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İSTANBUL AYDIN UNİVERSİTESİ
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



EGYPT FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION
AND ITS IMPACTS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Mohamed Elsheikh

Department of Political Sciences and International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin Uzun

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M.Sc. THESIS

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Y1612.110015

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To my mother who taught me the love of knowledge,

FOREWORD

The Arab Spring revolutions gave sense of optimism to large numbers of young people in the Arab world. They have seen long lasting dictatorships crumble under the pressure of peaceful popular movement.

In Egypt, the revolution failed to reach real democracy so far. There are many reasons that led to this result, but the most important cause is the problems in civil-military relations. While the effects of Egypt's foreign policy encouraged military to maintain power and impede democratic transition.

Most studies of civil-military relations focused on the internal environment as the conflict revolves between two groups within the state over the power. This study contributes to shedding light on the influence of the external variable on the relationship between civilians and the military in Egypt.

Istanbul Aydın University gave me the chance to present this study, which I hope to be useful for researchers interested in Egyptian affairs, as the changes taking place in Egypt have a direct and significant impact on all region.

I especially thank Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin Uzun. I have benefited greatly from her guidance during writing of this thesis. I also thank all the teaching staff who taught me the courses I completed during the master program.

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Mohamed Elshe

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EGYPT FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION AND ITS IMPACTS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

ABSTRACT

In civil-military relations, the focus is generally on the domestic variables. This is mainly because that this type of relations can be described as special type of bureaucratic politics. It is simply; two bureaucratic groups are competing or clashing over the political powers. The thesis main hypothesis is that the foreign relations of Egypt have significant impact on the civil-military relations inside Egypt. This impacts are usually in favor of the military. The study reviewed the hypothesis by examining the foreign relations of Egypt during different periods which represents different political regimes adopting variant foreign policy orientations.

As the Egyptian regime is mixture of military and personal rule; the periods of study are divided according to presidents. In each period the foreign policy orientation of the president is examined and the direct effects on the civil-military relations in that period is analysed in order to conclude clear patterns of impacts.

The study focuses on Egypt's relations with United States and Soviet Union and later Russia in international level. Also it focuses on Egypt's relations with Israel and Gulf countries especially Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in regional level. These relations are examined from the establishment of the republic after 1952 coup against the dynasty, starting by Nasser, then passing by Sadat and Mubarak, ending with different regimes after 25 January 2011 revolution, including ruling period of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Morsi, and Sisi.

This thesis assume that there are factors can hold significance in studying foreign policy interaction with civil-military relations in Egypt like military agreements with foreign states, Economic interests of both foreign states and the military, and Financial loans and aids. By studying these factors, the motives of foreign countries to intervene domestic politics can be understood. Also these factors can give clear idea about size of this intervention and its impact on the relations between civilians and military.

Egypt foreign policy witnessed shifts from non-alignment to east as USSR ally during Nasser period and then dramatically changed and became as US ally from Sadat period till nowadays. Except Morsi period, the armed forces succeeded to gain benefits from different situations in order to enhance the political cover of the existing regime and to obtain various forms of military, security and economic support.

The thesis concludes that the foreign countries interaction with Egypt can be addressed as a main factor that strongly shaped the relative balance of political powers between civilians and the military. The significance of the external factor on the civil-military relations was persistent despite the foreign policy orientations

changed widely throughout historical advancement. And this contributed to the obstruction of the democratic transition.

Keywords: *Egyptian regime, Military coip, Revolution*

MISIR'IN DIŐ POLİTİKA YÖNELİMİ VE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŐKİSİNE ETKİSİ

ÖZET

Sivil-asker ilişkilerinde odak nokta, genellikle, yerel değişkenlerdir. Bu durumun temel sebebi, sivil-asker ilişkilerinin bürokratik siyasetin özel bir türü olarak tanımlanabilmesidir. Basitçe ifade etmek gerekirse, iki bürokratik grubun siyasi güçler üzerinden rekabet etmesi veya çarpışması sözkonusudur. Bu tezin ana hipotezi, Mısır dış ilişkilerinin ülke içerisindeki sivil-asker ilişkileri üzerinde önemli ölçüde etkilediğidir. Bu etkiler, genelde ordunun lehineydi. Çalışmada, ilgili hipotez farklılaşan dış ilişkiler yönelimlerin benimsendiği farklı siyasi rejimleri temsil eden çeşitli dönemlerde Mısır dış ilişkilerinin incelenmesi yoluyla değerlendirildi.

Mısır rejimi, askeri ve sivil yönetimin karmasından oluştuğu için, incelenen dönemler başbakanlara göre ayrıldı. Net etki desenleri belirlemek amacıyla, her dönem için ilgili başbakanın dış siyaset yönelimi incelendi ve bu yönelimin sivil-asker ilişkisine doğrudan etkileri analiz edildi.

Bu çalışma, Mısır'ın uluslararası düzeyde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Sovyetler Birliği ve sonrasında Rusya ile olan ilişkileri üzerinde durmaktadır. Ayrıca, bölgesel düzeyde, ülkenin İsrail ve Körfez Ülkeleri ve özellikle Saudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ile arasındaki ilişkiler merkeze alınmaktadır. Ülkeler arasındaki ilişkiler, 1952 askeri darbesi sonrasında hanedana karşı kurulan cumhuriyetin kurulmasından itibaren incelendi. Nasser dönemiyle başlayan inceleme, Sedat ve Mübarek dönemlerinin ele alınmasından sonra Yüksek Silahlı Kuvvetler Konseyi (SCAF), Mursi ve Sisi dahil 25 Ocak 2011 devriminin ardından kurulan farklı rejimlerle sona ermektedir.

Bu tez, Mısır bağlamında, dış ilişkiler ile sivil-asker ilişkileri arasındaki etkileşimin incelenmesinde, yabancı devletlerle yapılan askeri anlaşmalar, her iki taraf devletin iktisadi çıkarları, mali kaynaklar, krediler ve yardımlar gibi bazı faktörlerin önemli rol oynadığı varsayar. Bu faktörler incelenerek, yabancı devletlerin ülkelerin iç ilişkilerine müdahale etmesinin arkasındaki amaç ve ayrıca, müdahalenin ölçeği ve sivil-asker ilişkileri dahil olmak üzere ülkenin iç iktidar dengesine etkisi anlaşılabilir.

Mısır dış siyaseti, Nasser döneminde Bağlantısızlar Hareketinden Doğuya (S.S.C.B. müttefikleri olarak) geçti, ve Sedat döneminden itibaren bugüne gelinceye kadar A.B.D. müttefikliğine geçerek, kökten bir değişime tanık oldu. Mursi dönemi dışında, silahlı kuvvetler, mevcut rejimin siyasi yüzünün güçlendirmek ve çeşitli askeri, güvenliğe yönelik, ve iktisadi destek elde etmek amacıyla farklı durumlardan fayda edinmeyi başardı.

Tezde, Mısır'ın yabancı ülkelerle olan ilişkilerinin, siviller ile ordu arasındaki göreceli dengeyi şekillendiren başlıca faktör olduğunu sonucuna varıldı. Dış faktörün sivil-asker ilişkileri açısından önemi, dış ilişkiler yöneliminin tarihsel ilerleme boyunca değişiklik göstermesine karşın sürmüştür. Bu durum, demokrasiye geçişin önünde bir engel teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : *Mısır rejimi, Askeri darbesi, Devrim*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Topic

Egypt is one of the countries that witnessed the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The years following the revolution showed problems in civil-military relations lasting from the establishment of the Republic in July 1952, these events also showed the impacts of Egypt's relations with regional and international powers on the relationship between civilians and military.

This thesis examines Egypt's foreign policy orientation that affects civil-military relations in Egypt, focusing on Egypt's alliances and rivalries at both regional and international level, especially after Egyptian revolution in 25 January 2011, as this period represents remarkable change because the military came to front for the first time since Nasser became the president of Egypt in 1954. Moreover, during this period it was the first time that civilian president heads the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

In civil-military relations, the focus is generally on the domestic variables. This is mainly because that this type of relations can be described as special type of bureaucratic politics. It is simply; two bureaucratic groups are competing or clashing over the political powers. This can be between the military and the presidency, the cabinet or the elected representatives as in democratic states. And maybe between the military and the opposition or as intra-military competition when the military completely seizes the political power and the main ruling elites is derived from military as a sole base. The second form is strongly present in developing states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Middle East was always field for the last mentioned form and Egypt represented clear example for the civil-military scholars.

The problematic issue of civil-military relations in Middle East stems from the military dealing with topics called national security. It ranges from purely military matters to issues of political, economic and social stability in the state, the region and the world. Military considers that all these matters have a reflection on military performance and professional composition.

Egyptian republican system, emerged from military coup in 1952 by Gamal Abd El Nasser. Egypt was ruled by four military figures until date. They are Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and El Sisi. The only exception is Morsi who was coming from Muslim Brotherhood and only for one year and he is now in jail after El Sisi made a second coup in Egypt's modern history and ousted him in July 2013. Even in transitional phase after the 25 January 2011 revolution in the context of the Arab spring, the SCAF took the control of the power. Therefore, military dominance re-emerged in the Egyptian politics.

1.2 Hypothesis

The thesis main hypothesis is that the foreign relations of Egypt has significant impact on the civil-military relations inside Egypt. This impacts were usually in favor of the military. The regional and international powers, competing for influence within Egypt, realized that the army is the solid power of the political system. The armed forces took advantage of this situation to gain benefits from different countries in order to enhance the political cover of the existing regime and to obtain various forms of military, security and economic support.

Egypt foreign policy witnessed shifts from non-alignment to east as USSR ally during Nasser period and then dramatically changed and became as US ally during Sadat period which lasted till nowadays. There are patterns and trends, which represents a causal relation between foreign relations instances and civil-military relations transforms, can be generalised on similar cases and hold explanatory power to several repeated events in the advancement of relation between civilians and military in Egypt.

1.3 Purpose/ Importance

Most academic papers studying Egypt's civil-military relations focus on internal factors, but this thesis helps in understanding the mechanisms by which the international determinant implied its impact on civil- military relations in Egypt. Also it examines the effects of changes in the international system on civil-military relations in Egypt.

The majority of studies refer to the weakness of the political structure and culture in the Middle East as main reason for the defects in civil-military relations in Egypt. The exogenous variables related to the foreign policy orientation of Egypt imposes

great impact over the end shape of the civil-military relation inside the country. That is because the political structure and culture is not sufficiently developed, the foreign interventions is weakening it more and indeed maybe one of its fundamental origins.

1.4 Methodology

The method applied in the thesis is composed of both qualitative and quantitative methods.

- The qualitative methods include: a) Secondary analysis on scholarly articles covering Egypt's foreign policy orientation and therefore exploration the impacts on civil-military relation. b) Content analysis of published news, statements, and interviews in local and international media.
- B) The quantitative methods include: a) Quantitative analysis of aids and military deals. b) Quantitative analysis of the trade exchange with other countries.

1.5 Literature Review

After the World War II, There was a breakthrough in studying civil-military relations. There was two opposing arguments by Samuel Huntington in his book 'Soldier and the State' (1956), which is considered as baseline of the contemporary civil-military theories that dominated the academia for several years, and Morris Janowitz in his book 'Professional Soldier' (1957). According to two books, three points of disagreement emerged.

Huntington considered that the professional military institution must be subject to political power, but assumed that this submission does not need any actions to be achieved, that was criticized by Janowitz, stressing the need to activate a number of political and cultural mechanisms within the community and the military to reach this situation.

Huntington distinguished between two types of civil control over the military, first is direct or subjective means that the civil authority has absolute control over the military. The second is indirect or objective so that only political objectives are governing. Huntington supported the second type, which allows high degree of professional independence, but Janowitz opposed this argument, as he considered that it contradicts the strategic logic of how to manage the various sources of power, not only military, in a way that achieves political objectives. In other words, the function of the political level is not limited to setting political objectives, but

ensuring that the following levels are implemented in a manner that achieves those goals.

Huntington considered that the military performance requires values and customs different from the surrounding society, while Janowitz saw that despite the specificity of the military but it is necessary to interact and respect the society norms, in order to make the military recognize themselves as part of the society and not only its guardian.

Huntington produced his assumption about what he called the 'military mind'; and he assumed that the military mind can be described as conservative realm. Building on that he demanded the accepting and dealing with this mentality in order to obtain balanced civil-military relations within the state (Huntington, 1957). Taking into considerations that his theory originated in the context of the cold war with the soviet union, and the ongoing internal debate in the United States about the balance of the military role in the foreign policy decision, and also that Huntington himself was known for his conservative perspective, some scholars like Bishara criticizes this theoretical perspective attributing its bias to the Huntington alignment with specific stand on deciding the military's foreign policy determinant role (Bishārah, 2017).

Both Huntington and Janowitz focused on the internal factors that influence the civil-military relations, That was the same with Sam Finer's who wrote one of the most important literature in this field 'The Man on the Horseback' (1962), He studied the problems of military intervention in politics and military coups which repeated in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. The importance of Finer's study is that it tracks the factors leading to military intervention like institutional and personal interests of military, loss of confidence in the civilians, and feeling responsibility about maintaining the state entity.(Finer, 1962)

Noboru Yamaguchi and David A. Welch had studied the civil-military relations from the bureaucratic politics perspective in their article 'Soldiers, civilians, and scholars'. In their article, they examined ways by which military can hold an effect on the foreign policy orientation. First building on Clausewitz, they saw the military force as a foreign policy tool. And its functions can be varied from: offense, defence, deterrence, competence (convincing an adversary to do something by threatening

force), intervention, signalling (showing support for an ally) and to occupation as well. (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005)

They mentioned four ways by which military can affect foreign policy of a state, it can be seen as levels of dominance in the decision making process:

- Military establishments and military interests which can set the political agenda.
- Military considerations which can constrain options.
- Bureaucratic interests of the military which can heighten political tensions.
- Military rivalries which can increase the inertia of political hostility (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

Welch and Smith (1974) studied factors that may facilitate a military withdrawal from politics like that military elites question their further involvement in politics, possibility to avoid internal conflicts, and growing confidence in the civilian to lead the state. (Welch and Smith, 1974) Despite the study of the former Spanish Minister of Defence Narcisse Serra, 'Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces' provided analytical framework or model to create civil control over the military during the democratic transition, including democratic consolidation phase. But he did not focus on how to deal with external challenges that affect the transition to democracy.

Another study by Roger W. Benjamin and Lewis J. Edinger attributed the level of military control over foreign policy determination process into multiple number of variables, and they proposed a causal relation model between those variables and the military control over foreign policy making. The proposed variables are:

- Decision-making framework: which examines the roles of the military in the decision making process.
- Normative role perception: this variable represents how the military perceive its role in the state.
- Political structures: studies how the political structure in a given state can afford more or less opportunity for military control.

- Military resources and organization: sheds the light on the material and institutional advantages that military may hold and adds a momentum for military interventions in the foreign policy.
- Socioeconomic patterns: how the society composition and the economic conditions can give the military ground for more dominance in the foreign policy making process.

The study only concentrated on major states: United States, Germany, France and Japan. They concluded that this multivariate relation could be a suggestive model for studying military role over foreign policy determination rather than univariate models (Benjamin & Edinger, 1971).

During the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars argued that armed forces may have a positive role in politics. Shils (1962) and Vatikiotis (1961) viewed armies as agents of modernisation in the newly independent states of the Middle East and they can lead the processes of industrialisation, due to the organisational capacity. This reflected the embrace of modernisation theories, which dominated academia in the 1950s and 1970s and considered industrialisation as the key to the development of modern societies. But this argument did not focus much on the role of external aids or sanctions in modernisation.

Pearlmutter (1969) used the term praetorian state, a state in which the military has the potential to dominate the politics. In a praetorian state political leaders come mainly from the military, and the military plays a dominant role in all key political institutions (Pearlmutter, 1981). He viewed the military as a repressive force, seeking to acquire more power and use it to serve its own interests. He argued that once a military comes to political power, it was unlikely to hand over power to civilians. (Pearlmutter, 1969). Nordlinger (1977) distinguished between military moderator, guardian and ruler regimes. In line with Pearlmutter, he argued that the actions of military are affected by their interests, rather than by any other thing. (Nordlinger, 1977) and these interests have dual interaction with foreign countries' orientations towards the state.

On both the theoretical and practical level of study of civil-military relations, the western studies cannot afford a reliable frame for studying civil-military relations in Egypt as one of Middle East countries. The problem lies in the western bias towards

the western contexts of shaping civil-military relations. For example, Huntington built his theory upon examining the armies' history in western countries as Germany and France and the emergence of what he called the military professionalism. This is completely incompatible with the modern Egyptian army, which has been established under the British occupation of Egypt. Noboru Yamaguchi and David A studied the civil-military interactions in foreign policy determination by bureaucratic politics, while mostly in Egypt the military is more decisive on foreign policy as ex-military personnel in the presidency and government, mainly occupy the bureaucracy.

This thesis assume that there are four factors can hold significance in studying foreign policy interaction with civil-military relations in Egypt and it may be valid for many other Arab Middle Eastern states as well:

- Military agreements with foreign states.
- Foreign military bases and assets inside the state.
- Economic interests of both foreign states and the military.
- Financial loans and aids.

As the state's international dependency increases, the international context and the alliances play effective role in determining the level of civil-military relations balance, and as the previous factors links the foreign, regional and international, powers interests to the military, it could represent a model for explaining how foreign policy could lay its burden over civil-military relations.

As the Egyptian regime is mixture of military and personal rule; the periods of study is divided according to presidents. In each period the foreign policy orientation of the president is examined and the direct effects on the civil military relations in that period are analysed in order to conclude clear patterns of impacts.

The first chapter examines period from establishment of republic till revolution of 25 January 2011. That means it examines Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods. It focuses on the relationship with United States and Soviet Union as international powers. As well as Israel and Saudi Arabia as influential regional actors.

Nasser was able to use the support he received from Soviet Union to suppress civilians and close the door against voices calling for a democratic transition. United

States was more interested in Egypt as a part of its competition with Soviet Union, than the issue of democracy. While the conflict with Israel helped to create a justification for the continuation of military rule, and considering that no voice is above the voice of the battle.

Sadat used the transition from the Soviet Union camp to United States camp to get rid of his rivals inside the military who was relying on Soviet Union as supporter. The peace treaty with Israel led to the escalation of civil and military opposition, but Sadat was able to overcome this crisis by American and Israeli support. He dissolved the parliament and dismissed large number of officers. However, the impact of this treaty remained intact until Sadat was assassinated.

Mubarak had long relied on a strategic alliance with the United States in the face of the judge's calls for independence, as well as in suppressing any moves aimed to achieve essential requirements for democratic transition and power handover to civilians. On the other hand, United States communicated directly with members of the Military Council to use them as a mean of pressure on Mubarak to implement policies that serve US interests.

The second chapter reviews the impact of relations with the United States, Russia, Israel and the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE in civil-military relations during SCAF period after revolution of 25 January 2011 as well as the period of the first elected civilian president in the Egyptian history.

The close ties between the United States and the Egyptian army encouraged the decision to abandon Mubarak, despite the Israeli rejection. Saudi Arabia and UAE recognised Arab Spring revolutions as a threat that could be transferred to their monarchies. While Israel feared from the impact of changes in the legislative and political environment on the peace agreement and support of Palestinian resistance movements. Russia feared from Arab Spring spreading to its allies. And these all lead to support military attempts to impede the handover of power to civilians.

Being Muslim Brotherhood member was a barrier between Morsi and Russia, which fought a long struggle against jihadists. Also support that Morsi provided to the Palestinian movement Hamas threatened Israel. This coincided with the desire of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to eliminate the model of civil rule in Egypt, especially as it was raising Islamic slogans that can affect the Gulf street in a

way that threaten the stability of their monarchies. All these led to support popular action against Morsi regime and recognition of the steps announced by the Minister of Defence in the military coup statement in July 2013.

The third chapter examines the impact of relations with the United States, Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in civil-military relations after the military coup in 3 July 2013 that military followed widespread popular protests began in 30 June of the same year.

Immediately after the coup, Saudi Arabia provided large funds to coup regime in form of loans and grants. Also Russia relations with Egypt was multidimensional and showed great breakthrough in comparison with the cold relations during the SCAF or Morsi period. Although US vocal critics which represented the condemning of use of violence, Obama administration did not label the action as a coup to preserve the shared interests with the Egyptian army.

2. NASSER, SADAT AND MUBARAK PERIODS

2.1 Nasser period (1952 – 1970)

In 23rd of July 1952, group of mostly middle rank officers named themselves 'Free Officers' executed coup and ousted King Farouk II who was the last successor of foreign dynasty that ruled Egypt and was established by the Albanian Ottoman commander Mohamed Ali Pasha in 1805. The coup leaders declared officers objectives in fighting corruption, spreading social justice and liberation of the Suez Canal from British occupation. They changed the political regime as they abolished the parliament, diminished political parties, froze constitution, and later performed aggressive crack down on the main political powers as the communists and Muslim Brotherhood. Gamal Abd El Nasser the coup head and later the Egyptian president implemented some agrarian reforms and built the High Dam. In addition, Nasser nationalized Suez Canal. Nasser internally consolidated his power and established what could be described as military society. Nasser ascended to power through military coup; in civil-military relations, the coup represented the complete absence of civilian control over the military, which is the desired ideal situation between civilians and military. On the other hand, the cuop also reflected the maximum level of military power in politics which exceed the influence through soft power to the direct intervention using the hard power.

On the international level, Nasser era witnessed the beginnings of the cold war between the US and USSR. The foreign relations represented corner stone for Nasser coup and his ruling period. Starting from the motives for the coup, the Egyptian army defeat in 1948 against Israel and the British occupation of Suez Canal deepened the feel among army officers that they are politically inferior and ignited their desire to correct their position in the state by acquiring more active role in politics. The coup necessarily required the coordination with foreign powers in the preparation phase. The coup also showed that interests of the foreign states is more important for them than the ideological orientations and conceptual stands. US primarily supported the coup, which was apparently against US declared democratic values. US wanted to

prevent Egypt from joining the Soviet camp. In addition, the Soviet Union later started supporting Nasser despite his anti-communist orientation.

The conflict with Israel was major determinant of the Egyptian foreign policy. The military used the military campaigns as justification for the authoritarian measures inside the state. From their point of view when a country is in war status, there is no space for opposition or democratic practices. The defeats in wars affects the civil-military relations on two levels. The first one is inside the military itself as the conflict of powers and authorities between competing parties can be resolved and reproduced as post defeat reforms so it creates new distribution of power. The previous assumption could be seen in Nasser regain of control over military after the exclusion of army chief commander Abdul Hakeem Amer after defeat in war against Israel in 1967. The second level is the political level; the military defeats derives the call for more democratic and more active civilian politics as the defeats shows the military regime's failure in confronting foreign threats and hence major functional failure in the main role of the military. This can be noticed in the civil protests post 1967 defeat, calling for more democracy and for the trial of the army commanders responsible for the defeat.

Nasser ambitiousness towards more influence in the region led him to adopt pan-Arabism speech, which produced Egyptian activity in many Arab countries. What also distinguishes Nasser regime that the intervention not only aimed to seize power; but also imposed ideological and structural changes to the Egyptian state. Nasser coup replaced the not well functioning democratic monarchy with personalistic military authoritarian regime. Nasser tried to spread his ideology among the Arab states, the state's reaction towards this ideology represented as main factor for either formation of alliances or hostilities. This part of the chapter will examine the Egyptian relations with US, USSR, Saudi Arabia and Israel and its influence on civil-military relations in Egypt

2.1.1 Nasser relations with United States

The US relation with Nasser regime started early even before the coup itself. CIA delegate to the Middle East Kermit Roosevelt held extensive meetings with the Egyptian officers (Bishara, 2017). One of the Muslim Brotherhood officers mentions meetings with the military attaché in US Embassy in Cairo between 1950 and 1952

where Nasser participated in, The hot topic in those meetings was the Egyptian army relations with US, and the communist threat (Bishara, 2017). Another important member of the Free Officers Anwar Al-Sadat, who became later Nasser's successor, mentions in his book 'My life Story' that US ambassador in Cairo expressed his gratitude for informing him about the planned coup date (Bishara, 2017).

The CIA officer responsible for Egypt mentions clearly that in 1952 there were no search for popular revolution and it was aimed that army will rule Egypt supported by specific sectors in urban and rural societies (Copeland, 1970). The US objectives from supporting the coup included formation large and stable middle class, and developing concordance between the government and people; make people to perceive their rulers as independent from foreign and domestic powers. The previously mentioned objectives intended to avoid the class struggle conflicts and cut the road on the communist ideas promotion. Another objective mentioned by CIA intelligence officer Miles Copeland is the formation of democratic organizations, which the people believe in and are different in nature from the western ones. Nasser did not have trust in the civilian elites, so he excluded them from political life, and preferred to delay democracy until the revolution achieves its objectives (Abdelfattah, 2016). Nasser established Liberation Committee in 1953 and later the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962. Moreover, CIA delegate introduced a report to US secretary of state Dean Acheson before 'Free Officers' coup stressing that there is no fear from popular revolution by either Muslim Brotherhood or the communists. The report also stressed that the officers will be pragmatic and good negotiators when they come into power, and It is important to tolerate the coup and not to oppose it. (Copeland, 1970)

The support for Nasser regime continued after the coup. Nasser told the US ambassador that giving freedom to Egyptians immediately is like letting children play on the road, which threaten their lives (Copeland, 1970). In late May 1967, Nasser stated to foreign diplomat that 'we can rule this country the way Duvalier rules Haiti' (pointing the military dictatorship) but we will not do that unless we needed it' Nasser adds, It was clearly mentioned in CIA reports that Nasser would establish military fascistic rule (Copeland, 1970).

In addition, US supported Nasser regime technically, the US ambassador in Cairo ordered his agent Lain Prager to train Egyptian media on the propaganda and black media, Those mechanisms were used to destroy Nasser enemies as Mohammed Naguib who demanded democratic rule (Copeland, 1970). The US helped Nasser to consolidate his power by enforcing him with required tools to exclude his political rivals including those who were calling for more democracy. It seems that the US officials did not have doubts that Nasser requested military aids will not be used, against Israel or even in Yemen; rather it was discussed regarding internal use with the domestic security issue.

The relation between Nasser and US deteriorated when US tried to form Baghdad Pact against USSR, Nasser viewed the pact as obstacle to his influence, which would be built upon pan-Arabism and independence from foreign powers (Copeland, 1970). Baghdad pact was weak because US did not join it, In addition King Hussein in Jordan did not join it.

Nasser adapted the non-alignment as declared strategy in the cold war, he managed to make advantage from his position and gained support from both US and USSR However, at the end he was completely dependent on USSR after 1967 war defeat against Israel,. Moreover, it has been believed that Nasser used his discourse about pan-Arabism and independence for African nations only to maximize his gains and improve his position internally (Copeland, 1970).

The US foreign aids policy towards Egypt showed fluctuation during Nasser era, this was dependant on both Nasser policy and the US presidential orientation (Bangura, 1999). Economically US had given until 1969 nearly 535 million dollars as cash loans (Copeland, 1970). During Eisenhower period, the US adopted policy of containment against Soviet Union in the Middle East (Bangura, 1999). While Nasser was perceived suspiciously to be aligned to the communist bloc, Eisenhower only gave Egypt 0.6 million dollars as food aid within PL-480 food aid programme (Bangura, 1999). Eisenhower efforts to stop Nasser's increased influence in the region failed by the failure of Baghdad Pact (Bangura, 1999). Nasser opposed the pact and addressed it as imperialist action. He exerted pressure on King Hussein in Jordan offering him alternative aids in line with Saudi Arabia, and by attacking Kameel Chamoun the Lebanese president using Sout Al-Arab Radio, the strong

regional media tool in Nasser regime (Copeland, 1970). Baghdad pact ended after the communist coup in Iraq in 1958 (Qureshi, 1982). Eisenhower administration had no clue rather using the carrot strategy to neutralise Nasser, the food aids jumped to 42.7 million dollar in 1959, which represents nearly 70 fold of the previous year aid (Bangura, 1999).

John F.Kennedy period showed a fresh restart of the relations between US and Egypt, US signed three years aid agreement with Egypt (Abdelaziz, 2017). This motivation for delivering such aids for Egypt was to prevent Egypt from being totally dependent on the Soviet Union (Abdelaziz, 2017). The end of Kennedy period witnessed the Soviet Union weapons deals to Egypt including T-54 tanks and MIG-21 jets (Bennett, 1985). Kennedy successor Lindon Johnson was described as pre-occupied with communism. His predecessor Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 and there were doubts to the Soviet involvement in the operation (Bangura, 1999). Johnson perceived Nasser as highly tied to the communists, as same as the northern Vietnamese in Vietnam, while both were not actually communists (Bangura, 1999). This wrong perception was more fuelled by Nasser intervention in Yemen for supporting the republicans against the dynasty in their civil war, and Johnson decided to cut off aids to Egypt (Abdelaziz, 2017). Johnson period only witnessed recovery of aid program in 1965 as US thought Nasser took steps away from Communist bloc, but after the increased tension between Arab states and Israel the aids were suspended again in 1966 (Bangura, 1999). Summarizing, first the US during Eisenhower used the aids as mean for pressing Nasser policies as he was preliminary received as communist stooge, then the aid revived when US re-evaluated him as independent from communist ideology, this continued during Kennedy era and lastly aids were stopped in Johnson anti-communist pro-Israeli policy.

2.1.2 Nasser relations with Soviet Union

Nasser rising to power in Egypt was parallel to the new soviet leadership of Khrushchev in Moscow (Qureshi, 1982). New policy was introduced after Stalin death based on the peaceful coexistence with different social systems, the policy mainly aimed to attract the Afro-Asian nations from the western influence and oppose the US proposed containment strategy against Soviet Union (Qureshi, 1982). Nasser felt uncomfortable towards Baghdad pact, as it was contraindicated to his

ambitions for pan-Arabism defence union led by Egypt. When an extremist party came into power in Israel in 1955 and the tension increased in Gaza strip that was under Egyptian administration, Nasser seek armament deal to strengthen his military position. Britain linked armament deal to compliance with Baghdad pact (Copp, 1986), while France linked it with stopping Nasser support to the Algerians, and US refused the deal because of Egyptians inability to provide cash payment (Qureshi, 1982). During Nasser participation in non-alignment summit in Bandung, he requested weapons from Chinese president who transformed his demand to the Soviet Union. In late 1955, Nasser made deal with Czechoslovakia to gain weapons in exchange with cotton and rice (Copp, 1986). The Soviet Union made an advantage of Nasser desire to armament and his disappointment from western powers to exert influence in Egypt and Middle East (Qureshi, 1982). The US and Britain criticized the deal and pressured Czechoslovakia to cancel it as it was perceived as threat for Baghdad Pact (Copp, 1986).

Following the arms deal the Soviet Union offered Egypt loan of 100 million £ to be used in the industrialisation of Egypt, moreover Soviet Union offered supporting Egypt with technical experts to participate in the establishment of the High Dam project, which was important for Egypt's industrial and agricultural development (Russia Today, 2011). The US and Britain offered 70 million dollars to help Nasser in the Dam project on condition that he wouldn't accept any further communist aids (Qureshi, 1982). Nasser thought to accept US-Britain offer to balance his relations with foreign powers, and to prevent being too dependent on Soviet Union (Qureshi, 1982). But the US withdrew its offer after Nasser have just accepted it, this step was thought to be as an aggressive measure against non-alignment policy of Nasser, and to provide lessons for other nations to move from neutral stand towards more US friendly stand (Copp, 1986).

Nasser decided to nationalise Suez Canal to fund the High Dam project. Britain, France and Israel started a military campaign against Egypt. Soviet Union hailed the nationalization step and threatened for using nuclear weapons against Britain and France to stop the war (Qureshi, 1982). After the aggression was stopped following international pressure, Soviet Union started the first phase of High Dam project.

In 1957, Nasser sought to revive his military capabilities with 150 million dollars of arms from Czechoslovakia (Qureshi, 1982). Khrushchev policy was prioritizing the political and economic influence over the ideological one (Qureshi, 1982). The Egyptian-Soviet approaching continued despite the Egyptian regime crack down over the communists in Egypt, also when Egypt and Syria unified under the United Arab Republic in 22 February 1958, it was considered as victory of Arab nationalists against communists (Qureshi, 1982). In 1958, Abd El Karim Kassim performed coup in Iraq; Nasser hoped Iraq would join the unity, which turned to be invalid predictions (Copp, 1986). Moreover, Kassim gave wide support for communists and assigned them multiple positions in the government (Copp, 1986). Nasser attacked the communists describing them as Moscow stooges. When the communists influence decreased in Iraq, Egyptian relations with Soviet Union started to improve again (Qureshi, 1982). The motives for both the Egyptians and Soviets to continue in cooperation were much more important than the communist ideological issue. Soviet Union seek influence in Middle East and hoped to encourage more nations to be neutralised in the American-Soviet conflict, While Nasser relied on the Soviet economic and military support to enhance his objectives. In 1958, Soviets agreed to finance the High Dam project completely with 400 million Russian ruble and more 500 million Russian ruble in 1960 (Qureshi, 1982). In 1961, Nasser regime took more steps towards the leftist policies by nationalizing 400 banks, limiting land ownership and promising workers to have shares in companies (Samir, 2018). This was addressed as the Arab Socialism; these steps were welcomed by Soviet Union. The Armament deals continued as in 1959 reached 250 million dollars, in 1961, 170 million dollars, in 1963, 220 million dollars and 310 million dollars in 1965 to reach total of 1.5 billion dollars until 1967. In addition to weapons, the Egyptian army was reorganized in soviet-like patterns with the help of 200 East German and 200 Czech experts (Qureshi, 1982). During this period the Egyptian officers enjoyed large privileges quoting soviet analyst words:

‘They [Egyptian officers] use their privileges for the improvement of their own well-being . . . officer businessmen [are] more interested in business than in the military preparation of soldiers and sergeants’. (Marfleet, 2011)

At the peak of Egyptian-Soviet relation during the inauguration of the High Dam on May 1964, Khrushchev promised 250 million dollar loan for economic development

(Copp, 1986). Nasser released some communists from prison allowing them to practice politics under the single party system that he developed (ASU) (Qureshi, 1982). Khrushchev was removed in 1964 and his policy in Middle East was one of the main reasons for his ousting, in Asia Soviet Union influence was hindered by China and in Latin America Soviet Union faced US, so Middle East was perfect target for Soviets to exert more influence (Qureshi, 1982). Soviet Union encouraged Nasser to intervene in Yemen in 1962 to achieve its interests in red sea and Indian Ocean and increase Nasser military dependency on Soviets (Copp, 1986).

In the economic field, Egypt exports to communist bloc represented 56% of its total exports. in 1966, 142,6 million dollar to USSR, 146,8 million dollars to Eastern Europe and 20,3 million dollars to Yugoslavia. In addition, 33% of Egypt imports were from communist bloc, by 93.7 million dollars from USSR, 186.3 million dollars from Eastern Europe and 17 million dollars from China. In addition to total grants and loans of 1,440 million dollars between 1954 and 1965 (Qureshi, 1982).

During six days war against Israel in June 1967, USSR sent 15 ships loaded with weapons to Egypt and USSR president and chief of staff visited Egypt shortly after the ceasefire (Qureshi, 1982). Following the humiliating defeat of Egypt against Israel, the soviets established permanent military mission in Cairo and started reorganizing the Egyptian army and the intelligence. Moreover, Soviets started replacement of destroyed arms during the war including new aircrafts. As Nasser recovered from the war, he announced war of attrition in 1969 to make the Israeli occupation in Sinai more costive for them. As reaction Moshe Deyan, the Israeli minister of defence, started bombing Suez Canal and later sites in the depth of Egypt as deep penetration raids (Qureshi, 1982). The Soviets for the first time provided the Egyptians with developed anti-jets missiles SAM-3 and soviet soldiers operated the system. Soviets centralized along Suez Canal, Cairo, Alexandria and High Dam in Aswan (Bennett, 1985).

In the year of 1970, Soviet pilots were flying the MIG-21 J interceptors; Soviet officers and soldiers were manning the missile sites in Egypt. In addition, there were around 8,000 Soviet instructors in various other branches of the Egyptian army. The volume of Soviet military support to Egypt during 1970 was unprecedented (Copp, 1986).

The Soviet intervention succeeded in stopping Israeli raids, but this represented first direct engagement for Soviet Union in non-communist country (Qureshi, 1982), and showed the strong position and increased dependence of Nasser regime on the Soviets.

2.1.3 Nasser relations with Israel

The humiliating defeat of the Arab armed forces in 1948 war against Israel sparked anger between the Egyptian officers. The defeat was considered as one of the main motives behind the army move in 1952 coup. However, Nasser stated that despite the defeat against Israel, he felt more anger towards Egyptian top officers, then the Arabs and British and lastly came the Israelis (Copeland, 1970). In 1956, When Nasser nationalized Suez Canal in order to obtain funds for the High Dam project; Israel accompanied France and Britain in attacking Egypt. The aggression was stopped following the international reaction that sided with Egypt, and more importantly with the pressure from super powers US and Soviet Union (Qureshi, 1982).

Nasser appointed his close friend from the free officers Abd El Hakeem Amer as the chief commander of the Egyptian armed forces. Amer clearly was lacking the necessary expertise to handle position like this. Amer influence increased in army as he was responsible for the appointment of high rank officers in the army, in 1962, Nasser tried to strip this authority of high ranks appointments and promotions from Amer hands but he failed to do so (Brooks, 2015). As tension escalated between Syria and Israel in 1967, Amer was motivated to involve in war against Israel. Mainly because of the disappointing performance of the Egyptian army in Yemen civil war, and as he was blamed for the failure of unity between Egypt and Syria. When soviet intelligence reports reached Amer that Israelis is preparing for attack, Amer sent memo to UN ordering the withdrawal of UN emergency forces that had been installed after 1956 tripartite aggression (Bishara, 2017). Nasser tried to oppose Amer decision by correcting the request to redistribution instead of withdrawal but his action was late (Bishara, 2017). Egypt decided to close Tiran terrain in action that was considered as declare of war, On 6 June 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria and West Bank and occupied large territories. Another humiliating defeat sparked a lot of internal changes in the Egyptian politics. Amer was much confident about Egyptian capabilities and estimated the loss of air forces in case of Israeli air strike to 15-20%.

The Israeli air strike destroyed 60% of Egyptian fighting aircrafts during three days of war and 40 aircraft were downed also later by the Israelis (Copp, 1986).

The defeat raised the tension between Nasser and Amer, while Nasser managed to gain sympathy whether real or fabricated after he resigned on TV and the demonstration demanded his return. Amer refused to take the responsibility neither to resign from his post (Aljazeera, 2002). Conflict escalated and Nasser arrested Amer with others accusing him of coup plot and on the later day, Amer was dead claiming he had committed suicide (Aljazeera, 2002). Mohamed Fawzi who succeeded Amer stated that the defeat was due to army appointments based on loyalty rather than qualifications (Bishara, 2017). It can be said that the political stands continued to be factor in appointments and promotions in the army. Nasser expelled ten pilots from air forces for alleged connections with Muslim Brotherhood while the Egyptian army was suffering from acute shortage (Marfleet, 2011). Nasser accepted resignation of number of officer and removed others as he gained the authority again over the army appointments and promotions (Brooks, 2015). Later in 1969, Nasser established national defence council (Bishara, 2017).

In February 1968, The light sentences after the trial of Egyptian air force commander's who were in charge during 1967 defeat against Israel initiated wide protests in the Egyptian streets. Protests started with Helwan military factory and spread to universities. It was motivated by the defeat and demanded the democracy and freedom (Bishara, 2017). While student's representatives were arrested after meeting with Sadat the head of People Assembly then, Nasser responded publically, declared supporting the demands, and promised implementing democracy (Bishara, 2017). In 1969, Nasser declared the down of intelligence state, practically what changed is that the intelligence became concerned with foreign activities and left the domestic security for the ministry of interior (Bishara, 2017). It can be stated that the conflict with Israel and the defeat enabled Nasser to gain control over the armed forces and get it subordinate to the president. On the other hand, it sparked congestion in the Egyptian society as proved that patience with repressive measures hoping for achieving internal development or external victories was completely invalid. The Egyptians figured that Nasser's regime did not achieve dignity as he promised neither democracy nor development.

2.1.4 Nasser relations with Saudi Arabia

The relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia witnessed ups and downs. The traditional kingdom was friend ally of King Farouk II, ousted by Nasser and his colleagues. King Saud mediated in the conflict between Nasser and Mohamed Naguib who was nominal leader for July 1952 coup, and the head of Revolution Council. Nasser also signed collective defence agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1955 (Dawisha, 1983). Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia opposed Baghdad pact formed by US to contain Soviet Union (Podeh, 2018). While Nasser opposed it as it threatened his regional ambitions for pan-Arabism, Saudi Arabia feared the increased power of its historical rival, the Iraqi regime. The Egyptians and Syrians took the responsibility for media and intelligence missions to attack the pact, while Saudi Arabia used the money as mean to prevent other Arab states, as Jordan, from joining the pact (Podeh, 2018).

The growing popularity of Nasser and his pan-Arabism ideology started to threaten Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia decided to form Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 supported by US to face Nasser's rising power.

The relations came to crossroads when the republicans in Yemen performed coup to oust the king in 1962 and civil war started. Saudi Arabia supported the royalists, while Nasser supported the republicans. Nasser was looking to regain his prestige after the unity with Syria came to complete fail and broke in 1961. Nasser thought it would be easy mission and started by sending three aircrafts and commandos' band, Nasser sank in the Yemeni war later with near 70,000 soldier (Podeh, 2018). The Saudi side feared Nasser might try to control oil fields in Arab peninsula if he succeeded in Yemen. Nasser criticized Saudi Arabia also for its alliance with US, describing it as the dependant on imperialists and Zionism allies (Dawisha, 1983). While Nasser adopted his socialist pan-Arabism, he descried Saudi Arabia as feudal system (Podeh, 2018), so the revolutionary stand of Nasser threatened the conservative ideology of the Saudi monarchy (Dawisha, 1983). After Nasser was defeated by Israel in June 1967, he went to Khartoum summit in Sudan in 29 August 1967, hoping to get support from Saudi Arabia, he offered King Faisal to withdraw his troops from Yemen, King Faisal accepted and declared supporting Nasser and called the Arabs to do so (Dawisha, 1983). Saudi Arabia helped in the evacuation of

the Egyptian forces from Yemen. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to support Egypt with annual 280 million dollars grant.

2.1.5 Impacts of Nasser foreign policy on the civil-military relations

The competition between the United States and Soviet Union was motivated by the desire to win Nasser as an ally regardless of authoritarian nature of his regime. Therefore, Nasser started to get support from different states including US, Soviet Union and Britain through armament deals. Those deals strengthened the army and the military deterrent power against the civil opposition, as the gained power was used to deal with protests and contain the opposition. However, this strength was internally sufficient to contain the opposition, it was totally ineffective in facing the external threat as happened in 1967 war against Israel, where The Egyptian army was defeated and Sinai was occupied.

As Nasser was in conflict with Israel, it was promoted that there is no chance for a democratic demands. The Egyptian army was involved in external a war against external enemy. That was used as justification for more dominance of the military in domestic politics, which in turn resulted in defected civil-military relations.

When Egypt was defeated in 1967 against Israel, there were popular protests against the light sentences after the military commander trial. Those protests were accompanied by demands for more democratic changes from Nasser regime. When the military failed in facing the external enemy, the people started to raise their concerns about the delayed democracy or limitations of the freedom and the enlarged military positions.

The defeat in war also was used by the military elites to initiate changes and get rid from their rivals inside the army. Amer appointment as army General Commander was not because of his professional history but because he was trusted by Nasser, later when Nasser realized that Amer became more powerful than Nasser himself inside the military, Nasser used the events after the defeat in 1967 to get rid from Amer dominance in the army and regain his control over it.

Nasser used army as foreign policy tool in war. This can be noticed in the case of the war in Yemen; when Nasser sent the Egyptian troops to Yemen to support the republican forces against the royalist, and of course this would not have been done in

case of a real strong civilian position in the legislative branch or strong public opinion emerging from active civil society.

Nasser kept the army subordinate to him, and also the civilian opposition groups had no authority over the military issues and was deprived from the right to discuss any matters related to the military allocation. Those measures are done in order to afford Nasser with the freedom to implement his policies that maybe not confined with the people interests.

In the previous preparations that preceded 1952 coup, the US officials were in touch with the coup leaders, it was driven by the United States desire to contain the communism in the Middle East especially in a crucial state like Egypt. Furthermore, the United States supported the coup financially by aids, militarily by armaments deals. The important support was the political one, when US helped the authoritarian regime which is military in nature to crack down on the civilian opposition by sending black media and propaganda expert to train the Egyptians. It worth mentioning that specifically this step helped to get the rid of Mohammed Naguib who was demanding the officers to hand over the power to civilians through democratic elections and ending the rule of the military officers.

The flow of support from Soviet Union to guarantee the influence, especially the military aids, opened the gate for the Egyptian military officers to benefit from it financially. The soviet experts described the Egyptian officers, as they are involved in their business. This led to strengthening of the military status over civilians.

2.2 Sadat Period (1970-1981)

Anwar Al Sadat succeeded Nasser after his death. The sudden death of Nasser and succession by Nasser's deputy Sadat, led to crucial changes in Egypt both internally and externally. Sadat presidency began with facing resistance from strong figures of Nasser system who were willing to take office. Main opponent was Ali Sabri the head of Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Nasser's single political party organization in Egypt. Sadat got rid of Nasserist's namely Ali Sabri and Shaarawi Gomaa, the former interior ministry, and other power centres, through what Sadat called corrective movement. Sadat declared the down of intelligence state burning surveillance tapes in front of reporters, closing detaining centres, ending arbitrary arrest and introducing first permanent constitution since 1952. Sadat adopted

'Infitah' policy (openness), he opened the door for foreign investment, expanded property rights and judicial institutions. Sadat faced with two major problems, Sinai Peninsula was occupied by Israeli troops since 1967 war; and domestically there was ongoing economic crisis. Sadat viewed the US as great power that Egypt should ally with, and planned to change Egypt position in foreign policy from East as Soviet Union ally to West. Over Sadat period, Egypt took more steps away from USSR and closer steps towards US. Sadat period witnessed complete shift in alliances for Egypt. Even in the regional level, Sadat after 1973 war against Israel took surprising steps towards Israel, started by visiting Knesset and ended by signing of peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. These step led to isolation of Egypt from its Arabian sphere.

The civil-military relations in Sadat period witnessed Sadat complete control over the military using the power of promotions and appointments. Sadat used his authority to persistently shuffle military leaders to eliminate the threat of any possible influencer persons. Sadat intervention in military affairs caused military crisis and affected Egyptian military proficiency even during critical moments like October 1973 war against Israel. An Example is that Sadat told US national security advisor Kissinger that Egypt had no intention to go further in the attack during war. Sadat was willing to gain the American trust, where on battlefield, it encouraged Israel to conduct a counter attack and concentrate forces on the Syrian front that was attacking Israel at the same time. Sadat interventions in military affairs sparked critics by military commander like Saad El Din El Shazly the ex-commander of staff who described Sadat steps as unconstitutional.

Sadat orientation towards US and his desire to reach peace agreement with Israel, pushed him to use the military as tool to achieve those goals despite the popular opposition. Sadat supported US allies militarily like Sissoko Mubuto in Congo. Therefore, it can be said that when the civilian control is weakened inside and the ruler realizes that he is not under monitoring; it encourages authoritarian rulers to use the military, without fear, in favour of foreign powers interests.

When Sadat's foreign policy orientations, especially Camp David accords with Israel, caused wide internal opposition, Sadat used the military as tool for gaining control over the opposition. When Sadat led openness policy economically and

started applying IMF programs and the government lift subsidies, the riots sparked, but ended also after Sadat called the military to crush it.

As the foreign policies initiates elevated unrest inside the country this also may lead to spread of opposition inside the military itself and sparks coup plots to change the regime. Sadat was assassinated in one of these plots planned by group of Islamist officers which succeeded in assassination of Sadat but failed to gain overall control of the state.

2.2.1 Sadat relations with United States

Sadat foreign policy witnessed complete divergence of orientation from East to West. While Nasser ended with completely dependence on Soviet Union militarily and economically, Sadat built strong relation with United States. Sadat main thought was that; developing closer relation with United States would press US to find compromise for the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than total support to Israel.

US relation with Egypt was mainly connected to the combat with Israel. During October 1973 war, Sadat informed US national security advisor Kissinger about his intention not to go further in the attack, the information which Sadat used to gain Kissinger trust led to military disaster (Bishara, 2017). The information should have reached Israelis and encouraged them to advance towards Cairo and regain balance in the battle (Bishara, 2017). Kissinger involved in mediation after October 1973 war and proposed plan accepted by both the Egyptians and Israelis. In 1975, Kissinger implemented limited engagement agreement stating the distribution of two hundred to two hundred fifty American technicians at the engagement line to monitor the agreement (Qureshi, 1982).

US president Jimmy Carter developed strong bilateral relations. During Camp David talks, Egyptians was negotiating at only one level that is Sadat, while the Israelis needed to negotiate through two levels by adding the domestic level including the Knesset and the electorates (Brownlee, 2011). As Sadat regime was non-democratic and more personalistic rule, Sadat was non-accountable to the public opinion and felt free to impose his view and depend on the state security forces to face any opposition. While Sadat only needed one hour to sign text, Israeli Prime Minister Begin needed three days to finish his work, even during the negotiation, Sadat was closer to Carter rather than his advisors (Brownlee, 2011). Moreover, Carter

threatened Sadat he would end his friendship if he did not accept the text needed for agreeing on a framework, Sadat was in relatively weak stand during the negotiations and was regarded as flexible while his counterpart Begin was tougher and less intending to compromise (Brownlee, 2011). Carter who was approaching the Congress elections told Sadat that insisting autonomy in West Bank for Palestinian would be politically costly for him, when talks came to critical points, Sadat told his team that he would sign any paper proposed by Carter (Brownlee, 2011). Carter mentioned that presence of Soviet forces along Suez Canal gave it the freedom of movement in the Africa and Middle East which constrains US interests in the region (Brownlee, 2011). Sadat came under heavy criticism from his team. Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, the Egyptian foreign minister, who told Carter "Pardon me, Mr. President, but we are meeting here to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to deal with the policies of the Soviet Union!" (Kamel, 2003). Kamel stated in his book 'The Lost Peace' that Sadat not only wanted to be US ally but also US policeman in the region (Kamel, 2003). In 1979 when the Islamic revolution in Iran ousted US strong ally, Sadat appeared as the important ally not only in the African horn but also in the Persian Gulf. Sadat offered his help in the region to US secretary of defence Harold Brown and in return Sadat gets additional assistance from US. However, the request for further aids was linked to the official sign of the peace agreement with Israel (Brownlee, 2011). Sadat helped the US ally Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Congo, by sending pilots to counter the communist opposition, and Sadat was rewarded by 750 million dollar of military aid (Brownlee, 2011). Sadat involved in supporting the US policy in the region, he supported Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against Soviet Union (Abdelaty, 2018).

Sadat accepted unilateral agreement with Israel disregarding west bank in Palestine and Golan heights in Syria, with promises of economic and military support from US. It has been thought that Sadat irrelevance to elites and public opinion in Egypt was fundamental factor for the production and maintaining of Camp David accords with Israel. Kamel resigned protesting the agreement (Brownlee, 2011).

Camp David accords initiated wide domestic opposition and series of political changes inside Egypt. Thirteen MPs issued statement refusing the excluding the Palestinian issue from the deal and the limited sovereignty in Sinai and wasting of the military resources in the Africa (Brownlee, 2011). However, the People's

Assembly dominated by Sadat accepted the agreement on 11 April 1979 with vast majority 329 MPs and just thirteen rejected (Brownlee, 2011). While the opposition in People's assembly was minor in terms of number, Sadat decided to run referendum on the peace treaty 19 April 1979, which gain 99.5 approval, and then Sadat called for new elections for the People assembly (Elmasry, 2011). Sadat wanted complete obedient assembly, as he could not handle even small opposition. Sadat was successful in the exclusion of Camp David opposing party Al Tagamu and only two opposing MPs were able to reach the assembly. The opposition in the assembly was handpicked opposition (Brownlee, 2011).

In March 1976, Sadat received first US armament deal of C-130 transport aircraft. Regarding non-military aids: between 1974 and 1977, food aids increased from 250 million dollars to 1 billion dollars annually (Brownlee, 2011). After signing peace treaty with Israel, Sadat started to receive gains from the treaty, 1 billion dollar as food aid and nearly equivalent as economic grants and loans. However, the economic aids did not manage to improve the economic crisis; it helped to strengthen the armed forces for domestic role.

In 1980, Sadat felt the growing threatening unrest and opposition internally, changed the constitution to allow himself to be re-elected for unlimited terms. About 70 political elite formed national coalition and signed a demand criticizing Sadat's foreign policy. In 1981, Unrest started to grow more when Israeli settlement in west bank continued, the only allowed opposition party in the Assembly Socialist Labour withdrew its approval for Camp David (Brownlee, 2011). In September 1981, Sadat arrested 1500 political elite including nearly all the political orientations from leftists to rightest, including Muslim Brotherhood Supreme guide, Omar El Tilmesany. Also Sadat put Copts pope, Shenouda II, under house arrest (Mahmood, 2018). While Sadat was attending military celebration of October war, small group of Islamists inside the army assassinated him in front of cameras within intended larger plot to change the regime that had failed. Sadat was clearly paying the cost of the domestic unrest following the treaty signing with Israel. The Islamists also opposed the westernization introduced by Sadat, regarding it as anti-Islamic actions (Jackson, 1981). There was an earlier attempt to perform Islamist coup in 1974 when group of officers attacked the military academy in Heliopolis but the attempt failed leaving thirty officer dead (Jackson, 1981). 1.5 billion dollars military aid in 1981 only

managed to provide military with privileged wages in wide unemployment country (Jackson, 1981). Sadat relied on the military as he appointed ex-defence minister Kamal Hassan Ali as foreign minister and deputy Prime Minister (Bishara, 2017). One of the factors that spread opposition is the US Rapid deployment Force distributed in Egypt as access point for Gulf States security (Jackson, 1981). These forces recalled the Soviet heavy presence in Nasser days. This stands for the direct link between the foreign policy orientations that led to crucial domestic changes. While US civilian aids reached 5.3 billion dollar since 1975, it lacked the orientation to major developmental areas, which would have helped improving Egyptians life quality (Jackson, 1981).

Sadat faced economic crisis, which also initiated strikes as 40,000 textile workers in Mahalla city in 1975, and the two days bread uprising in 1976 following lifting subsidies decision by government. The latter required the army intervention and costed nearly 80 death. While the government faced 2 billion dollar budget deficit, it imposed the subsidies lift rather than limiting military spending and without consulting the People Assembly (Brownlee, 2011). As 'Infitah' policy didn't grab foreign investment enough to overcome the economic problem (Aulas, 1982), Sadat relied on aids. Aids were mainly from US, Japan, West Germany, World Bank, IMF and and gulf countries (Jackson, 1981). In addition to pushing Egypt to peace treaty with Israel, US aid policy aimed to separate Egypt from Soviet Union, limit its influence in Arab world and achieve US regional objectives through Egypt support. Some of the aid intended to induce more cultural and economic normalisation between Egyptians and Israelis. In 1979, 70 million dollars were allocated to different universities and institutes; also, peace scholarships offered by US government for hundreds of Egyptian students. These efforts aimed to getting the Egyptian and Israeli intellectuals together to boost normalisation.

2.2.2 Sadat relations with Soviet Union

The Soviet Union decided to take 'Watchful Waiting' position with the rise of Sadat to presidency (Qureshi, 1982). Soviet's main concern was the continuity of anti-western position externally and adoption the leftist policies internally. Both expectations proven to be invalid, Sadat policy witnessed the complete reversal of foreign policy and formation of new alliance with US, internally Sadat adopted

rightest economic policies as he proposed openness policy 'Infitah'. The first months of Sadat carried bad news for the soviets, Ali Sabri the head of Arab Socialist Union ASU that was perceived as the Russia party was ousted in claimed coup attempt against Sadat (Copp, 1986). Soviet Union also failed to satisfy Sadat's demand. The main demand of Sadat from the Soviet Union was supplying him with offensive weapons that enables him to perform attack on Israel and regain Sinai. The situation was problematic as USSR wanted to stick to Détente. Détente was period of improvement in relation between USSR and US during cold war started in 1971 (Qureshi, 1982). Supplying Egypt with offensive weapons would be regarded as violation to the Soviet commitment to Détente. Sadat was disappointed with the continuity of no-war no-peace status; moreover, as Soviet economy suffered from constrains Sadat decided to direct his foreign policy more towards the west as Egypt suffered from inflation.

The first move away from Soviets came when Sadat told Head of US interest sections Donald Bergus on 4 February 1971, that Egypt is ready to open Suez Canal for navigation on condition that Israel accept UN 242 resolution and withdraw from west bank (Qureshi, 1982). Bergus was the US Principal diplomat in Egypt after 1967 war and the closure of US embassy. Despite Israel refused the initiative proposed by Sadat, it was received with discomfort in Russia as it was regarded as sign of Egyptian-American re-approach. During secret visit to Moscow in 1971, Sadat pressed Soviets to provide him with MIG-35 jets and missile launching Ililyushin. Soviets accepted on condition that weapons will be under soviet control till Egyptians get the training, a move was regarded as attempt to assure non offensive actions against Israel (Qureshi, 1982). Loan of 415 million dollars was allocated to Egypt for developmental aims as electrification of rural areas and desert reclamation and other industrial projects (Qureshi, 1982). Later in May 1971 Soviet president Podgorny signed the friendship and cooperation treaty with Sadat, it was first time for Soviets to sign such treaty with non-communist state, and the treaty stated that:

'It merely called on the two powers to consult each other on matters of mutual interests (Article 7), and not to enter into any alliance hostile to the other (Article 9). The Soviet Union agreed to continue training Egyptian forces with a "view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the

consequences of aggression* ' (Article 8). Article 2 of the Treaty called on the two sides to cooperate to preserve their social and economic benefits resulting from their respective revolutionary systems.' (Qureshi, 1982)

The contradictory interests started to flow on surface day over day. First, Sadat improved relation with Saudi Arabia the strong US ally in the region, Second, the discomfort with the presence of soviet technicians in the Egyptian army increased (Qureshi, 1982). Sadat started to realize gradually that the full dependence on Soviet Union won't enable him to go for war against Israel as this position contradicts with the Soviet orientation at that time.

Sadat visited Moscow three times, in October 1971, February and April 1972 (Qureshi, 1982). On the three occasions Sadat request for more advanced weapons were rejected by soviets, insisting the peaceful resolution of the conflict (Qureshi, 1982). In July 1972, Sadat decided to expel the soviet experts, but to keep the friendship treaty and the access to naval facility by the Soviets (Atalla, 2015). The diplomatic tension increased and ambassadors were called home on August 1972 (Qureshi, 1982). Later the ambassadors were sent again to embassies after the soviet approval of resuming supply of military spare parts. Sadat dismissed Mohamed Sadeq, the chief commander known for his anti-Soviet orientations (Atalla, 2015). Following the tension, Egypt received tanks and anti-aircraft missiles. Between December 1972 and June 1973 Egypt received more weapons that it received in 1970 and 1971 (Qureshi, 1982).

During October 1973 war, Soviet Union supported Egypt and Syria with 300 tons of war materials, and later threatened US in order to stop the Israeli violations to the ceasefire (Qureshi, 1982). However, when Egypt-US relations began to revive, Soviet criticized the approach between Egypt and US. First, Soviets claimed that US peace initiatives aimed to isolate Egypt from Arab's unified position and only targeting partial solution, Secondly, Soviets criticized the settlement of US monitoring technicians on the limited disengagement line in 1975 (Qureshi, 1982). Thirdly, Soviets refused to reschedule 3 billion dollars non-military and 7 billion military debts, and stopped supplying Egypt with spare parts (Qureshi, 1982). Egypt who suffered from 30% inflation failed to pay the debts, Sadat request to reschedule the debts over ten years was rejected by Soviets. In 1976, Egypt cancelled the

friendship treaty and denied further soviet access to naval facilities (Abdelaleem, 2015). Sadat accused the soviets and communists to be the initiators of riots of 1977, where Sadat used the army to control the protest over lifting the subsidies (Qureshi, 1982). Since 1973 war, Egypt only received thirty MIG-35 jets and twenty five- SU-22, belonging to previous agreements before 1973 war. Egypt relied on China for the supplement of spare parts (Qureshi, 1982).

Politically, Soviet Union opposed Sadat initiative to go to Jerusalem on 9 November 1977, pointing it as dividing attempt to the Arab front. After his return from Israel, Sadat called US, Israel, USSR, Syria and Lebanon to summit in Cairo, only US and Israel accepted the invitation (Qureshi, 1982). On 7 December 1977 Sadat expelled cultural attaches in the eastern bloc embassies of East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and USSR, claiming them to plot against him (Qureshi, 1982). Camp David accords came under strong criticism from Soviet side. Soviets regarded the treaty as 'separatist bargaining' and Israeli attempt to made Arabs oppose each other, and USSR demanded Israel for complete liberation of the occupied Arab territories (Qureshi, 1982). The unannounced reasons of rejecting Camp David treaty is the fear from increased influence of US in the region. Without including Syria and Palestine to comprehensive resolution, Soviets were obligated to continue supporting them against Israel.

In the recent years of Sadat, he moved further away from USSR and developed more vital relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the major US allies in the region. Egypt supported the Afghani Mujahedeen against Soviet invasion. This step represented a hostile action against the Soviet Union (Abdelaty, 2018). In January 1980 Sadat first limited USSR diplomatic mission size and expelled the remaining soviet experts who were only looking industrial projects like the High Dam and Helwan Oil and Steel complex (Qureshi, 1982). As the local opposition to Sadat following Camp David treaty increased, in September 1982 Sadat ordered the Soviet ambassador to leave Egypt accusing him to plot against him (Qureshi, 1982). At the same time, Sadat started crack down over all the Egyptian opposition groups. The following month witnessed the assassination of Sadat as result of the extreme congestion in the political atmosphere.

2.2.3 Sadat relations with Israel

The Israeli occupation of Sinai 6th June 1967 represented the most crucial issue for Sadat. He declared 1972 as the year of decision, but his inability to obtain the required weapons for the attack stopped him from taking positive moves. In 1973, after obtaining some weapons from Soviet Union and after coordinating with Saudi Arabia to use oil embargo weapon, Sadat was ready to start his war. Before the war, Sadat dismissed Mohamed Sadek, the war minister who previously sided with Sadat and prevented a coup from his predecessor Mohamed Fawzi (Bishara, 2017). Sadat appointed Saad El din El Shazly as Chief of Staff (Aljazeera, 2019). Generally, Sadat adopted rotation policy to eliminate any increased influence of his officers. In 1971, Sadat declared himself as General Commander of the army and dedicated office for him in the army headquarter, El Shazly mentioned that this step was unconstitutional as the president is only the supreme commander that is honourable position not executive (Bishara, 2017). The fear of Sadat from coups and from the use of any victory against Israel to threaten him personally derived his intervention in the army administration. El Shazly was dismissed in late 1973 after the war (Aljazeera, 2019). The main reason for dismissing El Shazly was opposing Sadat decision to advance in Sinai, as El Shazly said that Egyptian capabilities are not enough for that, Sadat insisted on his position which led later to afford Israel chance to balance its loss (Aljazeera, 2019). When Sadat needed more flexible military leadership to sign the peace treaty, he appointed Kamal Hassan Ali as war minister in 1978 and later as foreign affairs minister in 1980 (Bishara, 2017). In addition, on 16 April 1975, Sadat appointed Mubarak from the air forces as deputy president to control the army.

On 6th October 1973, Sadat started war and crossed to the east bank of Suez Canal, the hidden plan of Sadat was only to advance 10 to 15 km in Sinai and force Israel to set to negotiations (Bishara, 2017). Sadat did not inform the head of operations about the war aim neither the Syrian side that started simultaneous attack (Bishara, 2017). After ceasefire between Egypt and Israel that imposed by international powers, US started peace talk between the both sides in November 1973. In 1975, US sponsored limited engagement agreement and Israel retreated more backward in Sinai (Qureshi, 1982).

In 1977, Sadat declared that he is ready to visit Israel and the Knesset (Israeli parliament). Later he received invitation from the Israelis and visited Jerusalem on November 1977 (Brownlee, 2011). The step shocked many inside and outside

Egypt. Days before the visit, his foreign affairs minister Ismail Fahmy resigned. Sadat went to Camp David talks in 1978, by the day of the signing the peace treaty, Sadat had dismissed all military commander who participated in October war (Bishara, 2017). Sadat declared himself 'the hero of war and peace'. The peace treaty with Israel spread unrest and wide opposition inside the Egyptian society and the army. As result of the refusal of the treaty by the Islamists inside the army, they planned coup attempt and targeted Sadat himself in assassination operation during military parade. The plotters succeeded in killing Sadat but due to limited capabilities failed in changing the whole regime.

2.2.4 Sadat relations with Saudi Arabia

When Sadat expelled 20,000 soviet expert in 1972, King Faisal talked with US president Nixon, arguing US to take more balanced stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Dawisha, 1983). Faisal told Nixon that using the soviet presence in Egypt as justification of the US support to Israel is no longer acceptable. Moreover, Faisal told Nixon that Saudi Arabia will be in weak position if its ally US continued supporting Israel, also he demanded more active diplomatic role of US to press Israel withdrawal from occupied territories in 1967 (Dawisha, 1983). Disappointed by the negative role of US, Faisal became convinced that only aggressive and economic action might force Israel to withdraw from occupied territories. In August 1973, during visit to Riyadh, Sadat told Faisal to be prepared for using oil weapon. Ten days after the start of October 1973 war, Arab oil producers cooperation organization decided to cut the oil production. Oil barrel jumped from 3.01 to 11,65 dollars in four months (Dawisha, 1983). Cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia continued on regional issues, such as the ending of Lebanese civil war in 1976 (Podeh, 2018). Following the 'Infitah' policy; encouraging foreign capital due to exemption from taxes and allowing establishing complete foreign companies without Egyptian partnership, The Gulf invested nearly 4.45 billion dollars just between 1973 and 1975 (Brownlee, 2011).

On 9 November 1977, Sadat declared his initiative to visit Israel which represented a shock to Saudi Arabia. After the announcement of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Saudi Arabia had no other choice than condemning the agreement. Saudi Arabia position declared in Bagdad Summit in November 1978 (Dawisha, 1983). Saudi

decision for participation in implementing sanctions over Egypt was shaped by the pressure of Assad regime in Syria and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Arab states (Dawisha, 1983). The religious position of Saudi Arabia as guardian of Islam constrained its political choice. The Israeli intransigence and refusal to withdraw from Golan heights and west bank and insisting to conclude unilateral treaty with Egypt were received as attempt to isolate Egypt from the Arab camp. Saudi Arabia and Gulf states suspended all the financial aids to Sadat's regime (Podeh, 2018).

2.2.5 Impacts of Sadat foreign policy on the civil-military relations

Sadat was suffering from the difficulty to acquire offensive arms from Soviet Union and in affording the spare parts for the Soviet arms that the Egyptian army already had. The military aids from Soviet Union negatively affected the military as it created strong dependence on the Soviet Union, this dependence constrained Egypt's military orientation as it was be pressed to be confined with the Soviet orientations and avoiding conflicts with US and its allies at that time.

Despite there are many factors that formed Sadat's decision to change his alliance from Soviet Union to US, but one of most essential reasons is the fact that most of Sadat's rivals politically and inside the military was relying on Soviet Union as supporter. So changing the map of alliance gave Sadat the chance to be superior in the relationships with US and deprived his rivals from their traditional support source. In addition, to achieve that; Sadat was determined to serve as US policeman in the region and supported its allies militarily.

Sadat almost reached the peace treaty solely with only support of tight group inside the military and the government. During the negotiations for the peace treaty with Israel; Sadat was taking the decision without consultation with any other civil entity as the parliament or his government unlike his Israeli counterpart. This resulted in treaty that was widely criticized by the civil society in Egypt. The peace treaty with Israel lead to opposition inside the parliament and despite it was minority it forced Sadat to dissolve the parliament and made new elections to form a handpicked parliament. In addition, Sadat nearly dismissed all top officers who participated in the war against Israel in 1973. Military coup attempts started by the Islamist groups inside the army and the last one resulted in the assassination of Sadat.

Sadat was excessively involved in the military affairs even more than allowed in the constitution as described by his Chief of Staffs El Shazly. Moreover, Sadat gave critical information about the Egyptian intentions to United States during 1973 war that surely were transferred to Israel and harmed the Egyptian military position.

When Sadat economic policies caused inflation and sparked popular refusal, Sadat accused the protestors as linked to the Soviet Union and used the aggressive power to suppress them. It can be said that Sadat used the need of United States and Israel for peace to gain support required to tighten his grip on the army, as well as to repress civil protests, and voices calling for democracy, and considering the opinion of the people representatives in any foreign agreements.

2.3 Mubarak Period (1982-2011)

Civil-military relations during Mubarak period witnessed highly stable trends following turbulent events on the beginning of his period. The sudden assassination of Sadat brought his deputy Mohammed Hosni Mubarak to the presidency. Mubarak was known as pro-western figure, who was involved in multiple foreign affairs upon request of Sadat. Mubarak adopted policy centred on preserving status quo both internally and externally. It was expected that Mubarak would not impose changes to foreign policy and he will commit with previous agreements specially the peace treaty with Israel.

Mubarak first years witnessed competition on influence between Mubarak and his defence minister Abd El Haleem Abu Ghazala. The foreign relations orientations represented important variable in the competition between the two men. US the main ally of Egypt favoured Abu Ghazala during certain time over Mubarak himself, and Abu Ghazala received more privileged treatment in US as defence minister, while Mubarak the president hadn't received like this treatment. This was because of the US desire to exploit the competition between the presidency and the military head in the Egyptian state in order to force Mubarak to follow its interests especially in the economical aspect. The US investment in the relation with the military corporation rather than any other civilian power in Egypt deepen the pattern of military dominance and increased military role in politics. Even Mubarak could not expel Abu Ghazala from his office but he did only after Abu Ghazala faced the rocket

program crisis with US. As Abu Ghazala was accused to smuggle materials illegally for secret rocket development program.

Another pattern of civil-military relations during Mubarak period which was built on Sadat orientation is the usage of the military capabilities for the interests of the foreign allies. Not only Egypt participated in first Gulf war for liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion, but also the military cooperation with foreign powers reached high levels. This cooperation exceeded the normal fields to extreme ones like the Egyptian participation of secret detentions and investigations under the name of 'war on terror' for the US government.

The previous trends is linked directly to the most crucial variable in the equation of the foreign relation of Egypt during Mubarak period that is the military aid. The US military aid not only fostered the above-mentioned patterns in the civil-military relations but also imposed other critical impacts on the military internally. The economic benefits aroused from the weapon deals linked to US military aid represented one of the major economic activities of the military. In addition, as the Egyptian military got the US military aid it developed its ability to deal with the opposition inside the state and enforced the military control over the politics.

The peace treaty and the increased normalisation with Israel and the global interest in 'war on terror' from also both US and Russia; paved the way for Egypt military and security forces to implement hard measures, not only against aggressive Islamists but also included moderate non aggressive political Islamist movement like the Muslim Brotherhood. These measures caused paralysis in the political life and hindered any steps towards democracy.

The tight security measures against Islamist in politics was only eased when US demanded that during George Bush Jr. administration. The US interventions was present till the last days of Mubarak during Egyptian revolution in 2011; when US demanded his stepping down from power by the US president Obama and then US appraised the transfer of the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) during the transitional period.

2.3.1 Mubarak relations with United States

During Sadat period, in 23 June 1975 US ambassador in Egypt Hermann Elits was told by the Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy not to oppose Mubarak during meeting. Mubarak was viewed as messenger rather than diplomat. In a memorandum from US embassy in Cairo to US president Ford and US secretary of state Kissinger, Elites refer to Mubarak as the eye and ear of the Egyptian army (Al-Weshah, 2016). Mubarak was also thought to be 'strict and calculated leader with moderate skills at foreign diplomacy'. Although Mubarak opposed Camp David accords as he addressed its failure to solve crucial issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Al-Weshah, 2016). Proved only no more than vocal critics, US developed strong alliance with Mubarak as long as he did not actively oppose US.

The early years of Mubarak rule witnessed silent tension with Abd Alhaleem Abu Ghazala, the charismatic minister of defence. Abu Ghazala enjoyed more influence in US than Mubarak himself did. In 1986 Abu Ghazala visited US twice, met with US secretary of defence and secretary of state (Springborg, 1987). Abu Ghazala discussed non-military topics as the economic reforms and IMF plan to Egypt (Springborg, 1987). At the same year Mubarak visit was delayed upon pressuring him to follow more economic reforms. Abu Ghazala designated the army economic activities as part of his ambitions (Springborg, 1987). Mubarak relied on Abu Ghazala to control the Central Security Force (CSF) uprising in February 1986. CSF is linked to interior ministry and devoted for domestic security, mainly to control any popular uprising. CSF uprising was due to rumours of increasing the period of service. Abu Ghazala intervened and crushed the uprising (Springborg, 1987). Mubarak managed later to dismiss Abu Ghazala in 1989 when he was accused to develop hidden missile program in cooperation with Iraq and Argentina (CIA, 1999) and attempting to smuggle materials from US illegally (Bishara, 2017).

With 1.3 billion dollar annual military aid from U.S, Egypt became at 13th rank in the most powerful armies in the world (Al-Weshah, 2016). As the Egyptian army was the second largest army in the region after Iran, the Egyptian army perceived as regional partner for US (Al-Weshah, 2016). Weapons commissions represented opportunity for Egyptian officers, it is thought that even Mubarak himself benefited from these commissions (Nassif, 2013). Even supporting Egyptian army would be risky as Egyptian capabilities might be utilized against Israel someday, depending on portraying the Mubarak psychologically, ideologically and physically for its policy

determination; US decided to invest in Mubarak to acquire much influence in the region. Mubarak re-election for new six years term in 1987 encouraged US to further trust Mubarak as proposed long stay in office. The prospected impact of Egypt in the region become realistic when the Arab league restored Egypt Membership in March 1990 after suspending it following Camp David accords and moreover it moved its headquarter again from Tunisia to Cairo. The American investment in the Egyptian army and Mubarak proved to be beneficial during the first Gulf war in 1991. When US formed coalition to free Kuwait which Iraq's Saddam invaded. Egypt was the 4th largest contributor to US coalition by 35,000 soldier (Al-Weshah, 2016). Egypt gained appraisal from the Arab countries and the US, it has been rewarded by sweeping debts worth 20 billion dollars from the Arab Gulf States, Europe and US (Al-Weshah, 2016). US enjoyed privileged access into Suez Canal for its Navy, and thousands of its military jets permitted to cross the Egyptian airfield:

During Operation Desert Storm, Egypt expedited transit of 762 U.S. naval vessels and permitted 34,952 over-flights. Following the 9/11 attacks and through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Egypt permitted more than 36,000 overflights. (Axelrod, 2011)

Despite Mubarak opposition to the war on Iraq, 'in 2003, Egypt agreed to assist in the 4th strategic lift of the Infantry Division through the Suez Canal (Axelrod, 2011). In 2011, more than half of the Egyptian arms were American, The US military aid counted up to 85% of Egyptian army budget (Axelrod, 2011). Military training to Egyptians officers in US covered near 6,600 officer from 1995 until 2011. Every two years US perform the biggest multinational exercise in Middle East that is the Bright Star, US and Egypt have permanent military offices in each capital (Axelrod, 2011).

The American support to the Egyptian military was always concerned as it is devoted mainly to strengthening the regime's domestic security and its ability to confront popular movements, rather than strengthening Egypt's national defences (Axelrod, 2011). It has been demanded by Egyptian opposition figures like Amr Hamzawi and Saad El Din Ibrahim and even American intellectuals as the journalist John Bradley, that part of the US assistance should be directed to NGOs promoting democracy, or linking the continuity of assistance with the progress in political reforms (Axelrod, 2011). Those voices did not find its way to US policy towards Mubarak regime as

US continued its pragmatic approach in supporting Mubarak with regard to the authoritarian nature of his regime.

With regard to the Arab –Israeli conflict Mubarak intended to decrease the tension and normalise the relations with Israel, in order to guarantee US support. Moreover he proposed that strong alliance with US could get the US to play more active role in pressing Israel to stop aggressive actions as the continued settlement in the west bank (Al-Weshah, 2016).

Another factor that induced US alliance with Mubarak regime was his stand against the Islamist and especially the fundamentalists. Following assassination attempt in Ethiopia in 1995, Mubarak performed crack down on Islamists and detained nearly 20,000 in the jail by 1999 (Al-Weshah, 2016). Following 9/11 the importance of Egypt as partner in ‘war on terror’ evolved, US relied on Egypt to identify and stop the threats to Israel also. In 2005 Memo from US embassy in Cairo describes the Egyptian cooperation in war on terrorism as excellent (Aran and Ginat, 2014). Egypt has been accused for operating US secret detention and extraordinary rendition programs (Aran and Ginat, 2014). Despite the raised voices calling to enforce more democratization in Middle East and as proposed in Condoleezza Rice Middle East Partnership Initiative, Mubarak remained practically unaffected with the limited vocal critics to his authoritarian regime (Al-Weshah, 2016). When Congress in 2008 proposed an act to suspend 200 million dollars aids to Egypt to force Mubarak to conduct judiciary reforms and decrease the security hands over the society, Condoleezza Rice opposed the act that would threaten US strategic partnership with Mubarak regime (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

Unlike the Egyptian involvement in the first Gulf War, Mubarak opposed the war on Iraq in 2003 (Al-Weshah, 2016). He thought that the region is suffering from more important issues as the Arab-Israeli conflict and fearing that war would produce hundreds of Bin Laden (Al-Weshah, 2016). Moreover, when US got close to withdrawal from Iraq, Mubarak warned during Television interview that immediate withdrawal would create turbulence and unfavourable side effects (Al-Weshah, 2016). During the Arab spring in 2011, Obama stated that Mubarak must step down ‘now’ and ‘now means now’. Later, Joe Biden the vice president stated in TV interview that he would not mark Mubarak as dictator (PBS, 2011). Obama

administration did not concern about the rise of new powers in the regions, and did not view the ousting of US strategic ally Mubarak as threat to its interests (Al-Weshah, 2016). It may be justified that the bilateral military relations assured that Egypt's military will not adopt any actions that may threaten US interests. Given that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) would be in the power during the transitional period, US did not felt that its interests would be threatened.

2.3.2 Mubarak relations with Soviet Union and later Russia

The last days of Sadat witnessed complete halt in the Soviet- Egyptian relations. The rise of Mubarak to power possessed negative predictions for the future of the relations. Mubarak was known for his pro-western stand (Qureshi, 1982). The moderate and rational mentality of Mubarak however surpassed the pro-western stands. Mubarak sought to more normalised relations with Soviet Union. He perceived the cut in relations as unnatural and impractical, this is due to the legacy of technical and economic relations with Soviet Union in both the military and civil fields (Al-Weshah, 2016). Mainly the Egyptian debts to Soviet Union was an important factor to be considered, as Sadat decided to stop paying the debts during his last years (Al-Weshah, 2016). Mubarak agreed with Russia to drop the debts belonging to Soviet period.

The relations started to improve gradually during the early years of Mubarak as it witnessed the fall of Soviet Union. The relations began to tighten more as Putin came to power in 2000; Mubarak started to contact Putin seeking friendly relations (Borshchevskaya, 2016). In the following year, Mubarak payed a visit to Moscow and signed cooperation agreement with Putin in numerous fields. In 2004 the two foreign minister signed Protocol on Strategic Cooperation and Dialogue during Sergi Lavrov visit to Cairo (Borshchevskaya, 2016). In 2005, Putin visited Cairo becoming the first Soviet or Russian leader to visit Egypt in forty years. Putin mainly aimed to regain the lost influence in the Middle East. Following his visit to Egypt, Putin visited the Arab League Council and the council accredited Russian Ambassador in Cairo as the Russian representative in the Arab League (Borshchevskaya, 2016). Putin viewed Egypt as the gate to restore Russian lost power in the Arab world.

From Mubarak side, He sought more balanced relations than complete dependence on US. Matching Putin ambitions to regain impact in the region. Mubarak wanted to

benefit from the Russia Nuclear expertise in peaceful fields and in 2008, he signed agreement with Russia to build nuclear energy plant.

On the domestic level, Putin and Mubarak suffered from opposition from the Islamists, even the groups that hadn't adapted aggressive means. Muslim Brotherhood was always accused for supporting the Islamic insurgency in North Caucasus. In 2003, the Russian supreme court labelled Muslim Brotherhood as 'terrorist group', banning its activity all over the Russian Federation (Baczynska, 2012). As Mubarak forced to step down in 2011, Putin felt his plan to regain impact in the region would be threatened by the ascending of Islamist parties to the power.

2.3.3 Mubarak relations with Israel

Mubarak was thought to be critical to Camp David accords, as he demanded more comprehensive peace solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite his words, Mubarak actions proved commitment to the signed treaty. The first decade of Mubarak rule showed cold peace status between both sides. The cold peace was characterized by banning visits on the high levels whether in the government or legislative apparatus (Aran and Ginat, 2014). Barriers were made to harden advancement in the economic field. This can be justified with the societal rejection to normalisation with state of nearly thirty years legacy of war. The ascending of Netanyahu rightest party to power imposed more difficulties to the relations. The rigid stand of Netanyahu towards peace process and the Egyptian fear that Israel could obtain enlarged position over Egypt economically and politically, constituted political threat for Mubarak.

After Egypt enhanced its strategic alliance with US in the first Gulf War, Egypt was more entrusted to play more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations following Oslo agreement. So Egypt moved from the position of reluctant peace partner to active peace mediator.

The Islamic revolution regime in Iran possessed threat for both Mubarak regime and the Israelis. Egypt claimed that Iran supported some Islamic groups as Islamic Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiya, even it accused Iran to be behind the assassination attempt to Mubarak in 1995 in Ethiopia (Aran and Ginat, 2014). For Israel, Iran was supporter of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza strip. Therefore, as Egypt

publically condemned the Israeli offenses in Lebanon, it privately encouraged Israeli actions against Hezbollah (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

Domestically, the voice of normalisation between Egyptian intellectuals increased. Among those intellectuals was Ali Salim, writer and pro-normalisation figure who was threatened to be expelled from the Egyptian council of authors after he conducted visit to Israel (Aran and Ginat, 2014). This emphasizes that despite the increased voices calling for normalisation with Israel, the vast majority of Egyptian intelligentsia was opposing to the normalisation. Naguib Mahfouz the Nobel Prize awarded novelist, was targeted by assassination attempt from Islamists (youm7, 2016). The pro-normalisation movement gained momentum at late 1990s as the 'Cairo Peace Movement' officially established in Egypt. In 1993, Egypt cancelled the permit condition for travel to Israel. In 1995-1996 first Egyptian economic delegations went to Israel (Aran and Ginat, 2014). the number of Egyptians who received training in the agricultural field in Israel till 1996 was 2031 compared to only 51 Egyptians between 1987 and 1991 (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

'The Israeli businessman, Yossi Meiman, and his Egyptian counterpart, Hussein Salem, launched a joint venture to refurbish an oil refinery in Alexandria and, by 1995, had raised \$300 million for this project. The Israeli textile manufacturer, Delta, opened several factories in North East Cairo, which became flagships of the Egyptian textile industry. In 1996 to 2000, Egyptian-Israeli economic activity increased continuously. Egyptian imports of Israeli goods rose from \$23,000,000 in 1995 to \$60,000,000 in 2000, and between 1995 and 2000 Egyptian exports to Israel were maintained at around \$20,000,000.' (Aran and Ginat, 2014)

Egypt role as mediator in the peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel increased in 2000s, especially during the second intifada in September 2000. In 2003 and 2005, Egypt hosted diplomatic summits supporting Busch 'Road map for peace' (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

The Egyptian Israeli relations improved more and shifted to 'strategic partnership' during 2000s. As Israel withdraw, its forces unilaterally from Gaza strip. Former Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon stated that Egyptian side was informed even before the Israeli forces itself had been informed (Aran and Ginat, 2014). This

reflects the increased level of trust between both sides. As Hamas controlled Gaza strip in 2007, Mubarak imposed strict siege over Gaza. This is mainly related to Mubarak stands against the Islamists. Hamas as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood ideological school, possessed additional threat on the eastern boarder of Egypt added to the increased Muslim Brotherhood pressure inside Egypt. In 2005 and after calls from Busch administration to more freedom, Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to gain 88 seats in the parliament despite the government attempts to fraud the elections. This was much for Mubarak to handle. Egypt participated practically in the siege against Hamas and US ambassador in Cairo called for supplying Egypt with anti-tunnel technologies to fight the underground tunnels that were the main source of goods to Gaza (Aran and Ginat, 2014). The Egyptians also agreed with the Israelis that Nuclear Iran should not be allowed.

Egypt and Israel continued to strengthen the economic ties, and both signed QIZ agreement that mainly targeted cooperation in textile production field (Aran and Ginat, 2014). In 2005, Egypt signed agreement for supplying Israel with natural gas for next 15 years and began the export in 2008. Despite the prices re-correction in updated agreement in 2009, the Egyptian opposition accused the government of supplying Israel with lower than the global prices (Aran and Ginat, 2014). When Mubarak was ousted in 2011, Israel felt that Obama administration betrayed its ally, and feared the ascending of Muslim Brotherhood to power who will be hostile to Israel as Hamas in Gaza. During January 2011 uprising, Netanyahu warned clearly the threat of Islamists taking over the power in Egypt. The Israelis always viewed the US calls for free elections in Middle East as bearing the threat of Islamist ascending which would constitute danger to Israel (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

2.3.4 Mubarak relations with Saudi Arabia

After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak was received as not directly involved in the peace treaty with Israel. Furthermore, the Islamic revolution in Iran constituted threat for Saudi Arabia. The Shi'ite nature of the revolutions and the critics by Khomeini to Gulf monarchies as non-Islamist derived Saudi Arabia to form strong alliance with Egypt in the face of the possible influence of the Islamic revolution. This stand met Mubarak interests as west ally and hoping to regain the regional leadership role. While Iran possessed ideological threat for both, Egypt concerns in containing Iran was more of pragmatic political aims. In 2006, both Egypt and Saudi

Arabia privately encouraged the Israeli operation on Hezbollah, Iran close militant ally in Lebanon (Podeh, 2018). In addition, Egypt and Saudi Arabia shared the same opposing stand towards Iran nuclear project.

Following the boycott to Egypt and suspending its membership in the Arab league, in 1989 Egypt restored its membership in the Arab league and all diplomatic relations with all Arab states (Shura, 2018). After the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990, Arab summit was held in Cairo and decided to send military forces to liberate Kuwait. Egypt participated with 35,000 soldier beside Syria and Morocco (Al-Weshah, 2016). Egypt was rewarded by dropping 7 billion dollar debts from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Podeh, 2018). In 1991, Egypt, GCC and Syria signed agreement to pan-Arab defence, where the Egyptians and Syrians were the main contributor to its forces in return for financial aids. Addressing the importance of Saudi Arabia to Mubarak regime, Mubarak made 30 visits to Saudi Arabia between 1981 and 2007 (Podeh, 2018).

Economically the relations improved as the trading volume between Egypt and Saudi Arabia increased by ten folds between 1991 and 2001 (Podeh, 2018). Egypt became in the 3rd or 4th rank regarding the highest Arab states trade partners with Saudi Arabia (Podeh, 2018). In 2008, the volume of Egypt foreign trade with Saudi Arabia constituted one third of its total trade with all Arab countries (Podeh, 2018). In 2009, Saudi investors became the largest foreign investors in Egypt by 2500 company and 11 billion dollars invests (Podeh, 2018). Nearly one million Egyptian worker in Saudi Arabia sent 9.5 billion dollars as work remittances in 2009 (Podeh, 2018).

The increased Saudi regional role did not threaten Mubarak. Saudi Arabia took more active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict by providing peace initiative under the Arab League cover in 2002. In addition, Saudi mastered the reconciliation agreement between the opposing Palestinian factions Fateh and Hamas in Mecca agreement 2007 (Aljazeera, 2017). Despite the increased Saudi regional role over Egypt, Mubarak continued strong relations with Saudi Arabia till his removal in 2011, as he was economically dependent on Gulf States. (Podeh, 2018).

2.3.5 Impacts of Mubarak foreign policy on the civil-military relations

When the judiciary in Egypt was seeking more independence, US Congress issued an act to cut portion of the aid directed to Egypt to exert pressure on the Egyptian

regime. This act was waived by the US administration and this step was justified by the importance of the strategic alliance with Mubarak regime which was preferred over the independence of the judiciary and democracy requirements in Egypt.

Mubarak used the domestic events to justify his hostility with regional rivals. Egypt used such claims for political purposes like justifying the Egyptian stand from Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Egypt perceived Iran as regional rival and especially as it adopted Islamic addressed regime after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Mubarak accused Iran to be behind the assassination attempt that targeted him in Ethiopia in 1995, despite the group was belonging to jihadist.

During Mubarak early years his Defence Minister Abu Ghazala was welcomed in US where at that time Mubarak visits were delayed, at those days Abu Ghazala was discussing the economic reforms with US officials. The US used the approach with Abu Ghazala as tool of pressing on Mubarak to accept the economic policies intended to be implemented in Egypt. This manner precipitates the military involvement in the political issues, and its negative impact is represented in magnifying the power of military over the civil leadership in the state which negatively affected the norm of civilian superiority over the military entity. Furthermore, it creates a situation where the different political figures whether civilians or military ones inside the country start to seek the satisfaction of the foreign state interests to reach more political power, and the satisfaction of the foreign state interests could be on the expense of the state and people interests.

3. DURING ARAB SPRING (2011-2013)

The period that followed the 25 January 2011 revolution represented crucial time in Egyptian politics. The civil-military relations came to surface and affected Egypt's fate. The importance of this period is directly related to the position of the Egyptian military as the controller of power, from the ousting of Mubarak until the election of president Morsi, and continued as the military remained an active political actor, which was replaced with military coup. This chapter will analyse the external actors' influence on the civil-military relations in Egypt, taking into account different periods of time in the post-Arab spring. The first period will be taken from the ousting of Mubarak and the handing of power to SCAF in the transitional period till the election of Morsi as president. The second period will examine Morsi's rule till the military coup which ended his presidency on 3 July 2013.

3.1 Egypt's Relation With United States During Arab Spring

The Arab Spring motivated the US to look for a renewed approach to deal with the recent changes in Egypt. Mubarak committed to the strategic partnership with the US that was started by Sadat. This alliance became questioned with the developments that originated from the Arab Spring events. So when the January 2011 uprising started, the Obama administration found itself in front of hard choices. Regarding the declared American values like freedom and democracy, the US was obligated to show its support to the popular moves. On the other hand, losing an important figure as Mubarak, who was the most important ally in the region, caused a source of unrest, especially when the possible substitution options produced the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The problem lies in the differences between the US and MB in foreign affairs issues; namely the Palestinian case. While MB literature insisted on the rejection to accept Israel as a state, Mubarak showed high commitment to Israel's security and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The reluctance of the Obama administration in dealing with the January 2011 revolutions can be noticed in the change of the official tone during the events. On 18th of January, Obama called Mubarak and shared the US concern to avoid violence and call for

calm in the region, the previous comments were provided as discussing the recent developments in the region including Tunisia (Collins and Rothe, 2014). As the events started to roll out, Obama administration showed its support for people's wish, however it didn't stated or demanded the stepping down of Mubarak despite it was main demand for the protesters (Collins and Rothe, 2014). As Mubarak regime started to use violence against protesters Obama administration began to speak about the need for change or transition (whitehouse.gov, 2011). Firstly, Obama appraised Mubarak decision not to run for re-election and then he congratulated the Egyptian people after Mubarak stepped down (Collins and Rothe, 2014). Obama stated that the Egyptian military should assure the political transition of power and asserting the transparency and integrity of the process, he appraised the responsible role of the military (whitehouse.gov, 2011). Obama administration saw the change is coming and relied on another ally inside the Egyptian regime which is the military. The military relations between the US and Egypt is highly advanced. As the events in Egypt started to gain momentum, Sami Anan, the Chief of Staff, was on annual visit to the US (Hassan, 2013). According to Anan this visit was planned as part of Egypt – US military coordination and cooperation committee annual meeting. This committee is chaired by both the Egyptian Chief of Staff from Egypt, and from US side by the Secretary of Defence Assistant for the International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow (Hassan, 2013). Conversations with Anan shows that the use of violence from the Egyptian Army towards protesters was a major concern for the US administration at that time. Vershbow asked Anan about the expected reaction of the army if it was ordered to open fire on the protesters (Hassan, 2013). When the situation in Egypt escalated more on the evening of 27th of January as the country was looking for the Anger Friday protests, Anan was in Andrews base in Washington heading back to New York to catch a flight to Egypt on a hurry (Hassan, 2013). As he mentioned he was surprised that he found James Mattis, the Commander of United States Central Command, waiting him at the base. Again Mattis, described by Anan as Obama close figure, asked Anan about the probability of opening fire on protesters if the army was ordered to do that (Hassan, 2013). Both when Vershbow and Mattis asked Anan answer was that the army will not open fire even if it was ordered (Hassan, 2013). US administration relied on the Egyptian military to achieve the hard balance.

The believe at the time was that the Egyptian military would shepherd the democratic transition, and this institution, being so powerful in its own right, would help to preserve the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship (Aftandilian, 2013).

It is hard to know for exactly if the US was really willing for democratic transition in Egypt or not, but as far as it is known now; producing the military as central actor in the transitional period did not assure democratic transition but rather resulted in a coup.

Another concern for Obama democratic administration was the economic issue. In February 2011, The White House spokesperson raised the US concerns about the impact of the Egyptian revolution on the global economy.

We are concerned about capital that might leave and obviously we continue to monitor to see whether—what impact some of these—all of these actions might ultimately have on the global economic recovery" (Collins and Rothe, 2014)

Obama administration reoriented 65 million US dollars towards supporting democratic transition, those funds were originally planned to support economy (Sharp, 2012). In May 2011, Obama proposed a package for supporting countries undergoing transition in the Middle East, The plan included: 1 billion dollar in bilateral debt relief to Egyptian and 1 billion dollar in U.S. backed loan guarantees to finance infrastructure and job creation (Sharp, 2012).

Obama administration was looking to implement a financial support plan similar to that was implemented after the fall of Berlin Wall, The plan also included encouraging European organizations to participate in the financial support, by the same way those organizations were active in east Europe. (Sharp, 2012).

For Fiscal year 2012, by the act P.L 112-74, US Congress approved Obama administration plans for supporting Egypt economically, but this support was on two conditions. It required the Egypt commits to the peace treaty with Israel, and on the other hand, that Egypt takes more steps towards democracy through fair elections (Sharp, 2012). The act also stated that Secretary of State have the right to waive this requirements and approves the delivering of funds to the Egyptian state (Sharp,

2012). Some US administration officials argued that if it was decided to hold the funds dedicated for Egyptian military, that is going to result in inability of the Egyptian army to pay its contracts as the military aid is dedicated exclusively to buy from American companies (Sharp, 2012). The aid also contains 250 million dollar as economic aid beside the military. At the end US administration decided to waive the prerequisites and deliver the funds to Egypt. US Secretary Of State Spokesperson stated that: “the Secretary’s decision to waive is also designed to demonstrate our strong support for Egypt’s enduring role as a security partner and leader in promoting regional stability and peace.” (Sharp, 2012). From the previous statement, it can be noticed that the regional and international factor became more important to the US administration rather than supporting the democratic transition. For sure, this is not enough to judge that the US administration at that time was not caring for spreading democracy and human rights in Egypt; but at least it shows that the security is weighing more than democratic values when it comes to relations with Egypt.

On the Fiscal year 2013 the same pattern was repeated when the Congress proposed economic support fund of 250 million US dollars, in addition to 1.3 billion US dollars as military aids (Sharp, 2012). The same prerequisites for delivering the funds were stated and also the right to waive those requirements was given to the secretary of state.

The relations between the US and SCAF reached its worst point when the American NGOs were attacked on late December 2011 (Abu Baker, 2018). Fayza Abu El Naga was the Egyptian Minister for the International Cooperation, she was known figure connected to Mubarak regime (Sharp, 2012). Abu El Naga Ministry accused number of American NGOs for working without license (Sharp, 2012). The Egyptian police executed raids on offices and collected equipment including laptops (Abu Baker, 2018). US condemned the moves and SCAF promised that the NGOs will continue their activities (Sharp, 2012). In January 2012, Egyptian court decided travel ban on at least six personnel and charged 43 person with spending money without license (Abu Baker, 2018). While most of personnel managed to leave Egypt, the banned ones fled to US embassy (Sharp, 2012). The travel ban was lift after the court judges recused themselves on March 2012 (Abu Baker, 2018). The previous step was after the US official and lawmakers threatened that the aids dedicated to Egypt will be cut and IMF loan that Egypt was negotiating will be projected (Sharp, 2012).

The attacked NGOs were mainly working on election monitoring, political party training and government transparency (Sharp, 2012). The list of NGOs included: the International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Freedom House, among the charged personnel was Sam LaHood the son of Ray LaHood US secretary of transportation (Sharp, 2012). The IRI is generally linked to the Republican Party, and the NDI is connected to the Democratic Party. Among the actions done to solve the crisis was a call from Obama and a visit of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dambsey on February 2012 (Sharp, 2012). While the SCAF represented a political administration of Egypt at that time, US preferred to use its military figures to talk with SCAF threatening them with the cut of military aids (Sharp, 2012). The crisis resulted in limiting the NGOs work related to spreading democracy and assuring fair elections, as many of other NGOs closed their offices fearing the same fate. The SCAF motives to execute that campaign can be summarized as follow; first, the SCAF felt uncomfortable with US critics related to SCAF violence against protest during the last two months of 2011 (Aftandilian, 2013). Second, as the SCAF was reluctant to hand the power over to civilian elected government, Generals was worry of the impact of US linked NGOs and their impact in raising opposition against their expanded power. According to Abo El Naga statements; in the period between May and July 2011 nearly 174 million dollars were transferred to those NGOs in comparison with only 60 million dollars during the last four years in Mubarak period (Abdelaaty, 2012). SCAF viewed NGOs work as interference in their domestic affairs (Aftandilian, 2013). Apparently, SCAF reached a compromise with US as the threatening and pressure increased, and at the same time SCAF achieved its target by closing the targeted NGOs and terrifying other NGOs that was practicing similar activities.

On 17th of June 2012, SCAF issued constitutional declaration mainly aimed to keep military dependence on issues as army budget and declaring war (France24, 2012). Obama administration was critical to the military reluctance to hand power to civilians (Aftandilian, 2013). Moreover, when Hillary Clinton then the Secretary of State visited Egypt on July 2012 after the Morsi became a president, Tantawi the defence minister and head of SCAF stated that: “Egypt will never fall to a certain group. The armed forces will not allow it” (Aftandilian, 2013). In a sign that they will oppose more increased power grab by the MB. On the same visit Hillary Clinton

asserted “the return of its military to a “purely national security role.” (Aftandilian, 2013).

Despite Obama administration publicly asserted its support for the power transition to civilians, it maintained what was described as ‘two stop shopping’, as US officials maintained the pattern of visiting Morsi and MB from one side and the military from the other side (Aftandilian, 2013).

The US Secretary of Defence Panetta also met both Morsi and Tantawi when he visited Egypt. Panetta described Morsi as “he is his own man”, which meant that Morsi became independent from MB as he resigned before (Aftandilian, 2013). The reason that US maintained balanced relations with the military and Morsi maybe attributed to two main factors: first, the Egyptian military is important for US foreign policy in the region and especially for the security of Israel. Secondly, MB may have confronting agendas with US foreign policy, especially the hostility towards Israel, despite Morsi declared he is going to stick to peace treaty with Israel.

The opportunity came to Morsi on August 2012 when 16 soldiers were killed on the borders with Israel. Morsi dismissed Tantawi, Anan and the head of general intelligence. He also dismissed the Commanders of Navy, Air Force and Air Defence. Morsi appointed younger officers like El Sisi as defence minister (Aftandilian, 2013). El Sisi was the head of military intelligence and the youngest members of SCAF. Two weeks after the accident El Sisi visited Sinai and met with Bedouin promising them with 165 US Dollars developmental aids and asking them for support against insurgents (Aftandilian, 2013).

US showed its interest in supporting the Egyptian army in its counter insurgency efforts. US defence official stressed that US want to discuss the possible efforts especially the non-violent counter insurgency policies (Aftandilian, 2013). US also offered providing Egypt with more intelligence information satellite imagery drones and intercepting suspected insurgent members’ communications (Aftandilian, 2013). This emphasizes the importance of Sinai to US as bordering region of Israel.

Morsi issued a decree in November 2012 immunizing the constitution drafting committee and his decree itself from being overseen by judiciary (Aftandilian, 2013). The decree was seen as mean of grabbing extreme political power over the opposition groups. Clashes started among the Morsi supporters and protesters and the

political sphere gained more tension. El Sisi take an action as he invited the political groups to a dialogue meeting on December 2012 which was cancelled later and the army spokesperson justified the cancellation that reactions was not on the required level (almadaper.net, 2012). Later when Chuck Hagel succeeded Panetta as US defence secretary, El Sisi started to strengthen his relationship with him (Hessler, 2017). Hagel visited Egypt in March 2013 and decribed the relations with El Sisi as he said “Our chemistry was very good,” (Hessler, 2017). When the predefined date for protests against Morsi on 30th of June get closed, El Sisi intensified his communications with Hagel reaching about fifty calls, at least once a week (Hessler, 2017). Hagel said that sometimes the call lasted more than one hour, and Hagel became the only US official who is talking to El Sisi (Hessler, 2017). El Sisi in a late phone call just before the coup said: ‘What can I do?’ Hagel remembered. ‘I mean, I can’t walk away. I can’t fail my country. I have to lead; I have support. I am the one person in Egypt today that can save this country.’ (Hessler, 2017). It is very interesting how two top military commanders were discussing political issues in their countries and more specifically the intention of intervention from El Sisi side. There are no evidence that Hagel opposed El Sisi from taking the coup actions, at least it can be expected that El Sisi wanted to pass the message to US administration in order to test its level of opposition to the action.

US was looking to preserve its interests in the emerging regime after Mubarak. From the start, the Egyptian military appeared to US administration as known and familiar ally inside the Egyptian state. US policy towards Egypt was publically supporting the democratic transition and at the same time keeping strong connection with the military. Furthermore, US used its military figures to acknowledge the Egyptian military position towards the unfolding events. Despite the SCAF period and especially the NGO case showed the military repressive intentions towards civilian mobilization, the US continued to keep its open active channels with the Egyptian military. US was cautious about giving up security ally in the region like Egypt army, and that helped the Egyptian military to keep its position as crucial actor in the Egyptian politics which ended up with the military coup.

3.2 Egypt’s Relation With Russia During Arab Spring

The bilateral relations between Russia and Egypt during Mubarak time was of low significance. The main reason was that Mubarak kept strong alliance to US following what Sadat has started. Besides the low profile political relations between the two states, the economic ties also was at low levels. The trade volume between the two countries was around 2 billion US dollars, ‘‘Egypt’s trade with Russia represented just 0.3–0.4 percent of its total foreign trade in 2008’’ (Malashenko, 2013).

As the Arab spring was unfolding in Egypt, the Russians adapted wait and see policy, it did not show any clear support neither to Mubarak nor to the protesters (Erenler, 2012). The main concern of the Russian that the events in Egypt may result in regime that have ties with the western rivals of Russia including US and Europe. This can be noticed in the Russian foreign affairs statements, which asserted the concerns of Russia over foreign roles in the Arab spring. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated: ‘‘We do not consider it useful to produce any recipes from outside or deliver ultimatums. It is political forces in Egypt who should speak out’’ (Blank & Saivetz, 2012). The Russian Deputy PM pointed to Google to be behind the Arab spring events in Egypt, in a sign that the uprising is manipulated by foreign power (Erenler, 2012). It is also important to mention that Arab spring in general carried alarm for Russia as its people may follow the Arab spring footsteps to change the regime which face economic difficulties. Russia also feared that Islamit’s take of power after Arab spring might encourage Russia Islamist to seek increased influence, some studies links Arab spring with the increased Islamist mobilization in north Caucasus and Volga region. Russia also advised its regional allies in central Asia (Malashenko, 2013).

‘‘On 13 April, 2011, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin urged Central Asian governments to make timely reforms to prevent themselves from being swept away like Tunisia and Egypt. Russia’s primary goal for the region is stability, both to protect the periphery and to facilitate long-term alliances with Moscow’’ (Blank & Saivetz, 2012).

During the period of the SCAF the bilateral relations did not show any development, SCAF maintained the strong alliance with US as the military relations represents critical component of the overall relations with US (Katz, 2014). On the popular level, the negative view of Russia started to grow in the Egyptian street. The positive

view towards Russia in Egypt fall from 50% in 2007 to 16% in 2012 (Dannreuther, 2015). This view can be justified as reaction to Russian support to Syrian regime in the face of the popular uprising that started in March 2011. As the Russian hope to find new chances to increase their influence in post-Mubarak period collapsed on SCAF persistence of alliance with US, some analysts debated that MB might represent an alternative for the Russians (Malashenko, 2013). The main obstacle for approaching MB was previous Russian stand against Islamists and especially MB, as the Russian Supreme court listing of MB as terror organization was active (Malashenko, 2013).

After Morsi was elected as president, the Russians carefully tried to improve the relations. Lavrov stated in November 2012 that Russia is ready to cooperate with MB. Moreover Lavrov delivered Putin invitation for Morsi to visit Moscow (Malashenko, 2013). Morsi and Putin met twice in two successive months, first during BRICS summit in South Africa in March 2013 and then in Sochi in April (Katz, 2014). Sochi meeting resulted in initial agreement that Russia will support Egypt to build nuclear reactor (Katz, 2014). Morsi seemed to be looking for more balanced foreign policy trying to shift from complete independence on US and the west. Morsi adopted hard policy against the Syrian regime and expressed his support to the Syrian uprising. In the last month of Morsi rule, he declared, during rally for supporting Syrian uprising, closing the Syrian embassy in Cairo and withdrawing the Egyptian ambassador from Damascus. Morsi stand for supporting Syrian people move is consistent with being president who represents one of Arab spring new regimes. Morsi stand of course irritated Putin who was looking for more influential role in Middle East, it may aggravated Russian suspicions on MB intents and policies.

It is hard to conclude significance of the Russian relations with Egypt on the balance of the civil-military relations inside the latter. This is because the relations between the two states did not reach advanced level and Russia lacked the elements of influence in the Egyptian domestic politics.

3.3 Egypt's Relation With Israel During Arab Spring

The Arab spring carried source of threat to Israel, as it challenged the status quo of Mubarak strict commitment to the peace treaty. As the Arab spring started to spark in

Tunisia, the Israeli officials expressed their concerns about it. When the Tunisian president Ben Ali escaped from Tunisia and fled to Saudi Arabia, Israeli PM Netanyahu commented:

‘I would say that there is great deal of instability in the great geographic expanse in which we live. We hope that stability will be restored, and we hope that there will be quiet and security. We are carefully monitoring developments’ (Agdemir, 2016).

Moreover while US administration, Israel main ally, was vocally supporting the Arab people starve for change, their Israeli counterparts raised doubts about the fate of the rolling moves. Netanyahu claimed that the Arab spring would bring anti-liberal results, he stated that: the chances are that an Islamist wave will wash over the Arab countries, an anti-West, anti-liberal, anti-Israel and ultimately an anti-democratic wave (Agdemir, 2016). Netanyahu felt shock by US administration stance if giving up Mubarak (Hamilton, 2011). It is obvious that Israel preferred Mubarak authoritarian regime that commit to Israel security over more democratic regime that carry ambiguity and maybe insecurity to Israel. Israel viewed the MB, the main opposition group, as an anti-West, anti-liberal, anti-Israel and an anti-democratic, while Netanyahu sought the Americans to support Mubarak in the face of the popular uprising. By looking to Mubarak record concerning fraud elections and thirty years of state of emergency, it is not possible to attribute Netanyahu fears to his concerns about democracy and liberty. Furthermore, the fear that Iran could expand its influence in post Mubarak Egypt was augmented when Egypt allowed the passage of two Iranian warships to the Mediterranean Sea in February 2011 (Agdemir, 2016).

Soon after Mubarak stepped down the SCAF reconfirmed the Egyptian commitment to the peace treaty with Israel (Agdemir, 2016). The period followed Mubarak carried various points that led to hard times in the bilateral relations. The first sign came from the Egyptian PM Essam Sharaf when he stated that: “The Camp David agreement is not a sacred thing and is always open to discussion”. Sharaf states could not be evaluated as a real attempt to challenge the treaty, and can be justified as response to the increased anti-Israeli sentiment in the Egyptian street (Jacoby, 2013).

The period of SCAF witnessed escalation of tensions between Egypt and Israel. The first occasion happened when an Israeli citizen Ilan Grapel who holds also US nationality was caught in Tahrir Square in June 2011, he was accused to be spy for Israel, and that he was motivating the protesters to attack military personnel (Agdemir, 2016).

The worse came In August 2011, when group of insurgents in Sinai attacked the Israeli borders and killed eight of Israelis, when the Israeli forces reacted to the attackers; five Egyptian soldiers were killed (Jacoby, 2013). The death of the Egyptian soldiers sparked anger among Egyptians resulting in demonstration around the Israeli embassy in Cairo (Marefa, 2018). The protests increased in violence gradually, first the protesters brought down the Israeli flag and on another occasion they entered the embassy itself (Marefa, 2018). The Egyptian commandos rescued the Israeli diplomats and the Israelis left Egypt leaving only the deputy ambassador (Marefa, 2018).

The Israelis also suffered from attacks targeting the gas pipelines that deliver the Egyptian gas to Israel (Jacoby, 2013). The gas deal between Mubarak regime and the Israelis raised critics as it enabled the Israelis to get natural gas with much lower the international market prices (Jacoby, 2013). A public opinion poll in October 2011 concluded that nearly 73% of the Egyptians oppose the natural gas deal with Israel, compared to only 9% supporting it (Jacoby, 2013). The agreement was cancelled in April 2012, but some analysts refuse to sign the cancelation of the agreement as political crisis between the two states. This view is supported by two evidences; first, other important economic agreements were not touched by the Egyptians. The free industrial zones agreements allow the Egyptians to export duty free textile products to US as long as it contains certain percentage of Israeli constituents, the agreement participate to near 1.3 billion US dollars to the Egyptian economy kept untouched by the Egyptians (Jacoby, 2013). Second evidence can be found in the statements of the Egyptian and Israeli officials who asserted that the case is only business dispute. The Israeli PM Netanyahu described the cancellation as dispute between the Egyptian and Israeli company, he added that this cancellation have nothing to do with the peace treaty between the two states (Agdemir, 2016). Israeli foreign affairs minister Avigdor Lieberman expected that the step is part of the election campaigns and that relation would return to normal (Agdemir, 2016). The Egyptian ambassadors in Tel

Aviv mentioned that the case represents business dispute rather political crisis (Agdemir, 2016).

The long borders between Egypt and Israel which extend to 230 kilometre represented source of anxiety to the Israeli government. Even before the Arab spring, the asylum seekers in Israel used the Egyptian borders to enter Israel, the infiltrators numbers to Israel increased as the Egyptian security forces loosen its hands on borders because it required more concentrated forces in the main cities. This required the Israelis to adopt minimum-sentence terms and stricter deportation policies against the infiltrators (Jacoby, 2013).

Gaza strip constitutes important concern for Israel security, the strip is controlled by Hamas movement. Since the Arab spring, the blockade over Gaza was undermined by Egypt by opening Rafah gate for passage of individuals (Agdemir, 2016). The gate is dedicated to the passage of individuals not commodities which passes through Israel controlled gates. Hamas developed a network of underground tunnels for smuggling the basic commodities for Gaza. Hamas made use of tunnels to strengthen its fighting capacity (Jacoby, 2013). Israeli reports states that Hamas benefited from the tunnels to get weapons like anti-aircraft missiles from Libya after the uprising started against Libyan regime in February 2011 (Jacoby, 2013). On October 2011, The Egyptian regime mastered the deal between Hamas and Israel for the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalid for more than one thousand prisoner in the Israeli jails. The mediating role was played by the Egyptian intelligence which was traditional responsible for the Palestinian case in the Egyptian policy, also during Mubarak regime. By a concurrent deal, Ilan Grapel was released from the Egyptian jail for 25 Egyptians from the Israeli prisons.

When Morsi was elected as president, the fears that Netanyahu expressed from the reach of Islamists to the power became truth. When Israel executed air strikes over Gaza in May 2012, the committee of Arab affairs in parliament demanded the government to withdraw Egypt ambassador in Tel Aviv (Agdemir, 2016). The demands became fact when Israel started military campaign over Gaza in October 2012; Morsi withdrew his ambassador from Israel and Egypt played main role in implementing ceasefire between the two sides (Agdemir, 2016). In August 2012 when group of insurgents attacked Egyptian military base on the borders and passed

to the Israeli side, the Egyptian army responded by intensifying the military presence in Sinai. Egyptian army official stated the presence of the Egyptian army is coordinated with the Israeli army and stressed that it is not considered as violation for the peace treaty between the two countries (Agdemir, 2016). But the increased Egyptian presence in Sinai is not only linked to Morsi period events, it goes back to August 2011 attacks when the Israeli minister of defence Ehud Barak stated that he would allow the Egyptians to deploy helicopters and armoured vehicles but no tanks (Jacoby, 2013).

Despite that, the general conclusion could be point that the Arab Spring events in Egypt carried unrest inside Israel; it is hard to define how Israel may participated in reaching the civil-military crisis represented in the military coup. It can be said that both the anti-Israel popular movements during SCAF and Morsi background and his stand towards Palestine and Hamas movement irritated the Israelis. Although by comparing relations in the following period with El Sisi in power could be helpful in drawing the effect of relations with Israel in terms of continuities and changes.

3.4 Egypt's Relation With Gulf States During Arab Spring

The Arab spring constituted survival threat for most of the Gulf States. As the Arab spring was mainly concentrated around popular demands for more democratic regimes, the Gulf region was composed of authoritarian traditional monarchies which depends on the revenues from oil and natural gas as economic and political stabilization factor. Gulf monarchies feared that their own people could be infected by the freedom voices raising in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

The leading Gulf state Saudi Arabia always feared the Shiite influence by Iran, the regional competitor since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Saudi Arabia viewed the Arab spring suspiciously, as it feared that Iran would make advantage of the regime changes to increase its influence in the region. Perhaps the Shiite uprising in Bahrain against the Sunni monarchy in February 2011 irritated Saudis. Bahrain is small state mainly composed of islands, and its population barely exceeds one million. Saudi Arabia intervened military by sending military forces to Bahrain to perform crack down on the protestors. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia proposed 10 billion US dollars as assistance to Bahraini regime (Isaac, 2014). Not only externally but also domestically the Saudi monarchy used its economic advantage to restrain its people from revolting

against the regime. Moreover, In May 2011, Saudi Arabia proposed to add the remaining two monarchies; Morocco and Jordan to the Gulf Cooperation Council that is composed of Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. In December 2011 ten billion US dollars were proposed for both Morocco and Jordan monarchies for developmental projects (Isaac, 2014). The security concern of Gulf States motivated Riyadh to propose political federation to adopt unified defence and foreign policies In May 2012.

The Gulf States expressed their desire for the persistence of authoritarian regimes as soon as the Arab spring events were unfolding. Saudi granted the ousted Tunisian president Ben Ali asylum in its land. Gulf States except Qatar supported Mubarak during the uprising. As the uprising was unfolding in January 2011, Al Jazeera the Qatari state owned media organization, dedicated separate channel for covering the events in Egypt. The channel adopted pro-revolutionary stand and the channel continued during the post-Mubarak period. Gulf States and Saudi Arabia especially is important for the Egyptian economy, Egypt is ranked as the 2nd most receiver of the Gulf economic aids after Morocco (Isaac, 2014). The Gulf States made use of the economic crisis followed 2011 uprising in Egypt as tool to get leverage over the Egyptians. Saudi Arabia promised 4 billion dollars as aid to Egypt, but only 1 billion was deposited to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to help minimizing the decreased hard currency reserves of Egypt in the last quarter of 2011 (Isaac, 2014). In May 2012, Saudi Arabia delivered 500 million US dollars to Egypt as budgetary aid (Isaac, 2014). As the Saudi investment in Egypt ranked 1st among the region countries, Saudi offered 750 million US dollars as credit lines to support export to Egypt (Isaac, 2014). UAE also promised 3 billion US dollar to support small and medium projects beside housing projects (Isaac, 2014). Qatar that was the only supportive Gulf monarchy to Arab spring deposited 500 million US dollars to CBE, and offered 10 billion dollars for planning projects (Isaac, 2014). The Qatari aids increased after Morsi became the president, in January 2013 Qatar announced that it would lend Egypt 2 billion US dollars and more 0.5 billion US dollars as grants (Isaac, 2014). It also offered buying Egypt governmental bonds worth 2.5 billion US dollars, and gave low-interest loan to Egypt in May 2013 by 3 billion US dollars (Isaac, 2014). Kuwait came last with only 168 million US dollars (Isaac, 2014). It also can be noticed that despite the wide promised from the Gulf States to deliver

aids to Egypt, only small portion of these aids was actually delivered (El-khouly, 2014). Qatar is considered exception as it delivered the majority of the promised financial aids to Egypt (El-khouly, 2014). There are studies that also talk about the Gulf non-official aids to the political actors, websites, TVs and elections campaigns (Isaac, 2014). It is believed that Saudi Arabia mainly invested in Al Nour party that holds Salafist ideology, while Qatar mostly backed MB and its members.

The Saudi regime started to use the economic tool to interfere in the Egyptian domestic politics. In May 2011 Adel Elfakeih, the Saudi minister of labor, threatened that Saudi Arabia will expel foreign workers including Egyptians (Isaac, 2014). The step was viewed as attempt to show Egyptian how the Saudi regime could cause harm to the Egyptian economy. Egyptian labor in Saudi Arabia constitutes nearly half of Egyptian immigrants in the world by 1.3 million Egyptian (Isaac, 2014). The tension between Egypt and Saudi Arabia increased as the Saudi authorities arrested the Egyptian human rights activist Ahmed El Gizawi for criticizing the Saudi king; the step sparked protests in Egypt and ended in Saudis closing its embassy in Cairo in April 2012 (Isaac, 2014). The embassy was opened again on the next month after a visit of the Egyptian legislative chambers, Al Shaab and Al Shura councils, chairpersons and members to the Saudi King Abdullah, the two legislative chambers were dominated by MB and headed by its members (Sahafahnet.net, 2012). While Morsi chose Saudi Arabia as his first external destination, no signs of improvement in cold relations were observed.

The Emirati perception of Morsi and MB is best described in Wikileaks documents. The leaked document is a report from the Saudi embassy in Abu Dhabi, the capital of UAE, which was classified as secret (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). The report estimates the Emirati investments by 5 billion US dollars and near 600 Emirati company investing in Egypt (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). The report describes the position of Emirati investors by preferring Liberal Egypt more than Islamic one. Furthermore it describes the popular preference of Shafiq over Morsi as the Emirati people realize the conflict between the Emirati state and MB (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). The Emirati media was described as also confined with the official and popular stand.

On September 2012, relations with UAE get worse as the Emirati security forces arrested 80 of alleged members of MB in UAE and accused them for plotting to

change the regime (Isaac, 2014). Among the arrested was eleven Egyptians, Morsi sent his assistant for the foreign affairs and his secretary to UAE to solve the crisis but the meetings did not produce positive movements (Sada El Balad, 2013). The Egyptian visit to UAE also discussed the request of returning Ahmed Shafiq, who was Morsi competitor in the presidential race, to the Egyptian authorities (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). Shafiq was accused for corruption and seen as stooge of Mubarak regime. The later request did not find positive reply from the Emirati side (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). The leaked report tells that the Egyptian Intelligence head delivered evidences to the Emirati side proving that Shafiq is encouraging Mubarak regime figures to mobilize the public opinion against Morsi (Bahgat and Mohie, 2015). The Emirati conflict with Morsi rule is also induced by regional factors. The fear from the improvement in Egyptian-Iranian relations irritated Emiratis. Morsi visit to Tehran in August 2012 and the visit of Iranian foreign affairs minister to Cairo in January 2013 represented signs of the improved relations.

The fatal role of the UAE and Saudi Arabia is described in the New Yorker report which quotes senior American diplomat (Filkins, 2018). In his words he clarifies the plotting of Mohamed bin Zayed who is the deputy supreme commander of UAE and Bander bin Sultan then the Saudi intelligence head (Filkins, 2018). The American senior stated that they supported Tamarud movement that formed the civil front of the opposition against Morsi, and at the same time, they encouraged El Sisi to ouster Morsi by offering 20 billion US dollars (Filkins, 2018).

It can be concluded that the role of the Gulf States was highly diverse in shaping the civil-military relations in Egypt. Only Qatar, the ambitious small peninsula, supported the Arab spring and developed relations with the new arrivals to the power. Among Gulf States, the most generous one that apparently tried to commit delivering aids to Egypt was Qatar. It realized that the Arab spring is chance to increase its influence by petting on the new power groups. The remaining Gulf countries viewed the Arab spring as threat that could expand to affect their authority. This stand is clear in the support exerted to the ousted president, and the reluctance of delivering the financial aids to Egypt as promised. The step can be justified as an attempt to impose its conditions on the domestic politics in favour of creating friendly regime. The funding of political parties like Al Nour that constituted crucial

political supporter to the coup is another negative impact of the Saudi intervention in Egyptian politics.

The Saudis and Emiratis encouraged and supported the Egyptian army, which executed the coup, and backed Tamarud movement that was civil front of the pre-coup protests. These stands aggravated the growing imbalance in the civil-military relations and rather magnified and augmented the military intervention in politics. Generally, it can be concluded that UAE and Saudi Arabia role was negative to the civil-military relations in Egyptian politics.

3.5 Impacts Of Egypt Foreign Policy During Arab Spring On The Civil-Military Relations

Obama administration was reluctant to show its complete support to the popular uprising or to agreement to demands of stepping down of Mubarak. When the events started to escalate the US position became clearer on supporting the popular demands and demanding Mubarak stepping down, this only just happened when the SCAF started to appear into the scene by issuing statements on the events. At that time, the US realized that whatever would be the future of the regime in Egypt, the military will be part of it. The Egyptian military is strategic partner for the US and its presence on the top of the state during the transitional period could relieve the fears inside US administration about its interests. So the encouragement of the military to hold the power after Mubarak was welcomed by the US and that stance was the corner stone for the negative role played by the SCAF in hindering the handing of power to the civilians and enlarging the military political power, which at the end resulted in the military coup in 2013.

Israel which was concerned about its security played negative role in affecting the civil-military relations in Egypt by undermining the elected civil organization and supporting the military. Israel demanded the US not to back the popular demands for ousting Mubarak as he was committed to the security of Israel, the Israeli official got promises from the SCAF and El Sisi coup regime that the cooperation for the security of Israel will be continued. The civilian groups in Egypt showed hostility towards Israel especially during the Israeli embassy crisis in 2011, besides Morsi supportive stand to Hamas during its war against Israel in 2012.

After the Arab spring, and during the rule of SCAF, delivering US aids was linked by an act from Congress to the SCAF progression towards democracy, and despite that wasn't achieved; the act was waived by the Secretary of State and the move was justified by saying that cutting the aid would have resulted in inability of Egypt to pay the US companies. Moreover the move was accompanied by asserting the security role of Egypt in the region and its importance to US. So the tolerance of US with SCAF encouraged it to play more active role in politics, and enlarged its power over the civilians as it was not afraid from US having measures against it.

The US aids were normally intended to use Egypt army in the security goals of US, also cultural aids were used to encourage the normalization with Israel. On the other hand there were no adequate allocation of aids to improve the democratization, human rights or civil society presence.

When US was in crisis with SCAF as result of the NGOs case in late 2011, US managed to get their citizen back from Egypt but could not reopen the NGOs again despite it threatened with cutting the military aid. US came to point where it probably sought that going further in conflict with SCAF would harm its interests while scarifying the work of NGO on the democracy and free election would have minimal drawback.

US manner after the Arab spring till the coup in 2013 proves the persistence for dealing with the military in Egypt as political entity even after the election of Morsi. US kept connection with both civil leadership represented in Morsi and other civil faction from one side, and the military from other side. This connection continued, and even El Sisi was discussing with US Secretary of Defence Hagel critical political issues including the position of the army from the political crisis in Egypt and hinting on the possibility that the military may take an action.

Russia did not supported the Arab spring movement in Egypt even when Morsi reached the presidency, that stance could have undermined the international support for Morsi regime who was in confrontation with the military. Russia stand was mainly because it perceived Arab Spring with suspicion, described it as manipulated and feared that it could spread to other ally states resulting in minimizing the Russian influence. As Russia was actively supporting Assad regime in Syria in the face of the Syrian revolution, the approaching between Russia and Arab Spring regimes like

Morsi regime became more difficult. Morsi stand from supporting the revolutionaries in Syria was clear and this hardened the cooperation, taking into consideration that Russia is classifying MB that Morsi belongs to as terror group in Russia. All these led to the lack of Russian support for the newly born regime, which was facing challenges in its relations with United States and Israel, therefore with the popular uprising, all these countries accepted the army's move to regain the power.

Despite most of Gulf monarchies promised large amounts of aids to Egypt, only small percentage of these aids was delivered and mainly in the time of SCAF rule, with the exception of Qatar which delivered more aids during Morsi rule. UAE started political harassment with Morsi regime by arresting group of Egyptians accusing them of ties with MB and by hosting Shafik who was Morsi competitor and was accused of corruption charges and conspiring against Morsi, UAE refused to deport Shafik and more crucially secretly funded Tamarrud campaign which was the main initiator for the popular protests against Morsi that military used it to justify the coup intervention in 3 July 2013.

4. FROM 3 JULY 2013 MILITARY COUP TILL DATE

Nearly one year after the first civilian president elected, Egypt witnessed widespread protests on 30 June 2013 against the ruling regime. The protesters were demanding economic, social and political demands, but the most important demand was early presidential elections. In 3 July 2013 Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah El Sisi exploited these protests to declare Morsi ousting, and appointment President of Supreme Constitutional Court President Adly Mansour as transitional president, while El Sisi was the real ruler of the state.

The period followed military coup in July 2013 reflects the foreign states reactions towards the coup which is the extreme form of the military involvement in politics. Furthermore this period emphasizes how the foreign policy of coup regime affected civil-military relations in Egypt.

4.1 Egypt's Relations With United States After Military Coup

As United States is the greatest power in the international system, seeking its recognition of the coup regime is an essential step to acquire legitimacy and recognition by the international community. As mentioned in the previous chapter El Sisi was in continuous and extensive communication with US secretary of defence during the months that preceded the coup movement.

US did not take a clear position towards the 3rd of July coup, it neither described what happened as a military coup, nor supported the coup action (Menshawy, 2014). However, US took some decisions, including the cancellation of Bright Star Military Practice with Egypt, and the partial suspension of military aid, and the postponement of delivery of three aircrafts (F-16) and military equipment that had been agreed before, the US administration linked delivering the military aids and equipment to Egypt by advancement in the political process (Menshawy, 2014).

Obama issued a statement on 3 July 2013 concerning the situation in Egypt, in which he stressed that the United States supported transferring power to civilians since the revolution of 25 January 2011. (whitehouse.gov, 2013).

The position of US administration became stricter as Egyptian security forces cracked down on pro-Morsi protests in Rabia and Nahda squares. US Secretary of State John Kerry made a speech at a press conference calling for suspending the emergency law in Egypt, avoiding violence between the protesters and the Egyptian army, and respecting people desire (Alexander, 2013). White House spokesman Josh Ernest condemned the Egyptian security force's use of violence against protestors (Epstein, 2013).

Obama also condemned the use of violence and security measures taken by the Egyptian government, calling for an end to the state of emergency and not using violence against civilians. He said that normal cooperation with Egypt can not be continued while there are people who are killed on the streets, however he asserted the importance of partnership with Egypt for the interests of US in the region.

These relations entered another phase after issuing the Demonstration act in Egypt (November 2013), US stated that the law does not meet international standards, as the spokeswoman for the US "Jennifer Basaki" Stated "The United States is concerned about the adverse effects of the law of demonstration's organization adopted by the interim government" (Menshawy, 2014).

Signs of improvement in the relations were noticed in the visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry to Cairo in October 2013, he said that Egypt is a vital partner that Washington is committed to work with, pointing out that the Egyptian army's leaders are ready to establish democracy. In addition, he welcomed the invitation of Egyptian interim president, Adly Mansour, which was directed to the American president to start a strategic dialogue between the two countries (Menshawy, 2014).

By looking to the previous stands, it can be said that the US administration can be broken down into two trends; the first one is condemning the extreme actions of the coup regime which mainly oppose the declared stands of the US, but this condemning was maintained at the minimal level. That was clear in statements issued by the US administration condemning the killing of protesters or issuing repressive laws against the opposition in Egypt. However US administration did not cut the military aids given to Egypt despite it is strong tool that could have been used to exert pressure on the Egyptian military. It seems that US administration consider the military aids as crucial component in the strategic alliance between US and Egypt to

assure the continuity of peace with Israel, and the involvement of Egyptian army in achieving security goals of US policy in the region.

The position of the US Congress was different from the position of the White House, where the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress Issued a statement on 5 July 2013, considering that the Muslim Brotherhood failed to understand democracy in its real terms, and called the army and the transitional government to prove their intention of democratic transition, and to include a wider section of the people in the process of drafting the Constitution (Fisher, 2013). The statement also called on all political factions in Egypt to give up violence (Fisher, 2013).

Following the constitutional referendum in January 2014; the breakthrough in the apparent crisis in the relations between the two countries was confirmed by a delegation of the US Congress to Cairo (Menshawy, 2014). The delegation referred to the improvement in the situation in Egypt and the commitment of the interim government to the road map. Also the delegation considered that the referendum was performed in democratic sphere, which is a strong indicator of the advancement towards real democracy. The delegation called for the continuation of US aid to Egypt (Menshawy, 2014).

The US congress stands looks to be more tolerant with the coup action, and the initial statements after the coup could be described as welcoming and appraising the coup movements and the ousting of Morsi regime. Taking into consideration that the Congress which represents the legislative branch in the US was having majority of Republicans. The republican stand was more open towards the coup as they thought it is important to get rid from Morsi regime who may have ideological stands against the interests of US and Israel. The Congress could have used its legislative power to issue acts that exert pressure on the coup regime politically, economically or militarily. The absence of such actions reflects the support of the US Congress to coup regime, or at least not opposing it.

After El Sisi reached the presidency in June 2014, Obama told El Sisi his commitment to work with Egypt to promote common interests, stressing the strategic partnership between the two countries. He also stressed the continued support of the US to Egypt politically and economically (whitehouse.gov, 2014). Despite the fact that El Sisi was the coup leader who was mainly responsible for the repressive

actions condemned by the US administration; Obama recognized El Sisi as president that afforded him with international legitimacy. US administration considered the election of President in Egypt as positive transition, although this election was under repressive measures. This shows that US was looking for any minor transformation to repair its relations with Egypt to maintain US common interests.

The Jewish lobby groups in the US viewed El Sisi as potential partner to cooperate for achieving Israel interests. The fact that El Sisi was against the Islamist groups as Muslim Brotherhood represents a common ground for cooperation. Hamas which is Islamist Palestinian group linked to Muslim Brotherhood was main threat for Israel security. Egypt historically was crucial player in the Palestinian case, Jewish lobby groups mostly seek El Sisi pressing Hamas politically, and play more active role to prevent it from getting armaments by smuggling through Egyptian borders.

The Jewish lobby groups benefited from the crack down on the Egyptian opposition groups especially MB which adopts hostile stands against Israel. These lobby groups may have used their influence in the US to prevent any movement against the coup regime, rather it may have played active role in promoting El Sisi military regime as preferable partner in Egypt, rather than the civilian Islamist political groups.

Since El Sisi took over the presidency of Egypt, he has talked about Egyptian-American relations at every occasions, stressing the importance of military relations between the two countries. The military cooperation between Egypt and US lie in supplying Egypt with weapons and the latest military equipment, the transfer of military technology and military joint military practices.

El Sisi managed to benefit from the war on terror and manipulated the concept for domestic political purposes, El Sisi usually described the Islamist opposition even the peaceful one as MB as terror groups, moreover he promoted the terror threat as justification for the military intervention and the extreme measures.

There are many Joint practices between two countries. The Bright Star training reflects the strategic cooperation between Egyptian and US armies, it was carried out over 12 times in the period from 1981 until 2009, before it stopped for 8 years and then resumed on 10 September 2017 at Mohammed Najib military base in Egypt.

The Bright Start practices was suspended by Obama administration after the coup, while the resuming the practices came after Trump became the president of the US and the relations became more active. Trump decided to make the practices for two successive years in 2017 and 2018 despite it was regularly done every two years (Khalil, 2018).

During El Sisi period, Egypt received several arms deals from the United States, confirming the strategic partnership and military cooperation between the two countries. Egypt received at a ceremony at an airbase west of Cairo four US F-16 aircraft provided by the United States to the Egyptian Air Force on 29 October 2015. On 30 and 31 July of the same year, US handed over eight F-16 Block 52 aircraft to west Cairo air base (Al kahly, 2017). Egypt also received F-16 Block 52 aircraft with advanced combat capabilities that allow carrying out reconnaissance missions, and engagement with air targets (akhbarelyom.com, 2018).

Egypt and U.S. celebrated the resumption of joint production of Abrams M1A tanks at a ceremony that was held at the Egyptian Tank Factory on 25 October 2015 (akhbarelyom.com, 2018).

U.S. delivered five Abrams M1A1 tanks at the West Cairo airbase on 31 July 2015, and in August of same year U.S. also delivered 14 additional M1 tanks with the promise of continued production and delivery of more tanks (Al kahly, 2017). Also U.S. delivered Egypt two rapid missile boats through the port of Alexandria on 17 June 2015 (Al kahly, 2017).

The first shipment of anti-mine armoured vehicles from the United States arrived in Alexandria port for delivery to the Egyptian army on 12 May 2016. These armoured vehicles were specially designed to protect soldiers from IEDs, landmines and other types of attacks (akhbarelyom.com, 2018).

4.2 Egypt's Relations With Russia After Military Coup

After July 2013 coup, the relations between Egypt and Russia witnessed a remarkable improvement. El Sisi was looking for international recognition for the coup regime, and despite the Obama administration critics and measures were in total of minor impact; El Sisi estimated that approaching Russia will give him more recognition and may force the Americans to rethink about the measures directed

towards coup regime. Putin who was looking for more active role in the Middle East, wanted to develop relations with the coup regime as there were shared concerns about the Islamist increasing political power. Russia which already started to be involved in the Syrian civil war, needs regional ally like Egypt.

In August 2014, El Sisi visited Russia for the first time since he became president, the visit lasted for two days. At the end of the visit, El Sisi announced that Moscow and Cairo agreed to establish Russian industrial zone as a part of the vital investment project for the new Suez Canal (Alanba, 2014).

In August 2015, El Sisi visited Moscow to study special projects to be held in Egypt, he discussed the possibility of establishing a free trade zone between Egypt and Russia and establishing a nuclear plant to generate electricity. El Sisi called the Russian side to increase the volume of its investments in the projects of the logistics center of grains in Damietta, as well as in energy and agriculture sectors (Onaeg.com, 2015).

On the morning of 31 October 2015, a Russian plane crashed on Jabal Um al-Haseer in Al-Hassana area of North Sinai after taking off from Sharm el-Sheikh heading to the Russian city of St. Petersburg. ISIS declared its responsibility for the crisis. Since then, the direct flights between the two countries have been suspended. In April 2018 after long negotiations, Russia accepted to resume flights as it will participate in securing the Egyptian airports (Middle East Online, 2018).

Rosneft, one of the largest oil companies in Russia, executed a deal in October 2017 to acquire 30% of the concession rights to develop the largest natural gas field in Egyptian coasts of the Mediterranean Sea from Italian company Eni (Alhanafy & Ahmed, 2017).

Russian Company Gazprom started its first steps to identify opportunities for investment in the field of gas exploration in Egypt at the end of 2012, and in the following year won the right to supply 500 thousand tons Solar to the Petroleum Authority in a tender to import about 1.2 million tons of solar. In April 2015, the company signed an agreement to supply 35 liquefied gas shipments to Egypt over a period of five years with an average of 7 shipments per year until 2020 (Alhanafy & Ahmed, 2017).

In October 2015 Russia and Egypt signed a customs agreement, a mutual cooperation and administrative assistance agreement in customs affairs and combating customs violations, and a protocol of cooperation in the field of valuing goods exchanged between the two countries and subsequent audits. These agreements allowed the elimination of trade exchange obstacles between the two countries (Egypt State Information Service website, 2019b).

The most important agreement between Russia and Egypt is Dabaa nuclear project which was signed on 11 December 2017. The station is located in the Dabaa area in the far north-west of the country on the Mediterranean coast, and the project costs about 32 billion USD. The agreement provided that Russia will give a loan to Egypt worth 26 billion USD, for establishment and the operation of the nuclear plant. The loan term is 22 years, with rate of 3 percent per annum and the payment of the first instalment will be in 2029 (Almasry, 2018).

The project is managed by the Russian Atomic Energy Company, Ross Atom, which will build the station, educate and train its employees, and will ensure the deployment of reactors within the station and then follow up maintenance and repair later.

Anoter important agreement between two sides is Russian industrial zone in Egypt (Suez Canal Economic Zone). The agreement was signed on 11 December 2017, with investments of 7 billion USD, and aims to promote Russian products and technologies throughout whole Africa (Sputnik Arabic, 2017).

The industrial zone will be built on an area of 5.25 square kilometres, and the establishment of the area will be divided into 3 phases, and is funded through the Russian Fund for direct investment, and a number of Egyptian banks (Sputnik Arabic, 2017).

It can be noted that there are remarkable increase in the bilateral relations in the economic field between Egypt and Russia during El Sisi period. This increase is more clear when it is compared with Sadat, Mubarak, SCAF and also Morsi periods. Sadat relations with Soviet Union deteriorated as he approached US, Mubarak started to approach Russia but it wasn't reflected in noticeably improvement in the bilateral relations. The agreements concluded between the two states in terms of numbers and values represented a breakthrough in the relations. The most important agreements

are those related to the strategic projects like the industrial zone and the nuclear stations. The Russian desire to develop more strategic relations with Egypt is mainly driven by the hope to regain the lost influence in substantial state in the Middle East region. This pattern will be also confirmed through the increased cooperation in the military and security field.

On 3 March 2015, three military cooperation agreements were signed between the Egyptian and Russian armies at the end of the first meeting of the Russian-Egyptian Committee for Military and Technical Cooperation in Moscow under the chairmanship of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoyguo and Egyptian Defense Minister Major-General Sedki Sobhy.

The Russian government has published a draft agreement between Russia and Egypt that allows the two countries to use each other's air space, and use their military bases for their aircraft (BBC News Arabic, 2017).

The text of the draft agreement was signed in a decree signed by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on 28 November 2017, instructing the Russian Defence Ministry to negotiate with Egyptian officials and signing the document as the two sides reaches an agreement (BBC News Arabic, 2017).

Joint exercises between the two countries focused on training against armed groups in desert conditions, these exercises have been held in the two countries as Guardians of Friendship 2016 that took place in in the military site of Hammam city, northwest of Egypt, and Defenders of friendship Hosted by Russia in September 2017 (Egypt State Information Service website, 2018).

Egypt has agreed with Russia to be provided by different types of armaments including 50 MiG-35 fighter jets, Antai-2500 air defence system. In addition to the Modernisation of the short-range air defence system to the TorM2 system, and upgrading the medium-range air defence system to the BMM2 system (RT Arabic, 2017).

The increased military cooperation and the armament deals from Russia reflects the shared intentions to develop alliance concerning shared issues. Both Putin and El Sisi share the same stand against the Islamist movements. Muslim Brotherhood is considered terror group in Russia and it was classified as terror group again in Egypt

after the military coup. Not only domestically, but also concerning the civil war in Syria, both Putin and El Sisi adopt hostile stand against the rebellion groups and consider them as terror group who are undermining the State.

4.3 Egypt's Relations With Israel After Military Coup

The Egyptian-Israeli relations developed significantly after the coup of 3 July 2013 to the level of joint military exercises. Israel had shown its full support for the security and military efforts in Sinai and had provided its assistance to the Egyptian army in the field of information. Israel concerned about the changes happening in Egypt since 2011 uprising. For Israel the coup regime have been welcomed for three main reasons. First, the coup in Egypt ousted Morsi who was supporting Hamas in Gaza especially during 2012 war against Israel. Second, the Egyptian military showed high level of cooperation and coordination with Israel, and Israel thought that as the military regains the power in Egypt, it would effectively establish control over the Sinai and the border region which is considered a gate for smuggling arms to Gaza.

The energy sector especially regarding the natural gas witnessed activity between Egypt and Israel. When Egypt stopped exporting its natural gas to Israel after popular pressure in 2011, Israel was supposed to get 2 billion USD as penalty from Egypt, the two states later reached compromise resulting in Egypt paying the penalty as multiple instalments (Alaraby, 2017). The distinctive characteristic is the beginning of flow of Israeli gas to Egypt, which represents reversal way as Egypt was mainly supplying Israel with natural gas for years. While the importers of Israeli natural gas were private corporations, it requires permission from the Egyptian government (Saeed & Soliman, 2017). The allowance of such contracts may create dependence on Israel in this vital sector, which could give Israel advantage in exerting pressure on the Egyptian state for its interests. On the other hand it reflects the trust between the coup regime and Israel, this trust would be also shown in the elevation of military cooperation and security coordination between the two states.

Security relations between Egypt and Israel have developed since the military coup in July 2013. There was Israeli security concerns about the events associated with 25 January 2011 revolution and Muslim Brotherhood control of power in Egypt, but these fears quickly disappeared with the military coup.

An Israeli security delegation visited Cairo in August 2013 after the coup, to ensure the continuation of security cooperation between the two sides. Israeli newspaper Jerusalem post considered that the military cooperation between Israel and the Egypt reached unprecedented levels after EL Sisi came to power (Gross, 2017), but it seems that they try to reduce the level of media attention, because it embarrasses El Sisi and gives his opponents propaganda material against him.

The former Israeli defence minister, Avigdor Lieberman, called for strengthening cooperation between Israel and Egypt and supporting El Sisi in war on terror in the Sinai. He stressed that intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt on everything happening in Sinai is an Israeli interest (Aljazeera.net, 2016b).

The bilateral relations reached a state of military harmony to conduct the first joint military exercises between the two countries, and explicit Israeli media statements about the possibility of providing any security or military support to the Egyptian government. In the wake of the deadliest terror attack ever on Egyptian soil, that resulted in killing over 300 people inside mosque in the northern Sinai in November 2017, Israel was ready to respond to any Egyptian request to increase military and security cooperation in the Sinai (Ahronheim, 2019).

The new trend in cultural relations was characterised by modifying the Egyptian education curriculum and improving the image of Israel. There are three stages to modify the curriculum to accommodate the new political situation, the first stage came after the coup against Morsi directly to justify the coup, reducing the content of the revolution of January 25.

The second phase which dealt with issues of terrorism by accusing the Muslim Brotherhood, increasing the dose of glorifying the role of the armed forces, and deleting any symbols opposed a Rabaa massacre, as well as topics related to the Arab-Israeli conflict were deleted from books of history and national education

In the Third phase, all human sciences curricula are currently being modified in response to Israel's demands to change the content of 1,300 courses. This process costs about one billion pounds (about 1.4 million USD) to print books for about 20 million students from primary to university (Hamed, 2016). This improvement seems tangible compared to the curriculum conditions during Mubarak period (Samy, 2016).

El Sisi began to establish cultural base for the normalisation, in order to pave the road for the high level of security and military cooperation, the relations with Israel become controlled mainly by the military view which may represent the sole interest of the military not the state.

El Sisi may be looking for close relations with Israel just to get U.S. and Jewish lobbies by his side to get international recognition. In balanced civil-military relations the developing of such level of relations with Israel would be subjected to more discussion to assure the benefit for the state as whole not for the military or El Sisi as person.

4.4 Egypt's Relations With Gulf States After Military Coup

The Saudi support to 3 July 2013 coup regime started once Morsi has been ousted, the coup regime received financial support from Saudi Arabia in terms of funds and also commodities like petrol, there was remarkable increase in Saudi investment in the Egyptian market. On the other hand Saudi Arabia financed the Egyptian military by participating in funding armament deals.

Following the coup, the Saudi King Abdullah announced the providing of an aid package to help the Egyptians face the economic challenges, with total 5 billion USD, divided into 1 billion USD as a cash grant and 2 billion USD as commodities, 2 billion USD as a deposit with the Central Bank without funding costs. Egypt has already received the total package (Hasaneen, 2019).

After Egypt faced a major energy crisis, which negatively affected its electricity production, Saudi Arabia raised its oil assistance to Egypt from 2 billion USD to 5 billion USD (Youssef, 2016).

Saudi Arabia also provided in-kind assistance represented in 1000 metric tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to minimize the energy crisis in Egypt. In November 2014, three new bilateral agreements with total of 350 million USD were signed to finance two power plants to solve the electricity crisis, which has worsened over the previous years (Youssef, 2016).

At the end of 2015, King Abdullah ordered the provision of economic aid to Egypt, satisfying its oil needs over the next five years, increasing Saudi investments in

Egypt to more than 30 billion riyals, encouraging Saudi ships to support transport movement through Suez Canal (Reuters, 2016)

Saudi Arabia perceived Sinai as economic opportunity. The visit of King Salman in April 2016 was the beginning of unprecedented Saudi interest in the development of Sinai. This interest reflected in the signing of a series of agreements and memorandums of understanding.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed 10 agreements worth 1.130 billion USD aimed to establish a free economic zone in the Sinai Peninsula. These include preparation of studies and economic feasibility for the establishment of the region, which includes a seaport, to benefit from the promising investment opportunities in this region (youm7.com, 2016). This is in addition to 1.7 billion USD financing of the Sinai development projects by the Saudi Fund for Development (Egypt State Information Service website, 2019e).

Saudi financial support continued, Egyptian Prime Minister Sharif Ismail said on 13 October 2016, that Egypt received a deposit of two billion USD from Saudi Arabia in September 2016 (Elhamy, 2016). Saudi Arabia has decided to renew a deposit of 2.6 billion USD, a previous deposit it had granted to Egypt in 2013, which was supposed to be due in 2018, and was renewed for the next 5 years (Yaqub, 2017).

Economic relations continued after king Abdullah, On 8 April 2016, Egypt announced that the total value of the agreements signed during King Salman's visit to Cairo amounted to about 25 billion USD (Egypt State Information Service website, 2019e).

Arms deals between Egypt and Russia, estimated at billions of dollars Funded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, considered an indication of the close rapprochement between the Egyptian side and the Saudi side on the one hand, and the Egyptian side and the UAE side on the other after the coup of 3 July 2013 (Gamal, 2016). The French newspaper Le Figaro reported that Saudi Arabia funded the larger part for the deal of buying Mistral (an amphibious assault ship), which cost up to 950 million €.

In February 2015, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates supported the purchase of French military equipment by Egypt, including Rafal fighters (Fouad, 2016).

Egypt and Saudi Arabia participated in several joint exercises, like Maritime Training Morgan Conducted by units of the Egyptian and Saudi naval forces, the Red Sea in Saudi Arabia in February 2015 (Egypt State Information Service website, 2019d).

One of the most important joint exercises is Northern Thunder exercise which was organized in February 2016 in the King Khalid Military City in Hafr al-Batin north of Saudi Arabia. This exercise was the largest one in the history of the region in terms of the number of participants and used various military equipment, including artillery, tanks, infantry and defence systems. Participant list included: Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Senegal, Sudan, Kuwait, the Maldives and Morocco, as well as Pakistan, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritania, Mauritania, Mauritania, Mauritius (Russia Today Arabic, 2016).

From analysing both the economic and military bilateral relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia after coup of 3 July 2013, it can be stated that there was unprecedented Saudi support to Egypt in the both fields which reflects the political desire to back the coup regime. The support can be linked to the fact that both the uprising in Egypt in 2011 and the increased political power of Morsi and MB have been perceived as threat for the Saudi Arabia as one of Gulf monarchies. As explained in the previous chapter Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to provide any kind of support to Morsi regime and probably played role in encouraging the army to oust him. The economic support played role in stabilising the coup regime as Morsi regime was facing difficulties in terms of providing the essential services and goods which was declared as main reason for the popular movement against it.

The military cooperation represented in financing armament deals and joint practices reveal the importance of the security role of Egypt to the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia has always been concerned about the Iranian threat as regional rival, the support of the Egyptian military can be attributed to the Saudi policy to assure that Egyptian military will be present when needed as in the Gulf war. Generally the Saudi regime played crucial role in strengthening the coup regime against the civilian's factions to assure its interests in Egypt which was reflected negatively on the civil-military relations.

The UAE considers Egypt its own investment space, in agreement with the Gulf states that have organized their interests outside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) geography through the undeclared Gulf Investment Space agreement, unveiled by a senior member of Mohamed Morsi's presidential team. The UAE was a prominent member in the regional alliance that backed the 3 July 2013 coup.

Following the coup of 3 July 2013, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed intensified the Emirati presence within Egypt to control the capabilities of the Egyptian state through its political system. Not only the economic factor but also the political factor was determinant for the Emirati backing of El Sisi regime.

The political reasons can be summarized into two main reasons, first Emirates as monarchy would oppose any type of change that may enhance the popular demand for more freedom and democracy. Secondly, Emirates has already concerns about the MB that perceived as historical political threat. The special Emirati role in supporting the coup regime reflected its desire not only to protect interests at the moment but also to form prolonged influence on the Egyptian state.

In March 2014, UAE Company Arabtec signed an agreement with the Egyptian Ministry of defence worth 40 billion USD to create one million housing units (Aljazeera.net, 2014). In September 2014, Dana Gas of the United Arab Emirates acquired the right to manage and operate two gas fields in Salihia and Al Matria (Shafiq, 2014). In November 2017, Egypt and the UAE signed the agreement to establish company for maritime works under the name of Tahadi (Abd El-Fettah, 2017). The memorandum of understanding between Egypt and the UAE on financial and technical cooperation was signed in January 2017, and approved by the Egyptian Parliaments July of the same year; after discussion lasted for only a few minutes. (Alalamtv.net, 2017). Article 13 of the memorandum states the establishment of a Coordination Council on financial and technical cooperation. Among the controversial articles is article 14, which states that Egypt is prohibited from issuing laws affecting the Promotion and Protection of Joint Investment, and article 15, which assured the settlement of any dispute between the parties through negotiations and consultations, not courts. (Alalamtv, 2017).

This legislation emphasizes the principle of UAE hegemony and full intervention in the Egyptian economy, as it may pave the way for the acquisition of mega projects

by the UAE investors. It may include infrastructure projects that have a dangerous and influential strategic aspects, as it employ thousands of Egyptian workers and directly related to national security.

In January 2018, Egypt and the UAE signed a cooperation agreement in the fields of developing government work (Emaratalyoum, 2018). In February 2018, Egypt and the UAE signed an agreement for the implementation of the first phase of the development of the Sokhna area through Dubai Ports World. This agreement was signed with the Suez Canal Authority (alborsanews.com, 2018). It stipulates the acquisition of DP World of 30 km in the Ain Sokhna Port area for the establishment of service projects including medical industries, Communications, construction materials, logistics, textile industries, automobiles, food industries, energy and petrochemicals (alborsanews.com, 2018).

Abu Dhabi's Abraaj Capital has taken control over a number of health institutions in Egypt since 2013, after acquiring Al-Borj Laboratories, Al-Moktabar and more than 15 private hospitals including Nile Badrawy, Al Nakheel, Cleopatra (Altahir, 2018).

After the company's name started to be linked to the purchase intentions of a number of prominent health institutions as well as the acquisition of pharmaceutical factories (Amun), a stir raised in the Egyptian medical community about the role of the UAE in these deals, the company started not to declare its intention to buy new medical institutions, to avoid Egyptian public opinion reactions.

According to secret report published in September 2016, the group intends to control the entire Egyptian sector under the title of development. However, the main objective is to control this sector in full, especially as it affects the lives of Egyptians directly (Almasryalyoum.com, 2016b). Doubt about money laundering raised as result of the establishment of Credit Hydraulics Ltd. indirectly owned by Abraaj Capital and its executive director, while its shareholders are unknown. The report confirms suspicions about the purpose of the purchase (Almasryalyoum.com, 2016b).

The UAE has expanded its investment in the Telecommunications and Technology sector in Egypt until the number of its companies reached 674 companies operating in this sector, whose investment is targeted to sovereign entities within the country or through its partnership with the foreign investor who obtains security approvals

before allowing it to invest in this sector for considerations related to national security. (sasapost.com, 2017). The most prominent UAE investments in this field in Egypt are Etisalat Mobile Services. According to a report issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Investment in 2014, (sasapost.com, 2017).

The UAE has turned to the Egyptian tourism sector as an important pillar of the state budget. It is also a highly neglected sector by the official Egyptian authorities. Prism International, Emirati company based in France, signed an agreement with the Egyptian Sound and Light Company to develop sound and light shows in the Pyramid and Sphinx for 20 years (Al Qattan, 2018).

The UAE activities in the Egyptian energy sector have expanded through Emarat Misr Petroleum Company, with 15 service stations and 15 car terminals, while the company plans to double this number until 2020. The UAE company has also entered into a partnership with Egypt Petroleum company, which related to General Petroleum Corporation, in the Amsarjit project for supplying aircraft at the Borg Al Arab International Airport since 2014. The project includes pipelines, warehouses and the operation of a station catering aircraft with investments of more than 50 million pounds (Ahmed, 2016).

The cooperation of the Emirati company extends from the aircraft supply projects to operate in 12 regional airports in Egypt through a trade agreement between the two sides, as well as an agreement with Exxon Mobil International Catering Services at Cairo International Airport (Ahmed, 2016).

ADNOC Distribution, one of the companies related to Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, started an investment plan inside Egypt targeting the distribution of oil and petroleum products to 26 governorates, covering the entire Egyptian market. The company's investments in Egypt gave the right to acquire 10% of the Egyptian market, as well as to start new investments related to opening car maintenance workshops (Ali, 2015).

The UAE began its first steps to invest in the Egyptian transport sector in July 2016, after the start of the smart mass transport project within the Greater Cairo governorates through 180 buses. This project was invested by Transport Misr, which Emirates National Groups owns 70% share of it, with one billion USD (al-ain.com, 2017).

Egypt Transport Company, which was successfully acquired by the UAE company in 2015, offered a tender for the supply of 236 mass transport vehicles, the first phase of which began with 100 minibuses and 80 smart buses, 30% of which are for people with special needs (al-ain.com, 2017).

The UAE also sought to expand maritime transport projects within Egypt. It has also expanded in the transportation sector through Karim, an Emirati transport company specialized in private transportation through smart phone applications, which has reached about 500 million USD investment in Egypt (Elsayed, 2018).

The UAE has sought to expand and strengthen its presence in the Egyptian banks, where the major banks in the UAE have faced competition with their foreign counterparts in buying several Egyptian and European banks put up for sale. The Egyptian market currently includes five UAE banks: Emirates NBD, NBAD, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Union National Bank and Mashreqbank (aliqtisadi.com, 2015).

It is remarkable that the UAE has penetrated into the Egyptian economy and imposed full control over most of the investment opportunities in the country in order to subordinate the Egyptian political decision to Abu Dhabi.

Since 2013, the UAE has officially and unofficially provided the Egyptian regime with around 25 billion USD in grants, loans and bank deposits to pay for the stability of the El Sisi regime (mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2016), some of which were announced as follows: July 2013, UAE grants Egypt 1 billion USD and 2 billion USD interest-free loans (Alittihad.ae, 2013) October 2013, the UAE gave Egypt 3.9 billion USD in aid, including about 1 billion USD dedicated for fuel and energy (Russia Today Arabic, 2013). April 2017, UAE grants Egypt 4 billion USD (radiosawa.com, 2016). This grant was divided into two parts, the first in the form of investments, and the second part to be paid in the form of a deposit to the Central Bank of Egypt to support the cash reserve. What has been officially announced by the government in the two countries about 12 billion USD, and the rest has not been officially disclosed, but unveiled by experts in the economy, as well as some leaks published in the Arab and foreign Media.

It is noticed that after the coup of 3 July 2013, the UAE adopted grants, loans and direct aid to the Egyptian regime. But two years later, Abu Dhabi sought to control the Egyptian economy through a number of institutions and companies, to minimize

the cost of support and to benefit from the large facilities provided by El Sisi to the UAE.

The Emirati role in Egypt has exceeded the search for a current interests to the level of establishing control on the strategic sectors in Egypt. This may reveal that Emirates has learned from the Arab spring lesson and decided to create level of influence that would be hard to be faced by any coming regime in Egypt. Other than that, the Emirati support is considered as continuity for the hidden role discussed in the previous chapter of participating in ousting Morsi regime. Similar to the Saudi role; Emirates has allocated its assets to support El Sisi military coup and appraised the exclusion of the civilians from politics in manner that directly affected the civilian politics and enlarged the military political power.

4.5 Impacts of Egypt Foreign Policy After July 2013 Coup On The Civil-Military Relations

The foreign states stands from the military coup have great impact on the civil-military relations in Egypt. It is expected that the coup action would be rejected totally from the foreign countries especially those embraces democratic values as the coup representes extreme level of the military intervention in politics. The thesis concludes that even the democratic states reaction towards the coup was only vocal critics which represented the condemning of use of violence. Taking into consideration that labelling the military action in Egypt as coup would have obligated the US to cut its aid to Egypt according to the laws that prohibits supporting coup regimes. US did not label the action as a coup to preserve its shared interests with the Egyptian army. The political support of U.S. was also represented in the Congress stand, which appraised the ousting of Morsi and MB from power. U.S. officials like Secretary of State John Kerry stated that military in Egypt would handle the power to civilians. Obama administration gave legitimacy for El Sisi as president, Obama himself congratulated the coup leader El Sisi after winning the presidency despite the election was made in unusual political circumstances that included the exclusion of opposition groups. Not only the political support. but furthermore U.S. developed strong relations El Sisi regime especially on the level of military cooperation, this cooperation included excessive continuous meetings

between the military officials in the two states, armament deals from U.S. and the participation in military practices.

Russia stand from 2013 military coup was supportive from the early days, Russia relations with the coup regime was multidimensional and showed great breakthrough in comparison with the cold relations during the SCAF or Morsi periods. The political relations included top level presidential meetings, the military relations included armament deals and joint military practices, economic relations included increasing the Russian investments in Egypt and in particular in strategic areas like the industrial zone in the new Suez Canal project and Al Dabaa Nuclear station. The Russian stand in supporting the coup regime was driven by the fact that Morsi regime was confronting with Russia role in supporting Assad regime in Syria. El Sisi who was looking for international legitimacy and Putin who was looking for increase the Russian influence in Middle East, both found shared interests in cooperation with each other.

Not only the foreign states official stands affected the civil-military relations in Egypt, also lobby groups in foreign states hve great impacts. The Jewish lobby in U.S. played substantial role in supporting El Sisi regime. The Jewish lobby interests are represented in preserving Israel security. The Jewish Lobby groups preferred the Egyptian military to be in power as Egypt army had history of commitment with Israel security since the peace treaty. Morsi's position towards supporting Hamas against Israel in 2012 war may have irritated the Jewish lobby and gave a sign that Morsi's regime would not be in favour of Israel.

While the military cooperation between Egypt and Israel was continuous regardless the changed regimes even during Morsi period, the level of cooperation enlarged concerning facing of the Islamist insurgency in Sinai, and it took regional dimension by participation of Israeli and Egyptian forces in joint military practices. El Sisi went forward in the normalisation with Israel by modifying the education curriculums to less hostile ones towards Israel.

The Gulf monarchies support for July 2013 military coup had negative effect on the civil-military relations. Saudi Arabia and UAE played important role in affording the economic funds needed to the coup regime. Immediately after the coup, large funds in form of loans and grants were delivered to Egypt. The Saudi role was more

prominent in reports talking about the Saudi participation in funding armament deals for Egypt from Russia and France. UAE backed El Sisi regime but it was rewarded by enlarging the Emirati investments in Egypt, the defining characteristic of those investments that they are concentrated in infrastructure areas as the telecommunication, transportation health and energy. The Emirati investments in those fields acquiring large share of the market. It seems that Emirates is seeking to get more influential tools in Egypt that could be used as pressing mean to get the Egyptian regime achieve its interests. The challenge that would face any civil regime that succeeds El Sisi is the dealing with the greatly enlarged Emirati influence inside the Egyptian economy including vital sectors that could directly affect the national security of Egypt.

The Gulf Support for the Egyptian military comes from the fact that Egypt is committed to the security of Gulf States especially against the Iranian threat. In addition to the fact that the popular movement associated with Arab spring which brought MB as political power in Egypt represented threat for Gulf monarchies. This popular movement may encourage their own people to revolt against the ruling monarchies. This stand is aggravated in UAE whose regime had historical hostility with MB. Also the Saudi fear was increased as the Shiite opposition revolted against the Sunni ally monarchy in Bahrain in 2011.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis introduces question about the impacts of the foreign relations of Egypt on its own civil-military relations. It seeks to primarily detect if the foreign relations of Egypt since the establishment of the republic in 1952 until now have significant effect on the balance of political power of the civilians and the military. The thesis examines the foreign relations of Egypt during different periods which represents different political regimes adopting variant foreign policy orientations.

The thesis argues that the foreign policy orientations of Egypt have a significant impact on its civil-military relations. The foreign countries interaction with Egypt can be addressed as main factor that strongly shaped the relative balance of political powers between civilians and the military. The significance of the external factor on the civil-military relations was persistent despite the foreign policy orientations changed widely throughout historical advancement. Yet the patterns and trends of the emergent impacts have been widely changed regarding the nature of the Egyptian regime itself and the international context.

In civil-military relations, the focus is generally on the domestic variables. This is mainly because that this type of relations can be described as special type of bureaucratic politics. The thesis argued that the foreign relations of Egypt have significant impact on the civil-military relations inside Egypt. This impacts are usually in favour of the military.

This thesis concludes that as the state's international dependency increases, the international context and the alliances play effective role in determining the level of civil-military relations balance.

On both the theoretical and practical level of study of civil-military relations, the western studies cannot afford reliable frame for studying civil-military relations in Egypt as one of Middle East countries. The problem lies in the western bias towards the western contexts of shaping civil-military relations.

Most studies argued that the civil-military interactions in foreign policy determination by bureaucratic politics, while this thesis shows that mostly in Egypt the military is more decisive on foreign policy as ex-military personnel in the presidency and government, mainly occupy the bureaucracy.

The thesis is divided into three main chapters, each one studies specific period by analysing the foreign relations linked to that period and then extract the main patterns of impacts on the civil-military relations concerning that time frame.

The first chapter studies the foreign relations of Egypt from the establishment of the republic after 1952 coup against the dynasty starting by Nasser, then passing by Sadat and ending with Mubarak. First Nasser period was analysed regarding the relations with the main super powers United States and Soviet Union, in addition to conflict with Israel and the role of Saudi relations in that period. Generally, the analysis showed the importance of the international context as the Cold War on igniting the foreign power competition to win allies and so try to support Nasser coup regime to acquire more influence in Egypt and the Middle East. It can be concluded that interests of the foreign countries determines its policy towards Egypt with regard to the ideologies or the values that are adopted by that country domestically. This is also valid to U.S. which adopts values such as balanced civil-military relations, superiority of the civilians over the military and the opposition of the military coups or the military intervention in politics.

The analysis showed the support and coordination between Nasser and US in the preparations of the coup action and during the years, which preceded the war with Israel. The US support to Nasser included economic, political and technical aspects, the received support from US played crucial role in eliminating civilians from politics and the consolidation of the military political domination in Egypt. Soviet Union interests represented in looking for footstep in the Middle East met with Nasser seek for support for his national projects and later for his search for military ally to help him free occupied territories from Israel. The soviet support was not affected as Nasser was having internal campaign against the communists. The impact of the Soviet aids to the Egyptian officers who became involved in economic activities has been also addressed. These stands of the great powers like US and Soviet Union resulted in the precipitating of the military regime initiated by Nasser,

which caused prolonged deformities in the civil-military relations in Egypt that persists till the date.

The effects of the conflict with Israel on the civil-military relations in Egypt was discussed. The conflict with Israel was used as justification for the military dominance on the politics in Egypt, on the other hand the military defeats initiated popular demands for democracy and more active civilian political role. The analysis showed also that the military defeat can be used by the intra-military competitions as justification for excluding rivals as Nasser get rid of Amer, the army commander.

Sadat period was studied from different perspectives; first it focused on Sadat shift in alliance from the Soviet Union towards the US. That shift was motivated by Sadat desire to weaken his domestic rivals, who mainly had powerful connections with Soviet Union. Sadat desire to get more influential role in the military resulted in military defects as in the case of declaring the Egyptian objective to US during 1973 war against Israel. The relations with Israel represented in the peace treaty between Sadat and Israel was discussed in the terms of its impact on the civil-military relations in Egypt. Sadat signing of the treaty sparked protest even inside the parliament which led him to dissolve it and form less opposite one through manipulating the elections. Sadat economic policies resulted in popular protests but he claimed that the uprising is a plot by the Soviet Union, and used that justification to gain more support from US to crack down on protests. The repressive measures against the civilian opposition after the signing of peace accords with Israel led to emergence of coup attempts by Islamists in the army which ended in assassinating Sadat.

The last part of the first chapter studied Mubarak foreign policies, which was mostly continuity of Sadat's strategic alliance with US and the consolidation of the peace state with Israel. Egypt became more dependent military on US as it received military aids that opened the door for involvement of army officers in commission business. US precipitated the political role of the military in Egypt as it was encouraging and welcoming the role of Abu Ghazala, the Defence Minister of Mubarak, who was extensively involved in political and economic activities. This is an important aspect of the foreign intervention of foreign country in the civil-military relations which is the strengthening of political powers of the military figures over

the civilians. This can happen by giving the accreditation to a military figure to discuss non-military issues and use this as pressing tool on other civil politicians as happened with Abu Ghazala. US continued to prioritise its interests with Mubarak over supporting the civilian factions in Egypt, this is proved by the US stand from Mubarak conflict with the judiciary, where it refused to use the military aid as pressing tool. The study also focused on the role played by Egyptian military which is linked to the US stands such as the Gulf War against Iraq in which it was active partner. When Saddam of Iraq invaded Kuwait, Egypt was large contributor, regarding the number of soldier, in Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, of course Egypt had other reasons to involve in the war but also it had no other options to deal with the crisis other than the military choice which was mastered by US. If it would be thought about the possibility of Egypt denial to participate in any military action demanded by US, logically it is expected to be less probable, because the consequences of such decision could be very harmful to Egypt as US may cut the aid or suspend the military deals. This reflects the use of the military as foreign policy tool for foreign countries interest in absence of proper civilian control or monitoring. Mubarak used his conflict with civilian factions inside Egypt to justify his regional stands, an example is his rigid stand from Iran and Hezbollah and accusing Iran to be behind his assassination attempt in Ethiopia. These stands was driven by Mubarak hostility with Islamist insurgent groups and Muslim Brotherhood. This was also common point with Russia, which classifies Muslim Brotherhood as terror group.

The second chapter discussed foreign relations of Egypt during the Arab Spring period. The analysis showed that US was primarily reluctant to give up Mubarak and decided to keep good relations with the military in order to preserve its interests. This stance was persistent when SCAF was in power and even during Morsi rule. Even the US clashed with SCAF during the NGOs crisis, yet it was not determined to take hard measures against the military. Again, the foreign countries interests proves to be superior on supporting the civilians or enhancing their political power over the military. Israel supportive stand for Mubarak during protests and its demands for US not to give him up is an example of foreign states interests' interventions against civilian political stances.

The Gulf States opposing stand against the Arab Spring led to reluctance to support Egypt financially despite promises for aids. The hostile stand was also clear in the

crisis which led to the closure of the Saudi embassy and the Emirati action of detaining Egyptian MB members. Both Saudi Arabia and Emirates supported civilian factions that were active players in the movement that ended with the military coup in July 2013. Saudi Arabia supported Al-Nour Salafist party and Emirates secretly funded Tamarrud movement which was the main interface for protests against Morsi that were used by the military as justification to intervene and perform the military coup. Qatar was the exception as it estimated that it can rely on the groups that newly ascended to the power to increase its influence through this new alliances map. So Qatar politically and economically take supportive stand towards Morsi's regime.

The third chapter focuses on the coup regime foreign policy orientations. This part is important as it clearly emphasized the different foreign states positions towards the extreme military intervention in politics.

The US stand of Obama administration was rigid initially, yet started to restore normal relations as time passed. The thesis showed that different actors in US played different roles in the relations with Egypt. The US Congress welcomed ousting Morsi and MB, while the Jewish lobby groups in US were heavily involved in meetings with El Sisi. The military relations were fully restored shortly after the coup including the military cooperation, military practices, military aids and armament deals. The relations with US included other fields of cultural and economic cooperation. The US relations with the coup regime gave the military international legitimacy and encouraged it to crack down on the civilian leading to complete dominance of military in Egyptian politics.

The Russian relations notably revived after the coup, this was contrasted with the low level relations during Arab Spring, which was perceived suspiciously by Russia as US conspiracy. El Sisi who was looking for international legitimacy met with Putin's desire for more influential role in the Middle East. The relations was multidimensional including political, economic and military aspects. These relations also consolidated El Sisi power and strengthened its regime and acquired him international recognition that eased his internal campaign against civilian opposition. El Sisi regime which showed more military dominance in politics over the civilians found more shared ground to cooperate as Putin holds similar stands from the Arab spring, and this was reflected in El Sisi position in supporting Assad regime against

the Syrian rebellion. The thesis argues that democratic changes that may enable more civilian control over the military and decrease of military political power could threaten foreign states' interests, and as this happens these foreign states take negative stands towards these changes and decide not to support it. And vice versa, when the change in regime could be associated with more military dominance it could be supported from foreign states if it intersects with its interests.

The Israeli relations with Egypt came to a new level with increased military cooperation that reached the state of joint practices for the first time, and the cultural normalisation represented in changing education curriculum to a more friendly one towards Israel.

Gulf State role was mainly financial represented in supporting the coup regime with funds and loans and other forms of financial aids. The funds flowed directly after the coup by Saudi Arabia, Emirates and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in financing El Sisi's armament deals with western states that was El Sisi's way to buy legitimacy through arm deals. The Emirati role was mainly the investment in vital sectors in order to be a hard line in the future in the face of any dissenting regime, or at least to hold strong influence tools over the current regime.

Generally, Egypt's relations with major international and regional powers have played an important role in determining the nature of the relationship between civilians and the military and contributed to the obstruction of the democratic transition.

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RESUME

Name Surname: Mohamed Elsheikh

Place and Date of Birth: Egypt 19/08/1986

E-Mail: mahmedelsheikh@stu.aydin.edu.tr

EDUCATION

- **Bachelor: 2008, Mansoura university, Faculty of pharmacy**
- **Master : 2019, İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi, Political Sciences and International Relations.**