders (Guurti) installed an administration that continued to expand its capabilities. Hergaisa declared its independence at the time of the 14th Conference in 2002.

The failure of the UN-led international initiatives can be attributed to a number of causes. While some believe that the attempts failed because they were externally driven and there was no pressure put on faction leaders to keep the agreements, others argue that the Somalia problem was complex and long-standing and that the UN lacked the expertise and competence to solve it. The second viewpoint is backed by the claim that individuals assigned to the mission were inexperienced, whilst the first is based on the idea that Somalis were skeptical of the UN's intentions. Furthermore, the rivalry for command and control between Italy and the US supported this view. The third point of view criticizes the approach used. Supporters of the last perspective, Menkhaus and Prendagast (1995), claim that diplomacy contributed to the failure by employing ineffective methods aimed at hastening the recovery of the state structure that was originally to blame for the disorder. Above all, the failure is ascribed to the exclusive nature of all of these programs. They did not include all of the conflicting parties. Finally, several states took part in the efforts, which appeared to be in rivalry with one another, either regionally or domestically. As a result, as seen above, the activities were not coordinated.

The notion of inclusive peace may be dated directly to Dag Hammarskjöld's peace principles, which influenced and polished the process of establishing peace in the twenty-first century. As a result, proponents of conflict resolution strive to prove that long-term peace is the result of processes that involve multiple interests, relationships, discourses, and, in some cases, social institutions that perpetuate violent conflict. This can only be accomplished by embracing inclusive methods of peace-building. According to Nyadera, Ahmed, and Agwanda (2019), the relationship between the government and the people in Somalia has been strained for a long time, and attempts to renew residents' hopes and trust in their government must be prioritized. As some of the fundamental barriers to peace, it cites many shortcomings in prior peace initiatives that excluded public engagement and allowed for lax execution of peace treaties.

Local ownership of peace-building challenges the specific problems within peacebuilding efforts with technical experience (insider perspective) of dilemmas and concerns that continually cause conflict backsliding and recurrence, supplementing theories of technical understanding of global actors (outsider perspective) to the conflict problem. As a result, comprehending political, social, and economic concerns like land battles, resource conflicts (oil, minerals, water, or grazing land) and clan confrontations from a local ownership viewpoint gives an empowering framework. Most worldwide peace-building initiatives treat these challenges individually, viewing them as a minor cost to be paid in the pursuit of constructing central government institutions. They give relatively little attention to the many stages of peace-building "where localized hostility may play a critical part in dispute extension" (Da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012). As a result, the inclusion of localized ownership in literature has helped to save African peacebuilding efforts from highly centralized practices that were shown to be harmful to long-term peace and stabilities. Peace-building designed and implemented in a technical manner, by viewing the problem as distinct pieces of a puzzle in the form of various programs and initiatives, will almost surely fall short of establishing peaceful solution (Zerdem and Lee, 2016).

It is believed that local ownership aids in the successful "local capacity development and preservation" (Zaum, 2012, p. 56). Many believe that promoting local ownership encourages the development of localized institutions, which are frequently replicated developing worldwide 'alternative bureaucracies' assistance agencies attempting to implement peace-building and state-building programs. Thus, by depriving the state of 'economic means' via alternative administration providing 'its most competent public employees' to foreign organizations that pay higher wages, the state 'sucks out' local competence.

According to Track II diplomacy academics, constant communication and conversation that includes all stakeholders to provide for actual assistance and a voice for the most disadvantaged in crisis situations, such as indigenous communities, children, and women. It is critical to notice how communication and conversation have been overlooked as a driver for peace research that connects both institutional and grassroots methods. Communication, according to Erzurum and Eren (2014), is the driving factor that keeps the peacebuilding

process continuing. Specifically, communication serves as a catalyst for combining top-down and bottom-up methods, allowing macro (international and national organizations) and micro (regional and local communities) levels to connect without bureaucracy in order to achieve peace and unity. The various literatures on post-conflict peacebuilding in the twenty-first century has shown how exclusive approaches to peace have resulted in a deadlock. As a result, demand for inclusive peace-building methods (Lederach, 2005; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Richmond, 2011) that take into account grassroots concerns that impact organizational actions or conversely for beneficial peaceful results. Importantly, the idea of constructing reconciliation is lengthy and requires a tremendous deal of effort and patience.

Abdinur and Abshir's thesis main argument is that the Somali conflict was primarily driven by imperial legacies, cold war legacies, governmental persecution, and authority and resource competitiveness. It is common knowledge that the biggest conflicts in Africa have arisen as a result of artificial borders erected by Europeans. I agree with everything they stated in their thesis, but my thesis will also be looking at the internal causes of the conflict and why it has been hard to bring stability to the country. My study will look at the continuous interference of foreign entities, whether directly or indirectly, into the domestic affairs of Somalia and why this leads to lack of instability and security in Somalia. Some of these foreign entities are neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia, and others are members of the Arab League who continuously pursue their national interests in Somalia while informing the world that they are trying to bring stability and development to Somalia.

Since the breakdown of the government in 1991, Somalia endured civil war. What makes Somalia's situation unique is that, unlike other nations with civil wars, Somalia is a country with homogeneous people that are religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally similar. It is, however, a country that has grown in popularity in recent years as a result of civil unrest. Besides that, there hasn't been a genuine administration operating in Somalia since 1991 (Abdinur, 2018).

Somalia is strategically and geopolitically significant because of its location in East Africa. As a result, it has attracted foreign actors for many years. The major reason for this is the region's unique location, which connects it to the Red Sea and the Bal el Mandeb, which is the main route for commodities traveling from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East. It also connects India, the Middle East, and the Far

East. Not only Somalia, but the Horn of Africa as a whole, is regarded as one of the most dangerous regions on the planet. Even after several nations decolonized the Horn of Africa, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, the region was subjected to foreign operations and proxy conflicts (Mohammed, 1978).

Even after their independence, those countries were engulfed in a larger struggle with one another, causing their national development goals to be realized slowly. Despite the fact that UN security troops attempted but failed to tackle the region's problems, by 1991, the UN had begun its engagement as part of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Despite all of these operations, financing, and humanitarian efforts, the violence in many parts of Somalia has persisted, which has resulted in the country's becoming a failed state in the eyes of the international arena. The international community's involvement did not help to resolve the ongoing dispute in Somalia, but rather exacerbated an already-existing dispute, with the development of various types of piracy, radicalism, and terrorism, transforming the entire region into one of the world's most dangerous places, hurting everyone both regionally and globally (Abdinur, 2018).

Somalia has been engulfed in a never-ending civil conflict for the past two decades. Despite the government's best efforts to quell clan violence and establish a calm atmosphere for the Somali people, it has failed terribly. Furthermore, the formerly tranquil state has collapsed as a result of the continual fighting. This continuous conflict has resulted in a massive exodus of innocent Somali civilians from their homeland and homes to neighboring or foreign nations (Abshir, 2018). The failing state of Somalia has been the focus of international attention for years. This is due to the ongoing civil conflict between tribes, which compelled the UN to intervene by attempting to restore peace in the country through a variety of procedures. Peacekeeping operations such as the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), the Ethiopian military invasion into Somalia, and the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), as well as sending in peace-keeping soldiers, have all been used to try to stop the bloodshed and restore peace to the country (Abshir, 2018).

Abshir continues to state that despite foreign troops' efforts, the situation in Somalia remains unchanged. For decades, Somalia has been one of the East African nations that has been infiltrated by several foreign players. Even after they gained independence, the situation deteriorated. Decolonization was a time in which many

former colonies gained independence from European colonizers and embarked on a new state-building process with high expectations for the future. Despite this, several of those countries were engaged in civil wars for power and territory (Abshir, 2018).

Abshir argues in his thesis that in terms of the participation of external actors in the conflict, external responses were delayed since hostilities in other areas of the world, such as the Gulf War, drew more attention from international organizations. However, assistance finally arrived in 1992, when a UN diplomatic mission was established and a truce was brokered between the two principal warring factions in Mogadishu. UNOSOM was also established and deployed in Somalia, but it was unable to stop the bloodshed and solve the hunger that the country was experiencing (Abshir, 2018).

For years, Somalia has been portrayed in the international media as a country wracked by civil wars, piracy, terrorism, drought, and starvation, affecting millions of people. The Republic of Somalia has been a failing state since 1991, and civil war has erupted among the various castes. As a result, many people have died, and others have been forced to flee their homeland. Despite the fact that the Somali people share the same ethnicity, language, religion, and way of life, clan differences remain the fundamental cause of the constant warfare. The Somali people used the words 'Bur Bur', which means destruction and devastation, in order to describe the time between December 1991 and March 1992, when the country was torn apart by a clan war, with groups sabotaging the state's remnants and fighting for control of rural and urban resources. 25,000 people were killed in Mogadishu during the four-month war, 1.5 million fled the country, and at least 2 million are still internally displaced (Menkhaus, 2009).

Abukar's thesis argument is that local governments are formed to satisfy the requirements of the society in which they are located, and because they are the product of the environment in which they are founded, they cannot remain oblivious to the rapid and constant change that is taking place around them. Otherwise, concerns about their continuing survival will arise. My study will touch on this and will further explain why corruption and inequality in the local government of Somalia are one of the major internal causes of conflict and lack of stability in Somalia.

In today's world, no government or other public organization can maintain its

position unless it ensures that various organizations are active in meeting citizen demands at all times and in all places. Serving the people is one of the most impressive activities of any state. Regardless of political structure, democratic or autocratic, every citizen has the right to the fundamentals. Local government, the third tier of the government system, routinely administers and provides services to the public on behalf of the central government, including but not limited to security, education, licensing, healthcare, city planning, and so on (Anna and Lissa, 2016). The quality-of-service delivery is determined by the links between the government and its population in terms of involvement, openness, and accountability (Abukar, 2020).

Faysal's thesis's main argument was that the UN Peacekeeping mission failed because of their inability to provide security to the Somali people because they downplayed many factors, including the political situation. This thesis will be a bit different in the essence that it will look further into the national and personal interests of the states that are representing the UN and its peace mission in Somalia. This will provide a proper image of why the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia in the past failed to bring stability and peace to Somalia.

Despite UN efforts to stabilize the country, it has been in a state of flux for more than 30 years. Although authors and academics have played a significant role in the failure of UN peacekeeping missions, the underlying causes of the country's long-term failure have yet to be established. Large Somali institutions, including the police and military, are still under construction and underpaid in comparison to AMISOM troops, who receive an average of \$822 per month (APA News, 2018). A share of power for the sovereign state and its strong institutions is required to restore peace and the rule of law (Faysal, 2021).

Faysal argues in his thesis that the AMISOM peacekeeping force is not the first to be dispatched to Somalia, but after the country's functioning government collapsed in 1992, the UN and the US, with the help of an international opposition alliance, failed to remove warlords and restore peace (Ahmed and Green, 1999). AMISOM is backed by the AU and the UN. Human Rights Watch claimed in 2018 that some AMISOM soldiers have exploited the mission's humanitarian aid to force vulnerable women and girls into sexual behavior (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Abshir argues that the political, social, economic, and historical roots of the Somali war are diverse and complicated. Various external and internal causes played distinct roles before the conflict began and during the various stages of Somalia's civil war. Colonization, on the other hand, was a major factor in igniting the battle between the clans. The roots of the Somali civil war, particularly in the southern portion of the country, were sown in the late 1800s (Abdulahi, 2007). During that period, colonial forces split Somalia into five regions based on clan division, resulting in massive disparities between clans. Furthermore, two of the five areas were handed to Ethiopia and Kenya by their colonial rulers at the moment of independence, resulting in a bitter boundary dispute between the two countries. Many nationalists saw the formation of the Republic of Somalia as a step toward the nation's pinnacle (Abshir, 2018).

According to Abdinur (2018), Somalia is indeed the way it is because of international operations that led to invasions by surrounding nations. After years of violence, the country enjoyed peace, especially when the UN compelled Ethiopian troops to withdraw from a stretch of Somalia in 2006, and the AU, UN, and other peacekeeping organizations left as well. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a combination of Somali Clan Elders and notable Islamic religious leaders or sheiks, has made this possible. Somalia stayed calm at that time and began to rebuild a war-torn state. Additionally, the UIC expelled tribal leaders and insurgents from Mogadishu while launching reconciliation discussions among clan members, producing temporary solidarity in most states. Mogadishu's port had reopened, and discussions to restore Mogadishu Airport had begun. However, the participation of the AU and the UN, as well as Ethiopia's assault on Mogadishu, brought the issue to a climax (Abdinur, 2018).

Nonetheless, unlike many others, Douglas Ansel believes that, instead of putting pressure on the rebel groups, international parties should devote their time and resources to finding a system that would allow Somalia to live in peace. He also pushed for foreign players to collaborate alongside Somali civil society to create a genuine centralized administration in Mogadishu, Somalia, with the goal of steering the nation toward stability, growth, and profitability. (Douglas, 2011).

E. Limitations of the Study

One of the limitations that the researcher faced in this research is that some of these written materials may be prejudiced and one-sided, making obtaining the complete story subjective. The researcher overcame this limitation by using different sources in order to get an objective view. Another limitation that the researcher may face is limited sources which can limit the information obtained. The researcher overcame this limitation by making the best of what is available, reading widely on available literature and exhausting data from various sources. Outdated data can be another limitation to this study whereby these data may not answer specific research question which may lead to the researcher not obtaining reliable information. The researcher overcame this limitation by utilizing various sources and writings published over the years, and not over one period of time. The researcher will be unable to travel to Somalia due to security concerns which can be seen as a limitation since the researcher won't be able to obtain accurate and unbiased information. The researcher overcame this limitation by using secondary data, since it is relatively time-saving and also saves money.

F. Order of the Study

The first chapter of the study is the introduction. This chapter consists of the background information of the study, which tends to explain what the study is all about. The background information is essential to the study because it enables readers to understand the study. Also, in the first chapter, the purpose and importance of the study are discussed, whereby the question 'why is this study important?' is discussed, hence explaining why this research should be conducted. Within the first chapter, the research questions and the main argument are identified, thus signifying the objectives of the study, which steers the direction that the study will take. Research methodology and techniques are also discussed in the first chapter. The various methods of data collection are discussed, whereby the different approaches used in the study are discussed. This enables the readers to understand how the researcher collected the data to come up with the findings of the study. Last but not least, the first chapter also consists of a literature review whereby the researcher reviews previous works and literature conducted about the research topic. This enables the researcher to analyze the differences and similarities, hence shading light

on the issues that previous works and literature ignored about the topic of study.

The second chapter consists of a conceptual and theoretical framework. In this chapter, the theory of dependency is discussed, whereby concepts such as peace, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution are used to explain the theory behind the study. In this chapter, how countries from the periphery are exploited and kept dependent on the core countries in the international arena is explained. This chapter consists of the main and major theories that the researcher used to obtain the findings of the study.

The third chapter consists of the historical framework of the study. In this chapter, the researcher explains the pre-colonial period of Somalia, whereby the researcher sheds light on how the livelihood of the Somali people was before the colonial area. The colonial period of Somalia is also discussed in this chapter where the colonization strategy of divide and conquer was used in Somalia. The pre-colonial era, the cold war period, and also how these events affected Somalia are also discussed under this chapter. Last but not least, the collapse of the Somali state and the civil war in Somalia will be discussed in this chapter, explaining in detail the causes of the civil war and the collapse of the Somali state and how these events affected the Somali population.

The fourth chapter consists of the findings of the study, whereby previous international, regional, and local peacebuilding efforts are discussed. In this chapter, various international peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia, such as UNOSOM I and II, as well as regional peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, such as AMISOM and the initiative of IGAD, are discussed. Internal peacebuilding efforts in Somalia are also discussed in this chapter whereby we look into the peace process in the northern regions of Somalia as well as the various roles that the media and women play in bringing peace and stability to Somalia. Last but not least, the chapter concludes with the similarities and differences between the various peacebuilding efforts in Somalia and which efforts were the most successful in fostering peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

The final and last chapter, which is the fifth chapter, consists of the conclusion of the study. In this chapter, the researcher provided a summary of the entire study for the readers to understand properly. In this chapter, the researcher also provided a number of recommendations where the researcher outlines various ways

in which peace, stability, and unity can be achieved in Somalia.

II. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Peace

Peace can be defined as absence of violence or animosity with a broader focus on societal friendliness and harmony. Within the context of war, peace forms a major basis to which the war or conflict can be averted (Merriam-Webster, 2022). It is freedom from war or hostilities; the condition or state of a nation or community in which it is not at war with another (Oxford English Dictionary, 2022).

Peace means harmony and calm. In the East, it symbolizes tranquility and harmony. It's described as a state of law or civic governance, justice, and power balance or equilibrium. Peace is multifaceted. Peace is the opposite of war, violence, and conflict. It can describe internal (thought or country) or external links. It can be narrow, like a peace pact, or wide, like a complete culture (as in a world peace). Peace can be dichotomous, continuous, complacent, active, empirical, descriptive, positive, or negative (Leckman et al., 2014, pp. 1-17).

B. Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, when it was primarily promoted by North American and European scholars. In terms of conflict resolution development, there are four important periods to consider. First, there was the preliminary development period, which lasted from 1914 until 1945. This time span spans from the commencement of World War I to the end of World War II. Many individuals were slain during this time, and the economic infrastructure was also decimated (Kriesberg, 2007).

Between 1946 and 1969, the second stage of conflict resolution progress was establishing the basis. It began after World War II, when various international organizations advocating for peace and security, such as the UN, were founded. Between 1970 and 1989, the third era of conflict resolution evolution was growth and institutionalization, during which time many international treaties were

negotiated and the Cold War became more manageable. From 1990 to 2008, the fourth and final stage of conflict resolution evolution was diffusion and differentiation. This period began with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of international organizations that are capable of using conflict mediation and conflict prevention strategies (Kriesberg, 2007).

Johan Galtung coined the term 'peacebuilding' in 1975 to embrace a broader range of actions than peacemaking and peacekeeping by recognizing the necessity of finding and building structures that can militate against war, thereby addressing the core causes of conflict (Barnett et al., 2007, p. 37). The term was popularized by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Report on an Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1995) and reaffirmed in his 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1995). At the time, peacebuilding was referred to as 'post-conflict peacebuilding', limiting its application to activities after conflict had ended or was about to end. Here's where 'peacebuilding' is most confusing.

The practitioners of bottom-up peacebuilding questioned and objected to the technique on principle. Rather, they questioned how it should be read and what role they should play as peacemakers. Some realized the usefulness and participated in light conflict analysis and sensitivity cooperation and exchange with development players. As a result, development actors are frequently forced to engage in local dispute resolution before they can begin executing programs. The concept of accompanying peacekeeping forces or government forces into freshly freed areas to help establish confidence between government actors or police and local populations was, however, much too political and partial for the peacebuilding community to engage in. Rather than being controlled by money flows or government presence, they wanted to perform such trust-building exercises with whoever was regarded to be a significant participant, including non-state players, and wherever they felt the need (Hammond 2016).

Dedicated peacebuilding financing channels are often smaller and more ad hoc than established humanitarian and development funding schemes. Peacebuilding is likewise less well-established as a distinct policy area in many institutional contexts, and is frequently regarded from either a development or a foreign/security policy perspective. Despite the fact that peacebuilding has its own 'community', higher-level decision-makers do not often regard it as distinct from development

(Sherriff et al. 2018). Peacebuilding was conspicuously lacking as a long-term, human-relational, non-security, and state-centric activity. In the case of many African countries and other conflict-torn countries, it appears that ‘governance’ and ‘state-building’ have eclipsed peacebuilding in the triple nexus, and that foreign interventions have overlooked people-centered, bottom-up peacebuilding initiatives by focusing on building a functional state. These are considered more specialized or experimental actions carried out by a different group of actors. It is suggested and also pointed out that discussions about governance and state-building seldom assist in shifting resource-based clan and tribal disputes at the local level, which perpetuates the instability – and, by extension, the acute humanitarian need – that exists in many African countries.

Words and notions like peacebuilding, reconciliation, resilience, governance, and stabilization have all been thrown around at various times and with variable degrees of popularity and usage. The emergence of such terminology is a logical result of the evolution of notions that give diverse analytical lenses for dealing with the same complexity. Simultaneously, the multiplicity and conflation of these interconnected concepts has led to confusion among professionals, to the point where two organizations could be designing or implementing completely different and even divergent interventions under the same name, such as ‘resilience’, ‘peacebuilding’, or ‘stabilization’. This is because each and every party has their own objectives and interests, hence using peacebuilding infinitives to get what they want, which paves the way for foreign aid, hence leading to complete dependency. Another aspect sustaining this tendency is the fact that financing is frequently linked to ‘the label of the day’. and intervention terminology (though not usually format) must be tailored appropriately.

C. Dependency Theory

Dependency theory holds that resources flow from a ‘periphery’ of poor and undeveloped countries to a ‘core’ of wealthy countries, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. According to dependence theory, poor states are impoverished while wealthy nations benefit from their inclusion in the ‘global system’. In the late 1960s, after World War II, academics sought to identify Latin America's lack of progress with dependency theory (James 1985).

Frank (1966) and Samir Amin (1976) have made the most significant contributions to the development of the dependence theory as an explanation for economic underdevelopment. Frank believes that the terms ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ only have relevance when used in reference to countries that are a part of the capitalist global economy. According to Frank, this global economy is separated into two main parts: the metropolis and the satellite. These ideas are essentially comparable to the core and peripheral principles proposed by Wallerstein. The global economy is set up such that economic excess moves from the satellite (also known as the periphery) to the metropolis (also known as the core).

Because rich capitalist nations have consistently extracted wealth from the less developed countries, they have thus been and continue to be underdeveloped. This process has been referred to as the development of underdevelopment by Frank (1966). According to this theory, the underdevelopment of some nations has made the development of other nations possible, and the development of other nations has made the underdevelopment of other nations possible. The overwhelming majority of peasants and urban workers in the impoverished nations are the main casualties of this process.

Dependency theory contends that poor nations are not just primitive clones of industrialized countries but have distinct traits and systems of their own. According to dependency theory (Randall and Theobald 1998, 120), underdevelopment is caused by the West and North America's dominance in the capitalist world order. In development studies, dependency means a country or region depends on another for aid, ‘survival’, and advancement.

While the citizens of developed countries do benefit from this because their standard of living has increased significantly, the capitalists in metropolitan countries and the agricultural and industrial elites of satellite countries stand to gain the most. As a result, these groups have strong economic and political ties to the metropolitan elite and are essential to the retention, maintenance, and sustainability of their states' economic dependence. They are oblivious to the fact that their connection with urban capitalists is imbalanced. The industrialized countries, according to Samir Amin (1974), have highly articulated economies, or ones whose many sectors are intimately linked so that growth in one area prompts growth in the other sectors. Directly in opposition, disarticulated economies characterize underdeveloped

civilizations. These are economies with disjointed sectors that do not interact frequently. As a result, growth in any one area frequently does not beget growth in the other sectors. This is the situation in Africa, where the manufacturing of raw resources for sale to industrialized nations accounts for the majority of the country's economic activity.

Third-world states are poor countries in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America that share poverty, high birthrates, and economic dependence on advanced nations. The word means the third world is exploited and will be revolutionary. Underdevelopment in the third world is characterized by distorted and heavily reliant economies, traditional, rural social systems, significant population growth, and widespread poverty. Most third-world governing elites are obscenely affluent despite widespread poverty in rural and urban slums (Woldu, 2000).

Examining dependency's numerous shapes and forms can help us better understand the notion. Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) proposed three historical patterns of dependence that the currently disadvantaged countries had gone through. He refers to the first of this as colonial dependence. European capitalist powers invaded pre-capitalist territories under this system of reliance, which dates back to the 16th century in various parts of the world, and created a monopoly over land, mining, and labor. By regulating trade connections, Europe was able to collect excess riches from these areas. The economic makeup of these colonial areas was significantly influenced by their servitude to European countries. Financial and industrial dependence is the second. Late in the 19th century, this type of reliance first appeared. In contrast to earlier merchant capital, it was distinguished by the extension of European industrial capital into the underdeveloped parts of the world. This type of dependence was inherent to the monopoly stage of capitalism's growth. Big capitalists invested heavily in developing nations as a result of financial-industrial reliance, mostly to produce raw commodities that would be supplied to the core countries.

Dos Santos refers to the most current type of dependency as the 'new dependency'. The growth of transnational firms that make significant economic investments in developing nations is a post-World War II phenomena that contributes to this type of reliance. Along with this worry of the many types of reliance, there is also the issue of how economic dependency fosters and maintains underdevelopment.

Regarding the precise methods by which this occurs, dependency theorists frequently differ. Distinct theories have hypothesized a number of different processes via which dependency causes underdevelopment, and occasionally more than one is put forth by the same thinker. The present dependency literature most typically suggests four potential dependency mechanisms (Chase-Dunn, 1975; Delacroix and Ragin, 1981; Barrett and Whyte, 1982) Repatriation, elite complicity, structural distortion, and market vulnerability are all forms of exploitation.

In the end, Walter Rodney asserted that there are two ways to address the question of who and what is accountable for Africa's underdevelopment. First, the functioning of the imperialist system, which robs Africa of its riches and prevents the fast development of its resources, is largely to blame for the continent's economic stagnation. Second, one must deal with individuals who abuse the system and those who either work for it as agents or unaware collaborators. Western European capitalists actively expanded their exploitation of the continent of Africa from within Europe.

Capitalists from the US joined them recently and partially replaced them; for a long time, even the workers in those developed nations have benefitted from Africa's exploitation and underdevelopment. None of these statements aim to absolve Africans of bearing primary responsibility for development. They are not just complicit in the imperialist system, but every African has a duty to comprehend it and contribute to its demise (Rodney, 1972).

In the case of Somalia, foreign aid, which is mostly from developed countries, puts the country into a very dependent situation where it's very hard for the development and security of the country to move forward. According to Okolo and Eneh (2003), development entails growth, mobility, and advancement toward something greater. As a result, it involves acts, responses, and movements in both the material and non-material components of existence. They also noted that development encompasses more than just economic and social indices, such as human resource development and good behavioral improvements. Development entails improving individuals' access to food, water, and shelter, as well as information and communication, healthcare, excellent motorable roads, good education, and justice. When these goals are met, the individual's dignity, happiness, patriotic ideals, and quality of life will improve.

Development, according to Todaro (1992), is a multidimensional process entailing the restructuring and change in direction of the whole economic and social system. In addition to improved income and productivity, this includes significant changes in institutional, social, and organizational structure, as well as public attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs. According to Axline (2009), development is both a physical process and a mental condition. Institutional reform is only one facet of the process. The other part is that people's mindsets must shift. As a result, Susanne (1971) claims that the acts, reactions, and interactions that qualify for inclusion as parts of development are the result of rational thinking, intentional planning, and true citizen participation. As Okolo and Eneh have discovered, they are not random events or phenomena.

Development and improved productivity are related to the economic system first and foremost because they aim to enhance living standards, broaden the scope of productive activity, and build and develop the required basic infrastructure for higher, larger, and more beneficial economic transformations. Second, they are related to the social system because they influence education, health, housing, social ethics, and justice, all of which are physical and mental issues that help individuals grow and develop in society. Third, they are linked to the political system because they aim to improve legitimacy patterns by establishing conditions that allow all or a majority of the public to engage in the political process of making choices and distributing scarce resources and values in their communities. The most important element of what we can call the 'new' notions of development, according to Nnadozie (2010), is their concern for mankind, since progress is understood as a condition of human flourishing rather than a state of the national economy (Eme & Emeh, 2012).

Foreign aid has been considered a necessary prerequisite for the survival and renegotiation of many African and developing countries throughout the years. Most Western donors working in various developing countries implicitly acknowledge this. First, the steady infusion of both Western and non-Western foreign aid has pushed up the rents that the political elite bargain over. Second, assistance and foreign backing are contingent on those same elites refraining from large-scale political violence as a way of securing elite positions (Menkhaus, 2018, pp. 3).

As a result, the donor community has no choice but to continue its current course. The majority of developing and 'war-torn countries' Western donor assistance is clear, with state-building and development as the primary goal. This also influences the choice to gradually boost help channeled through various countries' systems while increasing support channeled through the national aid architecture. For example, in Somalia, only days after the World Bank committed USD 80 million in International Development Association (IDA) financing, the EU offered to contribute EUR 100 million in budget support as part of a state-building and resilience contract in July 2018. These decisions also indicate a strong belief among donors that Somali state-building and stabilization is now or never. The current condition is the closest Somalia has come to being in a functional state in decades. The federal model's failure is not considered an option. According to several scholars, this can lead to unduly hasty policymaking and a high tolerance for widespread political corruption and rent-seeking by Somali political elites as well as regional and foreign players with vested interests in Somalia. At the very least, it demonstrates that humanitarian relief and peacebuilding are not purely technical issues, and that each decision must be taken in the context of donor support for political stability and security (Medinilla et al. 2016).

Many claim that Africa's troubles are the result of its own doing. It used to be popular to attribute the problems in Africa to others, such as colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, etc. Political scientists refer to this blame-game phenomena as Dependency Theory, a sign of a symbiotic connection between the affluent and the poor in which the poor are purposefully dealt the worse cards. 'How Europe Under-Developed Africa' is a book about the topic written by Walter Rodney. This is no longer tenable in any way. The truth is that Africans themselves are mostly to blame for the ruin of Africa in modern times. For instance, crooked politicians and their armies of president-does-no-wrong supporters. Major public corruption in Africa still contributes to the continent's deteriorating underdevelopment. African nations have evolved into the private domains of organized crime groups whose stated goal is not the development of their nations but the theft of national wealth into foreign banks.

It is abhorrent when funds meant for Africa's development are siphoned off by corrupt officials. Europeans not only profit greatly from the interest on

investments made with stolen funds from Africa, but they also lend these funds to Africa at astronomical interest rates. As a result, in almost all African nations today, spending on healthcare and education is less expensive than paying interest on such loans (not the debt itself). Africa is essentially played like a football. Whoever gets possession of the ball kicks it till it almost deflates. The process continues after certain foreign loans are used to boost it. Since gaining independence, this has been the reality. Africa experiences ongoing deflation and sporadic, inconsistent growth (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2000).

If we use poverty as a basic barometer of underdevelopment, it would seem that poverty is ingrained in the cultures and nations of Africa and has ravaged the continent for decades. In fact, poverty has emerged as one of the simplest and most concrete indicators of Africa's underdevelopment and backwardness. Although more than one-fifth of the world's population lives in abject poverty today, Africa, particularly its sub-Saharan area, would appear to be the worst affected. Despite having abundant human and financial resources, poverty in Africa has increased, multiplied, and become ingrained in the vast majority of its citizens and nations. And despite significant financial investments as well as several laws and programs aimed at combating poverty and underdevelopment on the continent, it has persisted and seems to resist all remedies.

Therefore, the crucial query is what caused this horrifying and absurd circumstance. A number of variables have been shown to be maintaining Africa's underdevelopment and poverty (Nnadozie, 2010). These components have been divided into two main categories, namely internal and external influences, in order to be explained. Internal reasons include lack of good leadership, poor governance, corruption, a heavy debt load, political instability, racial and religious conflict, and civil war. A hostile physical environment, environmental deterioration, a high rate of jobless growth, regulations that discourage investment, as well as strange and antagonistic socioeconomic behaviors and customs, are only a few of the internal challenges that need to be addressed. The external elements include the function of poverty itself, foreign debt, foreign aid, and the dumping of hazardous waste on African soil (Nnadozie, 2010).

Somalia is an excellent example of a country where catastrophe has become the norm. In many parts of the country, humanitarian aid is a daily reality, and the

UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs forecasted that 4.2 million people will require help in Somalia. (November 2018; OCHA). This accounts for 34% of Somalia's overall population. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around 800,000 Somalis dwell in refugee camps in the region, with 2.6 million people internally displaced (UNHCR December 2018; UNHCR October 2018). A variety of humanitarian actors supply most, if not all, essential services in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Humanitarian groups, owing to their Social Safety Net Programs, which give long-term support to disadvantaged communities, sometimes have greater access to basic demographic data than the Somali government. As a result of their efforts, humanitarian organizations have a crucial role in the government of various sections of the nation.

In the absence of adequate state governance in complex political emergencies, humanitarian and relief agencies' mandates have expanded to include recovery and the provision of basic services such as long-term healthcare, nutrition, and education, as well as food assistance, livelihood support, and social protection (Bennett, 2016, p.35). This places an enormous strain on humanitarian finances in Somalia, and it also means that humanitarian aid has become an integral element of the service delivery paradigm. Humanitarian organizations have a thorough awareness of the Somali issue, and humanitarian networks are strongly embedded in Somali society.

As long as relative peace and security exist, there may be a need to reconsider the emergency relief paradigm's tenacity and the extent to which it should continue to apply to Somalia. The stated state-building aim of the international community, as well as the embeddedness of humanitarian aid, makes maintaining the perception of independence, impartiality, and neutrality problematic at times. Many African countries, especially Somalia, are countries whose power is challenged, with a diverse range of armed organizations and an ongoing insurgency targeting both domestic and international entities. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is unequivocally supported by the UN and Western donors, who also fund the regional peacekeeping mission that ensures its security. While humanitarian ideals are obvious in humanitarian tales, some practitioners have an unspoken knowledge that these principles are of little utility in Somalia since relief is nearly always political (DuBois 2018).

Humanitarian access must be arranged in cases of emergencies, such as the droughts of 2011 and 2021. This implies that humanitarian organizations and their partners must work with all stakeholders to ensure that help is delivered on time. Local elders, armed groups, AMISOM, and, in certain cases, Al-Shabaab fighters are among the latter. While interacting with Al-Shabaab is fraught with controversy due to international anti-terrorism prohibitions, research suggests that paying off Al-Shabaab-appointed gatekeepers was once common practice (Jackson and Aynte 2013). AMISOM is also playing an increasingly critical role in transporting and securing essential aid for UN humanitarian organizations in dangerous areas. As a result, it may be difficult to maintain a pretense of neutrality or independence as a result of this. Co-location of military and humanitarian workers is a *de facto* reality in Mogadishu and some Federal Member States (FMS) sites. Some non-humanitarian respondents suggested that, in such a complicated situation, a too principled attitude on the part of humanitarian agencies might stymie development or operate as a conceptual straitjacket that limits collaboration and coordination needlessly (LaGuardia & Poole 2016).

In many African countries, foreign assistance is both part of a delicate balance and a way to make the country dependent. It also looks to be nearing a tipping point, with both local and international players seeking not only a way out of the apparently never-ending state of crisis and humanitarian need but also their own private agendas. This aspiration will be translated into practical solutions through policy integration and nexus techniques. Changing one's attitude has the potential to disturb the power balance between those who profit from the status quo and those who want it to end. This is true of Somalia's evolving federal structures, but it is also true of the donor community.

III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR OF SOMALIA (1960-1990 PERIOD)

A. Pre-Colonial History of Somalia

For decades, European colonizers portrayed Africa as a land devoid of civilizations. Nevertheless, data from archaeology revealed that the region as well as its people had a lengthy history and civilization prior to the Middle Ages, when Africa was discovered. Nonetheless, due to their perspectives, the majority of the history documented dates back to years after the continent's discovery. Furthermore, little consideration was given to the continent's pre-European past. Although there are no documents from previous times written from the perspective of African historians, numerous historical sources suggest that European rulers did not introduce a new political structure to the peninsula, but rather adapted to the region's pre-existing structured political framework. The African Public Sector evolved from a post-structural framework on which European powers relied to form imperial administrations and strengthen governance. That is why colonists found it simple to establish their methods in various nations and contribute to civilization by bringing their foreign knowledge and technology (Falola, 2002, pp. 4–9).

Long before the advent of Europeans, many portions of Africa had flourishing civilizations and state forms. One of the oldest prominent features of state formation in antiquity, for example, may be dated directly towards the 4th century BCE alongside the Nile River region. This river links East African nations to Egypt and other Arab countries (Shumway, 2013). The Nile River flows across the region, uniting all of the countries in a life-or-death fight for survival. Its eastern shore connects to the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea, and its inhabitants have participated in commerce for hundreds of thousands of years, connecting them to the furthest corners of the Gulf and the rest of the world. Somalia is among the countries in this region of Africa that have been infiltrated by foreign forces. Alexander Rondos argued that the EU Representative for the Horn of Africa is one of

the most explored in the world; this is due to the territory's location at a crossroads that links both east to west and south to north. Prior to colonization, there were no established borders in the Horn of Africa region, and monarchs and chieftains reigned over those territories for millennia (Rondos, 2016).

From 700CE to 1200CE, the Somali people began organizing into tribes known as the Samaal, who migrated from Arab nations such as Oman, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and began growing in the area alongside the initial inhabitants of those territories known as the Bantu tribes (James, 2015). Those Arabs mostly descend from Yemeni ancestors. Because of Somalia's proximity to the Red Sea region, many Arabs who survived punishment fled to those areas and established themselves. They intermarried with the indigenous people, who largely consisted of nomads spread out over many parts of Somalia. Throughout the entire 16th and 17th centuries, the sultanates fought several battles with nearby kingdoms, such as the Abyssinian Imperial Power (currently known as Ethiopia) in order to enlarge and conquer their territory. As a consequence, they governed the majority of the Horn of Africa, but their kingdom crumbled into many tribes fighting for wealth and power, which led to their downfall. Among the many kingdoms that rained were Adal, Ajuran, Mijerteyn, Obbia, and Oman. The kingdom of Oman ruled Somalia from the 17th century until colonialism (James, 2015, p. 1).

The region's uniqueness is that there has never been a period in human history when there have not been battles. From the time when indigenous nomads began battling over the rights to water and land following the invasion of foreign forces by which the conflict has waged on since then, including Arabs, Egyptians, and the western countries such as the French, the United Kingdom (UK), and the Italians. As a result, while colonization had a key part in precipitating the conflict in Somalia, blaming it for everything is going to be erroneous. Before Europeans arrived in East Africa, natives and new external powers began a struggle for control, rights to trade, and commodities. The clans of Somalia are classified into six groups, with four of them serving as the country's primary and largest leaders. They are Darad, Dir, Hawiye, and Isaaq. These four major clans account for about 85% of Somalia's population and have the same historical and cultural origins. Moreover, the people were mostly nomads and travelers who relied on their livestock for day-to-day living. The other two clans, the Digil and Rahan-Weyn, accounted for about 15% of the

Somali population (Hesse, 2010).

The clan system has played a crucial role in Somalia's politics for decades. Whilst Somalia has indeed been accessible through a paternal lineage clan structure, the Somalia clan system is typically fluid and adaptable, shifting structure with respect to altering circumstances. Inter-class conflicts, on the other hand, erupt in modern Somalia as a result of clan leaders' wanting access to resources and authority. The clan structure has an impact on traditional disputes in Somalia, and that impact may be both critical and damaging. Somalia's unconstrained and crisis-ridden past as an outcome of the violence in Somalia has been exacerbated by economic and cultural difficulties. In addition, the political history of Somalia in general, and the Somali Region of Jubbaland in particular, will be discussed in the study. Certain historians believe that the root of the conflict and dispute in lower Juba is a struggle for ownership and control of the territory's resources. The Ogaden, Harti, Marehan, and Hawiye are the territory's founding clans. Other clans, on the other hand, are divided regarding Kismayu's claims to sovereignty over its surroundings. The debate, which evolved mostly among the Darood, Harti, Marehan, and Ogaden, hence disqualifying all others out of the race for the leadership position (Mryddinlewis, 2002, pp. 20-25).

Other scholars argue that the first inhabitants in the Kismayu area between the 17th and 18th centuries were Banjuni people. In 1865, Ogaden Somalis from the east to the west bank of the Juba River succeeded in driving away the long-established Oromo. The pastoral regions, such as the Tana and Juba rivers, were eventually given to the Ogaden. The Muqaabul sub-clan of Ogaden were the original Ogaden inhabitants of Kismayu city, and they are still quite powerful in Badade District in Kismayu's south. Harti merchants moved to Kismayu in the 1880s and began to establish themselves in the town. The primary Harti section based in town was the Majeerteen businesspeople. The social conflict in north-east Somalia between Ali Suleiban and Osman Mahmoud Majeerteen drove a large number of Ali Suleiban into Kismayu, significantly expanding the number of main Harti tribes in that area. During the hostile rivalry of Sayid Abdulla Hassan, the Dolbahunte and the Issa Mohamoud emigrated to Kismayu around the 20th century (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994, pp. 94-115).

As previously noted, since violence had been a significant part of the lives of the majority who inhabited those areas, colonialism was another major factor in igniting conflict in those locations. East Africa as a whole and especially Somalia, have been identified as being among the world's most volatile and dangerous places. The Map 1 depicts Africa in general before colonialism. However, rather than boundaries, the territories were separated into kingdoms. Unlike now, tiny kingdoms and sultanates ruled over parts of east Africa for centuries.



Figure 1 Henry Miller, (November 25, 2017). “Mapped Africa Before and After Colonialism, <https://matadornetwork.com/read/mapped-africa-scramble-africa/>

B. Somalia and The Colonization Period

The conflict over Somalia began centuries before European powers arrived, as documented in the pre-colonial era. Far from what colonialists use to justify their behavior, such as reforming the world's primitive population, East Africa, like the rest of the continent, was home to a few of the world's first human civilizations. According to history, the Somali population was already trading with the Middle

East and other merchants from the Far East, including China, in the 10th century. Additionally, this region was by far the most connected with the rest of the world, with commerce prevalent among neighbors, across the region, and beyond the continent. Commerce, marriage, migration, diplomacy, and conflict were all forms of interaction between societies (Reinhart, 1982, pp. 2–6).

This incorporation has provided opportunities for people to learn from various communities and grow as a result. Consequently, there has been no concept of forming a sovereign nation or developing a country. Up to the beginning of colonialism, the region was consolidated under the sovereignty of various kingdoms. This simplified the transfer of colonial authority in those nations. Furthermore, in virtually all civilizations, poverty, unemployment, and homelessness were novel ideas introduced after colonialism. For ages, affluent clans have looked after their destitute relatives by renting out a portion of their farms or cattle in exchange for a share of their earnings (Reinhart, 1982, pp. 2–6).

Imperialism and colonialism in Africa began with Europeans seeking control, natural resources, and outlets for their commodities. Supremacy has been the primary motivator for European states since possessing colonies was viewed as one of the foundations of getting an advantage in international affairs. As a result, practically all colonists fought for colonies without understanding anything about them or their significance. Germany, for example, was one of the last European countries to enter the fight for colonies. Since they had no interest in obtaining colonies up to that point, when questioned about his changed attitude, Bismarck of Germany said that fear of his enemy's gaining superiority in business and politics had prompted them to join in the race to obtain colonies. This was the fundamental reason that prompted those powers to take part in drawing and distributing fake borders among themselves (Brooke-Smith, 1987, pp. 1-2).

However, with Vasco da Gama's discoveries in the 15th century, Europeans acquired access to those lands for commerce and, ultimately, exploitation. The entrance and arrival of European traders, which paved the way for imperial powers, around the beginning of the 15th century, rivalry for the territory intensified considerably. As a result, the whole continent of Africa is in a state of panic. This would be an era when many European nations realized that the continent offered an abundance of resources for their expanding industries, labor force, and markets for

their products. With the rise of new European powers in international affairs, their appetite expanded rapidly. Prior to colonialism, competing for a region signified superiority over others (Vandervort, 1998, p. 26).

As an outcome, the Europeans chose to partition the continent among themselves rather than risking repeating the calamity that had befallen them throughout the course of thirty years of religious conflict to protect themselves against economic and political calamity. As a result, the 'Scramble for Africa' became one of the world's greatest instances of international relations diplomacy. In the 19th century, three European countries conquered Somalia as part of Africa. Somalia has experienced severe rivalry from some European countries, such as Italy, France, and the UK, as has the rest of the continent. However, unlike the others, it was a victim of both regional (like Egypt, Ethiopia) and foreign forces. As a consequence, this was divided among the three European powers, with Ethiopia annexing the Ogaden area. The only empire that was never colonized by other nations throughout the colonial period was Ethiopia. As a result, they took advantage of the chance to expand into neighboring nations. However, after gaining independence in 1977, Somalia suffered several battles and is currently battling with Ethiopia to reclaim territory acquired during the colonial era.

Colonization left a major imprint on any and all overseas territories, but the harm was especially greater in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. Even after those countries gained independence, the region became violent. The fundamental reasons for the region's infiltration and violence may be summarized as a resource and geographical curse. Economic hardship affects all states, regardless of wealth, and produces poverty and turmoil among their people while foreigners exploit their resources. Just about all known conflicts on the globe have significant links to the utilization of raw commodities, either legitimate or illicit, and it causes significant confrontation (Bannon & Collies, 2003, p. 9).

In terms of resource availability and physical position, the Horn of Africa should have been one of the world's most developed and prosperous areas. Since it is a place that has a distinct edge over others in terms of raw material availability, it is also recognized as the best site for worldwide trade and tourism appeal. Nonetheless, this region's battle for dominance turned it into a hub of poverty and violence. The most serious wars in Africa have arisen as a result of the Europeans' erection of

artificial frontiers. Somalia, as a member of the continent, was not excluded from this separation. Furthermore, this is one of the most visible examples in world history of how conqueror rivalry can harm a nation and how far the legacy can spread. The rivalry between Portugal and Spain was the catalyst for colonization. With such a resource, the others extended their territories in the 15th century, accompanied by the arrival of other European powers, until, in the early 18th and early 19th centuries, they elected to split the territory. As Somalia was split among three major powers at the time, as witnessed in East Africa.

The colonial powers in Somalia that occupied the land were Britain, France, and Italy, which were the largest, strongest, and most powerful powers in the world. These colonial powers succeeded in separating Somalia from the whole Horn of Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia. The British captured contemporary Somalia's northern territories and dubbed them Somaliland. Moreover, the British desired and inhabited Somalia's Ogaden region, which they eventually relinquished to Ethiopia once they withdrew from East Africa, as well as the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which was part of Somalia's Jubaland region and was later invaded and occupied by Kenya during the colonial era under British supervision, while the French successfully invaded the Northwest of Somalia and renamed it French Somaliland (Mulugeta, 2009).

Italy seized the southern-central regions of Somalia, including Mogadishu, the nation's capital, and proclaimed it Italian Somaliland. The two major colonial powers, Britain and France, seized command of Somalia's longest coastline, which spanned from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and was the region's most important commercial sector, while Ethiopia and Italy contended for control of the rest of Somalia. However, in 1884, Italy acquired the southern half of Somalia and renamed it Italian Somaliland. Despite that, Italy, the UK, and Ethiopia spent years fighting for Italian and British Somaliland until it was designated as an Italian protectorate by the nascent UN in 1949. (Archtner, 1993).




Figure 2 Map of Somalia during the colonization period. Retrieved from <https://www.quora.com/Somaliland-is-much-more-stable-than-the-rest-of-Somalia-and-has-sought-independence-for-some-time-Is-this-a-legacy-of-the-difference-between-the-Italian-and-British-administration-of-Somalia>.

Occupation and proxy warfare spawned nationalist groups that used both armed and non-military means to oppose colonization. The freedom fighter who is regarded as a key member of the Dervish Movement's armed resistance in Somalia, notably in the country's northern territories held by British forces, is Sayed Mohamed Abdalla Hassan. The Dervish groups were nationalists who opposed European invaders such as Italy, Britain, and Ethiopia as well. To quell the movement by the Dervish freedom fighters, the British and their allies in 1920, which witnessed the first aircraft bombardments in Africa, which were undertaken against a tiny nationalist movement. During that time, Somali resistance took the form of coalitions that fought against African colonization and led African liberation movement groups, as well as taking up the banner of all great Somalia under the dominion of Britain, Ethiopia, and France (Mohamoud, 2006).

The Somali Youth League (SYL) was the most well-organized resistance

entity in the southern parts, while the Somalia National League (SNL) was the most well-organized in the northern parts. The Somali struggle for freedom progressed rapidly, resulting in the removal of British rule from the northern section of Somalia on June 26, 1960. On July 1, 1960, the Italian administration in the southern half was likewise dissolved. Without delay, the two freed administrations (south and north) merged to become the Somalia Republic. Once the two areas merged, they used a multi-party system modeled after the western form of administration and successfully held legislative and elections for two presidential terms.

Nonetheless, although colonial empires took turns capturing the Somalia territories, Somali clans were also busy battling each other rather than combating colonialism in unison. Somalian tribes were at war with each other over territory in the 20th century. The Majeerteen and Ogadenis clans of Somalia were involved in a fight that resulted in many casualties. Throughout the fight, for example, about 80 Harti were slain. The Ogadenis refer to the battle location as 'Lafa-Harti', which translates as 'the Bones of the Harti', while the Hartis refer to it as 'Lafa-Rag', which translates as 'the Bones of Men'. Historically, Jubbaland held countless conflicts between the Ogaden sub-clans of Marehan and Awlihan. However, since the British Empire seized control of Kismayu from the Italians, British authority has often compelled the Harti and Ogadenis to reach an agreement since both of them were warring over how rich and fruitful the territory was. According to Ogaden, the arrangement granted dominance to the Ogadenis, who promised to have the position of Sultan, which provides overall control in Jubbaland territory. The Ogaden commander, Mohamed Zubeir, stated that the agreement with the Harti should remain in Liboi, which is located in the northern part of Kismayu, while the territory that lies to the south should remain controlled by the Harti. On the contrary, the Harti, the pact, said that the Ogaden commander Mohamed Zubeir should remain in Liboi-Kismayo in the north half of Kismayu, while the territory to the south remained under the Harti's dominion (Thakore, 2013, pp.7-16).

An important aspect contributing to the long-term source of hostile conflict in Lower-Juba was the local society and clan composition. Furthermore, the residents' illiteracy rate exacerbated the problem. People in the southern region are less homogeneous than those in the northern areas. The distinction between the civilizations in the region is marked by the lack of homogeneity of settlers in the

north of the various districts, as well as their language, customs, and numerous complexities of social structure. The region is significant because it accommodated and brought together pastoral, rural, and coastal populations. There are numerous large clans confederated in the lower-Juba region, each of which has traditionally engaged in various economic pursuits. Pastoralists include the Biya-mal (Dir), Hawiye (Gal-jaal), Marehan, and Ogadeni (Awlihan, Muqaabul, Bartire, and Mohamed-Zubeir). The Bantuu were renowned farmers who were local, whilst the Banjunii, the Harti (Majerteen, Warsengeli, Dolbahunte), and the Tuuni were mostly coastal people who mostly practiced business and fishing. The Bantu societies can be located near the Juba River (Zartman, 2009).

Mushunguli and Shanbara are the two primary groups in Bantu civilization. The Mushunguli, also known as Wazuguas, arrived in 1836 following a protracted drought and were thought to be the likely heirs of former Tanzanian slaves. People maintain their East African social identity and speak a variety of languages, including Afmaymay and Swahili, which are commonly located in an evenly surrounded region between Kamsuma and Juba and Zunguri. The Shanbaras were another clan which was divided into five sub-clans. These sub-clans were the Mgindu, Mkuwa, Myao, Nyasa, and Mlima. They are believed to be descendants of former slaves from Malawi, Tanzania, and Mozambique. Jilib was where these clans were initially stationed, but they were gradually assimilated into the Somali culture. They also changed their names to new Somali ones (Crocker, 2013).

When colonizers arrived, they promised civilized society a chance to develop. Somalia had an extremely low literacy rate. This lack of knowledge might have been a contributing factor to the never-ending struggle as their nation was being abused by outsiders. Throughout the colonial period, the department of education was degraded, resulting in poor education among the people. Paul Collier, an analyst of various conflicts, argued that the relationship between the disagreements and poor education has been studied. He claims that illiteracy is directly related to violence and also inhibits growth and progress (Galtung, 1996). His research included cases of nations at war and their level of education, with little or no schooling. That is also the case in Somalia, a country that has been embroiled in conflict for decades.

In brief, even though multiple sultans controlled Somalia prior to colonialism, there were frequent battles in the region. Nonetheless, this was steadier than during

the colonial period. Throughout this period, not only tribes but also colonial powers competed for a piece of Somalia, escalating what was already a conflict over a non-colonized area of Somalia. What's been remarkable regarding Somalia's predicament is that neighboring nations such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt desired land from Somalia during the African struggle. After the decolonization phase, these areas prompted regional warfare between those states, the emerging state of Somalia, and other fragmented entities established as a byproduct of the struggle.

C. Somalia's Protracted Conflict and Post-Colonial History

The struggle between the colonial empires lasted until the end of World War II. The proxy wars between Italy and Britain for Somalia's regions were particularly severe. Throughout this time, the Italian military compelled the British empire to relinquish the Somalian lands. As a consequence, the British have withdrawn from those territories, leaving just the Somali coast. However, after the end of World War II came the defeat of Italy, and the newly formed UN gained authority over the regions, which it relinquished later to Italy. After 1948, Italy governed Italian Somaliland for 10 years until its independence in June 1960 (Novati, 2008, pp. 41-57).

After World War II, Italy stopped being a great power in international politics after it was defeated, and Italy was obliged to yield its possessions in the Horn of Africa to the British empire under the peace settlement of 1947. Despite this, the UN reinstated them as guarantor of Eritrea and Somalia, disregarding the people's demands. To complicate things further, the actual determination of Somalia's borders was bound to bring Ethiopia into conflict with Italy, owing primarily to the Ogaden. During this time, Italy had already relinquished land in all of East Africa, including Eritrea and Libya. As a result, handing over the Somalia region to Ethiopia seemed impossible. As an outcome, they had to fight Ethiopia for the region's remaining possessions. In a nutshell, during a ten-year period, Italy was successful in replacing the culture of the British by collaborating with local leaders and giving them essential support. Nonetheless, Italy is unable to develop Somalia owing to a lack of financial resources that existed prior to their loss. Furthermore, they were unable to guide the Somali people to a stable administration owing to their lack of knowledge of the Somalian political structure and the intricacy of their tribal system. As a result,

until Somalia's independence in 1960, the Italian armed forces that took over the administration of Somalia had little notion of what to do. As a consequence, they attempted to impose the same centralized political structure that contributed to the government's demise after independence (Tripodi, 1999, pp. 49–74).

The international and regional powers' ruse in Somalia continued throughout colonization, independence, and is still continuing to the present day. However, it was only after Somalia became a mandate that they began conducting revolutionary battles against everything, eventually achieving independence in June 1960.

D. Somalia's Decolonization and Cold War

Following many years of conflict between Britain and Italy, Somalia attained independence in June 1960 when the old British-Somaliland and Italian-Somaliland merged to form one state. Nevertheless, upon their independence, the Somalia Republic, led by President Siad Barre, chose to retake the regions occupied by Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya at the time and administered by the French Administration. This fueled the emergence of 'Pan-Somali nationalism', which alarmed neighboring nations. The growth of nationalism in Somalia did not sit well with the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, Djibouti was ruled by France (Rupesinghe, 1995).

Beginning in 1945, the Cold War brought a fierce and brutal war to Somalia and surrounding states. In spite of the fact that it was an intellectual battle in Africa, a proxy war resulted in several wars around the continent. The Cold War began when the Axis Powers were removed from international power and politics at the end of World War II. Additionally, it was during this time that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the US emerged as dominating powers, separating the globe into two blocs. Most other countries' foreign and domestic politics were also influenced by the Cold War. Somalia was hardly an exception to the powers' predominance. As a result, their limited independence lasted only a few months before they were mandated to Italy. Despite being compelled, they were also obliged to adopt western philosophy, which was diametrically opposed to communism (Painter & Leffler, 2004).

In terms of foreign policy, Somalia maintained a strategy of lobbying for the decolonization of other African states that were colonized. The struggle to free all African colonial states from external or internal occupation was the primary goal, whereas Somalis struggled for the return of two main provinces which the colonials had turned over to surrounding countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. The two Somali allied regions advocated for the liberation of the French colonized region in Somalia, promoting non-violent civil demonstrations and peaceful protests that compelled the French government to grant Djibouti its independence on the condition that they not be incorporated into the larger Somalia. The issue of the other two Somali-populated regions occupied by Ethiopia and Kenya, on the other hand, was handled differently and involved in straightforward military conflict in 1964 and 1977, which was the nationwide responsibility of restoration of the country's missing regions that colonial states offered to other neighbouring nations (Painter & Leffler, 2004).

Somalia's democracy can be described as brief because it was interrupted by the military following the unexplained killing of democratically elected President Abdirashid Sharmake in 1969. On October 21, 1969, a military coup gained power through nonviolent means when General Siad Barre was declared President of Somalia. While the democratic process was stymied, the country saw rapid transformations on a local and worldwide scale. There has been enormous progress in many essential sectors of society, with international relations and the army being the most altered. By 1974, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)'s strained African relationship had been repaired thanks to the new relationship with the Arab League.

Nonetheless, with the direction of Moscow, Somalia's President, General Barre, switched their philosophy to communism in 1970. As a Soviet ally in the region, Somalia received assistance and military backing from the USSR in the years that followed, while Ethiopia, its neighbor, was a western ally. However, things began to change in 1974, when Ethiopia embraced communism. The USSR withdraws its assistance to Somalia in order to support Ethiopia. In 1977, seven years after declaring itself a communist state, Somalia launched a war against Ethiopia in the expectation of getting Soviet backing. Long before then, the USSR had transferred its backing to Ethiopia, attacking the Somali soldiers with Cuban help,

which resulted in Somalia's crushing loss in the Ogaden War (Tripodi, 1999, pp. 49-74).

Despite the fact that the West continued to back Ethiopia and Kenya during the Cold War, Somali politicians continued to seek assistance from the West. However, the US did not back Somalia's attempt to reclaim its borders from Ethiopian and Kenyan soldiers. The newly developed military command, well aware of the poor state of Somali military forces, immediately requested help from the USSR. The USSR was monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa in order to offset Western participation in the region. The USSR reacted promptly to Somali requests within a brief timescale, and the Somali force got modern weapons, allowing it to become one of the continent's strongest militaries. Following that, from 1977 to 1978, the Ogaden conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia began, and with USSR training and weapons, they took 90% of the disputed Somali province, dealing a major blow to the Ethiopian army, which had one of Africa's greatest militaries (Painter & Leffler, 2004).

During the Somalia crisis, the USSR switched its assistance to the Ethiopian side when Somalia refused to remove its forces from the area it had conquered from Ethiopia. When the USSR switched sides and left Somalia without an ally, Somalia endured and lost the war against the Warsaw alliance in the seized regions of the Ogaden Region. The USSR and its allies, notably countries from the Middle East linked with Communism such as Cuba, Libya, and Southern Yemen, backed Ethiopia. Instead of freeing the Ogaden area, Somalia faced self-destruction in the aftermath of the fight. After the Cold War ended, the Soviet and Western troops withdrew from the territories, leaving vast amounts of ammunition in Somalia, which lacked a legitimate authority. This massive number of firearms in the hands of the locals drove Somalia into the camp of war and struggle. As a result, while being a theoretically autonomous state, Somalia, like most African countries, was not free of neocolonialization under the cover of mission and political philosophy. Furthermore, the Cold War's imprint on the region was even worse than the colonization periods (Tareke, 2013).

The colonizers' strategy of divide and rule brought division among the Somali people. This created hatred and hostility among various clans in Somalia, whereby they fought for dominance and territory. The colonizing powers took advantage of

the division where they got the chance and the space to utilize the natural resources of the country. During the Cold War, the same strategy was used in Somalia, where the USSR provided assistance to the Somali government as long as their interests were safe. As soon as their interests did not align with those of the Somali government, the USSR stood against the Somali government. The same can be said about the US and western countries as well, whereby they use the concept of foreign aid to dismantle the country's natural resources.

E. The Collapse of the Somali State and the Post-1991 Conflict State

Undisciplined, various clan groups dismantled Somalia's armed forces and expelled President Said Barre from the nation in 1991, thereby ending the military regime that had administered Somalia since October 21, 1969. The opposition shared a single point of view, which was to depose the dictatorship from power, but they lacked a replacement strategy and a unifying objective. The clan-based conflict of interest spawned fresh rivalry for the country's leadership, leading to waves of warfare and economic disaster. This battle marked the start of a long civil war that destroyed all Somali administrative structures and livelihood mechanisms, broke law and order, and resulted in mass murders and fragmented clan-based territories administered by various warlords. The Somali population was mostly known for their homogenous and peaceful coexistence in the world, and they were unified against invaders, but they were demolished to rabbles and to unhappy clans fighting with one another (Mulugeta, 2009, pp. 9-12).

President Said Barre's popularity in Somalia plummeted during the terrible and costly war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden area. As a dictator, he was not recognized by local clans during his rule. Nonetheless, the defeat of the war fueled anti-government sentiments in the country. Since President Siad Barre took control, his regime oppressed the citizens via mass arrests, ill treatment, and mass executions, resulting in the deaths of nearly 10,000 people in a single month. This, along with the disastrous war, prompted the Somali people to rebel against his authority. In June 1990, a group of well-known commercial and political leaders signed the Mogadishu Manifesto, calling for his removal and the creation of a transitional administration until free and fair elections could be held. As an outcome, in 1991, he was compelled to resign, leaving Somalia without a functioning government. The demise of

Somalia's national government resulted in the nation's fragmentation into several minor self-proclaimed entities, such as Somaliland, which renounced their independence from the former central authority. However, no regional or international authority recognized them (JamesJan, 1995).

Somalia's Puntland Autonomous Region chose to rebuild a central government, whilst Somalia's Central-South sought to restore a centralized government. The long conflict in Somalia deliberately impacted competition based on political, economic, and misappropriation of Somalia's national resources via numerous clans. The key resources that prompted the wars were fertile lands, which generate high-quality crops, pastoral land, water supplies, and the use of national infrastructure such as bridges, canals, streets, water systems, and the main two, which are seaports and airports.

Furthermore, in the lower-beneficial Jappa's resources, local clans formed alliances to profit from the resources while competing violently for control of the territory. The affiliations of the two clans shifted since the agreement was based on their personal achievements, which paved the way for the parties to engage in an armed fight, which is more typical in inter-clan disputes in Somalia. For example, every person in Kismayu city was usually implicated in the civil strife that occurred in Kismayu by avidly pursuing a territorial right and the recognition of clans, whereas powerful clans were vying for ultimate control over the region and the region's scarce resources. Many factors contributed to the recurring confrontations, in both the middle and lower Juba districts, and particularly in Kismayu town. The following were the primary reasons for the conflict: Kismayu is a large and commercial city with a seaport that profits from a long, beautiful coastline. Traders import products and pay taxes, so the administration earns a lot of money. Kismayu also has a lot of potential resources, such as fertile land and well-off and wealthy grazing areas (BBC, 2018).

Somalia is known to be the most damaged country in Africa because the state has existed for less than fifty dreadful years, but the country has been at war for most of its history, making every attempt to deal with the country's political instability unsuccessful. When the authoritarian military dictatorship was toppled, the country was thrust into two crucial scenarios. The first was a risky situation involving cruel warlords, and the second involved Islamic warriors, who brought in foreign fighters.

As a result, the East African countries faced an uncertain future due to a security challenge, despite the fact that Somalia has been attempting in vain for years to achieve political stability. Since the defeat of the Said Barre in 1991, the state has remained afflicted and also inherently unstable. Following President Bare's escape from Somalia, the country experienced a long period of turmoil, with warlords serving as the framework and role models of the inter-conflicts or civil war, accompanied by natural disasters. Difficult drought and absolutely awful famine that also resulted in a loss of both human lives, which approximated to around 500,000, and the numerous livestock upon which Somali people relied. (Beardsley et al., 2006, pp. 58–86).

In 2012, the country formed a permanent administration that was completely supported by the international community, and the country began to experience a small level of stability once more. The federal system of government was introduced and welcomed by some of the political elites, but the Somali population believed that the new system of government would increase the division between the Somali people. This new system was seen and is still seen as a major roadblock to the unity of the Somali people. Each and every region in Somalia has their own flag and their own form of government whereby the central government oversees the regions. This has allowed regional leaders to meet foreign diplomats without the permission and oversight of the central government. Many argue that this form of government enabled neo-colonialism, where foreign powers made deals with regional leaders to utilize the natural resources of the country.

IV. PREVIOUS LOCAL, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PEACE BUILDING AND MEDIATION IN SOMALIA (1990-2021)

A. International Initiatives for Peacebuilding in Somalia

1. UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia

Christiane E. Phillips offers a conversation starter. "How did the UN engage in Somalia?" According to Christiane, the genuine armed conflict inside Somalia was first and foremost a threat to the Horn of Africa as a whole, and secondly to neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then Secretary-General of the UN, was nearing the end of his term when his desire to end the conflict in Somalia and achieve sustainable regional harmony was brought to the Security Council. The OAU, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Arab League agreed with this idea. This is because they had attempted to bargain with the various Somali gatherings, but their efforts had failed (Philipp, 2005, pp. 517–544).

The visit of Boutros-Ghali, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, followed. He traveled to Somalia with other UN extraordinary ambassadors in early January 1992. The objective would have been to accelerate diplomatic resolution and allow foreign guide groups access. Despite the fact that a truce was not accomplished, the UN's participation in the public compromise was invited. Thus, on January 23, 1992, the UN prioritized the Somali conflict.

In February 1992, the UN, League of Arab Nations, OAU, OIC, and agents from Somalia's armed factions convened in New York. The idea behind this gathering was to expedite a truce bargain.

In Mogadishu, a quick truce was agreed upon, and the two main fighting pioneers, Mehdi and Aideed, signed an agreement on the truce. This was followed by trips to Somalia by a large number of delegates from this assembly, which led to the ceasefire observers from the UN having deployed to Somalia, and they were followed by daintily military under the UN to accompany and secure the helpful

offices and their hardware (Philipp, 2005, pp. 517–554).

Glenn M. Harned, a former US army colonel, depicts the first UN efforts to broker peace in Somalia in his book "Stability Operations in Somalia 1992–1993." According to the agreement of ceasefire signed in New York City by Mahdi and Aideed, Resolution 751 of the UN was enacted, which resulted in the establishment of UNOSOM I on April 24th, 1992. The UNOSOM was established under a Chapter VI mandate with the primary aim of monitoring the ceasefire and promoting relief and humanitarian activities. On April 28, 1992, Algerian Mohamed Sahnoun was named as the UN representative in Somalia. On July 23rd, 1992, the UN was informed that the principal fighting commanders, Aideed and Mahdi, had welcomed the deployment of 500 UN security soldiers as members of UNOSOM. Pakistan provided these individuals, who arrived in Somalia six months later after the disputing leaders agreed to the mission (Harned, 2016).

It was a positive sign that the UN was ready to lend a hand and provide assistance, but the UN did not know, or rather, did not have adequate knowledge about the root causes of the Somali civil war. Without knowing the root causes of the conflict, it is very difficult to establish a lasting peace and unity. What the UN failed to understand is that this conflict was internal and needed local solutions, not foreign interference. The Somali population did not only need to be part of the peacebuilding process, but they wanted their participation to be taken seriously.

2. The creation and establishment of UNOSOM I

On the 22nd of July 1992, the Secretary General of the UN briefed the Security Council on the complexities of the war in Somalia which led to the severe humanitarian crisis, emphasizing the importance of the efforts needed to expedite assistance, as well as national unity, and the very most urgent, which was a nationwide ceasefire. The report was adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on July 27, and the subsequent resolution 767 encouraged all groups and parties to assist the UN in providing some humanitarian relief towards the Somali people throughout the country (United Nations, 1992). With the UNSC's approval, another UN technical delegation led by the UN Secretary General was dispatched to Somalia from August 2nd to the 15th. The study stressed the importance of expediting humanitarian aid to the majority of Somalis facing hunger. Even while the UN was

capable of accomplishing this, it was impeded by rampant assistance theft. As a result, the Secretary-General recommended that security personnel be increased to secure relief and distribution locations throughout Somalia.

Furthermore, the Secretary General proposed the establishment of four more UNOSOM zones, each led by a community of locals who were to assist the special representative from the UN in all regions. The UNSC accepted this report on August 28th as part of Resolution 775, which resulted in a 3000-soldier boost for UNOSOM. The Secretary General's proposal was also accepted on September 8th, and around three logistical units were established. The overall number of UNOSOM soldiers increased to 4,219 as a result (Harned, 2016).

Following UNOSOM's involvement in the Somalia War, the US participated, indicating that the US involvement in the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia, in particular, goes back at least to the Cold War. This period was when the USA and the USSR were struggling over territory with the goal of turning them into allies in return for protection. Somalia's military conflict had been wreaking havoc on the population, and universal suffering was indeed the norm as warlords and clans battled for all resources available and plundered one another. The torment was shown on various television networks in the US and was depicted in periodicals. The US had just returned from victory in 'Operation Desert Storm', so it believed it couldn't overlook the suffering in Somalia at the moment (Stewart, 2003).

As the hardship in Somalia intensified as a result of famine, the US launched relief methods such as airlifting goods from neighboring countries such as Kenya into Somalia's interior, preventing convoys that might be easily seized by militias. 'Operation Provide Relief' was the name given to the airlift of aid into Somalia. It was named on August 15, 1992. Because of the US's logistical competence, assistance was quickly carried into Somalia and distributed by relief groups that were previously established and functioning under UNOSOM. Stewart (2003) noted that this benefited the US since it avoided having to send soldiers into crisis zones.

Nevertheless, the situation on the ground deteriorated for a variety of reasons. To begin with, the plundering of relief goods given to the people continued, with warlords and gunmen using medical supplies and food to purchase support from the local community rather than the people. Furthermore, fighting groups used the looted aid as bargaining chips to demonstrate their superiority over the opposing parties

(Lotze and Williams, 2016). Furthermore, workers of international organizations were frightened and compelled to pay a huge amount of money for their safety, whereby if they did not, they risked being killed. Because of these difficulties, the US resorted to executing a reconnaissance mission using its special troops from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. These Special Forces not only conducted reconnaissance but also accompanied relief aircraft. This enabled the US to gather critical information in the event of a future involvement in which they might commit troops. However, its role was brief, and the 'sole superpower' in the new international order was forced to somehow get significantly involved, with President George W. Bush Senior authorizing the deployment of US troops. Its primary goal is to ensure that much-needed assistance reaches countless people suffering from both the conflict and hunger, thereby breaking the cycle of famine and starvation (Stewart, 2003).

The US's main goal in Somalia was the establishment of democracy. The US believed that with the establishment of democracy, there would be peace and prosperity in Somalia. However, let's not forget that Somalia was under dictatorship rule for a very long time where the president at the time ruled with fear and pure brutality, so moving from such a period to complete diplomacy was a fantasy and the Somali people did not need democracy at the time but just wanted peace and security.

3. The establishment and efforts of UNITAF

The active participation of the US resulted in the formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). It was established following the UNSC's passage of Resolution 794. It was a resolution that was overwhelmingly accepted, mostly because the suffering of the Somali population was getting increasingly severe. This resolution declared that all means necessary would be employed, hence providing a humanitarian route to distribute supplies but also, equally significantly, to accelerate the political settlement, restoring the rule of law. The phrase 'whatever necessary' steps in this case implied that the use of force was permitted.

It is critical to highlight that, despite the fact that the UN founded UNITAF, it did not participate in its structure or leadership. The US was UNITAF's largest soldier contributor, and it also held the operational leadership of UNITAF. UNITAF soldiers arrived in Mogadishu for the first time in December 1992, consisting of

24,000 American troops and 17,000 coalition forces. The nations' contributing soldiers donated the majority of the cash for the UNITAF forces. Despite the fact that UNITAF was formed by the UN, it was not responsible for its finances. Traditionally, when the UN organizes a peacekeeping mission, it is in charge of its finances. However, in this case, the UN formed the force but did not participate in its funding (Philipp, 2005, pp.517–554).

The fundamental purpose of UNITAF was to create security and a safe channel for relief to reach all people in need across Somalia. Furthermore, it tried to restore law and order. After fulfilling these objectives, UNITAF intended to give control over to UNOSOM. Furthermore, in a letter to then President Bush, the Secretary General of the UN said that a handover to UNOSOM could only take place if a certain criterion was met: that UNITAF's power to extend and implement throughout Mogadishu and its vicinity whereby they have legitimacy in Mogadishu and its environs. Some disagreements arose between UNITAF and the UN in order for these aims to be fulfilled. They couldn't agree on anything, notably how to disarm the militias.

The UN and UNITAF split over the disarmament program, whereby the UN favored total disarmament while UNITAF, commanded by the US, was just concerned with establishing a positive atmosphere wherein the UN as well as other organizations might transport supplies, so they let the warlords retain their construction machinery as long as they withdrew from Mogadishu. UNITAF's decision would be disastrous in the long run. Additionally, no difference was made between UNOSOM, which was in Somalia to act as a peacekeeping mission, and UNITAF, which would be there to enforce the law. A huge army of 37,000 soldiers was stationed in southern and central Somalia in March 1993, but the rest of the country was neglected. (Philipp, 2005, pp. 517–554).

The main concentration was kept in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia. This enabled the Somali people to move out of Mogadishu to other regions of the country that experienced some stability compared to the capital city. This can be seen as a reason why Mogadishu was the center of all instability in the country until today. For a lasting reconciliation to have taken place, all aspects of the country should have been included in the security strategy, but the UN and the US have placed their major focus in Mogadishu, only paving the way for other regions of the

country to declare their annexation since they felt that they were not considered important in the peacebuilding process.

4. The period of transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II

This transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was completed on January 20, 1993, when newly elected President Bill Clinton assumed office. At the time, UNITAF had 24,500 US troops and around 13,000 non-US personnel. There were around 7,000 people for UNOSOM II, and the US was ready and willing to commit a few thousand personnel to UNOSOM II. On January 28th, UNITAF Lieutenant General Johnson declared that most of the belligerent factions had been disarmed, that relief was flowing, that business was slowly returning, and that UNITAF's aims had been 'achieved'. This suggested that the Lieutenant General believed the time had come to give over responsibilities to UNOSOM II, particularly in the southern parts of Somalia. Nonetheless, the US desired a speedy changeover owing to the fact that the operation's expenditures were a significant burden, since it was reported that it would cost the US \$560 million in three months. The costs increased during the operation 'Operation Restore Hope', and the UN did not compensate (Walter, 2005).

Prior to the evacuation of US forces from UNITAF, it was clear that UNOSOM II would be unable to function without supplies, so a strong US logistical group was deployed to it. The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was given ultimate command of all US soldiers, and they had the final say on when US troops would be deployed, which paved the way for peace and reconciliation conferences and agreements. The UN Secretary-General convened a meeting for normalization of relations and humanitarian assistance in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, in January 1993, where he encouraged the Somali population to exchange thoughts, make a decision regarding their own fate, and build a foundation for governing the country that was consistent with their values and preferences (Philipp, 2005, pp. 517–554).

The Addis Ababa accord was regarded as a watershed moment in Somalia's journey toward peace and state building. If this deal had been successful, it would have saved the Somali people a lot of pain and suffering. If it had worked, the notion of global backing for multilateral peacekeeping would have gained traction. Every nation would have accepted the responsibility of regional and worldwide peace-

building. Regrettably, the collapse of such an agreement had such a negative impact on the UN because it was one of many reasons why the global community turned a blind eye to the 1994 Rwandan genocide prior to actually taking action to address it (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Under the auspices of the UN, fifteen different opposing forces from Somalia attended the Addis Ababa Accord. The fundamental purpose of this peace accord was to commit to the warring groups that they would manage a truce, disarm, assist UN operations in humanitarian delivery, peacefully handle disagreements, and build a transnational administration as well as regional authority. The anticipated strategy was essentially to create and enhance the institutions and structures of the transnational government and then to adopt a transnational constitution, laying the groundwork for elections in March 1995, whereby if these were accomplished, the transnational duration, as well as the UN peacekeeping mission, would have ended (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

The agreement resulted in three items. An immediate cease-fire throughout Somalia's cities; an agreement on how to carry out the truce; and an agreement on the mechanics of both the critical subject of disarmament. Unfortunately, the Addis Ababa Accord was also not fully implemented. In fact, weapons poured into the capital, Mogadishu, ensuring that the purpose of disarmament would fail. It was only a few months after the agreement was made. Furthermore, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was not established. General Mohamed Aidid, one of the principal warlords present at the deal, condemned the pact and said that he was compelled to sign it by the UN. The attack was known as 'Black Hawk Down', which resulted in the evacuation of both the US and UN, hence resulting in the completion of the Addis Ababa Accord (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

International peacebuilding efforts in Somalia were successful to some extent, but one thing that they had in common is that they did not totally understand the root causes of the conflict. Another problem was that the international parties had their own different interests in the country. If the root causes of the conflict are not identified and solved accordingly, the conflict will persist, and that is the reality in Somalia. Since the fall of the Bare regime, Somalia has not had a stable government that controls and has jurisdiction over the entire country. This can be seen as a result of not solving the root causes of the conflict.

5. The London conferences of 2012 and 2017

The British government invested an unprecedented amount of time and energy on the Somalia issue during the London Conferences. Many Somalis welcomed the meeting tentatively, unsure of whether the UK would be able to successfully unite the larger international community on a stance that did not determine the country's political destiny. The February summit of 2012 was preceded by a customary flurry of diplomatic activity, but attempts were also made to solicit opinions from Somali civil society both inside and outside the nation.

Success in diplomatic endeavors is difficult to quantify, whereby sometimes the most essential thing is that everyone is present and there are no significant arguments, much like during a large family gathering. It was a success in a sense that everyone from the world community who was interested in Somalia was present. African nations that border Somalia are still very much in the spotlight. However, governments from the Islamic world have re-engaged and are now acting more fiercely in Somalia. When done on a clan basis, representation for Somalis is always a political minefield. Previous international conferences have been plagued by it. The Somali side's presence at the London Conference took a welcome new turn. There was a break from the widely believed myth that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in any way 'represents' Somalia, even though inclusion was still lacking (Healy, 2012).

There were also the leaders of other Somali states, like Galmudug and Puntland, but none was as important as President Silanyo of Somaliland. Prior to that time, neither the international nor the peace conferences on Somalia have ever been attended by Somaliland. In his conference speech, President Silanyo argued for a bottom-up approach to establishing peace and stability in Somalia, drawing on Islamic principles and conventional conflict resolution techniques as well as lessons learned from what was effective in Somaliland. He used the occasion to argue for recognition, stating his fervent belief that doing so would aid in Somalia's stabilization and economic revival (Healy, 2012).

Al Qaeda's choice to embrace Al Shabaab more intimately, however, made it simpler to sidestep the entire discussion of 'talking to Shabaab'. One of the topics with the least international agreement has the potential to divide the conference participants. There is a strong thread of Somali thinking that sooner or later,

communication with Al Shabaab will be required for a political settlement, despite the fact that it was effectively avoided. Al Shabaab should have been invited to the meeting itself, some analysts have offered the strange proposal. But this appears to be the result of a misunderstanding of the event's goal. It wasn't a peace summit. And rather than the fifty or so Heads of State and Government in London, if Al Shabaab is going to start communicating to anyone, it will undoubtedly be fellow Somalis who live within Somalia. The summit might have done better by indicating that the international community would not automatically rule out a political process that involved Shabaab (Healy, 2012).

A significant international conference was jointly held by the governments of the UK, Somalia, the African Union, and the UN on May 11, 2017, in London. The conference's main objectives were to address Somalia's primary governance, statebuilding, and security concerns. It brought together members of the Somali government with those from donor nations, the UN, and international organizations including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Three key topics were covered at the conference: improving domestic and international security guarantees, inclusive and stable political systems, and economic recovery. It also decided on the framework for a new relationship with Somalia that would formalize donor support systems and allow initiatives to address all of these problems (Crouch, 2017).

The conference's security accord places a strong emphasis on allowing a reformed Somali security architecture and developing a unified, cohesive, well-trained force. The conference urged the Federal Government of Somalia and the international community to prioritize justice as a crucial problem requiring a distinct strategic approach. Justice must not be perceived as security's 'little brother', despite being referenced in the covenant; rather, it must be seen as a necessary condition. The absence of fair justice in Somalia has served as the basis for complaints that have led to support for non-state armed groups like al-Shabaab. To ensure that achievements gained in bolstering the police and military are felt by all Somalis, it is crucial to reform the judicial system, reduce corruption, and increase transparency and public scrutiny as Somalia advances (Crouch, 2017).

B. Regional efforts to promote peace in Somalia

1. The first peace-building efforts in Djibouti in 1991

Local politicians, opposition group leaders, and scholars gathered in Djibouti in July 1991, during the height of the civil war, to seek a peaceful resolution. After a brief period of inconclusive discussions, the nearby friendly nation of Djibouti attempted regional mediation of the Somalia peace talks, which ended in the installation of an interim administration led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed. The military arm of the Hawiye clan (based on USC opposition led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed) was outraged at Ali Mahdi Mohamed's appointment. The main source of USC resentment was that they did not receive their fair share from the politically driven associated manifesto lawmakers who dominated the administration. General Mohamed Farah Aideed's USC military wing attacked the Ali Mahdi administration, which was both financially and militarily incapable and could not even defend itself throughout Mogadishu, Somalia's capital city (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Ali Mahdi's military assault divided USC into two core combat units, both of which were supported by the two significant clans of Hawiye sub-tribe of Habar-gidir of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Abgal of Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Mogadishu, the capital city, was subjected to an intensive heavy weapons attack by the two feuding factions and their supporters, destroying practically all public and private infrastructure through plundering, heavy weaponry, and machine gun shelling, resulting in displacement and high civilian casualties. Man-made hunger devoured the lives of thousands of innocent people and thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries, as well as IDPs in the country's key cities, due to differences in the Somali people's living mechanisms and the destruction of human and personal property. Such violent and large-scale fighting led to the UN's first-ever interventionism, which was based on humanitarianism, as well as the deployment of US marines on Mogadishu's seashore (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Djibouti was the first attempt to bring peace and stability to Somalia. However, the tension between General Aidid and Ali Mahdi was very high, hence disqualifying any form of agreement reached in Djibouti. General Aidid was the front runner who was mostly responsible for the overthrow of the Bare regime. His goal was to be the next president of Somalia after elections were held, but that was

not a reality at the time. General Aidid and Ali Mahdi, who come from the same clan-family, were the conflicting parties after the Bare regime was overthrown. This has shown how divided Somalia was.

2. The initiative of IGAD in the Somali Civil War

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is made up of eight African republics from the Horn of Africa. The organization was established in 1996 to replace the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Diversification (IGADD) regional bloc, which had been established 10 years previously, with the main aim of lowering problems of poverty reliance via integration in the Horn of Africa, an area plagued by drought and catastrophe. Nonetheless, with the admission of yet another new member, which was Eritrea, and the addition of new responsibilities, the organization's name was changed to IGAD in 1996. As a consequence, IGAD was tasked with safeguarding security and peace in the Horn of Africa. Following the UN and the AU's failure to achieve peace in Somalia, they officially entrusted Somalia's safety to IGAD. The main purpose of IGAD is to help member governments achieve economic growth via collective cooperation and partnerships in order to eradicate poverty, preserve the environment, and promote regional peace and security (Sally & Bradbury, 2010).

IGAD, which is made up of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda, is located in eastern Africa, in a strategic area that links the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Tadjoura, which connects it to the Red Sea. Nevertheless, apart from this strategic location at the crossroads of the Middle East, Far East, and Europe, the area has become a source of intrigue and competition for global powers, ranking it as the most dangerous on the globe. Rivalry for the region remains even though colonization came to an end, which is why the region has been at odds with both international and neighboring countries for centuries.

Additionally, IGAD member nations are widely recognized for their competition and conflict. A good example would be Eritrea-Ethiopia, Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya-Somalia, Djibouti-Eritrea, South Sudan-Sudan, and the Somalia conflict, which have caused serious problems in the region. As a result, whenever they embark on a peacebuilding initiative or hold discussions about Somalia, they are

doomed to fail because member countries exploit these opportunities for proxy war. As a result, the peace negotiations begun by the member nations have had no beneficial results thus far. IGAD launched various peace treaties, particularly after its inception, with the support of the UN and the AU. They were successful in obtaining an initial truce, but it was not granted to last long (Byiers, 2016).

The major obstacles that IGAD confronted in resolving the Somali conflict can be classified into two groups: economic and political. Economic problems are one of the challenges that IGAD member countries face. This is mostly due to the member nations' failure to pay the agreements, and as a result, they were reliant on the US, UN, EU, and AU for financing of the next meetings. Nonetheless, the member states' economic dependence managed to give international contributors an advantage in the discussion, which resulted in, instead of focusing on what was ideal for their region and the Somali people, alternatives were much more likely to be oriented toward the international donors' and global communities' interests (Byiers, 2016).

To complicate matters further, IGAD member nations face recurring issues such as drought, desertification, and poverty. As a result, there was disunity among the member nations. The current state of affairs in the member nations was the second and most significant challenge that IGAD faced. Because of the ongoing wars and conflicts between surrounding nations, the eastern parts of Africa were recognized as the most dangerous area in the world. The conflict's origins may be traced back to the colonial era, when European invaders partitioned the territory into several fragmented governments with little regard for the population, culture, religion, or ethnic background. As a result, instead of concentrating on political and economic development, these countries were forced to fight each other over arbitrary borders after gaining independence. Their conflict raged on for years. As a result, while discussing the Somalia issue, they utilize the crisis to advance their own interests rather than Somalia's. The insecurity in the region has made resolving Somalia's problems extremely difficult (Byiers, 2016).

The 'Global War on Terror' and the counter-terrorism efforts intersected with the state building agenda, notably in the aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopia's subsequent military involvement in 2007. Because the international community was fixated on the 'destruction' of Al-Shabaab after 2007,

Western backing favored initiatives that promised to hold Al-Shabaab in check rather than those that could legitimately rule or develop agreement among the various armed factions (Crouch 2018).

In some respects, this gave the impression that Al-Shabaab was the sole or principal obstacle to Somalia's peace, and that its destruction would be the fulcrum of the country's successful statehood. The truth was considerably more complicated, and the dispute was far more convoluted. Counter-terrorism policies, such as the US Patriotic Act, enacted in 2001, have had a direct and sometimes legal impact on peacebuilders by restricting how and with whom peacebuilding organizations can interact for conflict resolution.

3. National reconciliation conferences in Sodere in 1997

The Horn of Africa Standing Committee on Somalia was formed in 1992, with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi acting as the first chairperson. This prompted the government of Ethiopia to utilize diplomatic intermediaries in Somalia, paving the way for the Addis Ababa peace process to begin soon after Zenawi was elected as the AU's first chairperson. It had collapsed numerous times before, and after years of civil conflict in Somalia, the Ethiopian government established the 'Sodere National Reconciliation Conference', one of the most crucial national reconciliation conferences for Somalia. This conference was given the name Sodere since it was held in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. Because of the continuous instability in certain regions of Africa, notably Somalia, the OAU, which was later renamed the African Union at the Cairo Conference in 1997, established a Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR) strategy. However, it has also been said that the US wanted Ethiopia to play a critical role in resolving the Somali conflict in order to support its strategy of 'African solutions to African problems' (Apuuli, 2010, pp. 261-282).

After the evacuation of UN peacekeeping forces from Somalia, the Ethiopian-led Sodere process continued for more than a year. Following the withdrawal of the UNOSOM troops and the US in 1994, the humanitarian mission has been mostly disrupted by deadly clan warfare and multiple fatalities without any outcome. The international community has lost interest in Somalia's reconciliation. Regardless of the fact that none of the soldiers from nations engaged in the Restore Hope Operation

were ready to sacrifice any more fighters, African countries were worried about the situation because they thought they needed to assist the Somali people and also because the AU's aim was to have Africa address African problems while keeping outsiders out of African problems. The neighboring countries of Somalia in the Horn of Africa shared this sentiment (Apuuli, 2010, pp.261-282).

On January 3, 1997, twenty-six Somali clan groupings signed a peace deal known as the 'Joint Declaration' in October 1996. The Ethiopian government exerted diplomatic pressure on these Somali clan groupings after being instructed by the AU and IGAD to convene the Sodere meeting. The Ethiopian government gathered delegates from twenty-six Somali clan groupings in Sodere, an Ethiopian vacation town. After six weeks of tense discussions and debates on heated topics, a National Salvation Council (NSC) was created, highlighting an exclusive consensus. It was made up of forty-one individuals chosen from among the twenty-six clans represented at the meeting. The NSC was tasked with laying the groundwork for the Provisional National Government (PNG) of Somalia (Apuuli, 2010, pp. 261-282).

According to Apuuli Phillip's study and numerous other pieces, Sodere was a watershed moment in the history of Somali peace talks in a variety of ways. First, it sparked the first constructive debate among the prominent Somali political actors following the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Somalia. Second, it effectively brought all of the clan faction leaders together. Third, this was the first procedure that gave rise to the principles of delegation and inclusion. Sodere received backing from governments and groups both inside and outside the region, but it also failed for a variety of reasons. To begin with, Hussein Aideed, the son of General Aideed who led the Somali National Alliance, did not participate in the Sodere conference. Despite the fact that twenty-six clans were represented, one of Somalia's most influential political actors declined to attend. Second, when it was founded, the NSC had only been active in Addis Abeba. As a result, many Somalis assumed that the NSC was a puppet of Ethiopia, when in reality, the people of Somalia blamed the government of Ethiopia for interfering in Somalia's affairs, causing instability, and prolonging the conflict. Furthermore, Ethiopia is accused of undermining two previous peace deals, the Arta Agreement and the Cairo Agreement of 2000 (Apuuli, 2010, pp.261-282). Third, once the agreement at Sodere was reached and the process began, Egypt began to exercise influence in the politics

of Somalia by opposing the peace efforts led by Ethiopia, because Ethiopia and Egypt were competitors in Somali politics. Therefore, in order to disregard and undermine the Sodere Conference, Egypt arranged another gathering of the warring Somali tribes in Cairo in 1997 (Apuuli, 2010, pp. 261-282).

There were only three warlords that signed the Egyptian agreement. These warlords were Ali Mahdi, Hussein Mohammed 'Aideed', and Osman Ali Atto. Egypt's effort to restore peace in Somalia ended in failure for a variety of reasons, including the perception that it was strengthening the Hawiye clan position while negatively impacting the representation and political ambitions of the Darod clan. Some of the main clan leaders, including Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and General Gebyo, decided to boycott the conference, accusing the Egyptian government of overturning the process of Sodere. Eventually, after the failure of both the Cairo Peace process and the Sodere Peace process, Djibouti initiated a new effort that would be more meaningful than the previous peacebuilding conferences (Menkhaus, 2007).

There were several inter-clan rivalries that made the peacebuilding process almost impossible, and the international parties who were to bring peace and stability to Somalia have taken advantage of these inter-clan rivalries to further their personal interests. The various warlords who lead different clans were given money and resources by different parties in the international community. This enabled warlords to have an unlimited supply of money and resources, hence further destabilizing the country.

4. Arta Peace Initiative Conference in 2000

The Djibouti peace proposal in 2000 was the next in line. The 'Arta Peace Process' was the name given to this peace effort. Egypt and the UN were supporters of these discussions, although they simply offered fair mediation. Djibouti's peace process resulted in the TNG of August 2000. One notable feature of this peace process was the absence of warlords from the various fighting factions. It included both civil society activists as well as clan chiefs. This process culminated in the 4.5 plan, which would be implemented in the politics of Somalia. This technique required a certain set of representatives for each clan in Somalia's politics. The idea is that Somalia's four biggest clan-families, Darood, Dir, Digil, Hawiye, and Mirifle,

should be given an adequate proportion of seats in parliament. The Bantu and the Benadir, who are the 'minority clans', including the lower caste groups, would get half of what the main clans did. In actuality, this approach did not address the political representation dispute (Menkhaus, 2007).

Nonetheless, the Arta process reintroduced the concept of a unified government in Somalia. It preferred it above the federal system in several ways. One of the drawbacks of this peace agreement was that it did not establish an administration that advocated for national unity. That's one of the primary reasons that various groups and clans created opposition organizations, making it impossible for the TNG to access certain parts of the country. The Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was an Ethiopian-led military group that made it difficult for the TNG to consolidate authority in the nation. Warlords headquartered in Mogadishu provided additional opposition to the TNG, which led the TNG to be degraded with time and become outdated (Menkhaus, 2007).

When seen in terms of accomplishments, the Arta method was lauded despite its flaws. For starters, it eliminated the possibility of just tolerating and bringing warlords and militias to the table. This approach let the Somali people understand that they were an important part of the negotiation process and gave them a sense of empowerment (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

The Arta peace process is said to be one of the key peace methods used to incorporate Somali women into conflict settlement. Furthermore, this peace process indicated that real political participation and peace talks could take place outside of Somalia and have a significant impact. Because of the effective use of the media, the process was extensively reported on a daily basis, reaching as far as the diaspora and the grass-roots level inside Somalia. As a result, the citizens of Somalia put a lot of pressure on their officials to pursue reconciliation as a goal. Finally, the Arta peace process is acknowledged as being the first in Somalia to achieve peacebuilding milestones such as the Transitional National Charter for the government; the establishment of a Parliament capable of electing a President; the nomination of a Prime Minister; and the formation of a Cabinet.

5. Peacebuilding efforts from Djibouti to Mbagathi

The IGAD oversaw the Mbagathi peace process, which began in Djibouti in December 2001. At first, these discussions were taking place in two distinct locations at the same time. These discussions took place between the SRRC and the TNG, whereby the two met in Gode, Ethiopia, as well as Nakuru, Kenya, for conversations. The talks originally fell short of their goal of addressing the underlying hidden roots of the Somali war as well as the intense animosity of clan rivalries. The discussions lasted three phases and years, thanks to the hard work of all the diplomats involved, but they finally resulted in the formation of the TFG. On October 2, 2002, the two factions met in Eldoret, Kenya, and agreed on the construction and institutions of a federal government, as well as the cessation of violence (Williams, 2018).

The second round of negotiations has begun, whereby Somalia's peacebuilding effort was once again taken up by IGAD. It supported a two-year peace process in Mbagathi, Nairobi, Kenya, where Kenyan authorities arbitrated the initiative, which was supported by the UN and the EU. In Kenya, the goal was to construct a new administration to replace the TNG, with both the Kenyan and Djibouti administrations based on the 4.5 fixed formula of representation. In addition to clan leaders, civil society, military, political, and traditional dignitaries were present. The objectives and goals of this summit were founded on three things. They are a ceasefire agreement, nonviolent conflict resolution, and power sharing (Menkhaus, 2007).

The preceding two phases were marred by breakdowns and failures. This advanced the Mbagathi process to the third step, which occurred in May 2004. The TFG's fundamental components restored their structure in some way. A transitory parliament with 275 members was formed, with a single chamber. However, the majority of parliamentarians were leaders of conflicting factions and warlords. During the civil war, the majority of these warlords and commanders were suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Surprisingly, a majority of Somalis perceived the TFG administration as being in Somalia to further foreign entities. Which is why the TFG was labeled 'Daba-dhilif', which translates as 'an administration established for a foreign interest' (Williams, 2018).

The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) took its oath of office on August 22, 2004, with 206 of the 275 members taking the oath. The inauguration took place

at the UN in Nairobi, Kenya. The 61 parliamentary seats were not allotted due to clan disagreements about who would occupy them. Another eight members did not show up. Although women had a right to a seat, they were denied it, which somewhat angered the civil society organizations as well as the international observers when their concerns were ignored. On September 2, 2004, the TFP held its inaugural assembly, and Shariff Hassan Sheikh Aden was chosen as the speaker two weeks later, on September 15, 2004. The TFP then chose Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the TFG's president. The president was elected on October 10, 2004, and his first assignment was to seek 20,000 AU peacekeeping forces to assist his administration at the time. It is worth mentioning that both the parliament and the government did not support the president's choice; furthermore, the president recommended Ali Muhammed Gedi as Prime Minister, despite the fact that he was more of a commoner than a politician. This nomination was met with hostility, but after much haggling, he was accepted. The Prime Minister appoints an 82-member cabinet. It appeared to be a large cabinet. On January 2, 2005, the parliament accepted this motion (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Despite its size, the parliament was able to bring together the leadership of the contending organizations, which had not happened in 14 years. Most Somalis were dissatisfied since Ethiopia was seen to have a strong influence on cabinet appointments. The TFG had a major disagreement just two months in, which led to its dissolution. The disagreement was about the deployment of peacekeeping forces and the establishment of a temporary capital, which led to a larger argument between the President and his Prime Minister. Each also had their own ministerial staff to back them up. Regardless, the administration picked Jowhar as an interim capital and eventually moved on to Baidoa because of the significant resistance in Mogadishu. While the government was squabbling within, a powerful and very well-equipped militia of Islamic fundamentalists was forming called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). They were activated when Ethiopia provided guns and training to the TFG. The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) was endorsed and funded by the US. Thus, they contributed to the notion that the TFG was a regime that promoted foreign interests, which resulted in the ICU having a large and straightforward recruitment procedure. Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, was taken over by the ICU in 2006 (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

The ICU established themselves as the 'government' through what is known as the 'victors' peace.' Negotiations did not result in the formation of a 'government' since it followed radical views and continued to call for Jihad against the Ethiopian government. These Jihadi threats against Ethiopia escalated into a conflict, pushing Ethiopia to intervene militarily in Somalia. The ICU was gaining in popularity, as did the number of foreign jihadists responding to the call to fight the holy war against Ethiopia. The military of Ethiopians arrived in Somalia in late 2006, although they were already stationed in the city of Baidoa, which is located in southern Somalia. In December 2006, the ICU attempted an attack against Ethiopian forces in Baidoa, but they were badly defeated. Ethiopia stormed into Mogadishu and immediately dismantled the ICU. They had the support of the US Air Force (Menkhaus, 2007).

The Ethiopians wanted to re-establish the TFG and dismantle the ICU troops. This was their 'peace-building' purpose, yet the Ethiopian involvement resulted in enormous human misery. The intervention lasted until 2008, and it resulted in 700,000 internally displaced Somali people. Over 15,000 people were thought to have died in 2008 alone. This involvement sparked an anti-Ethiopian uprising with the primary purpose of driving away the Ethiopian military. Because Al-Shabaab was predominantly the ICU's military branch, anti-Ethiopian resentment was a primary factor in the terror group Al-Shabaab's rise to popularity. The TFG was in the midst of a political crisis in November 2007, particularly between the president and his prime minister. As an outcome, the prime minister resigned, and in November 2007, Nur Adde became the new prime minister. The new prime minister openly called for talks, which was welcomed by the US, UN, and EU. They come together to develop an international cooperation framework to bridge the gap between stability and counterinsurgency (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

The framework prioritized the rule of law; therefore, it was mysteriously abandoned, only to be resurrected when the UN re-united the TFG and the new opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Former ICU members who switched sides, first cabinet officials who backed Prime Minister Ali Geedi, and many others in the diaspora made up the ARS. Their meeting was held in Djibouti in 2008. They came to terms and signed a pact to ensure security, stability, and harmony. The President at the time, Abdullahi Yusuf, resigned in response to heavy international pressure. Simultaneously, Ethiopian forces withdrew from the

capital, Mogadishu, and Somali IDPs returned. A two-tiered parliament was created as a result of ARS electing more legislators, who were incorporated into this parliament. On January 31, 2009, Somalia's parliament chose Sheikh Sharif Ahmed Sheikh as the country's next president. There seemed to be hope with Shariff Ahmed's election and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces (Menkhaus, 2009).

Somalia and Ethiopia have always had tensions between them since the formation of the Somali state. Therefore, when Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia, almost all Somali people saw it as a clear invasion. Most of the Somali people unified to fight against the invasion of Ethiopia, whereby conflicting parties started cooperating with one another to fight Ethiopian forces. The fighters of the ICU, now known as Al-Shabab, were also fighting the Ethiopian forces. After the expulsion of the Ethiopian forces, the united forces of Somalia were divided once again, disagreeing amongst themselves who ruled the country. This saw the birth of Al-Shabaab, an extreme group who practice Islamic fundamentalism to take hold of the country.

6. The establishment of AMISOM and its efforts in Somalia

The AMISOM is an African peacekeeping mission that was established in 2007 under the supervision of the UN with a six-month mandate. This peacekeeping operation was acknowledged after the IGAD's peacekeeping operation, the IGASOM, was replaced. IGASOM functioned in the region with UN assistance before December 2006. Despite the fact that the AU and the UNSC authorized the IGASOM to distribute their armed force in the Somalia neighborhood in order to assist the Transitional Government in establishing their administration in Somalia by providing military assistance and protection to the authorities, their implementation has been met with a barrage of violence by Islamic parties and other Somali factions (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Not only Islamic groups, but also clan elders, opposed the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Mostly because a significant proportion of those forces came from Kenya and Ethiopia, which share a land border and ethnic groups with Somalia. Additionally, the expanding Islamic parties in Somalia have become a menace in both countries, so disarming and driving such groups out of their borders is in both countries' interests. As an outcome, the Islamic court in charge of the

territory, as well as some other clan chiefs, rejected their mobilization. These groups felt driven to seek their own country's interests in Somalia because they were concerned about the possible deployment of soldiers from front-line nations. Such circumstances prompted significant debate amongst IGAD member nations regarding the deployment of the peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, IGASOM was known to be a Western media outlet funded by the US in its efforts to stifle the growth of the Islamic movement in the region. Furthermore, Somalia's various parties petitioned the UNSC to remove Ethiopian forces from their borders as well as the elected president at the moment, Abdullahi Yusuf of the transitional government, who seemed to have been a pro-Kenyan and pro-Ethiopian leader. Nonetheless, the elected president, Yusuf, was compelled to step down and resign since his government failed to establish a legitimate administration in Somalia (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

Because of this resistance, IGASOM's operation in Somalia was terminated, and the force was reconstituted the next year under the supervision of the AU and UN as the AU peacekeeping mission. Even though nations in the region have often been extremely cautious of the ripple effects of Somalia's persistent instability, the implementation of AMISOM troops in Somalia resulted in an AU decision that particularly accompanied the need to confront the forthcoming security issue that would comply with the final withdrawal of Ethiopian army units from Somalia. As an outcome, AMISOM soldiers were stationed in the Somalia region in early 2007, replacing IGASOM and Ethiopian forces in Somalia. With the purpose of safeguarding regional peace and stability, it launched peace negotiations between warring groups and played a major role in Somalia's first democratic election in 2012, which caused the government to resign and resulted in the transitional administration being replaced by the new government. Lastly, troops carried out a number of military support projects, including the provision of healthcare services and water to the local community, the promotion of discourse and reconciliation, and collaboration with key players (Linnea, 2017, pp. 161-173).

As a result, AMISOM has played a significant role in reclaiming regions previously controlled by Al-Shabaab terrorist organizations. The AMISOM mission was established to assist and safeguard major political personalities in Somalia; to provide assistance to the country's national security forces; to support different

election procedures; and to enable humanitarian aid to reach the target regions.

AMISOM, on the other hand, has encountered several challenges throughout its operations in Somalia. Working in a nation with no laws or governance is difficult for some of them. This is due to a lack of effective leadership, which has resulted in an increase in the number of terrorists and attacks in the region, endangering people's lives as well as the peacekeeping operation. No matter how effective AMISOM is, it will not be able to compel the political establishment to agree on and administer a legitimate national security structure based on eliminating Al-Shabaab. The cost of maintaining AMISOM in Somalia has become very expensive, not just for the AU but also for both the UN and the US. The functioning of AMISOM cannot be funded only by the AU. The key obstacles include a general lack of funding, inadequate institutional frameworks, and a lack of discipline. Furthermore, it is heavily reliant on outside support. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to attain the anticipated outcome.

Regional peacebuilding efforts were welcomed by many Somali citizens, but many political elites as well as Somali people argued that the participation of Ethiopia and Kenya in the peacebuilding efforts was not welcomed. They argued that Ethiopia and Kenya did not have good intentions towards Somalia since both countries had a bad history with Somalia, whereby a huge land mass that is believed to have belonged to Somalia was given to Kenya and Ethiopia during colonization. This has caused several clashes and hatred between Somalia and the two countries. Djibouti was the only country that all the Somali population trusted since they shared historical ties before the colonization period. Ethiopia and Kenya's skepticism is understandable given their hostile foreign policies toward Somalia. Various parties in Somalia used this aspect to deny and refuse any form of peacebuilding efforts that the two countries were part of, hence increasing tensions among different parties in the peacebuilding efforts.

Table 1: a Summary of International and Regional peacebuilding initiatives.

Peacebuilding Initiatives	The Year of the Initiative	Level of Initiative	Aims of Initiative	Success of Initiative	Failure/setbacks of Initiative
UNOSOM 1	1992	International	To monitor the ceasefire between the conflicting sides To promote relief and humanitarian activities	The deployment of 500 UN security soldiers as members of UNOSOM The airlift of aid into Somalia	Hardship in Somalia intensified as a result of famine Plundering of relief goods by warlords and gunmen
UNITAF	1992	International	To providing a secure humanitarian route to distribute supplies To accelerate the political settlement To restore the rule of law	Provided a secure route for humanitarian supplies Restored law and order in some parts of the country	Disagreement between UNITAF and the UN Not able to disarm the militias
UNOSOM II and Addis Ababa Accords	1993	International /Regional	Disarmament Peaceful handling of disagreement To build a transnational administration as well as regional authority	Cease-fire throughout Somalia's cities An agreement on how to carry out the truce An agreement on the mechanics of both the critical subject of disarmament	It was also not fully implemented Weapons poured into the capital, Mogadishu, ensuring that the purpose of disarmament would fail
The London Conferences	2012 & 2017	International	Improving domestic and international security guarantees Inclusive and stable political systems Economic recovery	The presence of Somaliland in the peace talks Economic recovery of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Failure to improve domestic security Somaliland still advocating for Independence Increase in disunity between the Federal government and the Federal member states of Somalia
Djibouti Initiative	1991	Regional	To establish an administration To create ceasefire	The installation of an interim administration	General Mohamed Farah Aideed disagreement Severe conflict between the new administration and general Mohamed Farah Aideed

Table 1: a Summary of International and Regional peacebuilding initiatives.

Peacebuilding Initiatives	The Year of the Initiative	Level of Initiative	Aims of Initiative	Success of Initiative	Failure/setbacks of Initiative
The IGAD Initiative	1996	Regional	To solve problems of poverty To solve problems of drought To establish peace and unity	Launched various peace treaties Obtaining an initial truce between conflicting parties	Competition and conflict between member states Economic difficulties since IGAD could not pay for the agreement Drought, desertification, and poverty
Sodere National reconciliation conference	1997	Regional	To solve the problem of insecurity of Somalia To create peace and unity among the Somali people	It effectively brought all of the clan faction leaders together National Salvation Council (NSC) was created	Hussein Aideed, the son of General Aideed who led the Somali National Alliance, did not participate in the Sodere conference Many Somalis assumed that the NSC was a puppet of Ethiopia
Cairo Initiative	1997	Regional	To establish security and stability in Somalia To bring an end to the conflict	It established a unity and understanding within the Hawiye clan-family	Only three warlords signed the Cairo agreement The perception that it was strengthening the Hawiye clan position
Arta peace Initiative	2000	Regional	To establish a working central government in Somalia To create unity among the Somali people To provide security and stability to the Somali people	Absence of warlords from the various fighting factions It included both civil society activists as well as clan chiefs Reintroduced the concept of a unified government in Somalia Incorporate Somali women into conflict settlement	It did not establish an administration that advocated for national unity The establishment of 4.5 government structure caused division among the Somali people
Mbagathi peace process	2002/3	Regional	To establish arms embargo To establish ceasefire The establishment of a parliament	Arms embargo established Agreement to a transitional parliament comprising of 351 members apportioned by clan	Several members have violated the arms embargo and the ceasefire The peace process has been characterized by posturing and recrimination

C. Somalia's internal peacebuilding efforts

1. Peacebuilding efforts in the northern regions of Somalia

With the exception of both international and regional attempts to establish peace and reconciliation, certain local institutions have also attempted to achieve this aim. Puntland and Somaliland, two *de facto* republics, have adopted some of the most well-known domestic peacebuilding strategies. Following the fall of the Siad Bare regime in 1991 and the following chaos in Somalia, two *de facto* republics emerged. They are Puntland in the northeast and Somaliland in the northwest. However, these two countries had opposing goals, whereby Somaliland sought and continues to seek international recognition as a separate entity, whilst Puntland seeks to become a state within a federated system in Somalia. The two countries used clan leaders and the bottom-up method to implement their own internal peacebuilding strategies. Furthermore, their peace-building efforts have relied on funding from both the foreign and local corporate community. It is worth noting that these two states do not receive adequate help and support from the international community (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, p. 3).

2. Somaliland House of Guurti peacemaking and peace-building processes

When it comes to Somaliland in the northwest, experts such as Abokor, Bradbury, Yusuf (2003), and Kaplan (2008) all mainly acknowledged the reasonably functional systems, peace, and stability that prevail in this region of Somalia. Despite terror threats from Al Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab, pirates, and clashes with neighboring Puntland over control of territories between the Sool and Sanaag regions. Nonetheless, five factors have been attributed to the effectiveness of Somaliland's peace-building initiative. A common identity, leadership, inclusivity, local governance, and tradition-based development are examples of these (Ridout, 2012, pp. 136-156).

The Somaliland peacebuilding effort has a clear unique identity that is appreciated by all of its residents; historical contexts have contributed to the spread of this common identity. Furthermore, this common identity brought together all-important players in various conferences, which were focused on establishing the government, fostering a feeling of belonging, and forging unanimity. Such common

identification may be dated directly to ethnic origins as well. It should be noted that Somaliland is mostly inhabited by one clan, which is the Issaq. The Issaq clan is home to over 70% of Somaliland's inhabitants. Furthermore, the Somaliland populace speaks the same dialect, follows the same Islamic sect (Sunni Islam), and shares the same culture. The north (Somaliland) was neglected throughout the Siad Barre rule economically as well as politically. This discrimination fostered a sense of common hardship, hence fostering a sense of communal identity. Another factor that contributed to this identity was the civil war that lasted from 1988 to 1991. The Somaliland people suffered greatly throughout this conflict. This resulted in two outcomes. They are a sense of victimhood and the recognition of a shared adversary. This, in turn, increased Somaliland's sense of unity (Ridout, 2012, pp. 136-156).

Capable leadership is essential in any peacebuilding effort, which is why Somaliland's clan leaders have risen to the level of governance. They are outstanding when it comes to politics, whereby characteristics such as persuasion and compromise stand out. These are important characteristics in both politics and peacebuilding. These clan leaders wield enormous authority and influence in various parts of Somalia. It evolved from the clan's need to rule its day-to-day operations, arbitrate disputes, and make peace or war on its behalf. The Guurti, which is based on Somali culture, is the supreme council of clan elders. This is a traditional governing structure that Somaliland has used in its peace-building efforts. It is in charge of resolving conflicts, developing relations among Somaliland's communities, and trying to restore trust and healthy relationships. Each of these factors remained crucial in establishing a secure environment favorable towards the establishment of an administration and the advancement of the peace agreement (Walls, 2009, pp. 308-310).

The majority of Somaliland's peacebuilding effort may be attributed to its inclusivity. In all of the literature on peacebuilding and inclusion, peacebuilding is stressed repeatedly. The involvement of all groups in resolving disputes and restoring peace is critical, and Somaliland has recently done so. Most clan families, clans, and sub-clans were represented in the majority of the major peace talks conducted in Berbera, Somaliland in February 1991, and Sheekh in October-November 1992. Each group addressed its main issues, the injustices that existed, and the potential remedies to these issues. The peacebuilding sessions dragged on for a long period,

with each faction expressing its concerns. This provided a sense of belonging to the local communities. It also gave them the impression that they had been heard and listened to. Additionally, their concerns were addressed, and the administration established as a result of these peace talks was seen as respectable in the eyes of the local populations (Ridout, 2012, pp.136-156).

There is tradition-based creativity, also known as ‘hybrid governance’ by certain researchers. Somaliland has chosen a combination of a traditional system and representative democracy over a wholly Westernized democratic form of governance or institutions based on Western models. In this hybrid system, there is a president, a vice president, and cabinet ministers who form the executive, while the bicameral legislature includes an upper chamber of elders and lawmakers. Then there's the Guurti, also known as the highest clan of elders, which is part of the independent judiciary. This system is known as the ‘Beel’ system. This effectively brought together all clan families in the government, and minorities are now involved in this type of governance. As a result, the Somaliland administration is seen as a power-sharing coalition made up of all clans inside the country. This fundamentally promotes peace and the progression of peace building efforts (Walls, 2009, pp. 308-310).

Finally, there is the concept of local ownership in the case of Somaliland's peacebuilding effort. It is connected to inclusion in the notion that a sense of ownership develops when everyone is active in both the peacebuilding process and government representation. Moreover, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was fighting for the freedom of Somaliland throughout the civil war, profited from local ownership since they had extensive grassroots support. In achieving peace, this movement was similar to Somaliland's forefather. They had support from both the principal clan of Issaq and the minority. Each person felt a sense of belonging to the process of achieving stability. Furthermore, prior to the formation of the coalition administration, small local conflicts were addressed. As a result, communities were urged to take responsibility of the peacebuilding effort. Unlike in Greater Somalia, when parties rapidly called for conferences while disregarding the underlying complaints, most experts believe that the process must achieve its aim again (Ridout, 2012, pp. 136-156).

3. Peace building efforts in Puntland

When it comes to Puntland, it's worth noting that it's comparable to Somaliland, whereby relative peace and structures have worked hard to deliver resources and a government with a clear separation of powers. Such similarities seem hard to come by in the vast majority of the country. These are seen in these two *de facto* countries. Puntland, on the other hand, is proposing a federal Somalia in which it will be regarded as a federal member of Somalia when compared to Somaliland. Furthermore, the state-building process of Puntland differs from that of Somaliland in that it is intended to fulfill two major goals, which are local security and the encouragement of particular clans' interests in a federal Somalia. The fear of the status of clans such as Majerten and its kin from the Harti clan line, in this case, Warsangelis and Dhulbahante, according to history, was a main reason for the establishment of Puntland. Puntland was eventually recognized as a Somali federal state in 1998 (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, p. 3).

The actors participating in the peacebuilding process played critical roles in both bringing peace and establishing stability in the state of Puntland. Puntland had the leftist Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) during the independence wars, which endured power conflicts and disagreements among its leaders after Puntland was created as a federal state of Somalia. The commanders in dispute were General Mohamed Abshir and Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf in 2004, when the latter was elected President of Somalia. The two leaders were spearheading the Puntland peace effort, which included the vital role of clan elders, which is also known as Isimo. The SSDF's allied leaders met in Sodere, Ethiopia, to reconcile their disagreements, and their dispute was initially resolved, but as the meeting went on, the clan elder Isimo intervened. Clan elders played an important role in resolving disagreements and holding mediations in various circumstances, most notably when mediating between the two chiefs. The clan elders employed the ancient 'Xeer' technique of conflict resolution. This system was eventually handed on to Puntland's democratic system. Professionals and intellectuals were also involved in the process, and their commitment and dedication to the peacebuilding effort was vital to its success (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, pp. 3-23).

Puntland's peace-building process may be examined from three perspectives. These are the actors participating; the effectiveness of mediation and administration;

and local ownership combined with money and credibility. Then there's the matter of Puntland's mediation and control mechanisms. Once again, the 'Isimo' plays a significant part in resolving the conflict between the Puntland chiefs. Their handling of the entire procedure instilled trust in the local community. Furthermore, the 'Isimo' oversaw the process at a key point when there was a disagreement in Puntland over the allotment of various seats in parliament and the choice of capital. Both controlled as well as negotiated the situation that led to Puntland's formation. Furthermore, the '15 wise men' have considerably handled and made some of the most important talks that have resulted in significant and worthwhile effects. These were people picked from all areas to represent them in talks and conferences, as well as to advocate the interests and grievances of all clans rather than just one (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, pp. 3-23).

Finally, community ownership, along with money and legitimacy, is important for the Puntland state. The settlements in Somalia's northeast are considered secluded and unreachable. In Somali, it is known as 'gariwaa'. Solitude and lack of access, as well as historical marginalization by various Somali administrations, prompted Puntland residents to develop a shared identity. Hostility from clans in the south and northwest enhanced this unified identity. Additionally, the northwest villages take pride in their 'political maturity', which results in a sense of collectivism to encourage and accelerate their peace-building efforts.

According to various specialists, the SSDF as well as all other partners received funding from all significant groups in fostering cooperation throughout Puntland, establishing them as the state's legal authority. Despite the fact that international money was not available for the construction of Puntland, the SSDF gathered funds through its business community, which made significant donations. Additionally, the local communities in the locations at which reconciliation conferences were conducted covered the expenses and supplies necessary. For example, the Nugaal region's Isse Mahamoud clan provided security, accommodation, and livestock for the representatives who participated in the peace negotiations.

4. The role of the media in the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia

The role of the media in every peacebuilding effort is significant. Scholars have highlighted four critical functions for the media in every peacebuilding effort. First, the media creates the political atmosphere whereby the peace negotiations happen. Second, it has an effective impact on the process's relevant stakeholders. Third, the media has a significant impact on the state of the peace efforts debate; and lastly, the media could either encourage or neglect the authenticity of the relevant stakeholders in a peace negotiation. Due to a lack of substantial and well-organized media infrastructure, the role of the media in peacebuilding in Somalia is essentially unseen. As a result, there is a scarcity of literature on the role of the media in Somalia's peacebuilding efforts. However, we will concentrate on a single case study (Sanjanah.WordPress, 2007).

HornAfrik is one of the standout case studies in Somalia's media. A private media company situated in Mogadishu the Somali capital. Since the overthrow of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991, Somalia has had insufficient or negligible media. HornAfrik, for example, was founded in 1999 by Somalis coming back from Canada. Originally, it started as a radio station and expanded to provide a TV network and a website. HornAfrik broadcasts news, entertainment, and instructional programming. Because of the popularity and efficacy of this medium, kin/clan-based radio stations have become obsolete and have closed totally. Because these stations were used to distribute propaganda, this was crucial for the peacebuilding efforts (Skjerdal, 2011, pp. 40-42).

Additionally, HornAfrik has collaborated on peace-building efforts with Somali-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) along with small local radio broadcasters. One of the main local radio stations was Radio Shabelle. When two of its founders and two other journalists were assassinated, it was hailed as a defender of press freedom and peace. This occurred between 2007 and 2009, when HornAfrik was in the forefront of publicizing human rights violations, resulting in pressure from the TFG and Somali militias. It has also given NGOs unrestricted airtime to communicate their messages to the whole Somali population. The NGOs conveyed information about health and peace to the wider populace. HornAfrik has been described as one of Somalia's most recognized media organizations, with a large international network. It has gained the support of industry titans like the BBC,

which would also have used it to retransmit Somali broadcasts on its native frequency. Most notably, the network has been recognized for encouraging dialogue between several opposing parties (Skjerdal, 2011, pp. 40-42).

The media always plays a major role in conflict resolutions and peacebuilding efforts. As seen in several countries in Africa, the media can also be a major cause of instability in a country. In the case of Somalia, the media played a positive role whereby it brought together various conflicting parties to negotiate and establish an understanding. The media also introduced and podcasted different pro-Somali songs to create a sense of love and nationalism for the Somali people. This established the need for peace and security in different sectors and regions in Somalia.

5. The role of women in the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia

In the Somali community, women often have limited or minor duties. There are, however, remarkable cases and important comments on how various women contributed to the Somali peacebuilding effort. When the civil war broke out, women realized that a disaster had befallen the society and that they had a part in bringing about reconciliation. One name that stands out is Mariam Hussein Awreeyea, the wife of a well-known Somali human rights activist. She founded the Ismail Jimcale Rights Group in Mogadishu with the primary purpose of supporting Somali rights and exposing civil liberties violations, whereby the various documentation would be utilized to bring the criminals to justice in the future. Dr. Hawa Abdi was another prominent figure. She was a gynecologist educated in Russia, and she was also nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. Starlin Abdi Arush, Mana Abdirahman Suldan, and Verena Karrer were also active in the peacebuilding effort, where both Starlin and Karrer were assassinated, and Mana died as a result of a cardiac arrest. In the city of Merka, all three were running orphanages and education centers focused on encouraging peace in Southern Somalia. They put their lives on the line in one of the conflict's most dangerous cities (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013, pp. 314-333).

Women were helping to promote peace in Somalia's northwest, notably in Somaliland. As peace advocates, women attended peace conferences in the 1990s, especially when the then-president, Mohamed Abdi Egal, had serious conflicts with numerous traditional elders. An important example of women's involvement in Somaliland's peace process happened when Businesswomen from the 'Hargesia

Business Community' released an appeal to publications pleading with both warring groups not to jeopardize Somaliland's stability. Despite this, women have used the Somali poetry known as 'Burambur' to communicate their message. This poem is viewed as a two-edged sword with the potential to both bring peace and incite violence. However, during the civil war, it was used to promote harmony and tranquility among Somali groups. Aside from this, NGOs were used to promote peace and security. Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) was one of the first NGOs to emerge in the middle of the civil war. Asha Xaji Elmi, a women's rights activist, started it. 'The Women's Development Organization' was created in the 1990s in Merka, in the south-west, with one of its major aims being militia disarmament (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013 pp. 314-333).

The Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organization (CGWO) was a notable NGO in Mogadishu in 1996. It served as a shield for women's voices aimed at promoting peace. NAGAAD was another NGO created by women in Somaliland that aspired to build peace. In general, these were some of the first women to be involved in the peace building effort. Women have proactively entered politics since the founding of the TFG in order to begin peacebuilding efforts (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013, pp. 314-333).

D. Similarities and Differences

It is critical to explain briefly why international and regional attempts to achieve peace in Somalia have had almost no effect. Academics have proposed the following explanations: Domestic 'spoilers' and constraints emanating from various warlords, foreign 'spoilers' and impediments wherein certain exterior mediators seemed to have an interest in Somalia, hence sought the war to continue. Ethiopia is regarded as being one of these actors. Most researchers, however, see this as a conspiracy theory. One of the factors that is frequently identified is missed opportunities, whereby international mediators lacked political interests and failed to address crucial issues during mediation.

The other components of peacebuilding need the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. In Somalia, there are major sources of violence. One is purely political. The northern section of the country has created peace and has a functional government with plans to split from the rest of the country. The ownership of the

provinces of Sool and Sanaag Bari has been a source of contention between Somaliland and Puntland on various occasions. These disputes featured both internal and external parties, each with their own agenda. Political measures are required to put an end to this form of violence. The second cause of insecurity is the illicit operations of freelancing militias. Following the civil war, various irresponsible militias gained access to a wide range of weaponry, which are currently being used to conduct crimes against people such as murder, robbery, rape, and kidnapping. The origins of insecurity that are essentially criminal and those that are politically driven should be differentiated. If local security guards, shari'a courts, business organizations, and the elderly were encouraged and supported, they could be able to cope with criminal activity.

External players have a big effect on state building in post-warlord Somalia. Regional players and the international community rallied behind candidates they believed would advance their goals. The terms 'stabilization', 'state building', and 'peacebuilding' have been employed interchangeably or highly interdependently by the UN and donors since the inception of the Somalia Transitional Government in 2004, and notably since the formalization of the Somalia Federal Government. Security was prioritized as a main goal and a necessary condition for the establishment of a state apparatus in Somalia from the beginning. Aside from AMISOM's enforcement powers, the concept of supporting 'quick impact initiatives' to go along with AMISOM's 'stabilization' activities were also floated. The goal was to extend the 'peace dividend' to people living in recently freed areas, legitimize the federal government, and solidify state presence and services.

While there is an increasing willingness in Somalia to support peacebuilding via finance, political will, and frameworks, the phrase has diverse meanings for different parties. The UN and donor community's current 'peacebuilding' discourse in Somalia focuses on providing physical security, assisting the federal government, and reconciliation at the highest levels. Bottom-up peacebuilding practitioners consider these initiatives extensions of overstabilization rather than 'peacebuilding' since they focus more on improving social connections than on maintaining state security. They are concerned that the notion of peacebuilding has been used to 'whitewash' what is really a political state building enterprise in Somalia.

They therefore see a risk to their impartiality if they are to completely embrace a nexus narrative.

Consider the UN, which has been chastised for its inattention, lack of political interest, and failure to seize critical opportunities for resolving the Somali conflict. Lastly, there is the problem of misinterpretation, in which international and regional mediation attempts failed to take the approach of first assessing the Somali situation and then prescribing a solution. This contributed to the use of ineffective mediation strategies as well as poor representation of the warring factions in various conferences. International mediators were frequently uninformed of the realities of clannism, which resulted in their incapacity to succeed.

One thing that almost all mediators from international and regional peacebuilding efforts had in common was that they did not understand the root causes of the Somali conflict. Various solutions that were introduced were not solutions that Somalia needed at the time, which resulted in failure. For the establishment of peace and security that lasts for a very long time, the root causes of the insecurity should be identified and solved accordingly.

Internal initiatives have resulted in a sense of stability in regions where peace-building efforts have been used. In Somaliland and Puntland, for example, since their establishment, Somalia's two *de facto* republics have enjoyed stability and functional institutions. Researchers and Somalis alike believe that domestic attempts have been more successful since 'a domestic problem is best addressed by a domestic solution'. Both international and regional efforts at peacebuilding are seen to not have had a huge impact on the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia because of the private interests of both international and regional actors.

V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the causes of the Somali war as well as the techniques used by different peacemakers to address insecurity and achieve long-term peace in Somalia. Although being one of the world's most homogenous communities in terms of culture, religion, ethnicity, and language, Somalis have fallen into a terrible cycle of continuous warfare over dominance, territory, and resources. The 1991 ouster of President Siad Barre's administration aggravated the situation. Ever since, Somalia has been embroiled in a civil conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The violence in Somalia affected not just the Somali population but the entire world.

This was attributable to the fact that, following the state collapse, Somalia was becoming a refuge for terrorism and piracy, which frightened the region and the rest of the globe. While warfare was a part of prehistoric peoples' lives, this paper argues that the primary reasons for the Somali conflict were the colonial legacy, the Cold War legacy, governmental persecution, and competition for power and resources. It is common knowledge that the biggest African conflicts originated as a result of European-created arbitrary boundaries. Somalia, being a part of the continent that is also geographically located in a geostrategic zone, was not spared from this separation.

Somalia was divided among three European powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These powers were Britain, Italy, and France. The French seized and dubbed the northwestern section of Somalia 'French Somaliland'. The southern-central portions of Somalia, including Mogadishu, the country's capital, were seized by Italy and called Italian Somaliland. The northern parts of modern-day Somalia were conquered and named by British Somaliland, including the Ogaden area in Western Somalia, which was eventually relinquished to Ethiopia, and the NFD, which was given to Kenya. This colonial heritage encouraged Pan-Somalism among Somalis, inspiring philosophical policies pursued by various post-colonial Somali administrations in the quest to unite all Somali territories under one banner.

Somalia's ongoing antagonism and violent confrontations with its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, are fueled by its colonial heritage. Former colonial powers sided with their cultural partners, Ethiopia and Kenya, both of which are members of the Christian club, causing tensions. The physical closeness of the two raging Cold War blocs resulted in heated competitiveness. Former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, used to see Somalia as a friend, but the USSR soon replaced them.

Somalia received financial assistance, military hardware, and political support until 1977, during the Ogaden War, when the USSR and Warsaw Pact allied with Ethiopia, fighting alongside them against Somalia, resulting in Somalia's severe defeat in 1978, an area of concern that may be related to the current Somali conflict. On October 21, 1969, after a brief period of relative democracy, General Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless military coup. All democratic institutions were suspended during his reign, and his obsession with power resulted in extreme state repression that affected all aspects of life, including the deaths of his communist colleagues and religious leaders. A failed military coup attempt by high-ranking military officials from the Majeerteen Clan in 1978 marked the pinnacle of his authoritarian tactics. This resulted in the chaotic years of late 1970 to 1991, whereby the armed strongman, President Mohammed Siad Barre, utilized this factor to help him hold onto power in a typical example of regime insecurity. President Said Barre implemented a divide-and-rule political paradigm that turned tribes against one another in a zero-sum political game. Attempts to remove him centered in the 1980s on clan-based armies, which turned on each other immediately after their shared opponent, Said Barre, was overthrown.

The thesis also demonstrated regional and international initiatives to resolve the Somali war as well as the problems they face. In the first decade, a peacebuilding initiative that began immediately after the conflict began in 1991, with the collapse of the administration, failed to yield any positive outcomes. Following the temporary halt of hostilities in early 1993, the international community established UNOSOM II, a peacekeeping mission that later became a component of larger peacebuilding initiatives. The mission, nonetheless, failed to fulfill its peace-building aims due to a disarmament plan that was a bone of controversy between the UN and several significant armed Somali organizations commanded by General Mohamed Aided. Approximately fifteen peace conferences have been organized by diverse parties,

including regional and international organizations. Several significant conferences, including the Djibouti Conference in 1991, the Addis Ababa Conference in 1993, and the Cairo Conference in 1997, were backed by regional states and the international community. Nevertheless, all of these conferences were ineffectual and did not generate the anticipated results for the Somali people. Following a string of setbacks, three notable peace conferences opened the path for a resolution to the Somali conflict.

One of the most important national reconciliation forums in Somalia was the Arta Peace Process. The process was coordinated by Djibouti, a neighboring sister nation, and it marked a watershed point in Somalia's peace process. Many observers saw the summit as a significant step forward in Somalia's state-building process. Two reasons were cited as success factors for this summit. The warlords from various conflicting factions were excused for the first time. Instead, engage a wide spectrum of clan elders and civil society organizations with strong roots in many areas of Somali culture. However, on the other hand, the Somali people across the globe, as well as the international community, continued to put a lot of pressure on the conference delegates to attain the generally acknowledged goal of reconciliation. The system established the 4.5 Formula, which is still in use in Somali politics today, and was meant to address the country's persistent problems with power-sharing and democracy. In the absence of all government structures and political institutions such as political parties for more than a decade, while all major clans claimed a dominant or absolute majority, thinking outside the box was essential. In Somalia's politics, the formula required a specific fixed representation for each clan.

The notion was that each of Somalia's four largest clans, the Darood, the Dir, the Hawiye, and the Digil-Mirifle, should have an equal number of seats in parliament. The Bantu, the Benadir, and other minor clans were to get half of what the big clans received. This proposal was never intended to bring about a long-term solution to the Somali crisis, but rather to address the urgent demand for political representation, despite the fact that it is still in use in Somalia.

The Arta peace process is credited with reintroducing the concept of a unified government structure in Somalia. A proposal for a provisional Transitional National Charter, a Transitional National Government (TFG), and a Transitional National Assembly consisted of 245 lawmakers who selected Abdikasim Salad Hassan as

Somalia's next interim president as an outcome of this process. Following the new president's inauguration in Djibouti, Somalia's new administration relocated to Mogadishu, the country's main city. It experienced several internal and external obstacles, which resulted in inefficiency, gradual disintegration, and finally collapse in 2002.

The study also demonstrated the significance of local ownership in peacebuilding. It investigated and shed attention on an underappreciated local peacebuilding process that demonstrated that peace-building efforts did not have to be restricted to external, regional, and international mediation. The various peacebuilding procedures carried out in Somalia's Northwest and Northeast regions demonstrated that the Somali people in these areas had a say and had made significant efforts to achieve long-term peace in their areas. These various areas have an obvious quality that distinguishes them from the vast majority of the country, whereby they have a strong clan elder leadership culture.

On May 18, 1991, the northern area, which had been a British colony prior to independence, unilaterally annexed the rest of Somalia and declared self-determination under the name of the Republic of Somaliland, alluding to the atrocities perpetrated and the severe devastation imposed on the region while the Issaq clan-based SNM fought against British military rule from 1982 to 1991. A conflict over power-sharing among clans and leadership competition among elite politicians triggered a brief civil war in the province shortly after independence. This brief period of conflict was immediately interfered with, restrained, and mediated by clan leaders. The end result was a realistic paradigm for peace-building that resulted not just in sustainable peace and stability but also in a valued emerging democratic process. This territory now lives in peace and tranquility within its social components, despite the fact that it does not have any form of global recognition as a sovereign state, as they would prefer.

In the same way that Somaliland did, the north-eastern region went through the same process. The region suffered from terrible human rights violations and war crimes committed against people during the war of the Majerten clan's Somali Salvation Democratic Front against President General Mohamed Siad Barre's administration from 1978 to 1991. Following the fall of the state in 1991, militia loyal to general Mohamed Farah Aideed and a radical Islamist combatants known as

Al-Itahad al-Islami stormed the region, killing innocent people and causing horrible harm to many communities. The efforts of Somaliland's northern areas and Puntland's northeastern region have helped to build a permanent peace, allowing the formation of semi-autonomous government setups that have managed, with a high degree of success, to restrict lawlessness. The achievement was attributed to local ownership, the implementation of culturally well-known custom law (xeer), and providing clan elders, religious leaders, and civil society groups the upper hand, which resulted in a genuine conclusion. Within this context, the global community considers the peacebuilding efforts in these two Somali regions to be effective, productive, and commendable.

The research also found that a confluence of various variables contributed to failed peace talks in Somalia after more than a decade of instability. The cooperation of groups that have gained from the conflict, such as warlords, the development of compact arms and small arms, and external interference in the form of supporting rival or simultaneous peace conferences and giving military and financial assistance to various fighting factions, has worsened hostilities, prolonged the conflict, and damaged the nation. Several other significant challenges that foreign interveners demonstrated and delayed essentially all peace-building initiatives include a lack of neutrality, disregard for Somali cultural norms, and a focus on an unsuitable objective. Many ongoing attempts by Somalia at various conferences have resulted in disappointment and disaster, leading to a shortage of donor objectivity in terms of organizers and funding. Several countries with private interests in the peace or intervention process changed the course of development in their favor.

Various analyses also demonstrate that the majority of conferences established and funded by regional or international groups have focused on the hopeless objective of state building. The proper procedure would have been to focus on peace-building amongst the conflicting parties who had endured deep distrust as a result of the extended civil war. It is self-evident that every process of state-building must be preceded by a process of peace-building. As we have seen, Somalia has been in a state of constant chaos since the civil war started. This has produced an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of problems such as piracy and terrorism, which have spread the bloodshed and disruption beyond the borders of Somalia. To understand the conflict and the efforts to resolve it, one must first understand the

source of the dispute as well as the reason for the failure of various peace-building operations both within and beyond the conflict. As a result, the purpose of this study is to provide a number of recommendations.

To begin, Somalia's security must be restored, particularly in the central and southern areas, if significant measures to address other issues confronting the country are to be taken. The most pressing concerns are security and territory control. The AMISOM peacekeeping force, assisted by government forces, must recognize that there will be no lasting peace and security as long as all Somali territories remain ungoverned. The Federal Government alone cannot do this. Other stakeholders, such as allied regional states, must be included. The global community should assist the Somali Federal Government in securing these regions while also strengthening state-building efforts, accelerating the central government's social and economic reconstruction initiatives, and managing the regional dimension. It will be critical not only for resolving the Somalia conflict, but also for promoting regional peace in the Horn of Africa and dealing with transnational threats emanating from Somalia.

The second recommendation is that it is important to construct a functional country that will strengthen the social fabric of Somalia in order to put the country back on track for recovery and reconciliation. This should entail re-establishing the rule of law, also re-establishing functional institutions, laying the groundwork for socioeconomic recovery, providing basic services, and promoting human rights, establishing some sort of justice, and reconciliation efforts among various communities. Furthermore, similar activities must also be launched, particularly in regions that are developing stability as a result of the increase in peacekeeping operations by the African mission in Somalia. Such efforts will be directed at the recapture of these territories while maintaining the political, developmental, and rule of law advances made in the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland.

The third recommendation is that the international community should promote the stabilization and development of Somalia to better the Somali people by providing scholarships to students and also offering educational classes to spread awareness of how all Somali people should come together to build the country and to bring forward the positive nationalism that the country needs today. This also needs the international community to give space and time for the elected officials of Somalia to come up with domestic solutions for domestic problems. This can only be

possible if the elected Somali officials never put the interests of foreign entities before the interests of the common citizens of Somalia.

Last but not least, the last recommendation is that in order to avoid or limit the dangers of any true peacebuilding process, the Somali people should initiate a genuinely indigenous and locally owned peacebuilding process. The idea, money, and facilitation should all come from within the country. The approach should be limited to national reconciliation and unification and not deflected to state building. A multidimensional and comprehensive, inclusive approach is necessary to address the critical challenges that Somalia faces as a country, such as secessionism, terrorism, state building, and economic growth. The limited emphasis on counter-terrorism taken by the UN and the US and the counter-extreme nationalism espoused by neighboring nations such as Kenya and Ethiopia are considered provocative and ultimately unhelpful by many Somalis. The peace initiatives utilized by Somaliland and Puntland, a bottom-up peacebuilding method that does not exclude any credible person or institution, and the promotion of local solutions for local issues, would be critical for resolving the Somali peacebuilding challenge.

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