

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES`
BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF SYRIA**

MASTER`S THESIS

Bader MUSTAFA

**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

MARCH, 2021

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare with respect that the study “The Impact Of Sanctions On The Authoritarian Regimes` Behavior: The Case Of Syria”, which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the Project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (.../.../20...)

Bader MUSTAFA

FOREWORD

First, I would like to dedicate the efforts that I made in this thesis to all components of the great Syrian people for all their sacrifice. History will talk about those people who offered the most precious souls in order to reach a decent and free life, despite their huge loses, they spent ten years searching for the lights of the freedom.

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Hazar Vural el, who accepted my thesis, trusted in my work, and gave me very precious notes. Also to my professor Deniz Yüksek for her guidance, support and admirable overall attitude as a teacher.

I dedicate it to my father Muhammad Mulla Rasheed, the man who gave us all his life and raised us to pursue knowledge and moderation in life. I will not be able to repay him of his debt at any time. In addition I dedicate it to his companion, my mother, who taught us before her departure to preserve the sincerity of the heart. She was the best teacher, mother and wife .Moreover, I would like to thanks my brothers who have supported me: Youssef and Muhammad who are the best advisers, and friends, and Siwar who is a diligent in his knowledge and work. I dedicate it to also my sisters, whom they are my pride in this life.

On the long journey of writing and studying, I owe my wife Shilan a lot to bear with me, the requirements of the nature of my life and work, for she was the best supporter for me and my efforts to pursue knowledge, and for my young kids Aram and Azad.

In addition, I want to express my thanks to “the Syrian forum and the Chairman of the Board; Mustafa Sabbagh”, and to my friends in “Omran Center for strategic studies”, for all their support and valuable help during the time I worked in the Center.

Finally, I would like to give my sincere thanks and gratitude’s to my friend Berk Özmeral, who reviewed all my work and corrected it linguistically, and made many precious comments, nevertheless my thanks to everyone who I may had forgotten to mention and may helped me in direct or indirect way to finish my thesis.

February, 2021

Bader MUSTAFA

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ABBREVIATIONS

BREXIT	: The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.
EU	: European Union
GDP	: Gross domestic product
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
IRA	: Irish Republican Army
IRGC	: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF	: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- The Quds Force
JCPOA	: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPF	: National Progressive Front
P5+1	: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United State
PIJ	: Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLO	: Palestinian Liberation Organization
SC	: Security Council
SYP	: Syrian pounds
TIES	: Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
U.S	: United States
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USSR	: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	: Weapon of mass destruction

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THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES' BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF SYRIA

ABSTRACT

This study examines the sanctions been imposed on Syria. Despite Syria is a country that received sanctions from more than four decades, starting from 1979, when first U.S sanctions were imposed on Syria. The scholarly filed had not dealt very often with Syrian case, for many reasons. Some of this reasons were a result of the sanctions nature, since they were not very harsh sanctions. Moreover Syria during the 1979 sanctions and later in the 1986 wave of sanctions were still receiving huge amount of financial support from Arab countries, and Soviet Union financial and military support. That is why this study after the conceptual part, is going through Syria`s modern history and tries to find how the previous mandate system and the Syrian foreign relations had shaped Syria – U.S & E.U relations.

Based on the objectives of this research, which are presented in the main question of the paper; what are the impact of sanctions on the authoritarian regimes? The study is examine how Hafiz al- Assad, took control over the Syrian armed forces and the security branches, then the political life in Syria. That is one of the new steps in this study, which is connecting the internal factors and the foreign relations of Syria, and showing how those factors led Syria to face sanctions from U.S. and E.U countries. The study also shows that the economic sufferance of Syria was not only as a result of the effects of the 1979, and 1986 sanctions, but other factors were present, like the Israeli occupation of Beirut port in 1982, and the cut of the funding from Arab countries to Syria after 1985, as a result of the Syrian support to the Iran against Iraq in the Iranian – Iraqi war, and the Syrian policies in Lebanon. Beside the isolation was imposed on Syria when Egypt and Jordan made independent peace agreements with Israel. By tracking those changes either in the Syrian foreign policies, or the internal authority developments, this study is one of the first in this regard, that covering Syrian developments and connecting it to the sanctions that imposed on in Syria.

Although Syria had faced sanctions in 1979, 1986, and 2003, and now from 2011 and still ongoing, but still the topic has not received what is deserve from coverage, that is why this paper is from a comprehensive type that covers those old wave of sanctions, and the ones that started from 2011. In this regard and starting from 2011, more than 1100 Syrian entity including individuals and institutions were sanctioned only by U.S and EU, beside huge set of sanctions from other countries, but still the Syrian regime neither fell nor changed its behavior. The thesis is trying to cover those set of sanctions and their effect, however the paper reaches to a conclusion that sanctions were not successful in their goal in the period that the study tried to cover more extensively, which was from 2011 until 2018.

Keywords: *Type of sanctions, history of sanctions, the international sanctions on Iran, sanctions on Libya, the modern history of Syria, the Syrian foreign relations,*

Syria support for the violent non state actors, the rule Baath party, Hafiz al-Assad rule. Sanctions on Syria in 1979 and 1986. The Syrian crisis and the multilateral sanctions.

YAPTIRIMLARIN, OTORİTER REJİMLERİN DAVRANIŞI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: SURIYE ÖRNEĞİ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Suriye üzerinde uygulanan yaptırımları incelemektedir. Suriye, ABD'nin ilk yaptırımlarının uygulandığı 1979'dan başlayarak kırk yılı aşkın bir süredir yaptırım alan bir ülke olmasına rağmen, bilimsel anlamda pek çok sebepten dolayı Suriye meselesiyle çok sık ilgilenmemiştir. Bu sebeplerden bazıları yaptırımların doğasının sonucuydu, çünkü çok sıkı yaptırımlar değillerdi.

Kaldı ki, Suriye, 1979 yaptırımları sırasında ve ardından 1986 yılı yaptırımları dalgasında hala Arap ülkelerinden geniş çaplı parasal destek, Sovyetler Birliğinden ise parasal ve askeri destek alıyordu. Bu sebeple kavram bölümünden sonraki bu çalışma, Suriye'nin modern tarihinden geçerek önceki manda sisteminin ve Suriye'nin dış ilişkilerinin Suriye – ABD ve AB ilişkilerini nasıl şekillendirdiğini bulmaya çalışıyor.

Makalenin temel hedefinde sunulan bu araştırmanın amaçlarına göre; yaptırımların, otoriter rejimler üzerindeki etkisi nedir? İlgili çalışma, Hafız Esad'ın Suriye silahlı kuvvetlerini ve güvenlik şubelerini, daha sonra Suriye'deki siyasi hayatı ne şekilde kontrol altına aldığını incelemektedir. Bu, Suriye'nin iç faktörleri ve dış ilişkilerini birbirine bağlayan ve bu faktörlerin Suriye'yi, ABD ve AB ülkelerinden yaptırımlara ne şekilde yönlendirdiğini gösteren bu çalışmanın yeni adımlarından biridir. Çalışma, bunların dışında, Suriye'nin ekonomik sıkıntısının sadece 1979 ve 1986 etkilerinin bir sonucu olmadığını, bununla beraber başka faktörlerin bulunduğunu, mesela İsrail güçlerinin 1982'de Beyrut limanını işgali ve 1985'den sonra Arap ülkelerinden Suriye'ye sağlanan fonların kesilmesi, İran-İrak savaşında Suriye'nin Irak'a karşı İran'a verdiği destek sonucu ve Suriye'nin Lübnan'daki siyaseti gibi. Mısır ve Ürdün'ün İsrail ile bağımsız barış anlaşmaları yapması üzerine Suriye'ye tecrit uygulandı. Gerek Suriye dış politikasındaki gerekse iç otorite gelişmelerindeki bu değişiklikleri takip eden bu çalışma, Suriye'deki gelişmeleri kapsayan ve bunu Suriye'de uygulanan yaptırımlarla ilişkilendiren bu bağlamda ilk çalışmalardan biridir.

Suriye, 1979, 1986 ve 2003 yıllarında yaptırımlarla karşı karşıya kalmıştı ve şu andakiler 2011'den beri hala devam ediyor, ancak konu yine de kapsamdan hak ettiğini almamıştır, bu makale, bu nedenle bu yaptırımları ve 2011'den itibaren başlayan eski dalgayı kapsayan kapsamlı türdendir. Bu bağlamda ve 2011'den başlayarak, aralarında bireyler ve kurumlar bulunan 1100'den fazla Suriyeli kuruluş, diğer ülkelerden gelen çok sayıda yaptırımın yanı sıra, sadece ABD ve AB tarafından yaptırıma tabi tutuldu, ancak yine de Suriye rejimi, ne düştü ne de tavrını değiştirdi. İlgili tez, bu yaptırımlar zinciri ile etkilerini kapsamaya çalışıyor, ancak makale, çalışmanın daha kapsamlı bir şekilde kapsamaya çalıştığı 2011'den 2019'a kadar olan dönemde, yaptırımların hedeflerinde başarılı olmadığı sonucuna varıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Yaptırım türleri, yaptırımların tarihi, İran'a yönelik uluslar arası yaptırımlar, Libya'ya yönelik yaptırımlar, Suriye'nin modern tarihi, Suriye'nin*

dış ilişkileri, Suriye'nin devlet dışı şiddet yanlısı aktörlere olan desteği, Baas partisi, Hafız Esad iktidarı. 1979 ve 1986'da Suriye'ye yönelik yaptırımlar. Suriye krizi ve çok taraflı yaptırımlar.

1. INTRODUCTION

The use of force in international relations is one of the most important topics that take a large space from the international relations field. Given that international relations theories have emerged and developed to explain the relations between international political entities, and to reach a safe environment at the international level besides ensuring the secure and stability of the international community as a whole, sanctions is emerging as one of the tools to keep peace and preserve human rights without resorting to force in achieving goals by states. However the most prominent theories of the international relations are not yet able to classify sanctions among their properties. Nevertheless what the paper found during the search process is sanctions are most used in a manner close to the realistic theory, since most of the cases of sanctions are used by great powers against other countries, as alternative tool in changing the targeted entities policies and enforcing what the more powerful side seeks to achieve.

Countries built their relations on the principle of power, and interest, and from here, the realist theory gained its power in explaining the behavior of states between each other. However, the success of the realistic theory in explaining the phenomenon of the use of power and own interests as the principle of the relations between states, did not frustrate the attempts of political scholars, and international law, even politicians themselves sometimes to search for options, that maintain the safety, and stability of the international community. This took place by defining the principle of prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and incorporating this principle into the articles of the United Nations Charter, that is governing international relations. This trend towards promoting and imposing bans on the use of force, appeared mainly during the period of the bipolarity system of the international , which ruled international relations for nearly a half century, under the sovereignty of two polar powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The polar conflict remained for a long

period known as the Cold War period, until the Soviet polar fragmented at its end into a relatively weak state, and with it the Cold War period ended.

The Cold War period ended, and a period of international conflict began between major powers trying to form the so-called new world order, which could be a multi-polar international order, on the contrary, the United States of America is still trying to counter this international trend in its endeavor to remain as a superpower which controls the global system .

The post-Cold War period witnessed developments in the direction of asserting the sovereignty of the international environment for the values of the victor, who is the American pole in the current international system, in this period the values of free economy and the globalization of the capitalist system in economic terms have dominated. The same period also witnessed the rise of political values, such as political freedom, individual rights, the respect of the human rights, and democracy. Moreover, it was distinguished by the tendency of the great powers to use two main tools in implementing their vision with regard to the rest of the countries around the world. The first; through the United Nations, and its institutions such as the Security Council, to obtain decisions to intervene internationally or impose sanctions. The second: is by direct unilateral intervention or the use of the sanctions tool unilaterally, against the target country at different levels and against different sectors, if the great powers had failed to obtain resolutions from the international organizations. These interventions or imposing sanctions took several names, such as intervention for humanitarian considerations in order to support the concept of human rights, and another to support the concept of democracy, and there is an intervention under the name of preserving regional and international security.

International sanctions, foremost amongst which are the economic sanctions, are old sanctions that were not only introduced in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, but their date back to the early days of modern organized human societies. In the past, economic sanctions were most often a complementary punishment for war operations, as wars were followed by sanctions based on unilateral well. The situation continued until the emergence of nation states, when an attempt was made to formulate them in a legal framework during the period of the League of Nations, which failed to achieve

its desired goals. After the end of the World War 2, the international community crowned its cooperation by establishing the United Nations.

The principles of the United Nations are based on maintaining and protecting the international security and peace, and resolving international disputes. To achieve these goals, the United Nations may impose sanctions on countries, or entities that violate the international laws. The types of sanctions imposed on regimes differ in terms of content, such as embargo on trade, or on the supply of arms, and travel. In addition, sanctions differs according to the nature of the senders, so when international organizations or group of countries issues them, they will be called multilateral sanctions. On the other hand, when they are implemented by one country, they would be called unilaterally sanctions.

Unilateral sanctions are often imposed by great countries, with strong and influential economies, as they possess, based on their strength, and ability to influence the entity, which in many cases they are associated with common interests. In the event that the Security Council and the United Nations are the senders, sanctions need a majority vote in both chambers, without the use veto right by prominent members in the SC; they became more effective because they have a comprehensive legal aspect more than unilateral sanctions. In addition, sanctions effectiveness is differ based on the economic power of the targeted country.

In the first chapter which is titled “CONCEPTUAL AND THEREORTICAL FRAMEWORK”; the study tries portrait how sanctions have developed through the history, and what are the main types of sanctions according to their nature, and also according to the nature of senders. Beside the academic duty that asks for such search, also our main case which is “the Syrian case” needs such attempt of connecting between the theoretical part and the practice of sanctions. The second part of the first chapter is presenting two cases, which are; Libya and Iran, the reason for choosing those two examples are; that Libya can be according the findings of the paper as one of the rare cases of the success of sanctions in changing some of the behaviors of an authoritarian regime. The sanctions on Libya could bring the country to the negotiation table, and later it went to stage of cooperation with the international community, however those sanctions were not related to the Libyan internal policies, so the levels of

freedom did not change inside Libya, nor a democratic institutions were built. The second example is about Iran, this example shows some similarity with Syria in regard of using the non-state actors very actively by the Syrian regime, also there were an opposition class in Iran, even if it is more than Syria before 2011, but it is not like the case of Iraq and or Libya were no opposition were left on the ground. Moreover the Iranian case has a side of using sanctions as a political tool by the sender countries, also it gives example of the presence of states that kept supporting both of countries, while they were suffering from sanctions.

In the second chapter the paper would, present the Syrian contemporary history, in regard of Syrian independence, from the France mandate, the fact that Syria was mandated by France played a significant role in Syria`s international relations with the Western countries, and built more trust in the Soviet Union, and the Communist Bloc. The Syrian relations with the Soviet Union, North Korea, beside some of the Syrian regional relations like the use of the Palestinian and some other non-state actors, also the Syrian interventions in Lebanon would be presented in this chapter. Later the paper would discuss how the Baath party took control of government in Syria in 1963, until 1970 when the former Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad made a coup d'état, and started building his own institutions. In this regard the paper would show how al-Assad control all the Syrian ruling institutions; the military, security branches, and the political life. Presenting those dynamics beside the mentioned Syrian international and regional relations shows how Syria was moving toward being targeted by U.S`s, unilateral sanctions, when it was placed on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979. After facing sanctions from U.S, the Syrian ruling party tried to do some makeup moves toward the relation with the violent non-state actors, but was not for real change. After discussion some of the economic effects of those sanctions the paper would present the second case of sanctions been imposed on Syria which was a result of the accusing Syria to be behind the attempt of exploding the Israeli El Al plan in London, this case led Syria to face its first collective sanctions in 1986. The study would show how those measurements led to some positive changes in the Syrian regional policies, and how did they effected the Syrian economy. Moreover the paper

would explain some other factors that motivated Syria to change its policies; like the peace deals between Israel and Egypt, which was followed by one between Israel, and Jordan, those developments was accompanied with 1986, sanctions, and also with the cut of funding from the oil producing countries to Syria as a result of her support to Iran during the Iraqi-Iranian war.

The third chapter includes sanctions that been imposed on Syria after 2000, when Assad the son, was nominated to the presidency, after his father death. The start of new sanction waves on Syria was after the U.S, invasion of Iraq in 2003. Other factor that made the international community take action against Syria, was the assassination of the former Lebanon Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, the assassination led the Syria leave from after 30 years of military control of Lebanon.

The year 2011 marked a turning point in the sanctions imposed on Syria in terms of their type, as well as the number of those involved in them, as the regime's suppression of the peaceful protest movement (March 2011) prompted some countries to impose various sanctions packages that targeted both Syrian and non-Syrian individuals and entities. The study is showing the number and nature of the targeted entities by sanctions, and is trying to reach some numbers in regard of their impact on the Syrian economy and some other aspect of life in Syria. In this point the study faced many obstacles

These sanctions are still in effect, until this study is written, their impacts are still a matter of debate by researchers in the fields of economics and international relations. Some scholars and economists see the effectiveness of sanctions, citing the sharp decline in the economic indicators and the growing economic pressures on the Syrian government, while some others cite the Syrian example to demonstrate the weak effectiveness of sanctions in modifying the behavior of the Syrian regime or pushing it towards achieving a democratic transformation in Syria. Giving evidence that sanctions contributed in creating interest-based structures allied with the regime, beside the continuity of the Syrian regime violations of the international laws, by bombing civilians, and absenting tens of thousands in prisons. Another factor appeared during the last stages of writing which is the pass of Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in the United States Congress. However even though the Caesar Act showing very

harsh impact on the Syrian government performance, and nearly stopped the Syrian deals with the outside world, but since it was not included in the main period of the studying target which is from 2011-2018, and it is changeable actor and dynamic that its results may take longer time to achieve its main goals, it was not included in the study.

In short what makes this study important among its counterparts is that, even though that sanctions been imposed on Syria from nearly four decades, but no such comprehensive study was made on their contexts and pretexts and their effect on the Syrian regime behavior. The lack of such studies was an obstacle in the process of writing also, it was an advantage of being one of the rare of such studies regarding international measurements on Syria. It also worth to mention here that the study benefited a lot from the very new published papers in regard of sanctions or the impact of war in Syria; like the “Syria at War: Eight Years on” report, issued by the National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) program of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), and the Center for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews, it also benefited from the study of Nusus Blog research that is on the topic of sanctions on Syria. But the study here tried to add a new conceptual framework that connected the Syrian modern history, and the nature of the Syrian regime with the set of measurements that Syria faced.

1.1 Importance of the study

States resort to sanctions individually or through the United Nations and regional organizations as a tool intended either in whole or in part to stop the targeted states from violating the international laws rule or preserve interests of the legislators.

Sanctions may have political or economic dimensions, and could be comprehensive, targeting all entity of the state in all its vital sectors, or selectively affecting the interests of entities or individuals belonging to the target State.

Some states may resort to impose sanctions gradually, while others resort to impose them directly as package to make more pressure on the targeted countries.

Sanctions are intended either to change behaviors and policies of the targeted states in whole or in part in line with the legislator's will to punish or to change the ruling regimes entirely, or to restrain their violations of human rights and to ensure their compliance with the international law rules.

Despite the repeated resort to sanctions, their effectiveness is still questioned by researchers in the field of international relations. One direction goes to demonstrate its effectiveness in achieving the goals it has embarked on repeatedly after the end of the Cold War, while another direction reduces its effectiveness, particularly regarding issues of modifying or changing the behavior of authoritarian regimes.

In light of the previous summary, it is important to address the issue of sanctions, by providing a conceptual framework that defines the concept, types and tools of sanctions, and which reviews academic views on the effectiveness of sanctions on changing or reforming authoritarian regimes. This thesis will then discuss the sanctions imposed on Syria in terms of the context in which they were imposed, and to those who imposed them, through an analysis of the data of US and European sanctions on Syria until 31/12/2018 as a case study.

Syria has been subject to unilateral measurements from 1986, and cumulative sanctions since 1979. As for pre-2011 sanctions they were characterized by their selectivity, limited scope of targets, and their nature as specific sanctions and were imposed only by the United States of America. They have gained an international dimension since 2011, concerning diversity of their patterns and the wide range of their targeted parties and those who are involved in imposing them.

1.2 The problem of research

The question of this research stems from the importance of the subject of sanctions as a field of research since it has been used frequently as mean by international organizations, and some states like United States on authoritarian

regimes. Sanction supposed to change or stop some behaviors of authoritarian, and even though it was used intensively and severely, but it could not provide definite results as aimed to do, it usually affected public, then affecting the survival and continuation of regimes.

Many reasons are behind the weak effects of sanctions, and they may be generalized to some extent, like the nature of regimes itself, since in most cases the targeted regimes are authoritarian. This kind of regimes are controlling all institutions and administrations of states by specific groups from the community, which can be replaced when targeted by sanctions without making real damage to the regime as all.

Customization: In many cases, sanctions are targeting specific parts of regimes, like army and security sections. Even those sections are vital, but for authoritarian regimes, the important goal is to survive, and the quality and quantity of army power and security means they preserve are enough to maintain in power. Also, in a world that its unit polarity can be argued those regimes have ability to reach alternative suppliers for weapons and needed security experience and means.

Gradual process: since most cases of imposing sanctions are aiming to change behaviors of regimes, they are imposed gradually. This method is providing chance for authoritarian regimes to adopt with the new circumstances, by observing the first shock, and starting to search for new rates of trade, laundering Money and taxation,

Institutionalization: the institutionalization of power succession in authoritarian regimes plays a key role in maintaining the party in power, which in our case is Al-Baath party who has an internal stability and preserves its capability to maintain legitimacy inside the country. Beside since, those institutions are not running by democratic and transparent policies, they are more able to resist sanctions from outside world.

The success and failure of sanctions on authoritarian regimes is still under argument and debate in the academic filed. This study would be part of this debate in a way to bring light on cases that sanctions can be effective, when a group of conditions is available, while they would just raise the suffering of

ordinary people when the sanctions are targeting sectors that can recover by maneuvering moves that are taking by targeted regimes.

1.3 Research question

The central/ main question in this research is; what were the effects of sanctions on the Syrian regime and its behaviors?

In addition, the research would take in consideration some other sub research questions:

1. What is the nature of the Syrian most important international relations?
2. How did the Baath party and the former Syrian president controlled Syria?
3. What are the packages and decisions of sanctions been imposed on Syria?
4. What were the contexts, pretext of the sanctions?
5. What are the levels of the effectiveness of sanctions on the Syrian government?
 - a) Did the sanctions made positive changes regarding political transition?
 - b) Did they lead to any changes regarding human rights violations?
6. What were the effects of sanctions on local communities?

1.4 Arguments

Based on the above research questions, my arguments are:

Sanctions are not able to change regimes, or to bring about hoped positive improvement, when they are imposed on authoritarian regimes.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEREORTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will try to present the history of sanctions and how they did developed through the history, the old one, and later the after the formation of nation states, and international institutions like the League of Nations and the United of nations, providing examples of sanction cases in brief. Later the paper would go through the definition of sanctions as been provided by experts and scholars and in linguistics.

Another part of this chapter is about the types of sanctions, and it illustrates how sanctions are categorized in many ways like comprehensive sanctions, unilateral sanctions and accumulative sanctions, on the other hand, there is differences according to the target sectors in the targeted country or entity, like financial sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, and military sanctions. These previous parts would make the ability to more of discussing attitudes toward sanctions in the next part, and how many scholars presents different perspectives toward sanctions. The last part, which deals with some examples of sanctioned countries in detailed way like, Libya, and Iran. Those two cases are presented since Libya is an example of sanctions success during the 1990s, and the beginning of 3rd millennium, when the Libyan leader decided to cooperate with the international community. The second example is Iran, which very complicated case, since domestic and regional policies of Iranian regime, are intersect with the interests of many countries, and resemble threat to regional security and international peace. The example of Iran is referring to a case of sanctions that is continuing for nearly four decades, with very little positive progress.

2.1 History of Sanctions

Sanctions have been a tool used by rulers against each other throughout the history of humanity. Regarding of the use of sanctions the most of specialists in the human sciences fields are referring to the “Megarian decree” 432 B.C.,

when Sparta, the city-state declared an opponent of the Athenian Empire, was aided by the Megara Empire, Pericles, an orator in Athens, approved a trade embargo between the Athenian Empire and the Megara. In short, it was a declaration of war, the message expressed that Athens will target whoever undermined his authority (Chidiebere, 2016). Before the creation of the nation states, most of the ruling entities used force as a tool to push other parties to implement their demands. However, the period that followed the establishment of national states, and formation of the League of Nations, was a start for humanity to search for answers on how solve problems than engaging into wars. That is where using sanctions marked the 20th century, to answer the question of how to prevent using the force in the international relations was one of the most important topic covered in contemporary international public law. After World War I, the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy began with an announcement by the then U.S. Mr Woodrow Wilson. He proposed to the League of Nations that imposing sanctions would help keep the world war-free. He called sanctions "a peaceful, silent and real solution" (UNOG Registry, 2016). In this context the establishment of the "League of Nations" was significant event, as it was a step forward of the historical development of international organizations. League of Nations tried to work on preventing wars. The idea started with the end of WWI, when winner countries met to discuss the settlement of peace. The project of the "League of Nations" was submitted to the Peace Conference 1919, in Versailles. The treaty consisted 15 parts. "It included in its part principles of relation between states like encouraging positive international relations to create stability and peace at world stage. In addition, it stated the Acknowledgement of commitments not to use war, but by recommending free, equitable and respectful ties among states. Regarding the international law and its obligation, the Covenant emphasized on states to accept certain obligations before resorting to war, or not to resort to it, and reducing armament. Moreover, those international relations to be public and based on justice and honor, and it respects the rules of public international law and respects the obligations established in treaties. Likewise the settlement of international disputes to be by peaceful means and achieving justice. Those countries violating Covenant to be sanctioned." (Law Library of Congress 2014)

The experience of League of Nations is not remembered as an active and alive type of international organization, but it remarks the beginning of the institutionalization of the international relations and its norms, which sanctions is one of them. With the beginning of World War II, it was clear that the League of Nations failed to achieve its primary goal of avoiding any future wars. During the WW II new attempts started to form a new international organization replacing the League of Nations. Those attempts concluded with forming the United Nations, on 21-24 October 1945. (Department of State of U.S). The United Nations had involved more actively in the international disputes, and conflicts by the "Article 24 of its Charter that asserts that the main role of the Council is to preserve international peace in the world, And the 'special powers granted to the SC to fulfill the responsibility can be noted in the Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. Chapter VII is the one relevant to a binding decision requiring all states to adopt certain measures, contain no forcible and permanent measures. "Upon the call of Members of the United Nations to apply such measures not involving the use of armed force "once it has determined "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. (Talmon, 2005)."

UN Sanctions started in 1963. The first sanctions, in 1963 and in 1965, the Security Council voluntarily put on the apartheid systems of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which eventually became compulsory measures, by the resolution 253 on the unrecognized state of Rhodesia, as reaction to the White Minority Regime's Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the UK. However, South Africa's smart sanctions were a reaction to its apartheid system, its territorial military intervention and its acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. During the Cold War, the absence of sanctions was related to the attempt between the Soviet Union, and The U.S.A to achieve a strategic advantage over each other. Which led them to support and cooperate with corrupt and brutal leaders (Shane, 2004). A new age was brought by the end of the Cold War, and a new set of countries faced penalties. In response to its 1990 invasion of Kuwait and its programs to build massive destruction weapons, stringent sanctions were implemented on Iraq from (1990-2003), and during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia (1991- 1996). In addition, comprehensive

sanctions were imposed on Haiti (1993-1994) when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a coup. In the 1990s, United Nations sanctioning regimes proliferated, most often in the form of measurement in the sense of an intrastate wars: Somalia (1992-present), Liberia (1992-2001), Yugoslavia (1993-1996), Angola (1993-2002), Rwanda (1994-2008), Sierra Leone (1997-2010) and Kosovo (1998-2001). Those sanctioned countries suffered from those measures for many reasons internally and externally threats, the repression of freedom and the promotion of terrorism (SC Special Research, 2013). In general freed from its Cold War straitjacket, the UN began to intervene more actively in global policies, including the implementation of financial compulsory measures.

2.2 Definition of Sanctions

To determine the cases and pretexts for using sanctions, a precise definition of sanctions need to be formulated. Since there is no precise definition, most of scholars are depending on analyzing United Nation`s pretexts for sanctions, and from international law books. According to UN, sanctions are defined as actions taken by the Security Council “to maintain or restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Sanctions encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use armed force” (p, 34, Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council). Since the definition is very wide, the search for fair and clear procedures to be taken for the imposition and lifting of sanctions, is still ongoing. As for the European Union the “level of sanctions are not explicitly defined in European law, but they serve a similar purpose in implementing the decisions either of the UN Security Council or the Council of the EU” (European Parliament, 2018). One of the notable definitions is written by Evans 2018, “Penalties are non-forcible precautions, reprisals and retaliatory actions that explicitly continue to occur in foreign affairs. Measures of punishment and deeper coercion than those necessary to force the responsible state to stop its illegal act.” (Galtung 1967) defined them as “initiated by one or more international actors (the 'senders'), against one or more others (the 'receivers'), and with either or both of two purposes: To penalize the recipients by depriving them of certain importance and/or to ensure the recipients cooperate with some requirements deemed

relevant by the addressees. A detailed formal definition (Government Offices of Sweden, 2015), shows sanctions as “Important tools to preserve stability and peace and to foster human rights and democracy. They are restrictive methods, which complement support measures in the fields of international politics and development assistance with the same goals. Sanctions mean 'limitations,' controlling the freedom to act of a State, community or its members They are implemented via a joint decision by other States. It is also done because the international community wants to use possible means to impact government, person or group behavior via different political and financial measures. They can be used to change a country’s policies, which endanger global peace and stability; they can be used to change a country’s policies which endanger global peace and stability; or force a regime to follow those values of democracy. Sanctions vary from other instruments of international relations, in that they are governed by statute. Penalties are supposed to be non-permanent and are periodically evaluated in light of evolutions and progress.

Briefly, international Sanctions are restrictions` instruments used to safeguard peace and security and to promote democracy and human rights, in intention to stop the violation of international law. On the other hand, when they are unilateral sanctions they can be defined as Clifton, Bapat, Kobayashi, explaining them “they are attempt by one country to impose restrictions in sake of changing behavior of a targeted country, in a way that satisfy the sender country

2.3 Types of Sanctions

As has been explained in definitions above, sanctions are measures aiming to force targeted entity, to change its behavior, regarding violating laws and norms. Those measures can differ regarding their severity, and dimensions, according to the type of behavior that intended to be changed. The evaluation and development of sanctioning system was related to the international relations development. During the first half of the 20th Century, sanctions were used in its unilateral form. Starting from the beginning of the fiftieth of 20th Century until the end of Cold war, sanctions started to be one of the main foreign policies used tools especially by the United States. However the quest by both the USSR

and the United States during the Cold War to gain a competitive edge over each other, led to decrease the use of sanctions by UN. As there was the mutual use of veto right in Security Council. During the Cold War UN, sanctioned only two countries, while U.S, used sanctions in 90 cases.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, and the collapse USSR, the UN, had more ability to impose sanctions on states, which were violating international law. Sanctions were deployed on occasions to force a target country to withdraw its troops from border clashes, or to abandon plans of territorial conquest. During the period of one decade after the collapse of USSR, United Nations sanctioned about 10 countries. The nature of UN sanctions until the mid-1990s, were comprehensive, this was the case for Iraq, Haiti and Yugoslavia. In general, the last decade of the 20th century was crucial regarding the evolution of sanctioning system in UNSC. However, especially after the experience of Iraq, most sanctions changed to be targeted ones, and their logic is to maximize the impact on the responsible individuals (in other words, the elite) in the country concerned, while minimizing humanitarian consequences for the innocent population. Regarding the transformation of UN, sanctions from *comprehensive type, to targeted* ones, there were two major factors prompted this shift. First, sanctions had gained negative reputation internationally because of their humanitarian consequences on Iraq, and Rwanda for the hurt they caused to innocent civilians more than the elites had. Second, sanctions against states seemed not only to be ineffective in changing regimes, but also entrenched groups in power, which were intended to be weakened (Giumelli, 2015). In short: Comprehensive sanctions: is to employ extensive trade embargoes against the target of sanctions and involve wide-sweeping bans on trade, diplomatic relations, and or other relationships between target and sender. On the other hand, Targeted or list-based sanctions: are sanctions impose on specific items or restrictions on a person or on groups of specific people, entities of a country or region, or sectorial ones when they target a specific industry of a country or region. (Association of Certified Sanctions Specialists).

Another classification of sanctions is regarding their senders, if it is by one country it would be named unilateral sanctions, which is defined according to (Jennifer A, Carol T. Robert A.1998), as. “any unilateral restriction or measures

on economic activity with respect to a foreign country or foreign entity, that is imposed by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security.” The other type is; multilateral or collective sanctions, which refer to sanction been imposed by multiple countries or international organizations trying to lead to more economic damage, and isolation of the targeted entity from the global economic and political forces (Peksen & Drury ,2010).

To summarize classifications mentioned above, we do have in general two types sanctions in regard of the sending party; they can be either unilateral sanctions, which means only one country is imposing them, or it can be multilateral sanctions, when a group of countries or international organization is the one who imposed them. Regarding the dimension of sanctions, we also do have two types of sanctions, the first is comprehensive sanctions, which means the entire structure of the targeted entity is sanctioned, or they can be targeted sanctions/smart sanctions, which refers to sanction that, are in goal of restricting specific institutions or peoples of a country or entities.

Despite that sanctions in the international relations is being a topic that takes a large part of the discussion in the scholarly arena; it is still characterized with a continuation of the debate about it, especially with the occurrence of new sanctions cases. Discussions are still did not reach to conclusion about the degree of its positive impact in terms of its effects on targeted countries to change their behaviors. The evolution sanctions took place more after the consequences of the Iraqi example, for the great damage they caused to the Iraqi people; some reports are referring to 1.5 million died as result of bad livelihood conditions. The catastrophe of Iraq led the United Nations and the Security Council to adopt new system of sanctions, which is targeted or smart sanctions policy. Targeted sanctions are “commonly used types of sanctions, (1) export sanctions, (2) import sanctions, (3) financial sanctions, (4) movement sanctions, (5) Diplomatic Sanctions. They may progress in a way that targeting specific people within a system”. These sanctions are sometimes used alone, but more often in combination. And they are used for many reasons the main ones of which are: conflict resolution, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, democratization and the protection of civilians including human rights (Hufbauer et al 2008).

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2.4 Attitudes toward Sanctions

Hufbauer et al. (2009), are among scholars who have written one of the most comprehensive books about sanctions titled “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”, and known as HSE data’s short of Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, who considered sanctions as one of tools for enforcing targeted government to behave according the international law. They do recommend the use of sanctions as a tool to stop states violets international law, by saying “even if the sanctions made little or no contribution by this test, that does not mean it was a mistake to impose them. It only means that, in similar episodes, presidents and publics should not count on sanctions alone to achieve the declared objectives” hufbauer et al. 2009, this statement makes imposing sanctions as experimental tool, even though its humanitarian impacts are catastrophic in many cases. However, one of their findings is that great powers, especially the U.S, have used sanctions to assert their leadership for worlds` affairs, and to prove that they have the power to influence events on global scale. Moreover, U.S also used sanctions for the terms of preserving “the loss of confidence both at home and abroad in the ability or willingness of the United States to act” (HSE, p5). Even if chances of changing the target country’s behavior is not for sure, U.S sanctions were used country’s leaders to answer domestic outrage, giving the example of sanctions against Burma. Motivations of internal politics are shared by other scholars, who have been referenced in HSE’s book, like the one is belonging to “(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1989), who argue that sanctions against South Africa reflected protectionist pressure from interest groups rather

than the goal supposed to be after imposing sanctions of making economic damage. In contrast, they provide another opinion for (Drezner 1999), who refuse the perspective of explaining sanctions on basics of domestic forces as motivations and inspirations for sanctions. Drezner argues that sanctions have been one of foreign policy purposive means, which are used when there are important interests for U.S, in the outcomes. Concerning legality of sanctions, the authors did not explore the legal issue of sanctions from international law perspective.

As for the effectiveness of sanctions, “HSE” explain them in three points; *first*, with limited success, when compelling to sanctions may cost the political and security of targeted country more than if they decided to resist the, then it would be limited in achieving its goals. *Second*, sanction failed, which their main goal was not to achieve real changes in a target country’s behaviors, giving the example of U.S sanctions on China after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, economic sanctions was lifted very fast, and the international isolation was ended. *Third*, sanctions sometimes fail because sender countries have different and conflicted advantages and goals, regarding their relations with the targeted country, in the same sender country or countries, when financial and investment, or security interests go through conflicts, many sanction episodes fail to achieve their goals. Cases of the European position toward U.S sanctions on Iran and Russia.

The research is reaching conclusion that about 34% of sanctions are at “least partially successful”, it means that real success is very lower than this percentage. When we take in considerations that most of attempts to stop military adventures were not successful, also it was not successful to prevent countries like; Argentina, Pakistan, India, and South Africa from becoming nuclear powers, successes were more with very weak countries, or countries that have to some degree democratic system. The failure of sanctions was for many reasons like; sometimes degree of sanctions imposed were not enough, or the goals were either too hard to reach, or too gentle, moreover sanctions may unify the target country. In addition, wealthy allies of the target country may take the role of penetrating sanctions in a way make them useless, like the case U.S sanctions against Cuba and Soviet Union sanctions against Yugoslavia. The

book concludes with some main factors that determine the fate of sanctions: 1_ the wanted goals` limits. 2_ the damage and coast of measures on the targeted country. 3_ the degree of system`s democracy in the targeted country. 4_ the relation between the country imposing sanctions and its allies, and its previous relation with the targeted country. 5_ the situation of the targeted country in its region. 6_ the location of the targeted country. 7_ targeted countries, which are economically strong enough, and having kind of political stability are more able to resist sanctions.

Gottemoeller from his side is highlighting some important changes in the concept of Sanctions. She starts from the changes that toke place regarding sanctions from the Iraqi experience, she states as many other writhers that sanctions against Iraq helped to end Iraqi nuclear and biological weapons and program. However, it did fail regarding its bad humanitarian impacts, and they did fail in toppling the Iraqi governing party and elite, or to change its behaviors regarding human rights violations. Again, the Iraqi experience is what driven the international powers to work more on developing smart sanctions, which based more on U.S dominance on worlds` economy and finance industries. Another idea is being pointed in the paper is about the system of the countries being targeted, and is considered to play important role in the success of sanctions, like the case of South Africa when sanctions did succeed because the nature of the regime and the liberation struggle of black people. Contrary sanctions fail especially when they are comprehensive, and directed against authoritarian regimes, moreover they do harm vulnerable people, women, and children, rather than the political elite. That failure is what pushed U.S and the international community to use Smart sanctions, more often after 2001. USA Patriot Act, which “contains a specific section addressing the financing of terrorist acts”. The Patriot Act was developed after 11 September attacks, as result of the work of the White House and Congress to track and get at Bin Laden`s sources of wealth. Another example of sanctions success was the case of Libyan case when the later gave-up its nuclear, chemical and biological-weapons program, and even handed its citizens for trial by international tribunal in the “Pan Am Flight 103” bombing. Libya was dropped from the renewal of sanctions in 2006. However, sanctions did not affect to change the behavior of

the governing elite and the human right situation. The research is emphasizing on the role of international cooperation by presenting the case of North Korea's assets which were frozen by U.S sanctions and was joined by UN's sanctions on North Korea after its nuclear test. The combined sanctions led to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, and on 13 February 2007, reached to agreement, North Korea asked to release its assets. According to (Dottemoeller, 2007), the request was achieved by a cooperation between the U.S and Russian banks and administrations.

Another comprehensive work like (HES datas) is the work of Bapat & Morgan (2009), which known as (TIES 4.0) data. In their work, they had examined "888" cases of imposing sanctions. Comparing the multilateral and unilateral sanctions, they found that "based on spatial models, it depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved or not". "Institutions could sufficiently deter free riding; imposing multilateral sanctions through international institutions could produce more coercive power and increase the likelihood of sanctions success". The notion of high cost is presented, since many targeted countries are refusing to cooperate with sender countries, when their costs are highly valued. To search for the right answers for which type of sanctions having more potential to force targeted countries to change their behavior. They used three theoretical arguments; the first is the Selection Effects; which argue that if sanctions are imposed multilaterally on issues are very high valued, targets would be less willing to cooperate. The second approach is the Public Good ones, which concentrate on the idea of the breaking the chain or decision of sanctions by some members of the sender countries, which minimize the costs that target state, supposed to pay. The third argument based on the "Spatial Theory of Sanctions", which suggest that the coalition of senders would suffer regarding the constant and consistent set of demands when they are many.

Bapat & Morgan, do examine their TIES data, according to three explanations; Selection Effects, Public Good, and the Spatial Model, and they found contrary to "HSE" and other previous theoretical and empirical works that multilateral sanctions are increasing the likelihood of sanction's success. Also, their findings are contrary to what been argued regarding the Public Good

explanation, which means that sanctions not necessarily generating free ride from the side of some participants. Moreover, they found that their study is unified with other work's empirical findings, which suggest the promise of Spatial Model. "TIES" reached many findings on how sanctions may success, like the case with the senders who can eliminate their incentives to break from cooperation either to focus the coalition on one subject, or to transfer the case to an international institution, since the involvement of International Institutions would rise chances of the success of sanctions. On the other hand plenty of goals may push sanctions to failure, so there is need to limit goals to that are expected to rise chances of sanction's success. Among those reasons that is obstacle in sanctioning process is the absence of coordination on high levels between the sender's administrations and institutions, so the presence of an institution organizing the coalition of senders is sustaining the process. One of the findings also is the sender's ability to use some demands as carrot for the target country, like easing some sanctions. Comparing the two studies TIES and HES, they reached to different rate of success cases HSE had reached to 34% of success, as for TIES it was less and reached 23%.

Scholars have no unified ideas or opinions concerning the type of sanctions can be used, so in time some says that sanctions are not effective, others asserting the opposite, also when some are promoting for multilateral sanctions, others stress on the unilateral sanctions, to stop the free rides some participants may do. In addition, many see them not effective at all and others do argue the opposite. From the camp of who opposing the success of sanctions is (Savey 2014), who criticize compressive unilateral sanctions that imposed by United States, on Myanmar, and as a foreign policy tool in general. In his article, he is taking position among those scholars who criticize comprehensive sanctions for their humanitarian and political consequences. The article is rising the issue of the period of military government years of control. How much longer those type of government keep in ruling for more years, it will be harder to affect their position by sanction. Those kind of regimes are stabilizing and insuring their tighten grip on all sources of the country, enlarging their sufficient means to control national incomes, and making relations with other countries, which lead to the sufferance of civilians and more suppress to people.

Savey is in support of U.S moves toward easing sanctions on Myanmar after 2012, seeing it as a step removing some of the effect on civilians, and opening the door for a “Carrot and stick policy”, after some reforms in the political life made in Myanmar by the ruling military officers, like releasing some political prisoners. What is missing regarding the reforming process from Savey paper is, he really did not highlighted the real change in Myanmar policies. However he considered releasing some prisoners like “Aung San Suu Kyi the first and incumbent State Counsellor of Myanmar”, as a real change movement toward democracy in Myanmar, in time where Suu Kyi herself was criticized for her silent toward the massacres toke place against the Muslim minority in her country. In this regard, she denied human right violations against the Rohingya minority to be ones of special targeting nature or ethnic cleansing. (BBC, 2013), but it is mutual one. Yet before and after U.S eased sanctions against Myanmar reports from International organizations about bad human right situation and massacres continued. However, United States went back to use its sanctions package, but more depended on smart sanctions or what as. Savey called them “Constructive Engagement”, which means using sanctions that target specific individuals, rather than the entire country, whom usually are personals from the military. In the paper, Savey is highlighting other topics that related to sanctioning circle, like the complex situation of sanctions laws between U.S federal government and states` governments added to it the European Union laws. In addition, he rose the issue of the damage that is causing to U.S relations with its allies, since allied countries may have different approach toward the case of sanctioning specific country, this situation happened frequently regarding U.S sanctions against Libya, Iran.

In his economical recommendation, Savey advocates that “instead of isolating an entire country”, there should be more investments to improve conditions of the target country, in many aspects like the infrastructure, protecting the environment, creating more employment chances, on the other hand sanctions should be proceeded on those institutions and certain individuals who are involved in human rights violations. What can be seen absent from this paper is regarding examples of cases succeeded by “Constructive Engagement”, since Myanmar cannot be considered successful example. The other point is how to

proceed this process of targeting and can be affective, since those influential individuals who are violating human rights can maneuver sanctions through other states and through shadow people who are running their interests.

2.5 Models of Sanctioned Countries

The list of countries sanctioned by the UN, for now contains 12 states since it is hard for the states in the Security Council to agree on sanctioning another state. However on the other hand and as for the U.S, and EU they are the most senders of sanctions the list is bigger, and contains dozens of countries are sanctioned in different levels as for senders or targeted countries. The reasons of choosing Iran, and Libya, among many are, the two countries are oil productive ones. They differ in size, nature, and ethnicity diverging. In addition, both countries have interfered in regional disputes. The differences of their political system, Iran has theoretical system, on the other hand Gadhafi was nationalistic dictator. Moreover, both countries tried to acquire WMD. Beside some other differences and similarities, encouraged me to present them as examples for what we may call a partly success of sanctions in the Libyan case, and an ongoing failure in represented with sanctions on Iran.

2.5.1 Iran Case

The Iranian relation with western world was not forever in tension like it is now, but it has seen many up-downs during the past century. Houghton In his, review for three books regarding the “U.S–Iranian Relations, Future and Past”, is discussing this relation starting from the “D’Arcy oil concession of 1901”. Between the Shah of Persia and William Knox D’Arcy”, the Iranian oil was granted for Britain and later U.S replaced as dominance on the production of the country, which led to the rise of Mohammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh appointed as Prime Minister in 1950. His administration introduced sweeping social and political reforms such as social security, rental regulation, and land reclamation. Nevertheless, nationalizing the Iranian oil production remains the most prominent point in the policy of his government, as it was controlled by the Britain. His decisions to nationalize the oil companies caused his overthrow in a coup against him on August 19, 1953, after holding a fraudulent referendum to

dissolve Parliament, in operation led by the CIA and MI6. “Mossadegh was succeeded by Iran's Shah, but more and more the Shah was seen as serving the U.S. by the 1970s. He depended increasingly on coercion instead of endorsement, and eventually fled from Iran in 1979” (Houghton, D2014).

Starting from the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi period Iran had a nuclear capabilities acquiring dream. The US and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957, as the Shah Mohammad Reza had ambition to turn Iran into a powerful state. Under the Shah rule, Iranian nuclear program proceeded in two parallel directions to achieve its objectives: The first: is to build the foundations for Iran's national infrastructure and organizational structure in the nuclear field. The second: expanding cooperation with the foreign countries in the nuclear fields, in order to obtain advanced knowledge. After long rounds of negotiations, Iran and U.S, reached a final nuclear agreement in the first half of 1978. Though the Iranian Islamic Revolution happened IN 1979 and overthrown the Shah, and an area of hostile relations with U.S, did started. U.S, Department of State designated Iran as a state sponsoring terrorism in 1984, and the nuclear program became a generator of sanctions on Iran. During 1990s and on, U.S put sanctions on Iranian Nonproliferation program. In 2002 when the international reports about Iranian efforts to gain nuclear power, witnessed many U.S sanctions especially in regarding Ballistic missiles and technology concerning sanctions of military capabilities. After 2002, again the sanctions had increased, as Iran program was uncovered, after this data the regional and in specific, the Israeli national security was one of the main reason either to sanction Iran, or to go through negotiation process to stop the program on the limits of peaceful uses (Patrikarakos, D, 2012). The turning point happened in 2007, as sanctions toke moved to another stage after Iran started to suffer sanctions from UNSC, in respond Iran's failure to comply with its demand to suspend uranium enrichment, and adopts Resolution 1747. Those international sanctions were tightened more by the resolution 1929. The EU was late in sanctioning Iran from its ally the U.S and started in 2010, by sanctioning “Iranian officials and some companies and sectors directly involved in Iran's nuclear program and other areas. It was only 2010 when U.S, started sanctions on Iran regarding the Human Rights Abuses by the Iranian government. Beside those sanctions, U.S

had a set of sanction on Iranian Bank, and countries that dealing with Iran importing prohibited materials, EU joined the U.S in banning importation of Iran`s oil in 2012, after U.S pressure was made.

Those packages of sanctions pushed Iran to negotiate with the Worlds Super powers, that joined in the P5+1, —the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany— and they reached an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal was signed on 18 October 2015. Iran agreed to take measures to limit its nuke program in exchange for a major relaxing of penalties from the US, the UN and the EU. The SC adopted legislation 2231 advocating the nuclear deal, and lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran once conditions outlined in the deal are met. In 2016, The US lifted nuclear-related secondary sanctions on Iran, but kept “primary” sanctions. Exceptions were made for Boeing and Airbus passenger planes and foreign subsidiaries of US multinational companies. However, U.S made some waivers of sanctions during the after 2015. The deal started to face obstacles even though the U.S administration renewed sanctions waivers, and certified Iran`s compliance with the JCPOA, but After Donald Trump came presidency in 2017, he declared that he would not certify the deal if the Congress did not resolve his concerns about the deal, and he did his threat on May 2018. Even though The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during monitoring Iran`s nuclear facilities has verified that Tehran`s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. In addition, the agency has also verified that Iran`s compliance with the JCPOA. However, the American president withdrawn from the agreement and described it as disaster, after pressure from Israel and its lobby in U.S. A new area of very harsh sanctions imposed by U.S, started, opposite to calls of the other four countries of JCPOA refused Trump decision, U.S, administration started to sanction Iran with more harsh series of measures. (Patrikarakos, d, 2012).

Since the Iranian-Israel hostile relations, is one of the main dynamics behind sanctioning Iran, it can explained by heightening why Israel is seeing Iran`s regime and its military capabilities as threaten to its existence. This categorization did not came from nothing. The leaders of the Islamic Iranian republic made it clear on many occasions, that their holiest work and goal is to

liberate Quds mosque and Palestine from the Israeli occupation, more over they went to show their willing and desire of annihilating the Israeli existence. For example, the previous Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made statement on April 2006, in which he said that "Jerusalem Cause", which includes annihilating Israel in one storm", also on June 2018, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reaffirmed Tehran's long-held position that Israel is "a malignant cancerous tumor that must be removed and eradicated." This kind of statement are told by most of Iranian leader, as we can see it also in what the commander of IRGC Major General Hossein Salami had said on Sept. 21, 2019, " This threatening regime should be erased from the world and that's no longer, A wish (but) that is an attainable purpose,".

The Iranian-Israel and U.S hostile relations is also resembled in some activities and announcements of the Iranian army of non-state actors across the region: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, and Afghanistan. The number of those Shia militias is about 20 in Iraq, and their elements are approximately 100 thousands, and about 15 friction in Syria with approximately 20 thousand element. In addition, in Lebanon there is Hezbollah, which the U.S. State Department estimates that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of members. As for Palestine and even though the Palestinian frictions support comes from some Arab countries. However, for long time Iran was one of the main source of aid they get from abroad especially Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Supporting Houthis in Yemen, the Houthis had a total of 100,000–120,000 followers, including both armed fighters and unarmed loyalists. Besides supporting Armed Non-State Actors in many regional countries, Iran has sub-economy in the same countries that providing economic assistance to Iran, and provide those armed frictions.

Military spending are damaged, as most reports and researches are agreeing on the fact that sanctions are affecting the Iranian financial system and military purchases; also, they are effecting the level of service that the government is able to offer, or the health situation, the trade with the world. The most important factor here is the Iranian military spending's, in this regard Iran`s spending on military reached its peak in 2006, and after that it dropped to nearly

30% between 2006 and 2015, another wave of decreasing was in after 2012, when Iran faced new wave of sanctions.

The year 2015-marked new period for the Iranian arming finance, since most of sanctions were removed after the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 5+1 group. After removing sanctions Iran`s military budget increased about 25%, until 2018, when U.S pulled out of the nuclear agreement and returned to sanction policy, again the military spending witnessed about 9% decrease, to reach 13.2 billion dollars. Since Iran is facing unilateral and multilateral sanctions beside the sanctions are imposed from the Security Council, most of its weapon porches are being done with Russia, for example in 2014 96% of Iran`s arms import was from Russia the rest were from China. However, Iran is capable of developing many kinds of weapons like ballistic missiles, and drones/unmanned aerial vehicles, and others. Even though Iran`s economy was damaged in disastrous way, and its military budget was decreased significantly, but the Iranian revolutionary expending policies in the region did not change.

Human Rights Watch in one of its latest reports on Iran after U.S lunched new packages against the country found that the “current economic sanctions, despite the humanitarian exemptions, are causing unnecessary suffering to Iranian citizens afflicted with a range of diseases and medical conditions”. The report makes recommendations for: to the US Government, Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, State Department, Congress, the European Union and Member States, Were about clarifying for companies and banks that they will not face legal actions, if they were dealing in sectors of humanitarian goods, and issuing clear guidance regarding protection of humanitarian trade with Iran. Forming mechanism and encouraging other states to manage the flow of humanitarian goods, also initiating diplomatic efforts, including direct talks with Iran, in addition authorizing a financial channel for humanitarian trade, and conducting studies on the impact of the economic sanctions on the humanitarian situation in Iran. Lastly Passing legislations that obligating U.S institutions to exclude from humanitarian finances. As for the Iranian government the report made some recommendations regarding; giving the prioritize for importing medical materials, facing the corruption and misuse of public resources, and taking the possible initiatives to negotiate with other

states on issues like counterterrorism and financial transparency, also asked for more access of international organizations to Iran.

Even though U.S sanctions has some exception for medical and humanitarian aid, but most of international banks and companies do not want to engage with Iran, moreover, such broad and expensive sanctions are effecting the access of people to all needs. U.S, officials are very sever in their statements regarding communicating or trading with Iran, this type of statements close the door for those entities are supposed to be allowed to communicate with Iran.

However, even though now Iran is one of the most sanctioned countries on the list of U.S, and the Security Council, but until now beside the devastating effects they made on the Iranian life style and the livelihoods of people inside Iran. they could not achieve the desired goals, not regarding United States goals concerning Iran`s nuclear program, nor the Iranian revolutionary policies in the region, for several reasons;

- The nature of war that Iran is running in the region, which is through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, one of the Iranian armed forces branch that was established after the revolution 1979 by an order of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is supposed to protect the Islamic Republic system at home and abroad. Iran is using IRGC, to support a huge group of non-state actors in several regional countries: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Despite renewed U.S. sanctions against Iran and its economic woes have not contributed to decline Ira`s activism in the region at least not yet.
- The axes policy in the region Saudi Arabia, against Iran; from the beginning of the regime change took place in Iran, and its adaptation of exporting the revolution to other Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia and some other Arab countries started their own counter policy.
- The nature of war that Iran is running in the region, which except of the war with Iraq from Sep 22, 1980 – until Aug 20, 1988, is through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is a branch of the Iranian armed forces that was established after the revolution of 22 April 1979 by an order of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Revolutionary Guards

(Basdaran) supposed to protect the Islamic Republic system at home and abroad. It has naval, air and land forces, and. Iran, through the Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force; Iran is supporting a huge number of non-state actors in many neighboring and regional countries: Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria. “Tehran extend her influence in the Middle East through the use of armed groups and political partners, this happens despite renewed U.S. sanctions against Iran, and U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Iran’s economic crisis have not success in declining its involvement in the region—at least not until now. If anything, Iranian leaders appear just as committed as ever to engagement across the Middle East using irregular methods. According to data collected and analyzed in this brief, there has been an increase in the overall size and capability of foreign forces that are partnered with the (IRGC-QF), Iran’s paramilitary organization which responsible for foreign operations, directly and through IRGC-QF’s partners. Iran is also attempting to establish land corridors across the region and increase its ability to move fighters and material from one theater to another” (Jones S, 2019).

- Another factor which is important regarding the ability of Iranian authorities to advocate its revolutionary policies was the; U.S war policy in the region, which always keeps a security vacuum, and is used by Iran either directly or indirectly, by supporting non-state actors in those countries are suffering from chaotic situation, like Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan.
- The wobbling and hesitant stand of the European Union, not all European countries are in full support of the sanction policy toward Iran, it was only after 2002, when United States and EU position toward Iran get closer, based reports about Iran’s` extending her capacity of enriching uranium. Previously, European and other countries appeared less concerned than the US about Iranian policies and were reluctant to sanction Iran. After the passage of Resolution 1929 (June 2010), EU sanctions on Iran became nearly as extensive as those of the United States as discussed below, after JCPOA, comprehensive agreement was

signed in 2015, virtually all EU sanctions were lifted on Implementation day, including the ban on oil imports from Iran, which was imposed on July 1, 2012. The EU preserves an embargo on sales to Iran of arms, missile technology, other proliferation-sensitive items, and gear for internal repression. The EU lifted

- The bypass given to Iran, by Russia, United Arab Emirates, and China in specific, are one of the main reasons that Iran is able to bear sanctions, the two permanent members of the U.N. SC, generally have enacted only those sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions.
- The international scene returned to more activity regarding Iran in March 2018, with the withdrawal of the United States of America from the nuclear agreement, and the return to the pressure policy on the Iranian regime in a severe way. The sanctions packages approached to the stage of close to imposing comprehensive type of sanctions. They directly targeted several sectors. Although the oil sector is a leading one in the Iranian budget, but the Iranian economy is varied one, which the United States is trying to reduce its effectiveness through diversifying the sanctions, to include nearly all Iranian exportations, and importations. For now, Iran is under sanctions from two directions; the first one is international sanctions coming from the Security Council, which are imposed for the sake of stopping the Iranian nuclear program, and ballistic missile. The second are sanctions imposed from U.S and, they are circled about the nuclear program, and the Iranian revolutionary, and security interventions in the region.

2.5.2 Libyan Case

Before its independence Libya in 1951, Libya was a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1711 until 1835, and under Italian occupation from 1912 to 1942, then the British and French occupation from 1943 until 1951 when it gained its independence. As for its relations with U.S it goes back to the Tripolitan government formally recognition of U.S. independence by signing of a peace treaty in Tripoli on November 4, 1796. As for the modern Libya, the United States recognized the United Kingdom of Libya on December 24, 1951. The U.S

Legation in Libya was raised to Embassy status, on September 1954, but after 1980, the U.S. Embassy at Tripoli was closed. Again On May 31, 2006, the United States resumed full diplomatic relations with Libya.

U.S relation with Libya was positive from the latter's independence in 1951 until the first years of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi's rule. Gadhafi led On September 1, 1969, a bloodless takeover involving a squad of revolutionary men, still at that time the U.S had an armed existence at Libya's Wheelus Air Force Base until 1971, and the base was "a vital link in Strategic Air Command (SAC) war plans for the use as a bomber, tanker-refueling and recon-fighter base". In exchange for the use of the airfield, deprived Libyans got an annual average of 2 million in excess of other resources previously offered by the U.S. From 1959 to 1986, the period when Libya became an oil exporter, U.S. oil companies such as ESSO made substantial incomes, but Libyans as a whole did not benefit from the new prosperity of the country.

Due to Gadhafi's opposition to international communism, particularly "Soviet imperialism," the shift of government was of little importance to the U.S. The first few years of Gadhafi's rule of control provided every excuse for Americans to be hopeful for the future of US-Libyan ties. However, as Gadhafi's son, Saif Aleslam Gadhafi, pointed out in 2003, "Trouble started when under Gadhafi's leadership, the new government, tried to claim national political sovereignty, and removed the US military bases from our territory." However the fact is that the loss of the Wheelus base in September 1971 was negligible, because of the production of nuclear weapons, bomber bases have become less important. The U.S. was much more focused on Libya's oil and the profitable incomes it brought to U.S. businesses than in a bases that were essentially redundant. The hopefulness that U.S. officials showed towards the Libyan government, however, soon vanished, and relations deteriorated for the next three decades.

While several American officials deny this interpretation, Libya's supposed support for terrorism has less to do with the root of the aggressive ties between the two countries than with other more basic differences about Libya's management of its natural resources, like, Gadhafi's decision to partially nationalize the country's oil wealth in the 1970s. While U.S. oil companies gradually settled their disputes with Libya, until they normalized relations in

2004-05, tension between the two countries continued. The dispute ranged from Libya's help to Palestinian resistance groups, and to its powerful political and military links with the former Soviet Union. American political leaders regarded Libya as a -Soviet satellite- and Gadhafi as a Soviet marionette, definitions that made every state an adversary of the United States at the height of the Cold War, with all the costs arising from such position. Ideological contradictions were such that the Libyan president sponsored regimes and national liberation movements on Washington's black list almost always, while the United States did whatever it could to undermine the Libyan government.

While the 1980s were marked by an extreme hostility that resulted in direct attacks by the United States — the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi being the prime example — the Lockerbie affair and issues of terrorism dominated U.S. policy toward Libya. The Lockerbie bombing on December 21, 1988, was seen as Libyan retaliation for U.S. air strikes on Libya in April 1986. On September 19, 1989, a year later, both the French and the British, who had carried out separate inquiries, also blamed Libya for the explosion of a French UTA 772 airplane over Niger. The UTA case was obviously planned by agents from Libya. Nevertheless, while the three-year Lockerbie operation investigation pointed the finger at the Libyans, Even after the imprisonment of two Libyans by a Scottish court in 1999, the situation was still more contentious. Apparently, there exist documents that demonstrate the involvement in the bombing of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, led by Ahmed Jibril.

The relation of Libya and U.S and later with the wide range states of the international community were most of the time hostile after Gadhafi took the control of the country with military coup. The period from 1970 -1982, was marked with many motivations for U.S for sanctioning Libya, the first one was actions were when Gadhafi started nationalizing Oil companies, the process of nationalizing foreign companies target a broad list of them;

Table 1.1: Gadhafi`s steps toward nationalizing foreign oil companies

On March 5, 1970	a law was issued regarding nationalizing the Libyan National Oil Corporation
On 4 July 1970	A decision was issued to limit the activity of importing and distributing oil products only to the Libyan National Oil Corporation.
On April 2, 1972	A declaration was made to rise the price of Libyan crude and investigating the tax due for years (65-1970).
On December 7, 1971	The British company, BP, was nationalized
On December 4, 1972	Colonel Muammar Gadhafi ; “We see Iraqi oil today being looted, and subject to a joint international, eastern and western plot”
On June 11, 1973	Nationalizing shares of the Bunkerhant Oil Company in Libya
On December 23, 1973	Gadhafi made an appeal to the Arab states to cut oil from America
On February 11, 1974	Libya nationalized the Texaco Overseas Oil Company and the Asian Oil Company
On March 30, 1974	The American company (Shell) was nationalized.
On December 2, 1974	The Revolutionary Command Council issued a law approving a compensation for the British Petroleum Company (BP) for all its oil activity in Libya.

Source: (Africa Gate News, 2019)

Colonel Gadhafi and the RCC (Libyan Revolutionary Command Council) focused intensely in their early years in power on taking steps to safeguard “national independence” and consolidate their rule through populist and nationalist political and economic programs. The members of the RCC were determined to secure the immediate and full pulling out of British and U.S. forces from military headquarters in Libya, which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970, correspondingly. Italian expatriates were expelled and their assets were seized on October 7, 1970. Gaining full independence according to Gadhafi was through two main steps; nationalizing oil companies, and expelling

the foreign forces from Libya. Those two-steps were the first motives for sanctioning Libya. Beside Gadhafi was the first Arab leader who used oil as weapon against the United States during the Syrian- Israel war in 1973. The list of main sanctions on Libya can be summarized as;

Table 1.2: U.S measurements on Libya

Year	Case
1972	United States recalled its ambassador.
1970s	Export controls on military and civil aircraft were imposed
1979	U.S. embassy staff members were withdrawn from Tripoli after a mob attacked and set fire to the embassy
1979	The U.S. Government designated Libya a "state sponsor of terrorism".
1986-2004	Banning all U.S.-Libya trade, including oil imports
(1986-2004	U.S frozen assets of the Libyan government and affiliated individuals and entities
1992-2004	Prohibiting U.S. airline flights to Libya
from 1996 to 2006	Legislation known as the 1996 Iran - Libya Sanctions Act allowed sanctions against companies doing business with or in Libya.
1992	The UN adopted the resolution 731. Security Council suspended the sanctions after Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, and Lamin Fhima, were handed over for trial in 1999.
2003	United Nations abolished them last in 2003 after Libya agreed to compensate the families of the Lockerbie victims as well as those of the 1989 bombing of a French airliner over Niger.

Source: (Bangura A, 2014, & United Nations Security Council, Resolution 731)

The oil nationalization was not the only factor that deteriorated the poor relationship between Libya and many countries around the world, the revolutionary policy of Muammar Gadhafi was based on direct targeting of the interests and citizens of the countries that he saw as his targets. Many examples can be listed in regarding Gadhafi `s violet operations around the world, in 1971

Gadhafi warned that if France opposes Libyan armed occupation of Chad, he will use all means in the war against France counting the "revolutionary weapon". Gadhafi was also a major Black September Movement financier who carried out the Munich massacre, at the 1972 Summer Olympics, The USA accused him of being the organizer, and for direct control of the 1986 Berlin nightclub blasting. It killed three people and injured more than 200, a large number of whom were US soldiers. He became widely recognized as the primary funder of international terrorism in the mid-1980s. In addition, Gadhafi was accused of offering logistics for the Irish Republican Army in 1973, when the Irish Naval Service seized the vessel Claudia in Irish territorial waters; the vessel carried Soviet arms from Libya to the IRA.

Another particularly pointed source of tension between the U.S and Gadhafi: was Libya's foreign relations toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in this regard and On 11 June 1972, Gadhafi declared that any Arab who wishes to serve for Palestinian organizations can apply for any Libyan consulate, will be offered suitable training for combat". Gadhafi opened many training camps for Palestinian groups, In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials refer to the reality of training camps in Libya and other Libyan government support for a list "of terrorist groups", including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Republican Army. Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War period and the 1990s, advocating armed struggle as the only possible means to end Israel's occupation of territory it seized from neighboring Arab countries in 1967, and Gadhafi and his security services until the late 1990s, provided funding, preparation, and safe harbor for Palestinian rebel factions.

The other file on Libya tension with the international community was the nuclear program, since despite Libya has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Muammar al Gadhafi made quite a few attempts to gain nuclear technology of weapons and associated support, he made requests from China to get nuclear weapons, Gadhafi also tried to acquire military nuclear technology from the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina. In addition, he made any statements to Arab countries to obtain their own nuclear

weapons capability. In 1979, Libya built a research reactor with Soviet help, and started many rounds of talks with Soviets and French to build larger nuclear facilities but they did not end with success. On the other hand, Libya's chemical weapons program was more advanced than its nuclear weapons development activities. In 1999, Libyan officials offered a deal to the Clinton Administration to dismantle Libya's chemical weapons programs in exchange for ending of U.S. sanctions. The offer was not accepted in an effort to continue burden on Libya to fulfil with United States' and U.N requirements regarding (Pan Am Flight 103) bombing case. Following the Lockerbie agreement, Libya re-engaged with United States and Britain negotiations in March 2003 regarding Libya's weapons of WMD. On December 19, 2003, Libyan foreign Minister made a statement announcing the government's decision to dismantle its WMD and Ballistic missile programs. Observers had attributed Libya's decision to end its detection of WMD to a number of reasons; like the U.S. military action in Iraq in 2003, which may showed Libya the resolve of the Bush Administration to eliminate perceived threats to U.S. From their side Libyan officials have considered the decision as a well to return Libya's relations with the international community and improve its security and economy. In addition, the decision was a considered as a move intended to finish the international sanctions that were restraining its economic activity. Later and on October 2005, all materials and mechanisms associated with Libya's nuclear weapons development program were removed and all related activities were stopped. Moreover, a period of cooperation regarding peaceful nuclear energy and materials development process was active between Libya, U.S, French and Russia.

A transformation of the type of sanctions on Libya from unilateral ones to international sanctions was the case of "Pan Am Flight 103". On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am flight 103 route from London to New York on sky of Lockerbie, Scotland, 270 people were killed. On November 14, 1991, the U.S and Scotland indicted two Libyan intelligence agents for their alleged role in the bombing: Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah. After direct request from Libya to hand over the two suspects failed. U.S, UK, and France started international process against Libya and on 21

January 1992, UN Security Council Resolution adopted 731. Which expressed fears of terrorist acts in which states are involved in, and indicated the involvement of Libyan government officials in those acts. Later on 31 March 1992, The Security Council passed Resolution 748 and expressed the need for Libya to comply with the requests of the three countries (U.S, UK, and France). The Resolution also imposed sanctions on flights from and to Libya. Restrictions on reaching weapons, and demands that it reduce the size of diplomatic missions abroad. Again, on 11 November 1992, The SC passed Resolution 883 extending sanctions to include a partial freeze on Libyan public funds and a ban on industrial petroleum equipment.

The beginning of new stage in Libya's relations with the international community started after 1999, when the Libyan authority accepted to pay compensation for the exploding of UTA 772 Flight, and the trial of two of its intelligence agents for exploding Pan Am Flight. Fhimah and Al Megrahi were tried on murder charges under Scottish law in The Hague beginning in 1999. Fhimah was acquitted and Al Megrahi was convicted: he was sentenced to serve a life sentence in a Scottish prison. In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility "for the actions of its officials" and agreed to a settlement agreement that called for successive payments to the families of Pan Am 103 victims. Under the terms of a prisoner transfer agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Libya. Megrahi was released on August 2009, on compassionate grounds by Scottish authorities. Some observers are relating the release of Megrahi with the agreement of the British Petroleum and the Libyan National Oil Company (LNOC) on a \$900 million energy exploration agreement in 2009.

In addition, Gadhafi's position toward violating international law, and supporting armed groups changed fundamentally at the same period. He offered counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation after the September 11, 2001, attacks. In late 2003, he announced dismantling Libya's weapons of mass destruction and Ballistic Missile Development programs. Gadhafi confirmed to end his help for violent movements around the world. The Libyan government has contributed in peacemaking efforts in some African disputes, like organizing and supporting U.N. WFP aid flights to Sudan, from Libya. Oil

production agreements and better relations with the US and a number of European and Asian countries established the touchable benefits of Libya's new political behavior. Moreover, Libya's participation in the international politics increased and the country was elected as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in October 2007, and held the seat and the presidency of the council for 2008 and 2009. From his side Gadhafi was elected as the chairperson of the 53-member African Union. Libya stepped toward cooperating with U.S, regarding fighting terrorist organizations and their activities, like Al Qaeda. According to the U.S. Department of State's 2009 Country Report on Terrorism (issued August 2010), the Libyan government "has continued to cooperate with the United States and the international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.". The United States removed sanctions on Libya in 2004, and restrictions on foreign assistance were stopped in 2006. During Bosh and Obama administrations, many legislations regarding assisting Libya were approved, during fiscal year (FY) of 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. Legislations were containing funding and supporting Libyan security forces in their activities of boarder security, and fighting terrorism, in Libya and Trans-Sahara. However, until late 2008, U.S.-Libyan relations remained clouded by mutual hindrance. New terrorism concerns delayed Libya's removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list until 2006. The Libyan regime answered Congress pressure with progressively straight speeches warning that if its relations with the United States, and its business community continued hesitated by unsettled terrorism claims, U.S. companies may lose opportunities to bid on profitable Libyan contracts to renew and modernize the country's infrastructure. Throughout this period, some participants on both sides supported efforts to find a plan for solving unresolved issues. Bilateral negotiations succeeded in mid-2008 in the form of a Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. The Bush Administration viewed Libya as an example for possible understanding with other countries that accused of sponsoring terrorism and sought to create and increase counterterrorism, armed, and financial collaboration. The Obama Administration started an effort to more renewed U.S. - Libyan relations.

3. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF SYRIA AND HER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In This chapter, there would be a touch upon the contemporary history of Syria, in addition to the development of its foreign relations. Starting from the era of the French mandate in 1923, to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The chapter will include three main parts: the first deals with Syrian relations with several countries, especially the Eastern axis, which led to its confrontation with the policies of the United States of America, in addition to some local and regional Syrian relations, which greatly contributed to shaping the shape of Syrian politics. The second part will deal with how Hafez al-Assad built his totalitarian system, whether with regard to the army and security forces, or how he fully controlled political life in Syria through the Arab Baath Party. The third part is in the form of three sections: The first section deals with the background of the hostile relations between Syria and the United States. The second part will deal with Syria receiving its first sanctions in its history, which happened in 1979, after placing it on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Through this section, the discussion will address the impact of sanctions on the Syrian regime and its leadership. As for the third section, it will deal with the incident of the attempted bombing of the Israeli plane El-016, which led them to impose collective punishment on Syria for the first time. Those sanctions led to the isolation of Syria by the Western axis, and within it, we will review the reasons for the sanctions, and measures taken by Western countries against the Syrian regime, in addition to some of their effects on the Syrian regime.

The contemporary history of Syria can be divided into five main phases; the administration of the Syrian state, along with its regional and international roles has changed during these times. The first phase started from the first declaration of independence in 1920 and ended with the French occupation, which lasted from 1923 to 1946, when the French withdrew their troops from Syria. The second phase started with the withdrawal of the French until 1963, which

marked the coup d'état of al-Baath party which took control of power in the country. That phase was characterized with serious attempts to create an institutionalized state. That period, however, was unstable due to the several military coups that occurred. During that period, Syria witnessed the failed attempt of unity with Egypt. The entire region, just like the rest of the world, suffered from divisions due to the policy of international alliances: The Fertile Crescent in 1943, the NATO alliance in 1949, the Middle East Leadership Project, the Baghdad Pact against the communist expansion in 1955, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. In those years, Syria took neutral policies in general and opposed joining any alliances that will drive Syria to side with any camp. At a later stage, Syria joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The third phase extends from the coup of Hafez al-Assad in 1979 until his death in 2000 (Aljazeera.net. 2016). The fourth phase extends from Hafez's death until 2011 and the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. The fifth and final phase starts with the beginning of the Syrian crisis and continues to this very day.

There are several reasons why Syria came under the US sanctions, some of which goes back to the beginning of the independence of Syria and how Syria's international relations evolved towards western and eastern camps. Russia was a key factor at the heart of all the events that Syria had witnessed. European countries and the United States tried to drag Syria and other Arab countries into a number of alliances in an attempt to anchor them to the policy of confronting the Soviet Union.

3.1 Syrian- Soviet Union Relations

In this regard and in terms of how Syrian relations evolved with the Soviet Union, we can refer to the involvement of the latter in World War II to the side of the allies, which increased its engagement with several Arab communities and authorities. With the emergence of a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers in this world, at a time when Arab countries have just gained their independence from the European foreign occupation. Arab countries were looking for a kind of international relations that ensured their autonomy, away from the former mandatory powers, and the Soviet Union (USSR) was looking for a foothold in Arab states. The Relations

between the USSR and Syria go back to 1944, when Syria started to restore control over the administration of its institutions from the French mandate. The Soviet Union recognized the independence of Syria and supported its demand in this regard in the United Nations. Russia used the veto for the first time in the history of the United Nations in 1946 to foil a US-European draft resolution that aimed at keeping France in Syria. With that step which rejected the direct intervention into states' domestic affairs, the USSR gained credit with the Arab states.

A short while after the independence of Syria in 1946, political problems started to emerge with the first coup d'état in 1949. That was due to several reasons, the most prominent of which was that politicians accused army commanders that they failed in preventing the declaration of the state of Israel and liberating Palestine in 1948. At the time, the USSR was against the coup and described it as illegitimate and believed that the coup represented the American and French hegemony. The USSR also accused those who implemented the coup as one link in a chain of schemes aiming at creating a Middle Eastern bloc that is supported by the USA. Two weeks after assuming power, Husni al-Zaim denounced communism and promised to "wage a fierce war against communism in Syria". He expressed his willingness to cooperate with the USA to fight communism and he welcomed the US Tapline company 11 days after his coup, to reach a deal on oil pipelines. The Soviets, however, were on good terms with Shukri al-Quwatli who was ousted in the same year, in 1949. A new coup was implemented by Sami al-Hinnawi who removed Husni al-Zaim. Russia considered him as a British pawn in an attempt to regain influence in Syria after the coup of al-Zaim, who was leaning towards the USA. Within a few months, Adib Shishakli removed al-Hinnawi at the end of 1949.

The relations of Syria shifted drastically towards the eastern camp in 1955, upon the meeting of the Syrian Foreign Minister Khalid al-Azm in the premises of the UN with the Soviet Foreign minister. During that meeting, the Syrian FM spoke about the pressures Syria is coming under by western countries, and how they are refusing to arm the Syrian army and he reiterated his desire to fill the gap of lack of weapons in his country by the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. The Soviet FM stressed that his country will provide weapons with

affordable prices, without any political conditionality. He also offered the provision of economic assistance to Syria. In the same year, Syria and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for cultural cooperation and exchange of experts and specialists in different scientific fields. Both parties decided to upgrade diplomatic representation to the level of ambassadorship. They also signed economic agreements related to the export of Syrian cotton and the import of agricultural machines from the USSR. Syria signed other agreements with Poland and East Germany; and in the same year, Syria signed the first arms deal with Czechoslovakia. As a result of this rapprochement, the US and British intelligence services attempted to support a coup in Syria in 1956 to drive Syria away from the Soviet camp and closer to the western one. However, the scheme was exposed leading to an increase in the influence and number of leftist officers in the Syrian army. USSR-Syrian relations improved greatly up to the point when the Syrian-Soviet agreement was signed in 1957. The agreement stated that the USSR would develop railway projects, geological studies, excavation, power plants, and assist with the development of the industrial sector in Syria. The Soviets stated that there would be no political conditions attached to the agreement, but that it would rather be based on the principle of equality and mutual benefits while regarding the trade agreement between the two parties since 1955 positively. Since the first Syrian-Soviet agreements in 1955, until 1973, the relation between the two parties progressed so much that a Soviet military base was built in the coastal city of Tartous and Russia was heavily involved in the Arab wars against Israel (Al-Lahibi 18, 139).

3.2 Syrian- North Korea Relations

The other critical issue in Syrian foreign relations is its relationship with North Korea. It is unclear how deep in history this relationship goes, but there are hallmarks that indicate deep cooperation between the two countries, including the participation of Korean pilots and experts in the October war in 1973, on both fronts of Syria and Egypt against Israel. Although Russia and Iran were the closest allies of the Assad regimes, those of both Hafez (the father) and Bashar (the son) in Syria, North Korea represented the role model for this regime, in its structure and the way of instilling the culture of loyalty to the leader. The visit

paid by the late president Hafez al-Assad to North Korea in 1974, when he met with the founder of the most totalitarian and closed state in the world, Kim IL Sung, was reflected deeply on the shape of the Assad state. It is said that Hafez was highly impressed by the approach of the North Korean regime, which has survived until today. Hafez cloned the North Korean dictatorship model to the letter, with its structures, methods and approach, starting with the al-Baath Vanguard, the Youth union, the demonstrations of support for the leader, and the security apparatus and the brutal militias, which are tasked with protecting the regime and eliminating its opponents, and on top of all, the rule bequeath. (North Korea: the Role Model for 'Assad's Syria').

North Korea provided a great deal of military assistance to Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, in the 1970s and 1980s through modernizing Syrian weapons, including missiles and tanks and the provision of expertise for manufacturing chemical weapons. North Korea was the country that built the Syrian nuclear reactor in Deir al-Zour, which was destroyed by Israel while it was still under construction. North Korea has also provided weapons and military advisors to confront the Syrian opposition after 2011. Despite the UN Security Council resolution stipulating the removal of the chemical arsenal from Syria in 2013, which was carried out, several UN reports point out that North Korea continued to send equipment used in making chemical weapons to Syria (Berger, 2015, pp, 64, 68). The Syrian regime is still until now under investigations of using chemical weapons against civilians during the ongoing war.

3.3 Domestic and Regional Relations

Domestically and regionally, the coup led by the al-Baath Arab Socialist Party in 1963 and its control over the Syrian state and all of its institutions was a declaration of the beginning of changing the Syrian map domestically and abroad. Al-Baath adopted a policy aimed at solidifying the rule of the single party, eliminating all traditional national parties, and carried out a complete merge between the civilian and military governing institutions. These policies were implemented within an ideological framework based on the principle of an ideological army, and strengthening the al-Baath as the leading party of the state and community as provided for in article eight of the former Syrian

Constitution. The centers of power changed in the political landscape – the positions of the president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament stopped having that political weight; the actual influence shifted to partisan organs. The Syrian political attitude shifted and the al-Baath Party made its ideological mottoes (Unity, Freedom, Socialism) the guiding principles of running the state in a line of policy that is in line with the USSR and dependent on the latter in arming, training and economy, adopting socialist policy domestically, and nationalist pan-Arabism in its foreign policy. Since its coup in 1970, the al-Baath Party has lived an internal ideological and pragmatic struggle, especially among Alawite officers, within two tracks. The first was the confrontation of Sunni officers in the Syrian army and in the Party, and the second was within the ranks of Alawite officers in an attempt to assume control over the Party, the army and the state. In this track, Hafez al-Assad succeeded in carrying out a military coup, when he was the Syrian Minister of Defense in 1970. The coup of Hafez al-Assad marked a historical turning point in the Syrian domestic policies and its regional security and military roles. In the period prior to the coup, Syria was drawing closer to its Arab surrounding and was trying to take steps towards success in unity with other Arab countries, such as that with Egypt in 1962.

Upon the coup of Hafez al-Assad in 1970, Syrian policy changed based on the new governing system and goals. Al-Assad started his rule with a political initiative that was well-received internally and regionally. He called for mitigating the sharp socialist transformation of community, and achieved a national reconciliation among the different political powers. He created a transitional council, and the measures of openness were going in parallel with contradictory security measures that were taken by the new president to solidify his position and get rid of his political and military rivals. After the execution of Salim Hatum, and the assassination of Abdul Karim al-Jundi. Salah Jadid, Nureddin al-Atassi and Yousef Zaeen were detained in al-Mezzeh military prison. Additionally, several competitors of Hafez al-Assad were assassinated in Syria and Lebanon. Al-Assad sought to make changes within the security agencies, making them partisan and linking them with him personally. In the army, he gave the leadership of powerful centers to people from his own clan. Regionally, as Zain al-Abdin pp325, 340 explains it; the civil war in Lebanon

was the entry point for Hafez al-Assad to play a direct military role beyond the Syrian borders.

3.4 Syrian Relations toward Lebanon & Palestine

The Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975 between the Christian powers and the leftist group's ones that were supported by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The conflict intensified and threatened to spill over to the entire region. When the Christians felt they were at the verge of defeat, the Lebanese republic president Suleiman Frangieh sought the help of Syria, which intervened on the side of the Lebanese government with a US green light. The Syrian army took control over Tripoli and Beqaa. To put an end to the conflict, the Arab League summit was held in Riyadh in October 1976, where it was agreed that a deterring Arab force be sent to Lebanon to end the civil war, and the summit granted Syria the right to keep a force of forty thousand soldiers within the deterring force. The civil war continued until the signing of The Taif Agreement in October 1990. This Agreement once again iterated the right of Syria to have military presence in Lebanon and to gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, something that only took place upon the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005.

Entering Lebanon paved the way for Hafez al-Assad to change Syria's position towards the Palestinian cause. Before Hafez, the Palestinian cause was dealt with according to ideological and nationalistic considerations, but under his rule, it has been dealt with according to pragmatic and functional considerations. In the early years of Hafez's rule, he promoted some Palestinian parties at the expense of taking a negative stance towards the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. In this context, it is worth noting that the Syrian army, upon entering Lebanon, perpetrated several massacres against civilian and military Palestinians, especially in Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp against the PLO and Palestinian refugees residing it in 1976 (Shaoul and Marsden). By entering Lebanon, Hafez managed to make many gains, including the weakening of the PLO there, which was desired by Hafez al-Assad as well as by the USA and Israel. On the other hand, Hafez al-Assad supported other Palestinian organizations and made them the spearhead in his attempt to weaken the PLO,

such as (Ahmad Jibril Organization and Fateh al-Intifada personnel). The nature of the intervention of the Syrian army in Lebanon shifted from being a necessity to stop the fighting and weaken some parties, to a form of mandate through which the army remained in Lebanon and ran it until the withdrawal in 2005 under international pressure (“Tal Al-Zaatar: The Secrets of the Battle”).

3.5 Syrian-Iraqi Relations

In addition to the change in Syrian foreign policy with regard to Lebanese and Palestinian issues, the relationship between Syria and Iraq in the early years of Hafez’s rule witnessed high tension with Iraq. The roots of the dispute between the two countries go back to what happened with Michele Aflaq, the founder of the Arab Baath Party, who had a major role in leading the al-Baath party to power in Syria. In 1966, however, a coup was carried out within the ranks of al-Baath party by Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid, after which Hafez removed Aflaq from the leadership of the al-Baath Party and exiled him to Iraq. In Iraq, Aflaq was chosen to be the secretary general of the Iraqi branch of al-Baath Party. Aflaq was close to Saddam Hussein when the latter was vice president and a minister of defense, and even later when Saddam assumed power through a coup in 1979. Both countries became a refuge for the opposition of the other country. Part of the policy of Hafez al-Assad was to open a space for several opposition groups from other countries to be active in Syria. “Hafez also supported the Islamic revolution in Iran when it was still under preparation and Syria was the first Arab country to recognize the new Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and the only Arab country to explicitly oppose the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980” (Bašić, 2014). That led to severing relations between Syria and Iraq in 1979, and the relations were only restored in 2008, with the appointment of a Syrian ambassador to Iraq. There were other reasons for the tension between Syria and Iraq, including Iraq’s policy of seeking relations with Western countries, while Syria was still part of the bloc of countries friendly with the USSR.

In these contexts, the cold war took place and imposed a security environment whose precursors started to appear since the dispute on the division of zones of influence between the USA and the USSR in the Malta Conference held in the

period 4 – 11 February 1945. In the wake of that dispute, the US strategic perception of its national security took global dimensions, after being limited to a narrow geographic scope. Hence, the “USA started to link the goals of its strategic action with two key dimensions: first, the US perception of the USSR as an expansionist power that should be confronted in different parts of the world. Second, the dialectic of the links between the US national security and global security, which suppose that what threatens any part of the world, constitute a threat to the US national security” (Fahmy 137,140). This correlation basically stems from the nature of extended US interests in the world. In such a reality, Syria did not have enough time to build genuine friendly relations with the USA. Since the independence of Syria in 1946 and within only two years, the establishment of the state of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948. The USA was the first country to recognize Israel on the very same day. Then the war between Arabs and Israel took place in the same year, where Israel was supported by most of the western countries through training and arming the Jews in Palestine. Upon losing the war, Arab policies took two courses: a national course through building nation states, and the Pan-nationalistic course which aimed at realizing unity among Arab countries (U.S. Embassy in Israel). Syria took a leading role in this course by the several attempts of unity with a number of states, especially Egypt and Libya. At the time, the USA was focused on mobilizing countries of the Middle East in a defensive system against pan-Arabism and the communist threat to protect western investments by local armies and self-funding, while western commitments are limited to some military and technical support, along with complete control over military, economic and political activities in the region. As the USA assumed leadership of western countries, especially the member states of NATO, the U.S policy in the region was centered on how to fill the vacuum that resulted from the drawback of influence of European mandate countries. In addition to promoting the US influence there, and creating a status of supremacy for Israel in the region, and giving distinct roles for the countries allied with Washington or NATO.

The political interactions in Syria, and in the region, were driving Syria in the opposite direction. Despite the several military coups in Syria, they were unable

to link Syria with any of the US alignment projects in the region, like Baghdad Pact, the Middle East Leadership project, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. There were several reasons for Syria not to join any of these projects, including taking a neutral position towards the two global camps for the two decades following independence, and the popular Syrian position towards western powers which, for very recent years, have been occupying their lands and other Arab territories. In addition, there are causes related to western policies toward Israel and other causes related to the rise of the national sentiment in Arab countries after the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate and the desire of the newly established Arab leaderships to reach a consensus to fulfil some kind of unity among Arab countries.

Hence, we can attribute the first set of sanctions the US imposed on Syria to two main reasons: the first was the regional developments represented in the dramatic shifts in the Middle East, amidst tense atmosphere due to the rise of the nation state and the attempt to solidify the foundations of its institutions. The emergence of nationalistic trends while weakening the religious ones, beside the national and international challenges faced by the new emerging states because of the establishment of Israel, whether in the development of their political landscape and intra-relations, or their relations with the two global superpowers, i.e. the Soviet Union and the USA. The region has witnessed only short periods of tranquility, as some conformity and stability dominated within the totalitarian regimes that came to existence and took control over all sources of power in their respective countries. However, this reality did not last for a long time. The region fell again in events that destabilized the dominating dictatorships. Additionally, Arab wars with Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 drew Arab republics to the side of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Iranian-Iraqi war from 1980-1988, gave the U.S, stronger presence and influence in the region. The second reason was the policy pursued by Hafez al-Assad in supporting several violent organizations in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Palestine to solidify his rule and to influence the policies of those countries.

3.6 Building an Authoritarianism regime

Since the coup of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad against power in 1970, he has worked in two directions. The first was to tighten control over the army and security branches, by linking them directly to his person, and appointing people close to him in leadership positions in them.

The second was through controlling political life, and the beginning was by eliminating his rivals and opponents within his party; the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Later over the Syrian political life through the formation of the National Progressive Front, and the appointment of the Baath Party as its leading party, while ending its political opponents, whether within the National Front or outside it, by various means: arrest, assassination, exile and disappearance.

3.6.1 Building Authoritarianism in the Army and Security Forces

After independence from France, Syria experienced an era of multiple coups and military dictatorships until 1956. During this period, Syria suffered from the emergence of district-level parties in addition to the formation of al-Baath party, which called for Arab nationalism to be the foundation for building Syria and uniting with other Arab states under the concept of 'statehood'. The Baath party engaged in Syrian political life and sought unity with Egypt in 1958. The same party, however, was one of the key actors, which ended unity with Egypt in 1961 due to the complete Egyptian takeover of Syrian decision-making. Within two years, the Baath party managed to take over power in 1963. Al-Assad, alongside five of his comrades, had led the separation from Egypt. Hafez al-Assad was appointed commander of the air force and defense in 1964. By 1970, Hafez al-Assad and his Alawite comrades had managed to exclude Druze and Ismaili officers and then take over al-Baath party's decision-making by exiling its leadership including the party's founder and secretary general Michel Aflaq. He then staged a coup d'état and controlled all ruling power after removing his friends from the same sect, too, such as Salah Jadid. Since then, the Baath party and Hafez al-Assad built an authoritative power which he expanded based on a two-pronged strategy:

1. A top-down revolution whereby Leninist political structures were employed to integrate rural population

2. Consolidation of a centralized, semi-hereditary regime through the emergence of an all-powerful commander who employs kinship and nepotism networks in coercive authority.

The result was a presidential, quasi-monarchical rule presiding over three main institutions of power: the Syrian army, al-Baath party and state bureaucracy. While the Baath party's takeover of power came under the banner of combating the conventional Syrian bourgeois, the Baath party was transformed into a military regime which evolved into a hereditary military rule led by a sectarian minority which exercised all that the Baath party rebelled against, namely to take decision-making away from the elite and give it to the people. Hanna Batatu, in his book *Syria's Farmers* (BATATU, 1999, p 387), says that al-Assad built the structure of power in Syria on four levels over which al-Assad presided:

The first level: Related to the general orientation of policies towards crucial elements of his regime such as security, intelligence, military and foreign affairs, all of which were in the hands of al-Assad under whom were the undeclared heads of the multiple intelligence networks which worked independently from one another and reported directly to al-Assad.

The second level: Elite military formations and their commanders who reported directly to him. Included in this level were commanders of special military factions who reported to him directly.

The third level: The Baath party in which Al-Assad was the secretary general and the ultimate commander.

The fourth level: Ministers, senior state employees, governors and local councils. Through al-Baath and security branches, al-Assad had sole control on all executive, legislative, military, security and unionist state institutions.

After his coup, Hafez al-Assad ran against the principles of the Baath party itself which officially declared ideology aimed at an ideal united Arab community with a socialist regime. Hafez al-Assad tended to build institutions built on family and sect, on the one hand, and on class on the other as he relied on Sunni businessmen and rich people. During his leadership of the ministry of defense, he had cleared the army from Druze officers and after his coup; he

purged Nasserists and early Baathists. Thus, al-Assad designed the ideological identity of the Syrian army. This identity consists of an ideological dimension which publically adopts al-Baath as a doctrine and a method and, in practice, a sectarian/family dimension which uses kinship and the level of loyalty to the individual in power as criteria for affiliation, promotion and purging.

During the 1970s, the sectarian identity masked with party ideology started to replace the national identity of the army establishment in terms of practice and behavior. The pretext was that this was necessitated by the nature of that era which required putting an end to the heedless coups and instability which were an external conspiracy; so everyone was a suspected traitor, conspirer or agent, and the country had to be protected. Moreover, its security and army apparatus needed to be under control by dictatorship if need be. Beside those pretexts, also the wars with Israel and other regional tensions were used to consolidate loyalty to the visionary commander. Based on these excuses the Syrian army was divided into special brigades with absolute allegiance and pure sectarian affiliation, whose mission was to protect the regime. Moreover the national army was reformed on the basis that its commanders were as Al Zoghayar, 2012 wording it: “loyal, ideologically indoctrinated, obedient or owed their lives to Hafez al-Assad who appointed them directly as the commander-in-chief of the army and armed forces”.

After taking over power, Hafez al-Assad appointed officers from his kinship, clan and sect as commanders of critical units of the army according to the importance of these units and their geographical distribution, particularly within Damascus, the capital, and its surroundings. In his trinity command structure of military units, which included unit commander, chief of staff and security officer, al-Assad employed sectarian diversity, while ensuring one Alawite person, at least, in each trinity. Exceptions were for some military intelligence, air force apparatuses and some military security networks such as the fourth division, republican guard and special task units which were given to persons from his clan. His son Bashar al-Assad followed suit.

Sectarian fissures in the Syrian army had started since the 1970s against the backdrop of the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Syrian regime which peaked after 1982 when Hafez al-Assad relied even more

on his kinship and sect, thus accentuating the Alawite character of the regime. So much so that no less than 61.3% of the 31 officers appointed by Hafez al-Assad in the command of the Syrian army between 1970-1997 were Alawite, including 8 from his own clan and 4 from his wife's. Upon closer examination, it turns out that seven out of those 12 were direct relatives of al-Assad. The Alawites' ultimate triumph in that era was assisted by their focus on strong strike units, which were directly implicated in staging or failing military coups. They succeeded in taking control over those units: air force, missile and armored units in and around the capital in addition to the intelligence and counterintelligence forces. Research by Syrian research centers reached to conclusion "showing that the sectarian and regional distribution of the most 40, important command positions in the Syrian army now were from the Alawite sect and al-Assad's kinship and clan (Al Mustafa, 2020)". They were documented by name and area of those officers including the general commander, the minister of defense, commanders of corps, formations and military divisions and some critical security and leadership positions in the Syrian army.

In his engineering of Syria, Hafez al-Assad embarked on building a totalitarian system at the two most important levels of governance in Syria; namely the ruling party which exerts control; the executive government and the parliament as well as the army and security which exerts control over any potential change. In terms of the army, Hafez al-Assad introduced changes on three levels:

- First: Giving Alawites special access to enlistment and promotion in the army. Al-Assad relied on tribal and sectarian factors because he believed that sects gave their followers a sense of ideological affiliation and tribal unity and fanaticism. Alawites constituted about 85% of graduates of higher military academies in Syria and abroad.
- Second: Special units and divisions and the multiplicity of paramilitary institutions. When Hafez al-Assad assumed power, he established a number of military apparatuses, which reported to him directly. Only those formations, rather than the Syrian army's regular formations, were allowed to enter the capital. These include:

- Military Intelligence Department: a widely powerful institution, which is responsible for monitoring the conduct of military personnel.
- Air force Intelligence Department: the agency most loyal to the regime. It is affiliated with the ministry of defense but the minister of defense has no authority over it, rather it is the other way around.
- Republican Guard Forces: One of the most prominent and most armed elite divisions of the Syrian army whose officers receive significant shares of Syrian oil revenues.
- Fourth Division: One of the Syrian army's best-trained and equipped formations commanded by Maher al-Assad, son of Hafez al-Assad. It is positioned around the Syrian capital
- Defense Companies: With his brother, Refa't al-Assad, as commander from 1970 to the mid-1980s. These were the companies directly responsible for the Hama massacre in 1981 (Omran Center, 2018, p. 27).
- Third: Security: Hafez al-Assad created a number of security agencies which reported to him directly and were independent from one another in terms of command and operation although they had overlapping mandates mostly related to internal policy control. They enjoyed extensive freedom and monitored closely anything which touched upon the al-Assad regime.

The connection of all security and Military institutions to the Syrian president




Figure 3.1: The control of the president on the security and defense institutions.

Source: (Omran Center 2018).

The above Info graphic shows how security agencies were directly linked to the Syrian president himself. This formula was adopted by Hafez al-Assad since he assumed power and continued throughout his and his son’s reign. These agencies owe their complete allegiance to the president personally apart from national considerations.

3.6.2 Building Authoritarianism in Politics

Michel Aflaq formed Al-Baath Party in Damascus in 1940. It took over power in Syria through a coup in 1963. Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970 was a coup within the party as much as it was a military coup to take over power. In 1970, the Tenth National Extraordinary Congress was held in October to discuss the internal crisis that threatened the existing governance system. Through his hegemony over the party, Salah Jadid managed to indict the minister of defense, Hafez al-Assad, and the chief of staff, Mustafa Tlas, and reach a decision to dismiss them from office. Before the decisions of the congress were implemented, Hafez al-Assad occupied the party’s civil offices and arrested

Nureddin al-Atassi, then president of the republic, Yusuf Zuayyin , then prime minister, and Salah Jadid, the national assistant secretary general. Al-Assad purged proponents of Salah Jadid within party ranks. A similar purge was undertaken in 1972 in which a large number of opponents to the al-Assad reign were excluded from party ranks. Al-Assad next introduced new measures to ensure the Party's loyalty, keeping it nominally as leader of state organs and governance institutions while the role of the Party's civil branch diminished significantly, which can be seen in the scarcity of congresses and weak party activity. The president then formed a central committee comprising 75 party members of whom 21 were elected as the new national leadership. The central committee and national leadership monopolized the party's activity as they were given broad mandates acting on behalf of the national congress when it is not in session.

Regarding political life, al-Assad formed the National Progressive Front (NPF) in 1982. It comprised most Syrian parties including the communist party led by Khaled Bakdash, Arab Socialist Union led by Jamal al-Atassi and Arab Socialists and other smaller parties. The NPF supposedly offered a framework for the parties' political action within an alliance. In actuality, however, it was a step for al-Assad to directly control political life in Syria. The NPF regards al-Baath Arab Socialist Party as the leader of the state and society. Its charter says "Baath Arab Socialist Party, through its major historic role in the Arab struggle movement at the national level and across the Arab homeland, and given the responsibility it has undertaken in leading the state and society since the 8th of March revolution and its achievements in various political, social and economic fields, shall lead a national progressive front which endeavors to unify the capacities of the masses to put them in the service of the Arab nation goals. Al-Baath Arab Socialist Party leadership shall be translated in its members comprising the majority of all state institutions. The Party's leadership of the National Front shall be founded on national and regional principles, based on the NPF's charter. It shall guide the NPF in designing its general policies and implementing its plans." In the eighth article of the charter of the NPF's parties: "with the exception of al-Baath Arab Socialist Party, the parties pledge to refrain from any organization, party activity or gatherings within the army and

armed forces.” Therefore, the privilege of operating within the army was given exclusively to al-Baath Party led by Hafez and later Bashar al-Assad. The NPF gives al-Baath Party leadership on various levels as it holds that “Baath leadership shall be translated in its members comprising the majority of all its institutions.” The article one of NPF’s statute stipulates: The following parties shall form a front amongst themselves called the National Progressive Front.

1. Al-Baath Arab Socialist Party.
2. Socialist Arab Union Party.
3. Syrian Communist Party.
4. Unified Syrian Communist Party.
5. Socialist Unionists Party.
6. Arab Socialists Party.
7. Democratic Socialist Unionist Party.
8. National Covenant Party.
9. Arab Democratic Union Party.
10. Nationalist Social Syrian Party- Center.
11. General Federation of Trade Unions.
12. General Federation of Farmers/Peasants.
13. National Syrian Student Union.

The NPF’s statute includes articles and provisions related to its structure including article five, which stipulates, “The NPF’s central leadership shall comprise a president and a number of members representing its parties. The representation of al-Baath Arab Socialist Party therein shall be at a ratio of half plus one to the other parties;” and article six which stipulates, “The president of the Front shall be the national secretary of al-Baath Arab Socialist Party.” The NPF’s central leadership comprises a president and 17 members including nine representatives of al-Baath Arab Socialist Party and eight representatives of the other parties with two representatives each. These articles alone show with striking clarity that the NPF was effectively a tool built by al-Assad to establish total control over Syrian political life. Further, the involvement of the student

union and farmers and workers federations directly show how al-Baath Party controlled the greatest part of political life in Syria. (The National Progressive Front, 1999).

Thus, all hopes in a true political life were damaged with the formation of the National Progressive Front. Moreover, in addition to article eight of the Syrian constitution of 1973, which stipulates, “Al-Baath Arab Socialist Party shall be the leader of society and state and shall lead a national progressive front which endeavors to unify the efforts of the people in furtherance of the goals of the nation.” Therefore, by a constitutional stipulation, al-Baath party took the majority of seats in the People’s Assembly, controlled the cabinet and secured the affiliation of all official newspapers. The NPF’s charter, also, gave al-Baath party the exclusive right to organize and stage party activities and gatherings within the army and armed forces. Furthermore, the national leadership of al-Baath party had the exclusive right to nominate the president of the republic. Thus, the constitution consolidated the status of al-Baath as a totalitarian party in control of all legislative, executive and judicial branches of governance in the state and society. (Zein al-Abedin, 2007, p. 447). Within 15 years, al-Assad, through al-Baath Party and his security and military apparatuses, made himself the sole leader of Syria. Mahmoud al-Ayyubi, the Syrian Prime Minister in 1975, expressed the control of al-Baath party over Syrian decision making with a statement saying: “In Syria, there is one authority and one leader”. The eighth national congress of al-Baath Party in 1985 used the slogan “our leader forever, the trustworthy Hafez al-Assad. The congress endeavored to affirm that loyalty to him was loyalty to the Party, to the people and its cause. The magnitude of control al-Baath Party had over political life in Syria can be understood by looking at the inflation in the number of people who joined the Party between 1970 and 1992, which reached over one million members. In addition to their membership in the Baath Party, they practically represented the bureaucracy of the state in most of its positions, in addition to the leadership of the military and security organs.

3.6.3 U.S- Syrian Relations as Driver toward of 1979 Sanctions

International relations of the Republic of Syria in the late 1950s leaned towards the Soviet Union, and it was further advanced after the emergence of al-Baath

Party who made socialism the ideology of the state. With the coup of Hafez al-Assad in 1970, Syria became one of the countries under almost complete Soviet influence at the climax of the cold war. The interventions of the Syrian regime in regional issues through violent methods, whether in Lebanon, Turkey or Palestine, especially in the attempts of bombing western passenger airplanes by some Palestinian groups, led to the first package of sanctions to be imposed on Syria in 1979, as it was put by the USA on the list of States Sponsors of Terrorism. The list then included Iraq, South Yemen, then Syria and Libya, and Cuba was added to the list in 1982, Iran in 1984, and North Korea in 1988. South Yemen was removed from the list in 1990, then Iraq in 2004 and Libya in 2006 then North Korea in 2008, and Cuba in 2015. The sanctions resolution defines monitoring policies for exports from the USA to countries that constitute a threat thereof. It also imposes the cooperation of countries with which the USA has concluded mutual defense agreements. In time, the designation of a terrorist country became linked with a number of severe consequences for the country in question, beyond the trade limitations with US companies. Such sanctions include deprivation of foreign aid; international sanctions under international law and threat of the use of military force (Sloan and Anderson 604). In short, a state sponsor of terrorism is defined as the state that provides support or sponsor of non-state actors who are involved in terrorist acts. The list is used by the USA at a local level to shed light on its policy towards some countries and to receive support from the local community. Whereas it uses it at the international level to shame, the counties designated as such, in addition to the sanctions imposed upon those countries to change their policies.

The United States adopted a policy of enticement towards Syria in multiple ways. It further used containment and positive alignment of Syria on two levels: first by trying to engage Syria in security schemes allied to Washington in the region; second by offering economic aid. In this latter context, between 1950-1981 the US offered around 627 million USD in aid for the Syrian state. Some of this aid was designated for the development of state institutions while some constituted direct economic aid with a significant part thereof covering food assistance, development of agriculture and irrigation and building road networks

in remote areas. (Congressional Research Service, M. Blanchard, & M. Sharp, 2011). The situation, however, started to change after Syria's intervention in Lebanon and the shift that took place in the Syrian regime's approach to security matters in addition to the very rapid transformation of the Syrian troops in Lebanon from a force meant to stop the conflict among Lebanese factions to a force directly engaged in the conflict. Therefore, the last quarter of the past century constituted a very complex period in the history of Syria for various reasons. Internally, Hafez Al-Assad started to consolidate his reign by eliminating his opponents within and outside the Baath Party; economically, through the introduction of five-year plans for the development of the Syrian economy; and, militarily, by increased dependence on Soviet weaponry. Regionally, Al-Assad was involved in the Lebanese war. He supported some Lebanese and Palestinian factions against others. The number of Syrian soldiers in Lebanon reached about 40 thousand soldiers. He further opened Syria and Lebanon to harbor the "Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)", which is listed by the European Union and others such as United States, Canada and Australia. In addition, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a terrorist organization. Internationally, on the other hand, Hafez al-Assad favored economic and military relations with the USSR while maintaining good relations with most European countries and maintaining redlines in relation to policy towards the United States. (Congressional Research Service, 2004)

The 1979 sanctions were attributed to two main reasons: first, al-Assad's use of Palestinian commando groups to carry out operations against Israel and to further his control on Lebanon. Second, he kept Syrian troops in Lebanon where they were directly involved in Lebanese internal strife. The main reason for al-Assad's systematic use of violent organizations was the gap between Syria's ambitions in terms of its regional role and its wish to play the main role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly after Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel. This wish, however, stumbled on Syria's limited military and economic weight. Hence, the use of violent organizations guaranteed the Syrian regime a leading role in regional security policies at a time when Palestinian factions in Syria and Lebanon in particular had become competitors to the state, controlled much of its area especially in Lebanon and Jordan. Moreover, it competed with

the national government in fighting Israel and owned huge resources with funding from states or external donations while the Syrian army and economy were fragile (Erlich, Re, 1998). In his, book *Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, Patrick Seale says, “Theoretically, Hafez Assad was whole-heartedly for it, but practically, the Palestinian question was a constant source of trouble for him. In return for his support to the Palestinian cause, he used the PLO and other Palestinian factions as a weapon against Israel (Seale, 1990, p.204).” Added to these factors was the very biased political negotiations conducted by then US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who managed a bad negotiation process for the Arabs and in favor of Israel since the 1973 war. Kissinger embarked on stopping the battle from one side, which he did. He also drove the American administration to support the Israeli state with hundreds of billions of dollars during and after the war. Kissinger engaged in shuttle political visits between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Most of his visits were aimed at favoring Israel. He drove Egypt into a unilateral peace agreement leading to true isolation of Syria under al-Assad rule, which was realized in Camp David agreement of 1978 which Hafez al-Assad rejected saying that this agreement would not be enforced, he would not allow it. It, however, did. Hence, the weight of Syria and Palestinian organizations shrunk greatly especially as Israel and the US allowed al-Assad to engage against them under the leadership of Yaser Arafat during his intervention in the Lebanese war. Hafez al-Assad had tried to impede reaching the agreement which led to Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978 (Elseid Hussein, 2012).

The Department of State’s designation of states sponsoring terrorism reveals three main characteristics for states to be on this list:

First: The Department of State is concerned with states which offer direct and indirect support to international terrorism whether as an explicit foreign policy tool or by complicity in allowing terrorists to use the state’s territories and resources.

Second: The Department of State’s assessment seeks to measure a state’s credibility in assisting the United States to combat terrorism.

Third: The Department of State is concerned because of the link between terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

According to the Department of State, a state's support to terrorism and assistance to terrorists may be through:

- Providing political and financial assistance.
- Offering diplomatic support.
- Offering safe haven.
- Attitudes and positions adopted in the UN and other international agencies. (Rochefort, D. 2005).

3.6.3.1 Syrian Economy after Imposing the First set of Sanctions in 1979

Most of the economic and technical studies about Syria fail to cover the period that extends from the beginning of the rule of Hafez al-Assad to the beginning of the third millennium, with the precise details and figures on the impact of sanctions on the Syrian regime in that period. Due to several interlinked factors including internal Syrian ones related to military coups, disputes within al-Baath party, the rise of Islamic movements, and the problems of state building after independence from French colonization. Other factors are related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the confusion and fragmentation of Arab countries, which were looking for international parties to help them strike a balance of power in the face of Israel. Therefore, most of what has been written about Syria during the decades of Hafez's reign focused on the political and security situation in Syria and the region. The US sanctions that were imposed on Syrian were not imposed with the aim of regime change in Syria or weakening it to the level of collapse. They can be seen as an attempt to contain Syria's regional role and as pressure to accept the Israeli and US conditions about the Palestinian cause. Signs about the impact of US sanctions can be inferred from some economic and political studies about Syria in that period. Because we lack accurate sources about the impact of sanctions in the period under study, so some indicators presented to reach the ability of measuring some impacts of sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime according to several sectors.

Table 3.1: Value of exports and imports

Year	Value of Exports			Value of Imports		
	Public Sector	Private Sector	Total	Public Sector	Private Sector	Total
1978	3702.3	457.2	4159.5	6878.3	2780.5	9658.8
1979	5931.9	521.4	6453.3	9445.6	3621.1	13066.7
1980	7669.9	602.8	8272.7	12010.6	4177.5	16188.1
1981	7528.9	724.8	8253.7	15553.6	4227	19780.6
1982	7107.7	845.9	7953.6	12863.9	2893.3	15757.2
1983	6730.3	817.1	7547.4	15722.5	2106.1	17828.6
1984	6556.8	718	7274.8	14820.9	1666.6	16487.5
1985	5939	481.5	6420.5	13118	2452.5	15570.5
1986	3623.1	1575.8	5198.9	7996.7	2712.4	10709.1
1987	11818.3	3373.3	15191.6	21916.4	5998.7	27915.1

Source: (National Information Center, 2007, p. 386)

The table above shows that the exports and imports of the Syrian public sector were on the rise in the years 1978 to 1981. Then the impact started to show as they declined sharply from around 7.6 billion Syrian pounds (SYP) in 1980 to their lowest level at 3.6 billion SYP in 1986. On the other hand, there was a kind of stability in the private sector imports and exports, due to the flow of the warm gulf money. As well as the money of remittances, the rise in production of agricultural crops and primary industry, the rise of oil revenue, and especially that the sanctions originally targeted the Syrian state in its relation with the USA. (National Information Center, 2007, pp. 290, 386)

In relation to the Syrian agricultural sector, however, Munir al-Himish states in his book “the period of the French Mandate led to poor distribution of agrarian ownership, in addition to the problem of expropriation for the benefit of public property, and the French Mandate, Syria became weak and could not keep up with global development. The industrial sector suffered from the adverse impact of foreign capital and the infiltration of foreign companies into the domestic market with the poor sources of energy, poor technical expertise, lack of advanced heavy industry and the focus of industrial investment on consumer industry. Syria witnessed a shift in the agricultural sector that extended from independence until late 1970s, through the distribution of feudal property to groups that do not own agrarian spaces” (Al-Himish, 2011, pp. 11, 12).

However, we cannot blame all of that on the French Mandate. Since independence until the late 1960s agriculture constituted somewhere between half and one third Syrian national income. The industrial projects were new and the market suffered from fluctuating prices and weakness of purchase power, decline in services, the presence of foreign investment companies and constant inflation in the Syrian economy.

Table 3.2: The value of the ministry of industry's budget allocations and the percentage to the actual total budget.

Year	Accreditation of the Ministry of Industry (Million S.P)	The Percentage of the General Budget
<i>1980</i>	1462	13.4
<i>1981</i>	1377	9.4
<i>1982</i>	1660	8.9
<i>1983</i>	1184	6.6
<i>1985</i>	723	3.7

Source: (al-Himish, 2011, p. 60)

The table above shows continued decline of the budget allocations of the Syrian ministry of industry and the percentage allocated to the industrial sector from the general budget. In this case, also, it declined greatly in five years from 13.4% to 3.7%. The author Munir al-Himish links this decline to a number of reasons, including the fact that the public industrial sector was subject to mismanagement and poor administrative performance. The absence of proportionality and balance, and a large displacement movement from rural areas to the cities, harming agriculture and leading the sector to fail to provide the basic material necessary for the factories, the existence of rigid bureaucracy that prevented attempts to correct the situation. The author does not mention sanctions, but their impact, and the impact of the regional policies of Hafez al-Assad are visible in the decrease in support directly allocated to the industrial sector.

Table 3.3: Budget of the Military

Syrian Army Revenue Costs

Year	Imports (in millions of Syrian pounds)
<i>1975</i>	1412
<i>1976</i>	500
<i>1977</i>	938
<i>1978</i>	863
<i>1979</i>	2060
<i>1980</i>	1874
<i>1981</i>	1348
<i>1982</i>	1973
<i>1983</i>	2233
<i>1984</i>	1809
<i>1985</i>	1362
<i>1986</i>	1262
<i>1987</i>	1402
<i>1988</i>	1312

Source: adapted from the World Bank Data, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Although it is difficult to verify figures about the military budget, sources show a lot of fluctuation in the military budget and how it was influenced by international and regional conditions. Such fluctuation is due to lack of transparency in Syrian military issues, and the involvement of Syria in Lebanon. Another impact of American sanctions was shrinking the Syrian economy, and the difference in the payments pledged by Arab countries to countries confronting Israel. The impact of sanctions on the Syrian economy can be explored through a number of indicators, including:

- The impact on the oil sector back then, whose production declined from 10,117 thousand cubic meters in 1977 to 9203 thousand cubic meters in 1980. Oil revenues in 1980 were estimated at 940 million US Dollars and they dropped in 1981 to 850 million US Dollars

- On another level, the number of visitors and participating countries in the Damascus International Fair declined by half. In 1975, it received 3.5 million visitors, and it dropped down to 1.5 million visitors in 1985.
- The exchange rate of the Syrian pound against the US Dollar declined in 1985 in the Syrian market to 8.25 SYP per dollar, whereas in the early 1980s, one dollar was no more than 4.30 SYP

Table 3.4: Exchange rates against US Dollar per year

Dollar exchange rates	
Year	Dollar exchange
<i>1970</i>	3.9
<i>1980</i>	4.1
<i>1986</i>	12
<i>1990</i>	42

Source: (Gaspard, 2013)

- The government consumption was at 23% in 1980 and it dropped in the following years to 11.7%, despite the increase of the number of employees
- Agriculture, industry and construction constituted 51% of the GDP in 1980, and then it dropped to 49% in 1985. Industry and mining dropped in the same period from 20% to 8%
- Foreign trade was at about 24 billion SYP in 1970, and it dropped to 13 billion SYP in 1985.
- Trade deficit was at 13% of the GDP in 1970, and it reached 25% in 1985.
- Western countries and the USA constituted the largest share of Syrian foreign trade, which dropped from 58% in 1975 to 46% in 1985. However, foreign trade with socialist countries increased in the same period from 19% to 23%.
- GDP per capita increased from 3,889 SYP to 7,930 SYP, whereas the average income decreased from 8,291 to 7,930 SYP between 1980 and 1985.

- Migration from rural areas to the cities as a phenomenon proved that development policies in rural areas were wrong. While the population of the governorates of Damascus and Aleppo was at around 20% of the total population of Syria in the 1970s, this figure increased in the early 1980s to 44%. (al-Himish, 2011, pp. 85, 99, 100, 101, 121)
- The value of exported commodities and services in 1970 was 83% and it dropped to around 30% in 1985.
- Official aid that had been provided by the USA since the independence of Syria until early 1981 was completely stopped. The total aid provided by the USA to Syria within 30 years was about 627 million US Dollars. (Congressional Research Service, M. Blanchard, & M. Sharp, 2011).

However, there were positive changes in general living conditions in Syria, shown in the supply of electricity to Syrian villages, which rose from 372 villages in 1975 to 5729 villages in 1984. The size of water networks increased as well. Water reached about 54% of villagers and 97% of city inhabitants. The number of doctors increased from 978 in 1963 to 4947 doctors in 1983; however, the number of beds in hospitals decreased from 1.12 to 1.08 beds per one thousand strong. The number of schools increased from 4131 in 1970 to 6302 in 1980. There was an increase in the quality of government services provided, with deep rural-urban disparity. There was also an increase in dropouts, lack of economic security, state scrutiny and crackdown on the freedom of thought.

- Many factors interfere with gauging the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States on Syria by the end of 1979. For the Syrian regime, ever since Hafez al-Assad's coup, it has become a totalitarian regime, which does not publish correct figures. Furthermore, Syria started to receive huge sums in the aftermath of the October war against Israel in 1973 within the framework of Arab states' program to support confrontation and resistance states, which are countries surrounding Israel: Syria and Lebanon to the north, Jordan to the east and Egypt to the south. 'Resistance' states were most remaining Arab countries. The agreement stipulated that oil states would support countries in confrontation with Israel. This caused some improvement in the

economic situation in Syria. The unified Arab economic report of 1984 indicates that Syria received USD 4191 million during 1974-1979. In addition to USD 3587 million in aid in the following three years (1980-1982). Therefore, the Arab assistance between 1974 and 1982 reached around USD 7779 million. Between 1982 and 1985, development assistance offered by oil-rich Arab countries and OPEC countries reached USD 3321 million. (Munir Al-Himish , pp.60 138, 139, 140).

Despite five-year development plans carried out by the Syrian regime, most figures related to the Syrian economy and general budget indicate a real structural crisis in the Syrian economy, which cannot be solely attributed to American sanctions. Although the regime sustained great economic damage due to the sanctions, it did not halt its war machines nor did it fall as American reports, saying that its situation was terrible, predicted back then. The same US department-of-state reports concluded that they would prefer that al-Assad remain in power to push towards his complete fall, showing that finding an alternative to al-Assad from the Alawites would be hard and would destabilize Syria. (Alaraby Aljadeed, 2018), this valuation of the political and security situation in Syria by U.S, kept the same during the rule of Hafiz the father and the son, since after 10 years of war in Syria, and with very high number of casualties, still the international community is not willing to permit the change of Bashar Al- Assad.

The American sanctions back then were not aimed so much at changing the regime's behavior as they were focused on some key goals including:

- 1- Goals related to American interests in the Middle East in general is related to addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict to reach a comprehensive solution for the conflict.
- 2- Curbing Soviet influence in Syria and trying to diminish USSR role in Syrian policies.
- 3- Reaching an appropriate solution for the civil war in Lebanon.
- 4- Mitigating the risk of Syria, in cooperation with radical Arab states such as Iraq, threatening stability and security in the Gulf.

5- The absence of international consensus on imposing sanctions on Syria has limited their impact

The sanctions that were imposed by the U.S on the regime ignored all the massacres perpetrated in Syria during the 1980s, most importantly, what happened in Hama city where the number of slaughtered civilians is estimated at 20-40 thousand. Some estimations put the number of victims even higher. All this indicates that American sanctions aimed to push Syria to accept a number of American demands while the U.S disregarded the Syrian regime's violent conduct. The Syrian regime continued its war in Lebanon, and continued to support armed non-state actors, harbored (PKK), and gave them training camps in Lebanese Beqaa and in Syria. Most of those steps showed that no policy change had taken place in Syria. Sanctions may have furthered one goal, which is isolating Syria and weakening its influence on Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement. Sanctions failed to effect change in the regime's general conduct. Economic effects were not due to US sanctions but to faulty Syrian economic policies and the authoritarianism and corruption which started to spread in the political and economic structures in Syria.

3.6.3.2 The Case of El Al Airlines 016 Flight and 1986 Crisis

The case of El Al 016 flight known also as the Nezar Hindawi Affair, named after Hindawi who was born in 1954 and worked as a journalist in Jordan before moving to London to be associated with a British girl "of Irish origin" named Anne Marie Murphy. In April 1986, he was accused of being behind the attempted bombing of the Israeli El Al plane "Flight 016", which was landing as a transit at London's Heathrow Airport in Britain, coming from New York and heading to Tel Aviv. (Glass, 1986).

Nezar Hindawi had brought his girlfriend, Murphy, to the airport. Israeli security officers discovered a bomb inside Mary's bag. Murphy claimed that she did not know that she was carrying explosives, and that the package was given to her as a gift from her fiancé Nezar Hindawi. Meanwhile, Nezar heard on the radio that the bomb had been discovered and his girlfriend had been arrested. Therefore, he went to the Syrian embassy in London requesting help. The Syrian ambassador received him in London, the ambassador handed him over to the Syrian security men at the embassy, who made changes to his appearance,

including cutting and changing his hair color. However, Nizar, on the next day, of April 18, 1986, surrendered to the British police. During the investigations, Hindawi said that the bombing attempt was carried out on the orders of a senior official in the Syrian Air Force Intelligence a year before the incident, and that the Syrian authorities had given him a new passport and identification papers, and trained him on how to prepare explosives. It was also reported that British intelligence intercepted Syrian communications that mentioned Hindawi's name, and that Hindawi's Syrian passport was original, as well as his other identification papers, knowing that he was not a Syrian citizen. (X. Clines, 1986).

Nezar Hindawi was referred to the court, where the surprise was that Hindawi retracted his confessions that he had made during the investigation. Hindawi said in his trial that he is a victim of a plot organized by Israeli agents and that he was tortured by the British police, who forced him to sign papers that he did not read. Adding that he was threatened to hand him over to the Israeli Mossad and his parents were arrested. Hindawi's lawyer presented at the trial a new vision of the events, saying that Hindawi was a victim of an Israeli conspiracy to embarrass the Syrian government and harm the relationship between Syria and Britain, but the court did not take Hindawi and his lawyer's viewpoint, and the court sentenced Hindawi to 45 years in prison.

Immediately after Hindawi was sentenced, the British government cut diplomatic relations with Syria, and Washington reduced its diplomatic representation. Britain also called on the rest of the European countries to take strict decisions against Syria, but the European countries did not agree to take this step. In addition, not all British officials agreed to tighten sanctions on Syria for several reasons, such as for the possible Syrian role in a peace process in the Middle East. In addition, it was considered a risky step with the presence of European and American hostages in Lebanon by the armed organizations, and the possibility that the sanctions in Syria would push Syria to offer support the Palestinian and Lebanese military organizations. Its diplomatic representation in 1986 and the British ambassador to Syria at that time did not agree on tightening sanctions on Syria through several statements in which he clarified

that "cutting ties is not in the interest of the British Kingdom." Hindawi incident`s penalties included:

- Britain: Cut the diplomatic relations with Syria, recalled its ambassador, and stopped its commercial relations with Syria.
- America: Expanded controls on exports of any controlled material for national security purposes, including relevant technical data, as well as all aircraft, helicopters, and related parts and components. The abolition of the US-Syrian air transport agreement, and the ban on selling Syrian Arab Airlines tickets in the United States, also halted all programs of the American Export-Import Bank and reduced the number of American embassy staff in Damascus.
- Western European countries: The European Economic Community met at the end of 1986, and decided to impose a program of limited sanctions against Syria. Greece did not agree on sanctioning Syria, those measures included the ban on arms sales, stopping high-level political visits, and reviewing the status of Syrian diplomatic missions, and intensifying security measures regarding the work of Syrian Arab Airlines. The European Parliament voted to withdraw development aid to Syria from the European Economic Community's 1987 budget.

The positions of European countries differed in dealing with the "Hindawi" issue. In terms of principle, most European countries were not compatible with British approaches to impose severe sanctions. The reason of such rapprochement were the risk of worsening the security situation even more. Moreover, France, Greece and other parties showed the possibility of the Israeli Mossad involvement in the operation, given the history of the "Hindawi" family itself, in addition to the fact that most of the investigations did not reach the conclusion of the Syrian President's participation in managing the operation.

In Syria, Al-Assad was quick to respond to some European pressures. Hours after the European Economic Community's decision, Syria took swift measures, so two French hostages were released and they were delivered to Damascus. The French Foreign Ministry thanked Syria for its role in the release, and the American hostage David Jacobsen was released, and al-Assad closed some of

the offices of the Palestinian Abu Nidal Group. In the wake of these developments, the European Economic Community stated in 1987 that Syria's position must be taken into account if a peace conference is to be organized in the Middle East. "Economically, the Syrian crisis with Britain came in 1986, at a time when the Syrian economy was suffering from contraction and fluctuation, in addition to the problems that were mentioned previously" (Scott, 2016). The crisis coincided with Syria's development of its sixth five-year plan, which contained general objectives of the Syrian economy (Congressional Research Service, 2010). According to the Syrian Minister of Economy, the country's economy was suffering at the time from:

- Global economic crises.
- Drought season.
- Interruption of foreign aid.
- Reduced remittances from Immigrants.
- The burden of paying off external debts.

The economic effects of European sanctions appeared directly on the Syrian regime. In the field of foreign trade, the table (named, value of exports and imports numbered 3) shows the impact of the Syrian economy exports and imports between the year 1985 and 1986. Where we find that the total of the value of exports were 6426 million in 1985, and decreased to 5198 million in 1986, as for imports they were 15570 million in 1985, and decreased to 10709 million in 1986. The proportion of public sector imports decreased from 75% in 1986 to 54% in 1990, also the imports of raw materials decreased from 96% in 1986 to 59% in 1990 (al-Himish, 2011, p. 225). In addition as the table titled Syrian Army Revenue Costs and numbered 3, shows the imports of the Syrian Army were 1362 million of S.P, and decreased to 1262 million of S.P. In addition to the impact of the sanctions and the threat of penalties shown through the exchange rate of foreign currencies, as we can see in the case of the Dollar, where in 1980 1\$ was equivalent to 4.1 S.P, and it jumped to 12 S.P, in 1986, and to 42 S.P, in 1990.

During the crisis of El Al 016 flight and its consequences, it was clear that threatening and imposing collective sanctions on the Syrian government,

severely affected the Syrian economy. Moreover, isolated the regime in a way pushed the Syrian government to change some of its behaviors, like controlling some of the Palestinian and Lebanese armed movements inside Syria and Lebanon. Nevertheless, they were not effective enough to stop Syrian interventions in other countries' issues like Lebanon politically or by supporting groups like Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, or the “PKK” in Turkey.

4. DEVELOPMENTS OF SYRIAN POLITICS FOLLOWING THE SANCTIONS OF 1986, UP TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS IN 2011

This chapter would attempt in its first part to answer several questions regarding the development of Syrian foreign relations in the 1980s, after being subject to collective sanctions by some Western countries. Moreover it will go through in what way the relationship between Syria and the United States of America evolved to reach the point where Syria joined the international coalition in the Second Gulf War 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Driven by many regional and international developments like the Revolutions of 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union 1991. The chapter will also discuss developments in the Syrian and regional political scene after the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the events of 9 September 2001 attacks. Such as tightening American policy against Syria with the passage of the “Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 -2004”, and the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 2005, which led to an international pressure on Syria that pushed it out of Lebanon. The second part of this chapter talks about the Syrian crisis that began as part of the “Arab Spring” revolutions. The subsequent repression of demonstrations by the Syrian regime, its use of heavy weapons in cities against civilians, and how these actions led to the imposition of sanctions by the European Union, the Arab League, and the United States on Syria again. During 10 years, the U.S, EU, and some other western countries sanctioned more than 1100 Syrian individuals, private companies, and government’s institutions. Those sanctions and some of them beside the war’s effects, would be explained in figures and tables in this chapter.

4.1 From the Crisis of 1980s to Cooperation in 1990s

The sanctions imposed by the USA have had an impact on the Syrian economy since the first set of sanctions were imposed in 1979, as Syria was placed on the

list of countries sponsoring terrorism. Then the economy was further affected by collective, but short-lived, sanctions, imposed by the UK, Western European countries and the USA in 1986, following the case of Nizar Hendawi. The Syrian economy has suffered as a result of sanctions and as a result of other factors, including the spread of corruption, the absence of rationing the usage of national resources, and the fluctuation in oil prices. The oil sector witnessed several crises that led to raising its prices during the years 1973 and 1979, and early 1980s, with a decline in Syrian oil production, therefore the Syrian market witnessed an abundance of foreign currencies, which was furthered by Arab aid. However, in the period following the 1986 sanctions, with the crisis of the increase in oil production above the market need, the Syrian economy was greatly affected, and Syria witnessed a significant increase in inflation rates which went as high as 18%. The Gulf money that was coming to support countries of confrontation with Israel, especially Syria, stopped after Hafez al-Assad took a stand in support of Khomeini's revolution in Iran and supported it in its war against Iraq. All of that led to a significant decline in Syrian resources. To address that problem, the Syrian state adopted a shrinking policy. Through that policy Syria stopped importing foreign goods, which led to a severe economic crisis, an increase in unemployment, a decline in the value of national currency, and a decrease in consumer spending from 74% in 1970 to 60% in 1975, then 65% in 1980 and 1985. Although government savings increased in 1975 to 20%, they dropped to 11% in 1980 and 10% in 1985. The trade deficit increased from 13% in 1970 to 26% in 1985. All of these bad figures for the Syrian economy in the period from 1975 to 1985 (Al-Himish, 2011, pp. 99, 12), were the result of the US and western sanctions, as well as internal corruption, the failure of economic plans and other local and regional political, military and security factors. At the regional level, Iraq entered a war with Iran from 1980 to 1988, which not only had a devastating impact on the two countries, but also on neighboring countries due to the political and military polarization in the region and the imbalance in the security system. The fact that Syria sided with Iran against Iraq led to the cancellation of Gulf aid, which was around 1.5 million USD on average. Additionally, Israel invaded Lebanon, reached Beirut in 1982, and expelled the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Syrian army from the city, which meant for Syria losing

resources that came from Lebanon in general and from the Beirut port specifically (Brynen, R. 1989). By the time, Egypt had already taken large steps in the peace process with Israel, whereas Hafiz al-Assad and the Baath party were isolated in the region, at a time where Syria was aligned with the axis of the Soviet Union. On the national level, in 1982 Syria witnessed the most violent internal confrontation ever in its history since its establishment, when the Syrian army besieged the city of Hama as a result of the confrontations with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian army killed more than 30 thousand civilians, and several thousand others went missing or were detained. Causes of the economic crisis that lasted from 1980 to 1990 can be mainly summarized in the following seven points:

1. The fact that Syria sided with Iran in its war with Iraq, which led to stopping the Gulf aid money.
2. Losing Syrian control over Beirut port and most of Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982.
3. Ending the US assistance provided to Syria.
4. The internal security crises, including the war against the Muslim Brotherhood and the coup attempt made by Rifaat al-Assad against his brother Hafez.
5. The launch of peace negotiations between Arab countries and Israel, leaving Syria politically isolated.
6. The widespread corruption in all structures of the Syrian government, including the executive, legislative, military and security establishments.
7. The incident of Nizar Hindawi and its consequences subjected Syria for the first time to collective sanctions by different international parties.

The 1989 year witnessed regional and international changes which casted their shadows on the Syrian political landscape. The Berlin wall fell during that year, marking the end of the era of the bipolar system in international politics. Saudi Arabia sponsored reaching the Taif Agreement among the Lebanese adversaries in that year. That agreement formalized the role of Syria as a custodian over Lebanon, in addition to its role within the Arab deterrent force. During 1990,

Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq, ordered the invasion of Kuwait, and that was faced by an international coalition established by the leadership of the USA to drive him out of Kuwait. This incident was the gateway for Assad to get back to the international arena through taking part in the international coalition in “The Desert Storm” operation, which kicked Iraq out of Kuwait and destroyed Saddam’s forces, the Baathist competitor to Hafez Assad. Although Assad continued his old regional policies during the 1990s, including the support to violent non-state actors, most of whom were listed on America’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations List like “ Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command. Hezbollah, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR), and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)”. (Foreign Terrorist Organizations - United States Department of State, 2020).

Assad also breached the UN Sanctions imposed against Iraq, but did not receive any sanctions from the international community or from the USA (Prados B. 2006). This could be because Hafez Assad practiced control over the activities of those organizations, turning them into tools, rather than genuine movements that act according to their own agendas. Syria had also entered into several rounds of negotiations with Israel. In this regard, The USA issued in 1994 The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of US defense articles and services to any country that questions US firms about their compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel.

However, sanctions imposed against Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism. In 1996, The USA issued the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the president to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (Section 325) or lethal military equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism list, (Congressional Research Service, M. Blanchard, & M. Sharp, 2011). The US pressure on Syria during that period continued with the aim of reaching a peace deal with Israel, as The USA was pushing the process forward. “The process started with the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and it was followed with a number of direct and indirect negotiations, but

never reached anything tangible” (Zuhair Diab, 2020). The US president Bill Clinton had visited Hafez Assad in October 1994, and Syria received the new Jordanian king, Abdullah bin Husein in the same year, in a clear change in its hostile position toward the Kingdom of Jordan on the backdrop of signing a separate peace accord with Israel. In 1998, Assad visited France in his first visit to a western country since 1978.

4.2 Developments of the Syrian Situation after 2000, US Invasion of Iraq and Expelling Syria from Lebanon

The relationship between the US and Syria fluctuated during the 1990s. With the beginning of the era of Bashar al-Assad in 2000, succeeding his father, there was a new hope in the region regarding the possibility of a change to occur in the nature of the Syrian regime. However, the events of 9/11, 2001 imposed new interactions in the region. There has been great cooperation between the Syrian and US intelligence on the issue of fighting al-Qaeda, but the US war on Iraq has reshuffled the cards, as Syria was against the US invasion of 2003 (H. Sadat & B. Jones, 2009).

Upon the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Syrian regime felt the danger of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, since the beginning of the war, Syria opened the Syrian borders to local and foreign fighters. It also established training camps for them, and it allowed extremist preachers to preach in the mosques to incite people against the US occupation of Iraq under the name of jihad. This led to an increased US pressure on Syria by the US administration of George W. Bush. The American demands from Syria, both pre- and post- the invasion of Iraq, focused on the following:

- Cooperation in terms of border control and stop the flow of foreign fighters.
- End the support for Palestinian and Lebanese organizations.
- Withdraw the Syrian forces from Lebanon.
- Support US actions and objectives in the region.

Although Syria continued to deny the US accusations against it, several American congress members pushed hard to increase sanctions on Syria. Indeed, that happened in 2003, through the executive order H.R. 1828, and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175), which stated:

- a. A ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
- b. A ban on US businesses operating or investing in Syria;
- c. A ban on landing in or over flight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
- d. Reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
- e. Restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States;
- f. Blocking of transactions in Syrian property, (Congress, 2003).

Between 2002 and 2004, Syria received the US secretary of state Colin Powell, several times who visited Syria to put pressure on it to meet the above-mentioned demands. The US has also practiced pressure in the UN Security Council to confront the Syrian policies and managed to pass resolution 1559 on 2 September 2004, which states the following:

1. Reaffirms its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon.
2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.
3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia (Resolution 1559, 2004).

In addition, there were four other paragraphs related to the political process in Lebanon. However, Syria did not implement the resolution until the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005. Syria and Hezbollah were the main suspects for the murder. Washington sent direct warning to Syria to conduct an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon, which was done. (Congressional Research Service, M. Blanchard, & M. Sharp, 2011). The following years witnessed attempts to keep the pressure on Syria, as with the sanctions imposed by the US Treasury on Syrian and Lebanese figures for their negative role in undermining democracy in Lebanon in 2007 ("US

sanctions against Lebanese and Syrians for "undermining the democracy" of Lebanon", 2007). Other attempts were to drive Syria to step away from its positions, whether through visits paid by American and European figures, such as Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives in 2007. In addition, John Kerry when he was heading the committee of foreign relations in the Senate or through allowing companies from the Gulf States or Europe to make large investments in Syria. Additionally, the Turkish mediation between Syria and Israel led the negotiations to a level where Israel accepted to withdraw from the occupied Golan Heights in 2008 (John Kerry Exposes Bashar Al-Assad's Concessions to Israel, 2018).

It was 2008 that witnessed further decrease in the international isolation imposed against Syria; the Summit of the Arab League was held in Syria, Damascus was visited by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Syria and Lebanon exchanged diplomats for the first time, the EU-Syria Association Agreement was signed in December 2008, so Syria's relations with Turkey improved greatly (Johnny, 2008). Internally, there has not been a change in the nature of the police regime during most of the regional and international changes. Nor was there any change in the structure of the regime in terms of elections. Syria continued electing Bashar to the presidency through public referenda that were conducted with coercion and forgery. The Syrian economy was fluctuating according to the international positions from Syria and the pressures practiced against it. However, the period of 2007-2011 represented the peak of pumping gulf funds for private, public and Private-Public partnership projects in Syria, and European funds in cooperation programs in terms of boosting the economy, fighting poverty, developing rural areas, and improving the performance of some state institutions.

All this positive change in Syria's relations with neighboring and European countries, which increased after the advent of Obama's administration and his policy of openness and containment toward Syria and Iran. They did not change the static fact that the Syrian regime is a totalitarian police regime whose survival depends on keeping the community under its control by surveillance, detention and forced disappearance of any individuals or groups that are suspected of opposing the regime. Syrian openness was not due to the US

sanctions alone, as the regime recognized that such sanctions do not aim to topple it. Nevertheless, there was a great change in the structure of the Syrian society, because of the increase of the percentage of young people and the advent of information technology, which had an impact on loosening the regime's grip to some extent. The regime also realized the importance of cooperating with the west and the USA to keep the gains of the ruling elite.

4.3 2011 the “Arab Spring” and Developments of the Crisis in Syria

The Arab Spring started from Tunisia in 2011 when Tunisians managed to topple the regime of Zein El Abidine Ben Ali who ruled them for over 20 years. The wave moved to Egypt where the people managed to topple the regime of Muhammad Hosni Mubarak who ruled Egypt since 1981. In parallel, a popular revolution erupted in Libya against Muammar al-Gaddafi who ruled Libya for about 40 years, and another revolution erupted in Yemen against Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled it since 1978. Protests in most of these countries managed to topple their governing regimes. Against this backdrop, the popular movement in Syria against the rule of the Assad family and its security and military system that lasted for over 50 years had started.

The popular protests in Syria started in February 2011, but quickly turned to become a popular war against the regime because of the suppression practiced by security and military forces against the revolting cities and towns. They killed hundreds of unarmed civilians in the squares during the protests and at homes. As the conflict expanded, armed opposition factions started to be formed to confront the Syrian government. The fighting extended and included the use of heavy weapons inside cities. Regional countries started to send their experts, whether to the side of the regime or to the other side. At that point, some quality changes would happen every now and again in the nature of the conflict taking place in the country. However, in 2013, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) appeared and declared control over Mosul in Iraq, and then in mid-2014 it assumed control over Raqqa in Syria. ISIS removed the borders between the two countries, becoming a self-proclaimed state with a territory under its control that is about 50% of the land area of Syria, and more than 30% of the

land area of Iraq ("ISIS" on the first anniversary of the declaration of the "caliphate", 2015).

4.4 The Syrian Regime under Sanctions

As the Syrian regime confronted people's demand for change with extreme force, Syria came under solid international positions, whether by the USA or some Arab countries and the European Union. A series of international sanctions have been imposed against hundreds of individuals supporting the regime as well as security, military, civil and economic institutions in Syria. This section will be divided into two parts according to two parameters. The first is the sanctions imposed by other countries on the Syrian regime and the second is the sanctions imposed by international organizations. Later, the discussion will take us further into the US and European sanctions, as they are the two parties that imposed the largest share of sanctions on the Syrian regime. The sanctions imposed by countries on the Syrian regime include the following:

4.4.1 Sanctions imposed by the USA

With the beginning of crackdown on the protests, the former US president Barack Obama issued an executive order on 29 April 2011, imposing new sanctions on Syria, expanding the ones imposed on the regime by virtue of decisions made in May 2004 within the framework of "Syria Accountability Act", and their modified versions of April 2006, and February 2008. The new sanctions targeted Syrian officials and public institutions and included a freeze of funds and a ban on commercial dealings with natural and legal persons subject to sanctions. On 18 May 2011, these sanctions were expanded to include the Syrian president himself, his deputy, the prime minister, the ministers of interior and defense, the director of military intelligence, and the director of the Political Security Branch. Later, in accordance with the mandate of President Obama's decision, the US Treasury Department froze the assets owned by the four main branches of the Syrian security forces that fall under the US jurisdiction, and prohibited Americans from any dealings with those branches. These sanctions were later expanded to include Muhammad Hamsho (one of the strategic economic arms of the Assad family), his holding company called

Hamsho International Group, the Syrian Commercial Bank and its subsidiary Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank in Beirut. It had also frozen the assets owned by the Syrian Real Estate Bank in the USA. The US Treasury sanctions also included the "Syriatel" mobile phone company, according to a separate presidential decree.

In August of 2011, the US government expanded sanctions to include the Syrian oil marketing company and the Syrian Oil Company, and froze all Syrian assets in the USA or those that fell under the jurisdiction thereof. Those sanctions banned Americans from making new investments or providing services to Syria, and banned the import of Syrian oil products. Early this year, the US Treasury Department froze the property of three Syrian institutes and laboratories: the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology, the National Laboratory for Standards and Metrology and the Institute of Electronic Engineering, and included them in the US list of centers used to spread weapons of mass destruction. In December 2011, these sanctions were followed with other sanctions targeting The Syrian Foreign Minister, in addition to military institutions and other businessmen. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria until the year 2019, the US imposed sanctions on nearly 750 cases of Syrian and foreign figures and entities within the regime or those who cooperated with it on economic or military issues. We will tackle the US and European sanctions in more details through tables of data illustrating the size and type of targeting (Marzouq, 2011).

4.4.2 Sanctions imposed by Turkey

On 30 November 2011, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced a series of sanctions imposed by his country on Syria, which included the freezing of Syrian government assets in Turkey, the suspension of relations between the Turkish Central Bank and its Syrian counterpart. In addition, Turkey made suspension of the delivery of all kinds of weapons and military equipment to Syria through its territories (Kayabal, 2011). The Turkish sanctions on Syria were considered a precedent in Turkey's dealings with a foreign country.

During the past century, Syrian-Turkish relations had witnessed severe tension for several reasons, most notably the issue of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which the Syrian regime considers a Syrian territory, the Euphrates River crisis and Turkey's construction of several dams on it, and the Syrian regime's support for the (PKK). The nature of relations between the two countries changed with the beginning of the rule of Bashar al-Assad. Relations with Turkey began to improve in line with the coming of Justice and Development Party rule in Turkey, and the relations were crowned with the signing of several agreements such as the Free Trade Agreement in 2004. In the period from 2000 to 2011, the two countries signed dozens of new protocols and agreements in various fields, including Defense, Security, Economy, Health, Agriculture, Irrigation, Environment, Electricity, Oil, and Transportation.

The volume of trade exchanged between the two countries in 2004, according to Bahaa al-Din Hassan, vice president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, reached 400 million US Dollars. After the agreements, the volume of trade recorded 2.2 billion US Dollars in 2010. However, relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011(Syrian-Turkish economic relations, 2017). During the years of war, the level of Turkish exports to Syria returned to their levels before the severing of relations, but they witnessed a change in the nature of materials exported from Turkey to Syria, which became mostly food and relief materials.

4.4.3 Sanctions imposed by Switzerland

Since 2011, Switzerland has joined the measures taken by the European Union against the Syrian regime. The Swiss sanctions targeted Syrian figures and entities, and included the freeze of funds, ban on financial transactions, and prevention of sanctioned individuals from obtaining entry visas to Switzerland. In addition to bans on the construction of power plants, communication devices, the export of precious metals and jewelry, and the prevention the Syrian Arab Airlines planes from taking off or landing in Swiss airports.

Switzerland began imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime as of 19 May 2011, after the Swiss federal government decided to join the measures taken by the European Union. In addition to imposing a ban on the export of military

equipment, the decision stipulates financial sanctions and limits the movements of 13 people. Although the sanctions did not include the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher was at the top of the list announced by Bern. Maher al-Assad, who is considered the second most influential figure in Syria, leads the Republican Guard and the Fourth Mobile Division that was used to invade Syrian towns. The list also included Rami Makhoul, the cousin of the Syrian president who until the year 2020 was the owner of the Syrian cellular communications company Syriatel, which is the most important local mobile phone operator. Makhoul also has a large presence in the fields of oil and public works.

The sanctions also included the decision to freeze funds and prevent obtaining entry visas for both Ali Mamlouk, who manages the "General Security" (the intelligence service), and Abdul-Fattah Qudsiyeh, head of the Military Intelligence Service. The same applies to the Syrian Interior Minister, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Shaar. These sanctions came in addition to a previous military ban ("Switzerland joins the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Syria", 2011). Switzerland added to the previous sanctions the freeze of some funds belonging to the Syrian president and leading Syrian figures. Switzerland remained on these sanctions, without imposing new ones, and in 2017, Switzerland refused a request by the Syrian Central Bank to lift the sanctions on it, and a claim by Rami Makhoul to remove the freezing of his balance in Swiss banks was rejected.

4.4.4 Sanctions Imposed by Australia

Australia announced imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime in 2011, including exporting weapons to Syria, and in 2012, it imposed more sanctions on Syria, which prohibited trade exchange in the oil sector, financial services, communications and precious metals with Damascus. According to the Australian Foreign Ministry statement at the time, the restrictions on the Syrian regime aimed to put pressure on it to end its repression. Australia has renewed its sanctions on Syria without adding new sanctions ("Syria sanctions regime", 2011).

4.4.5 Sanctions Imposed by Canada

Canada began imposing specific sanctions against figures from the Syrian regime in mid-2011, including freezing bank assets of persons associated with the Syrian government, in addition to expanding the sanctions to include the oil sector in terms of import, export and investment. In the same year, Canada added sanctions that included all imports from Syria, with the exception of foodstuff, and stopped the export of all communications and surveillance equipment. In 2012, Canada expanded its sanctions list to include other figures within the Syrian regime, and other sectors related to oil and services were added, in addition to freezing the assets of persons close to the regime. Sanctions stopped until 2014, as new measures were imposed in the fields of chemicals and chemical weapons. In 2017 and 2019, new names were added to the Canadian sanctions list (Regulations Made under the Special Economic Measures Act, 2019).

4.4.6 Sanctions Imposed by Japan

Japan imposed a set of measures on Syria in 2011, including the freezing of assets belonging to the Syrian president, in addition to figures linked to the regime and institutions affiliated with it. The sanctions were expanded in 2012 to include other financial sources for the Syrian president in Japan, which also included stopping the granting of entry visas to those covered by sanctions, and banning flights between the two countries (Japan expands Syria sanction Reach, 2012).

4.4.7 Sanctions Imposed by the UK

In the period 2011-2019, which included the year the UK left the European Union; Britain complied with the sanctions regulations imposed by the EU on the Syrian government. During Brexit, the United Kingdom confirmed its continued commitment to the sanction regulations imposed by the EU according to "two scenarios: First, in the event that Brexit is achieved with a deal and a transitional phase, then the European sanctions will be transferred immediately to the UK during the transitional period. The second scenario: Brexit without a deal, which requires endorsing the European sanctions with a separate British package (*Financial sanctions, Syria*, 2019). Draft resolutions have been

prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to include those covered by the European black lists in British laws,” which means covering about 349 people, through separate British lists, which include approximately 349 persons and entities.

4.5 Sanctions Imposed by Regional and International Organizations

4.5.1 Sanctions of the Arab League States

In their meeting in Cairo on 27 November 2011, the Arab foreign ministers adopted a set of economic sanctions against the Syrian government for ignoring the deadline offered by the Arab League regarding the Arab plan aimed at ending the campaign against peaceful protestors. The sanctions included banning the travel of senior Syrian officials to Arab countries, freezing Syrian funds, stopping business with the Syrian Central Bank, stopping investments, and preventing flights from Arab League countries to and from Syria. Nineteen countries approved the decisions, while Iraq objected and Lebanon refrained from taking a position under the slogan of "self-distancing". The decision also stipulated "asking Arab central banks to monitor bank transfers and commercial credits, except for bank transfers sent by Syrian workers abroad to their families in Syria and remittances from Arab citizens of Syria.”

The Arab League lacked real influence in the politics of Arab countries, and it has not been able to make a real impact on Arab politics since the 1980s. However, its role has most often been represented in the form of a platform through which Arab leaders present their vision of the Arab reality, and exchange accusations regarding the situation of Arab countries. The weakness of the Arab League increased with the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. The change in the presidents of the Arab republics of Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and the revolution in Syria led to the collapse of the previous balances in the Arab world. The change in the Arab republics prompted the emergence of a greater pioneering role for the Arab Gulf states, but soon there was a polarization within the Gulf, which led to a further weakening of the League’s role. Arab positions have witnessed a change in recent years towards the Syrian crisis. On 14 December 2018, the Arab Parliament supported Syria’s return to the Arab League. The ousted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visited the

Syrian capital Damascus. On 16 December 2018, The United Arab Emirates reopened its embassy in Damascus. On 27 December 2018, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan raised its diplomatic representation in Syria and reopened the "Naseeb Jaber" crossing. In addition to other diplomatic signals between some Gulf countries and Syria. These positions are considered a breach for the official Arab position, as the League of Arab States suspended Syria's membership on 12 November 2011, and economic and political sanctions have been imposed on Syria. In general, Arab positions were not united towards Syria. While countries such as Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Algeria, and the UAE continued to take a neutral stance or even supportive position of the regime. There was direct Iraqi and Lebanese support for the Syrian regime as a result of Iran's control of political decision in the two countries and its possession of dozens of militias affiliated with it in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, in addition to unclear positions from countries such as the Sultanate of Oman and Egypt after the coup of Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi (Abu Al-Rous, 2019).

4.5.2 European Union Sanctions

The brutal acts of repression practiced by the regime forces against the peaceful Syrian protest movement have prompted the European Union to act and impose sanctions on Syria since 2011. European sanctions include a list of measures, which are stopping all forms of commercial and technical cooperation between the two parties, stopping any payments and aid from the European Investment Bank, and freezing work on the association agreement between the two parties. Also prohibiting the purchase, import or transportation of Syrian oil and its products, preventing financial and commercial dealings with those covered by sanctions, freezing their financial assets, prohibiting their travel to the countries of the European Union. Moreover, it contains imposing a ban on Syrian cargo aircraft as well as the Syrian airline company, and prohibiting the supply of weapons to the Syrian regime. European sanctions imposed during the years from 2012 to 2019 included a list of more than 337 figures, Syrian and some non-Syrian figures who provided aid to the regime, in addition to sanctions and measures against political and military entities affiliated with or cooperating with the regime. The US and European sanctions will be discussed in more

detail through tables and graphs that illustrate the size and type of targeting (Sanctions against the regime extended by one year, 2020).

4.5.3 UN Sanctions

The United Nations has failed to intervene positively in the Syrian conflict, with regard to ending the conflict and stopping the violations perpetrated by the various parties, especially the Syrian regime, as it is still the politically recognized party, and is represented in international institutions. Although the main mission of the United Nations according to its principles is the maintenance of international peace, even if it necessitates imposing sanctions on certain countries, the international system has not been able to implement any provisions related to the protection of Syrian civilians and pressure the Syrian regime to change its behavior. The international organization has not been able to reach a consensus regarding exerting pressure on the regime since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 and its transformation into multiple and intertwining forms of wars, as a result of the Russian and Chinese rejection of any international punitive measure. The international organization has been curtailed since 2011, thanks to Russian pressure and the use veto by China and Russia 16 times between 2011 and 2020. (On the anniversary of the first veto how did Russia's most powerful weapon support Assad? 2020). These vetos were used against any resolutions, statements or measures by the UN and the SC, aimed to stop the war or put pressure on the regime. Whether they were regarding the use of weapons, the issue of missing and kidnapped persons, and even the use of chemical weapons against civilians.

The Security Council has only been able to adopt Resolution 2254 of 2015, which calls for the drafting of a new constitution to be approved within 18 months, and the conduct of elections under international supervision in accordance with the new constitution. In Paragraph 5 of its preamble it calls on “the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers, which shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent while ensuring continuity of governmental institutions.” However, Resolution 2254 did not specify the necessary constitutional arrangements for the transitional period that would extend for a period of 18 months. That resulted in the procrastination of the regime to enter the political process, and evading its

obligations under the UNSC Resolution 2254 until the end of 2020 (Carter Center, 2016). In addition to the failure of the United Nations to play an effective role in holding the Syrian regime and the parties violating international laws in Syria to account as a result of the Russian-Chinese rejection, UN officials were not in agreement with the US-European sanctions policy on the Syrian regime. This was demonstrated in statements by UN officials, such as Idris Al-Jazaery, the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, who said in 2018, that “the sanctions have greatly damaged the Syrian economy. The United States prevented the arrival of food, medicine, and spare parts to water networks and generators from reaching Syria”. A similar position to that stated by Idriss Al-Jazaery was presented by Stephane Dujarric, spokesperson for the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Who stated in 2020: “We echo the global call made by the Secretary-General to waive sanctions that could undermine the country's ability to guarantee access to food, basic health supplies and medical support, in light of the Covid-19 pandemic (“International expert: The sanctions imposed on Syria undermine human rights”, 2018).” This statement shows a warning position about the negative impact of international sanctions on civilians in Syria, but they also may give a hope to the Syrian regime, that there would be no accountability for its violations against the Syrian people.

4.6 Data of US and EU Sanctions

In the few next figures, an explanation of how frequent the EU, and U.S, sanctions were imposed on the Syrian regime and entities, would be presented, in addition to presenting some factors that affected the process of imposing sanctions like the emergence of ISIS, and the Iranian Nuclear program. Some of their economic effects would also be presented.

- Distribution of the European and U.S sanctions by year




Figure 4.1: Distribution of the European and U.S sanctions by year

Figure 2; Distribution of the European and U.S sanctions by year (the figure has been formed by the author depending on analyzing 1100 sanctioned entities, based on the Syria Report data base on sanction on Syria)

Data of the European Union illustrate that the EU sanctions against Syria are less, when they are compared to those imposed by the US, especially in 2013, “when only previous European sanctions were renewed. In addition no new sanctions were imposed on the regime, at a time when the number of Syrian victims had reached more than 95,000, the majority of whom were civilians who were killed under regime's bombing (Democratic Republic Studies Center, 2015).

The EU was not in favor of sharply escalating its policy against the regime, so it maintained its ban on arms access to the warring parties in Syria, including the Syrian opposition. The EU was also engaged in negotiations with Iran about the latter’s nuclear file, and the EU did not want to put severe pressure on Iran and its allies in the region or on the Iranian presence itself. The fact that Iran was heavily involved in Syria and supported dozens of Syrian, Iranian and Afghan militias, and other nationalities that Iran brought to Syria. That was one of the reasons that pushed the EU, and even the USA to reduce their sanctions against the Syrian regime, its militias, and the countries involved in the Syrian conflict, particularly in 2013. When the American administration and the Europeans were heavily involved in the Iranian issue. Some Iranian media sources in 2016 indicated that fact by referring to the existence of an Iranian agreement with the

American administration about lifting sanctions imposed on Iran in exchange for Iran's abandonment of the Assad regime (Al-Ahwaz, 2016).

The emergence of the Islamic State and its control over major cities in Iraq and Syria and its declaration of the Islamic caliphate on the doctrine and ideology of the organization in 2014 was another factor in the hesitation of the European Union's and the United States' stance against the Syrian regime. As several thousand European citizens joined the ranks of ISIS. Investigative reports within just two years concluded that over 41,000 fighters joined ISIS, including: 7,252 from Eastern Europe, 5,904 from Western Europe and 753 from the Americas, Australia and New Zealand (BBC, 2019).

The Syrian regime had been using the narrative of its fight against extremist organizations since the beginning of the crisis in Syria. At the time, imposing more sanctions on the Syrian regime would have led to its collapse, at a time when moderate Syrian armed opposition did not represent a capable force. That has also been indicated by studies in the extended period between 2013 and 2015 on how to confront ISIS with the need to punish the Syrian regime, with the caveat that sanctions do not lead to the collapse of the confrontation with ISIS. One of those studies was published by RAND think tank, stating that "the serious threat of economic sanctions and the possible repercussions of this threat are justified by the risk of continuing war in Syria and the continuing existence of the Islamic State in its present form" (RAND Corporation, 2017). The same concerns were expressed by the spokeswoman on international relations in the left wing of the German parliament, warning of the growing strength of the Islamic State. "This advance means new massacres against Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Shiites, Yazidis, Druz and other religious minorities. Millions of people are threatened with death," and she called for lifting sanctions on Syria to jointly combat ISIS, because these sanctions would only make ISIS stronger, calling for the necessity to stop the policy of regime change, which results in disastrous repercussions in the Middle East (The repercussions of the fall of Raqqa governorate to ISIS, 2014).



Figure 4.2: Targeted groups by the European sanctions

Figure 3, the targeted groups by the European sanctions; (the figure has been formed by the author depending on analyzing 1100 sanctioned entities, based on the Syria Report data base on sanction on Syria)

Figure (3) shows that the EU has focused on three key sectors in Syria, military commanders, security officers and officials in Syrian government departments, by a percentage of nearly 62%. These are smart sanctions targeting the structure of the Syrian regime. In addition to that, 12% of sanctions targeted private companies. These private companies have been largely targeted because they represented an indirect or even direct façade for figures from the Syrian regime, and they played economic roles in supporting the survival of the regime and its war machine.




Figure 4.3: European Sanctions on the Syrian government.

Figure 4, European Sanctions on the Syrian government. (The author, depending on analyzing 1100 sanctioned entities, has formed the figure based on the Syria Report database on sanction on Syria)

With regard to the distribution of sanctions according to government sectors, we find that European sanctions have largely targeted the Syrian oil sector, which is the most important sector in exports to the Syrian economy, having a direct impact on the regime's resources. However, the regime's loss of direct control over oil fields and its inability to make the necessary maintenance to those restored by the regime, made sanctions lose any direct effect on Syrian exports, but affected the oil imports of the regime to Syria. We notice that the commercial sector was targeted by about 33%, which led to a change of the trade exchange between the regime and the EU, which is about 45%, toward the Arab countries close to Syria, with a similar percentage.




Figure 4.4: Groups targeted by US sanctions

Figure 5, groups targeted by US sanctions. (The author depending on analyzing 1100 sanctioned entities, has formed the figure, based on the Syria Report database on sanction on Syria)

Figure (5) shows that the US sanctions focused heavily on the technocrat sector by about 45%, in addition to the terrorist organizations sector, which are linked to the Syrian or Iranian governments by undertaking combat or economic

operations for the Syrian regime. By focusing on technocrats, the USA tries to make a siege around the Syrian regime, preventing dealing with it, whether in their personal or governmental capacities. The USA focused on the private sector because of their role in support of the regime and its war machine.




Figure 4.5: Syrian agencies targeted by US sanctions

Figure 6, the Syrian agencies targeted by US sanctions, (the figure has been formed by the author depending on analyzing 1100 sanctioned entities, based on the Syria Report data base on sanction on Syria)

We notice from the US sanctions on the sectors of the Syrian government that there is intense targeting of the security and military institutions by around 80%, which is demonstrative of how much the military and security branches are involved in the human rights abuses committed against civilians.

4.6.1 Impact of Sanctions and War on Syrian Economy and the Structure of the Regime

All aspects of life in Syria have been affected by the war raging in it for 10 years. The war led to the internal and external displacement of more than half of Syria's approximately 23 million citizens when the revolution began in Syria in 2011. Within two years, Syria was divided into several zones of influence under the control of local forces opposing the Syrian government. By the end of 2013, the map of control began to change again, when ISIS controlled half of Syria, and the battle against ISIS began by several parties, which ultimately led to the

emergence of three zones of control in Syria. The perpetuation of the conflict and the stability of zones of control in the hands of some parties have led to the emergence of several forms of governance. Which were represented by the end of 2018 in three main forms: first, areas under the control of the Syrian government which has preserved the bureaucratic form of the state as it was. Despite the destruction, it suffered from in terms of its ability to carry out its official functions. Second, areas of the Syrian opposition that created several forms of local governance, some of which were functionally linked through some institutional hierarchy, especially in the field of education and local councils to a lesser extent. The remaining aspects of authority and administration in opposition areas were largely independent of each other and mostly linked to foreign supporters. For example, the health sector is managed, organized, and financed through international organizations and foreign civil society organizations. Opposition areas failed in creating unified financial, military, or administrative systems, despite their attempts to link some of their organs with the opposition interim government. The third zone is the one controlled by the Autonomous Administration under the management of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which formed an administrative, military, and political structure independent from the rest of the institutions of the other parties in Syria, such as the regime and the opposition. However, the Autonomous Administration kept some of the institutions of the Syrian government, mainly in al-Hasakah governorate, so those institutions conduct official transactions for citizens, especially with regard to official papers and documents.

The Syrian conflict, which has been going on for nearly a decade resulted in the state's loss of most of its capital and resources, be the human or economic. Due to heightened level of conflict which reached a level of total destruction of many areas and resources, and the increased control of local organizations over aspects of life, in addition to the involvement of international actors, with every foreign actor controlling resources that are produced or used in their respective zones of control. It is difficult to track the impact of sanctions on the Syrian regime in all its institutions, as studying such impact requires a kind of governance stability so that it is possible to evaluate economic development,

public capital, and the budget of the army and other state institutions. Therefore, this part will address some aspects of the impact of war, and some data that can give part of the indicators about the impact of sanctions on the Syrian state.

4.6.2 Impact of War and Sanctions on Syrian Economy

The conflict in Syria led to the division of the Syrian territories into different zones of control. The policies of various powers focused on forming their own structures of governance. The economy in Syria also witnessed a shift from normal economy to war economy, in a way that lacked coherence and was deprived of national policies, which led to a contraction of the overall economy by more than 54% between 2011 and 2018, according to a report of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). The report stated that what happened in Syria was contrary to the state of economic integration that was created in the country in the two decades preceding the conflict.

4.6.3 Damages to Physical Capital

The flight of a large part of Syria's capital to neighboring countries led to great economic loss. In general, Syria's losses amounted to more than 442 billion USD as the total of losses that afflicted the physical capital, in addition to the losses incurred by the gross domestic product, which declined from 61.1 billion USD in 2010 to 28 billion USD in 2018. The ESCWA report stated that "this colossal number does not express by itself the suffering of a people of whom at least 5.6 million have become refugees, 6.4 million internally displaced persons, 6.5 million suffer from food insecurity, and 11.7 million are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance." Figure (7) shows the annual levels of damage to physical capital between 2011-2018, in billions of dollars according to 2010 prices. (P. 47, ESCWA, 2020).




Figure 4.6: Annual levels of damage to physical capital from 2011 to 2018

Figure 7, p, 47. ESCWA.

The report also stated that the Syrian physical capital lost more than 117 billion USD during the years of conflict. The highest of which was in 2015, as a result of several factors, including the direct involvement of the Russian army in the Syrian conflict, which along with the Syrian army practiced the scorched land policy against areas outside the control of the state. In addition, ISIS expanded and besieged the city of Ain al-Arab (Kobani), and the city was destroyed in the process of expelling ISIS from it. Syria witnessed the lowest level in the loss of its physical capital in 2018, after the Syrian government regained control over most of the Syrian opposition areas, especially in the two most important Syrian cities, Aleppo and Damascus. Both cities were at the top of the cities that suffered losses in their physical capital, which reached around 32% of the total. The damage included most vital sectors of the Syrian state, especially housing and mining sectors, the army and security, transportation, health and electricity, as shown in the figure below (p. 48, ESCWA, 2020)




Figure 4.7: Sectoral distribution of the physical capital loss, 2011-2018

Figure 8 Sectoral distribution of the physical capital loss, 2011-2018 (billion dollars). The figure is been formed by the author depending on ESCWA, organization report.

4.6.4 Impact of War and Sanctions on the Exports Sector

The export and foreign trade sector has faced great obstacles since the beginning of the war. This sector was one of the key sectors affected by sanctions, as it is linked to the factor of relations with the countries to which Syria exports its materials, in addition to the fact that sanctions targeted Syrian financial institutions, and businessmen cooperating with the regime. This impact is shown by the percentage that exports and imports represented in the GDP, which was approximately 45% in 2010, and dropped to 27% in 2012, then it returned to increase steadily back to 43% in 2018. However, this increase was not mostly positive, as the proportion of imports increased at the cost of exports. The percentage of imports increased from 31% in 2010 to about 39% in 2018. On the other hand the percentage of exports decreased from 14% in 2010 to 4% in 2018. In absolute numbers, Syrian exports witnessed a decrease from 8.7% in 2010 to 4.1% in 2018.

Sanctions intensified the effects of the conflict on the Syrian economy, especially the oil sector that is one of the key sectors that came under US and European sanctions. Additionally, oil fields and pipelines have been subject to

massive sabotage, especially during the period of ISIS control. Accordingly, the proportion of oil and phosphate from Syrian exports dropped from 52% in 2010 to almost 0% in 2018. In light of this reality, the percentage of plant products increased from 10% to 56% of Syrian exports, but with a very low numerical value compared to the pre-conflict level. Sanctions on Syria led to a change in the traditional destination of Syrian exports. European countries used to receive about 46% of the total Syrian exports, at a value of nearly 5 billion USD, to decline to 0.15% in 2018, and in contrast, the share of Arab countries receiving Syrian goods increased from about 30% in 2010 to 62% in 2018. (pp. 60, 66. ESCWA, 2020). The figure 9 shows the change in the destination of Syrian exports, from European countries to Arab and regional countries, in addition to the general decline in exports. Exports to Russia, the country involved in the Syrian conflict, remained low, due to several reasons, including changes in the quality of Syrian exports. Which became mostly plant and agricultural exports, and most of their exporters wish to channel them through the lowest possible degree of international banking, to avoid the risk of facing sanctions as well as the desire to obtain their value faster.




Figure 4.8: Composition of exports, and their orientation between 2010 and 2018
 Figure 9; Syria at War: Eight Years on p,54 .

4.6.5 Impact of War and Sanctions on the Imports Sector

The sanctions also affected Syria's import sector. The value of goods imported into Syria fell from 17.6 billion USD to 6.7 billion USD between 2010 and 2018. Once again, as a result of sanctions, EU imports to Syria dropped from 25.8%, at the value of 4.9 billion USD to 10.7% at 0.7 billion USD in the same period. On the other hand, the share of Arab countries increased from 13.5% to 27.5%. At the value of 1.8 billion USD, whereas the shares of China and Turkey increased, and the shares of countries like Iran and Russia remained at almost the same proportions as before the war. Which is the result of evading direct trade in many cases as a result of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, in addition to the fact that these countries entered into direct contracts to invest Syrian natural resources. (pp. 53, 54, 55. ESCWA, 2020). In addition to the most important Syrian facilities such as phosphate extraction mines and Syrian ports. The figure below shows the change in the destination of Syrian imports in the years 2010-2018, and the change of destination from European countries to Arab countries, China and Turkey.




Figure 4.9: Composition of imports, their origin countries between 2010, 2018

Figure 10; Syria at War: Eight Years on p, 55

4.6.6 Impact of War and Sanctions on the Fuel Sector

Since the beginning of the war, 14 foreign oil companies have left Syrian territories for fear of international sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU on the Syrian oil sector. This caused the Syrian budget to suffer from a strong shock due to losing the most important source of revenue, namely oil, gas and minerals, which represented 25% of the budget revenue and 35% of Syria's exports. Foreign sanctions imposed on fuel supplies to the regime and the monitoring of any oil tanker bound for Syria carrying fuel and natural gas made the situation more difficult. Iran committed itself to provide the Syrian regime with oil derivatives at the rate of two tankers every month through the credit line signed between the two countries. Nevertheless, sanctions have contributed to besieging the regime and closing down on its capabilities to meet the country's needs of fuel, including gasoline, diesel, gas and electricity. Syria's daily need for energy supplies is estimated at 136,000 barrels of crude oil, about 4.5 million liters of gasoline, 6 million liters of diesel, 7,000 tons of fuel, and 1,200 tons of cooking gas, or 120 thousand gas cylinders. The daily financial bill is estimated at 8.8 million USD, which makes the monthly bill amounts to 264 million USD, making 3 billion and 168 million USD annually. The government indicated that the value of the monthly bill for the purchase of oil derivatives is 200 million USD. The suspension of the Iranian credit line at the end of 2018 contributed to hindering the payment of the energy bill and supplying the country with the fuel it needs, leading to a major crisis. The deficit of diesel lasted for 90 days, the deficit of gasoline reached 108 days, and the deficit of gas reached 45 days (Al-Nasser, 2019). Figure (11) shows the volume of oil production and consumption in the period 2010-2019. It is clear that production dropped from 385 thousand barrels per day in 2010 to 24,500 barrels by the end of 2019, which is 94% less than the 2010 production. Undoubtedly, this volume of production is unable to meet the daily needs except by 18%, provided that the daily consumption was 136,000 barrels per day in 2019 (Omran Center, 2020).




Figure 4.10: Syria`s daily oil production and consumption

Figure 11; Syria`s daily oil production and consumption. Omran Center, 2020.

4.6.7 The Impact of Sanctions and War on the Licensing of Companies

Sanctions and war have clearly affected the desire to open new companies in Syria, as evidenced by the number of companies licensed during 2019, with a total of only about 105 companies in various sectors, a very modest figure at a time when the state has increased control over large swathes of Syria. In addition, this comes at a time when the state needs a large number of companies to rebuild what has been destroyed by the war and provide services. It is noteworthy that most established companies were services and trade companies. As a result of the decline in the capital of these companies, and due to a desire not to take risks and enter a market that suffered from sanctions and crisis, these companies preferred to enter into businesses of a commercial nature and with little financial density that did not necessitate hiring many workers. The small number of licensed companies in 2019 shows the failure of the regime's approach to attract investment and funds to contribute to the reconstruction of the country despite military developments on the ground. Pro-regime parties and individuals developed a desire to collect easy money through trade which is rich with ways for corruption and exploitation of citizens, rather than taking risks in investing their capitals in industry or agriculture in such a situation Syria is going through.

Among the companies licensed in the service and trade sectors, are companies of land and marine shipping, exports and imports, general trade, real estates, logistics, and tourism investments. The share of the industrial sector was 13 companies working in cement, electric cables, plastic production and pharmaceutical industry, whereas the agricultural sector got a lesser share. Individuals close to the regime received licenses to companies newly established such as Marota City, Garden City and touristic facilities in Tartous and Latakia, at a time Syria is considered the poorest country in the world.

In terms of foreign component of licensed companies, Lebanon came first with 27 companies, followed by China with 5 companies, then Iraq, Jordan and Iran with 4 companies each, then Kuwait and UAE with 3 companies each, and Russia, Palestine and Tunisia with 2 companies each, and finally Spain, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan and the Netherlands with one company each. The interest of companies that include a Lebanese component indicates the intertwining relations between Syria and Lebanon through the militia of Hezbollah which provides military, financial and material support for the regime. The concentration of companies from these countries also shows the decline in attraction for investors from countries with strong investment capacities, such as Europe, the USA and other Asian countries, because of the unattractive investment environment in Syria due to the international sanctions imposed on the country. (Omran Center, 2019). In addition, the lack of a political solution that puts an end to the crisis and marks the beginning of a political transition and the start of reconstruction phase. Either we can say that those countries that invested in Syria are allies to the regime or they have no problem with the regime remaining in power

4.6.8 The Impact of War and Sanctions on the General Budget

The regime exhausted the Syrian national reserves of foreign currency, which reached 2 billion USD in 2012, which means within a year and a half since the beginning of the crisis. The Syrian government's reliance on financing increased the deficit in all the budgets of the years of the crisis. Internal debt increased as high as 4 trillion Syrian pounds (SYP), equivalent to 8 billion USD. This contributed to an increase in the monetary supply and the emergence of clear inflationary effects, and a distortion in the general budget, as the budget deficit

increased from 195 billion SYP in 2011 to 946 billion SYP in 2019 budget. The size of the general budget in US dollars dropped from 17 billion USD in 2011 to 8.9 billion dollars in 2019. External debt increased by 63% of the Syrian GDP in the years following 2012, as a result of the regime's dependence on foreign aid from Iran and Russia via undeclared loans. The table shows figures of the general budget adopted by the Syrian regime from 2010, the year that preceded the crisis in the country, to the year 2019. The figures illustrate the decrease in the value of the Syrian government's general budget to less than 9 billion USD in nearly 9 years of the crisis. Estimates indicate that the general budget declared by the Syrian regime does not reflect the reality of the specific fiscal year figures, as the state's resources cannot be fully traced. In addition to the fact that the regime relies on fixing the budget by focusing on current public spending that exceeds 80% of the total budget appropriations at the expense of investment spending that does not reach 20% in many budgets. This policy continued even in determining the budget for 2021. Current allocations occupied the greatest part of the 2021 budget and 2782 billion SYP were allocated to it; i.e. more than 71% of the value of the general budget. Investment spending received only around 1,100 billion SYP in value, i.e. less than 30% of the budget (about 2.5 billion USD, according to official exchange rates). This means that the main support sectors will not get much as the government has allocated only 430 billion SYP only for oil derivatives that is nearly one billion USD, about 361 billion SYP to support food supplies, 50 billion SYP for job opportunities and reconstruction, and 20 billion SYP for social support.

Table 4.1: Changes took place in the Syrian budget according to the year

Dollar exchange rate	Value in dollars	The Syrian budget	Year
45.5	16.5 billions	754 billions of SP	2010
45.5	18.3 billions	835 billions of SP	2011
55	24.1 billions	1326 billions of SP	2012
67.5	20.4 billions	1383 billions of SP	2013
140	9.9 billions	1390 billions of SP	2014
150	15.36 billions	1554 billions of SP	2015
250	7.9 billions	1980 billions of SP	2016
217	5.1 billions	2660 billions of SP	2017
500	6.3 billions	3187 billions of SP	2018
435	8.92 billions	3882 billions of SP	2019

Figure 12; Saleh, 2018

Throughout the years of the conflict, the Syrian government tried to control the deficit in the general budget, but it was unable to close the gap, so the percentage of revenue coverage for public expenditures has decreased dramatically over the past years. The deficit percentage in the 2019 budget reached approximately 42% of the budget value, i.e. The amount of foreign cash reserves at the Central Bank in Damascus decreased in 2018 to about one billion USD only, down from about 20 billion USD in 2010, according to what was announced by the Central Bank then. The World Bank estimates in 2016 indicated that the size of foreign monetary reserves in Syria dropped to about 700 million USD only, and later rose to nearly 1 billion USD after the monetary authorities in Syria intervened as a currency speculator (The collapse of Syria's foreign reserves within 7 years, 2018).

The totalitarian nature of the Syrian regime and its concealment of real figures about the country's economy affects most of the statistics. Nevertheless, the impact of war and international sanctions have clearly appeared on the Syrian general budget, in addition to the volume of deposits in Syrian banks. The total size of deposits in the banking sector have decreased by more than 82% in the

period 2010-2017, as a result of the deterioration of the economy, uncertainty and the high cost of the alternative opportunity to acquire funds in Syrian pound that was losing its value. The value of deposits in USD dropped from 8.29 billion USD in 2010 to 6.4 billion USD in 2016, which is 85%. It is estimated that deposits grew in 2017 by about 14%, reaching a value of 3.5 billion USD, but at the time of writing this paper, no real figures were released in this regard (p. 59, ESCWA, 2020). Therefore, the banking sector is one of the sectors most affected by the war, as the branches of public and private banks went out of service in areas of tension and stopped offering their services to clients. Bad loans became dead debts, the collection of money stopped in areas of tension, and the purchase power of national currency decreased. Sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU have led to an almost complete cutoff of banking operations and bank transfers for most sectors, with sanctions targeting banks dealing with the Syrian regime, in addition to punishing dozens of individuals and entities that have large capital in the name of the regime. In addition, the mere fear of US and European sanctions pushed international companies not to deal with Syrian individuals or the Syrian financial system for fear of sanctions.

4.6.9 The impact of sanctions and war on other sectors

The war has greatly affected the industrial sector in Syria with the massive destruction that occurred in Syria as a result of the battles that took place inside the main industrial Syrian governorates, especially Aleppo and Damascus. It is estimated that Syria has lost 67% of its industrial capacity because of the war, and it cannot rebuild the industrial infrastructure it has lost. It is very difficult for Syria as well to repair the rest of the sector, so that the authorities can provide the required services as a result of several factors, including the absence and loss of hard currency in addition to the sanctions imposed on Syria that target all companies and individuals dealing with the Syrian regime. The Syrian agricultural sector also lost a large percentage of its strength as a result of the war and the change of the force in control over the lands, which made large areas of agricultural lands become out of active service. The various warring parties, especially the regime, targeted crops belonging to people in areas outside its control, Syrian imports of food increased, although before the war, Syria was a self-sufficient country that exported many foodstuffs.

Syria lost part of its economic and historical resources as a result of the war and the destruction of historical sites, which led to the loss of more than 8 billion USD in revenues of Syrian tourism that was made in 2010. In addition to tourism sector, the country lost an important part of aviation and air shipping transit resources, and the movement of arrival to and departure from Syria has stopped, and the number of ships that use Syrian ports, whether as a result of severing relations or sanctions imposed on Syria, decreased by 62% compared to 2010. Losses in the Syrian physical capital in the electricity sector led to the loss of nearly 4 billion USD paid by citizens to get electricity from power generators (Syrian Chinese Business Council, 2019).

5. CONCLUSION

Speaking on sanctions keeps to be controversial subject, even though punishment measurements have been used for a long history of the humanity, but since in most cases they have been imposed by great powers on authoritarian, and dicta regimes, they been discussed from two aspects; are they effective or not, also are they a foreign policy tool or not?

In this work and by looking through the history of sanctions, starting from the beginning of the national states formation, and the first World War, which led to the formation of the League of nations. Later the Second World War, and the formation of the United Nations, the paper found that sanctions were both. In some cases used as a political tool, when it was imposed on countries that were opponent to the USA`s policies especially during the cold war, on the other hand they were a measurement which by it the international community tried to maintain the stability of the international security. However the scientific society is divided in this regard, but in general most of scholars are in support of sanctioning entities that violate international law, but with different attitudes toward the severness and level of sanctions. In this regard, the most realistic analyze was the work named as TIES dates, which found that authoritarian regimes may cooperate when they find that it will not result in their collapse, and sanction`s success would increase in case of the involvement of international institutions. On the other hand, the most probable reaction of an authoritarian in face of fatal sanctions is to resist them. This conclusion can be seen in the reaction of the Libyan, when Libya preferred to face sanctions was imposed only from the US, but when the nature of sanctions changed and a group of Western countries involved in the process, Libya preferred to cooperate, since sanctions were not aiming to tuple the regime.

The Iranian case also bring us to the same conclusion, since before 2000, Iran preferred to resist US, sanctions, but when the EU, and UN, get involved in the

sanctions senders, Iran engaged in negotiation process, and reached an agreement with the 5+1 group.

The Syrian case with sanctions can be traced back to the mandate period, since Syria was mandated by France until 1948, also Syrians witnessed the formation of Israeli in the same year 1948, by another Western country, the United Kingdom. Moreover after the Syrian independence the U.K, and U.S, tried to form and establish alliances in the region, in attempt to gather many countries in groups facing the Soviet Union, and establishing peaceful relations with Israel. Those reasons kept Syria always insecure, and skeptical about Western countries intentions toward Syria. Based on the regional motivations, and the rule of Bath party, Syria made steps toward the socialist camp, during 1960s, and 1970s. Eventually after Hafiz al-Assad military coup, Syria became one of the countries, that is full engaged in the opponent policies of US, in addition Hafiz started to involve in the regional conflicts through armed non states groups, by doing this Syria became a target of U.S, sanctions in 1979, by putting Syria on the list of the terror sponsoring states.

1979, sanctions were not successful in changing Syrian rulers behaviors, for many reasons; they were unilateral sanctions, also there were support of Arab countries, and the Soviet Union to Syria, economically, and politically. The situation changed in few years when Syria faced sanctions for the second time in 1986, after Syria was accused of the attempt of exploding the El Al Israeli Airlines flight 016. In this case, Syria for the first time faced multilateral sanctions from the European community, U.S, and UK. Those sanctions pushed the Syrian president to change some of his policies regarding the Palestinian groups. Even though Assad made some modification in his policies, they were very limited, and they were not just because of sanction. But also because of the peace deals between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, also the decrease of the finance support of the Arab Gulf countries to Syria, as a result of Syria support of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and Iran against Iraq in the Iranian Iraqi war. Nevertheless Assad had benefited from sanctions, by forming a portrait of the leader, who resisting the imperialist states, and Israeli occupation and aggression.

From the main new findings regarding 1979, and 1986 wave of sanctions on Syria, are; first sanctions were imposed when the Syrian regime threatened the interests of the western countries, not as a result of the brutal policies of the Syrian government in Lebanon through committing massacres after the first involvement in Lebanon in 1975. Also the Syrian Army committed huge massacres in Hama, Aleppo provenances and other regions of Syria during the Muslim Brotherhood movement events, which reached their peak in 1982. But there were no any actions from the international community in this regard.

The second was; the Syrian economy was hurt during 1986 sanctions, not only because of sanctions and other reasons been mentioned, but also was a result of the Arab funding's cut that was a result of the Syrian ruling president support to Iran, during the Iranian- Iraqi war, combined to this reason, Syria lived a period of isolation, during and after Egypt and Jordan reached to separate peace deals with Israel. Another important factor that happened between the 1979, and the 1986 sanction waves was the Israeli occupation of Beirut port and harbor in 1982. Beirut during that period had become Syrian main gate to the international market, exporting and importing, beside all the illegal operation were taking place in the port in the interest of the Syrian regime. The impact of losing Beirut port and Lebanon`s economy conditions can be seen also with its effects on the Syrian economy in 2018, 2019, and 2020, during Lebanon economic crisis, and the explosion accident of Beirut port and harbor, were the Syrian ponds witnessed one of its hardest drops.

Another sanction`s case was in 2003, when Washington target Syria by some sanctions for her presence in Lebanon, but the real reason of those sanctions were the Syrian position toward the American invasion of Iraq, so the Syrian government, choose to not bend to them, but just in Just period of two yeas Lebanon witnessed and explosion that resulted in the assassination of Lebanon former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The assassination of Hariri put Syria face to face with a decision from the Security Council, beside a very hard regional and international pressure. The pressure brought result when Syria withdrawn from Lebanon, and started to secure the border with Iraq, to stop the crossing of the radical organizations figures and equipment`s from Syria. The period between 2005 and 2011, was marked with some attempts from the Syrian government to

ease the relation with the western countries, with the help of some regional countries, and the attempt did succeeded in few files. Syria relations with the EU, was in better situation, also with Turkey after decades of tension, however this positive atmosphere did last for long time, since in 2011, the Arab Spring reached to Syria.

The Syrian people started to protest the political and governmental situation in their country in March 2011, and immediately the Syrian government returned with crashing the civil movement in the country, soon the crackdown of the regime on the civil protest led to the transform of the protest to armed uprising, and later reached to civil war in some periods. In short time after the Syrian uprising, the EU, and US, started sanctioning the Syrian institutions and individuals that are engaged in oppressing people, later the League of Arab States, joined them but with more limited sanctions, also some other countries imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria with less updating list. Starting from 2011 and until the time of writing this paper the US, and EU, sanctioned more than 1100, entity from all Syrian governmental institutions and individuals and others, including the security branches and military which are directly involved in killing hundreds of thousands of Syrian in directed targeting or by long process of torturing or besieging civil communities for long periods. In addition, the Syrian banking system and bureaucrats were sanctioned very frequently for their role of supporting the Syrian president and government. Beside the damages that happened to the Syrian economy and physical capital either because of the war or the sanctions. Other damages were possible to note like the sharp decline in all Syrian privet sector, which faced shrinking in the local markets and obstacles in far and neighbor markets, also all Syrian infrastructure were not able to rebuilt as a result of the lack of security and foreign currencies. Moreover, beside the war impacts sanctions also led to transfer a huge part of the Syrian economy to the informal sector, as well for the foreign financial transactions were moved out of the Syrian formal system toward the informal hawala system. Another sector, which was effected by sanctions, was the agriculture, which faced a lack in fuel supplements, beside a lack in the fertilizers.

However all of those sanctions could not change neither Syrian ruling class, nor their violations against the Syrian people, for many reason;

The first of all the regime realized that cooperating with the demands of sanctions senders, would mean its collapse, and according to most of scholarly opinions in this regard, this kind of regimes would prefer to resist sanctions in this case, as the Syrian regime had did.

The second; was the appearance of other threats to the international security, like the Islamic State “ISIS”, which took control of nearly 50% of Syrian, and Iraqi lands, and conducted attacks in EU. The Syrian regime presented itself as the fighter of the radicalism, so the collapse of the regime would mean the spread of “ISIS” to other countries.

The third was the support of Iran, and Russia, to the Syrian government, in all aspects, economically by offering direct cash, and providing tens of thousands of military personals, and militia elements. In addition, Russia used the veto right for 12 times in the Security Council preventing the Council from taking any steps toward the violations of human rights in Syria.

The fourth; was the establishment of many new economic networks, by the Syrian government inside and outside of Syria, which are replacing any entity that is sanctioned, Also the regime were benefiting from the remittances that Syrian diasporas were sending them to their families inside the country.

Those reasons and the others like the militarized nature of the Syrian regime, beside the absence of international will either to change the Syrian regime, or to impose comprehensive sanctions in the proper time, made the series of imposed sanctions something expected by the Syrian government. The exit from the Syrian chaotic situations looks very complicated, but the international community now has only the option of tightening the sanctions on the regime, which may make the regime to step toward the political transformation, that monitored by the international communities.

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